Australian Journal of Asian Law, 2014, Vol 15 No 2, Article 2: 1-18

China’s Death Penalty Practice Undermines the

Integrity of the Death Penalty as a Sentencing Option*
Chenjie Ma ♣

Despite a global trend toward abolition of the death penalty, China today is still believed to carry out a large number of
executions every year. The retention of death penalty in China is grounded on ‘national circumstances’ that ‘require’ the death
penalty to achieve crime control, incapacitation and soothe public anger. By examining a number of high-profile miscarriage
of justice cases, this paper tests the current death penalty practice against the roles the death penalty is said to perform in
China. It evaluates a range of legislative and policy changes that attempt to address shortcomings in the current practice. It
finds that a range of problems in death penalty practice in China (including problems with evidence, judicial independence
and lack of legal representation) undermine the death penalty as a sentencing option and prevent it achieving at least two of
its three main aims. Recent changes in policy and in law do address these problems to some extent but because a range of
fundamental flaws are left unaddressed, the death penalty system remains problematic.

The global push towards the abolition of the death penalty began in the second half of the 20th
century. As of the end of 2013, a total of 140 nations had abolished the death penalty either in law
or in practice (Amnesty International, 2013: 52). China, however, is still believed to execute more
people than the rest of the world combined (Amnesty International, 2013: 52). This is because
many of the basic principles and rationale behind the abolition of the death penalty that are relied
upon in other jurisdictions, including European and Commonwealth ones do not necessarily apply
in China. 1 Most academics, Chinese or otherwise, believe that China is simply not willing to abolish
the death penalty, at least in the short term.
A range of ‘justifications’ for the death penalty are often used in China. The most commonly
cited include using the death penalty as ‘crime control’; to incapacitate those who are ‘beyond help’;
and to soothe ‘public anger’. The legitimacy of these justifications is subject to much debate. It is
not, however, the aim of this article to interrogate them. Instead, it focuses on death penalty
practice: if China must keep the death penalty for some time, then it should at least ensure that
this most extreme form of punishment is applied only for those functions it is intended to perform
and not misused. A series of miscarriages of justice in death penalty cases show, however, that this
has not been achieved. By examining some of these cases, I argue that China’s death penalty
practices are inconsistent with the justifications used there for retaining the death penalty as a
sentencing option.
More specifically, I argue that despite recent reforms to Chinese Criminal Law and policies for
handling death penalty cases, a range of fundamental flaws are left unaddressed. As a result, even
those who accept the death penalty in China find it problematic. This article begins by providing a
context for the scope of China’s death penalty and the relevant judicial arrangements. It then
identifies the types of justifications commonly proposed for the retention of the death penalty in
China. This is followed by a discussion of the problems that exist in China’s criminal law
enforcement practices that put at risk the integrity of the death penalty as a sentencing option,
with reference to several high profile wrongly-decided cases. The last section evaluates reforms
that are designed to address the shortcomings in China’s death penalty system.

♣
Chenjie Ma is undertaking his Juris Doctor in the Melbourne Law School, the University of Melbourne.
He also works as a Research Assistant in the Asian Law Centre, Melbourne Law School.
* The author gives special thanks to Professor Sarah Biddulph, who spent considerable time helping me
improve this essay, and Professor Pip Nicholson for her detailed feedback.
1 See, for example, Johnson and Zimring, 2009: 9-11.
Australian Journal of Asian Law Vol 15 No 2

Background - Crimes Punishable by Death

A broad range of crimes are subject to the death penalty under China’s Criminal Law. Only two
offences, however, attract a mandatory death sentence: hijacking aircraft causing death (Criminal
Law, art 121); and kidnapping causing death (Criminal Law, art 239). Other offences punishable by
death include, in broad categories, endangering state security (Criminal Law, art 113);
endangering public safety (Criminal Law, arts 115 and 119); producing and selling fake medicine
(Criminal Law, art 141); smuggling (Criminal Law, art 151); intentional killing or injuring
(Criminal Law, arts 232 and 234); rape (Criminal Law, art 236); abducting and trafficking women
or children (Criminal Law, art 240); robbery (Criminal Law, art 263); participating in an armed
prison break (Criminal Law, art 317); and some drug-related crimes (Criminal Law, art 347).
Despite the abolition of the death penalty for many ‘economic crimes’ in the most recent
amendment to the Criminal Law, some of these prima facie non-violent crimes are still subject to
the death sentence, including producing counterfeit currency (Criminal Law, art 170); forging or
selling forged value-added tax invoices (Criminal Law, art 206); and embezzlement (Criminal Law,
art 383). A number of arms and army-related crimes also attract the death penalty. 2

Death Penalty as a Sentencing Option

As mentioned above, only two offences attract mandatory death penalty. Where the death penalty
is not mandatory, the alternative punishments range from imprisonment for more than 10 years to
life imprisonment. In these cases, Chinese criminal law provides that judges have discretion to
determine the severity of the sentence imposed, based on three factors: the facts of the crime; the
nature and circumstances of the crime; and the degree of harm to society (Criminal Law, art 61). Of
these three factors, the degree of harm to the society has a very important place. As an appellate
judge in Guangdong province reveals, in practice, judges rely on two main considerations when
making a death penalty decision: first, the seriousness of the harm caused by the crime; and,
secondly, the degree to which the crime has affected the community’s sense of security (Trevaskes,
2012: 89-90). Both these considerations go to the impact of the crime on the society.
Also relevant is the question of whether the crime is ‘extremely serious’. Article 48 of the
Criminal law provides that the death penalty is only to be imposed on criminals who have
committed ‘extremely serious crimes’. Beyond this amorphous statement, however, the law does not
provide any more guidance on what exactly constitutes an ‘extremely serious’ crime. Despite the
resemblance to the wording of ‘the most serious crimes’ under art 6 of the International Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), which China has signed but is yet to ratify, 3 the two do not
equate. While the phrase ‘the most serious crimes’ under the ICCPR refers mostly to intentional
crimes causing death 4, the provisions of art 48 focus on the degree of harm caused by a criminal
act, rather than the category of the crime (Trevaskes, 2012: 89). The result is that a large degree of
discretion is afforded to judges to decide whether or not the death penalty is applied in any
individual case.

The Sihuan System

Another important component of China’s death penalty system is the sentencing option of sihuan.
Although a death penalty sentence is, by default, carried out within seven days of the final decision
to impose it (art 251, 1996 Criminal Procedure Law), art 48 of the Criminal Law provides that a
death penalty with a two-year suspension (sihuan) can instead be imposed. If there is no
reoffending during this two-year period, the sentence is automatically converted to life-
imprisonment.

2 Criminal Law, arts 124, 127, 369, 370, 421-426, 430-33, 438, 439, 446.
3 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, open for signature 16 December 1966, 999 UNTS
171 (entered into force 23 March 1976), art 6.
4 See: Safeguards Guaranteeing Protection of the Rights of Those Facing the Death Penalty, ESC Res
1984/50, UN ESCOR, Supp No 1, UN Doc E/1984/84.

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After a period of under-use because of the ‘strike hard’ campaigns, sihuan started to play a
bigger role in the overarching policy of ‘building a harmonious society’ became more important
around 2006 (Trevaskes, 2012: 34-37). At the same time, the policies of ‘balancing leniency and
severity’ and ‘kill fewer, kill prudently’ also contributed to the increased use of sihuan. In late 2006,
the Supreme People’s Court identified a number of circumstances that should be treated as the
basis for choosing sihuan rather than death penalty. These include, for example, where the
defendant surrenders him or herself to police, or where the victim’s death is a result of a
neighbourhood dispute or relationship or marriage breakdown (Fu, 2006: A03). Together with the
new ‘case guidance system’ introduced in late 2010, these circumstances help to somewhat restrict
the discretion judges enjoy in death penalty cases. They are, however, limited to the circumstances
named (Trevaskes, 2013).

The Death Penalty Procedure

China has four levels of courts: Basic People’s Court, Intermediate People’s Court, High People’s
Court (HPC) at the provincial level, and, finally, the Supreme People’s Court (SPC) in the capital.
Art 12 of the 1996 Criminal Procedure Law (CPL) provides that intermediate people’s courts have
jurisdiction over cases in which death penalty may be imposed (arts 12 and 200 of the 1996
Criminal Procedure Law). As such, cases in which death penalty can potentially be imposed must
start from the intermediate people’s courts. Any appeal will then go to the local HPC. All death
penalty cases are further subject to a review process.
Prior to January 2007, the SPC had the default power to review all cases but it could delegate
this power to some local HPCs (1983 Organic Law, art 13). From 1980 to 1996, the SPC did
delegate some of this power to HPCs (Niu, 2007: 126-28) but these delegations gave rise to some
problems. First, allowing HPCs to review their own death penalty decisions effectively folds the
appeal and the review procedures into one. For a large number of death penalty cases, there was no
real review (Trevaskes, 2012: 146). Second, it also allowed local High Courts to apply the death
penalty liberally, an approach at odds with the policy of ‘kill fewer, kill prudently’. After the 2006
amendment to the Organic Law of the People’s Courts, all death penalty review now must go back
to the SPC (2007 Organic Law, art 13). This change was further consolidated in the 2012 CPL.

The Roles the Death Penalty is said to perform in China

To assess the impact of China’s criminal law enforcement practice in relation to death penalty
cases, it is first necessary to articulate the justifications for the existence of death penalty in China.
The following are the three most-often cited objectives that the death penalty is intended to
achieve.

Crime Control
This is a popular justification for the use of the death penalty in China (Jiang et al, 2009). There is
often the belief in the Chinese proverb of ‘killing one to warn a hundred’ and an assumption that
the death penalty is an effective deterrent. Despite the lack of empirical evidence for the notion
that the death penalty is effective in reducing crime rates, ‘crime control’ was the primary
justification for the liberal application of the death penalty during the long history of ‘strike hard’
campaigns. During the famous 1983 campaign, in which 24,000 death penalties were imposed, a
report by the Central Politics and Law Committee asserted that the ‘swift and severe’ punishment
of criminals had a positive impact on the social order (Ma, 1991: 519). As recently as 4 June 2014,
in the face of multiple terrorist attacks in China, the SPC again stated that various people’s Courts
should decide violent terrorist cases ‘swiftly and severely’ in order to strike at the arrogance of
terrorists (Xinhua News Agency, 2014: 4).
The legislature also views crime control as a main objective of the death penalty in China. In
the official explanation to the Eighth Amendment to the 1997 Criminal Law, in which death
penalty was abolished for a large number of economic crimes, the NPC asserted, for example, that
abolishing the death penalty for these offences ‘will not bring a negative impact on the security of

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the society’. 5 This, again, highlighted crime control as an important role of death penalty. In the
absence of supporting empirical evidence, however, the claimed need to use death penalty as a
means of crime control is little more than rhetoric.

Incapacitation
Another justification is based on the belief that some people are beyond help and cannot be
rehabilitated. It is believed that terminating their lives is essential to prevent them from
reoffending. Eminent criminal law scholar Gao Mingxuan commented in a Criminal Law
Conference that, ‘For those criminal elements who committed extremely serious crimes, only death
penalty (including sihuan) can stop them from offending again’ (Yue and Fu, 2006: 03). This belief
is especially strong for violent crimes. The justification becomes much weaker, however, when it
comes to economic crimes punishable by death. Some even argue that this justification is merely an
excuse for not developing a good crime detection system (Zou, 2005: 5). 6
The objective of incapacitation appears to gain some legitimacy when economic considerations
come into play. Arguably, if the aim of the death penalty is to prevent a specific person from
reoffending, life imprisonment would achieve the same result. The cost involved in these two
sentencing options is, however, very different in China. Unlike the judicial process in the US,
where a death penalty case can go through lengthy and costly appeals and the final execution of a
convicted criminal can occur 10 or 20 years after the time of the crime, the Chinese system for
death penalty moves a lot more swiftly. Hong Lu estimates from a sample of around 500 death
penalty cases that the average time between the trial of first instance and final approval is 449
days (Quince and Phillips, 2013). As such, the discrepancy in cost between a death penalty and a
life imprisonment is very significant. It is estimated that in Shanghai, the cost of administering a
custodial sentence is around 20,000 Yuan, not including depreciation of assets (Zhao and Guo,
2004: 65). Given the large population base of China, imposing a long-term custodial sentence rather
than a death penalty may involve significant cost implications. The appropriateness of putting a
price on people’s lives is questionable but at least economic considerations provide some empirical
support for the death penalty.

Soothing ‘Public Anger’

Another reason commonly-cited for why China should not abolish the death penalty in the short
term, especially for violent crimes, is the need to kill to ‘soothe public anger’. 7 The claim is that the
public is enraged when there is a violent crime that results in death, and the offender must be
killed in order to comfort people. One major factor underpinning this justification is the belief that
the idea of ‘an eye for an eye’ is deeply ingrained in the public minds. This belief is not entirely
baseless. Public opinions have influenced death penalty decisions on many occasions. Notably, in
the cases of Liu Yong, Yao Jiaxin and Li Changkui, public outcry for the execution of the
perpetrators resulted in the death penalty, with immediate execution, being substituted for the
lighter sentences originally imposed (Cai and Fu, 2003; Li and Lü, 2011; Wang, 2011).
Public opinion has gained prominence as a major justification for the death penalty as a result
of the use of phrases such as ‘not killing is not enough to soothe public anger’ (busha buzuyi ping
mingfeng) by the state and public figures. This kind of terminology has its origin in the phrase
‘popular indignation’ (mingfeng) used in the Mao era, and was common during the Cultural
Revolution years in the ‘trials by the masses’. It has continued to be widely used ever since (Zhang,
2008). At a conference held by the Henan HPC in August 2011 on criminal justice, this phrase
again featured (Han and Liu, 2011: A03). A well-known scholar Chen Xinliang even asserts that
‘the main function death penalty performs is to soothe public anger’ (Yue and Fu, 2006: 03).

5 National People’s Congress, 关于《中华人民共和国刑法修正案（八）草案》的说明 [Explanation of the

Draft Amendment Bill (Eight) of the Criminal Law of the People’s Republic of China] (28 August 2010)
National People’s Congress of the People’s Republic of China <http://www.npc.gov.cn/npc/flcazqyj/2010-
08/28/content_1592773.htm>.
6 See also Yue and Fu, 2006: 03.
7 See, for example: Hood, 2002: 234.

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There have been recent attempts to ascertain what the public opinion really is towards the
death penalty. For example, a survey conducted in 2005 by the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences
on the death penalty revealed that, of the nearly 5,000 participants, more than 95 per cent
supported its retention (Yue and Fu, 2006: 03). It should be noted, however, that this survey
contained only a single general question and could be misleading (Cullen et al, 2000). Another
survey involving more than 4500 subjects from across three provinces in China revealed that the
general public is actually largely indifferent about death penalty issues (Oberwittler and Qi, 2009).
This raises the question of whether there is, in fact, really strong ‘public indignation’ that
necessitates the death penalty. Some argue that the apparent punitive attitude of the Chinese
public may well be cultivated by the state through punitive criminal law policy (Qi and Oberwittler,
2009). 8

State of Death Penalty Practice Pre-reform

Having identified the common justifications used in China to retain the death penalty, the question
then, is whether the death penalty is performing the ‘roles’ these justifications imply in practice?
Due to the lack of empirical studies on the deterrent effect of the death penalty in China, it is
difficult to assess the effectiveness of the death penalty as a means of crime control. A series of
recent wrongful conviction cases of crimes punishable by death do, however, shed some light on the
objectives of incapacitation and soothing ‘public anger’. In this section, a number of high profile
miscarriage of justice cases are examined to illustrate major problems within China’s death penalty
system and their impact on these two objectives.
The objective of incapacitation aims to stop a specific individual from committing any further
crimes, which, in the context of death penalty, is achieved by terminating the life of the individual.
This requires the system to identify the correct offender. Where an innocent person is executed, it
cannot be said that incapacitation has been achieved. Not only would the actual offender be on the
loose and still pose a threat to the community but the rights of an innocent person would be
seriously violated. This also leads to a failure to soothe ‘public anger’, as the general public often
feel enraged when the truth about the deprivation of rights of an innocent person and the
authorities’ failure to bring the real offender to justice is revealed. As the following cases illustrate,
the actual practice of execution undermines the death penalty’s ability to achieve these two
essential objectives.
Many high-profile death penalty cases involving wrongful conviction have striking similarities.
The She Xianglin case is representative of a series of such cases, collectively referred to as the ‘back
from the dead’ cases. These are mysterious death cases that typically attract ‘popular demand’ for
the harsh punishment of the suspect when he or she is captured but, years later, when the alleged
murder victims reappear unharmed, the ‘perpetrator’ has already served years in prison, and some
have even been executed. 9 Outbursts of public anger often accompany the revelation of the truth.
While there may be initial popular indignation demanding the execution of the alleged offender, the
anger expressed later is directed at those who handled the case, and sometimes towards the flawed
death penalty system itself.
For example, She Xianglin and his wife, Zhang, lived together in Jinshan County. In 1994,
Zhang suddenly disappeared after quarrels with She Xianglin. Soon after, a female body was
discovered in a nearby village. The body was unidentifiable but Zhang’s family believed it was
Zhang and suspected that She had killed her. Local police arrested She and charged him with
murder. The court of first instance sentenced She to death. Because of flaws in the evidence, the
case was appealed several times and She eventually received a sentence of 15 years imprisonment
in 1998. In 2005, however, Zhang reappeared in Jinshan, whereupon She was declared innocent
and released (He, 2013). She’s household was, however, vastly different from the one he left 11
years ago. During She’s current trial and appeals, his mother had been searching to discover his

8 See also: Chen, 2006.

9 For example, whilst She Xianglin and Zhao Zuohai were not executed as a result of their ‘crimes’, Teng
Xingshan was executed years before his ‘victim’ reappeared.

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whereabouts and constantly petitioned. Because of the pressure she brought on local officials, she
was imprisoned for nine months and died shortly after her release (Yu, 2005). She and Zhang also
had a daughter. When She was arrested, his daughter was only seven. She grew up without
parents and soon without her grandmother, whom she had loved dearly. While still a minor, she
dropped out of school and moved to join her uncle’s family to work in an electronics factory in
Dongguan (He, 2014: loc 548).
The She Xianglin case exposes several problems in China’s death penalty practice: first,
problems in evidence; second, lack of judicial independence; and, last but not least, lack of proper
legal representation. These are now discussed in turn.

Problems in Evidence
Significant evidentiary flaws have been a major contributor to wrongful conviction cases. The most
notorious flaw is the use of illegally obtained evidence, especially through the use of torture during
interrogation. A recent study of 50 recent cases of wrongful conviction for murder featured in the
press showed that the use of extortion of confession by torture occurred, or was likely to have
occurred, in 47 cases (He and He, 2008: 10). In the She Xianglin case, She revealed after his release
that he had been interrogated for 10 days and 11 nights straight without any water or sleep and
was only allowed to have two meals a day (Yu, 2005). Before She’s trial at first instance in the
Intermediate People’s Court, he was forced to admit to no less than four different versions of
confessions, all of which were inconsistent with each other (He, 2014: loc 150). In an almost
identical ‘back from the dead’ case, Zhao Zuohai served 11 years of imprisonment before his alleged
victim reappeared in 2010. In this case, extortion of confession by torture had also taken place
(Zhang, 2010).
The practice of extortion of confession by torture is officially and expressly prohibited. Article
43 of the 1996 CPL provides that ‘In collecting evidence, the use of extortion of confessions by
torture, threats, inducement and deception and other illegal means are prohibited’. Despite this
prohibition, there were no concrete exclusionary rules for confessions collected through torture
before July 2010. Beken and Wei (2010: 564) suggest that the low visibility of interrogation process
is an important factor fuelling the wide-spread use of extortion of confession by torture. Until very
recently, police were not required to prove the legality of the confessions obtained and there was no
requirement for audio or video recordings of the interrogation process. This problem is exacerbated
by the lack of a right for lawyers to be present during the initial investigation. According to the
1996 CPL, a defender can only be appointed after initial interrogation by the investigative organ
(1996 Criminal Procedure Law, art 96).
Another major factor underpinning the wide use of torture in interrogation is, for example,
heavy reliance on confessions in criminal cases. Sometimes, these can be the sole piece of evidence
supporting the defendant’s conviction (Trevaskes, 2012: 63). In She Xianglin case, for example, no
DNA test was conducted on the unidentifiable body to find out whether it was, in fact, She’s wife.
Empirical evidence show that confessions provide evidence favourable to the prosecution in almost
all cases (Liu, 2007: 188-89). As such, the police naturally view confessions as the main
investigative activity and so, where there is difficulty in extracting information from a suspect,
there is a tendency to use unconventional means.
In addition, the court’s treatment of cases in which evidence is sketchy also contribute to the
miscarriage of justice. Unlike common law jurisdictions, where the standard of proof for criminal
cases is ‘beyond reasonable doubt’, in China, criminal evidence must be ‘sufficient and reliable’
(1996 Criminal Procedure Law, art 162), and so is much more stringent. What is essentially
required is that the court identify the truth of what happened. Beyond that requirement, however,
there is no detailed guidance on what ‘sufficient and reliable’ evidence is. Chinese courts have long
relied on the ‘two basics’ (liangge jibeng) rule as a guide. This says that a case can be decided where
there is basic evidence and if the basic circumstances are clear. Although the 1996 Criminal
Procedure Law does provide that ‘No person shall be found guilty without being judged as such by a
People's Court according to law’ (1996 Criminal Procedure Law, art 12), this has not been regarded
as a statement of presumption of innocence. Some argue that it is, in fact, just a confirmation of the

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courts’ authority to convict criminals (Yi, 2012: 19). 10 Consequently, the courts have, in practice,
been imposing convictions where the evidence is not entirely clear. Where there is unclear proof,
courts often decide to ‘leave some leeway’ for fear of wrongly acquitting a criminal and instead
apply a policy of ‘where the evidence is unclear, the sentence should be lighter’. This is exactly what
the court did in the She Xianglin case. Instead of a death penalty, a fixed-term of 15 years
imprisonment was imposed.

Judicial Independence
The lack of judicial independence also contributes to these miscarriages of justice. Lack of judicial
independence was evident on many levels in She’s case. Three kinds of influences affected the
decision of the court, with the pressure of public opinion being one of the most significant factors.
Prior to the appeal hearing by the Hubei HPC, the ‘victim’s’ family repeatedly petitioned the court
and organised 220 locals to sign a ‘jointly written letter’ claiming that there was a great degree of
public anger towards She and demanding speedy execution. This petition placed considerable
pressure on the courts (Yu, 2005; He, 2014). Although the court eventually did not sentence She to
death, the impact of the public pressure is shown in the court’s reluctance to acquit in the face of
contradictory evidence, and the application of the maxim of ‘If the proof is unclear, the sentence
should be lighter’.
In China’s death penalty system, the consideration of public opinion in death penalty cases is
not only not prohibited but is, in fact, sanctioned and encouraged by high-ranking judges. For
example, at an official meeting held in Guangzhou in 2008 on comprehensive management of public
order, the then newly-appointed Chief Justice of the SPC, Wang Shengjun, made the comment that
in deciding death penalty cases, the court must act according with three things: first, laws and
regulations; second, the current state of public security, and third, the feelings of the society and
the people (shehui he renming qunzhong de ganjue) (Wu Bo, 2008).
Public opinion also played an important role in influencing the court’s decision to execute the
offender in a later trial. In the Li Changkui case, the offender was convicted of raping and killing a
female, and killing her younger brother. Li was initially sentenced to death with immediate
execution. The Yunnan HPC, however, later changed the sentence to sihuan on appeal in March
2011, citing mitigating factors including voluntary surrender, display of remorse, and the fact that
the death was the result of relationship breakdown. 11 This change ignited heated public discussions
in the media. The victim’s family gathered the signatures of more than 200 local villagers in
opposition to the change of sentence and posted on major websites to call for support. These calls
led to an immediate public outcry for the reversal of High Court’s decision (Huang and Zhang,
2011). In July 2011, the HPC of Yunnan issued a statement that the previous judgment was wrong
and there would be a new trial. At the new trial conducted in August 2011, Li was sentenced to
death with immediate execution and the sentence was carried out in September 2011 upon
approval by the SPC (Wang Yan, 2011; Xinhua News Agency, 2011).
The current Chief Justice of the SPC, Zhou Qiang, also commented on the influence of public
opinion in capital cases during the recent lianghui (‘two meetings’) period. Zhou’s comments relate
to a recent high profile case, the Xia Junfeng case, which involved the killing of two public officials
by a street pedlar who claimed self-defence. Zhou said that
Xia Junfeng is a street pedlar and killed two Urban Management Officers and grievously wounded
another. But just because Xia Junfeng is a street pedlar and the victims are Urban Management Officers
and people have prejudice against Urban Management Officers, some people and even some influential
people agitate that this person cannot be killed. … But if this kind of [person] is not killed then it will be
very dangerous (Wen and Han, 2014: A09, my translation).

10 See also: 1996 Criminal Procedure Law, art 12.

11 《云南李昌奎案》[Yunnan Li Changkui – Case of Raping and Intentional Killing], 云南高级人民法院 [HPC
of Yunnan], 云高法终字第 1314号 [Yunnan HPC Final Appeal No 1314].

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While this can be seen as a change of attitude by the SPC in that it went against public demands
not to impose the death penalty, some have suggested that it was merely a reaction to the public
prejudice against Urban Management Officers, who reportedly routinely abuse their powers and
have, in recent years, caused a lot of serious injuries and even deaths while performing their duties.
Pressure from the public is usually not alone in influencing the court. It often comes in
combination with, and in support of, pressure from the government. Despite the provision in
China’s Constitution that courts exercise judicial power independently and are not subject to
influence from administrative organs (Constitution, art 126), the structure of the various organs
makes courts in China prone to such influence. They are, in fact, responsible to the relevant level of
people’s congress. The Chinese Constitution provides, for example, that ‘All administrative, judicial
and procuratorial organs of the State are created by the people’s congresses to which they are
responsible and by which they are supervised’ (Constitution, art 3; also art 128); ‘The National
People’s Congress [has the power] … to elect the president of the Supreme People’s Court’
(Constitution, art 62(7)); and that ‘The National People’s Congress has the power to remove from
office … the President of the Supreme People’s Court’ (Constitution, art 63(4)). In addition, the
NPC has the power to supervise the work of the SPC (Constitution, art 67(6)). Similar
arrangements exist for lower courts (Supervision Law, arts 5 and 44). The people’s congresses are
therefore in a position to exert significant influence on the courts. Further, because local
government leaders typically hold important positions in local people’s congresses, they are able to
place pressure on judges at the same level. 12
In a study involving judges in death penalty cases, the judges revealed that government
officials often visit the courts to enquire about cases that involve a degree of judicial discretion and
when they do, judges feel pressured to some degree (Qi, 2007: 199). In some cases, the local Politics
and Law Committee would directly supervise the process of individual cases. This is evident in the
She Xianglin case. After the case was remitted to lower courts by the Hubei HPC on grounds of
unclear facts and insufficient evidence, the local Politics and Law Committee held a meeting with
local courts, procurator’s office and the police. At that meeting, it was decided that in order to
prevent the case from being again appealed to the HPC, the charges would be laid in the local Basic
People’s Court. The Court would impose the most severe sentence in cases of doubtful guilt and the
Intermediate People’s Court would uphold the sentence (He, 2014: loc 461).
Government leaders also have the incentive to use their position to exert influence because of
the performance appraisal system. The political career of government leaders depends heavily on
the yearly appraisal of their performance. In recent decades, rising concerns over the impact of
frequent mass disturbance incidents led to the imposing of a policy of zero tolerance on mass
disturbances with ‘great impact’. Even one incident of a large scale petition could cost a local official
his or her opportunity for promotion and multiple incidents meant officials could be dismissed. 13 As
such, where it is perceived that family of the victim is likely to petition, local officials tend to do
everything they can to prevent it, including trying to influence the decisions of the courts. Another
such criterion is the ‘murder case must be solved’ (ming’an bipo) target initially introduced in early
2000s. Ever since the introduction of this target, local governments across China have consistently
reported near-perfect murder case resolution rates, with many even reporting 100 per cent success.
Comparing these results with murder solving rates of other nations, even developed ones, these
‘achievements’ are simply too good to be true. 14 While it is impossible to assess the accuracy of
these figures, the existence of this race to solve every single murder case is enough to push
government officials to influence the court’s decision.

12 See also: Scott, 2010.

13 For example, in a municipality in Yunnan, where there have been incidents of mass disturbance with
great impact, the responsible officials could not receive a ‘good’ grade for the year. If an official receives a
‘bad’ grade for two consecutive years, he or she may be dismissed. A similar policy is in place in many
other locations. The webpages containing these policies were accused in August 2013, but became
unavailable in 2014.
14 For example, it is reported that homicide clearance rates in cities with populations over 1 million in the
US dropped from 89 per cent in 1963 to 59 per cent in 2007. Admittedly, there are other factors such as
gun-related crimes at play. Police in the US, however, generally enjoy access to more advanced
technologies than do the police in China. See: Associated Press, 2008.

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A third factor undermining judicial independence in China comes from within the judicial
system itself, including from within the same court or from higher courts. From within the same
court, judges are influenced by the courts’ own judicial committee and it is, in fact, often the judicial
committee that has the final decision in specific cases. Article 10 of the 2006 Organic Law of the
People’s Courts provides that
People’s courts at all levels set up judicial committees which practice democratic centralism. The task of
the judicial committee is to sum up judicial experience and to discuss important or difficult cases and
other issues relating to judicial work. … The presidents of the people’s courts preside over meetings of
judicial committees.

While the judicial committee is established to ensure impartiality and transparency of decision
making, when voting on whether to impose an immediate or suspended execution, the judicial
committee, in practice, usually favours the former. In addition, when the judicial committee does
vote, individual judges or collegial panel feel politically pressured to vote the same way senior court
judges do (Trevaskes, 2012: 106).
There are several further problems with the practice of relying on the judicial committee to
make decisions in death penalty cases. First, not all judges in the judicial committee specialise in
criminal law. As such, not all fully understand the nuances of death penalty cases. Second, it is
suggested that the chair of the committee can sometimes sway votes through the tone of his or her
voice when reading out the case details (Trevaskes, 2012: 106-07). A further problem is that most
members of the judicial committee do not participate in the hearing of the case. Many thus argue
that judicial committee is not in a better position to make a decision on the case than the original
judge or collegial panel that heard the case (Peerenboom, 2010: 78).
Another significant influence comes from higher courts. In China, it is common practice for
lower courts to seek advice, formally or otherwise, on issues of both facts and law in cases currently
before them. This practice is heavily criticised for its effect of depriving the defendants of rights to
appeal because often important issues, especially issues of facts that should be a main contention
on appeal, were already decided by a higher court before the appeal (Zhao, 2009).

Lack of Proper Legal Representation

Another important contributor to wrongful conviction cases is the lack of proper legal
representation. This problem is two-fold. First, there is a lack of legal representation pre-litigation
and, second, there is a lack of quality defence during the trial.
The first problem stems from legislation that regulates when lawyers can get involved in a
death penalty case. As discussed above, the 1996 CPL only allows a defence lawyer to be appointed
after initial interrogation of the accused. In practice, however, many socio-economically
disadvantaged suspects cannot afford a lawyer, or do not even know they have the right to appoint
a lawyer. In these cases, a lawyer will only be appointed at trial (1996 Criminal Procedure Law, art
34). This is not uncommon. In a study published in 2007 involving an intermediate people’s court in
northern China responsible for all capital cases in an area of nearly 10 million people it was found
that 53 per cent of the defendants had to rely on court-appointed defence lawyers (Qi, 2007: 107-
08). In the She Xianglin case, She also had to rely on lawyer appointed by the court at his trial.
Thus, a large proportion of individuals suspected of crimes punishable by death never had a lawyer
before trial.
After a defence lawyer is appointed for the defendant, another problem arises, that is: the
quality of the defence. Several factors cripple defence lawyers’ ability to present a quality defence.
The first is that lawyers often have limited time to prepare. Article 34 of the 1996 CPL only
requires that a lawyer be appointed for cases in which the death penalty can be imposed. It does
not specify when this should happen. In practice, lawyers are often appointed just prior to the trial
and have only days to go through evidence that investigative organs spend months, if not years, to
collect (Qi, 2007: 210).
The second factor is the lack of availability to the defence of exculpatory evidence. In China, the
investigative organs are expected to collect evidence both favourable and unfavourable to the

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suspect (1996 Criminal Procedure Law, art 89). Because lawyers only get involved at a very late
stage in the judicial process, there is often insufficient time for lawyers to do any investigation.
Heavy reliance is thus placed on the evidence collected by the police. Prior to the 2012 CPL reform,
however, lawyers did not have any basis to request exculpatory evidence from the police. Given
police are often under pressure from local governments to solve all murder cases, they also have no
incentive to share such evidence with the defence.
Adding to this problem is judges’ attitude towards evidence submitted by the defence. A
prominent criminal defence lawyer Tian Wenchang points out in a 2009 study that a common
prosecution argument at trial is that ‘the source of defence evidence is questionable’ or ‘defence
evidence is illegal’ and courts too often lightly reject evidence adduced by the defence (Wang and Li,
2009: 48). The Vice-President of the Anhui HPC Wang Weiming also confirms this. In a recent TV
interview by official media, Wang stated that ‘Courts tend to place more attention on the evidence
provided by the prosecution and tend not to trust defence evidence. Some think that the
investigative organs and procuratorial organs collected the evidence through legal means, why
should one trust defence evidence over prosecution evidence?’ (Cui, 2014b).
The wrongful conviction cases discussed above illustrate three major problems in China’s death
penalty practice: problems in evidence, lack of judicial independence and lack of proper legal
representation. These threaten China’s ability to achieve the objectives of incapacitation and
soothing ‘public anger’. In imposing a 15 year custodial sentence on She, for example, the court not
only deprived an innocent person of his liberty but potentially allowed the real perpetrator get
away. When the innocence of She became clear, the public were particularly sympathetic towards
the impact of his wrongful conviction on his family and expressed great anger towards the
authorities. Many have called for the officials who handled She’s case to be severely punished.

Reforms and Evaluation

In light of the problems exposed through judicial practice and from ‘wrongful conviction cases’, a
series of reforms have been introduced to address the shortcomings. This section looks at these and
evaluates whether they have successfully changed the current practice and support the functions
the death penalty is claimed to perform in China.

Exclusion of Illegal Evidence

Formal attempts to curb the use of extortion of confession by torture began in 2010 when the ‘two
rules of evidence” was introduced. The essence of the provisions on the exclusion of illegally
obtained confessions was then consolidated in the new CPL, amended in 2012. As a result, there is
now a legal basis to exclude confessions extorted through the use of torture. Article 54 of the 2012
CPL provides that ‘Confessions of criminal suspects or defendants obtained through the practice of
extortion of confessions by torture or through other illegal means … should be excluded’ (2012
Criminal Procedure Law, art 54). On top of this, a further protection is provided: there is now a
mandatory requirement for audio and video recording of the entire interrogation process if the
death penalty can be imposed (2012 Criminal Procedure Law, art 121). Further, the new CPL
acknowledges that suspects have the right to appoint a lawyer as a defender and requires
investigative organs to inform suspects of this right during the first interrogation (2012 Criminal
Procedure Law, art 33).
Theoretically, the requirement to provide of audio and video recording of the interrogation
makes it harder for torture to take place; and even if extorted confessions do go through the first
stage, they are challengeable under art 54. Implementation of these changes, however, may take
some time, as has been acknowledged by a high-ranking judge in a provincial HPC (Cui, 2014b).
There have already been reports that some police are trying to circumvent the requirement of audio
and video recording by first torturing a suspect to extort a confession and then rehearsing an
interrogation to be put on film. 15

15 This case is still in litigation in a local Intermediate People’s Court in southern China. The facts are
reported by a lawyer on Weibo and the case has not featured in mainstream media. The allegation is that

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A further unresolved problem is that although suspects now have the right to appoint a lawyer
at the first interrogation, not all suspects can afford one. In practice, therefore, a large number of
suspects may still have to wait till trial to gain access to some form of legal assistance. As such, a
large number of interrogations will continue to be conducted without independent supervision, and
problems of poor quality defences due to short preparation time for defence lawyers will persist.

Death Penalty Review by the Supreme People’s Court

In October 2006, the Organic Law of the People’s Courts was amended to return the final review
power to the SPC. This change is absorbed in the new CPL, amended in 2012. Consequently, every
death penalty decision must now be reviewed by the SPC. This change arguably solves the concerns
previously present when HPCs had the power of review. Now the SPC is able to impose a uniform
standard on all death penalty cases, having regard to the policy of ‘kill less and kill prudently’.
Likewise, having all cases reviewed by the SPC ensures that every death penalty decision will be
reviewed by a different court, except in extremely rare cases where the SPC is the trial court.
In addition, the death penalty review process is more open than before. While it was previously
predominantly conducted by the SPC on paper without any external input, the review process after
reform takes into account input from the prosecution and defence. Article 240 of the 2012 CPL
provides that
When reviewing death penalty cases, the Supreme People’s Court must interrogate the defendant. Where
the defence lawyer makes a request, the opinion of the defence lawyer must be heard. During the review
of death penalty cases, the Supreme People’s Procuratorate may advise the Supreme People’s Court of its
opinion.

This means the SPC can now receive opinions from three sources in reviewing a death penalty
decision. The SPC’s death penalty review process has reportedly been successful in acquitting 825
wrongly convicted defendants in the first year after the amended scheme was formally introduced
(Zhou, 2014: 2).
Two major problems, however, remain. The first is that the scope of the death penalty review
process is limited to cases in which the death penalty is imposed and does not include cases in
which death penalty can be imposed. Where a defendant is charged with an offence punishable by
death but not, in fact, sentenced to death, the case will escape the SPC’s scrutiny. In both the ‘back
from the dead’ cases mentioned above, neither of the defendants were sentenced to death and so
neither of these cases would be subject to the SPC death penalty review process, even under the
amended scheme. It may be true that the SPC’s resources do not allow it to oversee every case that
is punishable by the death penalty but given the roles the death penalty is expected to play, it is
precisely these cases that call for careful practice to ensure they are not wrongly decided.
A second problem is lack of legal representation in the review process. Although defence
lawyers are entitled to submit an opinion, they do not have a legal basis to be present in the court
during the death penalty review process, 16 even though the SPC is required to interrogate the
defendant during the review. Many defendants in death penalty cases come from lower socio-
economic backgrounds and have not received any form of formal education, let alone legal
education. This means it is very difficult for them to prove their innocence without a professional
criminal defence lawyer. Scholar Wu Hongyao (2012: 102) further argues that the presence of a
lawyer can help to minimise ‘occupational blind spots’. Wu argues that because judges go through
hundreds of cases every year, it is likely that they tend to ignore some special characteristics in
individual cases. The presence of a defence lawyer can help alleviate this problem by pointing out
the nuances in each case.

several police members abused the suspect before forcing him to perform a rehearsed interrogation on
camera in September 2012: Zhang, 2014.
16 See also the official explanation of the 2012 CPL: National People’s Congress, 2014.

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Policy Shift
From June 2013, various authorities, including the Ministry of Public Security, the Central Politics
and Law Committee, the Supreme People’s Procuratorate and the Supreme People’s Court, have
issued formal policy papers to tackle wrongful conviction cases. These are internal policy
statements only and each applies only to the respective organs controlled by the issuing
authorities. They are technically of no legal force. While most of the content of the policy papers is
restatement of the relevant legislation, there are clear points of emphasis on particular issues. In
addition, they also provide disincentives for case-handling personnel to act outside the rules by
clarifying where responsibility will lie if a wrongful conviction case is discovered.

Improvements in Issues of Evidence

As mentioned, one of the main contributors to wrongful conviction cases is the courts’ emphasis on
confession and their attitude towards cases where the evidence is unclear. This problem is the main
target of the SPC’s ‘The Supreme People’s Court’s Opinion on Establishing and Optimising Work
Mechanism to Prevent Criminal Wrongful Conviction Cases’ (SPC Opinion) (Supreme People’s
Court, 2013). For example, point 6 targets the policy of ‘where the evidence is unclear, the sentence
should be lighter’ and states that ‘… where there is insufficient evidence to convict, the principle of
presumption of innocence is to be followed and the defendant should be acquitted’. The SPC
Opinion also requires judges to pay more attention to physical evidence, such as DNA and
fingerprints and explicitly provides that a conviction cannot be solely based on the confession of the
defendant. The requirement of evidence more than just the confession should, however, already be
implicit in the standard of evidence required by the CPL.
The ‘Ministry of Public Security’s Notice on Further Strengthening and Improving the
Handling of Criminal Cases and Actually Preventing Wrongful Conviction Cases’ (MPS Notice) also
deals with evidence (Ministry of Public Security, 2013). In addition to prohibiting the practice of
extortion of confession by torture, the MPS Notice attempts to solve the problem of lack of
exculpatory evidence by requiring the police to collect it. The new CPL now contains a legal basis
for lawyers to request exculpatory evidence from the investigative organs (2012 Criminal Procedure
Law, art 39). When this policy works together with the reformed legislation, lawyers will be better
equipped in preparing their defence. Again, however, this policy only mirrors the existing
requirement in the CPL.

Changes Addressing Judicial Independence

On the issue of influence of the public opinion and government pressure, the SPC Opinion simply
states that courts should not yield to outside pressure from the public or the government. The MPS
Notice also takes a similar position. Furthermore, the Central Government has started to devise
independent funding mechanisms for courts. Concrete regulations have not been published, so it is
difficult to see the effect of this change. Theoretically, however, this can reduce government’s ability
to influence courts.
On the other hand, there have been more reforms that target the problems associated with
judicial committees. One of the earlier reforms introduced by the SPC was for adjudicative
committees to hear major or difficult cases directly. Another was to create separate judicial
committees for civil and criminal cases (Peerenboom, 2010: 78). The SPC Opinion complements
these reforms by regulating the way judicial committees conduct their meetings. Point 17 provides
that the committee members are to express their opinions in turn, and the chair should express his
or her opinion last. In combination with the existing reforms, this change should help eliminate
unjustified influence from within the same court.
Attention has also been paid to reducing the influence of higher courts. From mid-2000s, courts
in various places started reforms to ban the practice of seeking advice from higher courts. 17 In

17 For example, the Yangzhou Intermediate People’s Court decided to prohibit this practice in 2004, and
Shanxi HPC did so in May 2006.

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2011, the SPC officially issued the ‘Supreme People’s Court’s Several Opinions on Regulating the
Judicial Relationship between Lower and Higher People’s Courts’ (Supreme People’s Court, 2011).
This Opinion does not explicitly prohibit the practice of lower courts seeking advice from higher
courts. Instead, it establishes a separate mechanism by which lower courts can request higher
courts to directly hear some cases that lower courts have difficulty deciding. The SPC Opinion now
clarifies the position by explicitly prohibiting lower courts from seeking advice on issues of fact or
evidence from higher courts. This may put a stop to the practice of lower courts ‘pulling’ opinions
from a higher court. It does not, however, prevent higher courts from ‘pushing’ opinions down.
Ironically, on 24 May 2014, the day of the decision in the Liu Han case (a trial at first instance of
the ringleaders of a major crime syndicate involving multiple homicide allegations) was handed
down, the SPC itself posted an entry on Weibo (equivalent to Twitter), reporting the outcome of the
case along with reference to commentary pieces written by two eminent criminal law scholars in
support of the decision of the court of first instance (Supreme People’s Court, 2014). This move
immediately attracted wide criticism among lawyers for stripping the defendants of their right to a
meaningful appeal. It is arguable that SPC’s post in this case was politically motivated due to the
‘underworld’ nature of the case. It is unclear, however, whether the SPC or other higher courts will
act similarly in the future.

Changes Addressing Lack of Legal Representation

No particular attention was paid in the policy papers to the protection of lawyers’ rights as a
defender during the various stages, other than simply restating the existing law. Point 20 of the
SPC Opinion states that in death penalty review procedures, ‘Where the defence lawyer makes a
request, the opinion of the defence lawyer must be heard’, an exact quote from the 2012 CPL. The
MPS Notice merely says that ‘the various rights of lawyers at the investigation stage should be
protected according to law’. Again, there is no further detail on the ways by which the powers of
lawyers are to be guaranteed. Given these policy papers have no legal force, no meaningful change
is offered by these policy changes in this respect.

Allocation of Responsibility
One of the most significant features shared across all these policy papers is the allocation of
responsibility for wrongful conviction cases. For example, point 27 of the SPC Opinion states that
Where adjudicating officers act in accordance with their duties, they will not be investigated for
responsibility. Where adjudicating officers handle cases in a way contrary to the work disciplines or bend
the law, they are to be investigated for responsibility according to the relevant discipline or law.

Paragraph 4 of the MPS Notice states that

Where there are quality issues with any case, the main handling officer is to be investigated for
responsibility. Where wrongful conviction cases have the approval of leaders in the public security organ,
the main leaders and the relevant leaders take primary responsibility. … Case handling officers who
intentionally violate the rules or cause serious mistakes are to be investigated for responsibility according
to law.

Theoretically, these changes can provide strong disincentives for officials in the judicial process to
act outside the rules. If strictly followed, police investigators, responsible judges and government
leaders are exposed to punishment if any wrongful conviction case does occur and so should treat
each case carefully.
This disincentive to act outside the rules is, however, countered by incentives to do the
opposite. As pointed out above, one of the factors deciding the political fate of government officials
is the murder-solving rate. Despite the Central Politics and Legal Committee and the Mistry of
Public Security’s repeated call to abolish the ‘case solving rate’ as a critical factor, even in April
2014, the Mistry of Public Security itself, ironically, continued to appraise the long-held, record and
near-perfect murder solving rate in Henan (Department of Public Security of Henan Province,

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2014). With the race to solve every single murder case still on, the pressure on government officials
remains unrelieved.
In summary, legislative reforms and policy changes have been brought in to address problems
that undermine the objectives the death penalty in China is intended to achieve. While legislative
reforms on the exclusion of illegal evidence patch some problems (such as the lack of a legal basis
for the exclusion of illegal evidence, the visibility of interrogation, and a lack of permission for
lawyers to get involved earlier in the litigation process), recent reports have shown that at least
some of the defence mechanisms against the occurrence of wrongful convictions in death penalty
cases have failed. So are these legislative changes sufficient? The SPC’s death penalty review
process could perform an important role in ensuring a concrete right to appeal and consistency in
all death penalty cases but there remain shortcomings that could allow some wrongful convictions
to fall through the cracks. So is the death penalty review system effective? Policy changes have also
been introduced to complement legislative reforms. Emphasis has been placed on many of the flaws
in practice. The majority of these policy papers are, however, simply restatements of the existing
law and because of the lack of concern for the role of defence lawyers, no independent check and
balance mechanism is in place. As such, heavy reliance is placed on the integrity of the internal
administration.
Will these policies be followed strictly? The legislative and policy changes are all relatively
recent so their effectiveness remains to be seen. As a commentator in People’s Daily points out, to
prevent wrongful convictions, more is needed than just rules on paper. What is needed most is the
actual implementation of all the rules (Peng, 2013: 17).

Conclusion
Despite the international tide for abolition of the death penalty, China is still believed to carry out
a large number of executions every year. The retention of the death penalty in China is said to be
based on ‘national circumstance’. Justifications include crime control, the need for incapacitation,
and the need to kill to soothe public anger.
In the absence of empirical studies, it is difficult to assess the impact of the practice in China’s
death penalty system on the objective of crime control. As we have seen, however, a series of
problematic practices have been exposed in recent wrongful conviction cases. As criminal law
scholar He Jiahong points out:
If a real perpetrator is acquitted because of lack of sufficient evidence, there is no mistake in law, but this
may be a mistake in fact, so there is in total only one mistake. If an innocent person is wrongfully
convicted, however, there are two mistakes: firstly an innocent person is unjustly treated, and secondly,
the true perpetrator is released into the society (Cui, 2014a).

The first mistake would create public anger at the authorities which goes against death penalty’s
objective of soothing public anger, while the second mistake undermines the objective of
incapacitation.
Recent legislative reforms target some of the problems in China’s death penalty practice. Many
questions, however, remain unresolved. Whilst policy reforms introduced by various authorities do
seem to complement the legislative changes and show an attempt to fill in the gaps, whether or not
these policies are strictly followed in practice will determine the effectiveness of China’s death
penalty practice in achieving its ‘intended’ objectives.

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Chinese Legislation
《中华人民共和国宪法》 [Constitution of the People’s Republic of China]. (Constitution)
《中华人民共和国刑法》 [Criminal Law of the People’s Republic of China] (People’s Republic of China)
National People’s Congress, 1 October, 1997. (Criminal Law)
《中华人民共和国刑事诉讼法》 [Criminal Procedure Law of the People’s Republic of China] (People’s Republic
of China) National People’s Congress, 17 March, 1996. (1996 Criminal Procedure Law)
《中华人民共和国刑事诉讼法》 [Criminal Procedure Law of the People’s Republic of China] (People’s Republic
of China) National People’s Congress, 1 January, 2013. (2012 Criminal Procedure Law)
《中华人民共和国人民法院组织法》 [Organic Law of the People’s Courts of the People’s Republic of China]
(People’s Republic of China) National People’s Congress, 2 September 1983. (1983 Organic Law)
《中华人民共和国人民法院组织法》 [Organic Law of the People’s Courts of the People’s Republic of China]
(People’s Republic of China) National People’s Congress, 1 January 2007. (2007 Organic Law)
《中华人民共和国各级人民代表大会常务委员会监督法》 [Supervision Law of Various Levels of Standing
Committees of People’s Congress of the People’s Republic of China] (People’s Republic of China) National
People’s Congress, 1 January 2007. (Supervision Law)

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