North American Philosophical Publications

Immorality with a Clear Conscience

Author(s): D. Goldstick
Source: American Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. 17, No. 3 (Jul., 1980), pp. 245-250
Published by: University of Illinois Press on behalf of the North American Philosophical
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 American Philosophical Quarterly
Volume 17, Number 3, July 1980

IX. IMMORALITY WITH A CLEAR CONSCIENCE

D. GOLDSTICK

literature1?to be morally disapproving of the censure of

LET me beginwill
nowadays with anti-ethnocentrism.
hesitate Who
to endorse the strictures such actions as are taken in conformity with the
social science has taught us to level at the notorious actor's conscience. For such censure is often quite in
narrow-minded parochialism of middle-class Victo? conformity with, or even dictated by, the personal
conscience of the censuring moralist. In such a case,
rians, for instance, in so hastily passing judgment on
societies and cultures other than their own, without
the consistent moral non-dogmatist must regard the
any real understanding of them, let alone human objected-to act of censure, however strongly he insists
sympathy with the people living in them? When, on dissenting from it, as being itself altogether
however, anti-ethnocentrism is carried to the point of blameless morally. It must be on some other grounds
tabooing any criticism whatever of a way of life that he takes exception to it. He could hardly, at that
different from our own, there is perhaps some room rate, be taking exception to such censure as being (to
for legitimate dissent. his way of thinking) inhumane?surely a species of
The critic of such a taboo can always make the criticism on moral grounds. And yet much of the
point that in finding fault with middle-class Victorians attractiveness, surely, of moral non-dogmatism must
for their ethnocentrism, one is doing precisely what lie precisely in its appeal to the sentiment of
the taboo would forbid; for the ethnocentricity humaneness.
characteristic of the Victorian middle class was In saying moral non-dogmatism does have consid?
indeed part and parcel of its entire way of life. Of erable psychological appeal, I am not saying it has
course, an absolutely consistent adherent of histori many explicit proponents among those professionally
cism, as the position has been called, would presum? employed in the field of ethics. The influence of a
ably refrain from criticizing anything that was not philosophical outlook often far exceeds the explicit
socially deviant in its own time and place. Not that he adherence which it secures. Thus, Immanuel Kant
would have to find fault with any and every example most certainly didn't ever explicitly premise the
of social nonconformity ; but he could not consistently inadmissibility of morally faulting an agent for
find fault with anything that was not an example of infractions of a moral law not of his own making ; but
social nonconformity. Viewed in this light, the plainly it was of no small importance to him to be
position surely loses much of its attractiveness. able to affirm in the Grundlegung that
However, my topic here is a different position, one
there is no one, not even the most hardened scoundrel?
which is specifically concerned only to limit criticism
in the sphere of morals. It is not acts in conformity provided only he is accustomed to use reason in other
ways?who, when presented with examples of honesty
with the socially-accepted moral norms that this
in purpose, of faithfulness to good maxims, of sympathy,
position specifically opposes censuring, but rather and of kindness towards all..., does not wish that he too
acts, whether of commission or omission, that do not might be a man of like spirit-By such a wish he shows
deviate from full conformity with the personal ethic that having a will free from sensuous impulses he
to which the actor himself subscribes. We must not, of transfers himself in thought into an order of things quite
course, consider the moral non-dogmatists?as adherents different from that of his desires in the field of
of this position have been termed in some of the recent sensibility... from this standpoint he is conscious of

1 See "Another Ethical Paradox" by Carl R. Kordig in Mind, Vol. LXXVIII, No. 312 (October 1969). Kordig's contribution is a
response to an earlier article by Brenda Cohen, entitled "An Ethical Paradox" in Mind, Vol. LXXVI, No. 302 (April, 1967). Cohen
defines "moral non-dogmatism" as the doctrine that everyone ought to do what he thinks he ought to do. Kordig extends the label to the
weaker doctrine that everyone is permitted to do what he thinks he ought to do, adding that both doctrines are incompatible with a
straightforward moral principle such as the principle that everyone ought not to be sexually promiscuous. The evident upshot is that any
moral non-dogmatist morally opposed to sexual promiscuity, for example, must either (a) adjust the moral principle to which he
subscribes so that it will prescribe abstention from sexual promiscuity only for those who morally oppose it?his fellow participants, pro
tanto, in the anti-promiscuity (sub) culture?or else (b) distinguish somehow or other between performing a censurable action and acting
otherwise than as one morally ought.
245

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 246 AMERICAN PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY

possessing a good will which, on his own admission, distinguishing between a "moral" act and an objec?
constitutes ... a law of whose authority he is aware even tively "right" act. In Carritt's words :
in transgressing it.2
If we do what we think wrong or fail to do what we think
In the twentieth century, it is much less common to right we act immorally.... If we do the act that we think
claim that everyone's conscience must at bottom right, and do it for that reason simply, we act morally... 7
really agree with that of everyone else. And we often,
When a moral theorist tells us that in accordance
indeed, hear a morally "non-judgmental" stance, as
with the ethics to which he himself subscribes he
it is called, urged on the grounds of the diversity of
sincere moral convictions existing in the world. At regards certain of the actions people perform as being
least implicitly this assumes that it cannot be in order objectively wrong but not actually immoral because
to fault a person morally for having acted in a way not contrary to the actor's conscience, we must ask
which he himself considered right. Indeed, he may him straightforwardly whether he himself is, all
have been motivated entirely by what he saw as being things considered, disposed to morally censure such
an action or not. The answer that in one sense he does
his moral duty. He may have made great personal
censure it while in another sense he does not seems
sacrifices in the course of carrying it out. He may, in
other words, have been altogether morally-minded unsatisfactory. Is he, insofar as he is influenced by his
and conscientious in doing what he did. Inasmuch as own moral conscience, really indifferent (or favora?
his own conscience does not reproach him for acting ble!) to the action in question's performance? If so, in
as he did, how can we? what sense is it an action contrary to the ethic to which
To take an extreme case, consider the life-work of he himself subscribes? If not, though, how could he be
Adolf Hitler. He certainly seems to have believed in indifferent to whatever it is which would motivate the
the moral Tightness of what he was doing, and to have action's performance? If he really is not morally
acted in furtherance of what he believed with the indifferent to the action or to the motivation for
utmost vigour, perseverance and whole-hearted ded? performing it, doesn't he feel, then, all things
ication. In the service of a better cause, these traits considered, a moral revulsion for such performance?
could without doubt have entitled him to moral But if he does feel such a moral revulsion, whatever
commendation, on balance. But, in the light of his else will be involved in his sincerely feeling such
actual conduct, such commendation?to speak eu? performance of the action to be, all things considered,
phemistically?seems paradoxical in the extreme. something which is immoral ?
Nevertheless, J. D. Mabbott, a contemporary philos? It is my present object to advance a deductively
opher whose position comes close to that of moral valid disproof of moral non-dogmatism showing that
non-dogmatism, is prepared to grasp the nettle boldly only a "moral indifferentist," devoid of any moral
and declare : conscience whatsoever, could consistently adhere to
the limitation on moral censure that it prescribes, and
I am inclined to think... that we must accept the
that he, for his part, could limit his moral censure in
paradox and award Hitler moral approval.3
accordance with its prescription only because he
Mabbott, however, would not deny the immorality would never morally censure anything in any case,
of absolutely every course of action which is not in inasmuch as there would be nothing whatsoever of
opposition to the actor's conscience. By way of which he himself morally disapproved, being consci?
exception, he holds that one must, on pain of enceless. But before presenting the a priori argument
immorality, scrupulously take thought and try to against moral non-dogmatism, it is desirable first to
determine as rationally as possible how it is best to rebut the case in its favor and to explain away as far
act, from a moral point of view, whether one's as possible whatever tends to make it attractive while
personal moral convictions actually recognize this adducing whatever good persuasive arguments there
obligation or not.4 The classification of Mabbott as a are against it. For, in view of the notorious unrelia?
moral non-dogmatist must also be qualified by bility of would-be conclusive a priori argumentation
reference to the fact that he5 follows E. F. Carritt6 in in the history of philosophy, it is surely necessary, as

2 Immanuel Kant, The Moral Law, translated by H. J. Pat?n (London, 1956), pp. 122-123.
3 J. D. Mabbott, An Introduction to Ethics (London, 1966), p. 58.
4 Ibid., pp. 65-69.
5 Ibid., pp. 54-55.
6 See Carritt's The Theory of Morals (Oxford, 1930), pp. 90-91.
1 Ibid., p. 136.

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 IMMORALITY WITH A CLEAR CONSCIENCE 247

far as possible, not only to prove that which is best will in the world would not have prevented the
philosophically true, but also rationally to make it act's performance. After all, even with the best will in
plausible. the world, only limited precautions against compu?
Some of the factors which, irrespective of the tational miscalculations or factual misassessments of
strength of the position rationally, do tend to confer the situation are reasonable in view of the various
psychological plausibility upon moral non-dogma? competing legitimate demands upon anyone's ener?
tism, have already been considered. An actual gies and time.
argument which over the years has been influential How good one's will is, I maintain, is indeed the
with meta-ethical cognitivists, at any rate, points out criterion of personal moral guilt or innocence. In the
that in moral reasoning we do take it that honest last resort, the sole moral duty one really has is to
error is a valid excuse in general, unless resulting have one's heart in the right place; which involves
from undue negligence, so that whatever in fact has adhering to the appropriate ultimate moral principles
been done because of a genuine honest error (which (whatever these are) and in consequence disposing
did not result from undue negligence) has therefore oneself to act accordingly just as far as one is able. To
been done innocently; why should an exception be fall short on either score is to be to that extent morally
made for honest error regarding what is morally right evil, by reason of failing to have an altogether good
to be done? As the nineteenth century moral non will. This can explain why sincerity and conscien?
dogmatist, James Martineau, put it : tiousness alone need not count as a morally valid
excuse for wrongful action, even though honest,
If guilt is incurred by an erroneous computation of
conduct, why not by a faulty column of statistics or a
conscientious error in assessing the facts of the
mistaken prophecy of market prices?8 situation or in calculating the application of ethical
principles to them, does count as fully exculpatory in
Like Kant, Martineau believed that the immediate our moral reasoning.
pronouncements of anybody's conscience were alto? On this basis, it is possible to see how to counter the
gether reliable?God, after all, was seeing to that? deduction of moral non-dogmatism from the Kantian
but that people might well honestly go astray and principle that "ought" implies "can." As one recent
differ as a result of miscalculation in their "compu? commentator has summarized the argument, when
tations" of derivative principles of conduct, applying somebody has really considered honestly and care?
the first principles which were immediately self fully what it is right for him to do before reaching a
evident to conscience.9 Indeed, even the opponent of conscientious decision on how to act, the demand, in
moral non-dogmatism must admit that no moral guilt the name of morality, that he should come to a
is incurred where a wrongful act of commission or different decision than he actually does
omission has been performed with a clear conscience,
is a demand for the impossible, i.e. that someone should
not because of ultimately corrupt moral principles or step outside his own frame of reference, know what he is
undue negligence in the endeavor to apply wholesome not in a position to know, judge what he is not in a
ones, but because of honest miscalculations or factual position to judge. But according to Kant's principle, it
misassessments of the situation, such that even the can never be a person's duty to do what he cannot do.10

8 Types of Ethical Theory, Second Edition, Vol. II (Oxford, 1886), pp. 55-56.
9 A few pages later, Martineau advances a different explanation for the apparent differences in people's moral convictions :
"It is also easy to understand, how, notwithstanding the uniformity of their moral nature, men may remain far from unanimity in
their apparent moral judgements. The whole scale of inner principles is open to survey only to the ripest mind; and to be perfect in its
appreciation is to have exhausted the permutations of human experience.... Still, however limited the range of our moral
consciousness, it would lead us all to the same verdicts, had we all the same segment of the series under our cognisance. ... Ask two
persons the value of B: if one measures it by A as a standard, and the other by C, their answers will not agree. Not that they contain
any real contradiction and may not both be true, when fully unfolded ; but so long as the measure tacitly employed remains latent and
is not even self-confessed, the relative nature of the decision is hid under the disguise of an absolute verdict; one voice declares a given
thing to be 'right,' another to be 'wrong ;' meaning no more than in the first case that it is superior to one substitute,?in the second,
that it is inferior to another." (Ibid., pages 61-62)
10 Brenda Cohen, op. cit., page 250. R. L. Sturch, in his contribution to the discussion ("Moral Non-Dogmatism", Mind, Vol. LXXIX,
No. 313, January, 1970), seems to endorse this line of argument (page 124), observing, however, (p. 125) that "the principle of not
committing or organizing genocide seems so obvious that most of us find it very hard to believe in the sincerity of anyone who denies it;
we tend to feel that at the best there is self-deception involved in such perversity, a wilful blinding of oneself to the truth. We feel either
that they do realize that genocide is wrong, or that their failure is itself wrong (morally wrong) ...." And so, it seems as though Sturch
might be willing, after all, to censure people for dissenting, however honestly, from his own moral convictions, provided only that the
question at issue is sufficiently "obvious."

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 248 AMERICAN PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY

The counter-argument required here will insist that, agreeing in imputing some value to the trait of
in the relevant sense, it really is possible for someone conscientiousness independent of the specific ends in
committed to an evil principle, however conscien? the service of which it may happen to be enlisted. But
tiously and honestly, to "step outside his own frame this is not enough to ensure that any conscientiously
of reference" and commit himself instead to better motivated behavior must be regarded, on balance^
principles, inasmuch as that is precisely what he even as morally innocent, let alone as morally
would do if he really did have his heart in the right praiseworthy.
place. Indeed, it is a tautology that if he really did However, let us concede to the moral non-dogmatist
have his heart in the right place, if he really were a that no behavior ever is morally praiseworthy unless
man of good will, then what he willed would not be it is motivated at least partially by moral considera?
evil. The claim is that, in contexts of moral judgment, tions. Inasmuch as moral praise of anyone is ultimately
the appropriate construal of what someone simply praise of his character?of his having a good will?it
"cannot do" limits the application of the phrase to plainly will be only in order when it is this sort of
things which even with the best possible will in the good moral character that has been manifested in his
world he would not be doing; and the possession of conduct. To do the right thing for any other reason
anything less than the best possible will in the world than the requirements of righteousness may sometimes
is itself morally culpable ; and one way in which a be morally innocent, but it cannot be morally
person's possession of less than the best possible will in praiseworthy.
the world might express itself is in his adhering, A third concession that should be made to the
however sincerely, to evil principles with regard to moral non-dogmatists, I think, is that no act can be
what is morally right and wrong. altogether morally innocent if its performance does
I have said that in my opinion the moral non go against the actor's conscience.12 For either, though
dogmatist can safely be conceded the point that, in the line of action he has taken is in itself unobjection?
judging people morally, we should count honest error, able enough in the circumstances, there is nonetheless
unless due to negligence, as a sufficient excuse for bound to be something the matter with the man's
anything, provided that the error involved is at conscience in view of his adherence to defective moral
bottom an error upon a question other than a moral principles, so that the man is to be held morally at
question. Let me now make three further concessions fault on that score ; or else the line of action taken is
to the moral non-dogmatist, with the aim not of itself objectionable in the circumstances, and his
strengthening his case but of weakening it, by taking it is a legitimately blameable manifestation of
showing that much of its plausibility derives from a evil motivations strong enough to have outweighed
natural but unwarranted extension of principles the opposition of his own conscience, however fine its
falling well short of what his position requires. We moral principles.
ought to concede, I think, that conscientiousness, an It is now time to mention three persuasive
active concern to behave in a moral fashion, is in considerations militating against moral non-dogma?
itself a morally good thing. However evil and tism. One is the moral offensiveness, already consid?
depraved an individual's moral principles are, there ered, of regarding an evil-doer like Adolf Hitler as
is indisputably something morally admirable in his being a morally innocent or even praiseworthy man
dedicatedly following them at real cost, it may be, to merely because he did honestly regard himself that
his own personal interests.11 Which is not to say that way, in all conscientiousness. The other two consid?
this consideration must count for very much when erations are sociological. What rational bearing can
weighed in the scale against the depravity manifested sociological considerations have on ultimate questions
in commitment to truly monstrous moral principles. of morality ? They can be rationally brought to bear
In view of positive morality's social function of in this way : when one realizes how positive morality
fostering the development of certain sorts of person? actually functions in society, one can then see more
ality make-up while discouraging other sorts, it is no clearly the sort of morality one has in all probability
surprise to find virtually every system of morality internalized oneself; and one can thus gain a less
11 J. F. M. Hunter, in his discussion contribution, "On Miss Cohen's Ethical Paradox" (Mind, Vol. LXXIX, No. 314 April, 1970),
suggests a possible exception: "If a person holds a belief which we think misguided, and we think that his holding it is a rationalization
of some deep-rooted surliness in his nature, we may be unsure whether to admire his devotion to duty or to discount it as another
manifestation ofthat imprudent recklessness which is characteristic of the surly man...." (p. 246).
12 Sturch in his above-quoted contribution makes a similar point (op. cit., pp. 123-124). It would seem to follow from this that unlike
the "weak" principle of moral non-dogmatism discussed here, the "strong" principle discussed by Cohen is actually vindicated, provided
that "Z morally ought to do A in the circumstances" means "X would be immoral, in the circumstances, if he did not do A".

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 IMMORALITY WITH A CLEAR CONSCIENCE 249

clouded insight into one's own moral sentiments. On whatsoever can succeed in reproducing itself from
that basis, one may then be capable of less prejudiced one generation to another without recourse to the
introspection, and may thus be brought to the blaming of acts performed by people known to be
recognition that the pronouncements of one's own altogether devoid of any conscientious objection to
conscience are really not what, under the influence of acting thus. Admittedly, it is not quite logically
a philosophical theory perhaps, one has thought them contradictory to maintain that moral conceptions can
to be. An alternative way of putting the point, more only be taught by means which inevitably involve
congenial to analytical philosophy, is that these their improper application, for the paradigm case
sociological considerations have a taxonomic bearing argument is philosophically wrong. But it certainly
on the conceptual definition, or the analysis, of what is an uncomfortable conclusion to which moral non
a moral conscience, or moral censure, is. But I believe it dogmatism appears to be forced here. Will anyone
goes more to the heart of the matter to emphasize seriously be content to acknowledge that it is only by
frankly the adhominem character of the sort of rational and through active injustice that regard for justice
appeal which is made by arguing sociologically on an can be inculcated ?
ultimate moral question like the one raised by the Now is the time for me to present the logical
dispute over moral non-dogmatism. argument which I claim refutes moral non-dogmatism
Here, in any case, are the two sociological by validly demonstrating that only a moral indiffer?
considerations in question. entist could consistently adhere to it. I shall proceed
Consideration one. The function performed by by first calling attention to a certain possible moral
positive morality in society is to foster the develop? principle?a principle which I have other reasons for
ment of certain sorts of personality make-up while introducing into the discussion than any wish to claim
inhibiting other sorts. At that rate, it is only natural that moral non-dogmatists are rationally or otherwise
that a morality will praise the former and dispraise committed to it. The principle is?
the latter. Not that a morality can operate primarily It is immoral to act in opposition to one's own conscience.
through motivating people externally to comply with
what it prescribes. Fear of moral censure by others Let us call this principle "principle /*". Now all acts
(together with fear of all the further social sanctions ever performed, whether of commission or omission,
that such censure can bring in its train) will be one are of two sorts. Either they are contrary to the actor's
operative motive for compliance, of course. But a conscience at the time of their performance, or they
morality cannot operate effectively unless it also are not. Call acts of the former sort "jP-violating".
motivates people internally to act in accordance with Furthermore, all possible moral rules are of two sorts.
its dictates ; unless, that is, their own consciences tell Every rule, of course, is a prohibition of certain classes
them to do what it prescribes and to abstain from of possible acts, whether of commission or omission.
doing what it prohibits. This is equally true of a The acts that a rule prohibits are either all P
socially conformist morality and of a dissenting one. violating, or they are not. In the former case, call the
Both serve to foster certain sorts of personality make? rule in question a "type-I" rule ; in the latter case, call
up while inhibiting others. That is simply what a the rule a "type-II" rule. A type-I rule is one that
morality is. prohibits no acts that are not contrary to the actor's
Consideration two. The part played by this own conscience. A type-II rule is a rule of any other
consideration is mainly to reinforce the conclusion sort. Examples of type-I rules are?
urged in the light of consideration one. Consider the
It is immoral to act in opposition to one's own conscience in cold
way in which morality is taught to children. There weather
are, of course, many different methods and styles of
teaching children morality, but no method can do
and
without praising them and blaming them for what It is immoral to tell lies in opposition to one's own conscience.
they do. Inevitably, then, they are initially blamed
for behavior which they themselves had no idea could Plainly, any type-I rule has the feature of being
be regarded as immoral until confronted with logically entailed by principle P, which is itself a
parental blame for it after the fact. Doubtless such type-I rule.
blame will, or should, have much less morally Now, the defining feature of moral non-dogmatism
censorious force than blame which is incurred by is that it refuses to regard any act as immoral which
malefactors old enough to know better. But neverthe? is not P-violating, that is, which is not contrary to the
less, the point still stands that no positive morality actor's own conscience. Consequently, the only sort of

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 25O AMERICAN PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY

moral rule consistent with moral non-dogmatism is a then it follows that the conscience of a consistent
type-I rule, a rule which limits the class of acts it moral non-dogmatist, which cannot prescribe more
censures as immoral to acts in opposition to the actor's than what P prescribes, could consequently prescribe
own conscience. In other words, the only moral rules nothing at all. In other words, there could not be any
consistent with moral non-dogmatism are rules such conscience. A moral non-dogmatist, to be
logically entailed by principle P. The class of acts consistent, would have to be completely conscience?
censured as immoral by P constitutes the largest less; he would, in short, have to be a moral
possible class of acts which a rule consistent with indifferentist.
moral non-dogmatism can censure as immoral. I take it that a person does not have a conscience
Principle P thus represents the maximum to which a unless he has in him something which, as we say, tells
consistent moral non-dogmatist can subscribe in the him what to do, at least in some cases, whether actual
way of negative moral rules. This, as I have already or only hypothetical. Unless it prescribes a definite
noted, is not to say that moral non-dogmatists are course of action or inaction for at least some situations,
rationally or otherwise committed to principle P. It it does not prescribe anything. The question to what
is only to say that they cannot consistently commit moral principles a person subscribes is the same as the
themselves to anything more than P. Principle P is the question as to what it is his conscience tells him to do,
maximum to which they can morally commit or not do, in different hypothetical situations. The
themselves. conscience of somebody who, as far as his moral
(I am assuming here that any moral system is fully principles went, subscribed only to P, would be
defined by the specification of what it censures as incapable of telling him to do something in a certain
immoral. The sort of conduct that it praises will sort of situation. It could only tell him to do it in that
simply be the abstention, under conditions unusually sort of situation if he actually disapproved morally of
unfavorable for such abstention, from something that abstaining from it in such a situation. And likewise,
it censures, or that it would censure but for the relative to no type of situation could it ever tell him
existence of those unusually unfavorable conditions. not to do something. It could only tell him not to do
And, again, the sort of character-type any morality it there if he disapproved morally of doing it there.
will favor is the character-type of such a sort as toWhatever it prescribed it would prescribe only
abstain from whatever it censures as immoral. Etc.) conditionally. Accordingly, there would not be
Since it appears principle P represents the maxi? anything such an individual's conscience ever actually
mum that the conscience of a consistent moral non told him to do or to abstain from doing. It could
dogmatist can prescribe, I wish to demonstrate now never say to him : do this ; or, do not do that. It could
that a conscience which prescribed nothing more only say : do this if.. . ; or, do not do that if... .
than what P prescribes would be a conscience that Hence, only a moral indifferentist, devoid of
prescribed nothing. If a conscience which prescribed conscience completely, could be a consistent moral
nothing more than what P prescribed were of non-dogmatist. Therefore, the stance of moral non
necessity a conscience that prescribed nothing at all, dogmatism must in principle be wrong.13

University of Toronto Received April g, igyg

13 Substantially this paper was read at a session of the Canadian Philosophical Association in Fredricton, New Brunswick, May 29,
1977

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