FRANKLIN P. BAUTISTA VS.

SANDIGANBAYAN (THIRD DIVISION), OFFICE OF THE

OMBUDSMAN AND PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 136082, May 12, 2000
BELLOSILLO, J:

Facts:

Petitioner Franklin P. Bautista, incumbent mayor of the Municipality of Malita, Davao del Sur, was
charged for violation of Sec. 3, par. (e), of RA 3019. The letter-complaint, which was prepared by the
Contractors Association of Davao del Sur and initiated by the Good Government Employees of Davao
del Sur,
alleged, among others, that petitioner caused the hiring of one hundred and
ninety-two (192) casual employees in the municipal government for political
considerations and that the payment of their honoraria and salaries was charged to the peace and order
fund of the municipality.

Despite arguing in his counter-affidavit that the hiring of 192 casual employees and the use of the
peace and order fund for their honoraria and salaries did not justify the charges filed against him, Graft
Investigation Officer (GIO II) Corazon A. Arancon, in his Resolution, found a prima facie case for
violation of Sec. 3, par. (e), of RA 3019, which was approved by the Ombudsman. An Information for
such violation was filed against the petitioner before the Sandiganbayan, which read –

[…] the abovenamed accused, a high ranking public officer, being the Mayor, Municipality of
Malita, Davao del Sur, while in the performance of his official functions, taking advantage of his
position and committing the offense in relation to his office, with manifest partiality, did then
and there willfully, unlawfully and criminally caused the hiring of some one hundred ninety-two
(192) casual employees in flagrant disregard of Secs. 288 and 289 of the Government
Accounting and Auditing Manual (GAAM), the honoraria and salaries of whom were charged to
the peace and order fund and to the project component and other services activity fund,
respectively and which represented 72.5% of the total personnel services expenditures, thereby
giving unwarranted benefits, advantage and preference to the said casuals, causing undue injury
to the Municipality of Malita.

Petitioner filed a Motion to Quash the Information, stating that the acts charged did not constitute the
offense indicated in Sec. 3, par. (e), of RA 3019, and that more than one (1) offense was charged in the
Information – the giving of unwarranted benefits, advantage and preference to the casual employees in
question and causing undue injury to the Municipality. The Sandiganbayan denied the Motion by
stating that all the essential elements for the crime charged were sufficiently alleged in the Information
which charged only 1 offense.

Issue:

Whether or not the Sandiganbayan erred in denying the petitioner’s Motion to Quash the Information
despite the fact that there were two (2) offenses charged, and as such, should be charged in separate
Informations.

Ruling:

No, the Sandiganbayan did not err in denying the petitioner’s Motion to Quash the Information since
the latter was only charged with 1 offense.

There were two (2) ways of violating Sec. 3, par. (e), of RA 3019, namely, (a) by causing undue injury
to any party, including the Government, and (b) by giving any private party any unwarranted benefit,
advantage or preference. The use of the disjunctive term "or" connotes that either act qualifies as a
violation, or as different modes of committing the offense (Santiago v. Garchitorena). This does not
indicate that each mode constitutes a distinct offense, but rather, that an accused may be charged under
either mode or under both.
For hiring 192 casuals and the charging of their honoraria and salaries to the peace and order fund, the
petitioner gave them unwarranted benefits, advantage and preference and caused undue injury to the
Municipality of Malita; or thereby caused undue injury to the Municipality of Malita. In either case, the
Information will not suffer any defect, as it is clear that petitioner is charged with violation of Sec. 3,
par. (e), of RA 3019, as amended, with either mode of commission obtaining or with both manners of
violation concurring.

JOSE REYES Y VACIO VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. Nos. 177105-06, August 4, 2010
BERSAMIN, J:

Facts:

Belen Lopez Vda. de Guia (Belen) was the registered absolute owner of two parcels of agricultural
land. Belen's son, (Carlos), forged a deed of sale, in which he made it appear that his mother had sold
the land to him. The Register of Deeds of Bulacan cancelled TCT No. 209298 and issued TCT No.
210108 in Carlos’ name.

On March 20, 1975, Carlos sold the land to Ricardo San Juan (Ricardo). The latter registered the deed
of sale in the Registry, which cancelled TCT No. 210108 and issued TCT No. 210338 in Ricardo’s
name. He subsequenty mortgaged the land to Simeon Yangco (Simeon).

Upon learning the transfers of her land, Belen filed a civil action for cancellation of sale, reconveyance,
and damages against Carlos, Ricardo and Simeon, before the Court of First Instance (CFI)

Ricardo executed a deed of reconveyence in favor of the tenants. Due to this, TCT No. 210338 was
cancelled and TCT No. 301375 was issued in the names of the tenants. The land was subdivided into
several lots, and individual TCTs were issued in the names of the tenants. Upon discovering for the
first time that her appeal had been dismissed for non-payment of docket fees, Belen filed a motion to
reinstate her appeal. The IAC granted the appeal (AC-GR CV-02883), declaring as null and void the
deed of sale executed by and between Belen and Carlos, ordering Ricardo to to reconvey to Belen the
lands, and ordering the Register of Deeds of Bulacan to cancel and/or annul TCT No. 210338 and
210108 and to reinstate TCT No. 209298 in the name of Belen. The IAC decision became final on
March 15, 1986.

On December 18, 1986, Belen filed a motion for execution before the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
which was subsequently granted. Upon learning about the deed of reconveyance, she also filed before
the a motion to declare Ricardo and the tenants in contempt of court for circumventing the final and
executory judgment. The RTC held the latter in contempt of court and ordered each of them to pay Php
200.00. Despite their appeal, the Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed the RTC order with modifications.

Meanwhile, Belen, through her daughter and attorney-in-fact, Melba G. Valenzuela (Melba), filed in
the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB) a complaint for ejectment and
collection of rents against the tenants. Petitioner Jose Reyes Y Vacio, as Provincial Adjudicator,
dismissed her complaint in favor of the tenants; the TCTs issued in the name of the tenants,
respectively, were consequently affirmed (DARAB Case No. 034-Bul-88). Despite the appeal and the
urgent motion to set aside the writ of execution (following the grant of the tenant’s motion for
execution), DARAB Central Office affirmed the petitioner’s ruling on October 24, 1994.

In due course, the CA reversed and set aside the decision, and was affirmed by the Supreme Court.

On May 13, 1998, the Office of the Ombudsman filed two Informations in the
Sandiganbayan, one charging the petitioner with a violation of Section 3 (e) of RA 3019 for “acting
with evident bad faith and manifest partiality [when he] willfully, unlawfully and criminally render his
decision in DARAB Case No. 034-Bul-88 favorable to the tenants […] thereby ignoring and
disregarding the final and executory CA decision in AC-GR CV-02883 which declared [Belen] as the
true owner of the lands subject of the litigation […]”. He was also charged with usurpation of judicial
functions under Article 241 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC). Despite pleading not guilty to each
Information, the Sandiganbayan found the petitioner guilty of both charges.

Issue:

Whether or not the petitioner is guilty of violating Section 3 (e) of RA 3019 in rendering his decision in
DARAB Case No. 034 BUL-88 when he disregarded the final and executory decision of the CA and
declared Belen as the true owner of the 2 parcels of lands.

Ruling:

Yes, the petitioner is guilty of violating Section 3 (e) of RA 3019 when he disregarded the final and
executory decision of the CA and declared Belen as the true owner of the 2 parcels of lands in his
Decision.

The essential elements of the offense under Section 3 (e) are the following:
1. The accused must be a public officer discharging administrative, judicial, or official functions;
2. He must have acted with manifest partiality, evident bad faith, or gross inexcusable negligence;
and
3. His action caused any undue injury to any party, including the Government, or gave any private
party unwarranted benefits, advantage, or preference in the discharge of his functions.

The petitioner was a Provincial Adjudicator of the DARAB discharging the duty of adjudicating the
conflicting claims of Parties when he rendered his decision in DARAB Case No. 034 BUL-88. This
establishes the first element.

The second element includes the different and distinct modes by which the
offense is committed, that is, through manifest partiality, evident bad faith, or gross inexcusable
negligence. Proof of the existence of any of the modes suffices to warrant conviction under Section 3
(e).

Manifest partiality, which is synonymous with bias, exists when the accused has a clear, notorious, or
plain inclination or predilection to favor one side or one person rather than another.

The petitioner was fully aware of the finality of the AC-G.R. CV No. 02883 Decision, having actually
admitted to having read and examined the following documents He thereby exhibited manifest
partiality when he rendered his decision in the DARAB Case that completely contradicted and
disregarded the decision in AC-G.R. CV No. 02883. His granting the tenants' motion for execution
made his partiality towards the tenants and bias against Belen.

Similiarly, the petitioner's evident bad faith displayed itself by his arrogant refusal to recognize and
obey the decision in AC-G.R. CV No. 02883, despite his obligation as Provincial Adjudicator to abide
by the CA's ruling.

Lastly, the expenses incurred by Belen and the needless prejudicial delay in the termination of the cases
unduly deprived her of exclusive ownership over the parcels of land. This sufficiently establishes the
third element.

ROLANDO E. SISON VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. Nos. 170339, 170398-403, March 9, 2010
CORONA, J:
On July 18, 1994, state auditor Elsa E. Pajayon conducted a post-audit investigation which revealed
that during petitioner Rolando E. Sison's incumbency as municipal mayor of Calintaan, Occidental
Mindoro, no public bidding was conducted for the purchase of a Toyota Land Cruiser, one hundred
nineteen (119) bags of Fortune cement, an electric generator set, certain construction materials, two (2)
Desert Dueler tires, and a computer and its accessories. Pajayon also found out that there were
irregularities in the documents supporting the acquisitions.

Along with Municipal Treasurer Rigoberto de Jesus, petitioner was indicted before the Sandiganbayan
in seven (7) separate Informations for 7 counts of violation of Section 3 (e) of RA 3019 to which the
petitioner pleaded not guilty. Accused de Jesus has remained at large.

During the presentation of evidence, the petitioner was called to the witness stand where he admitted
that no public bidding was conducted and that the purchases were done through personal canvass. He
further stated that no public bidding could be conducted because all the dealers of the items were based
in Manila; it was useless to invite bidders since nobody would bid anyway.

The Sandiganbayan found petitioner guilty as charged. A warrant of arrest was also issued against de
Jesus. Petitioner appealed to the Supreme Court, praying for an acquittal because his guilt was not
allegedly proven beyond reasonable doubt.

Issue:

Whether or not petitioner is guilty for violation of Section 3 (e) of RA 3019 when, during his
incumbency as municipal mayor, personal canvass instead of a public bidding was effected by the
petitioner for the purchase of the items.

Ruling:

Yes, the petitioner is guilty for violation of Section 3 (e) of RA 3019 for effecting a personal canvass
instead of a public bidding for the purchase of a a Toyota Land Cruiser, 119 bags of Fortune cement, an
electric generator set, certain construction materials, 2 Desert Dueler tires, and a computer and its
accessories.
To be found guilty under Section 3 (e) of RA 3019, the following elements must concur:
1. The offender is a public officer;
2. The act was done in the discharge of the public officer's official, administrative or judicial
functions;
3. The act was done through manifest partiality, evident bad faith, or gross inexcusable negligence;
and
4. The public officer caused any undue injury to any party, including the Government, or gave any
unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference.

It is undisputed that the first two elements are present in the case at bar. The third element may be
committed in three ways, i.e., through manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable
negligence. Proof of any of these three in connection with the prohibited acts mentioned in Section 3
(e) is enough to convict.

Bad faith imputes a dishonest purpose or some moral obliquity and conscious doing of a wrong. It is a
breach of sworn duty through some motive or intent or ill will, and partakes of the nature of fraud. In
this case, the petitioner’s admission that the canvass sheets sent out by de Jesus to the suppliers already
contained his signatures and that he knew about the provisions of RA 7160 on personal canvass but he
did not follow the law because he was merely following the practice of his predecessors was an
admission of a mindless disregard for the law in a tradition of illegality, which is truly unacceptable. As
municipal mayor, he should have been the first to follow the law and see to it that it was followed by
his constituency to assure the public that despotic, irregular or unlawful transactions in the acquisition
of government items do not occur.
Lastly, the fact that the petitioner repeatedly failed to follow the requirements of RA 7160 on personal
canvass proves that unwarranted benefit, advantage or preference was given to the winning suppliers.
This establishes the fourth element.