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LL 13 - People v. Vera 65 Phil 56
LL 13 - People v. Vera 65 Phil 56
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VOL. 65, NOVEMBER 16, 1937 57
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LAUREL, J.:
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(1) Under section 11 of Act No. 4221, the said Act of the
Philippine Legislature is made to apply only to the
provinces of the Philippines; it nowhere states that
it is to be made applicable to chartered cities like
the City of Manila.
(2) While section 37 of the Administrative Code
contains a proviso to the effect that in the absence
of a special provision, the term "province" may be
construed to include the City of Manila for the
purpose of giving effect to laws of general
application, it is also true that Act No. 4221 is not a
law of general application because it is made to
apply only to those provinces in which the
respective provincial boards shall have provided for
the salary of a probation officer.
(3) Even if the City of Manila were considered to be a
province, still, Act No. 4221 would not be applicable
to it because it has not provided for the salary of a
probation officer as required by section 11 thereof;
it being immaterial that there is an Insular
Probation Office willing to act for the City of
Manila, said Probation Office provided for in section
10 of Act No. 4221 being different and distinct from
the Probation Officer provided for in section 11 of
the same Act.
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"* * * The idea seems to be that the people are estopped from
questioning the validity of a law enacted by their representatives;
that to an accusation by the people of Michigan of usurpation
upon their government, a statute enacted by the people of
Michigan is an adequate answer. The last proposition is true, but,
if the statute relied on in justification is unconstitutional, it is a
statute only in form, and lacks the force of law, and is of no more
saving effect to justify action under it than if it had never been
enacted. The constitution is the supreme law, and to its behests
the courts, the legislature, and the people must bow. * * * The
legislature and the respondents are not the only parties in
interest upon such. constitutional questions. As was remarked by
Mr. Justice Story, in speaking of an acquiescence by a party
affected by an unconstitutional act of the legislature: 'The people
have a deep and vested interest in maintaining all the
constitutional limitations upon the exercise of legislative powers.'
(Allen vs. Mckeen, 1 Sum., 314.)"
In State vs. Doane ([1916], 98 Kan., 435; 158 Pac., 38, 40),
an original action (mandamus) was brought by the
Attorney-General of Kansas to test the constitutionality of
a statute of the state. In disposing of the question whether
or not the state may bring the action, 'the Supreme Court
of Kansas said:
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People vs. Vera.
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The mere fact that the Probation Act has been repeatedly
relied upon in the past and all that time has not been
attacked as unconstitutional by the Fiscal of Manila but, on
the contrary, has been impliedly regarded by him as
constitutional, is no reason for considering the People of
the Philippines estopped from now assailing its validity.
For courts will pass upon a constitutional question only
when presented before it in bona fide cases for
determination, and the fact that the question has not been
raised before is not a valid reason for refusing to allow it to
be raised later. The fiscal and all others are justified in
relying upon the statute and treating it as valid until it is
held void by the courts in proper cases.
It remains to consider whether the determination of the
constitutionality of Act No. 4221 is necessary to the
resolution of the instant case. For, "* * * while the court
will meet the question with firmness, where its decision is
indispensable, it is the part of wisdom, and a just respect
for the legislature, renders it proper, to waive it, if the case
in which it arises, can be decided on other points." (Ex
parte Randolph [1833], 20 F. Cas. No. 11,558; 2 Brock. 447.
Vide, also, Hoover vs. Wood [1857], 9 Ind., 286, 287.) It has
been held that the determination of a constitutional
question is necessary whenever it is essential to the
decision of the case (12 C. J., p. 782, citing Long Sault Dev.
Co. vs. Kennedy [1913], 158 App. Div., 398; 143 N. Y.
Supp., 454 [aff. 212 N. Y., 1; 105 N. E., 849; Ann. Cas.
1915D, 56; and app dism 242 U. S., 272] ; Hesse vs.
Ledesma, 7 Porto Rico Fed., 520; Cowan vs. Doddridge, 22
Gratt [63 Va.], 458; Union Line Co. vs. Wisconsin R.
Commn., 146 Wis., 523; 129 N. W., 605), as where the right
of a party is? founded solely on a statute, the validity of
which is attacked. (12 C. J., p. 782, citing Central Glass Co.
vs. Niagara F. Ins. Co., 131 La., 513; 59 S., 972; Cheney vs.
Beverly, 188 Mass., 81; 74 N. E., 306). There is no doubt
that the respondent Cu Unjieng draws his privilege to
probation solely from Act No. 4221 now being assailed.
Apart from the foregoing considerations, this court will
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cise thereof, * * *." (12 C. J., pp. 838, 839, and cases cited.)
If Act No. 4221, then, confers any pardoning power upon
the courts it is for that reason unconstitutional and void.
But does it?
In the famous Killitts decision involving an
embezzlement case, the Supreme Court of the United
States ruled in 1916 that an order indefinitely suspending
sentence was void. (Ex parte United States [1916], 242 U.
S., 27; 61 Law. ed., 129; L. R. A. 1917E, 1178; 37 Sup. Ct.
Rep., 72; Ann, Cas. 1917B, 355.) Chief Justice White, after
an exhaustive review of the authorities, expressed the
opinion of the court that under the common law the power
of the court was limited to temporary suspension and that
the right to suspend sentence absolutely and permanently
was vested in the executive branch of the government and
not in the judiciary. But, the right of Congress to establish
probation by statute was conceded. Said the court through
its Chief Justice: " * * * and so far as the future is
concerned, that is, the causing of the imposition of
penalties as fixed to be subject, by probation legislation or
such other means as the legislative mind may devise, to
such judicial discretion as may be adequate to enable
courts to meet by the exercise of an enlarged but wise
discretion the infinite variations which may be presented to
them for judgment, recourse must be had to Congress
whose legislative power on the subject is in the very nature
of things adequately complete." ('Quoted in Riggs vs.
United States [1926], 14 F. [2d], 5, 6.) This decision led the
National Probation Association and others to agitate for
the enactment by Congress of a federal probation law. Such
action was finally taken on March 4, 1925 (chap. 521, 43
Stat. at L. 1259, U. S. C. title 18, sec. 724). This was
followed by an appropriation to defray the salaries and
expenses of a certain number of probation officers chosen
by civil service. (Johnson, Probation for Juveniles and
Adults, p. 14.)
In United States vs. Murray ([1925], 275 U. S., 347; 48
Sup. Ct. Rep;., 146; 72 Law. ed., 309), the Supreme Court
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People vs. Vera.
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State vs. Teal [1918], 108 S. C., 455; 95 S. E., 69; State vs.
Abbot [1910], 87 S. C., 466; 33 L. R. A. [N. S.], 112; 70 S. E.,
6; Ann. Cas., 1912B, 1189; Fults vs. State [1854], 34 Tenn.,
232; Woods vs. State [1814], 180 Tenn., 100; 169 S. W., 558;
Baker vs. State. [1913], 70 Tex., Crim. Rep., 618; 158 S. W.,
998; Cook vs. State [1914], 73 Tex. Crim. Rep., 548; 165 S.
W., 573; King vs. State [1914], 72 Tex. Crim. Rep., 394; 162
S. W., 890; Clare vs. State [1932], 122 Tex. Crim. Rep., 211;
54 S. W. [2d], 127; Re Hall [1927], 100 Vt., 197; 136 A., 24;
Richardson vs. Com. [1921], 131 Va., 802; 109 S. E., 460;
State vs. Mallahan [1911], 65 Wash., 287; 118 Pac., 42;
State ex rel Tingstad vs. Starwich [1922], 119 Wash., 561;
206' Pac., 29; 26 A. L. R., 393; 396.) We elect to follow this
long catena of authorities holding that the courts may be
legally authorized by the legislature to suspend sentence by
the establishment of a system of probation however
characterized. State ex rel. Tingstad vs. Starwich ([1922],
119 Wash., 561; 206 Pac., 29; 26 A. L. R., 393), deserved
particular mention. In that case, a statute enacted in 1921
which provided for the suspension of the execution of a
sentence until otherwise ordered by the court, and required
that the convicted person be placed under the charge of a
parole or peace officer during the term of such suspension,
on such terms as the court may determine, was held
constitutional and as not giving the court a power in
violation of the constitutional provision vesting the
pardoning power in the chief executive of the state. (Vide,
also, Re Giannini [1912], 18 Cal. App., 166; 122 Pac., 831.)
Probation and pardon are not coterminous; nor are they
the same. They are actually distinct and different from
each other, both in origin and in nature. In People ex rel
Forsyth vs. Court of Sessions ([1894], 141 N. Y., 288, 294;
36 N. E., 386, 388; 23 L. R. A., 856; 15 Am. Crim. Rep.,
675), the Court of Appeals of New York said:
"* * * The power to suspend sentence and the power to
grant reprieves and pardons, as understood when the
constitution was adopted, are totally distinct and different
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of the Probation Act for this cause." (Archer vs. Snook [1926], 10
F. [2d], 567, 569.)
"That the power to suspend the sentence does not conflict with the
power of the Governor to grant reprieves is settled by the
decisions of the various courts; it being held that the distinction
between a 'reprieve' and a suspension of sentence is that a
reprieve postpones the execution of the sentence to a day certain,
whereas a suspension is for an indefinite time. (Carnal vs. People,
1 Parker, Cr. R., 262; In re Buchanan, 146 N. Y., 264; 40 N. E.,
883), and cases cited in 7 Words & Phrases, pp. 6115, 6116. This
law cannot be held in conflict with the power confiding in the
Governor to grant commutations of punishment, for a
commutation is but to change the punishment assessed to a less
punishment."
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arisen. But, in the case at bar, the legislature has not made
the operation of the Probation Act contingent upon
specified facts or conditions to be ascertained by the
provincial board. It leaves, as we have already said, the
entire operation or non-operation of the law upon the
provincial boards. The discretion vested is arbitrary
because it is absolute and unlimited. A provincial board
need not investigate conditions or find any fact, or await
the happening of any specified contingency. It is bound by
no rule,—limited by no principle of expediency announced
by the legislature. It may take into consideration certain
facts or conditions; and, again, it may not. It may have any
purpose or no purpose at all. It need not give any reason or
have any reason whatsoever for refusing or failing to
appropriate any funds for the salary of a probation officer.
This is a matter which rests entirely at Its pleasure. The
fact that at some future time—we cannot say when—the
provincial boards may appropriate funds for the salaries of
probation officers and thus put the law into operation in
the various provinces will not save the statute. The time of
its taking into effect, we reiterate, would yet be based
solely upon the will of the provincial boards and not upon
the happening of a certain specified contingency, or upon
the ascertainment of certain facts or conditions by a person
or body other than the legislature itself.
The various provincial boards are, in practical effect,
endowed with the power of suspending the operation of the
Probation Law in their respective provinces. In some
jurisdictions, constitutions provide that laws may be
suspended only by the legislature or by its authority. Thus,
section 28, article I of the Constitution of Texas provides
that "No power of suspending laws in this state shall be
exercised except by the legislature"; and section 26, article
I of the Constitution of Indiana provides "That the
operation of the laws shall never be suspended, except by
authority of the General Assembly." Yet, even provisions of
this sort do not confer absolute power of suspension upon
the legislature. While it may be undoubted that the
legislature
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Law. ed., 1145; Yick Wo vs. Hopkins [1886], 118 U. S., 356;
30 Law. ed., 220; Williams vs. Mississippi [1897], 170 U. S.,
218; 18 Sup. Ct. Rep., 583; 42 Law. ed., 1012; Bailey vs.
Alabama [1911], 219 U. S., 219; 31 Sup. Ct. Rep. 145; 55
Law. ed., 191; Sunday Lake Iron Co. vs. Wakefield [1918],
247 U. S., 450; 38 Sup. Ct. Rep., 495; 62 Law. ed., 1154.) In
other words, statutes may be adjudged unconstitutional
because of their effect in operation (General Oil Co. vs.
Clain [1907], 209 U. S., 211; 28 Sup. Ct. Rep., 475; 52 Law.
ed., 754; State vs. Clement Nat Bank [1911], 84 Vt., 167; 78
Atl., 944; Ann. Cas., 1912D, 22). If a law has the effect of
denying the equal protection of the law it is
unconstitutional. (6 R. C. L. p. 372; Civil Rights Cases, 109
U. S., 3; 3 Sup. Ct. Rep., 18; 27 Law. ed., 835; Yick Wo vs.
Hopkins, supra; State vs. Montgomery, 94 Me., 192; 47 Atl.,
165; 80 A. S. R., 386; State vs. Dering, 84 Wis., 585; 54 N.
W., 1104; 36 A. S. R., 948; 19 L. R. A,, 858.) Under section
11 of the Probation Act, not only may said Act be in force in
one or several provinces and not be in force in the other
provinces, but one province may appropriate for the salary
of a probation officer of a given year—and have probation
during that year—and thereafter decline to make further
appropriation, and have no probation in subsequent years.
While this situation goes rather to the abuse of discretion
which delegation implies, it is here indicated to show that
the Probation Act sanctions a situation which is intolerable
in a government of laws, and to prove how easy it is, under
the Act, to make the guaranty of the equality clause but "a
rope of sand". (Brewer, J. Gulf C. & S. F. Ry. Co. vs. Ellis
[1897], 165 U. S., 150, 154; 41 Law. ed., 666; 17 Sup. Ct.
Rep., 255.)
Great reliance is placed by counsel for the respondents
on the case of Ocampo vs. United States ([1914], 234 U. S.,
91; 58 Law. ed., 1231). In that case, the Supreme Court of
the United States affirmed the decision of this court (18
Phil., 1) by declining to uphold the contention that there
was a denial of the equal protection of the laws because, as
held in Missouri vs. Lewis (Bowman vs. Lewis) decided
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