In reference to the judgment passed by the Allahabad High Court as on May, 28 2020 in the case

titled, M/s Shakuntla Educational and Welfare Society vs State of Uttar Pradesh and Others, the
claimant lodges this petition under Article 136 of the Indian Constitution, with a question of
impugned judgment passed by the Hon’ble High Court. The Allahabad High Court quashed the
Government Order issued by the State of Uttar Pradesh on August 29, 2014, taken in public
interest and also the actions and demands of the Yamuna Expressway Industrial Development
Authority treating them to be illegal.
The basis that the petitioner submits the Judgment to be impudent are as follows:
1. The decision of the Government to issue an order was immensely in the interests of
public for which a high-level committee, Chaudry Committee was constituted for 700
petitions filed by the farmers over acquisition of land. Thus the Committee came into the
decision only after viewing the issues and circumstances.

2. The Allahabad High Court also disregarded the facts of the cases, Gajraj Singh v. State of
U. P. and Savitri Devi vs State of Uttar Pradesh, in which both the cases had similar
circumstances as the Government’s Order being passed with specific interests of the
public. Thus the additional compensation was to address the grievances of the
farmers/landowners. Protecting the interests of the third parties and also developing the
land with no hindrances.

3. The Hon’ble High Court presumed that the judgment in Gajraj and Savitri Devi’s case
was particularly based on Government’s Order. And even if the Courts in these previous
cases mentioned that they were not to be precedent and must be applied only in peculiar
cases yet were followed by one another. Thus the same can be applied under this
representative case as well and not stating the Government’s Orders as illegal.

4. The High Court did not take any notice of the Government Order that was issued in favor
for farmers especially in the work of development underway.
5. It was unjustifiable of the High Court to dismiss the unilateral right that mentioned, the
allottees had clearly agreed and accepted the terms that stated the right to make changes,
alterations or modifications in the given conditions.

6. The High Court also declined to acknowledge the Government’s Order to be in view of
Article 14 of the constitution, i.e., the doctrine of equality.

7. The Hon’ble High Court disregarded the judgment of MotilalPadampat Sugar Mills Co.
Ltd. v. State of UP and Ors. In which it was in which high public interests were involved
including the contrary in lease deed and the contractual arrangement.

8. The High Court dismissed the fact that several allottees made statement to the Chaudry
Committee to bind by the decisions of state/committee to resolve the distress.

9. Despite the court’s findings that no judicial review by the court can be presented on the
State’s policy to compensate the farmers, it yet quashed the Government Order stating it
illegal.
Grounds for the petition: ( EXTRA )

1.) SECTION 41 (4) of Uttar Pradesh Urban planning and development act, 1973

“Every order of the State Government made in exercise of the powers conferred by this Act
shall be final and shall not be called ii question In any court”

2.) The Hon’ble High Court of Allahabad Considered the whole argument of the
respondents to be based on GAJRAJ CASE but, the fact, that the Government Order
was based on the recommendation of a High-Level Committee constituted under the
chairmanship of Shri Rajendra Chaudhary (“Chaudhary Committee”). The Chaudhary
Committee was set up by the State in view of
(i) over 700 petitions being filed by farmer-landowners against the acquisition of their
land and
(ii) the disruption caused by farmer groups to development activity over the acquired
and allotted land.

The Chaudhary Committee came to its decision after considering the views of the
relevant stakeholders including farmer groups, third party allottees including builders
and developers and allottees, and the Petitioner - YEIDA.
The Fact that several allottees (petitioners before the Hon’ble High Court) had given
representations prior to the Petitioner and made statements before the Chaudhary
Committee that they would be bound by the decision of the State / Committee in
order to resolve the distress of farmer landowners and to be able to commercially
exploit the land allotted to them.
Therefor Section 41 (3) of Uttar Pradesh Urban planning and development act, 1973
is satisfied.
 3.) The Fact that the “GAJRAJ CASE” will not act as precedent is declared in “Savitri
Devi Case” & This judgement came after the government decided the the extra
compensation of 64.7%.

Considering the time at which the government have came out with this solution they
kept in mind the verdict of GAJRAJ CASE, the fact the solution is really tangible and
all the formers satisfied with proposed solution, displays the fact the extra
compensation of 64.7% is a tangible solution.

4.) The Respondent – Allottees had agreed and accepted that the Petitioner – lessor (through
CEO) shall have the right to unilaterally make “additions, alterations or modifications” to the
terms and conditions. This was specifically provided in the various schemes of allotment and the
lease deeds following the allotment of land. This provision is unqualified and unrestricted in its
application, and it gives wide unilateral right to the Petitioner to change the terms and conditions
for allotment and the lease. There is no reason or justification for the hon’ble High C either in
fact or in law to conclude that this power cannot be exercised for modifying the land premium.

5.) Section 5A of the Land Acquisition Act of 1894:

(1) Any person interested in any land which has been notified under section 4,
sub-section (1) as being needed or likely to be needed for a public purpose or
for a Company may, within thirty days from the date of the publication of the
notification, object to the acquisition of the land or of any land in the locality,
as the case may be.
(2)Every objection under sub-section (1) shall be made to the Collector in writing,
and the Collector shall give the objector an opportunity of being heard in person or by
any person authorised by him in this behalf or by pleader and shall, after hearing all
such objections and after making such further inquiry, if any, as he thinks necessary,
either make a report in respect of the land which has been notified under section 4,
sub-section (1), or make different reports in respect of different parcels of such land,
to the appropriate Government, containing his recommendations on the objections,
 together with the record of the proceedings held by him, for the decision of that
Government. The decision of the appropriate Government on the objections shall be
final.

Thus, under this section as mentioned the objector i.e., the farmers have a right to be heard and
following the same the collector appointed, presented a report further to the Government seeking
for a Committee that seeked order in interests of the farmer which the government passed.
Adding to this the Article 14 of the Indian Constitution specifies the right to equality. And by
quashing the Government’s Order it implies that the rights of the farmers to be heard or be
equally treated have been quashed as well.

It can also be found in the case, Smt. Maya Devi And 5 Others vs State Of U.P. And 2 Others, 7
November, 2019, that even if the provisions of Section 5A and Section 17(1) were wrongly
invoked (in the Gajraj case as well), instead of quashing the acquisition the Full Bench enhanced
the compensation by 64.7%.