1

CASE DOCTRINES ON CRIMINAL

PROCEDURE (Rules 110 to 127)

PEOPLE vs. HENRY T. GO

G.R. No. 168539               March 25, 2014

1) Once it is shown by probable cause after PI that a

private person and a public officer have conspired to
commit a crime (e. g. violation of R. A, No. 3019) the
private person may be properly charged, tried and
convicted in the Sandiganbayan even if the public officer
is not charged with him by reason of his death or some
other reason.
Although the public officer has died and could no
longer be charged with the private person, it does not
mean that the allegation of conspiracy between them
could no longer be proved or that their alleged conspiracy
is already expunged. The only thing extinguished by the
death of the public officer is his criminal liability. His
death did not extinguish the crime nor did it remove the
basis of the charge of conspiracy between him and private
person.
The requirement before a private person may be
indicted for violation of Section 3(g) of R.A. 3019, among
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others, is that such private person must be alleged to have

acted in conspiracy with a public officer. The law,
however, does not require that such person must, in all
instances, be indicted together with the public officer. If
circumstances exist where the public officer may no
longer be charged in court, as when the public officer dies
before he could be charged, the private person may be
indicted alone.
2) By posting bail and filing a motion for
consolidation of the cases against him, an accused is
deemed to have submitted himself to the jurisdiction of
the court. The rule is well settled that the act of an accused
in posting bail or in filing motions seeking affirmative
relief from the court is tantamount to submission of his
person to the jurisdiction of the court.
LACSON vs. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
G.R. No. 128096 January 20, 1999

1) For the SB to assume jurisdiction over the case, it

is not enough that it be alleged in the Information that the
accused public officer “committed the crime in relation to
his office”. The Information must contain specific
allegation of facts showing that the crime is “intimately
connected” with the office of the accused such as (1) that
he committed the crime while in the performance of his
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official functions; (2) that he had no personal motives and

would not have committed crime if not for his office; (3)
that he used the powers of his office to commit the crime
or (4) that he could not have committed the crime if not
for his office.
2) The use of the phrase in the Information “the
accused committed the crime in relation to his public
office”, which is a mere conclusion of law, is not what
determines the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. What is
controlling is the specific factual allegations in the
information that would indicate the close intimacy
between the discharge of the accused's official duties and
the commission of the offense charged. Thus, even if the
phrase does not appear in the Information, the SB may
exercise jurisdiction if there are specific factual
allegations showing close intimacy between the discharge
of the accused's official duties and the commission of the
crime charged.
SANCHEZ vs. DEMETRIOU
G.R. Nos. 111771-77 November 9, 1993

1) The SB is without jurisdiction over the case

because there is no allegation in the information showing
that that there is an "intimate connection" between the
offense of rape with homicide and the accused’s official
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functions as municipal mayor. It follows that the said

crime, being an ordinary offense, is triable by the regular
courts and not the Sandiganbayan.
HANNAH SERANA vs. SANDIGANBAYAN
G.R. No. 162059             January 22, 2008

1) Section 4(A)(1)(g) of P.D. No. 1606 provides that

the SB has jurisdiction over “presidents, directors or
trustees, or managers of government-owned or controlled
corporations, state universities or educational institutions
or foundations”. Although she is not a public officer with
salary of at least 27, by express provision of P. D. No.
1606, accused Serana, a U. P. student regent, is included
among those the SB exercises jurisdiction.
2) The SB has jurisdiction over the crime of estafa if
there are specific allegations of facts in the information
showing that the accused public officer committed the
crime in relation to his office. The following allegations in
the information is considered sufficient to vest jurisdiction
on the SB over the crime, to wit: "while in the
performance of her official functions, committing the
offense in relation to her office and taking advantage of
her position.”
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3) A U. P. Student Regent was considered a public

officer based on the following definition of a public
office, to wit:
"A public office is the right, authority and duty,
created and conferred by law, by which, for a given period,
either fixed by law or enduring at the pleasure of the
creating power, an individual is invested with some portion
of the sovereign functions of the government, to be
exercised by him for the benefit of the public. The
individual so invested is a public officer."

The fact that accused was not receiving salary as

student regent is of no moment because salary is not an
essential element of public office.
4) Presented here is a brief legislative history of the
statute creating the Sandiganbayan. The Sandiganbayan
was created by P.D. No. 1486, promulgated by then
President Ferdinand E. Marcos on June 11, 1978. It was
promulgated to attain the highest norms of official
conduct required of public officers and employees, based
on the concept that public officers and employees shall
serve with the highest degree of responsibility, integrity,
loyalty and efficiency and shall remain at all times
accountable to the people.
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P.D. No. 1486 was amended by P.D. No. 1606 which

was promulgated on December 10, 1978. P.D. No. 1606
expanded the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.
P.D. No. 1606 was later amended by P.D. No.
1861 on March 23, 1983, further altering the
Sandiganbayan jurisdiction. R.A. No. 7975 approved on
March 30, 1995 made succeeding amendments to P.D.
No. 1606, which was again amended on February 5, 1997
by R.A. No. 8249. Section 4 of R.A. No. 8249 further
modified the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. 

DE LIMA vs. HON. GUERRERO

G.R. No. 229781 October 10, 2017

1) Under Section 90 of R. A. No. 9165, the RTC

exercises exclusive original jurisdiction over all violations
of the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act regardless of
whether the accused is a public officer with a salary grade
of at least 27 and he committed the crime in relation to his
office and regardless of the imposable penalty. Section 60
of R. A. No. 9165 provides, as follows:

Section 90. Jurisdiction. - The Supreme Court shall

designate special courts from among the existing Regional
Trial Courts in each judicial region to exclusively try and
hear cases involving violations of this Act. The number of
courts designated in each judicial region shall be based on
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the population and the number of cases pending in their

respective jurisdiction.

The DOJ shall designate special prosecutors to

exclusively handle cases involving violations of this Act.

No other trial court is mentioned in R. A. No. 9165

as having the authority to take cognizance of drug-related
cases. Thus, even if the violation of R. A. No. 9165 is
punishable by imprisonment of not more than six years,
the crime is still exclusively cognizable by the RTC. The
only exception to this rule is that when the violation of R.
A. No. 9165 is committed by a minor, or in conspiracy
with a minor, then the crime falls under the exclusive
original jurisdiction of the Family Court.
2) R. A. No. 9165 specifies the RTC as the only court
with jurisdiction to exclusively try and
hear cases involving any violation thereto. This is an
exception, couched in the special law on dangerous drugs,
to the general rule under Section 4(b) of PD 1606, as
amended by RA 10660. It is a canon of statutory
construction that a special law prevails over a general law
and the latter is to be considered as an exception to the
general.
3) The exceptions to the doctrine on hierarchy of
courts are (1) xxxxx, (2) when the case involves
transcendental importance; (3) when the case is novel; (4)
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when the constitutional issues raised are better decided by

this Court; (5) when time is of the essence; (6) when the
subject of review involves acts of a constitutional organ;
(7) when there is no other plain, speedy, adequate remedy
in the ordinary course of law; (8) when the petition
includes questions that may affect public welfare, public
policy, or demanded by the broader interest of justice; (9)
when the order complained of was a patent nullity; and
(10) when the appeal was considered as an inappropriate
remedy.
4) As a rule, the denial of a motion to quash is an
interlocutory order and is not appealable; an appeal from
an interlocutory order is not allowed under Section 1 (b),
Rule 41 of the Rules of Court. Neither can it be a proper
subject of a petition for certiorari which can be used only
in the absence of an appeal or any other adequate, plain
and speedy remedy. The plain and speedy remedy upon
denial of an interlocutory order is to proceed to trial.
5) Probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of
arrest is the existence of such facts and circumstances that
would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent person to
believe that an offense has been committed by the person
sought to be arrested. Hence, the judge, before issuing a
warrant of arrest, 'must satisfy himself that based on the
evidence submitted, there is sufficient proof that a crime
 9

has been committed and that the person to be arrested is

probably guilty thereof'.
At this stage of the criminal proceeding, the judge is not
yet tasked to review in detail the evidence submitted
during the preliminary investigation. It is sufficient that he
personally evaluates such evidence in determining
probable cause. The judge needs only to determine the
probability, not the certainty, of guilt of the accused and,
in doing so, he need not conduct a de novo hearing.
DUNCANO vs. SANDIGANBAYAN
G. R. No. 191894               July 15, 2015

1) Under Section 4(A)(1) of R. A. No. 8249, the

Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction over a Regional
Director of the BIR classified as Salary Grade 26. The
relevant provision reads, as follow:
"SEC. 4. Jurisdiction.– The Sandiganbayan shall
exercise exclusive original jurisdiction in all cases
involving:

xxx

(1) Officials of the executive branch occupying

the positions of regional director and higher,
otherwise classified as Grade ‘27’ and higher, of
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the Compensation and Position Classification Act of

1989 (Republic Act No. 6758), specifically including:

Based on the afore-quoted, the phrase "otherwise

classified as Grade ‘27’ and higher" qualifies "regional
director and higher". Thus, for a Regional Director to fall
under the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, his position
must be classified as Salary Grade 27 or higher”. In the
instant case, the accused’s position of Regional Director is
classified as Salary Grade 26, placing him outside the
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.
2) The creation of the Sandiganbayan was mandated
by Section 5, Article XIII of the 1973 Constitution. By
virtue of the powers vested in him by the Constitution and
pursuant to Proclamation No. 1081, dated September 21,
1972, former President Ferdinand E. Marcos issued P.D.
No. 1486. The decree was later amended by P.D. No.
1606, Section 20 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, P.D. No.
1860, and P.D. No. 1861.
With the advent of the 1987 Constitution, the special
court was retained as provided for in Section 4, Article XI
thereof. Aside from Executive Order Nos. 14 25 and 14-
a, and R.A. 7080, which expanded the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan, P.D. No. 1606 was further modified by
R.A. No. 7975, R.A. No. 8249, and just this year, 2015,
R.A. No. 10660.
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3) To speed up trial in the Sandiganbayan, Republic

Act No. 7975 was enacted for that Court to concentrate on
the "larger fish" and leave the "small fry" to the lower
courts. This law became effective on May 6, 1995 and it
provided a two-pronged solution to the clogging of the
dockets of that court, to wit:
It divested the Sandiganbayan of jurisdiction over
public officials whose salary grades were at Grade "26" or
lower, devolving thereby these cases to the lower courts,
and retaining the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan only
over public officials whose salary grades were at Grade
"27" or higher and over other specific public officials
holding important positions in government regardless of
salary grade,
Enumerated below are some of the public officers
whose positions may be lower than SG 27 but, by express
provision of law, are placed under the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan: (1) a member of the Sangguniang
Panlungsod, (2) a department manager of the Philippine
Health Insurance Corporation (Philhealth), (3) a student
regent of the University of the Philippines, and (6) a Head
of the Legal Department and Chief of the Documentation
with corresponding ranks of Vice-Presidents and Assistant
Vice-President of the Armed Forces of the Philippines
Retirement and Separation Benefits System (AFP-RSBS).
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INOCENTES vs. PEOPLE

G.R. No. 205963-64 July 7, 2016

1) Under subparagraphs (a) to (g) of Section 4(1) of

P.D. No. 1606, the Sandiganbayan exercises jurisdiction
over the accused, a Branch Manager of the GSIS Tarlac
City field office, although his position is classified as
Salary Grade 26. The applicable law provides that
violations of R.A. No. 3019 committed by presidents,
directors or trustees, or managers of government-owned
or -controlled corporations (such as GSIS), and state
universities shall be within the exclusive original
jurisdiction of the Sandganbayan.
The Sandiganbayan exercises jurisdiction over public
officers specifically enumerated in (a) to (g) of Section
4(1) of P.D. No. 1606, as amended, regardless of their
salary grades. Simply put, public officers with Salary
Grade 26 and below may still fall within the jurisdiction
of the Sandiganbayan, provided they hold the positions
enumerated under subparagraphs (a) to (g) of Section 4(1)
of P.D. No. 1606, as amended. In this category, it is the
position held, not the salary grade, which determines the
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.
2) An accused who has posted bail is deemed to have
voluntarily surrendered his person to the jurisdiction of
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the court and may no longer question the court’s finding

of probable cause which led to the issuance of the warrant
for his arrest.
3) There are two kinds of determination of probable
cause: executive and judicial. The executive determination
of probable cause is one made during preliminary
investigation. It is a function that properly pertains to the
public prosecutor who is given a broad discretion to
determine whether probable cause exists and to charge
those whom he believes to have committed the crime as
defined by law and thus should be held for trial.
Otherwise stated, such official has the quasi-judicial
authority to determine whether or not a criminal case must
be filed in court. Whether or not that function has been
correctly discharged by the public prosecutor, i.e.,
whether or not he has made a correct ascertainment of the
existence of probable cause in a case, is a matter that the
trial court itself does not and may not be compelled to
pass upon.
The judicial determination of probable cause, on the
other hand, is one made by the judge to ascertain whether
a warrant of arrest should be issued against the accused.
The judge must satisfy himself that based on the evidence
submitted, there is necessity for placing the accused under
custody in order not to frustrate the ends of justice. If the
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judge finds no probable cause, the judge cannot be forced

to issue the arrest warrant.
4) The case should be dismissed for inordinate delay
if it took the Ombudsman seven (7) years to conduct the
PI before filing the information with the Sandiganbayan.
There is inordinate delay if the delay in the PI
unreasonable, oppressive, and vexatious. This kind of
delay violates the accused’s constitutional right to the
speedy disposition of his case. A person’s right to a
speedy disposition of his case is guaranteed under Section
16, Article III of the Constitution:
All persons shall have the right to a speedy
disposition of their cases before all judicial, quasi-
judicial, or administrative bodies.

This constitutional right is not limited to the accused

in criminal proceedings but extends to all parties in all
cases, be it civil or administrative in nature, as well as in
all proceedings, either judicial or quasi-judicial. In this
accord, any party to a case may demand expeditious
action of all officials who are tasked with the
administration of justice.

CRISOSTOMO vs. SANDIGANBAYAN

G.R. No. 152398. April 14, 2005
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1) Republic Act No. 7975, which limited the

jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan to public officers with
SG 27 or higher, took effect on May 6, 1995. Before the
effectivity of this law, the Sandiganbayan exercised
jurisdiction over all public officers regardless of his SG.
Since the crime charged was allegedly committed by the
accused police officer, a jail guard, in 1989, the SB
assumed jurisdiction over him without objection. The
issue was whether there were specific allegations of facts
in the information showing that he committed the crime of
killing an inmate in relation to his office as a jail guard.
The Information alleged that Crisostomo "a public
officer, being then a member of the Philippine National
Police (PNP) stationed at Solano Police Station and
a jailer thereat, taking advantage of his public position
and thus committing the offense in relation to his office"
conspired, confederated and connived with his co-accused
who are inmates of the Solano Municipal Jail to kill
Renato, "a detention prisoner."
The SC ruled that the allegations in the foregoing
information sufficed to vest on the Sandiganbayan
jurisdiction over the case.
2) Section 11(a) of Rule 122 of the Rules of Court
provides that "[a]n appeal taken by one or more [of]
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several accused shall not affect those who did not appeal,
except insofar as the judgment of the appellate court is
favorable and applicable to the latter." In this case, only
Crisostomo questioned the jurisdiction and decision of the
Sandiganbayan. However, the evidence against
Crisostomo and his co-conspirator, Calingayan, are
inextricably linked as their conviction hinged on the
prosecution’s unproven theory of conspiracy. Thus,
Crisostomo’s acquittal, which is favorable and applicable
to Calingayan, should benefit Calingayan.
3) An appeal in a criminal case opens the entire case
for review. The reviewing tribunal can correct errors
though unassigned in the appeal, or even reverse the lower
court’s decision on grounds other than those the parties
raised as errors.
ESTEBAN vs. SANDIGANBAYAN
G.R. Nos. 146646-49. March 11, 2005

1) The Sandiganbayan may exercise jurisdiction over

the crime of acts of lasciviousness committed against a
court employee by the presiding judge provided there are
specific allegations of facts in the information showing
that the judge committed the crime in relation to his
office. The SC found the following information sufficient:
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"That on or about the 5th day of August 1997 in

Cabanatuan City, Nueva Ecija, Philippines and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
named accused, JUDGE ROGELIO M. ESTEBAN, a
public officer, being then the Presiding Judge of
Branch 1 of the Municipal Trial Court in Cabanatuan
City, who after having been rejected by the private
complainant, Ana May V. Simbajon, of his sexual
demands or solicitations to be his girlfriend and to
enter his room daily for a kiss as a condition for the
signing of complainant’s permanent appointment as a
bookbinder in his Court, thus in relation to his office
or position as such, with lewd design and malicious
desire, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously grab private complainant, kiss her all over
her face and touch her right breast against her will and
consent, to her damage and detriment.

2) In People v. Montejo, it was ruled that an offense is

said to have been committed in relation to the office if the
offense is "intimately connected" with the office of the
offender and perpetrated while he was in the
performance of his official functions. This intimate
relation between the offense charged and the discharge of
official duties must be alleged in the Information. This is
in accordance with the rule that the factor that
characterizes the charge is the actual recital of the facts in
the information. Hence, where the information is wanting
in specific factual averments to show the intimate
relationship/connection between the offense charged and
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the discharge of official functions, the Sandiganbayan has

no jurisdiction over the case.
BONIFACIO vs. RTC OF MAKATI
G.R. No. 184800               May 5, 2010

1) Under Article 360 of the RPC as amended by

Republic Act No. 4363, the criminal action for libel or
written defamation shall be instituted either in the proper
court of the place where the libelous article was printed
and first published or in the proper court of the place
where the private complainant resides.
If the place where the libelous article was printed and
first published is made the basis for the venue, the
Information must allege with particularity where the
defamatory article was printed and first published, as
evidenced or supported by, for instance, the address of
their editorial or business offices in the case of
newspapers, magazines or serial publications. inclination
to harass.
The foregoing, however, cannot be done if the
defamatory material appeared on a website on the internet.
If such is the case, there would be no way of determining
the situs of its printing and first publication. In the instant
case, since the libelous material appeared on a website on
the internet, the SC ruled that only the residence of the
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offended party may be made the basis of the venue of the

criminal action. Certainly, the place where the offended
party would allege to have accessed the libelous material
could not be used in lieu of the place where the libelous
material was printed and first published. This would give
the offended party the undue opportunity to harass the
accused by filing the case in remote, out-of-town venues.

DISINI, JR. vs. SEC. OF JUSTICE

G.R. No. 203335               February 11, 2014

1) In the instant case, the Supreme Court ruled, as

follows:
a. Section 4(c)(4) that penalizes online
libel is declared valid and constitutional with
respect to the original author of the post but
void and unconstitutional with respect to
others who simply receive the post and react
to it; and
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b. Section 5 that penalizes aiding or

abetting and attempt in the commission of
cybercrimes is valid and constitutional only
in relation to Section 4(a)(1) on Illegal
Access, Section 4(a)(2) on Illegal
Interception, Section 4(a)(3) on Data
Interference, Section 4(a)(4) on System
In view of the foregoing, when the offender is
charged with libel twice, the first under Section 4(c)(4)
of Republic Act 10175 and second under Article 353 of
the Revised Penal Code, his right against double
jeopardy would be violate. So would an offender right
against double jeopardy be violated if charged with
child pornography twice, first under Section 4(c)(2) of
Republic Act 10175 and, second, under Republic Act
9775 or the Anti-Child Pornography Act of 2009..
2) Online libel is different from libel defined
under the RPC. There should be no question that if the
published material on print, said to be libelous, is
again posted online or vice versa, that identical
material cannot be the subject of two separate libels.
The two offenses, one a violation of Article 353 of the
Revised Penal Code and the other a violation of
Section 4(c)(4) of R.A. 10175 involve essentially the
same elements and are in fact one and the same
offense. Indeed, the OSG itself claims that online libel
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under Section 4(c)(4) is not a new crime but is one

already punished under Article 353. Section 4(c)(4)
merely establishes the computer system as another
means of publication. Charging the offender under
both laws would be a blatant violation of the
proscription against double jeopardy.
The same is true with child pornography
committed online. Section 4(c)(2) merely expands the
ACPA’s scope so as to include identical activities in
cyberspace. As previously discussed, ACPA’s
definition of child pornography in fact already covers
the use of "electronic, mechanical, digital, optical,
magnetic or any other means." Thus, charging the
offender under both Section 4(c)(2) and ACPA would
likewise be tantamount to a violation of the
constitutional prohibition against double jeopardy.
JIMENEZ vs. SORONGON
G.R. No. 178607               December 5, 2012

1) Every action must be prosecuted or defended

in the name of the real party in interest. A real party in
interest is one who stands to be benefited or injured by
the judgment in the suit, or by the party entitled to the
avails of the suit. By real interest is meant a present
substantial interest, as distinguished from a mere
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expectancy, or a future, contingent, subordinate or

consequential interest.
Procedural law mandates that "all criminal
actions commenced by complaint or by information
shall be prosecuted under the direction and control of
a public prosecutor." In appeals of criminal cases
before the CA and the Supreme Court, the People is
the real party in interest represented by OSG.
A private complainant, therefore, has no legal
personality to assail the dismissal of the criminal case,
either by appeal or petition for certiorari, if the main
issue raised pertains to the criminal aspect of the case
such as the existence of probable cause. If the private
complainant is not appealing to protect his pecuniary
interest as an offended party of the crime, but to cause
the reinstatement of the criminal action against the
respondents, then he is without legal personality.
PEOPLE vs. VALDEZ
G.R. No. 175602               January 18, 2012

1) The real nature of the criminal charge is

determined not from the caption or preamble of the
information, or from the specification of the provision
of law alleged to have been violated, which are mere
 23

conclusions of law, but by the actual recital of the

facts in the complaint or information. In the instant
case, the SC did not consider the aggravating
circumstance of treachery in imposing the penalty on
the accused because, although the word treachery was
alleged, there was no allegation of specific facts
constituting the treachery. The rule is that, even if the
aggravating circumstance was alleged and established
by proof beyond reasonable doubt, if the specific facts
constituting the aggravating circumstance were not
alleged in the information, such aggravating
circumstance cannot be considered by the court.
The allegation in the information that “then and
there shooting [them] with a gun, hitting [them]" on
various parts of their bodies "which [were] the direct
and immediate cause of [their] death[s]" did not
sufficiently set forth the facts and circumstances
describing how treachery attended each of the killings.
In People v. Dimaano, it was held that “what is
controlling is not the title of the complaint, nor the
designation of the offense charged or the particular
law or part thereof allegedly violated, these being
mere conclusions of law, but the allegation of specific
facts describing how the crime was committed
including the attending aggravating circumstances, if
any.
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2) To discharge its burden of informing the

accused of the charge against him, the State must
specify in the information the details of the crime and
any circumstance that aggravates his liability for the
crime. The requirement of sufficient factual averments
is meant to inform the accused of the nature and cause
of the charge against him in order to enable him to
prepare his defense. It emanates from the presumption
of innocence in his favor, pursuant to which he is
always presumed to have no independent knowledge
of the details of the crime he is being charged with.

MIGUEL vs. SANDIGANBAYAN

G.R. No. 172035               July 4, 2012

1) In deference to the constitutional right of an

accused to be informed of the nature and the cause of
the accusation against him, Section 6 of Rule 110
requires, inter alia, that the information shall state the
designation of the offense given by the statute and the
acts or omissions imputed which constitute the offense
charged. Additionally, the Rules requires that these
acts or omissions and its attendant circumstances
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"must be stated in ordinary and concise language" and

"in terms sufficient to enable a person of common
understanding to know what offense is being.
The test of the information’s sufficiency is
whether the crime is described in intelligible terms and
with such particularity with reasonable certainty so
that the accused is duly informed of the offense
charged. In particular, whether an information validly
charges an offense depends on whether the material
facts alleged in the complaint or information shall
establish the essential elements of the offense charged
as defined in the law. The raison d’etre of the
requirement in the Rules is to enable the accused to
suitably prepare his defense.
In the instant case, the SC disputed petitioner’s
argument that since the phrase “acting with evident
bad faith and manifest partiality” immediately
followed the phrase “conspiring and confederating
with the private [individuals”, it means that the phrase
“acting with evident bad faith and manifest partiality”
pertained only to petitioner’s co-conspirators/private
individuals only and not to him.
The SC said the information clearly reveals that
the phrase "acting with evident bad faith and manifest
partiality" was merely a continuation of the prior
 26

allegation of the acts of the petitioner, and that he

ultimately acted with evident bad faith and manifest
partiality in giving unwarranted benefits and
advantages to his co-accused private individuals. This
is what a plain and non-legalistic reading of the
information would yield.
PEOPLE vs. SORIA
G.R. No. 179031               November 14, 2012

1) The SC found the Information sufficient and

valid although it did not specify with certainty whether
the accused committed the rape through sexual
intercourse under paragraph 1 of Article 266-A, or
rape by sexual assault as described in paragraph 2
thereof. The Information stated that accused inserted
his penis into the genital of "AAA," which constituted
rape by sexual intercourse under the first paragraph of
Article 266-A, at the same time, it also alleged that
accusd used force and intimidation to commit an act of
sexual assault. While these allegations cause
ambiguity, they only pertain to the mode or manner of
how the rape was committed and the same do not
invalidate the Information or result in the automatic
dismissal of the case.
 27

Where an offense may be committed in any of

the different modes and the offense is alleged in the
Information to have been committed in two or more
modes, the Information is sufficient, notwithstanding
the fact that the different means of committing the
same offense are prohibited by separate sections of the
statute. The allegation in the information of the
various ways of committing the offense should be
regarded as a description of only one offense and the
information is not thereby rendered defective on the
ground of multifariousness.
In the instant case, the SC convicted the accused
of rape by sexual assault because that was the
accused’s mode of committing rape that was proved
beyond reasonable doubt.

UNION BANK vs. PEOPLE

G.R. No. 192565               February 28, 2012

1) Venue is an essential element of jurisdiction in

criminal cases. It determines not only the place where
the criminal action is to be instituted, but also the
court that has the jurisdiction to try and hear the case.
The reason for this rule is two-fold. First, the
jurisdiction of trial courts is limited to well-defined
 28

territories such that a trial court can only hear and try
cases involving crimes committed within its territorial
jurisdiction. Second, laying the venue in the locus
criminis is grounded on the necessity and justice of
having an accused on trial in the municipality of
province where witnesses and other facilities for his
defense are available.
Section 15(a), Rule 110 of the 2000 Revised
Rules of Criminal Procedure provides:
(a) Subject to existing laws, the criminal
action shall be instituted and tried in the court or
municipality or territory where the offense was
committed or where any of its essential
ingredients occurred.
The above provision should be read in light of
Section 10, Rule 110 of the 2000 Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure which states:
Place of commission of the offense. – The
complaint or information is sufficient if it can be
understood from its allegations that the offense was
committed or some of its essential ingredients
occurred at some place within the jurisdiction of the
court, unless the particular place where it was
committed constitutes an essential element of the
offense charged or is necessary for its identification.
 29

2) The crime of perjury committed through the

making of a false affidavit under Article 183 of the
RPC is committed at the time the affiant subscribes
and swears to his or her affidavit since it is at that time
that all the elements of the crime of perjury are
executed. In this instance, the proper venue of the
criminal action would be the proper court of the place
where the affidavit was subscribed and sworn to. For
the information charging a crime under Article 183 to
be sufficient, the place where the affidavit was
subscribed and sworn to must be alleged.
On the other hand, when the crime is committed
through false testimony under oath in a proceeding
that is neither criminal nor civil, venue is at the place
where the testimony under oath is given. If in lieu of
or as supplement to the actual testimony made in a
proceeding that is neither criminal nor civil, a written
sworn statement is submitted, venue may either be at
the place where the sworn statement is submitted or
where the oath was taken as the taking of the oath and
the submission are both essential ingredients of the
crime of perjury. In all cases, determination of venue
shall be based on the acts alleged in the Information to
be constitutive of the crime committed.
TEEHANKEE vs. MADAYAG
G.R. No. 103102 March 6, 1992
 30

REGALADO, J.:

1) Now, an objective appraisal of the amended

information for murder filed against herein petitioner
will readily show that the nature of the offense
originally charged was not actually changed. Instead,
an additional allegation, that is, the supervening fact of
the death of the victim was merely supplied to aid the
trial court in determining the proper penalty for the
crime. That the accused committed a felonious act
with intent to kill the victim continues to be the
prosecution's theory. There is no question that
whatever defense herein petitioner may adduce under
the original information for frustrated murder equally
applies to the amended information for murder. Under
the circumstances thus obtaining, it is irremissible that
the amended information for murder is, at most, an
amendment as to form which is allowed even during
the trial of the case.
It consequently follows that since only a formal
amendment was involved and introduced in the second
information, a preliminary investigation is
unnecessary and cannot be demanded by the accused.
The filing of the amended information without the
requisite preliminary investigation does not violate
petitioner's right to be secured against hasty, malicious
 31

and oppressive prosecutions, and to be protected from

an open and public accusation of a crime, as well as
from the trouble, expenses and anxiety of a public
trial. The amended information could not conceivably
have come as a surprise to petitioner for the simple
and obvious reason that it charges essentially the same
offense as that charged under the original information.
Furthermore, as we have heretofore held, if the crime
originally charged is related to the amended charge
such that an inquiry into one would elicit substantially
the same facts that an inquiry into the other would
reveal, a new preliminary investigation is not
necessary.
2) A substantial amendment consists of the recital
of facts constituting the offense charged and
determinative of the jurisdiction of the court. All other
matters are merely of form. 11 Thus, the following
have been held to be merely formal amendments, viz:
(1) new allegations which relate only to the range of
the penalty that the court might impose in the event of
conviction; 12 (2) an amendment which does not
charge another offense different or distinct from that
charged in the original one; 13 (3) additional
allegations which do not alter the prosecution's theory
of the case so as to cause surprise to the accused and
affect the form of defense he has or will assume; and
(4) an amendment which does not adversely affect any
 32

substantial right of the accused, such as his right to

invoke prescription.

SOLIDUM vs. PEOPLE

G.R. No. 192123               March 10, 2014
BERSAMIN, J.:

1) In criminal prosecutions, the civil action for

the recovery of civil liability that is deemed instituted
with the criminal action refers only to that arising
from the offense charged. Since the civil liability that
may be determine could arise only from the crime
charged, only the accused may be held liable for such
civil liability. No person who has not been charged
with the accused may be held jointly and severally
liable with the accused for the damages arising from
the delict. This is specially with regards to a juridical
entity which could not be charged with the accused. A
person or entity not charged with the accused may,
however be held to have subsidiary liability provided
the requirements of Article 103 of the Civil Code are
satisfied. Article 103 reads, as follows:
“Art. 103. Subsidiary civil liability of other
persons. — The subsidiary liability established in the
next preceding article shall also apply to employers,
teachers, persons, and corporations engaged in any
 33

kind of industry for felonies committed by their

servants, pupils, workmen, apprentices, or employees
in the discharge of their duties.”
Since a hospital is not engaged in any industry, it
cannot be held to have subsidiary liability for its
doctor’s civil liability arising from reckless
imprudence resulting in serious physical injuries of his
patient.

CASTILLO vs. SALVADOR

G.R. No. 191240               July 30, 2014
PERALTA, J.:

1) There are two kinds of acquittal, with different

effects on the civil liability of the accused. First is an
acquittal on the ground that the accused is not the
author of the actor omission complained of. This
instance closes the door to civil liability, for a person
who has been found to be not the perpetrator of any
act or omission cannot and can never be held liable for
such act or omission. There being no delict, civil
liability ex delicto is out of the question, and the civil
action, if any, which may be instituted must be based
on grounds other than the delict complained of. The
second instance is an acquittal based on reasonable
doubt on the guilt of the accused. In this case, even if
 34

the guilt of the accused has not been satisfactorily

established, he is not exempt from civil liability which
may be proved by preponderance of evidence only.
Thus, although the accused’s acquittal was based
on reasonable doubt, if the prosecution failed to prove
the civil liability of the accused by preponderance of
evidence, the accused could not be held civilly liable.
JOHN DY vs. PEOPLE
G.R. No. 158312             November 14, 2008
QUISUMBING, Acting C.J.:

1) An accused may be held civilly liable where

the facts established by the evidence so warrant. The
rationale for this is simple. The criminal and civil
liabilities of an accused are separate and distinct from
each other. One is meant to punish the offender while
the other is intended to repair the damage suffered by
the aggrieved party. So, for the purpose of
indemnifying the latter, the offense need not be proved
beyond reasonable doubt but only by preponderance
of evidence.
Thus, even if the accused was acquitted of estafa
and Violation of B. P. Blg. 22, if his civil liability has
been established by preponderance of evidence, the
accused may be held civilly liable.
 35

LILY LIM vs. KOU CO PING

G.R. No. 175256               August 23, 2012
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO

1) A single act or omission that causes damage to

an offended party may give rise to two separate civil
liabilities on the part of the offender - (1) civil liability
ex delicto, that is, civil liability arising from the
criminal offense under Article 100 of the Revised
Penal Code, and (2) independent civil liability, that is,
civil liability that may be pursued independently of the
criminal proceedings. The independent civil liability
may be based on "an obligation not arising from the
act or omission complained of as a felony," as
provided in Article 31 of the Civil Code (such as for
breach of contract or for tort). It may also be based on
an act or omission that may constitute felony but,
nevertheless, treated independently from the criminal
action by specific provision of Article 33 of the Civil
Code ("in cases of defamation, fraud and physical
injuries").

The civil liability arising from the offense or ex

delicto is based on the acts or omissions that constitute
the criminal offense; hence, its trial is inherently
intertwined with the criminal action. For this reason,
the civil liability ex delicto is impliedly instituted with
 36

the criminal offense. The civil liability based on delict

is extinguished when the court hearing the criminal
action declares that "the act or omission from which
the civil liability may arise did not exist."
On the other hand, the independent civil
liabilities are separate from the criminal action and
may be pursued independently, as provided in Articles
31 and 33 of the Civil Code, which state that:
ART. 31. When the civil action is based on an
obligation not arising from the act or omission
complained of as a felony, such civil action may
proceed independently of the criminal proceedings and
regardless of the result of the latter.
ART. 33. In cases of defamation, fraud, and
physical injuries a civil action for damages, entirely
separate and distinct from the criminal action, may be
brought by the injured party. Such civil action shall
proceed independently of the criminal prosecution,
and shall require only a preponderance of evidence.
(Emphasis supplied.)
Because of the distinct and independent nature of
the two kinds of civil liabilities, jurisprudence holds
that the offended party may pursue the two types of
civil liabilities simultaneously or cumulatively,
without offending the rules on forum shopping, litis
 37

pendentia, or res judicata. They present different

causes of action, which under the law, are considered
"separate, distinct, and independent" from each other.
Both cases can proceed to their final adjudication,
subject to the prohibition on double recovery under
Article 2177 of the Civil Code.
CASUPANAN vs. LAROYA
G.R. No. 145391            August 26, 2002
CARPIO, J.:

1) In a case of collision between two motor

vehicles, driver #1 may file against driver #2 a
criminal case for reckless imprudence resulting in
damage to property based on the Revised Penal Code.
Deemed instituted with this criminal action is the civil
action to recover damages arising from the crime.
Simultaneously or successively with the criminal
action, driver #1 may also file against driver #2 an
independent civil action for damages based on Article
2176 of the Civil Code. On the other hand, driver #2
may file against driver #1 a civil action for damages
based on Article 2176 of the Civil Code.
Although the two foregoing civil actions arose
from the same act or omission, they have different
causes of action. The first civil action is based on the
 38

crime charged in the criminal action while the second

civil case is based on culpa aquiliana actionable under
Articles 2176 and 2177 of the Civil Code. These
articles on culpa aquiliana read:
"Art. 2176. Whoever by act or omission
causes damage to another, there being fault or
negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage
done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-
existing contractual relation between the parties,
is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the
provisions of this Chapter.
Art. 2177. Responsibility for fault or
negligence under the preceding article is entirely
separate and distinct from the civil liability
arising from negligence under the Penal Code.
But the plaintiff cannot recover damages twice
for the same act or omission of the defendant."
Moreover, paragraph 6, Section 1 of Rule 111
expressly requires the accused to litigate his
counterclaim in a separate civil action, to wit:
"SECTION 1. Institution of criminal and
civil actions. – (a) x x x.
No counterclaim, cross-claim or third-party
complaint may be filed by the accused in the
 39

criminal case, but any cause of action which

could have been the subject thereof may be
litigated in a separate civil action." (Emphasis
supplied)
Since the present Rules require the accused in a
criminal action to file his counterclaim in a separate
civil action, there can be no forum-shopping if the
accused files such separate civil action. The essence of
forum-shopping is the filing of multiple suits
involving the same parties for the same cause of
action, either simultaneously or successively, to secure
a favorable judgment. Forum-shopping is present
when in the two or more cases pending, there is
identity of parties, rights of action and reliefs sought.
2) Under Section 1 of the present Rule 111, the
independent civil action in Articles 32, 33, 34 and
2176 of the Civil Code is not deemed instituted with
the criminal action but may be filed separately by
the offended party even without reservation.
Thus, the offended party can file two separate
suits for the same act or omission. The first a criminal
case where the civil action to recover civil liability ex-
delicto is deemed instituted, and the other a civil case
for quasi-delict - without violating the rule on non-
forum shopping. The two cases can proceed
 40

simultaneously and independently of each other. The

only limitation is that the offended party cannot
recover damages twice for the same act or omission of
the defendant. In most cases, the offended party will
have no reason to file a second civil action since he
cannot recover damages twice for the same act or
omission of the accused. In some instances, the
accused may be insolvent, necessitating the filing of
another case against his employer or guardians.
Similarly, the accused can file a civil action
for quasi-delict for the same act or omission he is
accused of in the criminal case. This is expressly
allowed in paragraph 6, Section 1 of the present Rule
111 which states that the counterclaim of the accused
"may be litigated in a separate civil action." This is
only fair for two reasons. First, the accused is
prohibited from setting up any counterclaim in the
civil aspect that is deemed instituted in the criminal
case. The accused is therefore forced to litigate
separately his counterclaim against the offended party.
If the accused does not file a separate civil action
for quasi-delict, the prescriptive period may set in
since the period continues to run until the civil action
for quasi-delict is filed.
Second, the accused, who is presumed innocent,
has a right to invoke Article 2177 of the Civil Code, in
 41

the same way that the offended party can avail of this
remedy which is independent of the criminal action.
To disallow the accused from filing a separate civil
action for quasi-delict, while refusing to recognize his
counterclaim in the criminal case, is to deny him due
process of law, access to the courts, and equal
protection of the law.
CATERPILLAR, INC. vs. SAMSON
November 9, 2016 G.R. No. 205972
BERSAMIN, J.:

1) A civil action for unfair competition, damages

and cancellation of trademark and a criminal action for
unfair competition filed against the same person may
co-exist. A common element in the two cases is
fraud. Under Article 33 of the Civil Code, a civil
action entirely separate and distinct from the criminal
action may be brought by the injured party in cases of
fraud, and such civil action shall proceed
independently of the criminal prosecution. Being an
independent civil action, it cannot operate as a
prejudicial question that that would justify the
suspension of the proceedings in criminal action.
PIMENTEL vs. PIMENTEL
G.R. No. 172060               September 13, 2010
 42

CARPIO, J.:

1) Does a civil action for annulment of marriage

under Article 36 of the Family Code filed by the wife
against her husband constitute a prejudicial question
that would warrant the suspension of the proceeding in
the criminal action for frustrated parricide filed against
the husband? The issue in the civil case for annulment
of marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code is
whether petitioner is psychologically incapacitated to
comply with the essential marital obligations. The
issue in parricide is whether the accused killed the
victim. In this case, since petitioner was charged with
frustrated parricide, the issue is whether he performed
all the acts of execution which would have killed
respondent as a consequence but which, nevertheless,
did not produce it by reason of causes independent of
petitioner’s will. At the time of the commission of the
alleged crime, petitioner and respondent were married.
The subsequent dissolution of their marriage in case
the petition for nullity of marriage is granted, will
have no effect on the alleged crime that was
committed at the time of the subsistence of the
marriage. In short, even if the marriage between the
spouses is annulled, the husband could still be held
criminally liable since at the time of the commission
 43

of the alleged crime, he was still married to

respondent.
JM DOMINGUEZ. INC. vs. LICLICAN
G.R. No. 208587               July 29, 2015
VELASCO, JR., J.:

1) The pendency in the RTC of an intra-corporate

dispute questioning the validity of the election of a set
of corporate officers and their subsequent acts of
disbursing corporate money constitutes a prejudicial
question to a criminal action charging said corporate
officers with qualified theft for the said act of
disbursing corporate money.
2) Grave abuse of discretion may arise when a
lower court or tribunal violates or contravenes the
Constitution, the law or existing jurisprudence. By
grave abuse of discretion is meant, such capricious
and whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to
lack of jurisdiction. The abuse of discretion must be
grave as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary
or despotic manner by reason of passion or personal
hostility and must be so patent and gross as to amount
to an evasion of positive duty or to a virtual refusal to
perform the duty enjoined by or to act at all in
contemplation of law. The word "capricious," usually
 44

used in tandem with the term "arbitrary," conveys the

notion of willful and unreasoning action. Thus, when
seeking the corrective hand of certiorari, a clear
showing of caprice and arbitrariness in the exercise of
discretion is imperative.
FENEQUITO vs. VERGARA, JR.
G.R. No. 172829               July 18, 2012
PERALTA, J.:

1) An order issued by the RTC in the exercise of

its appellate jurisdiction setting aside the order of the
MTC dismissing the criminal case for lack of probable
cause and directing the court a quo to proceed to trial
by allowing the prosecution to present its evidence is
an interlocutory order and cannot be appealed to the
Court of Appeals by petition for review.
BURGUNDY REALTY CORP. vs. REYES
G.R. No. 181021               December 10, 2012
PERALTA, J.:

1) In a preliminary investigation, the public

prosecutor merely determines whether there is
probable cause or sufficient ground to engender a
 45

well-founded belief that a crime has been committed,

and that the respondent is probably guilty thereof and
should be held for trial. It does not call for the
application of rules and standards of proof that a
judgment of conviction requires after trial on the
merits. The complainant need not present at this stage
proof beyond reasonable doubt. A preliminary
investigation does not require a full and exhaustive
presentation of the parties' evidence. Precisely, there is
a trial to allow the reception of evidence for both
parties to substantiate their respective claims.
2) To reiterate, probable cause has been defined
as the existence of such facts and circumstances as
would excite the belief in a reasonable mind, acting on
the facts within the knowledge of the prosecutor, that
the person charged was guilty of the crime for which
he was prosecuted. Probable cause is a reasonable
ground of presumption that a matter is, or may be,
well founded on such a state of facts in the mind of the
prosecutor as would lead a person of ordinary caution
and prudence to believe, or entertain an honest or
strong suspicion, that a thing is so.
The term does not mean "actual or positive
cause" nor does it import absolute certainty. It is
merely based on opinion and reasonable belief. Thus,
a finding of probable cause does not require an inquiry
 46

into whether there is sufficient evidence to procure a

conviction. It is enough that it is believed that the act
or omission complained of constitutes the offense
charged.
ABANADO vs. BA YONA
A.M. No. MTJ-12-1804               July 30, 2012
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:

1) An information that is filed in court shall, as

far as practicable, be accompanied by a copy of the
resolution of the investigating prosecutor, the
complainant’s affidavit, the sworn statements of the
prosecution’s witnesses, the respondent’s counter-
affidavit and the sworn statements of his witnesses and
such other evidence as may have been taken into
account in arriving at a determination of the existence
of probable cause. If the resolution of the investigating
prosecutor recommending the dismissal of the
complaint is reversed by the city or provincial
prosecutor, the latter’s resolution finding probable
cause shall replace the resolution of the investigating
prosecutor. The reversed resolution of the
investigating prosecutor need not be attached to the
information and the judge cannot insist that the same
be submitted to him.
 47

HEIRS OF NESTOR TRIA vs. OBIAS

G.R. No. 175887               November 24, 2010

1) Preliminary investigation is executive in

character. It does not contemplate a judicial function.
It is essentially an inquisitorial proceeding, and often,
the only means of ascertaining who may be reasonably
charged with a crime. Prosecutors control and direct
the prosecution of criminal offenses, including the
conduct of preliminary investigation, subject to review
by the Secretary of Justice. The duty of the Court in
appropriate cases is merely to determine whether the
executive determination was done without or in excess
of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion.
Resolutions of the Secretary of Justice are not subject
to review unless made with grave abuse. 

2) In Crespo it was held that after the information

has been filed in court, the court’s permission must be
secured should the fiscal find it proper that
reinvestigation be made. Thereafter, the court shall
consider and act upon the findings and
recommendations of the fiscal.
 48

In Ledesma v. Court of Appeals, it was clarified

that the justice secretary is not precluded from
exercising his power of review over the investigating
prosecutor even after the information has already been
filed in court. However, the justice secretary’s
subsequent resolution withdrawing the information or
dismissing the case does not cause the court to lose
jurisdiction over the case. In fact, the court is duty-
bound to exercise judicial discretion and its own
independent judgment in assessing the merits of the
resulting motion to dismiss filed by the prosecution, to
wit:
When confronted with a motion to withdraw an
information on the ground of lack of probable cause
based on a resolution of the secretary of justice, the
bounded duty of the trial court is to make an
independent assessment of the merits of such
motion. Having acquired jurisdiction over the case, the
trial court is not bound by such resolution but is
required to evaluate it before proceeding further with
the trial. While the secretary’s ruling is persuasive, it
is not binding on courts. A trial court, however,
commits reversible error or even grave abuse of
discretion if it refuses/neglects to evaluate such
recommendation and simply insists on proceeding
with the trial on the mere pretext of having already
acquired jurisdiction over the criminal action.
 49

UY vs. JUDGE JAVELLANA

A.M. No. MTJ-07-1666               September 5, 2012
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:

1) Criminal cases falling within the scope of the

Revised Rule on Summary Procedure shall be
commenced either by complaint or by information,
except that, in Metropolitan Manila and in chartered
cities, such cases shall be commenced only by
information, except when the offense cannot be
prosecuted de oficio. The complaint or information
shall be accompanied by the affidavits of the
complainant and of his witnesses.
If commenced by complaint, on the basis of the
complaint and the affidavits and other evidence
accompanying the same, the court may dismiss the
case outright for being patently without basis or merit
and order the release of the accused if in custody.
If commenced by information, the court shall
issue an order which, together with copies of the
affidavits and other evidence submitted by the
prosecution, shall require the accused to submit his
counter-affidavit and the affidavits of his witnesses as
 50

well as any evidence in his behalf, serving copies

thereof on the complainant or prosecutor not later than
ten (10) days from receipt of said order. The
prosecution may file reply affidavits within ten (10)
days after receipt of the counter-affidavits of the
defense.
Should the court, upon a consideration of the
complaint or information and the affidavits submitted
by both parties, find no cause or ground to hold the
accused for trial, it shall order the dismissal of the
case; otherwise, the court shall set the case for
arraignment and trial. If the accused is in custody for
the crime charged, he shall be immediately arraigned
and if he enters a plea of guilty, he shall forthwith be
sentenced.
2) Under Section 18 of the Revised Rule on
Summary Procedure, cases requiring referral to the
Lupon for conciliation under the provisions of
Presidential Decree No. 1508 where there is no
showing of compliance with such requirement, shall
be dismissed without prejudice, and may be revived
only after such requirement shall have been complied
with. This provision shall not apply to criminal cases
where the accused was arrested without a warrant.

PEOPLE vs. VALENCIA

 51

G.R. Nos. 94511-13 September 18, 1992

1) A person who is lawfully arrested, without a

warrant pursuant to paragraph 1(b), Section 5 of Rule
113 shall be subjected to an inquest in accordance
with Rule 112, Section 6, after which Information may
be filed against him without a preliminary
investigation.
PCGG vs. NAVARRO-GUTIERREZ
G.R. No. 194159 October 21, 2015

1) The Supreme Court has consistently refrained

from interfering with the discretion of the
Ombudsman to determine the existence of probable
cause and to decide whether or not an Information
should be filed. Nonetheless, the Court is not
precluded from reviewing the Ombudsman’s action
when there is a charge of grave abuse of
discretion. The Court’s pronouncement in Ciron v.
Gutierrez is instructive on this matter, to wit:
x x x this Court’s consistent policy has been to
maintain noninterference in the determination of the
Ombudsman of the existence of probable cause,
provided there is no grave abuse in the exercise of
 52

such discretion. This observed policy is based not only

on respect for the investigatory and prosecutory
powers granted by the Constitution to the Office of the
Ombudsman but upon practicality as well. 
The conduct of preliminary investigation
proceedings is geared only to determine whether or
not probable cause exists to hold a respondent for trial
for the supposed crime that he committed.
Probable cause, for the purpose of filing a
criminal information, has been defined as such facts as
are sufficient to engender a well-founded belief that a
crime has been committed and that respondent is
probably guilty thereof. The term does not mean
"actual or positive cause" nor does it import absolute
certainty. It is merely based on opinion and reasonable
belief. Probable cause does not require an inquiry
whether there is sufficient evidence to procure a
conviction. It is enough that it is believed that the act
or omission complained of constitutes the offense
charged.
A finding of probable cause needs only to rest on
evidence showing that, more likely than not, a crime
has been committed by the suspects. It need not be
based on clear and convincing evidence of guilt, not
on evidence establishing guilt beyond reasonable
 53

doubt, and definitely not on evidence establishing

absolute certainty of guilt. In determining probable
cause, the average man weighs facts and
circumstances without resorting to the calibrations of
the rules of evidence of which he has no technical
knowledge. He relies on common sense. What is
determined is whether there is sufficient ground to
engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been
committed, and that the accused is probably guilty
thereof and should be held for trial. It does not require
an inquiry as to whether there is sufficient evidence to
secure a conviction.
2) Hearsay may be the bases for issuance of the
warrant "so long as there … [is] a substantial basis for
crediting the hearsay." x x x And, in Aguilar, we
recognized that "an affidavit may be based on hearsay
information and need not reflect the direct personal
observations of the affiant," so long as the magistrate
is "informed of some of the underlying circumstances"
supporting the affiant’s conclusions and his belief that
any informant involved "whose identity need not be
disclosed…" was "credible" or his information
"reliable." x x x.
DE LIMA vs. REYES
G.R. No. 209330 January 11, 2016
LEONEN, J.:
 54

1) The Secretary of Justice has the discretion,

upon motion or motu proprio, to act on any matter
that may cause a probable miscarriage of justice in the
conduct of a preliminary investigation. This action
may include, but is not limited to, the creation of a
second panel of investigators to look into new
evidence submitted by the complainant after the first
panel has submitted its resolution dismissing the
complaint. Furthermore, a petition for certiorari under
Rule 65 questioning the regularity of preliminary
investigation becomes moot after the trial court
completes its determination of probable cause and
issues a warrant of arrest.
2) The public prosecutor’s power to conduct
preliminary investigation appears to be quasi-judicial
in nature only to the extent that, like quasi-judicial
bodies, the prosecutor is an officer of the executive
department exercising powers akin to those of a court.
A quasi-judicial agency performs adjudicatory
functions such that its awards, determine the rights of
parties, and their decisions have the same effect as
judgments of a court. Such is not the case when a
public prosecutor conducts a preliminary investigation
 55

or when the Secretary of Justice reviews the former’s

resolution.
3) Petitions for certiorari and prohibition are
directed only to tribunals that exercise judicial or
quasi-judicial functions. The issuance by the Secretary
of Justice of a department order is a purely
administrative or executive function. It is not a quasi-
judicial function. The DOJ is not a quasi-judicial
office or agency. Its preliminary investigation of cases
is not a quasi-judicial proceeding. Nor does the DOJ
exercise a quasi-judicial function when it reviews the
findings of a public prosecutor on the finding of
probable cause in any case. 
4) A petition for review under Rule 43 cannot be
brought to assail the Secretary of Justice's resolution
dismissing a complaint for lack of probable cause
because by issuing such resolution, the Secretary of
Justice did not perform a quasi-judicial but an
essentially executive function.
5) A writ of prohibition is directed against the
proceedings of any tribunal, corporation, board,
officer or person, whether exercising judicial, quasi-
judicial or ministerial functions. The Department of
Justice is not a court of law and its officers do not
perform quasi-judicial functions. The Secretary of
 56

Justice's review of the resolutions of prosecutors is

also not a ministerial function.
6) If the trial court refuses to grant the motion to
dismiss filed by the prosecutor upon the directive of
the Secretary of Justice, will there not be a vacuum in
the prosecution? The answer is simple. The role of the
prosecutor is to see that justice is done and not
necessarily to secure the conviction of the person
accused before the Courts. Thus, in spite of his
opinion to the contrary, it is the duty of the fiscal to
proceed with the presentation of evidence of the
prosecution to the Court to enable the Court to arrive
at its own independent judgment as to whether the
accused should be convicted or acquitted. The fiscal
should not shirk from the responsibility of appearing
for the People of the Philippines even under such
circumstances.
LUZ vs. PEOPLE
G.R. No. 197788               February 29, 2012
SERENO, J.:

1) A person who was flagged down for a traffic

violation under a city ordinance and was brought to a
nearby police station to be issued a traffic citation
ticket cannot be considered to have been arrested for
 57

the purpose of a warrantless search incidental to a

lawful arrest. A person caught committing a traffic
violation should not be arrested but issued only traffic
citation ticket. The shabu recovered from the person
by the police officers is therefore inadmissible in
evidence.
2) The following are the instances when a
warrantless search is allowed: (i) a warrantless search
incidental to a lawful arrest; (ii) search of evidence in
"plain view;" (iii) search of a moving vehicle; (iv)
consented warrantless search; (v) customs search; (vi)
a "stop and frisk" search; and (vii) exigent and
emergency circumstances. None of the above-
mentioned instances, especially a search incident to a
lawful arrest, are applicable to this case.
3) The "stop and frisk" rule normally applies
when a police officer observes suspicious or unusual
conduct, which may lead him to believe that a criminal
act may be afoot. The rule is, however, a limited
protective search of outer clothing for weapons.

ANTIQUERA vs. PEOPLE

G.R. No. 180661               December 11, 2013
ABAD, J.:
 58

1) Since the police officers had to push open the

slightly ajar door of the house of the accused before
they purportedly saw him using shabu, there could be
no valid arrest in flagrante delicto. Considering that
the arrest of the accused was illegal, the search and
seizure that resulted from it was likewise illegal.
Consequently, the various drug paraphernalia that the
police officers allegedly found in the house and seized
are inadmissible, having proceeded from an invalid
search and seizure.
2) The alleged failure of the accused to object to
the irregularity of his arrest by itself is not enough to
sustain his conviction. A waiver of an illegal
warrantless arrest does not carry with it a waiver of the
inadmissibility of evidence seized during the illegal
warrantless arrest.
PEOPLE vs. DONALD VASQUEZ
G.R. No. 200304               January 15, 2014
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:

1) Any objection to a defect or irregularity

attending an arrest must be made before the accused
enters his plea on arraignment. If the accused fails to
 59

file a motion to quash before his arraignment, he will

be estopped from questioning the legality of his arrest.
Any irregularity is cured upon the accused’s voluntary
submission to the court’s jurisdiction.
2) Since the accused was caught in flagrante
delicto of selling illegal drugs to an undercover police
officer in a buy-bust operation, his warrantless arrest
was valid Section 5(a) of Rule 113. If the warrantless
arrest was valid, the warrantless seizure of the illegal
drugs from the accused is likewise valid.
ZUÑO vs. JUDGE CABEBE
A.M. OCA No. 03-1800-RTJ        November 26, 2004
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:

1) Under the present Rules, a hearing is

mandatory in granting bail whether it is a matter of
right or discretion. The grant or the denial of bail in
cases where bail is a matter of discretion, hinges on
the issue of whether or not the evidence of guilt of the
accused is strong, and the determination of whether or
not the evidence is strong is a matter of judicial
discretion which remains with the judge. In order for
the latter to properly exercise his discretion, he must
first conduct a hearing to determine whether the
evidence of guilt is strong. In fact, even in cases where
 60

there is no petition for bail, a hearing should still be

held.

2) The failure of the prosecution to raise an

objection to the accused’s application for bail does not
dispense with the requirement of a bail hearing. Even
if the prosecution refuses to adduce evidence or fails
to interpose any objection to the motion for bail, it is
still mandatory for the court to conduct a hearing or
ask searching and clarificatory questions from which it
may infer the strength of the evidence of guilt, or lack
of it, against the accused. Where the prosecutor
refuses to adduce evidence in opposition to the
application to grant and fix bail, the court may ask the
prosecution such questions as would ascertain the
strength of the State's evidence or judge the adequacy
of the amount of bail. Irrespective of respondent
judge's opinion that the evidence of guilt against the
accused is not strong, the law and settled
jurisprudence demand that a hearing be conducted
before bail may be fixed for the temporary release of
the accused, if bail is at all justified.
GOVT. HK SPEC. ADM. REGION vs. OLALIA
G.R. No. 153675             April 19, 2007
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:
 61

1) A potential extraditee who has been arrested

and detained is entitled to bail. While the Philippines
must honor its extradition treaties with other countries,
it does not necessarily mean that it should diminish a
potential extraditee’s rights to life, liberty, and due
process. More so, where these rights are guaranteed,
not only by our Constitution, but also by international
conventions, to which the Philippines is a party. An
extradite should not therefore be deprived of his right
to apply for bail, provided that a certain standard for
the grant is satisfactorily met.
An extradition proceeding being sui generis, the
standard of proof required in granting or denying bail
can neither be the proof beyond reasonable doubt in
criminal cases nor the standard of proof of
preponderance of evidence in civil cases. While
administrative in character, the standard of substantial
evidence used in administrative cases cannot likewise
apply given the object of extradition law which is to
prevent the prospective extraditee from fleeing our
jurisdiction. The potential extraditee must prove by
"clear and convincing evidence" that he is not a flight
risk and will abide with all the orders and processes of
the extradition court. “Clear and convincing
evidence" is a quantum of evidence that is lower than
 62

proof beyond reasonable doubt but higher than

preponderance of evidence.
LEVISTE vs. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 189122 March 17, 2010
PERALTA, J.:
1) The rules authorize the court to exercise
discretion in the grant of bail pending appeal to those
convicted by the Regional Trial Court of an offense
punishable by imprisonment of more than 6 years but
not death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment. In
the exercise of that discretion, the proper courts are to
be guided by the fundamental principle that the
allowance of bail pending appeal should be exercised
not with laxity but with grave caution and only for
strong reasons, considering that the accused has been
in fact convicted by the trial court. The “tough on bail
pending” policy must be observed.

2) The 3rd paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114

applies to two scenarios where the penalty imposed on
the appellant applying for bail is imprisonment
exceeding six years but not death, reclusion perpetua
or life imprisonment. If it is shown during the bail
hearing that at least one of the bail-negating
circumstances enumerated in the 3rd paragraph of
Section 5, Rule 114 exist, the court has no option but
 63

to deny bail. If it is shown during the bail hearing that

none of the bail-negating circumstances exist, the
court, in the exercise of its discretion, may grant or
deny bail.

ENRILE vs. SANDIGANBAYAN

G.R. No. 213847               August 18, 2015
BERSAMIN, J.:

1) In granting bail to an accused charged with an

offense punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life
imprisonment, the court may consider the principal
purpose of bail, which is to guarantee the appearance
of the accused at the trial, or whenever so required by
the court. The court may also take guidance from the
Philippines’ responsibility in the international
community arising from the national commitment
under the Universal Declaration of Human Rights to:
x x x uphold the fundamental human rights as
well as value the worth and dignity of every person.
This commitment is enshrined in Section II, Article II
of our Constitution which provides: "The State values
the dignity of every human person and guarantees full
respect for human rights." In other words, the
Philippine authorities are under obligation to make
available to every person under detention such
 64

remedies which safeguard their fundamental right to

liberty. These remedies include the right to be
admitted to bail.
2) Bail is not granted to prevent the accused from
committing additional crimes. The purpose of bail is
to guarantee the appearance of the accused at the trial,
or whenever so required by the trial court. The amount
of bail should be high enough to assure the presence of
the accused when so required, but it should be no
higher than is reasonably calculated to fulfill this
purpose. Thus, bail acts as a reconciling mechanism to
accommodate both the accused’s interest in his
provisional liberty before or during the trial, and the
society’s interest in assuring the accused’s presence at
trial.
3) In deciding whether to grant bail or not to an
accused charged with an offense punishable by death,
reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, the court
should not consider the presence of mitigating
circumstances that may reduce the penalty that may be
imposed on the accused to less than reclusion
perpetua or life imprisonment. The relevant clause in
Section 13 of Article III is "charged with an offense
punishable by." It is, therefore, the maximum penalty
provided by the offense that has bearing and not the
 65

possibility of mitigating circumstances being

appreciated in the accused’s favor.
4) Enrile’s social and political standing and his
having immediately surrendered to the authorities
upon his being charged in court indicate that the risk
of his flight or escape from this jurisdiction is highly
unlikely. His personal disposition from the onset of his
indictment for plunder, formal or otherwise, has
demonstrated his utter respect for the legal processes
of this country. We also do not ignore that at an earlier
time many years ago when he had been charged with
rebellion with murder and multiple frustrated murder,
he already evinced a similar personal disposition of
respect for the legal processes, and was granted bail
during the pendency of his trial because he was not
seen as a flight risk. With his solid reputation in both
his public and his private lives, his long years of
public service, and history’s judgment of him being at
stake, he should be granted bail.
NAPOLES vs. SANDIGANBAYAN
G.R. No. 224162 November 7, 2017
REYES, JR., J.:

1) The court may deny bail to an accused charged

with an offense punishable by death, reclusion
 66

perpetua or life imprisonment by evidence less than

that required for his conviction. At the bail hearing,
the court does not sit to try the merits or to enter into
any nice inquiry as to the weight that ought to be
allowed to the evidence for or against accused, nor
will it speculate on the outcome of the trial or on what
further evidence may be therein offered and
admitted. It should not be forgotten that the purpose of
the bail hearing is to determine whether the accused is
entitled to provisional liberty before conviction. To
require more from the prosecution, as well as from the
trial court, effectively defeats the purpose of the
proceeding.
2) Even though there is a reasonable doubt as to
the guilt of accused, if on an examination of the entire
record the presumption is great that accused is guilty
of a capital offense, bail should be refused.

3) The purpose of the bail hearing is for the court

to determine whether there is a strong presumption of
the guilt of the accused. It is merely a preliminary
determination, and the court may deny admission to
bail even when there is reasonable doubt as to the guilt
of the accused. Thus, the prosecution can discharge its
burden by proving that the evidence against the
accused shows evident proof of guilt or a great
 67

presumption of guilt. “Evident proof of guilt” or a

“great presumption of guilt’ means “clear, strong
evidence which leads a well-guarded dispassionate
judgment to the conclusion that the offense has been
committed as charged, that accused is the guilty agent,
and that he will probably be punished capitally if the
law is administered." Presumption great" exists when
the circumstances testified to are such that
the inference of guilt naturally to be drawn therefrom
is strong, clear, and convincing to an unbiased
judgment and excludes all reasonable probability of
any other conclusion. 
ALTOBANO-RUIZ vs. PICHAY
A.M. No. MTJ-17-1893 February 19, 2018
PERALTA, J.:

1) Under Section 17 (a) of Rule 114, if the

accused is arrested in the same province, city or
municipality where his case is pending, he may file
bail in the court where his case is pending or, in the
absence or unavailability of the judge thereof, with
another branch of the same court within the province
or city. If the accused is arrested in a province, city or
municipality other than where his case is pending, he
has two (2) options. First, he may file bail in the court
where his case is pending or, second, he may file bail
 68

with any regional trial court in the province, city or

municipality where he was arrested. When no regional
trial court judge is available, he may file bail with any
metropolitan trial judge, municipal trial judge or
municipal circuit trial judge therein.
DEL CASTILLO vs. PEOPLE
G.R. No. 185128               January 30, 2012
PERALTA, J.:

1) When prohibited and regulated drugs are

found in a house or other building belonging to and
occupied by the accused, the presumption arises that
he is in possession of such drugs in violation of law.
For the presumption to apply, however, the
prosecution must prove that the accused had
knowledge of the existence and presence of the drugs
in the place under his control and dominion and the
character of the drugs. If the prosecution fails to prove
that the house was under the control and dominion of
the accused, there casts a reasonable doubt as to his
guilt. In considering a criminal case, it is critical to
start with the law's own starting perspective on the
status of the accused - in all criminal prosecutions, he
is presumed innocent of the charge laid unless the
contrary is proven beyond reasonable doubt. Proof
beyond reasonable doubt, or that quantum of proof
 69

sufficient to produce a moral certainty that would

convince and satisfy the conscience of those who act
in judgment, is indispensable to overcome the
constitutional presumption of innocence.
MIGUEL vs. SANDIGANBAYAN
G.R. No. 172035               July 4, 2012
BRION, J.:

1) Before an accused is suspended under Section

13 of R.A. No. 3019, a pre-suspension hearing is
required. While a pre-suspension hearing is aimed at
securing for the accused fair and adequate opportunity
to challenge the validity of the information or the
regularity of the proceedings against him,
jurisprudence has not established a hard and fast rule
in regulating its conduct. With the purpose of a pre-
suspension hearing in mind, the absence of an actual
hearing alone cannot be determinative of the validity
of a suspension order. In one case, the Court
considered the opposition of the accused (to the
prosecution’s motion to suspend pendente lite) as
sufficient to dispense with the need to actually set the
prosecution’s motion for hearing. In another case, the
Court ruled that while there was no pre-suspension
hearing held to determine the validity of the
Informations that had been filed against the accused,
 70

the numerous pleadings filed for and against them

have achieved the goal of this procedure. The right to
due process is satisfied not just by an oral hearing but
by the filing and the consideration by the court of the
parties' pleadings, memoranda and other position
papers.
Since a pre-suspension hearing is basically a due
process requirement, when an accused public official
is given an adequate opportunity to be heard on his
possible defenses against the mandatory suspension
under R.A. No. 3019, then an accused would have no
reason to complain that no actual hearing was
conducted. It is well settled that "to be heard" does not
only mean oral arguments in court; one may be heard
also through pleadings. Where opportunity to be
heard, either through oral arguments or pleadings, has
been accorded, no denial of procedural due process
exists.
2) Section 13 of R.A. No. 3019 which provides
for the suspension of the accused pendente lite is not
a penal provision that would call for a liberal
interpretation in favor of the accused and a strict
construction against the State. The suspension
required under this provision is not a penalty, as it is
not imposed as a result of judicial proceedings; in fact,
if acquitted, the accused official shall be entitled to
 71

reinstatement and to the salaries and benefits which he

failed to receive during his suspension.
PEOPLE vs. LARA
G.R. No. 199877               August 13, 2012
REYES, J.:

1) The right to counsel is deemed to have arisen

at the precise moment custodial investigation begins
and being made to stand in a police line-up is not the
starting point or a part of custodial investigation.
The guarantees of Sec. 12 (1), Art. III of the 1987
Constitution, or the so-called Miranda rights, may be
invoked only by a person while he is under custodial
investigation. Custodial investigation starts when the
police investigation is no longer a general inquiry into
an unsolved crime but has begun to focus on a
particular suspect taken into custody by the police who
starts the interrogation and propounds questions to the
person to elicit incriminating statements. Police line-
up is not part of the custodial investigation; hence, the
right to counsel guaranteed by the Constitution cannot
yet be invoked at this stage. This is because during a
police line-up, the process has not yet shifted from the
investigatory to the accusatory and it is usually the
 72

witness or the complainant who is interrogated and

who gives a statement in the course of the line-up.

PEOPLE vs. JUDGE AYSON

G.R. No. 85215 July 7, 1989
NARVASA, J.:

1) A person who is being investigated by his

employer for having misappropriated company funds
is not in any sense under custodial interrogation. The
constitutional rights of a person under custodial
interrogation under Section 20, Article IV of the 1973
Constitution are therefore not applicable. Neither may
he invoke his right against self-incrimination during
such investigation.
VILLAREAL vs. PEOPLE
G.R. No. 151258               December 1, 2014
SERENO, CJ:

1) Since the dismissal of a criminal case on the

ground that the accused’s right to a speedy trial has
been violated amounts to an acquittal, any appeal or
reconsideration thereof would result in a violation of
 73

the accused’s right against double jeopardy. The

acquittal of the accused may, however be challenged
by petition for certiorari under Rule 65 where there
has been a grave abuse of discretion, amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction. The prosecution mut
convincingly establish that the court’s decision
dismissing the case was attended by a whimsical or
capricious exercise of judgment equivalent to lack of
jurisdiction. It must be shown that the assailed
judgment constitutes "a patent and gross abuse of
discretion amounting to an evasion of a positive duty
or to a virtual refusal to perform a duty imposed by
law or to act in contemplation of law.
2) A felony committed by means of culpa is
legally inconsistent with one committed by means of
dolo. Culpable felonies involve those wrongs done as
a result of an act performed without malice or criminal
design. Regardless of how the crime was committed, if
is shown that it was committed by means of culpa, it
cannot be given the penalty as it was committed by
means of dolo.
3) An accused who has been sentenced by the
trial court to a non-probationable penalty but on
appeal is sentenced to a probationable penalty is
allowed by law and jurisprudence to avail himself of
probation.
 74

PEOPLE vs. ESTOMACA

G.R. Nos. 117485-86 April 22, 1996
REGALADO, J.:

1) If the accused enters a plea of guilty to a

capital offence, the trial court shall conduct a
searching inquiry to determine: (1) the voluntariness
of the plea; and (2) the full comprehension of the
consequences of the plea. The questions of the trial
court must show the voluntariness of the plea of guilt
of the accused and the questions must demonstrate
accused full comprehension of the consequences of
the plea of guilty. The court must inquire into
the personality profile of the accused can serve as a
trustworthy index of his capacity to give a free and
informed plea of guilt. The age, socio-economic
status, and educational background of the accused
must also be determined. The failure of the trial court
to comply with the foregoing requirements would
render the arraignment of the accused null and void.

2) No valid judgment can be rendered upon an

invalid arraignment. If the arraignment of the accused
was void, the judgment of conviction rendered against
him would likewise be void. If such is the finding of
the appellate court, it shall order the case be remanded
to the trial court for further proceedings.
 75

PEOPLE vs. PANGILINAN

G.R. No. 171020             March 14, 2007
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:

1) The fact that the accused was arraigned only

after the case was submitted for decision did not
prejudice him. This procedural defect was cured when
his counsel participated in the trial without raising any
objection that his client had yet to be arraigned. In
fact, his counsel even cross-examined the prosecution
witnesses. His counsel’s active participation in the
hearings is a clear indication that he was fully aware
of the charges against him; otherwise, his counsel
would have objected and informed the court of this
blunder. Moreover, no protest was made when the
accuse was subsequently arraigned. The parties did not
question the procedure undertaken by the trial court. It
was only after being convicted and sentenced to two
death sentences, that accused complained that his
constitutional right has been violated.
2) Jurisdiction over the person of the accused is
acquired upon his arrest or voluntary appearance. The
accused’s arrest, not his arraignment, confers on the
trial court jurisdiction over his person.
DAAN vs. SANDIGANBAYAN
 76

G.R. Nos. 163972-77               March 28, 2008

AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:

1)The acceptance of an offer to plead guilty to a

lesser offense is not demandable by the accused as a
matter of right but is a matter that is addressed entirely
to the sound discretion of the trial court. The court
should accept such plea of guilty to a lesser offense
only when it is shown that the prosecution does not
have sufficient evidence to establish the guilt of the
crime charged. Thus, if the offer to plead guilty to a
lesser offense is made by the accused after the
prosecution has already rested its case, the only basis
on which the fiscal and the court could rightfully
allow the accused to change his former plea of not
guilty to guilty to a lesser offense should be the
evidence already in the record. The reason for this
being that Section 2, Rule 116 under which a plea for
a lesser offense is allowed was not and could not have
been intended as a procedure for compromise, much
less bargaining.
2) The court may correctly accept the accused’s
offer to enter a plea of guilty to a lesser offense even if
made after the prosecution has rested its by reason of
equity case provided the requirements for plea
 77

bargaining under Section 2 or Rule 116 are complied

with and such offer would redound to the benefit of
the state, as for instance the accused can help in the
prosecution of the other more guilty accused.
PEOPLE vs. JANJALANI
G.R. No. 188314               January 10, 2011
SERENO, J.:

1) Convictions based on an improvident plea of

guilt should be set aside only if such plea is the sole
basis of the judgment. If the trial court relied on
sufficient and credible evidence to convict the
accused, the conviction must be sustained, because
then it is predicated not merely on the guilty plea of
the accused but on evidence proving his commission
of the offense charged.
G. R. No. 213847 August 18, 2015
ENRILE vs. PEOPLE
BERSAMIN, J.:

1) During the preliminary investigation, a

respondent is not entitled to copies of the affidavit of
his co-respondents. His motion for bill of particulars
 78

demanding to be furnished such affidavits should

therefore be denied.
2) Under procedural law, a respondent under
preliminary investigation has the right to examine the
evidence submitted by the complainant, but he does
not have a similar right over the evidence submitted
by his or her co-respondents. There is no law or rule
which states that it is a compulsory requirement of due
process in a preliminary investigation that the
investigating prosecutor furnish a respondent with the
counter-affidavits of his co-respondents. Neither
Section 3 (b), Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure nor Section 4 (c), Rule II of the
Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman
supports Sen. Estrada's claim.
Although Section 4 (c), Rule II of the Rules of
Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman provides
that a respondent "shall have access to the evidence
on record," this provision should be construed in
relation to Section 4 (a) and (b) of the same Rule, as
well as to the Rules of Criminal Procedure. First,
Section 4 (a) states that "the investigating officer shall
require the complainant or supporting witnesses to
execute affidavits to substantiate the complaint." The
"supporting witnesses" are the witnesses of the
complainant, and do not refer to the co-respondents.
 79

PEOPLE vs. DUMLAO

G.R. No. 168918               March 2, 2009
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:

1) If the ground raised in the accused’s motion to

quash is that the facts charged do not constitute an
offense, the fundamental test in determining the
sufficiency of the material averments of the
information is whether the facts alleged therein, if
hypothetically admitted as true, would establish the
essentials elements of the crime as defined by law.
Evidence aliunde, or matters extrinsic of the
Information, are not to be considered.
2) Insufficiency of evidence is not one of the
grounds of a Motion to Quash. Insufficiency of
evidence is a ground for dismissal of an action only
after the prosecution rests its case.
SORIANO vs. PEOPLE
G.R. No. 162336               February 1, 2010
DEL CASTILLO, J.:

1) A petition for certiorari under Rule 65 is not

the proper remedy to assail the denial of a motion to
quash an information, there being a plain, speedy and
 80

adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law for the

aggrieved party. The proper remedy for the accused is
to enter a plea, go to trial without prejudice on his part
to present the special defenses he had invoked in his
motion to quash and if after trial on the merits, an
adverse decision is rendered, to appeal therefrom in
the manner authorized by law. The case of
Macapagal-Arroyo, however, provides for an
exception to the rule established in this case.
CO vs. NEW PROSPERITY PLASTIC
PRODUCTS
G. R. No. 183994               June 30, 2014
PERALTA, J.:

1) In determining whether the criminal case was

properly dismissed on the ground that the accused's
right to speedy trial was violated, the delay should be
considered in view of the entirety of the proceedings.
The factors to balance are the following: (a) duration
of the delay; (b) reason therefor; (c) assertion of the
right or failure to assert it; and (d) prejudice caused by
such delay. Surely, mere mathematical reckoning of
the time involved would not suffice as the realities of
everyday life must be regarded in judicial proceedings
which, after all, do not exist in a vacuum, and that
 81

particular regard must be given to the facts and

circumstances peculiar to each case. While the
accused's right to speedy trial should be recognized,
the Sta could not be deprived of a reasonable
opportunity to fairly prosecute criminals. Unjustified
postponements which prolong the trial for an
unreasonable length of time are what offend the right
of the accused to speedy trial.
IMPERIAL vs. JOSON
G.R. No. 160067               November 17, 2010
PEREZ, J.:

1) Although the Revised Rules of Criminal

Procedure mandates commencement of the trial within
30 days from receipt of the pre-trial order and the
continuous conduct thereof for a period not exceeding
180 days, Section 3 a (1), Rule 119 provides that
delays resulting from extraordinary remedies against
interlocutory orders shall be excluded in computing
the time within which trial must commence. In
determining the right of an accused to speedy trial,
moreover, courts are "required to do more than a
mathematical computation of the number of
postponements of the scheduled hearings of the case"
 82

and to give particular regard to the facts and

circumstances peculiar to each case.
PEOPLE vs. MA. CRISTINA SERGIO
G. R. No. 240053 October 9, 2019
Hernando, J.:
1) The fact that the prosecution witness is in
prison in Indonesia awaiting her execution justifies a
resort to Rule 23 so her deposition can be taken by
written interrogatories to be used in the prosecution
for human trafficking of the persons who sent her to
Indonesia with sever kilos of prohibited drug without
her knowledge. Courts should always be guided by the
principle that rules shall be liberally construed in order
to promote their objective of securing a just, speedy
and inexpensive disposition of every action and
proceeding. Simply put, rules of procedure should
facilitate an orderly administration of justice. They
should not be strictly applied causing injury to a
substantive right of a party to case. The rules of
procedure should be viewed as mere tools designed to
facilitate the attainment of justice. Their strict and
rigid application, which would result in technicalities
that tend to frustrate rather than promote substantial
justice, must always be avoided.
 83

JIMENEZ vs. PEOPLE

G.R. No. 209195               September 17, 2014
BRION, J.:

1) For the purpose of the discharge of an accused

to be a state witness, absolute necessity exists for his
testimony when he or she alone has knowledge of the
crime. In more concrete terms, necessity is not there
when the testimony would simply corroborate or
otherwise strengthen the prosecution’s evidence.The
requirement of absolute necessity for the testimony of
a state witness depends on the circumstances of each
case regardless of the number of the participating
conspirators.
2) That the prosecution could use the voluntary
statements of the accused his discharge as a state
witness is not an important and relevant consideration.
To the prosecution belongs the control of its case and
the court cannot dictate on its choice in the discharge
of a state witness, save only when the legal
requirements have not been complied with.
3) The testimony of the state witness may be
substantially corroborated in its material points not
only by the testimonies of other prosecution witnesses
but also by pieces of object evidence that were
 84

discovered through information furnished by the state

witness.
4) In resolving a motion to discharge an accused
to be a state witness under Section 17 of Rule 119, the
rules only require that that the testimony of the
accused be substantially corroborated in its material
points, not on all points. A trial judge cannot be
expected or required, at the start of the trial, to inform
himself with absolute certainty of everything that may
develop in the course of the trial with respect to the
guilty participation of the accused. If that were
practicable or possible, there would be little need for
the formality of a trial.
5) By jurisprudence, "most guilty" refers to the
highest degree of culpability in terms of participation
in the commission of the offense and does not
necessarily mean the severity of the penalty imposed.
While all the accused may be given the same penalty
by reason of conspiracy, yet one may be considered to
have lesser or the least guilt taking into account his
degree of participation in the commission of the
offense. What the rule avoids is the possibility that the
most guilty would be set free while his co-accused
who are less guilty in terms of participation would be
penalized.
 85

6) For purposes of discharging an accused to be a

state witness, the principal by inducement is not
automatically the most guilty in a conspiracy. If one
induces another to commit a crime, the influence is the
determining cause of the crime. Without the
inducement, the crime would not have been
committed; it is the inducer who sets into motion the
execution of the criminal act. Neither is the principal
by direct participation more guilty than the principal
by inducement as the Revised Penal Code penalizes
the principal by inducement only when the principal
by direct participation has executed the crime.
7) In determining whether to discharge an
accused to be a state witness, the trial court is not a
mere "rubber stamp" of the prosecution. It is still the
trial court that determines whether the prosecution’s
preliminary assessment of the accused-witness’
qualifications to be a state witness satisfies the
procedural norms. This relationship is in reality a
symbiotic one as the trial court, by the very nature of
its role in the administration of justice, largely
exercises its prerogative based on the prosecutor’s
findings and evaluation.
PEOPLE vs. DOMINGUEZ
G.R. No. 229420 February 19, 2018
 86

1) The death of the state witness prior to trial

proper will not automatically render his testimony
during the discharge proceeding inadmissible. Section
17 of Rule 119 provides that evidence adduced in
support of the discharge shall automatically form part
of the trial. It is only when the court denies the motion
for discharge of the accused as state witness that his
sworn statement shall be inadmissible in evidence.
Upon the grant of the motion for discharge, whatever
transpired during the hearing, including the sworn
affidavit of the state witness, is already automatically
deemed part of the records of the criminal case. The
subsequent death of the state witness before he could
testify in the trial of the case will not render his
testimony during the hearing of the motion for
discharge inadmissible.

While Section 17 of Rule 119 requires the

accused to testify again during trial proper after he
qualifies as a state witness, his noncompliance
therewith would only prevent the order of discharge
from operating as an acquittal. It does not speak of any
penalty to the effect of rendering all the testimonies of
the state witness during the discharge proceeding
inadmissible. On the contrary, the testimonies and
admissions of a state witness during the discharge
proceedings may be admitted as evidence to impute
 87

criminal liability against him should he fail or refuse

to testify in accordance with his sworn statement
constituting the basis for the discharge, militating
against the claim of inadmissibility.

That the testimony of the accused was offered for

the limited purpose of qualifying him as a state
witness does not automatically render his statements
as to the specifics on the commission of the offense
inadmissible. One of the requirements under Section
17, Rule 119 is to establish that the erstwhile
respondent does not appear to be the most guilty
among him and his cohorts. Thus, it is quite
understandable that, during the discharge proceeding,
the accused would narrate in graphic detail his entire
knowledge of the crime and the extent of the
participation of each of the accused.

CABADOR vs. PEOPLE

G.R. No. 186001               October 2, 2009
ABAD, J.:

1) A motion to dismiss filed by the accused

before the prosecution has rested its case alleging that
unreasonable, vexatious, and oppressive delays due to
the fault of the prosecution have attended the trial of
his case should be treated as a motion to dismiss on
 88

the ground of denial of his right to speedy trial and not

a demurrer to evidence even if he also mentioned in
the motion that trial court "has no evidence to
consider," "the charge has no leg to stand on," and that
"the witnesses had no knowledge of his connection
with or any participation in the incident." The fact that
the accused filed the motion before the prosecution
has rested his case and that he did not even mention
the evidence adduced by the prosecution that proved
to be insufficient to prove his guilt beyond reasonable
doubt disqualifies it from being a demurrer to
evidence. The denial of the motion which was filed
without leave of court should not, therefore, be a
ground to deprive the accused of his right to adduce
evidence.

REPUBLIC VS. DE BORJA

1) In a demurrer to evidence, however, it is

premature to speak of "preponderance of evidence"
because it is filed prior to the defendant's presentation
of evidence; it is precisely the office of a demurrer to
evidence to expeditiously terminate the case without
the need of the defendant's evidence. Hence, what is
crucial is the determination as to whether the plaintiffs
evidence entitles it to the relief sought.
 89

LLAMAS vs. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 149588               September 29, 2009
NACHURA, J.:

1) The remedy of annulment of judgment under

Rule 47 cannot be availed of in criminal cases. The
remedy cannot be resorted to when the RTC judgment
being questioned was rendered in a criminal case. The
2000 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure itself does
not permit such recourse, for it excluded Rule 47 from
the enumeration of the provisions of the 1997 Revised
Rules of Civil Procedure which have suppletory
application to criminal cases. Section 18, Rule 124
thereof, provides:
Sec. 18. Application of certain rules in
civil procedure to criminal cases. – The
provisions of Rules 42, 44 to 46 and 48 to
56 relating to procedure in the Court of
Appeals and in the Supreme Court in
original and appealed civil cases shall be
applied to criminal cases insofar as they are
applicable and not inconsistent with the
provisions of this Rule.
There is no basis in law or the rules, therefore, to
extend the scope of Rule 47 to criminal cases. When
 90

there is no law or rule providing for a remedy,

recourse to it cannot be allowed.
HIPOS, SR. vs. JUDGE BAY
G.R. Nos. 174813-15               March 17, 2009
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:

1) A court cannot be compelled through a writ of

mandamus to dismiss a criminal case by virtue of a
motion to withdraw information filed by the
prosecutor’s office on the ground of lack of probable
cause. As an extraordinary writ, the remedy of
mandamus lies only to compel an officer to perform a
ministerial duty, not a discretionary one; mandamus
will not issue to control the exercise of discretion by a
public officer where the law imposes upon him the
duty to exercise his judgment in reference to any
manner in which he is required to act, because it is his
judgment that is to be exercised and not that of the
court.
In Crespo v. Mogul, it was held that once a
criminal complaint or information is filed in court, any
disposition of the case or dismissal or acquittal or
conviction of the accused rests within the exclusive
jurisdiction, competence, and discretion of the trial
court. The trial court is the best and sole judge on what
 91

to do with the case before it. A motion to dismiss the

case filed by the public prosecutor should be
addressed to the court who has the option to grant or
deny the same.
ABELLANA vs. PEOPLE
G.R. No. 174654               August 17, 2011
DEL CASTILLO, J.:

1) It is an established rule in criminal procedure

that a judgment of acquittal shall state whether the
evidence of the prosecution absolutely failed to prove
the guilt of the accused or merely failed to prove his
guilt beyond reasonable doubt.20 In either case, the
judgment shall determine if the act or omission from
which the civil liability might arise did not
exist.21 When the exoneration is merely due to the
failure to prove the guilt of the accused beyond
reasonable doubt, the court should award the civil
liability in favor of the offended party in the same
criminal action. In other words, the "extinction of the
penal action does not carry with it the extinction of
civil liability unless the extinction proceeds from a
declaration in a final judgment that the fact from
which the civil liability might arise did not exist."
 92

While an act or omission is felonious because it

is punishable by law, it may also give rise to civil
liability not so much because it is a crime but because
it caused damage to another. What gives rise to the
civil liability is really the obligation and moral duty of
the accused to repair or make whole the damage
caused to offended party by reason of his own act or
omission, done intentionally or negligently, whether or
not the same be punishable by law. Simply stated,
civil liability arises when one, by reason of his own
act or omission, done intentionally or negligently,
causes damage to another. Hence, for the accused to
be civilly liable, it must be proven that the acts he
committed had caused damage to the offended party.
G.R. No. 173089               August 25, 2010
PEOPLE vs. Hon. ENRIQUE C. ASIS
Mendoza, J.:

1) A petition for certiorari under Rule 65,

not appeal, is the remedy to question a verdict of
acquittal whether at the trial court or at the appellate
level. In our jurisdiction, We adhere to the finality-of-
acquittal doctrine, that is, a judgment of acquittal is
final and unappealable. The rule, however, is not
without exception. A petition for certiorari questioning
the acquittal of the accused in, or the dismissals of,
 93

criminal cases may be entertained if there a clear

showing that the lower court, in acquitting the
accused, committed not merely reversible errors of
judgment but also grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction or a denial of due
process, thus rendering the assailed judgment void.
An order of the trial court granting an accused’s
demurrer to evidence may be assailed via a special
civil action of certiorari under Rule 65 based on the
ground of grave abuse of discretion, amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction. Such dismissal order, being
considered void judgment, does not result in jeopardy.
Thus, when the order of dismissal is annulled or set
aside by an appellate court in an original special civil
action via certiorari, the right of the accused against
double jeopardy is not violated.
BASILONIA vs. HON. VLLLARUZ
G.R. Nos. 191370-71, August 10, 2015
PERALTA, J.:
1) A motion for execution of a judgment of
conviction filed more than 20 years from the time it
became final and executory may properly be granted
by the court provided the penalty has not prescribed.
The prescription of penalties found in Article 93 of the
RPC applies only to those who are convicted by final
 94

judgment and are serving sentence which consists in

deprivation of liberty, and that the period for
prescription of penalties begins only when the convict
evades service of sentence by escaping during the term
of his sentence. Thus, if the accused was never
brought to prison or placed in confinement despite
being sentenced to imprisonment by final judgment,
the prescription of penalty of imprisonment would not
have ran in his favor.

2) Once a judgment of conviction becomes final

and executory, it is the ministerial duty of the court to
immediately execute the penalty of imprisonment
and/or pecuniary penalty (fine). A motion to execute
judgment of conviction is not necessary. With respect
to the penalty of imprisonment, the trial court should
cancel the bail bond and issue a warrant of arrest, if
the accused is not yet under detention. If the convicted
accused is already under detention by virtue of the
warrant of arrest issued, the trial court should
immediately issue the corresponding mittimus or
commitment order for the immediate transfer of the
accused to the National Penitentiary to serve his
sentence, if the penalty imposed requires the service of
sentence in the National Penitentiary. The
commitment order should state that an appeal had
 95

been filed, but the same had been withdrawn,

dismissed or decided with finality.

2) The motion for execution of the judgment of

conviction with regards to the civil liability filed after
20 years from its entry should be denied as it is in
violation of Section 6 of Rule 39.

Xxxxxxxxxxxx

1) The dismissal of a criminal action on the

ground that the lacks jurisdiction over the case is not
an acquittal of the accused. Basic is the rule that a
dismissal of a case is different from an acquittal of the
accused therein. Except in a dismissal based on a
Demurrer to Evidence filed by the accused, or for
violation of the right of the accused to a speedy trial,
the dismissal of a criminal case on the ground of the
court’s lack of jurisdiction will not result in the
acquittal of the accused. Acquittal is always based on
the merits, that is, the defendant is acquitted because
the evidence does not show that defendant's guilt is
beyond a reasonable doubt; but dismissal does not
decide the case on the merits or that the defendant is
not guilty. Dismissal terminates the proceeding, either
because the court is not a court of competent
jurisdiction, or the evidence does not show that the
 96

offense was committed within the territorial

jurisdiction of the court, or the complaint or
information is not valid or sufficient in form and
substance, etc. 

2) The only instance when the word dismissal

amounts to an acquittal is where the court grants the
accused’s demurrer to evidence. In this case the
dismissal is in reality an acquittal because the case is
decided on the merits. 

3) If the prosecution fails to prove that the

offense was committed within the territorial
jurisdiction of the court and the case is dismissed, the
dismissal is not an acquittal, inasmuch as if it were so
the accused could not be again prosecuted before the
court of competent jurisdiction; and it is elemental that
in such case, the defendant may again be prosecuted
for the same offense before the court of competent
jurisdiction.
BRIONES vs. PEOPLE
G.R. No. 156009               June 5, 2009
BRION, J.:

1) For new trial to be granted on the ground of

newly discovered evidence, the concurrence of the
 97

following conditions must obtain: (a) the evidence

must have been discovered after trial; (b) the evidence
could not have been discovered at the trial even with
the exercise of reasonable diligence; (c) the evidence
is material, not merely cumulative, corroborative, or
impeaching; and (d) the evidence must affect the
merits of the case and produce a different result if
admitted.
2) An accused charged in the information with
robbery may be convicted of simple theft. The failure
of the information to specify the correct crime
committed will not bar the accused’s conviction for
the crime of theft. The character of the crime is not
determined by the caption or preamble of the
information, or by the specification of the provision of
law alleged to have been violated. The crime
committed is determined by the recital of the ultimate
facts and circumstances in the complaint or
information. Robbery, which is the crime charged in
the information necessarily includes the crime of
simple theft, which was the crime established beyond
reasonable doubt.

SALUDAGA vs. SANDIGANBAYAN

G.R. NO. 184537               April 23, 2010
MENDOZA, J.:
 98

1) The failure to conduct a new preliminary

investigation does necessarily amount to a violation of
the accused right to due process. While it is true that
preliminary investigation is a statutory and substantive
right accorded to the accused before trial, the denial of
the accused’s claim for a new investigation would not
deprive him of his right to due process if the new
information does not contain substantial amendments
warranting a new preliminary investigation.

PAYUMO vs. SANDIGANBAYAN

G.R. No. 151911 July 25, 2011
MENDOZA, J.:

1) The erroneous admission or rejection of

evidence by the trial court is not a ground for a new
trial or reversal of the decision if there are other
independent evidence to sustain the decision, or if the
rejected evidence, if it had been admitted would not
have changed the decision.
CORAZON MACAPAGAL vs. PEOPLE
G.R. No. 193217               February 26, 2014
PERALTA, J.:
 99

1) An order of the trial court denying the

accused’s notice of appeal is not a decision or final
order from which an appeal may be taken. The Rules
of Court specifically provides that no appeal shall be
taken from an order disallowing or dismissing an
appeal. Rather, the aggrieved party can elevate the
matter through a special civil action under Rule 65.
ROSIE QUIDET vs. PEOPLE
G.R. No. 170289               April 8, 2010
DEL CASTILLO, J.:

1) Section 11 or Rule 122 provides that an appeal

taken by one or more of several accused shall not
affect those who did not appeal except insofar as the
judgment of the appellate court is favorable and
applicable to the latter. Since the judgment of the
appellate court reduced the penalty imposed the
accused-appellant, such judgment shall apply to his
co-accused who did not appeal the judgment of the
trial court.

BALABA vs. PEOPLE

G.R. No. 169519               July 17, 2009
CARPIO, J.:
 100

1) An error in designating the appellate court in

the notice of appeal is not fatal to the appeal.
However, the correction in designating the proper
appellate court (Sandiganbayan) should be made
within the 15-day period to appeal. Once made within
the said period, the designation of the correct appellate
court may be allowed even if the records of the case
have been forwarded to the court without appellate
jurisdiction (Court of Appeals). Otherwise, the second
paragraph of Section 2 of Rule 50 would apply, to wit:
"An appeal erroneously taken to the Court of Appeals
shall not be transferred to the appropriate court but
shall be dismissed outright."

PEOPLE vs. OLIVO

G.R. No. 177768               July 27, 2009
QUISUMBING, J.:

1) The present rule is that an appeal taken by one

or more of several accused shall not affect those who
did not appeal, except insofar as the judgment of the
appellate court is favorable and applicable to the latter.
If the judgment of the appellate court, therefore,
acquitted the accused-appellant for insufficiency of the
 101

prosecution evidence to convict him beyond

reasonable doubt, such judgment, being definitely
favorable and applicable to the accused who did
appeal, shall be applicable to him.

PEOPLE vs. TARUC

G.R. No. 185202               February 18, 2009
Chico-Nazario, J.:

1) If accused fails without justifiable cause to

appear at the promulgation of judgment despite notice,
and the judgment is one of conviction, he shall lose
the remedies available in these Rules against the
judgment and the court shall order his arrest.
2) If the accused-appellant escapes from prison
or confinement, jumps bail or flees to a foreign
country during the pendency of the appeal, the Court
of appeals shall dismiss the appeal. Once an accused
escapes from prison or confinement or jumps bail or
flees to a foreign country, he loses his standing in
court and unless he surrenders or submits to the
jurisdiction of the court he is deemed to have waived
any right to seek relief from the court.
Although Section 8 of Rule 124 particularly
applies to the Court of Appeals, it has been extended
 102

to the Supreme Court by Rule 125, Section 1 of the

Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, which reads:
SECTION 1. Uniform procedure. -
Unless otherwise provided by the
Constitution or by law, the procedure in the
Supreme Court in original and in appealed
cases shall be the same as in the Court of
Appeals.
There are certain fundamental rights which
cannot be waived even by the accused himself, but the
right of appeal is not one of them. This right is granted
solely for the benefit of the accused. He may avail of it
or not, as he pleases. He may waive it either expressly
or by implication. When the accused flees after the
case has been submitted to the court for decision, he
will be deemed to have waived his right to appeal
from the judgment rendered against him.
G.R. No. 162370               April 21, 2009
TIU vs. COURT OF APPEALS
CARPIO, J.:

1) The private complainant has no legal

personality to file with the Supreme Court a petition
for review on certiorari assailing the decision of the
 103

Court of Appeals. Settled is the rule that only the

Solicitor General may bring or defend actions on
behalf of the Republic of the Philippines, or represent
the People or State in criminal proceedings before the
Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals.
COLINARES vs. PEOPLE
G.R. No. 182748               December 13, 2011
ABAD, J.:

1) An accused who appealed a judgment

sentencing him to a non-probationable penalty may
avail himself of probation if the appellate court
sentences him to a probationable penalty. The
Probation Law never intended to deny an accused his
right to probation through no fault of his. The
underlying philosophy of probation is one of liberality
towards the accused. Such philosophy is not served by
a harsh and stringent interpretation of the statutory
provisions. The Probation Law must not be regarded
as a mere privilege to be given to the accused only
where it clearly appears he comes within its letter; to
do so would be to disregard the teaching in many
cases that the Probation Law should be applied in
favor of the accused not because it is a criminal law
but to achieve its beneficent purpose.
 104

VILLAREAL vs. PEOPLE

G.R. No. 151258               December 1, 2014
Sereno, SJ,:

1) The ruling in Colinares v. People, which

modified the ruling in Francisco insofar as the
eligibility for probation of those who appeal their
conviction is concerned, was applied in this case. In
Francisco, the accused who appeals for whatever
reason a judgment of conviction is disqualified from
availing himself of the benefits of probation even if
the appellate court sentences him to a probationable
penalty. In Colinares, if the accused appeals a
judgment of conviction imposing on him a non-
probationable penalty but the same is modified by the
appellate court to a probationable penalty, he may
avail himself of probation. Of course, if the accused
appeals a judgment of conviction imposing on him a
probationable penalty, he is disqualified from applying
for probation even if the appellate court sentences him
to a probationable penalty.
G.R. No. 209464               July 1, 2015
DUNGO vs. PEOPLEO N
MENDOZA, J.:
 105

1) Section 13(c), Rule 124 of the Revised Rules

of Criminal Procedure, as amended by A.M. No. 00-5-
03, dated October 15, 2004, governs the procedure on
the appeal from the CA to the Court when the penalty
imposed is either reclusion perpetua or life
imprisonment. According to the said provision, "[i]n
cases where the Court of Appeals imposes reclusion
perpetua, life imprisonment or a lesser penalty, it shall
render and enter judgment imposing such penalty. The
judgment may be appealed to the Supreme Court by
notice of appeal filed with the Court of Appeals.
An accused, nevertheless, is not precluded in
resorting to an appeal by certiorari to the Court via
Rule 45 under the Rules of Court. An appeal to this
Court by petition for review on certiorari shall raise
only questions of law. Moreover, such review is not a
matter of right, but of sound judicial discretion, and
will be granted only when there are special and
important reasons.

In other words, when the CA imposed a penalty

of reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, an accused
may: (1) file a notice of appeal under Section 13( c ),
Rule 124 to avail of an appeal as a matter of right
before the Court and open the entire case for review
 106

on any question; or (2) file a petition for review on

certiorari under Rule 45 to resort to an appeal as a
matter of discretion and raise only questions of law.
G.R. No. 158467               October 16, 2009
MARIMLA vs. PEOPLE
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:

1) A.M. No. 99-10-09-SC provides that the

guidelines on the enforceability of search warrants
provided therein shall continue until further orders
from this Court. In fact, the guidelines in A.M. No.
99-10-09-SC are reiterated in A.M. No. 03-8-02-SC
entitled Guidelines On The Selection And Designation
Of Executive Judges And Defining Their Powers,
Prerogatives And Duties, which explicitly stated that
the guidelines in the issuance of search warrants in
special criminal cases by the RTCs of Manila and
Quezon City shall be an exception to Section 2 of Rule
126 of the Rules of Court, to wit:
Chapter V. Specific Powers, Prerogatives and
Duties of Executive Judges in Judicial Supervision
Sec. 12. Issuance of search warrants in special
criminal cases by the Regional Trial Courts of Manila
and Quezon City. – The Executive Judges and,
 107

whenever they are on official leave of absence or are

not physically present in the station, the Vice-
Executive Judges of the RTCs of Manila and Quezon
City shall have authority to act on applications filed by
the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI), the
Philippine National Police (PNP) and the Anti-Crime
Task Force (ACTAF), for search warrants involving
heinous crimes, illegal gambling, illegal possession of
firearms and ammunitions as well as violations of the
Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002, the
Intellectual Property Code, the Anti-Money
Laundering Act of 2001, the Tariff and Customs Code,
as amended, and other relevant laws that may
hereafter be enacted by Congress, and included herein
by the Supreme Court.
The applications shall be personally endorsed by
the heads of such agencies and shall particularly
describe therein the places to be searched and/or the
property or things to be seized as prescribed in the
Rules of Court. The Executive Judges and Vice-
Executive Judges concerned shall issue the warrants, if
justified, which may be served in places outside the
territorial jurisdiction of the said courts.
PEOPLE vs. NUEVAS
G.R. No. 170233             February 22, 2007
TINGA, J.:
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1) The Constitution states that a search and

seizure must be carried through or with a judicial
warrant; otherwise, such search and seizure becomes
"unreasonable" and any evidence obtained therefrom
is inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding. The
constitutional proscription, however, is not absolute
but admits of exceptions, namely:
1. Warrantless search incidental to a lawful
arrest. (Sec. 12, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court
and prevailing jurisprudence);

2. Search of evidence in "plain view." The

elements are: (a) a prior valid intrusion based on
the valid warrantless arrest in which the police are
legally present in the pursuit of their official
duties; (b) the evidence was inadvertently
discovered by the police who have the right to be
where they are; (c) the evidence must be
immediately apparent; (d) "plain view" justified
mere seizure of evidence without further search;

3. Search of a moving vehicle. Highly

regulated by the government, the vehicle’s
inherent mobility reduces expectation of privacy
especially when its transit in public thoroughfares
furnishes a highly reasonable suspicion amounting
to probable cause that the occupant committed a
criminal activity;
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4. Consented warrantless search;

5. Customs search;

6. Stop and Frisk; and

7. Exigent and emergency circumstances.

2) For a search incidental to a lawful arrest to be

valid, the arrest must precede the search; the process
cannot be reversed. Nevertheless, a search
substantially contemporaneous with an arrest can
precede the arrest if the police have probable cause to
make the arrest at the outset of the search. It is also
required that the person to be arrested must be
committing or has committed a crime in the presence
of the police officers. Reliable information alone is not
sufficient to justify a warrantless arrest under Section
5(a), Rule 113. The rule requires, in addition, that the
accused perform some overt act that would indicate
that he "has committed, is actually committing, or is
attempting to commit an offense."
3) For purposes of a valid search under the plain
view doctrine, an object is in plain view if it is plainly
exposed to sight. Where the object seized was inside a
closed package, the object itself is not in plain view
and therefore cannot be seized without a warrant.
However, if the package proclaims its contents,
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whether by its distinctive configuration, its

transparency, or if its contents are obvious to an
observer, then the contents are in plain view and may
be seized. In other words, if the package is such that
an experienced observer could infer from its
appearance that it contains the prohibited article, then
the article is deemed in plain view. It must be
immediately apparent to the police that the items that
they observe may be evidence of a crime, contraband
or otherwise subject to seizure. If the dried marijuana
leaves were inside a plastic bag, packed in newspaper
and wrapped therein. that the person to be arrested is
carrying and were not readily apparent or transparent
to the police officers, the dried marijuana leaves could
not be considered in plain view.
4) While the constitutional immunity against
unreasonable searches and seizures is a personal right
which may be waived, it must be seen that the consent
to the search was voluntary in order to validate an
otherwise illegal detention and search. For consent to
be valid, it must be unequivocal, specific, and
intelligently given, uncontaminated by any duress or
coercion. The consent to a search is not to be lightly
inferred, but must be shown by clear and convincing
evidence. The question whether a consent to a search
was in fact voluntary is a question of fact to be
determined from the totality of all the circumstances.
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Relevant to this determination are the following

characteristics of the person giving consent and the
environment in which consent is given: (1) the age of
the defendant; (2) whether he was in a public or
secluded location; (3) whether he objected to the
search or passively looked on; (4) the education and
intelligence of the defendant; (5) the presence of
coercive police procedures; (6) the defendant's belief
that no incriminating evidence will be found; (7) the
nature of the police questioning; (8) the environment
in which the questioning took place; and (9) the
possibly vulnerable subjective state of the person
consenting. It is the State which has the burden of
proving, by clear and positive testimony, that the
necessary consent was obtained and that it was freely
and voluntarily given.

VERIDIANO vs. PEOPLE

G.R. No. 200370 June 7, 2017
LEONEN, J.:

1) There is no valid arrest in flagrante

delicto and search incident thereto under Rule 113,
Section 5(a) of the Rules of Court if the person
arrested at a checkpoint was not committing a crime
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but was merely a passenger who did not exhibit any

unusual conduct in the presence of the law enforcers
that would incite suspicion. The police officers
effecting the warrantless arrest and search cannot rely
solely on the tip they received. Reliable information
alone is insufficient to support a warrantless arrest
absent any overt act from the person to be arrested
indicating that a crime has just been committed, was
being committed, or is about to be committed.
2) A warrantless arrest and search cannot
likewise be justified under Section 5(b) of Rule 113 if
the law enforcers effecting the arrest had no personal
knowledge of any fact or circumstance indicating that
petitioner had just committed an offense. A hearsay tip
by itself does not justify a warrantless arrest. Law
enforcers must have personal knowledge of facts,
based on their observation, that the person sought to
be arrested has just committed a crime. This is what
gives rise to probable cause that would justify a
warrantless search under Section 5(b) of Rule 113.
3) For warrantless search to be valid under the
"stop and frisk" doctrine, the law enforcer must have a
genuine reason to believe, based on his experience and
the particular circumstances of each case, that criminal
activity may be afoot.  Reliance on one suspicious
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activity alone, or none at all, cannot produce a

reasonable search. 
A "stop and frisk" search is defined as "the act of
a police officer to stop a citizen on the street,
interrogate him, and pat him for weapons or
contraband."  The allowable scope of a "stop and
frisk" search is limited to a "protective search of outer
clothing for weapons." Although a "stop and frisk"
search is a necessary law enforcement measure
specifically directed towards crime prevention, there is
a need to safeguard the right of individuals against
unreasonable searches and seizures. Law enforcers do
not have unbridled discretion in conducting "stop and
frisk" searches. While probable cause is not required,
a "stop and frisk" search cannot be validated on the
basis of a suspicion or hunch. 
4) The invalidity of an arrest leads to several
consequences among which are: (a) the failure to
acquire jurisdiction over the person of an accused; (b)
criminal liability of law enforcers for illegal arrest;
and (c) any search incident to the arrest becomes
invalid thus rendering the evidence acquired as
constitutionally inadmissible.
Lack of jurisdiction over the person of an accused
as a result of an invalid arrest must be raised through a
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motion to quash before an accused enters his or her

plea. Otherwise, the objection is deemed waived and
an accused is "estopped from questioning the legality
of his [or her] arrest."
The voluntary submission of an accused to the
jurisdiction of the court and his or her active
participation during trial cures any defect or
irregularity that may have attended an arrest.  The
reason for this rule is that "the legality of an arrest
affects only the jurisdiction of the court over the
person of the accused."
Failure to timely object to the illegality of an
arrest, however, does not preclude an accused from
questioning the admissibility of evidence seized. The
inadmissibility of the evidence is not affected when an
accused fails to question the court's jurisdiction over
his or her person in a timely manner. Jurisdiction over
the person of an accused and the constitutional
inadmissibility of evidence are separate and mutually
exclusive consequences of an illegal arrest.
MIGUEL vs. PEOPLE
G.R. No. 227038 July 31, 2017
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
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1) There was no valid arrest in flagrante delicto

by Bantay Bayan operatives of a man caught urinating
on a fence along the road and allegedly showing his
private parts who, after being searched, yielded two
sticks of marijuana in a pack of cigarette and was later
charged not with displaying his private parts but
possession of a dangerous drug. The marijuana
recovered was inadmissible for being the fruit of an
unreasonable search. Clearly, the circumstances did
not justify the conduct of an in flagrante delicto arrest,
considering that there was no overt act constituting a
crime committed in the presence or within the view of
the arresting officer. Neither did the circumstances
necessitate a "hot pursuit" warrantless arrest as the
arresting Bantay Bayan operatives did not have any
personal knowledge of facts that petitioner had just
committed an offense. More importantly, there could
be no valid warrantless arrest of the accused on
account of the alleged public display of his private
parts because he was not charged for said crime but
for illegal possession of dangerous drugs.
2) With regard to searches and seizures, the
standard imposed on private persons is different from
that imposed on state agents or authorized government
authorities. If the search that yielded the evidence was
conducted by a private person and not on behalf of the
State, the constitutional provision on unreasonable
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searches and seizure would not apply. In other words,

a private person could not conduct an unreasonable
search that would render the evidence inadmissible. If
the search is, however, made upon the request of law
enforcers, a warrant must generally be first secured if
it is to pass the test of constitutionality.
3) Under existing jurisprudence, barangay
tanods, Barangay Chairmen, and bantay bayan
operatives are deemed as law enforcement officers for
purposes of applying Article III of the Constitution. A
bantav bayan operative has the color of a state-related
function and objective insofar as the entitlement of a
suspect to his constitutional rights in relation to the
authority to conduct a custodial investigation under
Article III, Section 12 of the Constitution.
4) A Port Authority (Manila, Cebu etc.) is clothed
with authority by the state to oversee the security of
persons and vehicles within its ports. While there is a
distinction between port personnel and port police
officers in this case, considering that port personnel
are not necessarily law enforcers, both should be
considered agents of government under Article III of
the Constitution. The actions of port personnel during
routine security checks at ports have the color of a
state-related function.
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DIMAL vs. PEOPLE

G.R. No. 216922 APRIL 18, 2018
PERALTA, J.:

1) It is well settled that objects falling in plain

view of an officer who has a right to be in a position to
have that view are subject to seizure even without a
search warrant and may be introduced in evidence. For
the "plain view doctrine" to apply, however, it is
required that the following requisites are present: (a)
the law enforcement officer in search of the evidence
has a prior justification for an intrusion or is in a
position from which he can view a particular area; (b)
the discovery of evidence in plain view is inadvertent;
and (c) it is immediately apparent to the officer that
the item he observes may be evidence of a crime,
contraband or otherwise subject to seizure.
What the 'plain view' cases have in common is
that the police officer in each of them had a prior
justification for an intrusion in the course of which he
came inadvertently across a piece of evidence
incriminating the accused. The doctrine serves to
supplement the prior justification-whether it be a
warrant for another object, hot pursuit, search incident
to a lawful-arrest, or some other legitimate reason for
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being present unconnected with a search directed

against the accused-and permits the warrantless
seizure. Of course, the extension of the original
justification is legitimate only where it is immediately
apparent to the police that they have evidence before
them; the 'plain view' doctrine may not be used to
extend a general exploratory search from one object to
another until something incriminating at last emerges.
2) A description of a place to be searched is
sufficient if the officer with the warrant can ascertain
and identify with reasonable effort the place intended,
and distinguish it from other places in the
community.  A designation that points out the place to
be searched to the exclusion of all others, and on
inquiry unerringly leads the peace officers to it,
satisfies the constitutional requirement of definiteness.
Technical precision of description is not required.
"It is sufficient that there be reasonable particularity
and certainty as to the identity of the property to be
searched for and seized, so that the warrant shall not
be a mere roving commission. Indeed, the law does
not require that the things to be seized must be
described in precise and minute detail as to leave no
room for doubt on the part of the searching authorities.
If this were the rule, it would be virtually impossible
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for the applicants to obtain a warrant as they would

not know exactly what kind of things to look for.
3) A search warrant may be said to particularly
describe the things to be seized (1) when the
description therein is as specific as the circumstances
will ordinarily allow; or (2) when the description
expresses a conclusion of fact - not of law by which
the warrant officer may be guided in making the
search and seizure; (3) and when the things to be
described are limited to those which bear direct
relation to the offenses for which the warrant is being
issued. The purpose for this requirement is to limit the
articles to be seized only to those particularly
described in the search warrant in order to leave the
officers of the law with no discretion regarding what
items they shall seize, to the end that no unreasonable
searches and seizures will be committed.

LENIZA REYES vs. PEOPLE
G.R. No. 229380 June 06, 2018
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

1) There was no lawful arrest of the accused

because she was just passing by the police officers
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without acting suspiciously or doing anything wrong,

except that she smelled of liquor. As no other overt act
could be properly attributed to the accused as to rouse
suspicion in the mind of the police officers that she
had just committed, was committing, or was about to
commit a crime, the arrest is bereft of any legal basis.
The act of walking while reeking of liquor per
se cannot be considered a criminal act. Since the arrest
was unlawful, the search that followed it is also
unlawful rendering the dangerous drug recovered
inadmissible in evidence.

2) One of the recognized exceptions to the need

of a warrant before a valid search may be effected is a
search incidental to a lawful arrest. In this instance,
the law requires that there first be a lawful arrest
before a search can be made – the process cannot be
reversed.
HILARIO vs. PEOPLE
G.R. No. 161070             April 14, 2008
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:

1) In criminal cases, the accused may file a

petition for relief from denial of appeal if, despite his
express instruction, his counsel failed to file a notice
of appeal of the judgment of conviction. In all criminal
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prosecutions, the accused shall have the right to appeal

in the manner prescribed by law. An appeal is an
essential part of the judicial system and trial courts are
advised to proceed with caution so as not to deprive a
party of the right to appeal and instructed that every
party-litigant should be afforded the amplest
opportunity for the proper and just disposition of his
cause, freed from the constraints of
technicalities. While this right is statutory, once it is
granted by law, however, its suppression would be a
violation of due process, a right guaranteed by the
Constitution. Thus, if the accused’s loss of the right to
appeal was due to his counsel’s negligence and not at
all attributed to him, his petition for relief from denial
of appeal should be granted.