Professional Documents
Culture Documents
GLENN J. AMES
The University
of Toledo,OH
ABSTRACT
Based on extensive archival research in Lisbon and Goa, this article examines the sym-
biotic relationship between the newly independent Portuguese Crown and the rising
provincial nobility in Portugal during the late seventeenth century. The provincial nobil-
ity had been a prime supporter of João, duke of Braganza, in his revolution against
Habsburg Spain in 1640. Thereafter, the new dynasty and the provincial nobility assisted
each other in meeting the political, military, economic, and imperial challenges of the
post-1640 period. By examining the careers of roughly a dozen nobles originally from
the pre-1640 provincial nobility, the article shows that this relationship proved to be
mutually beneficial and advantageous. The house of Braganza preserved its indepen-
dence and was able to overcome many daunting challenges, in particular stabilizingthe
precarious position of the Asian empire, the Estadoda India, during these years. At the
same time, the members of the provincial nobility, through their serice to the Crown
at home and in the empire, were able to rise in the social hierarchy, sometimes enter-
ing the lofty ranks of the titularesor "titled ones" in the process.
As Carl A. Hanson and others have shown, the December 1640 revo-
lution in Lisbon, directed against the 60 year long "captivity" at the
increasingly shaky hands of the Spanish Habsburgs, owed much to the
support of the provincial nobility in Portugal.' Philip II had originally
promised merely a personal union of the Crown to his vast imperial
holdings along with a good deal of Portuguese autonomy in his con-
quest and consolidation of power from 1580-1582.? Both Philip III
Gusmao, and his sons Afonso VI and Pedro II would succeed by ca.
1683 in firmly establishing the house of Braganza on an independent
Portuguese throne.' This was no mean achievement given the difficulties
confronting them in 1640. One aspect of this consolidation process that
has not received extensive attention in the historiography was the need
to re-establish a new court and administrative nobility in the wake of
the revolution of 1640. By examining roughly a dozen noble careers
during the Restoration years, this article will argue that Joao IV and
his immediate successors logically sought to rebuild this court and admin-
istrative nobility with the sons of the provincial nobles who had origi-
nally supported the revolution of 1640. It will argue further that a
common model of career advancement characterized the rise of these
young nobles, and that this model was a clear reflection of the chal-
lenges and structures of seventeenth-century Portugal. Finally, it will
maintain that one of the main challenges confronting the Braganza
dynasty was to restore some semblance of wealth to Portuguese Asia,
the so-called Estado da India. This Asian Empire, stretching from Mozam-
bique in southeast Africa to Macau in China, had won glory and riches
for the Aviz dynasty while attracting the jealousy of European rivals.
The office of Viceroy of India remained a coveted position, and a fitting
culmination for provincial nobles on the rise under the Braganzas. In
fact, no indigenous Portuguese dynasty would ever be considered legit-
imate and solid without fulfilling the task of restoring to viability this
"most glorious" of the conquests. At the same time, no provincial noble
family would consider its mission of social advancement fulfilled until
it had reached the ranks of the titulares or "titled ones." Between ca.
1661-1683 both the Braganzas and selected noble families would achieve
their ambitions by trying to salvage what remained of Portuguese Asia.
During these years, the Braganza dynasty would devote increasing atten-
tion to this "most glorious" imperial possession and, in doing so, offer
much largesse to those nobles who agreed to take on the challenges of
the office of Viceroy in Goa.
What were the main challenges confronting Joao IV and his succes-
sors in the decades after 1640? Winning the independence war with
Spain was certainly the immediate problem. But the need to find an
acceptable end to the struggle with the Dutch for overseas empire, and
to rebuild a moribund military and economy severely taxed by six
' Cf.
Godinho, "Portugal and her Empire" in TheNew Cambridge ModernHistoryV' The
of France,1648-88, ed. F.L. Carsten (Cambridge, 1961), 384-97.
Ascendancy
8 Cf.
"Portugal and her Empire," 389-90, 96-97; Historyof Portugal,vol. I: 322-23.
`-'On the
challenges confronting, and resources available to, Joao IV, cf. Godinho
"Portugal and her Empire," 385-89; Birmingham, Concise History,34-43; Livermore,New
History,173-79; and Oliveira Marques, Historyof Portugal,vol. I: 327-31.
'° On the
importance and functioning of the military orders in Portugal, cf. Francis
A. Dutra, "Membership in the Order of Christ in the SeventeenthCentury," TheAmericas
27 (1970): 3-25.
" For details on the Council
system of Joao IV, cf. V.M. Godinho, "Portugal and
her Empire," 390-92.
The men who held the office of Viceroy of the Estado da India dur-
ing the years ca. 1661-1683 began their careers in the 1640s fighting
in the war in the Alentejo against the Spanish. After winning their
"knightly spurs" in honorable combat, they enjoyed royal largesse in
the form of a pension or office in the developing administrative bureau-
cracy in Lisbon.2' Next, it was common for these young nobles to receive
a knighthood or commandery in one of the military orders, usually the
Order of Christ, followed by an initial imperial posting in Brazil, Africa
or the Estado da India. After returning to the reino following meritorious
service abroad, there would frequently be a post on the king's princi-
pal councils (state, war, overseas). Finally, given sufficient reputafao, per-
sonal ties to the Crown, influence at court, and fortune, one might hope
for an appointment as Viceroy of the Estado da India as the capstone of
one's career. This final step in career advancement under the early
Braganzas often involved entrance into the elite of the noble class in
Portugal, the ranks of the titulares. Overall, then, the break with Spain
facilitated the rise of a group of hitherto relatively minor provincial
noble families who, by their aggressive service to the Crown, would
come to dominate the administrative system of the Braganzan state. In
doing so, they not only helped to establish this dynasty, they also saved
what remained of the Estado da India.
In early 1661, at the outset of the second stage of the Restoration
struggle, Queen Regent D. Luisa wrote letters to the fourth governing
Council of the Estado, warning of a large fleet of some "30 ships and
8000 soldiers" that the Dutch East India Company (VOC) was prepar-
ing to send to Asia.22 D. Luisa informed her Governors that for some
time she had hoped to report a peace with Holland, a pact that would
"improve things there." Unfortunately, the States-General and VOC
were proving obstinate. Meanwhile, the Governors were ordered to con-
tinue the policy of "the defense and conservation of the prafas and lib-
erty of commerce." On a more positive note, D. Luisa wrote that the
war with Spain was going well, despite the separate peace that France
had concluded, and that the kingdom would fight on until the last drop
21The
plethora of minor and major pensions and grants that these rising nobles
receivedfrom the Crown can be traced most convincinglyin Arquivo Nacional da Torre
do Tombo [ANTT] Chancelarias Reaisand Registro
geralde Mercescollectionsfor the reigns
of Joao IV and Afonso VI.
22 Cf. Historical Archive of Goa,
Panjim, India [HAG] Livrosdas monçõesdo Reino
[MR] 28A, Count of Ponte to D. Luisa Gusmao: fo. 232, 7/11/1661; fo. 236, 14/II/1661.
and MR 28A Count of Miranda to D. Luisa:fo. 238, 10/11/1661;and fo. 234, 1/111/1661.
of blood !23 That same month, the Queen Regent reaffirmed her inten-
tion to appoint a new Viceroy as soon as possible and one "of such
quality" that one could justly expect that "his experience and valor
would promptly procure a Remedy to the affliction" in which the Estado
found itself. Until major assistance could be dispatched, she was con-
vinced that "with your work and industry, and above all your valor,
and that of your subjects," the impending challenge could be met.24
The members of this Governing Council were D. Pedro de Lencastre,
Luis de Mendon?a Furtado e Albuquerque and D. Manoel Mascarenhas.25
Mascarenhas then held the lucrative post of Captain of Mozambique
and had declined the honor of the Viceroyalty.26 The other two mem-
bers of the Council were both younger sons of provincial nobles who
had championed the 1640 revolution. Lencastre was the fourth son of
D. Louren?o de Lencastre and D. Ines de Noronha. He had begun his
service to Joao IV "in the year of his happy acclamation in the province
of the Alentejo." There, he had held the offices of Captain of the
Infantry, Captain of Cavalry, Commissario and Mestre de Campo. Lencastre
had served in the Restoration War until 1657. In that year, he first
traveled to India as capitiio-mor (captain-major) of the fleet that conducted
his uncle, the Count of Vila Pouca de Aguiar, to Goa as the 29th
Viceroy of the Estado. Vila Pouca had died on the outward voyage and
never assumed his office. A Dutch blockade of the mouth of the Mandovi
had also prevented Lencastre from returning to the Reino until the spring
of 1661, when he was named one of the Governors on the Council. 17
Luis de Mendon?a Furtado e Albuquerque was the son of Pedro de
Mendon?a. His father had been alcaide-mor of Mourdo, commendador(com-
mandery holder) of Santiago de Cassem and Vila Franca, senhor of
Seregeira, one of the principal nobles who had acclaimed D. Joao IV
in December 1640, and later guarda-mor for the king.28 Luis was the
eldest child of Pedro's second marriage to D. Antonio de Mendon?a,
a lady-in-waiting of D. Luisa de Gusmao. Like Lencastre, he had begun
2s Cf. HAG MR 28A fo. 212, D. Luisa Gusmao to Governors of India, ll1IV/1661.
24 Cf. HAG MR 28A fo. 215, D. Luisa Gusmao to Governors of India,
20/IV/1661;
and also HAG MR 28A fo. 218, 26/IV/ 1661.
z5 Cf. HAG Codex 650 fos. 9-10;
J.F. Ferrcira Martins, Os hice-Reisda India, 1505-
1917 (Lisbon, 1935), 149-50.
2f Cf. HAG Codex 650 fos. 9-10; Ferreira Martin, Os Vice-Reis,149-50;and Biblioteca
Publica de Evora [BPE] Codex CXV/1-21 fo. 91v.
27 Cf. HAG Codex 650 fos. 9-10; Ferreira Martin, Os Vice-Reis, 149-50.
28 On Pedro de
Mendon?a's notable role in the events of 1640, cf. Count of Ericeira,
Historiade PortugalRestaurado,
vol. I: 104-13.
his career in the 1640s fighting in the war in the Alentejo, where he
performed with "reputation" and "distinction." Luis had first traveled
to the Estado in 1651, as capitiio-mor (captain-major) of a three ship fleet
that made a swift voyage to and from Goa. In 1653, he had repeated
this impressive feat in an epoch of general maritime disasters for the
Estado by departing from Lisbon in March with two ships and reach-
ing Goa in October of that year. In 1657, Mendon?a Furtado had
returned to the Estado aboard the fleet carrying the count of Vila Pouca
and Lencastre, with the title of Admiral of the Indian Seas. Between
January and March 1658, he had also commanded with great skill the
Portuguese fleet that tried to break a Dutch blockade of the Mandovi
and relieve Jaffna, the remaining Estado outpost on Ceylon. According
to the Jesuit Queiroz, Mendon?a Furtado had the most impressive
physique of all the Portuguese in India at that time. Throughout these
naval encounters with the Dutch fleet: "Great was the valour and wis-
dom [with] which the Portuguese Admiral acted ... infusing courage
into all by his presence."29
On land, Mendon?a Furtado's fama do valor had also grown during
his imperial service in the 1650s. In late 1658, the king of Bijapur, in
league with the VOC, had invaded the Goan province of Salsette with
some 400 cavalry and 4,000 infantry under the general Abdula Hakim.
The only Portuguese force then in Salsette was some 250 men in Rachol
under the command of Gaspar Carneiro Girao. In Goa, this news
prompted the dispatching of Mendon?a Furtado as general along with
some troops to meet the challenge. In a pitched battle fought near the
village of Arli, the Portuguese inflicted a decisive defeat upon Abdula
Hakim's army and obliged his men to retreat across the Western Ghats.
Again according to Queiroz, Mendon?a Furtado performed a notable
feat of valor on that day. As the armies deployed for battle, "one of his
[Abula Aquimo's] higher officers who was considered the most valiant
among them, took manifest pains to get a view of him [Mendon?a
Furtado]." The Portuguese general "sallied forth from the ranks to meet
him with only the dress sword which he had at his side and a round
target, which they had given him in Rachol by way of a shield, because
29For
background on Mendon?a Furtado's family and early career, cf. Gayo, Nobiliario
de Familiasde PortugalXX (Braga, 1939):53-56; Caetano de Sousa, HistoriaGenealogica
XI
(Coimbra, 1953): 260-61; Martins Zuquete, ,Nobrezade Portugal(Lisbon, 1960), vol. II:
678; Braamcamp Freire, Brasiesda Sala de Sintra (Coimbra, c. 1923), vol. II: 366-67;
HAG Codex 650 fos. 9-10; C.R. Boxer, A india Portuguesa, 43-44, 59-61; and Queiroz,
The Temporaland SpiritualConquestof Ceylon,trans. S.G. Perera (Colombo, 1930), 990.
the buckles were not large enough for his arms." Thus armed, on foot,
Mendon?a Furtado had then engaged the mounted Muslim officer, "and
when the Moor galloped at him at full speed, he got behind the hind
quarters of the horse and with his left foot he made the Moor's horse
stumble and from one side ran him through to the top of the opposite
shoulder, the Moor dropping dead, a feat characteristic of his strength
and darning.""
Unfortunately, Mendon?a Furtado's initial foray into governing the
Estado with Lencastre from June 1661 until December 1662 was an ane-
mic reflection of his military feats of glory. The root of many of his
problems related to a blood feud that developed with Bartolemeu de
Vasconcelos, who charged Mendon?a Furtado with various excesses after
the Salsette campaign.3' To avoid an open breach in Goa, Mendon?a
Furtado was sent to the strategic fortress of Mormugao. Upon his return
to Goa as Governor, however, the simmering feud between him and
Vasconcelos erupted into street fights between their partisans.3z Meanwhile,
problems confronting the Crown and its Viceroyalty, notably the con-
tinuing aggressions of the VOC on the west coast of India, were largely
ignored. During the chaos of this eighteen-month period, the Dutch
captured Cranganor on the Malabar coast and turned their attention
to expelling the Portuguese from Cochin. :13
It was at this critical juncture that the long awaited Viceroy promised
by D. Luisa at last reached India. The fidalgo selected for this post,
Antonio de Mello de Castro, had the pedigree necessary for this daunt-
ing assignment, as his family had an impressive and long-standing record
of service to the Crown in the Asian empire. His paternal grandfather
and namesake had been Captain of the ships of India. Two of his
uncles, Diogo and Joao de Mello de Castro, had also served with dis-
tinction in the Estado, while his brother Fernao would serve as general
of Ceylon. Antonio and his brother were the sons of Francisco de Jello
;° Cf. Fernao de
Queiroz, The Temporaland SpiritualConquest
of Ceylon,1000-1002.For
60 and
additional details on the 1658 campaign in Salsette, cf. Boxer, A india Portuguesa,
the sources cited therein.
3' Cf. Martins
Zuquete,NobrezadePortugal,vol. II: 678. Among other things,Vasconcelos
charged Mendonca Furtado with needlesslyattacking local strongholds and the indige-
nous populace on the pretext of being in league with the king of Bijapur, as well as the
more inflammatory charge of summarily executing I 1 men.
32As
J.F. Ferreira Martins aptly noted on this Council, it was "always in discord,
being sterile in [its] administrativeaction when preciselythe opposite was indispensable."
See Os Vice-Reis, 149-50.
33Cf. Ferreira
Martins, Os hice-Reis,149-50.
de Castro, who had himself held the posts of capitiio-mor of the seas of
India and Admiral of the Royal Fleet, and his second wife, D. Angela
de Mendon?a, whose own father had died serving in the Estado. Like
Lencastre and Mendon?a Furtado, Mello de Castro had begun his ser-
vice to the Crown by fighting "with valour" in the war against Philip
IV's armies in the Alentejo. He had been awarded the commandery of
Fornellos and the post of alcaide-mor of Colares. Eventually appointed
to the Council of State, Mello de Castro was initially given the title of
Governor of the Estado by D. Luisa in Letters-Patent of 11March 1662,
with permission to assume the title of Viceroy a year later after suc-
cessfully reaching Goa.?4 The generally dismal state of Portuguese mar-
itime power at this time and the desire to exploit the terms of the 16611
treaty with England, including the cession of Bombay, ensured that
Mello de Castro sailed to take up his office aboard an English fleet
under James Ley, the earl of Marlborough. This fleet departed from
Lisbon in April 1662 and reached Bombay in late September. By mid-
December 1662, Mello de Castro reached Goa and officially assumed
the office of Governor. 35
In India, Mello de Castro confronted the dizzying array of difficulties
that Mendon?a Furtado and Lencastre had failed to address. Following
a long period during which the Crown had paid little attention to its
eastern possessions, Mello de Castro's term of office represented a pro-
longed reconnaissance mission. The new Governor was expected to
report on the wreckage of the previous decades of neglect, to isolate
the most glaring problems, to suggest remedies and, if possible, to begin
to address many of these difficulties. Viewed in this context, his Viceroyalty
must be judged a success. While Antonio de Mello de Castro's tenure
is most noted for the fact that he refused for three years to turn over
Bombay to the English, in fact his administration embodied a good deal
more. He oversaw a comprehensive survey of the straining structures
de Familiasde PortugalX: 147-48; HAG Codex 650 fos. 9-10; Martins Zuquete, Nobreza
de Portugal,vol. III: 356; Ferreira Martins, Os Vice-Reis,
153-54; and BPE Codex CXV//
1-21 fos. 93-93v.
38Cf. HAG MR 33 fo.
92, Sdo Vicente to Afonso, 25/1/1667.
39Cf. AHU DAl Box
27, Document 99, Sao Vicente to Afonso, 21/IX/1667.
41 Cf. India Office
Library, London [IOL] OriginalCorrespondence
rOC] 3213, President
and Council in Surat to Directors, 5/IV/ 1667.
41 Cf. HAG MR 35 fos. 149-49v., Mello de Castro to Albnso, 28/1/ 1666.
Cf. HAG MR 33 fo. 21, 25/1/1667; and MR 33 fo. 92, 25/1/1667.
the Viceroy urged the King not to tax the assets of the Society of Jesus
in Goa: "one should not take from religiosos who set such an example
and show such zeal to the service of God and His Majesty in con-
serving this Estado."43 In February 1667, hoping to levy a temporary
food tax (colecta)to finance more regular fleets, Sao Vicente won approval
from the city council, nobles, and povo of Goa. But since the religioso.s
of the Society of Jesus, the Dominicans, the Augustinians and the
Carmelites all opposed it, the Viceroy decided, in light of the "impor-
tance" of these dissenters, to wait for advice from the Crown before
proceeding further." When Sao Vicente died in Goa in November 1668,
his support of the religiosos was not forgotten: he was buried at the foot
of the Altar of S. Francisco Xavier in the Jesuit Church of Bom Jesus
in Velha Goa.4'
The letter of succession named Luis de Miranda Henriques, Manoel
de Corte-Real de Sampaio, and Antonio de Mello de Castro as the
fifth Governing Council.4f Meanwhile, the uncertainties engendered by
Prince Pedro's overthrow of Afonso VI in late 1667, the European
machinations stemming from Louis XIV's invasion of the Spanish
Netherlands, and the usual delays all conspired to delay the arrival
of a new Viceroy until May 1671. Fortunately, all three of the new
Governors on the scene in Goa had substantial experience in the Estado.
Corte-Real de Sampaio had served on the Council of State in Goa
under Sao Vicente, while Miranda Henriques was then the Captain of
D iu. 17 Antonio de Mello de Castro, a distant relative to the former
Viceroy of the same name, had perhaps the most impressive record of
service to the Crown. Son of Jeronimo de Mello de Castro, governor
of the Castle of S. Filipe in Setubal, alcaide-mor of Villa Vicoza, and
capitiio-mor of the Armada to the Indies of 1588, his paternal grand-
father and uncle had also served in the Estado. By the late 1660s, Antonio
had served and lived in Asia for more than twenty years; he had mar-
ried three times, had three sons there, and was considered a true casado.
In the service of His Majesty's Council, Mello de Castro had held the
posts of capitiio-mor of the campo of Ceylon (where he had distinguished
himself in the defense of Colombo in 1655-56), and of the Armada of
the North; General of the Armadas of the Reino; Captain of the fortress
of Bassein; and, from 1664 to 1667, Captain of Mozambique and
Sofala. 41
The tenure of this Council was far less acrimonious than the previ-
ous one. As the Minutes of the Goa Council of State reveal, Mello de
Castro and Corte-Real de Sampaio made the major decisions and were
largely willing to allow the entrenched machinery of the Estado to func-
tion as before." The fact that only eight major Assentos (resolutions) of
the Council of State were taken during these years certainly suggests a
hands-off management style. so At the same time, both these men were
anxious to advance the long-term interests of the casado lobby in Goa
at the expense of the reinados, the service nobility from the Reino who
customarily held the post of Viceroy for a specified term and then
returned as rich men to Portugal. 51 'Their most notable military success
related to a 1669 fleet Mello de Castro and Corte-Real de Sampaio
sent to the Straits of Hurmuz. As they pointed out in a letter of January
1670 to Pedro, this fleet had been a "great credit to the reputation of
Your Arms:" bombarding Muskat, and defeating the Omani Sultan's
fleet off Bandar Kung, sinking five of his best ships and killing nearly
2,000 of his men. News of this great victory had "frightened the nations
of the East" and helped to restore the reputation of the Portuguese as
"Senhores do mar," friends had sent congratulations, enemies had sent
envoys to treat. 52
41 On the
family background and previous experience of Antonio de Mello de Castro,
cf: HAG Codex 650 fo. 10; Martins, Os Vice-Reis, 155-56;and Gayo, Nobiliariode Familias
de PortugalXI: 39-40, 71.
49Miranda
Henriques never reached Goa to share in the duties of government, as
the devastating attack of the Omani Arabs on Diu in December 1668 demanded all of
his energies in the years that followed. Cf. HAG MR 34 fo. 203, Governors to Pedro,
284-84v., 26/I/ 1670.
Cf. ACE, vol. IV: 203-17. It is interesting to note that in a letter of 8 January
1669, the Governors pointed out that Sdo Vicente had also been responsiblefor "only"
seven or eight consultasduring his tenure. Cf. HAG MR 35 fo. 23.
5' One of the
principal problems with the Estado,declared the pair in a letter of
January 1669, was that such Viceroys and Governors placed "little authority" in the
wise opinions of the casadosand others with long years of service in Asia, and instead
did "what seem[ed] best to [them]." This tendency "was not convenient to the service
of Your Majesty," since the reinadosproceeded for themselvesonly little advised of the
matters of this State. Cf. HAG MR 35 fo. 17, Governors to Pedro, 8/I/ 1669.
52 Cf. HAG MR 34 fos. 277-77v., Governors to Pedro, 28/1/1670; and MR 34 fos.
303-03v., Governors to Pedro, 28//1/1670. For details on the naval warfare between the
While Pedro was cheered to receive these glad tidings, he was nev-
ertheless anxious to appoint a new Viceroy, one of his own, who would
once and for all reverse the decades of decline in the eastern posses-
sions. The Prince Regent had already resolved upon a fundamental shift
in Crown policy regarding the tripartite empire, and was committed to
initiating a series of reforms in the Estado in order to regain a sem-
blance of its former glory and economic benefit to the Crown .5' News
of Sao Vicente's death reached Lisbon in early November 1669.54 The
search for a suitable replacement took place amid a flurry of activity
regarding the approaching Dutch War, and Colbert's attempt to lure
Pedro into his war against the Netherlands by launching a campaign
against the VOC in Asia. In early 1670, the Prince Regent made two
important decisions regarding his quest to rehabilitate the Estado: he
rejected once and for all the often-repeated offers of an Asian alliance
against the Dutch proffered to him by Louis XIV's ambassador, the
marquis de Saint-Romain; and in March 1670 he selected Luis de
Mendon?a Furtado e Albuquerque as the 31st Viceroy.
Mendon?a Furtado returned to Portugal in January 1663, and there-
after became involved with the clique of young nobles in Lisbon that
came to favor the removal of Afonso VI and Castelo-Melhor and the
accession of Pedro to power. 55He had already garnered an impressive
cache of wealth from his service in Asia. Mendon?a Furtado was also
willing to favor the new Prince Regent with advice he did not want to
hear. In the immediate aftermath of the 1667 coup, he offered to repay
D. Maria Fran?oise's dowry within the space of three days provided
that Pedro would forego marrying his brother's wife. It was much to
the Prince Regent's credit that he did not hold a grudge for being
opposed on this emotional issue, for Mendon?a Furtado subsequently
served on both the Council of State and the Council of Following
Estado and the Omani Arabs during this period, cf. Glenn J. Ames, "The Straits of
Hurmuz Fleets: Omani-Portuguese Naval Rivalry and Encounters, c. 1660-1680," The
Mariner'sMirrorLXXXIII (November, 1997): 398-409.
Cf. Glenn J. Ames, "The Carreirada India, 1668-1682:Maritime Enterprise and the
Quest for Stability in Portugal's Asian Empire" TheJournal of EuropeanEconomic History
20.1 (1991): 25-27.
5+The reached the Tagus from Goa at that time. Cf.
ship NossaSenhoradosRernedios
HAG MR 35 fo. 7, Governors to Pedro, 8/1/1669; BPE Codex CXV/ 1-21 fo. 93v.
and Ames, "The Carreirada India, 1668-1682," 19-22, and the manuscript sources cited
therein.
55 On his actions in the 1667
coup against Castelo-Melhorand Afonso VI cfl Count
of Ericeira, Historicde PortugalRestaurado,
vol. IV: 444-45.
')6On
Mendon?a Furtado's return to the Reinoand activities there from 1664-1670,
cf. C.R. Boxer, Salvadorda Sá, 352 ff.
z For details on
Mendonca Furtado's assumption of his new titles and his voyage to
Goa, cf. BPE Codex CXV/ 1-21fos. 93-93v.;HAG Codex 650 fos. 9-10; Ferreira Martins,
Os Vice-Reis,157-58;ANTT Registryde Mercês:OrdensMilitares,Book 12 fo. 453 and Book
14 fo. 9v.; Martins Zuquete, Nobrezade Portugal,vol. II: 678; ACE, vol. IV: 217-23; and
HAG MR 36 fo. 405, Mendon?a Furtado to Pedro, 14/X/ 1671 and GlennJ. Amcs,
"A Noble Life: Luis de Mendon?a Furtado and the Quest for famain Baroque Portugal
and her Empire" RevistaPortuguesa de HistóriaXXXII (1997-1998):305-29.
58Saint-Romain's summaries of these conversationsand other information
relating to
the proposed Franco-Portuguesealliancecan be found in Archivesdes AffairesEtrangeres,
Paris [AAE] Correspondance [CC] fos. 97-100v., "Extrait des Lettres de M. Saint-
consulaire
Romain," 22/XII/ 1669-12/V/ 1670; fos. 103-05,Saint-Romainto Colbert, 30/XII/ 1669;
fos. 110-13v., Saint-Romain to Louis XIV, 22/1/1670; and fos. 119-20, Saint-Romain
to Colbert [in cipher], 4/II/ 1670.
59 Cf.
Glenn J. Ames, "The Eftadoda India, 16fi3-1677:Priorities and Strategies in
Europe and the East" RevistaPortuguesade HistóriaXXII (1987): 38-46 and the manu-
script sources cited therein.
b° As Gerald Aungier, the able English President in Bombay, wrote as early as 1674
on Lavradio's attempt to address the traditional banes of bad government and the abuses
of the religiousorders and nobles, "the prudence of this Viceroy hath raised them much:
both in one and in the other." Cf. IOL OC 3929, Aungier to Company Directors,
25/1/1674.
61 For details on the
family background and early career of D. Pedro de Almeida,
cf: Martins, Os hice-Reis,159-60;Braamcamp Freire, Brasões,vol. II: 366-67; HAG Codex
650 fo. 10; Martins Zuquete, Nobrezade Portugal,vol. II: 328; and Gayo, Nobiliariode
Familiasde Portugal,vol. II: 74-75.
62 Cf. AHU Codex 17 fos. 122v.-24.
63 For details on the Pate
expedition, cf: ACE, vol. IV: 304-15; BPE Codex CXV/1-
21 fo. 95v.; HAG MR 43 fos. 208-09, Pedro to D. Pedro de Almeida, 5/IV/ 1677; HAG
MR 43 fo. 218, Pedro to Governors, 8/IV/ 1677; Eric Axelson, 77? Portuguese in South
East Africa,1600-1700 (Johannesburg, 1964), 151 ff.; and AHU Documentsavulsosrela-
tivosa Mofambique[DAM] Box 3, Document 16, Consultaof the Overseas Council on
the Pate Expedition, 23/VI/1677; and Glenn J. Ames, "An African Eldorado?: The
Portuguese Quest for Wealth in Mozambique and the Rios de Cuama,c. 1661-1683,"
Journal if AfricanHistoricalStudies31.1 (1998):91-110.
International
64The
"Entrega que faz o exm.mno S.or Dom P.o dalmeida V. Rey da India da
governanca della aos Il.mos Sores Dom Fr. Antonio brandao, Arc.o de Goa, e Primas
da India e Antonio Paez de Sande, ambos do Concelho de S.A." is given in ACE, vol.
IV: 311-13. The letters of successionwere opened on 24 January 1678.
villa, e uivia [sic] das suas fazendas a lei da Nobreza." At the order
and expense of his father, Antonio, like many of his noble contempo-
raries, had been sent to fight in the Restoration struggle in search of
fama do valor and social advancement in September of 1643. He evi-
dently distinguished himself during the next two years in actions near
Badajoz with the Company of Andre de Melo de Albuquerque and
at Valverde under the command of Joao de Mesquita Pimental. After
marrying D. Catarina de Castro Pereira Soutto-Mayor in 1645, and with
the permission of the Crown, he spent several years in Spain serving
as provedor and corregedor of Moncao. In 1666, he received a comman-
dery in the Order of Christ for his services and was named Secretary
of the Estado da India."
Sailing aboard the Viceregal fleet of the count of Sao Vicente, Paes
de Sande reached Goa for this first time in September 1666, where-
upon Nunes da Cunha asked him to assume the office of Vedor-geral da
Fazenda in addition to his original duties. When he returned to Lisbon
in March 1671, the Prince Regent rewarded him for his services in the
Estado by naming him Guarda-mor of the Ribeira de Goa, "supraanu-
merario de Conselheiro de Capa e Espada, no Conselho Ultramarino,"
and the commander of Sao Mamede de Mogadouro in the Order of
Christ. His insightful memoranda, sent on to Pedro as consultas of the
Overseas Council during the crucial Viccroyalty of Mendon?a Furtado,
no doubt helped to convince the Prince Regent to embrace many of
the long overdue reforms that characterized those years. In the spring
of 1677, in recognition of these services and his previous experiences
in Asia, Paes de Sande was nominated as the Vedor da Fazenda Geral of
the Estado, arguably the second most important position in the imperial
edifice in the east, "one of the most powerful that the Estado has,
exceeded only by that of Viceroy." Departing from Lisbon with D. Pedro
de Almeida aboard the Sio Pedro da Ribeira, Paes de Sande took office
on 4 November of that year and remained as Vedor until his appoint-
ment to the Governing Council in January 1678. 16
what Pedro strove to do, and with some success." As the deeds of Sao
Vicente, Lavradio, and Assumar demonstrate, a service nobility was
developing, willing and able to provide real serr?i?ofor the pressing needs
of the Crown, in order to rise into the ranks of the titulares and the
most lucrative positions the court could bestow. It was a quid pro quo in
the truest sense of the word, an arrangement that benefited both sides:
the Asian empire received assistance that was badly needed after long
decades of neglect, while a noble estate badly in need of periodic trans-
fusions received some fresh blood.