SECRET/NOFORN (U) Confidential Human Source Policy Guide (U) Confidential Human Source Policy Guide i 3 ty SA Es 4, (U) Federal Bureau of Investigation (U) Directorate of Intelligence (U) 0836PG (U) September 21, 2015 (U) Classified By Casw25B14 (U) Derived From: Mi (U) Deciassity (QU) Revised: 0520-2016 SECRET /NOFORNSCRE T/INOFORN (U) Confidential Human Seumce Potwey Crude (U) General Information (UU) Questions of comments pertamung to this policy guide can be directed tor (U) Federal Bureau of inveshgation Headqnarters, Duertorate of Intelligence (VU) Division pomt of contact: Section Chief, HUMINT Operations Section (U) Supersession Information (U) This document supersedes the following - vy) + WV) * (U) All electronic communications related to confidential imuman source operations dated pnior to the publication of this policy pmide. mchuding (U) Sections 1-3 of this policy guide contain guidance Sections 4-22 incorporate the current Confidential Hi HBB revised September 7. 2007. but with new gudance regan undisclosed participation to reflect revisions prompted Operations Guide (DIOG). Thus policy gmde will be confidential human source administration and domesty source operations 1s finalized (U) This document and its contents are the property of are provided to an outside agency. 1t and its contents ar agency without the written permission of the unit ln implementation guide (U) This policy guide is solely for the purpose of It ss not mended to does not, and may not be relied upon to create any ni annve or procedural, enforceable by law by any party in any matter. civil or criminal ace an lmstanon on otherwase lawful investigative and litigative prerogatives of the Department of Justice and the FEL (©) DIOG Provision (U) No policy or policy guide may contradict, alter. or otherwise modify the standards of the DIOG. Requests for DIOG modifications can be made to the Intemal Policy affice (IPO) pursuant to DIOG subsection 3 2.? paragraphs (A) (B). (C). and (D} ii SECRET ‘NOFORN fySECRET//NOFORN (U) Confidential Human Source Policy Guide (U) Table of Contents 1, (0) Introduction . LL (U) Scope 12 (U) Purpose 13. (U) Intended Audience 14. (U) Authonties 15. (U) Approval Levels and Delegations. 15.1 (U)AGG-CHS and AGG-Dom Exceptions and Dispute Resolution 2 152. (U) CHSPG and DIOG Exceptions and Dispute Resolution (U) Roles and Responsibilities ........0sunuunininssnnnnnnnnnnnninnnne 4 21. (U)CHS Program Management and Oversight 4 211 (U) Assistant Directors in Charge, Special Agents in Charge. Assistant Special Agents in Charge (ASACs), and Supervisory Special Agents (SSAs) 212 (U) Confidential Human Source Coordinator (CHSC) 2.13. (U) Department of Justice Confidential Human Source Coordinator 2.2. (U) CHS Operation. 22.1. (U) Case Agent and Co-Case Agent Roles 2.22. (U) Task Force Officer as Co-Case Agent 223. (U)Non-Agent Investigative Staff 23. (U) Prohibitions on FBI Personnel in the Identification, Evaluation, and Recruitment of PCHSs and the Development and Operation of CHSs 231. (U) Gifts 10 3, (U) Identification, Evaluation, and Recruitment of Confidential Human Sources in Type $ Assessments 12 Aan & & iS) 3.1 (U/FOUO) PCHS Risk/Benefit Analysis 12 3.2. (U/[FOUO) PCHS Operations: Introduction. B 33. (U) Mdentification Phase 4 3.3.1, (WU) Opening the Type 5 Assessment in the Identification Phase “4 3.3.2. (U) Modification of the CHS Identification Plan 15 3.33. (U) Transition From the Identification Phase to the Evaluation and Recruitment Phases 16 3.4 (U/FOUO) Evaluation and Recruitment Phases 16 3.4.1. (U/FOUO) Evaluation Phase .. 16 iti SECRET//NOFORN+ wn 6. SECRET//NOFORN (U) Confidential Human Source Poliey Guide 342 (U/FOUO) Recruitment Phase 343. (1) Opeing he Type $ Aas ial ace 35. (U) Basic Approval. All Phases Soe 35.1. (U) Additional Approvals nt venoninaeanee’ 36 (0) Authorized Taventgitive Methods in Type 5 Astor: Ail Pas st 3.7. (U)PCHS Approaches... on 371. (U) Guidance Specific to Special Agents Approachag 3 PCHS 3.72. (U) Methods of Approach 3.8. (U) File Reviews 3.9. (U//FOUO) Funding for Type 5 Assessments 3.9.1. (U) Identification Phase Funding 3.92. (U) Evaluation and Recruitment Phase Funding 3.10. (U//FOUO) Duration and Closure of a Type 5 Assessment 3.10.1. (U) File Maintenance and Disposition (U) Opening and Reopening a Confidential Human Source... 4.1. (U) Use of the CHS Program 4.2. (U) When a CHS May Be Tasked 43. (U) Source-Opening Communication 4.4, (U) Additional Background Information and Records Checks 45, (U) Requirements for Reopening a CHS 45.1. (U) Request to Reopen a CHS Previously Closed for Camse 45.2. (U) Closed CHS Reopened by Another Field Office... (U//FOUO) Confidential Human Source Admonishments ... 5.1. (U) Timing and Provision of Admonishments = eee 5.2, (U) Required Admonishments 53. (U) Additional Admonishments $31 (U) Subjects Represented hy Conceet or Pliny Tega Bea 53.2. (U) Employees of Financial Institutions. 53.3. (U) Employees of Educational Institutions 5.3.4. (U) Otherwise legal Activity (U/FOUO) Confidential Human Sources Requiring Approval for Operation.. sca 6.1, (U) Types of CHS That Require DOJ ApprovalOo SECRET//NOFORN (U) Confidential Human Source Policy Guide 1 (Q) Senior Leadership CHSs 612 (U) High-Level Government CHSs 614 (UV) High-Level Union Official CHSs 6.14. (U/POUO) Privileged CHSs 615. (U) Media CHSs 616 (U/POUO) Long Term CHSs 62. (U) DOI Review Procedure for CHSs Requiring DOJ Approval 621 (VU) CHSs Reporting on National Secunty and Foreign Intelligence 622 (U) CHSs Not Reporting on National Secunty Investigations ot Foreign Intetligence Collection (U/FOUO) Confidential Human Sources Requiring Additional Approvals... 48 WW 72 (U) Federal Probationers, Parolees. and Supervised Releasees (U) Pnsoners Under Bureau of Prisons (BOP) Supervision or in the Custody of the United States Marshals Service (USMS) 72.1 (U) FPO, BOP. and USMS Approval 73, 73 4 75 76 VW. 78. 79 7:10. 7 712 (U) State or Local Prisoners, Probationers, Parolees, and Supervised Releases 1. (U) Approval to Release a State or Local Prisoner From Custody (U) BOP Personnel (U) State, Local, or Contract Prison Employees (U) Swom Law Enforcement Officers (U) Employees of Federal, State, Local, or Tribal Agencies (U) Minors (Individuals Under the Age of 18) (U) Counselors. Employees. and Patients in Substance Abuse Treatment Programs (U/FOUO) Union Officials (U) Department of Energy (DOE) Personnel (U) Personne! Affiliated With the Department of Defense (DoD) (Not Including Joint Operations With DoD) 7.12.1. (U/FOUO) Definitions 7122. (U/FOUO) Concurrence Requirements 7.123. (U/FOUO) Concurrence Procedures 713 74. 71S. (U) Fugitives (U) Megal Aliens (U) Former FBI Employees and Persons With a Present or Former Relationship With an FBI Employee... ¥ SECRET //NOFORN “ 4” aS 46 16 47SECREN/NORORM (U) Confidential Vrnan Senace Potiey Conde 716 (U) Current or Former Pasticrpants in the Witness Gecumity Progean (WGP) 717 (U) Members of Congress and Their Statte 718 — (U) White House Personnel 719 — (U) No Foreign Policy Objection Statement 8. (U) Witness Security Program. 9. (U) Immigration Matter 9.1. (U//FOUO) CHSs im the Umte 92. (U) Requirements for Opemng Opes 9.3. (U) Available Programs fi P os mi Stamas for wat Delaying a ( Deporta 93.1. (U) Signific (U) Deferre: (U//FOUO) Ads 934 )S\ 0 Public Law 110 (P' Pr 94 (U) Individuals Seekis a0 95. (U/FOUO) 10. (U/FOUO) Operati 101. (U/FOUO 102 (U) Electron 103. (U) Consensu 104. (U) Undercover Open 10.5 (U/FOUO) Undisel 10.6. J/FOUO) Alias False Identiti . 10.7. (U) Obtaining Information Abou Pendung Charees or Legal Defiense Plans. SECRET) NOFORNSECRET//NOFORN (U) Confidential Human Source Policy Guide 108 Br mre nn Wire ce beettoanc Service Provider 109 (0) Elected or Appointed Government Oficials 10.10 (U//FOUQ) Employees of Financial Institutions 10.11 (U//FOUO) Employees of Educational Insitutions 10.12. (U/FOUO) Use of a Sub-Source 10.13. (U//FOUO) Use of CHS Information in a Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act Affidavit 10.14. (U//FOUO) CHS Pronitization System 11. (U) Department of Justice Notification Requivements ....0.cccccceenencnnnn 80 11.1, (U) Notification Designees 11.2. (U) Notification to DO! of Unauthonzed Megal Activity 113 (U) Notification to DOJ of the Investigation ot Prosecution of a CHS. 114 (U) Notification to DOJ Regarding Certain Federal Judicial Proceedings 115. (U) Notification to DOI of Privileged or Exculpatory Information 116 — (U/FOUO) Notification to DOJ Upon Naming a CHS as an Interceptee or a ‘Violator in an Electronic Surveillance Application. 117 (U/FOUO) Responding to Requests From FPO Attorneys Regarding a CHS 118 (U) Exceptions to the DOJ Notification Requirements 119 — (U//FOUO) DOI Review of CHS Files for Non-Testimonial CHSs. 12. (0) Confidential Human Source Participation in Unauthorized Megal Activity Bs ph sats 121. (U) Notification Process 122. (U/FOUO) Request for Approval of the Contimsed Operation of a CHS. 123. (U/FOUO) UIA Resulnng From Violation of the Authonzation for Iegal Activity 13. (W//FOUO) Confidential Human Source “let ihe in Otherwise legal Irae Teen hae ic iene 85 13.1. (U) Prohibited Activities 132. (U)Tier TOIA 1321. (U) Tier I OIA Definition. 13.22. (U) Tier 1 OLA Authonzation. 13.23 (U/FOUO) Tier 1 OLA Emergency Oral Authorization. 13.24. (U) Tier 1 OLA Duration vil SECRET//NOFORN 80 80 80 80 81 si 82 82 82(U) Confidential Human Source Policy Gaide 133 (U) Tier OTA aaa 31 (U) Tier IOWA Authorization 13.32. (U) Coordination With FPO Attorney. ; 1333. (U) Tier 1 OIA Emergency Oral Authorization 13.34. (U) Tier LOIA Duration. “a B4 (0) Documented Findings of Tier Land Tier IT OTA Approvers 1341 (U) Precautionary Measures 13.5. (U) Admonishments Related to OLA 13.6. (U) Renewal and Expansion of OLA Authorization 13.7. (U) Suspension of OIA Authorization 138. (U) Revocation of OLA Authorization. 139 (U) Recordkeeping Procedures. 14. (U//FOUO) Operation of Confidential Human Sources Involving Other Federal, State, Local, and Tribal Agencies or FBI Field Offices. 14.1, (U) Joint Operations of FBI CHSs With Other Agencies 14.1 (S/INF) Joint Operation With CIA, USG, OR USIC to Advance National Security Objectives : 14.2. (U) Sole Operation of an FBI CHS by Another Agency 143. (U//FOUO) Joint Field Office Operation or a CHS Operating Wothin Another FBI Field Office 144, (U//FOUO) Operation of CHSs in Another Field Office's Terntory 15, (U//FOUO) Disclosure of a Confidential Human Source’s Identity... 15.1. (U) Principles of Confidentiality 152. (U) Disclosure Authority 15.3. (U/FOUO) SAC Objection to CHS Disclosure cpanel 154. (U/FOUO) Record of Disclosure of CHS Identity 16. (U//FOUO) Administration of Confidential Human Sources... 16.1, (U/FQUO) CHS Files... 1611 Ui /FOUO) Creation and Maintenance of CHS Files in Deli os 1612 YEO DO) esate Creation ant ateate ee in Delta... oe 1613. (Ul 70V0) Opie CH on Paes For Delta 1614 1615SECRET/NOFORN (U) Confidential Human Source Policy Guide: 161.6 — (U) Properly Classifying CHS Information 161.7 (U) Documenting CHS Information. 1618. (U) Retention of CHS Files 162 (U/FOUO) CHS Number 163 (U) Payment Name 164 (U) Code Name es 165. (U/FOUO) CJIS Division/NCIC “Stop Notices” 166. — (U) Positive Records Checks and Concurrence to Operate 167. (U) Field Office Annual Source Report 168 (U) Quarterly Supervisory Source Report 169. (U) Annual Database Checks 1610 (U) Documenting CHS Derogatory Information 16.11. (U) Other CHS-Related Deconfliction Checks 16.12 (U//FOUO) Transport of CHS Files and Access to Delta Files by Another Field Office or FBIHQ 16.13. (U) Requirements When a CHS is Injured or Killed 17. (U/FOUO) Confidential Human Source Financial Matters. 17.1. (U) Payment Prohibitions 172. (U/FOUO) Field Office Funding for CHSs 173. (U)SAC Anmual CHS Payment Authority 174. (U) Aggregate Payment Authonty 175. (U) CHS Payment Categories: Services and Expenses 1751. (U) Services 1752 (U) Expenses 176 (U) Rules Regarding Expenses for Meals, Vehicles, Medical Costs, Housing. Equipment, and Relocation 17.61 (U) Meals Associated With CHS Debriefings 1762 (U) Vehicles 1763. (U) Medical Costs 1764. (VU) Housing 1765. (U) Equipment 1766. (U) Relocation 17.7. (U) Payment Requests ix SECRET//NOFORN 102 109 109 109 lil 112 112 113SECREL/NOFORN (U) Confidential Human Source Policy Caxide 1771 (U) Payment Request Entries 1772 (U) Vendor Recespis 178 (U) Payment Approvals 1781 (U) FPO Attomey Approval 1782. (U) FBI Field Office Approval, 1783. (U) Advance Expense Payments 179 (U) Paying aCHS 17.10. (U) SSA Financial Audit of Payments 17.11. (U) Acceptable Uses for Service Agreement: 1711.1. (U) Modification, Expiration, Renewal. and Agreements panat 17.12. (U) Payments to CHSs by Other Field Office 1713. (U) Gifts in Liew of Monetary Payrn 1714 (U) Lump-Sum Payments 1715. (U) Rewards 17.15.1. (U) Rewards Offered by Entities Outside 17.152. (U) Rewards Offered by the FBI 17.16. (U) Forfeiture Awards 17.17. (U) Project-Generated Income 17.18. (U) Funds/Gifts Given to a CHS by a Sul 17191 17.192. 17.20. (U) Payments to a Closed CHS 17.21. (U) One-Time Non-CHS Payment 17.22. (U) Payments to a Non-C S Requi 18. (€) Closing a Confidential Human Source im 18.1, (U) Closing Communica 18.1.1 (U) General Reasons for C 18.1.2. (U) Closing a CHS for Cause 18.2. (U) Closing Procedure 1821 (U) Delayed Notification. 183, (U) Future Contact With a Closed CHS, x SECRET NOFORN 128 Ds a 130 130 130SECRET//NOFORN (U) Confidential Human Source Policy Guide 184. (U) Coordination With FPO Attomeys 19. (U) Extraterritorial Operations... 191, (U) National Security Investigations 19.11 — (U) ET CHS Operation in Support of a National Security Investigation. 1912. (U) Prohibited ET National Secunty CHS Operations 19.2. (U) Required Approvals and Notifications for ET CHS National Secunty Operations... 1921. (SNF) ET OIA bya CHS in Support of a National Security Investigation 193, (U) Cnminal Investigations 19.31 (U) ET CHS Operations in Support of Criminal Investigations Not Involving Sensitive Circumstances 1932, (U)ET CHS Operations in Support of Criminal Investigations Involving Sensitive Circumstances 1933. (U) Required Approvals and Notifications for ET CHS Criminal Operations 1934. (S//NF)ET OIA bya CHS in Support of a Criminal Investigation 194. (U) Policy Applicable to ET CHS Operations in Support of All Types of Investigations 1941 (U) Documentation Requirements for All CHS ET Operational and Communication Requests 19.5 (U/FOUO) Roles of the FBIHQ Operational Entities 1951. (U//FOUO) Role of the Operational Division HUMINT Operations Center 195.2. (U/FOUO) Role of the FBIHQ Operational Unit 1953. — (U//FQUO) Role of the Directorate of Intelligence HUMINT Coordination Center 196 — (UFOUO) Role of the Legat in ET CHS Operations 197 (U//FOUO) Role of the Intemational Operations Division in ET CHS 197.1 (U) Intemational Operations Division Approval and Management Role ‘Over LEGAT- or ALAT-Assigned ET CHS 198. (U) ET CHS Operations by a LEGAT or an ALAT 1981. (U/FOUO) LEGAT or ALAT Access to a Field Office CHS File 199. (U) Employee Travel Related to a CHS Operation 1991 (S/INF) Special Agent Undeclared Travel 19.10. (SNF) ET Admonishments x SECRET//NOFORN 130 14 14 135 135 137 140 140 140 141 143 145 145 155 155 157 157 158 159 160 160 161 161 162 16319.11 (U) Pre Operational CHS ET Bnefs and Planing 19.12. (U/FOUO) CHS Payments. 19.13. (Ui/FOUO) Emergency ET OIA Authorization Baar A 1914 19141. (VU) Suspension and Revocation of ET OIA Authorization. 19.15. (U) Exemption to Providing Legal Notification 19.16. (U) Special Cucumstances 00... 19.17. (U//FOUO) Use of an ET Sub-Source... 19.18. (U) Communications About a CHS 19.19. (U) ET Unauthorized Ilegal Activity 19.19.1. (U) Unauthorized Iiegal Activity Notification to DOJ 19.20. (S//NF) International Incidents 20. (U) Confidential Human Source Validation... (U) List of ini Mi Appendix A: (U) Final Approvals Appendix B: (U) Sources of Additional Information ... Appendix C: (U) Contact Information... Appendix D: (U) Acronyms... Appendix E: (U) TS//SCI CHS Reportin Appendix F: (U) Service Agreement...SECRET/NOFORN (UV) Confidential Human Source Policy Guide 2 WU) iatroduction LL. (1) Scope (W/POUD) The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBD) recruits and operates confidential human ‘sources (CHSs) to obtain intelligence, which advances investigative program priorities, meets ‘national and FBI intelligence collection requirements, and, through dissemination, supports “objectives of the Umted States (US) govermment’s intelligence and law enforcement (LE) ‘communities The Duectorate of Intelligence (D1) maintains responsibihty for these activities through the development and oversight of the FBI's CHS program (SNF) This policy guide (PG) applies to the use of the CHS Program in all investigative and intelhgence collection activities conducted by the FBI in the United States, its terntones, outside the territories of all countnes, and in foreign countries (U) The CHSPG 1s for mtemnal pudance It 1s not umtended to create an enforceable legal nght or a private nght of action by a CHS or any other person. Any conflict between these guidelines and the Aiforney General's Guidelines [AGGs} Regardmg the Use of FB] Confidential Human Sources [AGG-CHS] or the sttorney General's Gurdelines for Domestic FBI Operations (AGG Dom] must be resolved in favor of the AGGs 12. (U) Purpose (1) The purpose of this PG is to standardize CHS Program policies so that they are consistently and uniformly applied, to the extent possible, in all FBI investigative programs This will promote compliance with relevant AGGs and facilitate the development of CHSs to engage in ‘cross-program reporting (U"FOUO) The entical components of the CHS Program addressed in this PG are as follows. (UFOUO) The roles and responsibilities of FBI personnel and task force officers (TFOs) with regard to CHS Program activities * (U/FOUO) The identification. evaluation. and recruitment of potential confidential ‘muman sources (PCHSs) * (U/FOUO) The admunistration and operation of CHSs supporting any of the FBI's investigative programs and/or other authonzed information collection activities (U) This PG also emphasizes the importance of oversight and self-regulation to ensure that CHS Program activities are conducted within Constitutional and statutory parameters and that civil liberties and privacy are protected. 13. (Uy Intended Audience (U) This PG applies to all FBI employees, TFOs. FBI contract employees. and FBI detailees 14. (U) Authorities {U//FOUO) The provisions in this PG are governed by the authorities set forth below © (UV) Atomey General's Guidelmes Regarding the Use of FBI Confidential Human Sources. December 13, 2006 + (U) Attorney General's Guidelines for Damestic FBI Operations. September 29. 2008 1 SECRET//NOFORNSECKET/NOKORN (U) Conbidentsal Vasnan Sennce Policy Cie © (U) Domestic Investigations and Operations Crde (ROC! Ortaloes 6, 204% © (U) Atlomey General Order No 4019 2008, Conforming the Attorney Canaral’s Gutdalines Regarding, the Use of VBI Confidential Ffuman Simerces to the Altorray Generals Gutdelines for Domestic FBI Operations, Nervemibes 16, 2008 (U/FOUO) Other authorities, such as statutes, executive odes (20k), ceguiations and memorandums of understanding (MOUs) ase referenced om thes PO 1.5. (U) Approval Levels and Delegations (U) Approval levels specified 1n tas PG may be delegated ome supervisory level ico tie wtaied level of to a designee. unless specifically prohibited m the PG The deleganon must be aude an writing, st must specify each activity of task delegated and identify the supervisory penton te which the approval authority 1s delegated Delegations of authonty for semor executives ase filed under and delegations of authonty for nom -sesior exerasives ate Sed under| A field office (FO) retasnung 2 commumcation detathng 3 delegzeen of authonty must file the delegation of authonty communscahon ite the local PO cxenmon of the above MB HQ case file (¢ as (U) All supervisory authonty for approval of an activity cated m thes PG may be granted by a duly authorized acting supervisor or by a supervisor holding 2 position hagher than that specified in this PG (U) References to the special agent m charge (SAC) m this PG are umtended to mchude the FO assistant director in charge (ADIC) poston. even fnot specifically mentioned 15.1. (U) AGG-CHS and AGG Dow Exception: and Dispute Revolution (U//FOUO) Whenever an FBI assistant director (AD) (or above) ADIC SAC chef federal prosecutor (CFP), ot his or her respective desimeets) bel exist that Warrant an exception to any provision of the between or among the FBI and other Department of Justice (DO!) entuhes rezardine the AGG- CHS. an exception must be sought from—or the dispute must be sesolwed by-—the DOF s assistant attomey general (AAG) (or his or her designe) for the Cremmnal Devuaon or the National Secunty Division (NSD). whichever is appropriate (U//FOUO) Whenever there is a dispute with the AAG for exther the Criminal Diesen or 85D) of the DOJ the dispute must be resolved by the deputy attorney general (DAG) or bis ar ler designee. (U/FOUO) Any departure from a provision of the Lon, must be requested and made sm accordance with DIOG Section 2 (U/FOUO) Any exception to a provision of the AGG-CHS nmst be requested via am. communication (EC) with pnor approval of the SAC and sent to the AD. Di forsemew_ must coordinate the request for the exception with the appropnate DOT compenent (U!FOUO) The exception granted or dispute resolved must be documented in’ (U) CHSPG and DIOG Exceptions and Dispute Resolution (U’ FOUO) Whenever an ADIC or an SAC beleves that warrant an exception, or when there is a dispute over the t 2 SECRET) NOFORNSECKET//NOPORN (U) Confidential Haman Source Policy Gaade 2. (U) Roles and Responsibilities 21. (U) CHS Program Management and Oversight 2.1.1. (U) Assistant Directors in Charge, Special Agents im Charge, Assistant Special ‘Agents in Charge (ASACs), and Supervisory Special Agents (SAs) (U//FOUO) The SAC of each FO is responsible for ensuring that the FO thas a\CHS programs tat contributes to the FBI's collective human intelligence (HUMINT) base. ADICs, SACs, and members of the FO's investigative and intelligence operations management staff. sactadeng ASACs and SSAs, must ensure that the FO fulfills its mtelhgence collection and mionmaien dissemination responsibilities in comphance with FBI protocols, rules, ané regulations, mchadine those contamed in this PG. Although the SAC is charged wath the ultimate sesponsiblaty for the FO’s CHS program, daily oversight responsibility for PCHSs and CHSs resides with the SGA. who must review all communications regarding the CHSs om has or her squad and supervise the special agents (SAs) operating those CHSs (U) SSA program management responsibilities may not be delegated to nom-agent personnel (Supervisory intelligence analysts [SIAs] do, however, have critical oversight responsibilities with regard to the identification and evaluation of PCHSs, as set forth in Section 3 “Identification, Evaluation. and Recruitment of Confidential Human Sources m Type $ ‘Assessments.”) 2.1.2. (U) Confidential Human Source Coordinator (CHSC) (U) Each FO must have at least one SA serving as the FO's full-tume CHSC The CHSC is responsible for addressing all duties and r bilities of the CHS The CHSC mst be assigned fo the FO's HUMINT squad ee [At least one altemate CHSC. who need not be assigned to the MINT or intelligence squad, must also be designated. The SAC. at his or her discretion. may have additional persommel assigned to these duties, as appropriate. (U) The CHSC is responsible for overseemg the FO’s CHS program including the proper administration of CHS files and associated documentation Because of these oversight responsibilities, the CHSC must aot be assigned as either the case agent (CA) or co-case agent (co-CA) for any CHS assigned to the FO. This restriction does not apply to the altenaate CHSC. However, when the altemate CHSC is working in that capacity. be or she may aot review any communication generated for or about CHSs for which the CHSC is the CA or co-CA These communications must be forwarded for review to the HUMINT andiorfNISSA who supervises the CHSC (U//FOUO) Each CHSC nmust designate a space within the confidential file room (CFR) to house all legacy and current CHS files and other CHS-related material such as any physical eft received from a CHS that is not considered evidence. In order to guarantee the confidentialiny of CHS information. only personne! assigned to the CHS program may be located inside the CFR.(U) Confidential Haman Policy Guide re ee ees ee Peering Ofte AO) atarmey +P to facilitate compliance with the AGG-CHS. Matters routinely handled by Pia esactnating OA YPO"s renpoasiniiies unio tx AGC-CHS, serving as ‘of contact (POC) for matters under the AGG-CHS; approving matters under the Pa RE erie, cs FO Cesc con canta ol cota and u Sone ‘handling discovery matters. Each FO CHSC must establish and maintain contact with A CHSC(s) in his of her temtory Contacts with the DOJ CHSC must be documented and ‘maintamed in the CHS program file 22. (U) CHS Operation DLL (U) Case Agent and Co-Case Agent Roles (U#FOUO) The CA of a PCHS or a CHS must be an FBI SA. Each SA, with the exception of the (CHSC, has a core responsibility to create and maintain a CHS base to provide vital information ‘Supporting FBI investigative and national intelligence pnorities. The SAC may grant an ‘exception to this responsitulity when an SA is assigned to duties that logically preclude CHS ‘operation. This exception must be documented in a written EC matntamed in the FO CHS ‘program management file (WFOUO) In addition to an assigned CA. every CHS must have a co-CA assigned and identified. A co-CA has all the same duties, responsibilities, and file access as the CA. Ifa TFO {is assigned as co-CA. however, there are linutaions to is or her duties, as set forth im subsection 2.2.2, “Task Force Officer as Co-Case Agent.” The frequency with which the co-CA meets with the CHS is determined by the impact and sigmficance the CHS’ reporting has on FBI investigations. If the CHS contributes significantly to an FBI investigation, the co-CA must meet ‘with the CHS more frequently The frequency that is considered appropriate should be determined by the CA, co-CA. and their SSA. but, in every case, the co-CA must meet with the (CHS at least every six months, The meeting must be documented in the CHS file. This ‘requirement may be met through the documentation of a CHS program-related activity through which the co-CA’s meeting with the CHS 1s evident, for example, a source reporting document, ‘an admonishment form. or a payment receipt bearing the co-CA’s name (Ui/FOUO) If the CA and co-CA are unavailable, the SSA may designate, on a temporary basis, another co-CA to handle PCHS matters or operate a CHS. Regardless of such temporary designations, however, the CA is responsible for the maintenance and accuracy of PCHS or CHS filles assigned to him or her (U/FOUO) No member of the FBI's management staff may serve as the CA or co-CA. The only exceptions fo this rule are as follows © (U/FOUO) Legal attaches (LEGATs) and assistant legal attachés (ALATs) are permitted to operate CHSs as CAs under a modified approval process, as set forth in Section 19. ‘and any other litigation. component of DOJ with zuthonity to prosecute federal crumnal offense: section: of the Antitrust Divison, Civil Dreision, Civil Rights Division, Envwonmental and 4 SECRET//‘NOFORNSECRET/NOPORN (U) Confidential Haman Sennce Potion Cride “Fixtraterttional Operations ” However, ap PBI Sensor Exerntee assigned as the LEGAT muy not be assigned as the CA on coh © (U/FQUO) An acting SSA may continue to be anupned a a CA of 2 00-CA fot PCT and CHSs for up to 180 days. While the acting SSA 1s assigned as a CA. ‘ related to PCHSs and CH%s for which the 86A.1s the CA. must be: c ox an SSA whom the ASAC designates. After 190 days have elapsed, the. i approving, 3g those communications rmust assign another SA 26 the CA on <0-CA ob those — PCHSs and CHSs. The reassignment may be made, homeves, a a have elapsed, as deemed appropriate by the ASAC 222, — (U) Task Force Officer as Co Case Agent (U/FOUO) Although: they are non-apent personnel TFOs who have secerwved the sequiatie OO) A es ae ee An SSA may assign a TFO as a co-CA by approving the opening commumacation, foe either 2 PCHS or a CHS, in which the TFO 1s named as the co-CA The SSA's approval aise serves as the authonity to disclose the PCHS's ot CHS s identity to the assigned TFO (U//FOUO) Any TFO assigned as 4 co-CA must be advised of and follow. all relevant FEI policies regarding the identification, evaluation, and tecrusiment of PCHSs and the developmacst and operation of opened CHSs. as described im this PG and other relevant polices, sacludeng tr AGG-Dom, AGG CHS, and the LIOG (U!/FOUO) A TEO co-CA has the same duties and access to the PCHS of CHS file as the CA. except as described below. The TFO co-CA may use the PCHS approach methods described am subsection 3.7.2. (“Methods of Approach”) meet with a PCHS. and debrief an open CHS while unaccompanied by a CA, provided that each contact is fully documented by the TFO and placed in the file of the PCHS or CHS for whom the TFO has been approved as co-CA (U/FOUO) A TFO co-CA is not permutted to © (U/FOUO) Open a Type 5 assessment © (U/FOUO) Prepare the source-opening communcation or open a CHS s= Delta * (U/FOUO) Provide admonishments to 2 CHS The TFO may be present as a.mimess when admonishments are reviewed with a CHS, however. the admonsshments must Be provided by an SA © (U/FOUO) Paya CHS. unless an SA is present as a witness when CHS payments are ade (a AR ose 3A 2.2.3. (U) Non-Agent Investigative Staff / (U/FOUO) Non-agent FBI investigative staff are not permitted to be assigned as CAs or eo assign non-agent investigative staff Sentinel case participant responsubslittes that interaction with a PCHS. 2.23.1 (U)Non-Agent Linguists (U/FOUO) Non-agent linguists are not pemutted to be assigned a5 CAS or: and CHSs. Non-agent FBI Linguists are also prokubited fom contacting ; 6 i SECRET/NOFORNSECRET//NOFORN (VU) Confidential Human Sourve Policy Guide of a CA, a 60-CA, or a TPO who has been assigned as aco CA. ACA of a y \atigag kta cera Peer te tee 1 ish bbe present during, contact The SSA of the squad with PCHS, approving or denying it, mn writing, (U//POUO) The followmg information must be inctuded in the request _— © (U/POUD) A description of the requested services ‘© (U/POUO) The specific investigation(s) bemg supported (U//FOUO) The following factors should be considered prior to approving a request © (U/POUO) The length of time the services will be needed © (U/FOUO) The purpose of the services ¢ (U/FOUO) The potential operational or personal security risks resulting from the non ‘agent linguist interaction with the PCHS or CHS and the steps to mitigate any identified risks ne (U/FOUO) This written request and written approval must only be retained in the CHS’s maim 2.2.3.2. (U) Intelligence Analysts (IAs) (Ui/FOUO) IAs are not permitted to be assigned as CAs of co-CAs for CHSs. A supervisor may ‘only assign IAs case management or case participant responsibilities that do not require interaction with PCHSs. (W/FOUO) IAs are prohibited from contacting CHSs without the presence of a CA, a co-CA, or ‘a TFO who has been assigned as a co-CA_ A CA or aco-CA may request. in writing (¢ . email, EC), that an LA accompany him or her to CHS debriefings. The SSA of the squad with CHS ‘oversight and the LA's supervisor must respond to the request. by approving or denying it. in ‘writing (U/FOUO) The following information must be included in the request: © (U/FOUO) A description of the requested services ‘© (U/FOUO) The specific investigation(s) being supported ‘(U//FOUO) The following factors should be considered prior to approving the request af © (U/FOUO) The length of time the services will be needed ' (U/FOUO) The purpose of the services ee potential operational or personal security risks resulting from the IA’s ee mee ene to mitione any identified risks in IA may be assigned as a case participant or a case manager to identify and iS: pe ahe Type 5 eocacacel (eee Section 3 “Identification. Evaluation. and 7 SECRET//NOFORN‘engage PCHISs or the public in operational settings during the couse of a Type 5 ascenmanent_ including in online venues, as described in subverhon 3/2.) 6. “Use of the Conest Agguccarte oy JAs on Publicly Accessible Web Sites ~ 23. (U) Prohibitions on FBI Personnel im the Identification, Evaluation, and Recruitment of PCHSs and the Development and Operation of CHiSs (U) For the purposes of this section, FBI personne! includes TFOs acting 2s co-CAs and amy other detailee participating in the operation, oversight, analysis, or mecrustnent of an PES CHS-or PCHS, (V) FBI personnel directing. overseeing. ot parbexpating wn the durechon of a CHS or devecting. overseemg, of parhcipating m the identification evaluation or recrumment of a PCHS ae act permitted to (U) Open another FBI employee as a CHS on a PCHS (U) Open an FBI contractor as a CHS, unless the following criteria ate met aad documented in the main file © (U) In the performance of his or ber duties under the contract, the contractor's association as a contractor with the FBI could not reasonably be discerned toy someone in the subject's position. unless the subject s knowledge of the eelatonsiags 1s relevant to the assessment or predicated investigation im whic the CHS will be used 2 (U) The use of the contractor as 2 CHS will not conflict with ins or her contractual obligations © (U) The contracting officer's representative (COR) approves the tse of the commactor: as a CHS (U) Have any role in the operation or oversight of a CHS or a PCHS who is the employee's spouse, significant othes. relative. or other person whose relatonshap fo the employee could create the appearance of a personal or professional conflact of matexest. (U) Engage in sexual or unduly familiar social relationships with any CHS ar CHS (U) Socialize with 2 CHS or a PCHS. except to the extent mecessary an appropriate Ser (U) Entertain or meet a CHS or a PCHS at any FBI employee's (U) Pay CHS with peal fd we pio ctSECRET//NOFORN (U) Confidential Human Source Policy Guide ‘as Soon as prachcable, but no more than five business days from the date of oral approval, feimbursement must be sought in accordance with subsection 17./.1., “Payment Request (U) Allow a CHS or a PCHS to distribute contraband (¢ g.. illegal drugs or stolen Property) into the market unless authorized to do so. (U) Authorize a CHS to participate in an act of violence, except in self defense during an ‘emergency to protect his or her own life or the hives of others against wrongful force (U) Authorize a CHS to participate in an act designed to obtain information for the FBI that would be unlawful if conducted by law enforcement officer (LEO) (eg , breaking and entering. illegal wiretapping, illegal opening or tampering with the mail, or trespass amounting to illegal search), (U) Interfere with, influence, or impede any criminal investigation, arrest, prosecution, or Gvil action in which the CHS or PCHS is a party or a witness. However, an SAC may submit a letter containing facts regarding a CHS’s relationship with the FBI to a prosecutor or a court for consideration. Disclosures must be documented in accordance wath Section 16, “Administration of Confidential Human Sources,” (U) Make any promise of immunity to a CHS or a PCHS: make any commitment limiting the use of any evidence by the government, or give the impression that he or she has the authority to do so. However, an SAC may provide a letter to the prosecutor or court stating the facts regarding a CHS's relationship and assistance to the FBI (U) Disclose FBI investigative information to a CHS ot a PCHS (e.g. information relating to electronic surveillance [ELSUR), search warrants, indictments and other charging documents, of the identity of other actual or potential subjects or PCHSs or CHSs), other than what is strictly necessary for operational reasons (U) Reveal to a CHS or a PCHS any information relating to any federal. state. or local pending or closed investigation of the CHS or PCHS or his or her friends or relations. inching confirmmg or denying the existence of an investigation. unless authorized to do so by the CFP or his o her designee, after consulting with the SAC. In national security matters, the SAC or his or her designee must consult with the appropriate operational division at FBIHQ and obtain CFP authonzation. (U) Exchange gifts with a CHS or a PCHS, except as provided for in subsection 23 “Gifts” (U) Provide the CHS or PCHS with anything of more than a nominal value. except pursuant to an approved CHS payment. as authonzed by Section 17. “Confidential Human Source Financial Matters.” or pursuant to a Type 5 assessment expense. as authorized by Section 3, “Identification, Evaluation. and Recruitment of Confidential ‘Human Sources in Type 5 Assessments (U) Receive anything of more than nominal value from the CHS or PCHS (U) Engage in any business or financial transactions with the CHS or PCHS 9 SECRET /NOFORNSECRET/NOFORN (U) Confidential Human Source Pokey Gande (yi pest eee the direction of a PCHS or a CHS mst not matiess related to the FBI's with the PCHS or CHS with anyone ties odes Se seed 0 Hee OI (U) When interacting with PCHS and CHSs, all PBI employees, meinding TPO co-CAs and SA CAs, must conduct themselves professionally and i accordance with FISI standards aad pudance for FBI employee conduct, including those set forth im the /"B/ Eshics crnd Integrity Program Policy Directive and Policy Guide O7SADPG. 23.1. (WU) Gifts . 23.11, (U0) Gifts Offered by a CHS or a PCHS (U/FOUO) Ifa PCHS or a CHS offers a gift to a CA. aco-CA. on other FBI employer. the CA. co-CA, or other FBI employee should not accept the ttem_ If the PCHS or CHS is aware of the CA or co-CA’s FBI affiliation, the CA or co-CA should use the opportunity to diplomatically advise the PCHS or CHS that the relationship 1s a professional one and that restrictions apply to their interactions. The offer and refusal of a pift must be documented in the PCHS's file or CHS'’s validation sub-file Gifts should be refused even from PCHSs recruited through a nonaffiliated approach (see subsection 3.7.2 2, “Nonaffiated Approach”) This general sale applies because, among other issues. when the CA or co-CA eventually reveals has or ber FL affiliation to the PCHS, the previous acceptance of a gift may become an obstacle to a successfill Tecruitment (U//FOUO) In some very limited circumstances, accepting a pift from a PCHS or a CHS maybe justified. The CA’s SSA must approve the acceptance of such pifts mn accordance wath the miles set forth in this subsection. If the CA or co-CA takes the gift and the SSA does not approve. the CA or co-CA must return the gift to the PCHS or CHS (U/FOUO) If acceptance of the gift is necessary and appropriate for operational seasons, and the refusal of a gift would isreparably damage the relationshp and jeopardize the willmeness of a PCHS or a CHS to cooperate or continue to cooperate. an SSA may. after coucumence of the chief division counsel (CDC) (considering the legal and ethnical issues assoczated wath setaimmg ‘the gift), authorize the CA or co-CA to accept the guft The SSA's authorzaton for the acceptance of the gift. the results of the consultation with the CDC. 2 description of the gift and the justification for its acceptance must be documented it the PCHS's file or tbe CHS's validation sub-file The SSA must provide authorization in advance if the CA or co-CA is aware that a PCHS or a CHS will offer a gift Otherwise. the CA or co-CA must obtam authorization and document the gift in Delta as soon as practicable, but no later than five busmess days fiom receipt of the gift. This communication also should be used to document the disposition ofthe gift discussed below) and the reason why that particular method of disposition was chosem 7 (U/FOUO) The SSA nmust approve one of the methods described below to store or dispose ofan accepted gift. Under no circumstances may the gift be kept by an FBT employee The disposition: method will depend on the type of gift and its prospective operational use or treatment a5. evidence © (U*FOUO) If the item is perishable. imma be desl Po ee penshable gift. a photograph must be taken of the item and placed im the ‘the CHS file. with documentanon noting the destruction method 2 of why the item was destroyed. 10 SECRET NOFORN:SECRET//NOFORN (VU) Confidential Human Source Pohey Guide © (U/FOUO) If the pif is not perishable and will not be treated as evidence, the CA ot CA nmst submit if to the CFR to be maintained as part of the CHS file (e p., the gift may bbe placed physically m a serialized 1A envelope/accordion folder, or a pall” sub-file can be created fiom the main file) for appropiate storage If. on a rare occasion, the pift needs to be wom or shown to the PCHS or CHS so as not to jeopardize the relationship during a subsequent contact or debriefing, the gift mmst be officially charged out of the file. Upon conclusion of the CHS meeting, the gift must be charged back into the CHS file Upon closing the CHS file, the pift must follow the National Archives and Records Administrahion (NARA) approved final disposition schedule established for the CHS file * (U/FOUO) If the gift 15 to be treated as evidence, it must follow the same process as any ote: eden 5: rrr (U//FOUO) If an FPO is participating in an investigation or a prosecution using the CHS, written notice must be provided to the FPO attomey—in advance, whenever possible—if an SSA approves the acceptance of a sift. A copy of the FPO notification must be retained in the CHS validation sub-file 2.3.1.2. — (U) Gifts Given to CHSs and PCHSs (U//FOUO) Gifts offered to PCHSs and CHSs may be provided in accordance with subsection 3.9.2. “Evaluation and Recmuitment Phase Funding.” and subsection 17.13 , “Gifts in Lieu of Monetary Payments.” rT SECRET//NOFORNSECKET/NOFORN (U) Confidental Haman Source Pobey Garde: 3. (U) Identification, Evaluation, and Recruitment of Confidential Human Sources in Type 5 Assessments _ 3.1. (U/FOUO) PCHS Risk/Benefit Analysis (UMFOUO) The FBI has successfully vetted and recruited CHSs sence its inception A CHS was traditionally, and still 1s, oflen identified during the course of an ongoing assessment or predicated investigation, ot through routine liaison. As of December 2008 the C4; Dom, as implemented by the DIOG. provided an additional tool known as the “Type 5 assesersent — for the identification. evaluation, and recruitment of CHSs In addshon to the DIOG. tne section in conjunction with Section 2, “Roles and Responsibilities.” governs the respecteve roles of SAs and JAS in the identification, evaluation. and recrustment of PCHSs under the Type 5 aesesament ‘The purpose of this section is to pve further details reparding the implementation of DIG subsection 5.6.3.4; however, in the event of a conflict, the DIOG is the controlling authority (U/FOUO) Inherent in each Type 5 assessment, of prior to opening any CHS, 1s the element of determining the potential benefits to be gained through the identification, evaluahon. and recruitment of the PCHS, balancing them against the possible operational and other costs associated with the PCHS and ensuring that the benefits outweigh the costs. grven the known information and the circumstances involved. If a PCHS 1s ullimately opened. he or she enters into a relationship with the FBI. and that relationshp will forever affect the life of that indsvadual The PCHS will be either an “FBI source” or 2 “former FBI source.” and in turn. bss or her conduct or misconduct will reflect on the FBI Fairly or unfairly. the FSI will be viewed an the light of that reflection. Therefore. it is important to recognize that decisions and activities undertaken in the identification, evaluation. and recrurtment phases are exercises mn nisi management (U/FOUO) Once the PCHS is open, hie or she is subject to the guidance provided m Sechos 2 “Confidential Human Source Validation.” Prior to openng each PCHS, agents and analysts amast be aware of the need to assess and weigh the risks associated with the PCHS (U//FOUO) There is a number of factors to be considered during the identification evaluation, and recruitment of a PCHS. Documented past activities and observable characteristics cam provide insights that point to future control or handling issues, reliabulsty problems. or lack of credibility on the part of the PCHS. Likewise. the PCHS s beliefs, values. and allegiances may reveal motivational platforms that enhance existing benefits and are critical critena for the agent and analyst to define throughout the Type 5 assessment. These factors. as outlined im the six bullets below. should then be assessed in their totality against the backdrop of each of the five CHS criteria to determine whether the risk in ultimately recruiting the PCHS source is low. ‘medium. or high. and what steps can be taken to nutigate identified risks A similar evaluation should then be conducted on the potential benefits the CHS 1s reasonably expected to deliver The final step is to determine whether the potential benefits outweigh the potential risks and act accordingly (UiFOUO) The factors below nnust be used by analysts and agents to weigh the nisks against the benefits involved during the evaluation and recruitment of PCHSs Each of the factors and tum, the CHS cniteria. cannot be weighted equally since. for example. 3 PCHS's access relevant intelligence or information may outweigh a pasticular suitability or security ris especially if such concems can be adequately mutigated. When evaluating benefits comer pes SECRET NOFORNSECRET//NOFORN (U) Confidential Human Source Policy Guide t os ig nen ermine beter he PCT's pace md cor one to outwer associated with of hen, ers et gh oreo ‘one of more (U#POUO) The imminent operational need and importance of the desired mformation, (UPOUO) The likelihood that the PCHS will inform others of the FBI's interest in the PCHS. (U/FOUD) The likelihood that any revelation about the FBI's interest in the PCHS will have a minimal adverse affect (U/FOUD) The likehthood that the intelligence or information will be lost (UMPOUD) Whether and how a nsk can be mitigated. (Ui/FOUO) Whether the FBI will be able to control the PCHS through existing handling procedures and venty the trustworthiness of the information provided through the existing validation processes. (U//FOUO) The PCHS criteria are 32 (U/FOUO) Access: the individual's placement and sustained ability to acquire information of operational and/or intelligence interest. (In some instances, this may be a matter of potential access to high-value information ) (U/FOUO) Suitability: the mdividual’s character, intelligence, and competence as they relate to his or her potential to provide authentic, accurate, and reliable information. This helps to answer the question, “Does the individual have the appropriate attnibutes to perform as a CHS?” (U/FOUO) Susceptibility: the likelihood that the individual will accept recruitment as an FBI source and provide information on a confidential manner. This aspect requires an analysis of possible motivations and biases, life experience. and other factors relevant to the willingness of the individual to become a CHS. (U/FOUO) Accessibility: the FBI's ability to gain access to the individual for the ‘purpose of assessment and evaluation as a means to move toward recruitment. (U/FOUO) Security: the FBI's assessment of operational security and counterintelligence risks associated with the PCHS. This means evaluating the individual ‘and the operational curcumstances related to the following questions: © (U/FOUO) What if the individual rejects recruitment by the FBI? © (U//FOUO) What if the individual becomes aware of the FBI interest and objectives, ‘but his or her loyalties are elsewhere? © (U//FOUO) Are there possible lifestyle or professional vulnerabilities that might create reliability issues or invite exploitation by others? (U/FOUO) PCHS Operations: Introduction _ (UFOUO) The Type 5 assessment consists of three phases. The identification phase is opened without a specific. named individual, for the purpose of identifying persons with placement and 13 SECRET//NOFORNSECRET/INOPORN (U) Confidential Human Source Poly Geste access fiom a poo! of unknown individuals. The evaluation phase is opened om a specie, individual believed to have appropriate placement and access. ta pf information to better ascertain the nature and extent of his ot her access, security rile, o accessibility, and/or susceptlility to becoming a CHS. The reerusiment phase, wlicth continuation of the evaluation phase for SAs, mvolves the SA's efforts to obtams named individual's agreement to voluntarily enter a relatvonshep wath the FIL io to provide operational assistance and/or intelligence These phases are addeessed im detail in the subsections that follow. (U/FOUO) Th the FO collechon management coordinator (ColIMC) must be assigned as case participants in every Type 5 assensment (U/FOUO) A Type 5 assessment, in any phase, may not be opened on a subject of a pending FBI predicated investigation In addition, a previously opened CHS may aot be opened as a Type 5 assessment. See DIOG Classified Appendix G for a specific exception to thas requisement 3.3. (U) Identification Phase (U//FOUO) The purpose of the identification phase of the Type 5 assessment is to ideatify a PCHS with placement and access from a pool of uninnown individuals 331 (U) Opening the Type 5 Assessment im the Identification Phase (U/FOUO) The approval requirements to open a Type 5 assessment in the identification phase are specified in sub: ;. “Basic Approval: All Phases” The Type 5 assessment identification phase is initiated with the submission of 2 CHS identification plan. which must support an existing predicated vestigation or assessment. The plan must be documented mam TEP (x a sucoesoas born a Ey Se acapeereet I identification phase may be undertaken by an SA assigned to either a HUMINT or an investigative squad, of by an IA assigned to an FO or to FBIHQ who wishes to open a Type § assessment in the identification phase These files may be assigned jomstly to SAs and IAs. The 819 classification consists of the following restricted alphas. which specify the operational program area to be supported by the CHS identification plan pT caf cYB CRIM iT ei Ce Recut Fe Neh nnaorcarell earl fee) pees) = | (U/FOUO) The contents of the identification plan EC must include the followung © (U//FOUO) Case TD: the designator for the appropriate l-lassification © (U/FOUO) Title: CHS Identification Plan © (U/FOUO) Synopsis: the authonzed purpose and clearly defined Identification plan * (U/FOUO) DetailSECRET/NOFORN (V) Confidential Human Source Policy Guide ° st particular placement and access to information that the FISL is cittaeeee with such placement and access The ‘tumber(s) and title(s) of the assessment(s) or sein nan a ee) © (UNFOUO) Common characteristics or search criteria of madividuals believed to have the desired placement and access described above and the basis for selecting, the characteristics or search cntena. There must be an arhiculated reason to ‘that the charactenstics and search criteria will yeld the individuals likely to have the desired placement and access, and the selected charactensties must not be based solely on race, ethnicity, national ortpin, religion, activities protected under the First Amendment, or a combination of only these factors © (U//FOUO) The investigative methods the TA or SA anticipates using (e g., database and online searches, surveillance of physical locations, ot attendance at particular ‘events, only as authorized in the [DIOG) and the reasons why these investigative methods are expected to yield persons who are likely to have the needed placement and access associated with the common characteristics or search criteria set forth above (U//FOUO) In developing the identification plan, the focus should be to understand the activities ‘associated with the threat based upon existing intelligence or information received, and the type ‘or characteristics of people who logically intersect with those activities. From this group, characteristics or search critena can be refined, and investigative methods identified, to yield specific persons with the appropriate placement and access 3.3.2. (U) Modification of the CHS Identification Plan (U/FOUO) If an 1A or an SA seeks to utilize additional charactenstics or investigative methods that were not documented in the identification plan EC, their use must be requested in an EC (or a successor form in Delta) addressing the following * (U/FOUO) Case ID: the designator for the appropriate ff-lassification + (U/FOUO) Title: Modification of CHS Identification Plan * (U/FOUO) Synopsis: “To request modification of CHS identification plan created to [restate the authorized purpose and clearly defined objective(s) of the original CHS identification plan)" * (U/FOUO) Details: the additional characteristics. the reason for selecting them, and the additional investigative methods fo be used, with an explanation of how these methods are expected to yield persons with the characteristics specified (W/FOUO) For more information regarding the definition of the individuals and groups that ‘qualify as sensitive PCHSs, itis important to also refer to Section 5 of the DIOG on Type 5 ‘assessments and Section 10 of the DIOG on sensitive investigative matters (SIMs) in Type 5 assessments, 15 SECRET//NOFORNSECKET/ROPORN (U) Confidential Hisnam Sener Peltiey Conde 333. — (U) Transition From the Identification Phase to the Evaluation and Kecrwitoment (U/FOUO) If a CHS identification plan leads wo the identification of ome ox meme madiersdiedlec f who appear to have the desired access and placement to be commdered fon farther evaleation i and/or recsustment, one of the following steps must be taleen ft . {UITOUO) I the Type 5 serene i Ate cee the [A must open a separate Type 5 assessment a the plane (om aecendcmee with subsechon $4 , below) to evaluate the mdividwal as a PCHS © (U//FOUO) If the Type 5 assesument m the identification phase was aamngpied to an SA one of the followme processes must be wved (U//FOUO) The SA may close the Type 5 assesment, and then open and operate the individual as a CHS im accordance with Section 4, “Opening aad Reopenise 2 Confidential Human Source.” provided that the SA belbeves that the mndivsdaal is suitable, the individual agrers to be 2 CHS, and admomishements ase penned So the CHS within 90 days of openmg. © (U//FOUO) The SA may open a Type 5 assessment im the evaluation or recrutment phase (in accordance with subvection 3 4 below) if addtional evatuanen or recruitment efforts beyond 90 days are requared 34. (U//FOUO) Evaluation and Recruitment Phases (U/FOUO) The approval requirements to open a Type 5 assessment us the evaluation aad recruitment phases. which focus on identified individuals. are specified im sateechion 3 | “Bante Approval: All Phases.” These individuals may come to the attention of LAs and SAs i a aunsbex of ways, including the identification phase of a Type 5 assessment, authorized investigating methods used by SAs im other assessments and predicated investigations and research of historical information in existing records, as set forth in subeernon | 6, Authored Investigative Methods in Type 5 Assessments. All Phases 3.4.1. (U//FOUO) Evaluation Phase (U/FOUO) The purpose of the evaluation phase of the Type 5 assessment & to obtam additional background information regarding a known mdividual to better ascertain has or her placement access, security risk. suitability, and/or susceptibility to becomung 2 CHS. Ths phase may be used by IAs and SAs assigned to HUMINT or investigative squads, and by LAs assigned to FBIHQ SAs may be assigned jointly with LAs to Type 5 assessments ms thes pase (U//FOUO) A Type 5 in the evaluation phase is not a prerequisite to opening an indevadual 25 a CHS: rather. the Type 5 provides additional tools that may be used to evaluate a PCHS Am SA may open an individual as a CHS if the SA has sufficient knowledge to believe that the individual has access to valuable information. is susceptible to becoming 2 CHS. and may be given admonishments within 90 days of openmz However. fan SA focuses on an indovidmal as a PCHS. and the SA requires more than 90 days to evaluate the individual or needs to mse investigative methods to further evaluate the individual. an evaluation phase must be opened. (U/FOUO) LAs and SAs must open an evaluation-phase Type 5 assessment to assess. a PUES. whether the individual was identified through an identification-phase Type 5 assessment eet through other means If an LA develops information during this phase indicating that the PCHS: , 16 - SECRET NOFORN LalaSECRET//NOFORN (U) Confidental Human Source Policy Guide should be recmnited, the IA should prepare a source idenficabon packape (SIP) for use in the ‘recrustment of this individual by an SA on the appropriate HUMINT ot investigative squad A. SIPs defined as a wntten product drafted for the purpose of providing information reparding, an individual that will be used im order to determine or relay the dividual 's potential as a CHS ‘Drafting a SIP 1s recommended, but not mandatory, because a SIP may not be necessary in all Gircumstances. However, as stated above, an evaluanon-phase Type 5 assessment must be ‘opened before a SIP may be drafted, even if the information used for drafing the SIP was ‘obtained pursuant to an already-open predicated case on the individual, before the focus on him or her was as a PCHS. A CHS targeting package is a SIP, however, the title SIP must be used instead of the targeting package in order to provide consistency across the FBI Once the SIP 1s ‘completed, the Type 5 assessment (in the recruitment phase) must be reassigned to the appropriate HUMINT ot mvestigative squad for recruitment. (WIFOUO) If the information developed dung this phase indicates that the mdividual should ‘not be recruited as a CHS, the Type 5 assessment nuust be closed in accordance with the DIOG and subsection 3.10. “Duration and Closure of a Type 5 Assessment (U//FOUO) SAs may open evaluation phase Type 5 assessments on individuals identified through identification-phase Type 5 assessments, predicated investigations, or other means, but have the additional authonty to engage in recruitment activities under the recruitment phase. which 1s descnbed below 34.2. (Ui/FOUO) Recruitment Phase (U/FOUO) The purpose of the recruitment phase of the Type 5 assessment is to obtain a PCHS’s agreement fo voluntarily enter a relationship with the FBI and provide operational assistance and/or intelligence. Only SAs assigned to mmvestigative or HUMINT squads may engage in the recruitment phase. Non-agent professional staff may be requested to assist with the recruitment phase in accordance with subsection 2 2 3, “Non-Agent Investigative Staff.” If the recruitment is successful, the Type 5 assessment must be closed in accordance with the DIOG, and the individual must be opened as a CHS in Delta. The Type 5 assessment must also be closed if the recruitment is not successful, either because the individual declines to become a CHS or a decision 1s made not to continue the recruitment 34.3. (©) Opening the Type 5 Assessment in the Evaluation and Recruitment Phases (U/FOUO) A Type 5 assessment in the evaluation or recruitment phase must be opened with an EC (or a successor form in Delta) containng the | file number. The I HMB ss 2 set of restncted files consisting of numencal classifications corresponding to specific rogram areas which the PCHS. based upon placement and access to information on a potential ‘or existing threat, 1s expected to support if opened as a CHS. These file classifications are set forth in the following table: (U/FOUO) The contents of the opening EC must include the following * (Ui/FOUO) Case ID: the designator for the appropriate file v SECRET//NOFORNSECKET/NOFORN: (U) Confidential Human Source Policy Gunde: © (U//FOUO) Title: the name of the PCHS «© (U//FOQUO) Synopsis: the authorized purpose and clearly defined dhyectivels) = (U/FOUO) Details: (U/FOUO) File classification(s) or crime probilem indicatos (CPT) code(s) of the operational program or threat the PCHS ts expected to support © (U/FOUO) The PCHS's name, date of bath, and all other available thographacal data (U/[FOUO) Synopsis of any mformation collected regarding the PCHS pursuant to an identification phase Type 5 assessment or a prior assesment of predicated investigation m which the PCHS was umtially identified as a subyect (U//FOUO) The information for which the PCHS has placement and access. and wy such a CHS would be of value to the FBI 35. (U) Basic Approval: All Phases (U/FOUO) A Type 5 assessment for any phase must be approved by the appropnate supervisor and opened with an EC (or a successor form in Delta) Notwithstanding any other provision i the DIOG, a Type 5 assessment cannot be opened based on oral approval An SA opening a Type 5 assessment must obtain SSA approval, an LA openme a Type 5 assessment must obtam approval from the SLA and the SSA on the HUMINT or investigative squad whach would eventually recruit any individual idennfied as a PCHS. 1. (UW) Additional Approvals (U//FOUO) In addition to the approvals set forth in subsection 35 above, additional approvals are required if, during the identification phase. at least one of the charactenstics mn the subsections below 1s being used to identify indrviduals with placement access or 1s 3 characteristic of a PCHS in a Type 5 assessment evaluation or recruitment phase The characteristics are presented according to the approval levels required 5. (C) CDC Review and SAC Approval for Sensitive PCHSs (U/FOUO Sensitive PCHSs must be treated in accordance with DIOG subsection 56.3442 (U/FOUO) CDC review and SAC approval are requured before a Type 5 assessment may be opened on a sensitive PCHS of if, dung the identification phase. a sensitrve characteristic ss at least one of the aspects being used to identify individuals with potennal placement and access to information of interest If it 1s determined, after opening a Type S assessment. that 2 PCHS ss. sensitive or that a sensitive characteristic must or will be added to the PCHS identsficanon plan, the assessment activity may continue. but the matter must be documented in an EC (or a successor form in Delta) and reviewed by the CDC and approved by the SAC promptly (1. not more than five business days after the determmation is made) (U//FOUO) Sensitive PCHSs (and sensitive charactenstics included as part of a CHS: identification plan) include: © (U//FOUO) Domestic public officials (other than members of the U.S Congress and ‘White House staff. who require higher approval authority—see subsections 3 5.1.2.1 and 3.5.12.2, below) 18 SECRET //NOFORNSECRET//NOFORN (UV) Confidential Human Source Policy Guide © (UMPOUO) Domestic political candidates © (W/POUO) Indiwrduals who are prominent within religious orpamzations = (U//FOUO) Individuals who are prominent with domestic political organizations © (U/FOUO) Members of the news media * (U/PQUO) Members of faculty or admmnustration of colleges and universities in the ‘United States 351.2 (U) SAC and Executive Assistant Director (EAD) Approval After Consultation With the Office of the General Counsel (OGC) 38.121. — (U) White House Personnel (UMFOUO) SAC and appropnate EAD approval. with a recommendation from the OGC, are required to open a Type 5 assessment m which © (U//FOUO) White House staff status 1s one of the specified charactenstics in the CHS identification plan (identification phase) * (U/FOUO) A meniber of the White House staff will be evaluated or recruited as a PCHS (evaluation and recruitment phases) 3.5. (U) Members of Congress and Their Staff (UNFOUO) SAC and appropnate EAD approval, with a recommendation from the OGC and prior notice fo the AD, Office of Congressional Affairs (OCA), are required to open a Type 5 assessment in whch: * (U/FOUO) Stams as a member of Congress of a part of a member's staff 1s a specified charactensstic in a CHS identification plan (identification phase) * (U/FOUO) A member of Congress or a part of a member's staff will be evaluated or recruited as a PCHS (evaluation and recruitment phases) (U) SAC and Responsible DI Deputy Assistant Director (DAD) Review and Approval (UFOUO) SAC approval [review and the approval of the DI DAD with HUMINT Program responsibility are required for CHS identification plans and evaluation- and recrutment-phase activity that mvolve © (U/FOUO) The establishment of an apparent or actual business © (UFOUO) The use of employment sites ‘+ (U/FOUO) Any other activity which might have an adverse legal impact on a third party (U//FOUO) Following SAC approval. the request to approve a CHS identification plan for one of the sbovecharactenstics mt esx oh ir rrr rrr ‘with a copy to the appropriate [junit to be presented to the DI review commuttee 35.14, — (C) Department of State (DOS) Approval (S//NF) Pursuant to the} 19 SECRET//NOFORN 35.1.3SECRET/NOTORN (U) Comfidentual Hurnan Senace Policy Ganide (SI/NF) If the SA conducting the Type 5 assessment determines that ax culminate in a recrutment offer, NG must be obtained prior 1 tery aerview 1s likely to ondacnow the S/INF) To obtain III the CA must provide the appropriate FIO operational unit with an SSA-approved EC contasung the followmg information © (S//NF) The PCHS's nationality and emtuzens « (S//NF) The time frame of the approack (S/NF) The individual 's diplomatic or offi ¢ (S//NF) A description of th be international orgamzational component or diplomanc belongs and a description of has or her dutie drvidual the organ « (S//NF) Whether the approach would be passive or coercive © (S/F) The arget agamst w Sis cepected wane + (S//NF) The probable motivation for the PC wp become a CF (S//NF) If known, whether the PCHS 1s likel operate {U/FOUO) The operational unit must then request (IMMMIIN trom the DOS before the CA conducts the imtial interview 3.6. (U) Authorized Investigative Methods in Type 5 Assessments: All Phases (U) As set forth in the DIOG. only the inves ganve methods listed below may be used ma Type assessment, whether m the identification. evaluation. or secrustment phase (U) All of the following inve: six investigative methods ative methods may be used by SAs. LA: ry use only the first © (U/FOUO) Use of public informatior © (U//FOUO) Use of FBI and DOJ recerds or information SECRET NOFORNSECRET/NOFORN (U) Confidental Human Souree Boley Guide © CLPOUO) Use of records of unformation from other federal agencies and state local mibal, or foreign government agencies © (U/POUO) Use of online services and resources * (W/POUO) Use of informaton voluntanly prowded by povernmental or private entibes © (UNTOUDO) Use of alias/false identification (AFID) ot the covert approach (see ‘gubsection 7.2.5.6. “Use of the Covert Approach by IAs on Publicly Accessible Web Sites,” for 1A. specific purdance) only pernutted for use during approved ach vity 1m a ‘Type 5 assessment © (W/FOUO) CHS use and recnuntment © (WIFOUO) Intermrews of or requests for information fiom the pubhe and pnvate entities © (UMOUO) Physical surveillance (not requiring a court order) = (U/POUC) Polypraph examinations = (WFOUD) Trash covers (1. searches that do not require a warrant ot court order, SSA approval and consultation with CDC/OGC 1s required prior to using this method [see DIOG subsection 18 612 5) (UMFOVO) DOT has opined that SAs are authorized to perform consent searches m assessments (U/FOUO) Investpatve methods used during assessments that may require higher than SSA approval are set forth m DIOG subsection 18 5 (UMPOUO) In addition, as specified in division PGs, there may be agreements (eg MOUs) that require additional coordination and approval por to conducting certain activities {U/FOUO) In the course of a predicated investigation. an agent may not utilize undercover activity (pursuant to The Attorney General 's Guidelines on Federal Bureau of Investigation Underover Operations [AGG-UCO]) wath the specific purposes of identifying. evaluating. or recrusting a PCHS. The agent must open a Type 5 assessment and. f deemed operationally appropnate and necessary based upon the circumstances. may seek approval to utilize the covert approach. The following example illustrates this requirement (U/-FOUO) Scenario: Dunng a predicated vestigation of a violent crime group. the FBICA identifies a person associated with the cnmumal group who may be a PCHS Based upon thus, the CA decides, according to the AGG-UCO. to use up to “five undercover actvity” contacts with the PCHS as a means to evaluate the person as a PCHS (U/FOUO) Response: This 1s not permutted A Type 5 assessment must be opened. and approval to utlize the covert approach can be sought (see CHSPG for approval standards) ‘to further evahiate and recrunt the PCHS. The predicated case cannot be used as a basis for undercover activity related to contact with the person. since the actual purpose for the interaction is to evaluate and potentially recruit the person as. a CHS rather than seeking anformation relevant to a federal crime or national secunty threat 21 SECRET ‘NOFORN(U) Combidentas Hossa Sommer Poliny Crider 37. (0) PCS Approwches : a. oe eee st ecmas (U/FOUO) Dunng the course of a Type § sseniecent, in aAdatiens to: acento: accessible Web ates, an SA 15 dlowed to maker duect contact with » PCTS 26 eee evaluation and recrustmnent process All contacts must be dorueneated a a] Reporting Information That May Become the Subject of Testimony.” the| file (or a successor file wn Delta) le a ind hould be referenced m thes “PCHS * The (IEEE aunnbeer toh on the and of the PCHS provides wcidentally collected wiellegrnee. Sete andere, the relevant assessment or predicated investigation that the formation or midTegract sapports should be mcluded as well (UFOUO) The sole purpose of an SA's contact with 4 PCHS dunay a Type 5 sesmenient aust be to ascertain the PCHS's placement, access, sustabrlaty. susceptibiisty to tecommeg 2 CHES. amt any security issues that may impact the PCHS Contact with « POH sist sot foe sve uo tad thee PCHS to collect evidence of operational miclhigence Ouly an open CHS who teas secmeend te! admonishments required m Secon 5, “Confidential Human Source Ademonsdeescens.“ muay te tasked with collecting evidence or intelligence (U//FOUO) In addition, in the course of a predicated revestigation. an agent may net etdiexe undercover activity (up to five substantrve contacts purssant to AGG 15.G), woth die spenitier purpose of identifying, evaluating, or recrusting a PCHS The agent next mmtrad open = Vig assessment and. if deemed operationally appropriate and necessary feel oe may seek approval to utilize the covert approach. See suimecting 2.7.2.3,, “Covert Aggroactt Using True Name.” and subsection 37.2.5. “Covent Approach,” for coven approactr pradelars: (U/FOUO) Scenario: Dunng a predicated mvestiganon of a vicieat cme group, Ge FBICA identifies a person associated with the crmaal group who may be 3 ACES. Based upon this. the CA. decides, mm accordance with the AGG-UCO, to woe up to “fae undercover acusity” contacts with the PCHS as a means to evaluate the perso 28:3 PCHS, (U//FOUO) Response: This 1s not permitted A Type 5 aisesenent miat be ppeacd anit approval to wulize the covert approach can be sought to farther ewdhuate 20d room Stee PCHS. The predicated case cannot be used 2s 2 bams for “undercover actrasty” selated contact with the person. since the actual purpose for the micrachon 1 to evaluate dnd potentially recrut the person as a CHS rathes than 10 seek maformasess selevant tera federal crime or national secunty threat 3.7.2. (U) Methods of Approach (U//FOUO) The three types of approaches discussed below are avaiiabic to.an SA Gumag a” 5 assessment. The approach selected will depend on the SA's planned sccnateest stacey “ any of the approaches utilized. if the SA has been msued an AFID: the SA may saethe AFIS pay for appropnate recrustment expenses (e.g, meals or event! se ae sot to Aiichose bey ne her FBI affiliation to the vendors or merchants, m2 accordance sirvertieat f zSECRET/NOFORN: (1) Confidential Human Source Policy Guide {(WPOUVO) An SA contacting the PCHIS using the nonaffihated oF covert approach must ‘contemonsly evaluate the need for continned contacts with the PCHS to ensure that those ‘contacts further inform the objectives of the Type 5 assessment (te. that additional nonaffilated ‘of covert contacts provide useful and necessary msight into the PCHS 's access, stability. suscepability, accesstbihty, and possible operational security asses) (U/FOUD) Durga Type 5 assessment, the SA may collect mformanon that 1s volunteered or provided inedentally by the PCHS if it relates fo an ongomg assessment, predicated mvestipation, collection requirement_or other aspect of the FBI's mission ‘The SA must document this information in ani filed in the appropnate investigative file as well asm file (or a successor file in Delta) The SA may also ask questions related to interest to the Type S assessment (1 ¢ information for the purpose of ascettaming the PCHS's placement, access, surtabihty. suscepttbibty. and accessibihty or security concems) S721 (U/POUO) Affiliated Approach (UFOUO) In the affiliated approach, the SA or TFO discloses his or her affihation with the FBI to the PCHS. The SA or TFO has the option of not revealing the true purpose of the contact to the PCHS In this affiliated approach option, the PCHS 1s provided a plausible reason for the contact other than the FBI's purpose of assessing the person as a PCHS If the true purpose of the contact 1s not revealed, the SA or TFO must ensure that the purported purpose used would not reasonably be expected to violate the nights or damage the reputation of another person. and that the purported purpose does not miply that adverse legal consequences may follow to the PCHS {or a person close to the PCHS) if the PCHS declines to speak with the SA or TFO 37.211. (U/FOUO) Approval for Affiliated Approach (WFOUO) No approval 1s required for using the affihated approach 47.2.2, (U/FOUO) Nonaffitiated Approach (U/FOUO) In the nonaffihated approach. the SA does not volunteer to the PCHS that he or she ‘ss employed by the FBI or other LE or untelligence agency and a TFO does not volunteer that he or she is employed by the parent LE or mntelhgence agency ot the particular FBL investigative ‘entity, such as a Jot Terrorism Task Force (JTIF) However the SA or TFO does not use an alias and does not affirmatvely deny affilanon with the FBI ot other LE or intelligence agency ‘when using this approach Affirmative denial constitutes the use of the covert approach and mchades the use of apparel or props (eg. wearmg a plumber’s uniform or driving a cable truck) to mtentonally musdirect the SA ‘s or TFO's affilation with the FBI ot other LE or intelligence agency An SA or a TFO may withhold FBI affilianon sf based upon the operational ‘circumstances, the withholding 1s necessary or advantageous to achieving the objectives of the assessment The SA may contunue to make contact with the PCHS while using the nonaffihated approach, as long as the standards set forth below for maintainmg nonaffiliation in the Type 5 assessment are met (U/FOUO) If the PCHS asks whether the SA or TFO 1s employed by the FBI or another LE ot intelligence agency. and the SA or TFO affirmatively denies the affiliation. the SA may complete the contact with no additional authority. If the SA mtends. while using true name. to continue to smake these representations in the next substantive contact (meanimg. a contact that 1s not made for the purpose of or related to scheduling the next meeting). the $A must furst meet the Fequirements set forth in subsection 3.723, “Covert Approach Using True Name " If, however 3 SECRET NOFORN