Presumption of Innocence

Del Castillo v. People, 664 SCRA 430 (2012) 

FACTS:
 Pursuant to a confidential information that petitioner Del Castillo was engaged in selling
shabu, police officers headed by SPO3 Masnayon, after conducting surveillance and test-buy
operation at the house of petitioner, secured a search warrant from the RTC. Upon arrival to
the residence of Del Castillo to implement the search warrant, SPO3 Masnayon claimed that
he saw petitioner run towards a small structure, a nipa hut, in front of his house. Masnayon
chased him but to no avail, because he and his men were not familiar with the entrances and
exits of the place. They all went back to the residence of Del Castillo and requested his men
to get a barangay tanod and a few minutes thereafter, his men returned with two barangay
tanods who searched the house of petitioner including the nipa hut where the petitioner
allegedly ran for cover. His men who searched the residence of the petitioner found nothing,
but one of the barangay tanods was able to confiscate from the nipa hut several articles,
including four (4) plastic packs containing white crystalline substance.
 
Thus, an information was filed against Del Castillo for violation of Section 16, Article III of
R.A. 6425 and was found guilty by the RTC and affirmed by the Court of Appeals. Petitioner
filed with the Supreme Court the petition for certiorari contending among others that CA erred
in finding him guilty beyond reasonable doubt of illegal possession of prohibited drugs,
because he could not be presumed to be in possession of the same just because they were
found inside the nipa hut.

RULING: By virtue of the above provisions, the police officers, as well as the barangay
tanods were acting as agents of a person in authority during the conduct of the search. Thus, the
search conducted was unreasonable and the confiscated items are inadmissible in evidence.
Assuming ex gratia argumenti that the barangay tanod who found the confiscated items is
considered a private individual, thus, making the same items admissible in evidence, petitioner's
third argument that the prosecution failed to establish constructive possession of the regulated
drugs seized, would still be meritorious.

While it is not necessary that the property to be searched or seized should be owned by the person
against whom the search warrant is issued, there must be sufficient showing that the property is
under appellant’s control or possession.29 The CA, in its Decision, referred to the possession of
regulated drugs by the petitioner as a constructive one. Constructive possession exists when the drug
is under the dominion and control of the accused or when he has the right to exercise dominion and
control over the place where it is found.30 The records are void of any evidence to show that
petitioner owns the nipa hut in question nor was it established that he used the said structure as a
shop. The RTC, as well as the CA, merely presumed that petitioner used the said structure due to the
presence of electrical materials, the petitioner being an electrician by profession. The CA, in its
Decision, noted a resolution by the investigating prosecutor, thus:

x x x As admitted by respondent's wife, her husband is an electrician by occupation. As such,

conclusion could be arrived at that the structure, which housed the electrical equipments is actually
used by the respondent. Being the case, he has control of the things found in said structure.31
In addition, the testimonies of the witnesses for the prosecution do not also provide proof as to the
ownership of the structure where the seized articles were found. During their direct testimonies,
they just said, without stating their basis, that the same structure was the shop of petitioner.32
During the direct testimony of SPO1 Pogoso, he even outrightly concluded that the electrical
shop/nipa hut was owned by petitioner
The prosecution must prove that the petitioner had knowledge of the existence and presence of
the drugs in the place under his control and dominion and the character of the drugs. With the 35 

prosecution's failure to prove that the nipa hut was under petitioner's control and dominion, there
casts a reasonable doubt as to his guilt. In considering a criminal case, it is critical to start with
the law's own starting perspective on the status of the accused - in all criminal prosecutions, he is
presumed innocent of the charge laid unless the contrary is proven beyond reasonable
doubt. Proof beyond reasonable doubt, or that quantum of proof sufficient to produce a moral
36 

certainty that would convince and satisfy the conscience of those who act in judgment, is
indispensable to overcome the constitutional presumption of innocence. 37 

Right to be Heard, Miguel vs. Sandiganbayan, 675 SCRA

FACTS:

The petitioner, a former Municipal Mayor of Koronadal City, was charged with violation of Sec. 13 of
RA 3019 in connection with the consultancy services for the proposed Koronadal City public market.

The information for violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019 reads: “..former Municipal Mayor of
Koronadal, South Cotabato, and as such while in the performance of his official functions, committing
the offense in relation to his office, taking advantage of his official position, conspiring and
confederating with the private [individuals] xxx acting with evident bad faith and manifest partiality,
did then and there willfully, unlawfully and criminally give unwarranted benefits and advantages to
said [accused]..”

The petitioner claims that the Sandiganbayan gravely abused its discretion in ordering his suspension
despite the failure of the information to allege that the giving of unwarranted benefits and
advantages by the petitioner was made through "manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross
inexcusable negligence." He alleges that the phrases "evident bad faith" and "manifest partiality"
actually refers not to him, but to his co-accused, rendering the information fatally defective.

HELD: The pre-suspension order is valid

Section 13 of R.A. No. 3019 reads:

Section 13. Suspension and loss of benefits. Any public officer against whom any criminal prosecution
under a valid information under this Act or under the provisions of the Revised Penal Code on bribery
is pending in court, shall be suspended from office. Should he be convicted by final judgment, he
shall lose all retirement or gratuity benefits under any law, but if he is acquitted, he shall be entitled
to reinstatement and to the salaries and benefits which he failed to receive during suspension, unless
in the meantime administrative proceedings have been filed against him.
While the suspension of a public officer under this provision is mandatory,37 the suspension requires
a prior hearing to determine "the validity of the information"38 filed against him, "taking into
account the serious and far reaching consequences of a suspension of an elective public official even
before his conviction."39 The accused public official’s right to challenge the validity of the
information before a suspension order may be issued includes the right to challenge the (i) validity of
the criminal proceeding leading to the filing of an information against him, and (ii) propriety of his
prosecution on the ground that the acts charged do not constitute a violation of R.A. No. 3019 or of
the provisions on bribery of the Revised Penal Code.

In the case at bar, while there was no pre-suspension hearing held to determine the validity of the
Informations that had been filed against petitioners, we believe that the numerous pleadings filed for
and against them have achieved the goal of this procedure. The right to due process is satisfied nor
just by an oral hearing but by the filing and the consideration by the court of the parties' pleadings,
memoranda and other position papers.

Since a pre-suspension hearing is basically a due process requirement, when an accused public
official is given an adequate opportunity to be heard on his possible defenses against the mandatory
suspension under R.A. No. 3019, then an accused would have no reason to complain that no actual
hearing was conducted.47 It is well settled that "to be heard" does not only mean oral arguments in
court; one may be heard also through pleadings. Where opportunity to be heard, either through oral
arguments or pleadings, has been accorded, no denial of procedural due process exists.48

In the present case, the petitioner (i) filed his Vigorous Opposition (to the OSP’s Motion to Suspend
Accused Pendente Lite), and after receiving an adverse ruling from the Sandiganbayan, (ii) moved for
reconsideration of the suspension order issued against him, and (iii) filed a Reply to the OSP’s
Opposition to his plea for reconsideration.49 Given this opportunity, we find that the petitioner’s
continued demand for the conduct of an actual pre-suspension hearing – based on the same alleged
"defect in the information,"50 which we have found wanting – has legally nothing to anchor itself on.

Another reason that militates against the petitioner’s position relates to the nature of Section 13 of
R.A. No. 3019; it is not a penal provision that would call for a liberal interpretation in favor of the
accused public official and a strict construction against the State.51 The suspension required under
this provision is not a penalty, as it is not imposed as a result of judicial proceedings; in fact, if
acquitted, the accused official shall be entitled to reinstatement and to the salaries and benefits
which he failed to receive during his suspension.52

Rather, the suspension under Section 13 of R.A. No. 3019 is a mere preventive measure53 that arises
from the legal presumption that unless the accused is suspended, he may frustrate his prosecution or
commit further acts of malfeasance or do both, in the same way that upon a finding that there is
probable cause to believe that a crime has been committed and that the accused is probably guilty
thereof, the law requires the judge to issue a warrant for the arrest of the accused.54
Suspension under R.A. No. 3019 being a mere preventive measure whose duration shall in no case
exceed ninety (90) days,55 the adequacy of the opportunity to contest the validity of the information
and of the proceedings that preceded its filing vis-à-vis the merits of the defenses of the accused
cannot be measured alone by the absence or presence of an actual hearing. An opportunity to be
heard on one’s defenses, however unmeritorious it may be, against the suspension mandated by law
equally and sufficiently serves both the due process right of the accused and the mandatory nature
of the suspension required by law.

On appeal, Lara pointed out several errors that supposedly attended his conviction. First, that he was
arrested without a warrant under circumstances that do not justify a warrantless arrest rendered
void all proceedings including those that led to his conviction. Second, he was not assisted by counsel
when the police placed him in a line-up to be identified by the witnesses for the prosecution in
violation of Section 12, Article III of the Constitution. The police line-up is part of custodial
investigation and his right to counsel had already attached.

Contrary to Lara’s claim, that he was not provided with counsel when he was placed in a police line-
up did not invalidate the proceedings leading to his conviction. That he stood at the police line-up
without the assistance of counsel did not render Sumulong’s identification of Lara inadmissible. The
right to counsel is deemed to have arisen at the precise moment custodial investigation begins and
being made to stand in a police line-up is not the starting point or a part of custodial investigation. As
this Court previously ruled in People v. Amestuzo:22
The contention is not meritorious. The guarantees of Sec. 12 (1), Art. III of the 1987 Constitution, or
the so-called Miranda rights, may be invoked only by a person while he is under custodial
investigation. Custodial investigation starts when the police investigation is no longer a general
inquiry into an unsolved crime but has begun to focus on a particular suspect taken into custody by
the police who starts the interrogation and propounds questions to the person to elicit incriminating
statements. Police line-up is not part of the custodial investigation; hence, the right to counsel
guaranteed by the Constitution cannot yet be invoked at this stage. This was settled in the case of
People vs. Lamsing and in the more recent case of People vs. Salvatierra. The right to be assisted by
counsel attaches only during custodial investigation and cannot be claimed by the accused during
identification in a police line-up because it is not part of the custodial investigation process. This is
because during a police line-up, the process has not yet shifted from the investigatory to the
accusatory and it is usually the witness or the complainant who is interrogated and who gives a
statement in the course of the line-up

3. Right to Counsel

The defense contends that Atty. Mangallay was retained by Alfredo Kinao and not by appellant. It is
also argued that the said lawyer was unable to advise or to explain the contents of the extrajudicial
confession to the appellant before the latter signed it.

We are not persuaded. At the outset, we must clarify that the right to counsel does not mean that
the accused must personally hire his own counsel. The constitutional requirement is satisfied when a
counsel is (1) engaged by anyone acting on behalf of the person under investigation or (2) appointed
by the court upon petition of the said person or by someone on his behalf.22 Thus, that Atty.
Mangallay was retained not by the appellant personally but by his uncle, Alfredo Kinao, is not proof
of counsel deprivation. The fact remains that Kinao, in hiring the counsel, acted on behalf of
Appellant Espiritu. Besides, Espiritu did not object when Atty. Mangallay represented him during the
investigations before the police and the city prosecutor. In fact, he expressly acknowledged Atty.
Mangallay as his counsel.23cräläwvirtualibräry

The meaning of competent counsel was explained in People v. Deniega24 as follows:

xxx [T]he lawyer called to be present during such investigations should be as far as reasonably
possible, the choice of the individual undergoing questioning. If the lawyer were one furnished in the
accuseds behalf, it is important that he should be competent and independent, i.e., that he is willing
to fully safeguard the constitutional rights of the accused, as distinguished from one who would
merely be giving a routine, peremptory and meaningless recital of the individuals constitutional
rights. In People v. Basay,25 this Court stressed that an accuseds right to be informed of the right to
remain silent and to counsel contemplates the transmission of meaningful information rather than
just the ceremonial and perfunctory recitation of an abstract constitutional principle.

Ideally therefore, a lawyer engaged for an individual facing custodial investigation (if the latter could
not afford one) should be engaged by the accused (himself), or by the latters relative or person
authorized by him to engage an attorney or by the court, upon proper petition of the accused or
person authorized by the accused to file such petition. Lawyers engaged by the police, whatever
testimonials are given as proof of their probity and supposed independence, are generally suspect, as
in many areas, the relationship between lawyers and law enforcement authorities can be symbiotic.

xxx

x x x The competent or independent lawyer so engaged should be present from the beginning to end,
i.e., at all stages of the interview, counseling or advising caution reasonably at every turn of the
investigation, and stopping the interrogation once in a while either to give advice to the accused that
he may either continue, choose to remain silent or terminate the interview.

Undoubted is the competence of Atty. Mangallay who was himself presented by the prosecution as
witness. Without violating the rule on privileged communication, he testified:
PEOPLE VS. JUDGE AYSON G.R. No. 85215 July 7, 1989

DOCTRINE:

The right against self-incrimination is not self- executing or automatically operational. It must be
claimed. If not claimed by or in behalf of the witness, the protection does not come into play. It
follows that the right may be waived, expressly, or impliedly, as by a failure to claim it at the
appropriate time.

FACTS:

Private respondent Felipe Ramos was a ticket freight clerk of the Philippine Airlines (PAL), assigned at
its Baguio City station. It having allegedly come to light that he was involved in irregularities in the
sales of plane tickets, the PAL management notified him of an investigation to be conducted into the
matter of February 9, 1986. During the investigation, Ramos’ answers were to the effect inter alia
that he had not indeed made disclosure of the tickets mentioned in the Audit Team’s findings, that
the proceeds had been “misused” by him, that although he had planned on paying back the money,
he had been prevented from doing so, “perhaps (by) shame,” that he was still willing to settle his
obligation, and proferred a “compromise x x to pay on staggered basis, (and) the amount would be
known in the next investigation.”

About two (2) months later, an information was filed against Felipe Ramos charging him with the
crime of estafa. On arraignment on this charge, Felipe Ramos entered a plea of “Not Guilty,” and trial
thereafter ensued. The prosecution of the case was undertaken by lawyers of PAL under the
direction and supervision of the Fiscal.

The private prosecutors made a written offer of evidence which included “the (above mentioned)
statement of accused Felipe J. Ramos taken on February 9, 1986 at PAL Baguio City Ticket Office,”
which had been marked as Exhibit A, as well as his handwritten admission given on February 8, 1986,
also marked as Exhibit K.

The respondent judge declared Exhibit A “inadmissible in evidence, it appearing that the accused was
not reminded of his constitutional rights to remain silent and to have counsel, and that when he
waived the same and gave his statement, it was [not] with the assistance actually of a counsel.” He
also declared inadmissible “Exhibit K, the handwritten admission made by accused Felipe J. Ramos,
for the same reason stated in the exclusion of Exhibit ‘A’ since it does not appear that the accused
was assisted by counsel when he made said admission.”

The private prosecutors filed a motion for reconsideration which was subsequently denied.
Consequently, they filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition.
ISSUE:

WON respondent judge acted with grave abuse of discretion when it excluded the People’s Exhibits A
and K.

HELD:

Yes. At the core of the controversy is Section 20, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution, to which
respondent Judge has given a construction that is disputed by the People. The section reads as
follows:

SEC. 20. No person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself Any person under investigation
for the commission of an offense shall have the right to remain silent and to counsel, and to be
informed of such right. No force, violence, threat, intimidation, or any other means which vitiates the
free will shall be used against him. Any confession obtained in violation of this section shall be
inadmissible in evidence.

It should at once be apparent that there are two (2) rights, or sets of rights, dealt with in the section,
namely:

1) the right against self-incrimination — i.e., the right of a person not to be compelled to be a witness
against himself — set out in the first sentence, which is a verbatim reproduction of Section 18, Article
III of the 1935 Constitution, and is similar to that accorded by the Fifth Amendment of the American
Constitution, 12 and

2) the rights of a person in custodial interrogation, i.e., the rights of every suspect “under
investigation for the commission of an offense.”

That first sentence of Section 20, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution does not impose on the judge, or
other officer presiding over a trial, hearing or investigation, any affirmative obligation to advise a
witness of his right against self-incrimination. It is a right that a witness knows or should know, in
accordance with the well known axiom that every one is presumed to know the law, that ignorance
of the law excuses no one. Furthermore, in the very nature of things, neither the judge nor the
witness can be expected to know in advance the character or effect of a question to be put to the
latter.

The right against self-incrimination is not self- executing or automatically operational. It must be
claimed. If not claimed by or in behalf of the witness, the protection does not come into play. It
follows that the right may be waived, expressly, or impliedly, as by a failure to claim it at the
appropriate time.

The second sentence refers the rights of persons “under investigation for the commission of an
offense,” i.e., “suspects” under investigation by police authorities; and this is what makes these rights
different from that embodied in the first sentence, that against self-incrimination which, as
aforestated, indiscriminately applies to any person testifying in any proceeding, civil, criminal, or
administrative.

The rights above specified, to repeat, exist only in “custodial interrogations,” or “in-custody
interrogation of accused persons.” And, as this Court has already stated, by custodial interrogation is
meant “questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody
or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way.”

It is clear from the undisputed facts of this case that Felipe Ramos was not in any sense under
custodial interrogation, as the term should be properly understood, prior to and during the
administrative inquiry into the discovered irregularities in ticket sales in which he appeared to have
had a hand. The constitutional rights of a person under custodial interrogation under Section 20,
Article IV of the 1973 Constitution did not therefore come into play, were of no relevance to the
inquiry. It is also clear, too, that Ramos had voluntarily answered questions posed to him on the first
day of the administrative investigation, February 9, 1986 and agreed that the proceedings should be
recorded, the record having thereafter been marked during the trial of the criminal action
subsequently filed against him as Exhibit A, just as it is obvious that the note (later marked as Exhibit
K) that he sent to his superiors on February 8,1986, the day before the investigation, offering to
compromise his liability in the alleged irregularities, was a free and even spontaneous act on his part.
They may not be excluded on the ground that the so-called “Miranda rights” had not been accorded
to Ramos.

The writ of certiorari is granted.

1. Right to Speedy, Impartial and Public Trial, Villareal vs. People 664 SCRA
FACTS:

In February 1991, seven freshmen law students of the Ateneo de Manila University School of Law
signified their intention to join the Aquila Legis Juris Fraternity (Aquila Fraternity). Hazing was pre-
requisite in joining for which Lenny was one of few who had undergone the process. After the
initiation, Lenny’s condition worsened due to the blows he received, the Aquilans rushed him to the
hospital. Lenny was pronounced dead on arrival.

Consequently, a criminal case for homicide was filed against the 35 Aquilans. Four of the accused
(Tecson, et. al.) were found to be guilty of homicide by the trial court but was reduced to crime of
slight physical injuries and sentenced to 20 days of arresto menor by the Court of Appeals. However,
upon appeal to the Supreme Court by the Office of the Solicitor General, the Supreme Court ruled
that they should be liable for reckless imprudence resulting in homicide instead.

In Motions for Clarification or Reconsideration, Tecson et. al. clarified the effect of the decision of the
Supreme Court to their criminal liability. According to Tecson et. al., they immediately applied for
probation after the CA rendered its Decision lowering their criminal liability from the crime of
homicide, which carries a non-probationable sentence, to slight physical injuries, which carries a
probationable sentence. Hence, they have already been discharged from their criminal liability and
the cases against them closed and terminated by virtue of their granted Applications for Probation
for which the terms therein are already been complied with.

[4] G.R. Nos. 178057 and 178080 (Villa v. Escalona): Did the CA err in dismissing the case for violation
of the accused's right to speedy trial?

We do not see grave abuse of discretion in the CAs dismissal of the case against accused Escalona,
Ramos, Saruca, and Adriano on the basis of the violation of their right to speedy trial.

While we are prepared to concede that some of the foregoing factors that contributed to the delay
of the trial of the petitioners are justifiable, We nonetheless hold that their right to speedy trial has
been utterly violated in this case.

The absence of the records in the trial court [was] due to the fact that the records of the case were
elevated to the Court of Appeals, and the prosecutions failure to comply with the order of the court a
quo requiring it to secure certified true copies of the same. What is glaring from the records is the
fact that as early as September 21, 1995, the court a quo already issued an Order requiring the
prosecution, through the Department of Justice, to secure the complete records of the case from the
Court of Appeals. The prosecution did not comply with the said Order as in fact, the same directive
was repeated by the court a quo in an Order dated December 27, 1995. Still, there was no
compliance on the part of the prosecution. It is not stated when such order was complied with. It
appears, however, that even until August 5, 2002, the said records were still not at the disposal of
the trial court because the lack of it was made the basis of the said court in granting the motion to
dismiss filed by co-accused Concepcion.

It is likewise noticeable that from December 27, 1995, until August 5, 2002, or for a period of almost
seven years, there was no action at all on the part of the court a quo. Except for the pleadings filed
by both the prosecution and the petitioners, the latest of which was on January 29, 1996, followed by
petitioner Sarucas motion to set case for trial on August 17, 1998 which the court did not act upon,
the case remained dormant for a considerable length of time. This prolonged inactivity whatsoever is
precisely the kind of delay that the constitution frowns upon.

From the foregoing principles, we affirm the ruling of the CA in CA-G.R. SP No. 89060 that accused
Escalona et al.s right to speedy trial was violated. Since there is nothing in the records that would
show that the subject of this Petition includes accused Ampil, S. Fernandez, Cabangon, and De Vera,
the effects of this ruling shall be limited to accused Escalona, Ramos, Saruca, and Adriano.