Review

Development of the self-concept

during adolescence
Catherine Sebastian, Stephanie Burnett and Sarah-Jayne Blakemore
UCL Institute of Cognitive Neuroscience, 17 Queen Square, London WC1N 3AR, UK

Adolescence is a period of life in which the sense of ‘self’
changes profoundly. Here, we review recent behavioural
and neuroimaging studies on adolescent development
of the self-concept. These studies have shown that ado-
lescence is an important developmental period for the
self and its supporting neural structures. Recent neuroi-
maging research has demonstrated that activity in brain
regions associated with self-processing, including the
medial prefrontal cortex, changes between early adoles-
cence and adulthood. These studies indicate that
neurocognitive development might contribute to beha-
vioural phenomena characteristic of adolescence, such
as heightened self-consciousness and susceptibility to
peer influence. We attempt to integrate this recent neu-
rocognitive research on adolescence with findings from
developmental and social psychology.
Introduction: the self in adolescence
Human adolescence begins at puberty onset and ends with
stable commitment to an adult role [1]. As such, adoles-
cence has both biological and psychosocial demarcations.
Social psychology studies indicate that during and after
puberty, children become increasingly self-conscious and
more aware of, and concerned with, others’ opinions [2,3].
Recent empirical research has focussed on neurocognitive
aspects of self-processing in adolescence. These studies
point to continuing development of the self during adoles-
cence, and an increasing integration between one’s own
and others’ mental states. Here, we describe the develop-
ment of the self-concept (Box 1) and its neural correlates
during adolescence, with a focus on the medial prefrontal
cortex (MPFC), a brain region that has a key role in self-
reflection [4]. We also consider how this development
might be related to changes in perspective-taking and peer
influence.
A changing concept of the self
There are two main sources of information that we use to
build up a self-concept [5]. Direct appraisals of ‘what we are
like’ can be abstracted from our own reactions to past
events and experience, whereas reflected appraisals result
from our beliefs about how we are seen by others, a concept
termed the looking glass self. Research in developmental
psychology has shown that evaluation of oneself becomes
more comprehensive and differentiated during childhood
and adolescence [6]. By early adolescence, children are
more likely to compare themselves with others and to
understand that others are making comparisons and judg-
Corresponding author: Blakemore, S.-J. (s.blakemore@ucl.ac.uk).
1364-6613/$ – see front matter ß 2008 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved. doi:10.1016/j.tics.2008.07.008 Available online 18 September 2008
ments about them; they also begin to place higher value on
these judgments. Thus, the looking glass self starts to have
a larger role in self-concept. During adolescence, interper-
sonal environments undergo rapid change and an individ-
ual takes on new social roles [7], both of which probably
contribute to changes in the self-concept. Recent neuroi-
maging research indicates that developmental changes in
the self-concept might also be because of neuroanatomical
development (Box 2) and functional brain changes in
regions involved in self-processing, as described in the
following section.
Neural correlates of the self in adolescence
Neuroimaging studies of self-reflection in adults, in which
participants think about their own attributes and prefer-
ences, have shown activation in a network of brain regions,
with consistent activations in dorsal MPFC. For example,
reflecting on one’s own thoughts, or on personality trait
adjectives that describe oneself, activates dorsal MPFC [8–
11]. This is one of the brain regions that undergoes ana-
tomical development during adolescence; a recent longi-
tudinal MRI study revealed that the MPFC is one of latest
developing regions [12] (see Box 2 and Figure 1).
Recent developmental neuroimaging studies have
begun to look at the neural correlates of self-reflection in
children and adolescents. A functional magnetic resonance
imaging (fMRI) study compared young adolescents (mean
age 10 years) and adults (mean age 26 years) on a task of
self versus social knowledge retrieval [13]. Participants
were scanned while they judged whether phrases such as ‘I
like to read just for fun,’ described either themselves (the
self-condition) or a familiar other (in this case, the fictional
character Harry Potter; the social condition). Adolescents
activated the dorsal MPFC to a greater extent than did
adults during the self-condition (Figure 2). By contrast,
adults activated the lateral temporal cortex more than
adolescents did during the self-condition. The authors
[13] suggest that, given the part played by the lateral
temporal cortex in semantic memory retrieval, adults
use stored self-knowledge when performing the task more
than adolescents do. By contrast, adolescents might rely
more on ‘on-line’ self-reflective processing performed by the
MPFC [8–11]. This indicates that adolescents and adults
use different neurocognitive strategies when making self-
referential judgments.
In addition to being able to reflect on one’s own attri-
butes and preferences, the self-concept also comprises the
ability to think about what you are likely to do in a given
situation. A recent fMRI study investigated the develop-
441
Review
Box 1. Multiple selves
There is no single unified definition of self [32]. Here, we focus on
the development of one aspect of self: the self-concept. The self-
concept is defined as how one perceives oneself (e.g. ‘I am
outgoing’). The self-concept also includes the ‘social self-concept’,
that is, one’s perceptions of how others perceive them (e.g. ‘people
think I am shy’). This is sometimes referred to as the ‘looking glass
self’ [5].
More primitive aspects of self require less explicit self-reflection,
and are present from an early age [33]. Even newborn babies seem
to have some forms of ‘implicit self-awareness’, that is, they show
signs of being able to distinguish between self and other. Within
24 h of birth, babies root (orient their face towards the source of
tactile stimulation) more to external touch compared with sponta-
neous self-touch to the cheek [34]. By 5–6 months of age, infants
show preferential looking to a pre-recorded video of another, same
age infant, compared to a pre-recorded video of themselves wearing
identical clothes [35]. At around 18 months, self-awareness
becomes more explicit: there is evidence that children this age
show signs of understanding that they exist as an individual,
separate from other people. For example, children this age start to
recognize themselves in mirrors [36]. In the second and third years,
infants start to show an understanding that other people are
similarly self-aware, and differentiate between themselves and
other people in speech [37].
ment of this ability by asking participants to think about
what action they would take, given a particular intention
[14]. Adolescents (aged 12–18) and adults (aged 22–37)
were scanned while answering questions about intentional
causality (e.g. ‘You want to see what’s on at the cinema; do
Box 2. MRI studies of the adolescent brain
Recent structural magnetic resonance imaging (MRI) studies have
shown that brain regions involved in self-related processing
continue to develop during the second decade of life [38,39] (see
Figure 1 in main text). The amount of white matter in various cortical
regions, including the prefrontal cortex (PFC), temporal and parietal
cortex, increases between childhood and adulthood [40]. This
increase in white matter is thought to reflect continued axonal
myelination [41]. At the same time, grey matter volume in several
cortical regions decreases between childhood and adolescence [38].
Some MRI studies have found that grey matter volume follows an
inverted U shape during adolescence [37]. An initial increase in grey
matter volume, thought to reflect a period of synaptogenesis during
childhood, gives way to a protracted decrease in grey matter
volume, hypothesized to reflect synaptic pruning during adoles-
cence [42]. These changes in the grey and white matter do not occur
on the same timescale throughout the brain. Areas subserving
primary functions, such as sensory or motor systems, tend to
mature before puberty [40]. By contrast, higher order associative
regions, including prefrontal, parietal and temporal cortices, are still
maturing after puberty and this continues even into the twenties. A
subset of these late-maturing brain regions are involved in self-
related processing including MPFC.
It has been proposed that these neuroanatomical changes
contribute to the functional changes (increased prefrontal activity)
between adolescence and adulthood reported in several fMRI
studies. The continued axonal myelination and pruning of synapses
in certain regions in adolescence might render the neuronal circuitry
more efficient so that less activity would be required to perform a
given task [43]. This explanation might account for the decrease in
activity in the MPFC in self-referential tasks between early adoles-
cence and adulthood [13,14,21]. This idea is speculative and makes
several assumptions about neuronal activity and its relation to the
BOLD signal (see Ref. [44] for further discussion). Furthermore, it
cannot account for brain regions such as the temporal cortex, in
which activity increases with age according to several studies
[13,14,21].
442
Trends in Cognitive Sciences Vol.12 No.11
Figure 1. Cortical thickness development in MPFC data from a longitudinal study
of 375 participants aged 3.5 to 33 years [12]. The figure shows cortical thickness
trajectories across age in different regions of the right medial prefrontal cortex.
Phylogenetically recent (isocortex) areas develop along a cubic trajectory with age
(in red). More primitive regions follow either a quadratic trajectory (with an initial
increase in cortical thickness followed by a decrease – in green) or a simple linear
decline in thickness (blue). For regions in which development followed a cubic or
quadratic trajectory, cortical thickness peaks at an earlier age (around 7 years) in
primary sensory and motor areas than in secondary areas. Parietal regions peak at
around 9–10 years, whereas dorsolateral prefrontal, medial prefrontal (shown
here) and cingulate cortices reach peak thickness last (around or after 10.5 years).
Data from Ref. [12].
you look in a newspaper?’), or physical causality (e.g. ‘A
huge tree suddenly comes crashing down in a forest; does it
make a loud noise?’). Consistent with the self versus social
knowledge study described earlier, adolescents activated
part of the dorsal MPFC more than adults did when
thinking about their own intentions, compared to during
physical causality judgments (Figure 2). By contrast, in the
same comparison (intentional – physical), adults activated
part of the right superior temporal sulcus more than
adolescents did. Therefore, these two studies show that
during development there is a shift in the pattern of
activity associated with self-reflection, such that MPFC
regions are used more in adolescence and posterior
temporal regions are used more in adulthood. There are
several possible explanations for this shift in activation
pattern. One possibility is that adolescents and adults use
different neurocognitive strategies when performing the
same task. A second possibility is that the functional brain
changes are related to the neuroanatomical changes that
take place during adolescence (Box 2).
Development of perspective-taking during adolescence
The looking glass self refers to the self as viewed by other
people. Therefore, an increasing awareness of others’
perspectives might provide additional information from
which to construct the self-concept. A behavioural study
investigated the development of perspective-taking during
adolescence [15]. Children (mean age 9 years), adolescents
(mean age 13) and adults (mean age 24) were tested using a
perspective-taking task that required the participant to
imagine which of two emotions either she or he (first-
person perspective) or a protagonist (third-person
perspective) would feel in various emotional scenarios.
The results demonstrated that the difference in reaction
time between first-person and third-person perspective-
taking decreased with age. This indicates that proficiency
of perspective-taking improves between childhood and
adulthood. Alternatively, as the self-concept becomes more
coherent with age, adolescents might increasingly use the
self as the basis for judging others.
 Review Trends in Cognitive Sciences Vol.12 No.11

Figure 2. Functional development of MPFC in self-tasks. Activity changes in MPFC between early adolescence and adulthood from two developmental fMRI studies in which
participants reflected on the self. (a) Activity in MPFC (Montreal Neurological Institute coordinates [MNI] coordinates 10, 54, 14) was higher in young adolescents than in
adults on a task of self versus social (other) knowledge retrieval [13]. Participants were asked to indicate whether phrases accurately described them (self-condition) or a
fictional, familiar other (social condition). (b) Activity in a similar region within MPFC (MNI coordinates 12, 42, 21) was more active in adolescents than in adults when
thinking about one’s own intentions and actions relative to thinking about physical events [14].

Increased awareness of others’ perspectives during ado-
lescence might also be related to the ‘imaginary audience’.
This term describes the phenomenon whereby adolescents
believe that others are constantly observing and evaluat-
ing them [16], even if this is not actually the case. The New
Look Theory [17,18] suggests that the phenomenon results
from a combination of two processes. First, adolescents
need to develop their own identity as separate from their
parents (separation-individuation). As they begin to ques-
tion who they are and how they fit in, they might become
increasingly self-conscious, leading to the imaginary audi-
ence. Second, the development of social perspective-taking
results in adolescents becoming increasingly aware that
others have the capacity to evaluate them. This could
subsequently lead them to overestimate the extent to
which this actually occurs [19]. It should be noted that
studies conducted more recently indicate that the imagin-
ary audience peaks in adolescence but persists into young
adulthood, and that even older adults exhibit some
phenomena associated with it [20].
The ability to integrate the wider context in a social
encounter is another form of perspective-taking that might
affect self-concept. For example, to understand whether a
remark is meant sincerely or ironically, an individual
needs to be able to appraise the effect of recent events
on the speaker’s mental state, and use this to interpret
their implied meaning. A recent neuroimaging study pro-
vided evidence that the neural processing underlying con-
text-based inference in social encounters develops during
adolescence [21]. Adolescents (aged 9–14) and adults (aged
23–33) judged whether a series of phrases (e.g. ‘Nice
going!’) were sincere or ironic. Adolescents showed stron-
ger activation of the dorsal MPFC during this task than
adults did. Adults activated posterior regions, including
the superior temporal and fusiform gyri, more than ado-
lescents did. This study shows that the pattern of neural
activity associated with taking into account the wider
context of a social encounter changes during adolescence.
These results are similar to the developmental neuroima-
ging studies of self-processing described earlier, showing
again that activity moves from anterior (dorsal MPFC) to
posterior (temporal) structures with age.
A similar result was found in a recent fMRI study that
investigated changes in the neural processing of social
emotion in the first or third person perspective during
adolescence. [22]. Adult (age 22–32) and adolescent (age
10–18) participants read scenarios that described either
social emotions (guilt or embarrassment) or basic emotions
(fear or disgust), and were asked to imagine these scenarios
happening either to themselves (self-condition) or to some-
one else (their mother – other condition). First, akin to the
findings of several developmental social cognition studies
reviewed earlier, activity in the dorsal MPFC during social
emotion relative to basic emotion was higher in the ado-

443
Review
Figure 3. Social emotion from the self- and other-perspective. Adults and adolescents imagined social and basic emotion scenarios (a) from their own or from their
mother’s perspective. A region within left temporo-parietal junction (b) differentiated better between self and other in adults than it did in adolescents [22].
lescent group than in the adult group. Second, the left
temporo-parietal junction (TPJ) showed differential
activity to protagonist and emotion, depending on age
group (Figure 3). Specifically, this region differentiated
better between self and other in adults than it did in
adolescents, whereas in adolescents the left TPJ was more
responsive to the difference between social and basic
emotion irrespective of perspective. This finding indicates
that the neurocognitive strategies for attributing social
and basic emotions to self and other develop with age. A
possible interpretation is that adolescents rely more heav-
ily than adults do on a simulation-based strategy when
imagining the emotional response of another person.
Emotion regulation and resistance to peer influence
It has been argued that positive social feedback becomes
increasingly rewarding during adolescence and that nega-
tive social experiences can contribute to the increased
incidence of affective disorders such as depression during
this period of life [23]. A recent study showed that having a
negative self-concept in adolescence (defined by high scores
on measures of self-hate, self-neglect and self-blame) is
associated with both internalising behaviours such as
depression and anxiety, and externalising behaviours such
as delinquency and aggression [24]. Regulating the dis-
tress associated with negative social events, in addition to
other negative stimuli, is important in self-concept devel-
opment. An fMRI study recently looked at self-regulation of
emotion, which relies on lateral and medial PFC in adults
[25], in a group of children aged 8–10 years [26]. When the
children voluntarily suppressed their emotional reactions
to sad film excerpts, there was activity in a larger number
444
Trends in Cognitive Sciences Vol.12 No.11
of prefrontal regions than in adults. The authors [26]
suggest that this change in activation pattern might be
related to anatomical development within these regions
(Box 2).
Adolescence is a particularly important time for the
self-concept to be shaped by other people, especially peers.
Self-report studies have shown that adolescents find
spending time with peers particularly rewarding and
are particularly influenced by their peers [27,28].
Susceptibility to peer influence is thought to contribute
to adolescents’ greater propensity to engage in risky
activities, compared to other age groups [29]. A recent
behavioural study measured the incidence of risky driving
events in a car simulation video game, in which adoles-
cents and adults played alone or with two friends present
[30]. For adolescents, the presence of peers more than
doubled the number of risks taken, whereas for adults
the presence of peers had little effect on risky driving. This
empirical study corroborates anecdotal evidence that ado-
lescents are more likely to make risky decisions in the
presence of peers.
A recent fMRI study found that children (aged 10 years)
with high resistance to peer influence showed greater
functional connectivity between several brain regions
when observing emotional (angry) gestures, compared to
children with low resistance to peer influence [31]. This
was interpreted as indicating that children with low resist-
ance to peer influence scores were more reactive to
emotionally laden actions. It would be interesting in future
studies to investigate systematically how susceptibility to
peer influence relates to self-concept and how its neural
basis develops within the same individual over time.
Review
Box 3. Outstanding questions
- Are there gender differences in the development of the self-
concept during adolescence?
- Does development of self-concept proceed through a series of
discrete cognitive stages during adolescence?
- How is the development of self-concept affected by individual
differences in genetic background?
- How does the environment influence development of the self-
concept and its neural correlates?
- How is self-concept development related to neuroanatomical
maturation, and how is this related to functional brain activity in
adolescence?
- Is the development of self-concept in adolescence related to the
increased incidence of affective and anxiety disorders during this
period of life?
Conclusion
Adolescence is an important period for development of the
socially integrated self-concept. The evidence discussed
here indicates that neurocognitive development during
adolescence occurs in brain regions involved in reflecting
on the self. In particular, changes in activation pattern
with age have been demonstrated in several recent neu-
roimaging studies in the MPFC. Specifically, fMRI studies
have shown that there is a shift in activity from MPFC to
temporal regions between adolescence and adulthood.
Common to all paradigms in these fMRI studies is the
requirement for self-related processing or for the proces-
sing of self-relevant social cues. Changes in self-concept
might contribute to behavioural phenomena typical in
adolescence, such as heightened self-consciousness and
susceptibility to peer pressure. Future studies might
address these links (Box 3), and explore structure–func-
tion relationships in late maturing regions such as the
MPFC.
Acknowledgements
The authors’ research is funded by the BBSRC, Wellcome Trust and
Royal Society, UK. We are grateful to I. Dumontheil for commenting on
previous versions of the manuscript.
References
1 Damon, W. (2004) Foreword. In Handbook of Adolescent Psychology
(2nd edn) (Lerner, R.M. and Steinberg, L., eds), pp. vi–vii, John Wiley
& Sons
2 Parker, J.G. et al. (2006) Peer relationships, child development, and
adjustment: a developmental psychopathology perspective. In
Developmental Psychopathology: Theory and Methods (Vol. 1)
(Cicchetti, D. and Cohen, D.J., eds), pp. 96–161, Wiley
3 Vartanian, L.R. (2000) Revisiting the imaginary audience and personal
fable constructs of adolescent egocentrism: a conceptual review.
Adolescence 35, 639–661
4 Ochsner, K.N. et al. (2004) Reflecting upon feelings: an fMRI study of
neural systems supporting the attribution of emotion to self and other.
J. Cogn. Neurosci. 16, 1746–1772
5 Gallagher, S. (2000) Philosophical conceptions of the self: implications
for cognitive science. Trends Cogn. Sci. 4, 14–21
6 Harter, S. (1990) Developmental differences in the nature of self-
representations: implications for the understanding, assessment,
and treatment of maladaptive behavior. Cognit. Ther. Res. 14, 113–
142
7 Brown, B.B. (2004) Adolescents’ relationships with peers. In Handbook
of Adolescent Psychology (2nd edn) (Lerner, R.M. and Steinberg, L.,
eds), pp. 363–394, John Wiley & Sons
8 Ochsner, K.N. et al. (2005) The neural correlates of direct and reflected
self-knowledge. Neuroimage 28, 797–814
Trends in Cognitive Sciences Vol.12 No.11
9 Johnson, M.K. et al. (2006) Dissociating medial frontal and posterior
cingulate activity during self-reflection. Soc. Cogn. Affect. Neurosci. 1,
56–64
10 Macrae, C.N. et al. (2004) Medial prefrontal activity predicts memory
for self. Cereb. Cortex 14, 647–654
11 D’Argembeau, A. et al. (2007) Distinct regions of the medial prefrontal
cortex are associated with self-referential processing and perspective
taking. J. Cogn. Neurosci. 19, 935–944
12 Shaw, P. et al. (2008) Neurodevelopmental trajectories of the human
cerebral cortex. J. Neurosci. 28, 3586–3594
13 Pfeifer, J.H. et al. (2007) ‘I know you are but what am I?!’: neural bases
of self- and social knowledge retrieval in children and adults. J. Cogn.
Neurosci. 19, 1323–1337
14 Blakemore, S-J. et al. (2007) Adolescent development of the neural
circuitry for thinking about intentions. Soc. Cogn. Affect. Neurosci. 2,
130–139
15 Choudhury, S. et al. (2006) Social cognitive development during
adolescence. Soc. Cogn. Affect. Neurosci. 1, 165–174
16 Elkind, D. (1967) Egocentrism in adolescence. Child Dev. 38, 1025–
1034
17 Lapsley, D.K. (1991) Egocentrism theory and the ‘New Look’ at the
imaginary audience and personal fable in adolescence. In Encyclopaedia
of Adolescence (Lerner, R.M. et al., eds), pp. 281–286, Garland
18 Lapsley, D.K. (1993) Toward an integrated theory of adolescent ego
development: the ‘‘new look’’ at adolescent egocentrism. Am. J.
Orthopsychiatry 63, 562–571
19 Lapsely, D.K. and Murphy, M.N. (1985) Another look at the theoretical
assumptions of adolescent egocentrism. Dev. Rev. 5, 201–217
20 Frankenberger, K. (2000) Adolescent egocentrism: a comparison
among adolescents and adults. J. Adolesc. 23, 343–354
21 Wang, A.T. et al. (2006) Neural basis of irony comprehension in children
with autism: the role of prosody and context. Brain 129, 932–943
22 Burnett, S. et al. Development during adolescence of the neural
processing of social emotion. J. Cogn. Neurosci. (in press)
23 Davey, C.G. et al. (2008) The emergence of depression in adolescence:
development of the prefrontal cortex and the representation of reward.
Neurosci. Biobehav. Rev. 32, 1–19
24 Ybrandt, H. (2008) The relation between self-concept and social
functioning in adolescence. J. Adolesc. 31, 1–16
25 Ochsner, K.N. et al. (2002) Rethinking feelings: an FMRI study of the
cognitive regulation of emotion. J. Cogn. Neurosci. 14, 1215–1229
26 Lévesque, J. et al. (2006) Neural basis of emotional self-regulation in
childhood. Neuroscience 129, 361–369
27 Csikszentmihalyi, M. et al. (1977) The ecology of adolescent activity
and experience. J. Youth Adolesc. 6, 281–294
28 Larson, R. and Richards, M.H. (1991) Daily companionship in late
childhood and early adolescence: changing developmental contexts.
Child Dev. 62, 284–300
29 Steinberg, L. (2008) A neurobehavioral perspective on adolescent risk-
taking. Dev. Rev. 28, 78–106
30 Gardner, M. and Steinberg, L. (2005) Peer influence on risk taking, risk
preference, and risky decision making in adolescence and adulthood:
an experimental study. Dev. Psychol. 41, 625–635
31 Grosbras, M.H. et al. (2007) Neural mechanisms of resistance to peer
influence in early adolescence. J. Neurosci. 27, 8040–8045
32 Strawson, G. (2000) The phenomenology and ontology of the self. In
Exploring the Self: Philosophical and Psychopathological Perspectives
on Self-experience (Advances in Consciousness Research) (Vol. 23)
((Zahavi, D., ed.), pp. 39–54, John Benjamins Publishing Company
33 Rochat, P. (2003) Five levels of self-awareness as they unfold early in
life. Conscious. Cogn. 12, 717–731
34 Hespos, S.J. and Rochat, P. (1997) Dynamic mental representation in
infancy. Cognition 64, 153–188
35 Bahrick, L. et al. (1996) Development of visual self-recognition in
infancy. Ecol. Psychol. 8, 189–208
36 Povinelli, D.J. (1995) The unduplicated self. In The Self in Infancy:
Theory and Research (Rochat, P., ed.), pp. 161–192, Elsevier Science
37 Bates, E. (1990) Language about me and you: pronominal reference
and the emerging concept of self. In The Self in Transition: Infancy to
Childhood (Cicchetti, D. and Beeghly, M., eds), pp. 165–182,
University of Chicago Press
38 Giedd, J.N. et al. (1999) Brain development during childhood and
adolescence: a longitudinal MRI study. Nat. Neurosci. 2, 861–863
445
Review
39 Gogtay, N. et al. (2004) Dynamic mapping of human cortical
development during childhood through early adulthood. Proc. Natl.
Acad. Sci. U. S. A. 101, 8174–8179
40 Paus, T. (2005) Mapping brain maturation and cognitive development
during adolescence. Trends Cogn. Sci. 9, 60–68
41 Yakovlev, P.I. and Lecours, A.R. (1967) The myelogenetic cycles of
regional maturation in the brain. In Regional Development of the Brain
in Early Life (Minkowski, A., ed.), pp. 3–70, Blackwell Scientific
446
Trends in Cognitive Sciences Vol.12 No.11
42 Huttenlocher, P.R. (1979) Synaptic density in human frontal cortex:
developmental changes and effects of aging. Brain Res. 163, 195–
205
43 Durston, S. et al. (2006) A shift from diffuse to focal cortical activity
with development. Dev. Sci. 9, 1–8
44 Blakemore, S.J. (2008) The social brain in adolescence. Nat. Rev.
Neurosci. 9, 267–277