SIMEON LAPI Y MAHIPUS v. PEOPLE, GR No.

210731, 2019-02-13
Facts:
The trial court found Simeon M. Lapi (Lapi) guilty beyond reasonable doubt of having
violated Article II, Section 15 of Republic Act No. 9165
In an Information dated April 20, 2006, Lapi, Allen Sacare (Sacare), and Kenneth Lim
(Lim) were charged with violation of Article II, Section 15 of Republic Act No. 9165. T
On arraignment, Lapi, Sacare, and Lim pleaded not guilty to the crime charged. At pre-
trial, Sacare and Lim changed their pleas to guilty, and were sentenced to rehabilitation
for six (6) months at a government-recognized center. Only Lapi was subjected to trial
on the merits.
According to the prosecution, at around 1:50 p.m. on April 17, 2006, operatives of the
Bacolod City Anti-Illegal Drug Special Operation Task Group conducted a stake-out
operation in Purok Sigay, Barangay 2, Bacolod City. During the operation, Police Officer
2 Ronald Villeran (PO2 Villeran) heard noises from one (1) of the houses. He "peeped
through its window"[8] and saw Lapi, Sacare, and Lim "having a pot session."
PO2 Villeran tried to enter the house through the main door, but the door was locked.
He then tried to enter through the kitchen door. Upon entry, he met someone trying to
flee, but PO2 Villeran restrained the person.
Then, PO2 Villeran "peeked into the adjacent room"[11] and saw that the pot session
was ongoing. He entered the room and introduced himself as a police officer. Lapi,
Sacare, and Lim tried to escape, but were caught b PO2 Villeran's team members, who
were waiting by the main door.
the Regional Trial Court found Lapi guilty. It ruled that the warrantless arrest against him
was legal since he was caught in flagrante delicto.
Lapi appealed to the Court of Appeals.
the Court of Appeals denied the Appeal and affirmed the Regional Trial Court Decision
The Court of Appeals ruled that PO2 Villeran, upon seeing the pot session, "had
reasonable ground to believe that [Lapi was] under the influence of dangerous drugs.
Thus, he was justified and even obligated by law to subject him to drug screening
laboratory examination."
Lapi filed a Motion for Reconsideration,[24] but it was denied by the Court of Appeals
Petitioner asserts that while he failed to question the validity of his arrest before entering
his plea, his warrantless arrest was illegal from the start. Hence, any evidence obtained
cannot be used against him. He argues that PO2 Villeran committed "a malevolent
intrusion of privacy"[28] when he peeped through the window; had he not done so, he
would not see what the people in the house did.[29] He contends that this intrusion into
his privacy "cannot be equated in plain view[;] therefore[,] petitioner cannot be
considered caught in flagrante delicto."[30] He submits that to "rule otherwise would be
like giving authority to every police officer to intrude into the private homes of anyone in
order to catch suspended drug offenders."
Respondent,... asserts that the warrantless arrest was valid, as "[t]he act of having a pot
session is clearly the overt act required under the law, which indicates that petitioner is
actually committing an offense."[33] It argues that what prompted PO2 Villeran to enter
the house was not the noise from one (1) of the houses, but what he saw petitioner and
his companions were doing in the house where they were apprehended.
Further, respondent claims that since petitioner was not the owner of that house, he had
no "reasonable expectation of privacy that must be upheld."[35] It submits that "[a]
houseguest who was merely present in the house with the consent of the householder
cannot claim a reasonable expectation of privacy in his host's home."
Issues:
This Court is asked to resolve the Issue of whether or not the warrantless arrest against
petitioner Simeon M. Lapi was valid.
Ruling:
The Constitution guarantees against "unreasonable" warrantless searches and
seizures. This presupposes that the State may do so as long as they are reasonable.
People v. Aruta[49] outlines the situations where a warrantless search and seizure may
be declared valid:Warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest recognized under
Section 12, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court and by prevailing jurisprudence;Seizure of
evidence in "plain view," the elements of which are:   (a) a prior valid intrusion based on
the valid warrantless arrest in which the police are legally present in the pursuit of their
official duties;   (b) the evidence was inadvertently discovered by the police who had the
right to be where they are;   (c) the evidence must be immediately apparent[;] and   (d)
"plain view" justified mere seizure of evidence without further search;Search of a
moving vehicle. Highly regulated by the government, the vehicle's inherent mobility
reduces expectation of privacy especially when its transit in public thoroughfares
furnishes a highly reasonable suspicion amounting to probable cause that the occupant
committed a criminal activity;Consented warrantless search;Customs search;Stop and
Frisk; andExigent and Emergency Circumstances.
Here, petitioner was seen by police officers participating in a "pot session."
Here, however, petitioner admits that he failed to question the validity of his arrest
before arraignment.[56] He did not move to quash the Information against him before
entering his plea.[57] He was assisted by counsel when he entered his plea.[58]
Likewise, he was able to present his evidence.
What he questions is the alleged illegality of his arrest.Petitioner, however, has already
waived the right to question the validity of his arrest. No items were seized from him
during his arrest as he was not charged with possession or sale of illegal drugs . Thus
the trial court and the Court of Appeals did not err in finding him guilty beyond
reasonable doubt in violation of Article II, Section 15 of Republic Act No. 9165.
MARIO VERIDIANO vs. PEOPLE
G.R. No. 200370
June 7, 2017
(warrantless searches, requisites)

Facts:

1.) At about 7:20am of 15 January 2008, a concerned citizen called a certain PO3 Esteves, police radio
operator of the Nagcarlan Police Station, informing him that a certain alias “Baho” who was later identified
as Veridiano, was on the way to San Pablo City to obtain illegal drugs.

PO3 Esteves immediately relayed the information to PO1 Cabello and PO3 Alvin Vergara who were both
on duty. Chief of Police June Urquia instructed PO1 Cabello and PO2 Vergara to set up a checkpoint at
Barangay Taytay, Nagcarlan, Laguna.

The police officers at the checkpoint personally knew Veridiano. They chanced upon Veridiano at around
10PM inside a passenger jeepney coming from San Pablo, Laguna. They flagged down the jeepney and
asked the passengers to disembark. The police officers instructed the passengers to raise their t-shirts to
check for possible concealed weapons and to remove the contents of their pockets.

The police officers recovered from Veridiano “a tea bag containing what appeared to be marijuana.” PO1
Cabello confiscated the tea bag and marked it with his initials. Veridiano was arrested and apprised of his
constitutional rights. He was then brought to the police station.

At the police station, PO1 Cabello turned over the seized tea bag to PO1 Solano, who also placed his
initials. PO1 Solano then made a laboratory examination request, which he personally brought with the
seized tea bag to the Philippine National Police crime laboratory. The contents of the tea bag tested
positive for marijuana.

2.) RTC found Veridiano guilty beyond reasonable doubt for the crime of illegal possession of marijuana.

3.) Veridiano appealed the decision of the trial court asserting that "he was illegally arrested." The CA
rendered a Decision affirming the guilt of Veridiano.

4.) The Court of Appeals found that "Veridiano was caught in flagrante delicto" of having marijuana in his
possession.

5.) Veridiano moved for reconsideration which was denied.

6.) Veridiano filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari. Petition was granted.

Issue:

Whether there was a valid warrantless search against petitioner

Ruling:
Petitioner's warrantless arrest was unlawful.

A search incidental to a lawful arrest requires that there must first be a lawful arrest before a search is
made. Otherwise stated, a lawful arrest must precede the search; "the process cannot be reversed." 78For
there to be a lawful arrest, law enforcers must be armed with a valid warrant. Nevertheless, an arrest may
also be effected without a warrant.

There are three (3) grounds that will justify a warrantless arrest. Rule 113, Section 5 of the Revised Rules
of Criminal Procedure provides:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Section 5. Arrest Without Warrant; When Lawful. — A peace officer or a private person may, without a
warrant, arrest a person:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is
attempting to commit an offense;

(b) When an offense has just been committed and he has probable cause to believe based on personal
knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed it; and

(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or place
where he is serving final judgment or is temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped
while being transferred from one confinement to another.

The first kind of warrantless arrest is known as an in flagrante delicto arrest. The validity of this
warrantless arrest requires compliance with the overt act test79 as explained in Cogaed:

[F]or a warrantless arrest of in flagrante delicto to be affected, "two elements must concur: (1) the person
to be arrested must execute an overt act indicating that he [or she] has just committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit a crime; and (2) such overt act is done in the presence or within
the view of the arresting officer.”

Failure to comply with the overt act test renders an in flagrante delicto arrest constitutionally infirm.
In Cogaed, the warrantless arrest was invalidated as an in flagrante delicto arrest because the accused
did not exhibit an overt act within the view of the police officers suggesting that he was in possession of
illegal drugs at the time he was apprehended.

Rule 113, Section 5(b) of the Rules of Court pertains to a hot pursuit arrest. 92 The rule requires that an
offense has just been committed. It connotes "immediacy in point of time."93 That a crime was in fact
committed does not automatically bring the case under this rule. 94 An arrest under Rule 113, Section 5(b)
of the Rules of Court entails a time element from the moment the crime is committed up to the point of
arrest.

In this case, petitioner's arrest could not be justified as an in flagrante delicto arrest under Rule 113,
Section 5(a) of the Rules of Court. He was not committing a crime at the checkpoint. Petitioner was
merely a passenger who did not exhibit any unusual conduct in the presence of the law enforcers that
would incite suspicion. In effecting the warrantless arrest, the police officers relied solely on the tip they
received. Reliable information alone is insufficient to support a warrantless arrest absent any overt act
from the person to be arrested indicating that a crime has just been committed, was being committed, or
is about to be committed.

The warrantless arrest cannot likewise be justified under Rule 113, Section 5(b) of the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure. The law enforcers had no personal knowledge of any fact or circumstance indicating
that petitioner had just committed an offense.

A hearsay tip by itself does not justify a warrantless arrest. Law enforcers must have personal knowledge
of facts, based on their observation, that the person sought to be arrested has just committed a crime.
This is what gives rise to probable cause that would justify a warrantless search under Rule 113, Section
5(b) of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure.

Moreover, petitioner's silence or lack of resistance can hardly be considered as consent to the
warrantless search. Although the right against unreasonable searches and seizures may be surrendered
through a valid waiver, the prosecution must prove that the waiver was executed with clear and
convincing evidence.134 Consent to a warrantless search and seizure must be "unequivocal, specific,
intelligently given . . . [and unattended] by duress or coercion."

In the present case, the extensive search conducted by the police officers exceeded the allowable limits
of warrantless searches. They had no probable cause to believe that the accused violated any law except
for the tip they received. They did not observe any peculiar activity from the accused that may either
arouse their suspicion or verify the tip. Moreover, the search was flawed at its inception. The checkpoint
was set up to target the arrest of the accused.

The warrantless search conducted by the police officers is invalid. Consequently, the tea bag containing
marijuana seized from petitioner is rendered inadmissible under the exclusionary principle in Article III,
Section 3(2) of the Constitution. There being no evidence to support his conviction, petitioner must be
acquitted.

WHEREFORE, the Decision dated July 16, 2010 of the Regional Trial Court in Criminal Case No. 16976-
SP and the Decision dated November 18, 2011 and Resolution dated January 25, 2012 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-GR. CR. No. 33588 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Petitioner Mario Veridiano y Sapi is
hereby ACQUITTED and is ordered immediately RELEASED from confinement unless he is being held
for some other lawful cause.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,  vs.JERIC PAVIA Y PALIZA @ "JERIC" 

Facts:

On 29 March 2005, at around 6:00 in the evening, a confidential informant reported to SPO3
Melchor delaPeña (SPO3 Dela Peña) of the San Pedro Municipal Police Station, San Pedro,
Laguna, that a pot session was taking place at the house of a certain "Obet" located at
Barangay Cuyab, San Pedro, Laguna. Upon receipt of the information, SPO3 Dela Peña formed
a team to conduct police operations against the suspect. The team was composed of the
confidential informant, PO2 Rommel Bautista (PO2 Bautista), PO3 Jay Parunggao (PO3
Parunggao), PO1 Jifford Signap and SPO3 Dela Peña as team leader. 3

At around 9:00 in the evening of the same date, the team proceeded to the target area. When
the team arrived, the members saw that Obet’s house was closed. Since the house was not
surrounded by a fence, PO2 Bautista approached the house and peeped through a small
opening in a window where he saw four persons in a circle having a pot session in the living
room. PO3 Parunggao then tried to find a way to enter the house and found an unlocked door.
He entered the house,followed by PO2 Bautista and they caught the four persons engaged in a
pot session by surprise. After they introduced themselves as police officers, they arrested the
four suspects and seized the drug paraphernalia found at the scene.  Among those arrested
4

were herein appellants, from each of whom a plastic sachet containing white crystalline
substance were confiscated by PO3 Parunggao after he conducted a body search on their
persons.  PO3 Parunggao marked the plastic sachet he seized from appellant Pavia with "JP,"
5

representing the initials of Jeric Pavia while that taken from appellant Buendia was marked, also
by PO3 Parunggao, with "JB," representing the initials of Juan Buendia.  These plastic sachets
6

were transmitted tothe crime laboratory for qualitative examination where they tested positive for
"shabu." 7

Consequently, appellants were charged with violation of Section 13, Article II of R.A. No. 9165
in two separate but identically worded informations which read:

That on or about 29 March 2005, in the Municipality of San Pedro, Province of Laguna,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court accused without authority of the
law, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have in his possession, control and
custody [of] METHAMPHETAMINE HYDROCHLORIDE, commonly known as shabu, a
dangerous drug, weighing zero point zero two (0.02) gram, in the company of two
persons.  When arraigned, both appellants pleaded not guilty to the offense.
8 9

A joint trial of the cases ensued.

In defense, appellants provided a different version of the incident. According to them, on the
questioned date and time, they were roaming the streets of Baranggay Cuyab, selling star
apples. A prospective buyer of the fruits called them over to his house and requested them to go
inside, to which they acceded. Whenthey were about to leave the house, several persons who
introduced themselves as policemen arrived and invited appellants to go with them to the
precinct. There, they were incarcerated and falsely charged with violation of the Comprehensive
Drugs Act of 2002. 10

The Ruling of the RTC

The trial court found that the prosecution was able to prove the offense charged through the
spontaneous, positive and credible testimony of its witness. Thus, the testimony of PO2 Bautista
on the witness stand, narrating the events leading to the apprehension of appellants, deserves
full faith and credit.
11

The Ruling of the Court of Appeals

On appeal, the CA affirmed the decision of the RTC, upon a finding that the evidence on record
support the trial court’s conclusion that a lawful arrest, search and seizure took place, and that
the prosecution fully discharged its burden of establishing, beyond reasonable doubt, all the
elements necessary for the conviction of the offense charged.

On the contention of appellants that their warrantless arrest was illegal and, therefore, the items
seized from them as a result of that arrest were inadmissible in evidence against them, the CA
held that this argument totally lacks merit.

Issue:

WON warrantless arrest was illegal

Held;

Paragraph (a) of Section 5 is commonly known as an in flagrante delicto arrest. For a

warrantless arrest of an accused caught in flagrante delictoto be valid, two requisites must
concur: (1) the person to be arrested must execute an overt act indicating that he has just
committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit a crime; and (2) such overt act is
done in the presence or within the view of the arresting officer.

After a careful evaluation of the evidence in its totality, we hold that the prosecution successfully
established that the petitioner was arrested in flagrante delicto.

We emphasize that the series of events that led the police to the house where the pot session
was conducted and to their arrest were triggered by a "tip" from a concerned citizen that a "pot
session" was in progress at the house of a certain "Obet" at Baranggay Cuyab, San Pedro,
Laguna. Under the circumstances, the police did not have enough time to secure a search
warrant considering the "time element" involved in the process (i.e., a pot session may not bean
extended period of time and it was then 9:00 p.m.). In view of the urgency, SPO3 Melchor dela
Peña immediately dispatched his men to proceed to the identified place to verify the report. At
the place, the responding police officers verified through a small opening in the window and saw
the accused-appellants and their other two (2) companions sniffing "shabu" to use the words of
PO2 Bautista. There was therefore sufficient probable cause for the police officers to believe
that the accused-appellants were then and there committing a crime. As it turned out, the
accused-appellants indeed possessed and were even using a prohibited drug, contrary to law.
When an accused is caught in flagrante delicto, the police officers are not only authorized but
are duty-bound to arrest him even without a warrant.

In the course of the arrest and in accordance with police procedures, the [appellants] were
frisked, which search yielded the prohibited drug in their possession. These circumstances were
sufficient to justify the warrantless search x x x thatyielded two (2) heat-sealed plastic sachets of
"shabu

Contrary to what the [appellants] want to portray, the chain of custody of the seized prohibited
drug was shown not to have been broken. After the seizure of the plastic sachets containing
white crystalline substance from the [appellants'] possession and of the various drug
paraphernalia in the living room, the police immediately brought the [appellants] to the police
station, together with the seized items. PO3 Parunggao himself brought these items to the
police station and marked them. The plastic sachets containing white crystalline substance was
marked "JB" and "JP". These confiscated items were immediately turned over by PO2 Bautista
to the PNP Regional Crime Laboratory Office Calabarzon, Camp Vicente Lim, Calamba City for
examination to determine the presence of dangerous drugs. After a qualitative examination
conducted on the specimens, Forensic Chemist Lorna Ravelas Tria concluded that the plastic
sachets recovered from the accused-appellants tested positive for methylamphetamine
hydrochloride, a prohibited drug, per Chemistry Report Nos. D-0381-05 and D-0382-05.

When the prosecution presented these marked specimens in court, PO2 Baustista positively
identified them to be the same items they seized from the [appellants] and which PO3
Parunggao later marked at the police station, from where the seized items were turned over to
the laboratory for examination based on a duly prepared request.

Thus, the prosecution established the crucial link in the chain of custody of the seized items
from the time they were first discovered until they were brought for examination. Besides, as
earlier stated, the [appellants] did not contest the admissibility of the seized items during the
tria1. The integrity and the evidentiary value of the drugs seized from the accused-appellants
were therefore duly proven not to have been compromised.

PESTILOS VS GENEROSO

FACTS:
The petitioners were indicted for attempted murder. Petitioners filed an Urgent Motion
for Regular Preliminary Investigation on the ground that there no valid warrantless
arrest took place. The RTC denied the motion and the CA affirmed the denial.
Records show that an altercation ensued between the petitioners and Atty. Moreno
Generoso. The latter called the Central Police District to report the incident and acting
on this report, SPO1 Monsalve dispatched SPO2 Javier to go to the scene of the crime
and render assistance. SPO2, together with augmentation personnel arrived at the
scene of the crime less than one hour after the alleged altercation and saw Atty.
Generoso badly beaten.

Atty. Generoso then pointed the petitioners as those who mauled him which prompted
the police officers to “invite” the petitioners to go to the police station for investigation. At
the inquest proceeding, the City Prosecutor found that the petitioners stabbed Atty.
Generoso with a bladed weapon who fortunately survived the attack.

Petitioners aver that they were not validly arrested without a warrant.

ISSUE:
Are the petitioners validly arrested without a warrant when the police officers did not
witness the crime and arrived only less than an hour after the alleged altercation?

HELD:
YES, the petitioners were validly arrested without a warrant. Section 5(b), Rule 113 of
the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure provides that:

When an offense has just been committed, and he has probable cause to
believe based on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the
person to be arrested has committed it.

The elements under Section 5(b), Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure
are: first, an offense has just been committed; and second, the arresting officer has
probable cause to believe based on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that
the person to be arrested has committed it.

The Court’s appreciation of the elements that “the offense has just been committed” and
”personal knowledge of facts and circumstances that the person to be arrested
committed it” depended on the particular circumstances of the case. The element of
”personal knowledge of facts or circumstances”, however, under Section 5(b), Rule 113
of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure requires clarification. Circumstances may
pertain to events or actions within the actual perception, personal evaluation or
observation of the police officer at the scene of the crime. Thus, even though the police
officer has not seen someone actually fleeing, he could still make a warrantless arrest if,
based on his personal evaluation of the circumstances at the scene of the crime, he
could determine the existence of probable cause that the person sought to be arrested
has committed the crime.
However, the determination of probable cause and the gathering of facts or
circumstances should be made immediately after the commission of the crime in order
to comply with the element of immediacy. In other words, the clincher in the element of
”personal knowledge of facts or circumstances” is the required element of immediacy
within which these facts or circumstances should be gathered.

With the facts and circumstances of the case at bar that the police officers gathered and
which they have personally observed less than one hour from the time that they have
arrived at the scene of the crime, it is reasonable to conclude that the police officers had
personal knowledge of the facts and circumstances justifying the petitioners’
warrantless arrests.

Hence, the petitioners were validly arrested and the subsequent inquest proceeding
was likewise appropriate.

PEOPLE VS VILLAREAL MARCH 2013

On December 25, 2006 at around 11:30 in the morning, as PO3 Renato de Leon (PO3 de Leon)
was driving his motorcycle on his way home along 5th Avenue, he saw appellant from a
distance of about 8 to 10 meters, holding and scrutinizing in his hand a plastic sachet of shabu.
Thus, PO3 de Leon, a member of the Station Anti-Illegal Drugs-Special Operation Unit (SAID-
SOU) in Caloocan City, alighted from his motorcycle and approached the appellant whom he
recognized as someone he had previously arrested for illegal drug possession.4

Upon seeing PO3 de Leon, appellant tried to escape but was quickly apprehended with the help
of a tricycle driver. Despite appellant’s attempts to resist arrest, PO3 de Leon was able to board
appellant onto his motorcycle and confiscate the plastic sachet of shabu in his possession.
Thereafter, PO3 de Leon brought appellant to the 9th Avenue Police Station to fix his handcuffs,
and then they proceeded to the SAID-SOU office where PO3 de Leon marked the seized plastic
sachet with "RZL/NV 12-25-06," representing his and appellant’s initials and the date of the
arrest.5

Subsequently, PO3 de Leon turned over the marked evidence as well as the person of appellant
to the investigator, PO2 Randulfo Hipolito (PO2 Hipolito) who, in turn, executed an
acknowledgment receipt6 and prepared a letter request7 for the laboratory examination of the
seized substance. PO2 Hipolito personally delivered the request and the confiscated item to the
Philippine National Police (PNP) Crime Laboratory, which were received by Police Senior
Inspector Albert Arturo (PSI Arturo), the forensic chemist.8

Upon qualitative examination, the plastic sachet, which contained 0.03 gram of white crystalline
substance, tested positive for methylamphetamine hydrochloride, a dangerous drug.9

Consequently, appellant was charged with violation of Section 11, Article II of RA 9165 for illegal
possession of dangerous drugs in an Information10 which reads:

That on or about the 25th day of December, 2006 in Caloocan City, Metro Manila and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, without being authorized by law,
did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have in his possession, custody and
control, METHYLAMPHETAMINE HYDROCHLORIDE (Shabu) weighing 0.03 gram which,
when subjected to chemistry examination gave positive result of METHYLAMPHETAMIME
HYDROCHLORIDE, a dangerous drug.

CONTRARY TO LAW.

When arraigned, appellant, assisted by counsel de oficio, entered a plea of not guilty to the
offense charged.11

In his defense, appellant denied PO3 de Leon’s allegations and instead claimed that on the date
and time of the incident, he was walking alone along Avenida, Rizal headed towards 5th

Avenue when someone who was riding a motorcycle called him from behind. Appellant
approached the person, who turned out to be PO3 de Leon, who then told him not to run, frisked
him, and took his wallet which contained ₱1,000.00.12

Appellant was brought to the 9th Avenue police station where he was detained and mauled by
eight other detainees under the orders of PO3 de Leon. Subsequently, he was brought to the
Sangandaan Headquarters where two other police officers, whose names he recalled were
"Michelle" and "Hipolito," took him to the headquarters’ firing range. There, "Michelle" and
"Hipolito" forced him to answer questions about a stolen cellphone, firing a gun right beside his
ear each time he failed to answer and eventually mauling him when he continued to deny
knowledge about the cellphone.13 Thus, appellant sustained head injuries for which he was
brought to the Diosdado Macapagal Hospital for proper treatment.14

The following day, he underwent inquest proceedings before one Fiscal Guiyab, who informed
him that he was being charged with resisting arrest and "Section 11." 15 The first charge was
eventually dismissed.

The RTC Ruling

After trial on the merits, the RTC convicted appellant as charged upon a finding that all the
elements of the crime of illegal possession of dangerous drugs have been established,

In its assailed Decision, the CA sustained appellant’s conviction, finding "a clear case of in
flagrante delicto warrantless arrest"17 as provided under Section 5, Rule 113 of the Revised
Rules of Criminal Procedure. The CA held that appellant "exhibited an overt act or strange
conduct that would reasonably arouse suspicion,"18 aggravated by the existence of his past
criminal citations and his attempt to flee when PO3 de Leon approached him.

ISSUE

HELD

The appeal is meritorious.

Section 5, Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure lays down the basic rules on
lawful warrantless arrests, either by a peace officer or a private person, as follows:
Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. – A peace officer or a private person may, without a
warrant, arrest a person:

(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;

(b) When an offense has just been committed and he has probable cause to believe
based on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested
has committed it; and

(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal
establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or is temporarily confined
while his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement
to another.

xxx

For the warrantless arrest under paragraph (a) of Section 5 to operate, two elements must
concur: (1) the person to be arrested must execute an overt act indicating that he has just
committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit a crime; and (2) such overt act is
done in the presence or within the view of the arresting officer. 19 On the other hand, paragraph
(b) of Section 5 requires for its application that at the time of the arrest, an offense had in fact
just been committed and the arresting officer had personal knowledge of facts indicating that the
appellant had committed it.20

In both instances, the officer’s personal knowledge of the fact of the commission of an offense is
absolutely required. Under paragraph (a), the officer himself witnesses the crime while under
paragraph (b), he knows for a fact that a crime has just been committed.

In sustaining appellant’s conviction in this case, the appellate court ratiocinated that this was a
clear case of an "in flagrante delicto warrantless arrest" under paragraphs (a) and (b) of Section
5, Rule 113 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure, as above-quoted.

However, a previous arrest or existing criminal record, even for the same offense, will not suffice
to satisfy the exacting requirements provided under Section 5, Rule 113 in order to justify a
lawful warrantless arrest. "Personal knowledge" of the arresting officer that a crime had in fact
just been committed is required. To interpret "personal knowledge" as referring to a person’s
reputation or past criminal citations would create a dangerous precedent and unnecessarily
stretch the authority and power of police officers to effect warrantless arrests based solely on
knowledge of a person’s previous criminal infractions, rendering nugatory the rigorous requisites
laid out under Section 5.

It was therefore error on the part of the CA to rule on the validity of appellant’s arrest based on
"personal knowledge of facts regarding appellant’s person and past criminal record," as this is
unquestionably not what "personal knowledge" under the law contemplates, which must be
strictly construed.
People v. Martinez et al.
G.R. No. 191366, December 13, 2010

FACTS: On September 2, 2006 at around 1245 PM, PO1 Bernard Azarden was on duty at the Police
Community Precinct along Arellano St., Dagupan City when a concerned citizen reported that a
pot session was underway in the house of accused Rafael Gonzales in Trinidad Subdivision,
Dagupan City. PO1 Azardan, PO1 Alejandro dela Cruz and members of Special Weapons and
Tactics (SWAT) proceeded to aforesaid house. Upon inquiry from people in the area, the house
of Gonzales was located. As the team entered the house, accused Orlando Doria was arrested
while coming out. Inside the house were Gonzales, Arnold Martinez, Edgar Dizon, and Rezin
Martinez. Seized from the accused were open plastic sachets (containing shabu residue), pieces
of rolled used aluminum foil and pieces of used aluminum foil. The accused were arrested and
brought to police station, seized items were sent to the Pangasinan Provincial Police Crime
Laboratory. All accused, except for Doria, were found positive for methylamphetamine HCL.

On February 13, 2008, RTC found Arnold Martinez, Edgar Dizon, Rezin Martinez and Rafael
Gonzales guilty beyond reasonable doubt under Sec. 13 in relation to Sec. 11, Art. II of RA 9165
and sentenced each to life imprisonment and fined PHP 500,000 plus cost of suit.

The CA supported the findings of the lower court.

ISSUE: Were the guilt of the accused proven beyond reasonable doubt?

RULING: No, the Court finds that the prosecution failed to prove the guilt of the accused beyond
reasonable doubt because (1) evidence against the accused are inadmissible and (2) even if the
evidence were admissible, the chain of custody was not duly established .

The evidence is inadmissible because of the illegal arrest, search and seizure. Searches
and seizures without a warrant are valid in (1) incidence of lawful arrest, (2) “plain view”
search of evidence, (3) moving vehicle search, (4) consented search, (5) customs
search, (6) stop and frisk, (7)exigent and emergency cases. Under Rule 113, Sec. 5 of
RRCP warrantless arrest can only be done in in flagrante cases, hot pursuit cases, and
fugitive cases. The arrest of the accused-appellants were based solely on the report of a
concerned citizen, no surveillance of the place was conducted. Under Rule 113, fugitive
case does not apply. In flagrante and hot pursuit case may apply only upon probable
cause, which means actual belief or reasonable ground of suspicion. It is reasonable
ground of suspicion when suspicion of a person to be arrested is probably guilty of the
offense based on actual facts, that is, supported by circumstances. In case at bar, this is
not the case since the entire arrest was based on uncorroborated statement of a
concerned citizen.

The chain of custody as outlined in Sec. 21, Art. II of RA 9165 was not observed as no
proper inventory, photographing, was done in the presence of the accused nor were
there representatives from the media, the DOJ and any popularly elected official present,
although in warrantless seizures, marking and photographing of evidence may be done
at the nearest police station.

Court sets aside and reverses the decision of the CA dated August 7, 2009, acquits the
accused and orders their immediate release.
People v. Molina, 19 February 2001

FACTS:
On June 1996, SPO1 Marino Paguidopon received information about a marijuana
pusher in Davao. Paguidopon first saw the pusher in person on July of the same
year, when his informer identified Mula as the driver of a motorcycle who just passed
by them. Molina, on the other hand, was never identified prior arrest. 
 
In the morning of August 8, 1996, Paguidopon received information that the drug
pushers will pass by at NHA, Ma-a, Davao City that morning, so he called for
assistance from the PNP. A team composed of SPO4 Cloribel, SPO2 Paguidopon
(brother of Marino), and SPO1 Pamplona were dispatched to proceed to Marino's
house where they'll wait for the drug pushers will pass by. Two hours later,
a "trisikad" identified by Paguidopon as carrying Molina and Mula passed by. So, the
team boarded their vehicle, overtook the trisikad and accosted the two. At that point,
Mula was holding a black bag. He handed the same to Molina. Pamplona,
introducing himself as a police officer, asked Molina to open the bag, to which
Molina replied "Boss, if possible, we will settle this."-Pamplona insisted on opening
the bag, which revealed dried marijuana leaves inside. Thereafter, Mula and Molina
were handcuffed. Mula and Molina filed a Demurrer to Evidence, saying that the
marijuna was illegally seized from them, therefore it is inadmissible. The trial court
denied this. The two waived presentation of evidence, and opted to file a joint
memorandum. Later, the trial court still found them guilty, and sentenced them
to suffer the death penalty. Pursuant to Art. 47 of the RPC and Rule 122, Sec. 10 of
the ROC, the case is elevated to the SC on automatic review. The SolGen moved
for the acquittal of the two.
 
ISSUE/S: 

1. Was the arrest of Mula and Molina fall under the exception of in flagrante
delicto in warrantless arrests.
2. Whether or not the marijuana is inadmissible in evidence for having been
seized in violation of appellants’ constitutional rights against unreasonable
searches and seizures

 
RULING:
 
1.       No. The law mandates that searches be carried out with a search warrant
upon the existence of probable cause. Likewise, the law protects against
unreasonable searches and seizures and holds evidence taken from such incidents
as inadmissible as evidence. There are exceptions to this, the first being seizure
conducted incidental to a lawful arrest
For this, there should be a lawful arrest first, before a search can be made. It doesn't
work the other way around. Likewise, as a rule, an arrest is legitimate if it's
with a valid warrant of  arrest. However, a police officer may conduct warrantless
arrests:

D.      In flagrante delicto - When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has
committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense
E.                   Arrest effected in hot pursuit - when an offense has just been
committed and he has probable cause to believe based on personal knowledge of
facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed it.

F.                   Arrest of escaped prisoners - when the person to be arrested is a

prisoner who has escaped from penal establishment or a place where he is serving
final judgment or is temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped
while being transferred from one confinement to another. 

In this case, the trial court found that the warrantless arrest and seizure were valid
apparently because they were caught in flagrante delicto in possession of the
prohibited drugs. In flagrante delicto arrests, it is settled that "reliable information"
alone is not sufficient to constitute probable cause that would justify in flagrante
delicto arrests

 
2. Yes. In the case at bar, accused-appellants manifested no outward indication that
would justify their arrest. In holding a bag on board a trisikad, accused-appellants
could not be said to be committing, attempting to commit or have committed
a crime. The response of Molina that “Boss, if possible we will settle this” is an
equivocal statement which standing alone will not constitute probable cause to effect
an in flagrante delicto arrest. Note that were it not for SPO1 Marino Paguidopon
(who did not participate in the arrest but merely pointed accused-appellants to the
arresting officers), accused-appellants could not be the subject of any suspicion,
reasonable or otherwise. SPO1 Paguidopon only learned Mula’s name and address
after the arrest. It is doubtful if SPO1 Paguidopon indeed recognized accused-
appellant Mula. It is worthy to note that, before the arrest, he was able to see Mula in
person only once, pinpointed to him by his informer while they were on the side of
the road. These circumstances could not have afforded SPO1 Paguidopon a closer
look at accused-appellant Mula, considering that the latter was then driving a
motorcycle when SPO1 Paguidopon caught a glimpse of him. With respect to
accused-appellant Molina, SPO1 Paguidopon admitted that he had never seen him
before the arrest. The Court holds that the arrest of accused-appellants does not fall
under the exceptions allowed by the rules. Hence, the search conducted on their
person was likewise illegal. Consequently, the marijuana seized by the peace
officers could not be admitted as evidence.
 People v. Mengote, 25 May 1994

FACTS:

l Western Police District received a telephone call from an informer that there were three suspicious-looking
persons at the corner of Juan Luna and North Bay Boulevard in Tondo, Manila.
l A surveillance team of plainclothesmen was forthwith dispatched to the place.
l Patrolmen Rolando Mercado and Alberto Juan narrated that they saw two men "looking from side to side,"
one of whom was holding his abdomen. They approached these persons and identified themselves as
policemen, whereupon the two tried to run away but were unable to escape because the other lawmen
had surrounded them.
l The suspects were then searched. One of them, who turned out to be the accused-appellant, was found with
a .38 caliber Smith and Wesson revolver with six live bullets in the chamber.
l His companion, later identified as Nicanor Morellos, had a fan knife secreted in his front right pants pocket.
The weapons were taken from them.
l Mengote and Morellos were then turned over to police headquarters for investigation by the Intelligence
Division.
l One other witness presented by the prosecution was Rigoberto Danganan, who identified the subject weapon
as among the articles stolen from him during the robbery in his house in Malabon on June 13, 1987. He
pointed to Mengote as one of the robbers.
l He had duly reported the robbery to the police, indicating the articles stolen from him, including the revolver.
l Mengote made no effort to prove that he owned the firearm or that he was licensed to possess it and claimed
instead that the weapon had been "Planted" on him at the time of his arrest.
l It is submitted in the Appellant's Brief that the revolver should not have been admitted in evidence because of
its illegal seizure. no warrant therefor having been previously obtained. Neither could it have been seized
as an incident of a lawful arrest because the arrest of Mengote was itself unlawful, having been also
effected without a warrant.
l The defense also contends that the testimony regarding the alleged robbery in Danganan's house was
irrelevant and should also have been disregarded by the trial court.

ISSUE:

WON the arrest was lawful

HELD:

NO. The Supreme court held that par(a) section 5 Rule 113 of rules of court requires that a person be
arrested after he has committed or while he is actually committing or is at least attempting to commit an
offense in the presence of the arresting officer.

These requirements have not been established in the case at bar. At the time of the arrest in question, the
accused was merely “looking from side to side” and “holding his abdomen”. There was apparently no
offense that has just been committed or was being actually committed or at least being attempted by
Mengote in their presence.

The Court takes note that there was nothing to support the arresting officers' suspicion other than
Mengote's darting eyes and his hand on his abdomen. By no stretch of the imagination could it have been
inferred from these acts that an offense had just been committed, or was actually being committed, or
was at least being attempted in their presence.

This case is similar to People v. Aminnudin, where the Court held that the warrantless arrest of the
accused was unconstitutional. This was effected while be was coming down a vessel, to all appearances
no less innocent than the other disembarking passengers. He had not committed nor was be actually
committing or attempting to commit an offense in the presence of the arresting officers. He was not even
acting suspiciously. In short, there was no probable cause that, as the prosecution incorrectly suggested,
dispensed with the constitutional requirement of a warrant.
Par. (b) is no less applicable because its no less stringent requirements have also not been satisfied. The
prosecution has not shown that at the time of Mengote's arrest an offense had in fact just been committed
and that the arresting officers had personal knowledge of facts indicating that Mengote had committed it.
All they had was hearsay information from the telephone caller, and about a crime that had yet to be
committed.

The truth is that they did not know then what offense if at all, had been committed and neither were they
aware of the participation therein of the accused-appellant. It was only later after Danganan had appeared
at the Police headquarters, that they learned of the robbery in his house and of Mengote's supposed
involvement therein.

As for the illegal possession of the firearm found on Mengote's person, the policemen discovered this only
after he had been searched and the investigation conducted later revealed that he was not its owners nor
was he licensed to possess it.

Before these events, the Peace officers had no knowledge even of Mengote' identity, let alone the fact (or
suspicion) that he was unlawfully carrying a firearm or that he was involved in the robbery of Danganan's
house.

Hence, accused-appellant is acquitted.

People v. Malmstedt, 19 June 1991

Facts:

            Captain Alen Vasco, the commanding officer of the first regional

command (NARCOM) stationed at camp Dangwa, ordered his men to set
up a temporary checkpoint for the purpose of checking all vehicles coming
from the Cordillera Region. The order to establish a checkpoint was
prompted by persistent reports that vehicles coming from Sagada were
transporting marijuana and other prohibited drugs. And an information also
was received about a Caucasian coming from Sagada had in his
possession prohibited drugs.

            In the afternoon the bus where accused was riding stopped. Sgt.
Fider and CIC Galutan boarded the bus and announced that they were
members of the NARCOM and that they would conduct an inspection.
During the inspection CIC Galutan noticed a bulge on accused waist.
Suspecting the bulge on accused waist to be a gun, the officer asked for
accused’s passport and other identification papers. When accused failed to
comply, the officer required him to bring out whatever it was that was
bulging o his waist. And it turned out to be a pouched bag and when
accused opened the same bag the officer noticed four suspicious looking
objects wrapped in brown packing tape. It contained hashish, a derivative
of marijuana.

            Thereafter, the accused was invited outside the bus for questioning.
But before he alighted from the bus accused stopped to get two travelling
bags. The officer inspects the bag. It was only after the officers had opened
the bags that the accused finally presented his passport. The two bags
contained a stuffed toy each, upon inspection the stuff toy contained also
hashish.

Issue:

            Whether or not there is a violation of the constitutional right against

unreasonable search and seizure

Ruling:

            The Supreme Court held that under Section 5 Rule 113 of the Rules
of Court provides:

“Arrest without warrant; when lawful – a peace officer or a private person

may, without a warrant, arrest a person:

a) When, in the presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is

actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;

b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal
knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed
it; and

c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a

penal establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or
temporary confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while being
transferred from one confinement to another”
Accused was searched and arrested while transporting prohibited drugs. A
crime was actually being committed by the accused and he was caught in
flagrante delicto, thus the search made upon his personal effects falls
squarely under paragraph 1 of the foregoing provision of law, which allows
a warrantless search incident to a lawful arrest.
Probable cause has been defined as such facts and circumstances which
could lead a reasonable, discreet and prudent man to believe that an
offense has been committed, and that the object sought in connection with
the offense are in the placed sought to be searched.
When NARCOM received the information that a Caucasian travelling from
Sagada to Baguio City was carrying with him a prohibited drug, there was
no time to obtain a search warrant.

People v. Chua, 17 June 1999

Fact: In response to reports of rampant smuggling of firearms and

other contraband, CID began patrolling the Bacnotan coastline with
his officers. While monitoring the coastal area he intercepted a radio
call from ALMOITE requesting police assistance regarding an
unfamiliar speedboat. CID and six of his men. When the speedboat
landed, the male passenger alighted, and using both hands, carried
what appeared a multicolored strawbag. He then walked towards
the road. By this time, ALMOITE, CID and BADUA, the latter two
conspicuous in their uniform and issued side-arms, became
suspicious of the man as he suddenly changed direction and broke
into a run upon seeing the approaching officers. BADUA, however,
prevented the man from fleeing by holding on to his right arm.
Although CID introduced themselves as police officers, the man
appeared impassive. Speaking in English, CID then requested the
man to open his bag, but he seem not to understand. CID thus tried
speaking Tagalog, then Ilocano, but still to no avail. CID then
resorted to what he termed “sign language;” he motioned with his
hands for the man to open the bag. This time, the man apparently
understood and acceded to the request. A search of the bag yielded
several transparent plastic packets containing yellowish crystalline
substances. which was later found out that it was Shabu. CID then
gestured to the man to close the bag, which he did. As CID wished
to proceed to the police station, he signaled the man to follow, but
the latter did not to comprehend. Hence, CID placed his arm around
the shoulders of the man and escorted the latter to the police
headquarters. CHUA was initially charged with illegal possession of
methaphetamine hydrochloride before the RTC. The RTC convicted
Chua Ho San guilty beyond reasonable doubt. Chua Ho San prays
for his acquitttal and the reversal of the judgment of the RTC.

Issue: Whether the accused who was acting suspiciously constitute

Probable Cause impelling the police officers from effecting an in
flagrante delicto arrest.

Held: No, the Court, finds that these do not constitute “probable
cause.” None of the telltale clues, e.g., bag or package emanating
the pungent odor of marijuana or other prohibited drug, confidential
report and/or positive identification by informers of courier(s) of
prohibited drug and/or the time and place where they will
transport/deliver the same, suspicious demeanor or behavior and
suspicious bulge in the waist — accepted by this Court as sufficient
to justify a warrantless arrest exists in this case. The term probable
cause had been understood to mean a reasonable ground of
suspicion supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in
themselves to warrant a cautious man’s belief that the person
accused is guilty of the offense with which he is charged.
Specifically with respect to arrests, it is such facts and
circumstances which would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent
man to believe that an offense has been committed by the person
sought to be arrested. In cases of in fragrante delicto, arrests, a
peace officer or a private person may without a warrant, arrest a
person, when, in his presence, the person to be arrested has
committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an
offense. The arresting officer, therefore, must have personal
knowledge of such facts or as recent case law adverts to, personal
knowledge of facts or circumstances convincingly indicative or
constitutive of probable cause.

The search cannot therefore be denominated as incidental to an

arrest. While a contemporaneous search of a person arrested may
be effected to deliver dangerous weapons or proofs or implements
used in the commission of the crime and which search may extend
to the area within his immediate control where he might gain
possession of a weapon or evidence he can destroy, a valid arrest
must precede the search. The process cannot be reversed. In a
search incidental to a lawful arrest, as the precedent arrest
determines the validity of the incidental search, the legality of the
arrest is questioned in a large majority of these cases, e.g., whether
an arrest was merely used as a pretext for conducting a search. In
this instance, the law requires that there be first a lawful arrest
before a search can be made — the process cannot be reversed.