T71 - ANSI RIA R15.06: Robot and Robot System Safety © racANSI/RIA R15.06-2012 Pe = Update of R15.06 - 1999 = 1999 withdrawn: end of 2014 (+TR R15.106 and TR R15.206) = R15.06 - 2012 is a national adoption of ISO 10218-1 and ISO 10218-2 = ANSI/RIA R15.06-1999 was used as. basis for ISO 10218 + RIA (print) w.roboties.org = With an ANSI/RIA Introduction een a eer os eeWho is addressed by standards? Eo WHO ECC Oe: |=) ahaa oy a) Manufacturer x x Integrator x x User Could be directed to all entities Suppliers ONLY ANSI: guidance to Manufacturers, Integrators & Users of machinery (depends on scope) ISO & EN standards: SUPPLIERS , NOT Users except when Users also have role of supplier, of industrial machinery, Allows movernent of lke goods into and within Europe OSHA standards provide requirements only to Users (Employers) for occupational safety, but can include responsibilities to Employees (ex. Lock-out)History of ANSI/ RIA R15.06 Eo Occupational Health & Safety Act created 15.06 drafting started Publication of ANSURIA R15.06 ~ 1986 15,06 update started Publication of ANSI RIA R15.06 - 1992 15,06 update started rte Publication of ANSI RIA R15.06 - 1999 ics eed ISO 10218 started based on ANSI/ RIA R15.06 - 1999 15.06 update started (working with draft ISO) Publication of ISO 10218-1 AND ISO 10218 revision started Publication of ANSI RIAISO 10218-1 - 2007 & RIATR to enable its use Publication of ISO 10218-1 and ISO 10218-2: 2011 ANSI RIA R15.06 adopts ISO 10218-1 and -2:2011 ANSI RIA Tech Reports published (TR R15.306, 406, 506) Anticipate publication of updated TR R'15.306 wiminor revsWhat's new with R15.06-20122 @ Wag = Standard structure » Part 1: Robot (comes from robot manufacturers) = Part 2: Integration: requirements placed on the integrator (role of integrator — not necessarily the business purpose) = Normative references to ISO & IEC standards = Safety features embedded in robot systems (some optional)R15.06 — 2012: 7 Top changes Ce . Terminology (limited changes) . Risk assessment REQUIRED! . Functional safety (quantifiable) “<< . Floor space optimization due to new features (some OPTIONAL) & changes to CLEARANCE . Detachable & wireless pendants . Perimeter guarding changes (min/max) . Collaborative operation (4 types identified) = The issue is collaborative application — not just the robot. This topic is GREATLY misunderstood!New Terms Terminology changes Automation Explanation Robot Robot System Robot Cell Reduced speed Protective Stop reduced speed high speed Operator(s) Robot arm & robot control (does NOT include end effector or part) Robot CAD files do NOT include tooling or parts. Robot, end effector and any task equipment Robot System and safeguarding (inside safeguarded space) Called Slow speed in the 1999 standard Called Safety Stop in the 1999 standard Purpose: protection of people. This is different from Estop. Often called T1, was called Teach Mode in 1999 standard. (Teach is a task using manual reduced speed mode) Often called 72, but also called APV in the 1999 standard All personnel, not simply production operators. Maintenance, troubleshooting, setup, production...Standard “special” words prooeit Shall Normative or mandatory requirement Should Recommendation or good practice May Permissive or allowed Can Possible or capable - statement of fact Notes are informative and are used to provide additional information or explain concepts. If you see a “shall,” “should” or “may” in a note — itis an error. Notes are INFORMATIVE! We (standards writers) try, but we still make mistakes.R15.06 — 2012, Part 1 > Robot Mfger: Eo = Part 1: Annex D describes OPTIONAL features. Robot manufacturers are NOT required to provide any of these features, however if they are provided, they have to meet the stated requirements in Part 1. Here are the optional features listed in Annex D Emergency stop output functions Enabling Device features (common enabling device functionality and connecting additional) Mode section (providing mode information as a safety related functions) Anti-collision sensing awareness signal (not safety-related function but helpful) «Maintaining path accuracy across all speeds, so that using T2 is not needed Safety-rated soft axis and space limiting (allows smaller cell footprints) Ex: FANUC DCS, Kuka Safe Operation, ABB SafeMove, Yaskawa FSU. ‘Stopping performance measurement Do NOT presume that these features are provided. OPTIONS! Part 2 is for the integration of robots into systems and cells.Impact to Integrators & Users Pre = Part 2 (ISO 10218-2= R15.06 Part 2) « This is the BIGGY for Integrators (and Users to know) = Users are not specifically addressed = User acts as integrator, then integrator requirements apply to User. = Users need to use the information provided by the integrator. = Users address the residual risks: typically developing procedures & training, training personnel, adding warnings/ signs and safety management. = Integrators/ Users: options in Part 1, Annex D needed? = Know before buying robots. = Arobot that meets ISO 10218-1 (which is ANSI RIA R15.06 Part 1), only has these optional features if you request them or if the manufacturer states that their robot has these options. = Validation & verification, Clause 6, requires Annex G (p 127 Part 2) = Then START READING the standard!R15.06: 2012 — Part 2 Pe = Clause 1: Scope = Clause 2: Normative References = ISO to be used for global (including US) compliance while some ANSI standards can be used instead of ISO if compliance is for US only. Clause 3: Terms and definitions Clause 4: Hazard Identification & Risk Assessment (see TR R15.306) Clause 5: Safety Requirements and protective measures = 5.2: Functional safety (ISO 13849-1 & IEC 62061) requirements and equivalency to “Control Reliability” = 5.10: Safeguarding (Use ISO & IEC standards or if ONLY US, TR R15.406 can be used) Clause 6: Verification & validation of safety requirements and protective measures (NORMATIVE reference to ANNEX G in Part 2) Clause 7: Information for Use (page 101, Part 2)Part 2: 5.2 Functional safety Ce = [SO 13849-1:2006 and IEC 62061 provide metrics for functional safety = Can quantify performance, determine requirements, and validate = “Control Reliable”: concept in 1999 standard = PL=d with structure category 3 is equivalent to the requirements in the 1999 for “control reliability” : « Asingle fault does not lead to the loss of the safety function = The fault shall be detected before the next safety function demand; = When the fault occurs, the safety function is performed and a safe state shall be maintained until the detected fault is corrected; . erin foreseeable faults shall be detected. = Functional safety applies to all safety features which include a control system/ logic (SRP/CS)Optimize Your Floor Space Eo = Using safety-rated soft axis and space limiting feature of the robot control (optional feature) See Part 1: 3.19.3, Part 1: 5.12.3 and Part 1: Annex D = This is a type of “Limiting Device” (safety function) that reduces the “maximum space” to the restricted space. Maximum, Restricted, and Operating Spaces include the robot, end-effector, & partOptimize Your Floor Space: Clearance [Masai = IF ONLY Manual Reduced Speed (T1) and NO T2, then clearance is required for tasks inside the safeguarded space where there is an exposure to hazard(s) due to lack of space (pinch, crush, trapping). = No task no need for clearance! Be real in the risk assessment. = If there is a lack of space for a task, then 20in (500mm) needed for trapping (body/ chest). For other body parts, use ISO 13854. = 1999: 18-inch clearance from the operating space was required. = 2012: Silent whether distance is from the restricted or operating space. = Case studies: up to a 30-40% reduction in footprint! Important If the robot has high-speed manual (T2), then 20in (600mm) clearance is required regardless ofthe risk assessment (Part 2, 5.8.2)Perimeter Guard Dimension Comparison [Mjgguua R15.06-1999 ISO 10218 & R15.06-2012 CSAZ434 Lower Dimension Upper Dimension Upper Dimension MINIMUM b VI l $ Lower Dimension, MAXIMUM Only if hazards cannot be accessed by reach over, under and through. Example, if there is a hazard within 43” of the bottom, then the guard must have a lower dimension smaller than 7”. (see SO 13855 or RIA TR15.406)Collaborative Operation PR = 4 types of collaborative operation (Part 1, 5.10; Part 2, 5.11) for collaborative applications (can be a mix of the following) = all while in AUTOMATIC: = Safety-rated monitored stop: Operator may interact with robot system when it is stopped (drive power may be ON). Automatic operation resumes when the human leaves the collaborative workspace » Hand-guiding operation: Operator in direct contact with the robot system, using hand controls. Speed and Separation monitoring: Robot/hazard speed is reduced the closer an operator is to the hazard. Protective stop is issued before contact. Power and force limiting: Incidental contact between robot and person will not result in harm to person. Reference ISO TS 15066. Requires a risk assessment per each body region Applications where WORSE CASE is ONLY SLIGHT INJURY! A collaborative application could include 1 or more of the above capabilities. NOTE: Additional guidance for collaborative operations has been drafted in ISO TS 15066. Mostly about Power & Force Limited and Speed & Separation Monitoring.RIA Technical Reports... Pe = R15.306, R15.406, and R15.506 were developed for the US because the 1999 standard included these details and the 2012 edition does not. = TR R15.306 update of 1999 risk assessment methodology and matrix (from 2x2x2 to 3x3x3). = TR R15.406 Safeguarding, pulls many (but NOT all) requirements from various ISO safety standards. For EU or global compliance, use ISO standards. = TR R15.506 Applicability of R15.06-2012 for existing robot applications. Needed because ISO standards only look forward (new).TR R15.306 Risk assessment (task-based) [Mgugaauta Encore from 60 12100 fous! = Conduct a risk assessment (required now, option in 1999) iskassessment_ | Consider task locations & access requirements. Dxeraten fhe Rs See Part 2, clause 4.3 —— = Identify tasks & hazards & the needed protective cot tron measures for all phases of operation ‘fe mactnery 0853) = Include the need for access to tasks and providing space to perform tasks, including clearance if needed. “ann = 3x3x3 Matrix Cine ay Severity, Exposure, and Possibility of Avoidance: See TR R15. 306, Table 1 7 Adequate nk egycton~ 00 662RIA TR R15.306 — 2014 Factor Rating Criteria (Examples) ~ choose most credible Injury Severity Serious $3 Moderate 82 jormally non~eversble: fatality Read erteria from | time amputation the top and down, |-long tem disability Tor each factor | chronic ines | permanent health change If any ofthe above are applicable, the rating is SERIOUS Normally reverse broken bones [severe laceration [short hospitalztion | short tem disability + losttime (mut-day) [fingertip amputation (not thumb) If any ofthe above are applicable, the rating is MODERATE Minor st First a Cruising small cuts f-no loss time (multi-day) | dows not require attention by a medical doctor ifany of the above are applicable, the rating is MINOR.RIA TR R15.306 with EO Tee FACTOR vith £0 Rat + Exposure to hazard(s) is eliminated’ controlled! limited by inherently safe design measures. Use of guards prevents exposure or access to the hazard(s) r=) Prevented | (see Part 2, 5.10). I an interlocked quard is selected, the following bullet must also be met Eee] E0 —_~ If functional safety is used as a risk reduction measure, the functional safety performance (PL) meets or exceeds the requited functional safety performance (PLr). See Part 2, 5.2. if any of the above are applicable, the rating is PREVENTED Exposure Typically more than once per day or shift High Frequent or multiple short duration E2 _ —Durations/situations which could lead to task creep and does not include teach If any of the above are applicable, the rating is HIGH L Typically less than or once per day or shift - Occasional short durations Ifeither of the above are applicable, the rating is LOW NOTE: E0 is used during validation as E0 is only available as a selection AFTER the 1* round as it requires risk reduction (which happens after the initial assessment) Low etRIA TR R15.306 Te Factor Rating Criteria (Examples) - choose most credible Read criteria from the top for each factor Insufficient clearance to move out of the way and safety-rated reduced speed control isnot used The robot system or cell layout causes the operator to be trapped, with the escape route toward the hazard Safeguarding is not expected to offer protection from the process hazard (e.g. explosion or eruption hazard) If any of the above are applicable, the rating is NOT POSSIBLE Insufficient clearance to move out ofthe way and safety-rated reduced speed control is used Obstructed path to move to safe area Not Likely * Hazard is moving faster than reduced speed (250 mm/sec) Avoidance = A2_— + Inadequate waminglreaction time The hazard is imperceptible If any of the above are applicable, the rating is NOT LIKELY Sufficient clearance to move out of the way Hazard incapable of moving greater than reduced speed (250mm/sec) i" Adequate warningireaction time + Positioned in a safe location away from the hazard If any of the above are applicable, the rating is LIKELY OPC) eesTR R15.306: PLe not typically applicable to robot system RISK REDUCTION = Table 2 without EO RISK REDUCTION Table 2 Toppa Probab of Probably of cirosune | Prabal iskLeve in LB Ca AVOIDANCE WODANCE wnPL SC: exeosune At ei ‘Atay Aa ora sally arnt ease Le. =e a Low ‘tise; | Medium rer S2Moderate S2Moderate s2oras chit orn grat Muh Stee key oF not key Mora? ely or not ely Ezhih E2high $3. Serious $3. Serious As notpossie [PMTInherently safe design measures by the designer/ supplier dosigner & user ‘See Supplier 3 Step Method Administrative Cont developed from Information for Use Training & supervision Warnings & Awareness Means ——>/ A Personal protective equipment (PPE) _—_——Hierarchy of risk reduction measures ot peer au Fs a £ 5 a g Hy = ns Elimination Inherently Safe | petitution Design Measures Limit interaction (by inherently safe design) Safeguards & if applicable Parts of the Control System (SRP/CS) ‘Complementary Protective Measures + Emergency stop devices and functions Complementary |. piatforms and guard railing (tall prevention) & safo Protective access - building codes & standards can apply + Measures for escape & rescue of people, isolation Measures & energy dissipation, handling heavy parts Warnings & Awareness Means Safeguarding and Information for Administrative Controls Use Personal Protective Equipment ‘See TR R15.306 fora detailed Hierarchy of Risk Reduction MeasuresRIA TR R15.306 Table 4 - Min risk reduction as a function of the risk level Tossed ett] Risk Reduction Measure Most Preferred Least Preferred Elimination ‘Substitution Limit Interaction ‘Safeguarding! SRPICS Risk Level Use of one or a combination of these risk reduction measures are required as a primary means to reduce risks. Complementary Protective Measures Warnings and Awareness Means ‘Administrative Controls PPE Use of one or a combination of these risk reduction measures may be used in conjunction with the above risk reduction measures but shall not be used as the primary risk reduction measure. Use of one or a combination of any of the risk reduction measures that would reduce risks to an acceptable level may be used. ‘Assess residual risk (6.6). Will acceptable risk be achieved (6.7). If not achieved, repeat. if residual risks are low or negligible this is sufficient. Perform verification and validation (6.8). Document (7.9). And be aware of Updates (7)TR R15.306, table 5 Pe Minimum functional safety performance PL, Structure Category Risk Level b ~ 2 To a VERY HIGH (see 5.6.2) A did not exist in R15.06-1999 Robot safety standards require PLd, Cat 3 unless a risk assessment determines another PL and Cat is needed. Functional safety could be lower or higher, based on application — with end-effector and part(s). A higher requirement is not expected due to hazards associated with a robot system but could be required for other application risks. PLd, Cat 3 is equivalent to Control Reliable & can be validated!TR R15.406-2014 Pe = TR R15.406 Safeguarding, pulls many (but NOT all) requirements from various ISO safety standards. = For EU or global compliance, use the EN/ ISO standards. c 3 2 o 2 © & 2 Cc = Po :@O 2&TR R15.506 Scope prooeit t ° a oO £ © o# c |. i: O © ed = ANSI/RIA R15.06-2012 provides forward-looking guidance for industrial robots and industrial robot systems/cells effective at the time of its publication and contains no requirements for change or retrofit. This TR provides guidance as about what applies to existing equipment built to an earlier version of the standard.Tossed TR R15.506 Pre Figure 1 - Flowchart outlining various requirements otet Foti eauremens of orroboteet |ANSIRIA 5 052072 epae yf Cont pater retatsh estore ms expected Reconfigure col Rebate cot (Sermo) shat orRemove (Sora ts iTR R15.506 Table 2 - Risk assessment and standard requirements for each scenario Tess to Peete Repair or Refurbish Robot or Cell Move Robot or Cell ‘Add or Remove Robot or Components Modify Robot or Components Assessment Requirement: Applicable Standard: 3or4 Not required 5 or6 Tors 9 or 10 ANSI/RIA R15.06-1999, unless ANSIRIA R15.06-2012 was in effect at the time of initial installation (4.1.2 or 4.2.2) or the robot system utilizes new features permitted in ANSI/RIA R15.06-2012Tossed Challenges moving ahead... Pe Change is difficult. We have a new standard (and TRs) to learn Risk assessment is now required. Some people are not yet comfortable with risk assessment. But also many have become quite comfortable. + Drive for new TR15.306 to have 3 levels of seventy: slight, moderate, serious, 180 13849-1 and IEC 62061 are relatively new to the US Functional safety can seem scary because it includes equations. Math can be easily done by free software (Sistema for ISO 13849-1). Combines reliability with diagnostics coverage (to detect a failure), rather than simply relying on an architecture (categories). + Functional safety requires understanding components (machine and safety-related), then integrating properly and lastly validating, More expeced... progress This design, integration and use needs to reflect the entire lifecycle of the robot system and application. It requires a discipline — the discipline of functional safety management, akin to quality management. We have PLe which didn't exist in EN954 plus “Control Reliable” was the “best”What’s Next? een oy Collaborative Operations / Applications: ISO TS 15066 out for ballot. Manual load station (ISO TS technica’ specification) — when is a load station a “hindrance device” that prevents entry New Projects = Robot/AGV combination Other... + UL1740 revision to go to ballot in 2016 soy stander fortis?Allen-Bradley Guadimarter Tossed ett] Roberta Nelson Shea Global Marketing Manager, Safety Components Rockwell Automation Chelmsford, MA, USA +1 978-446-3494 RNelsonShea@ra Rockwell.comIntro to Robot / Robot System Safety GD rusuc