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Constraints on the
Development of Safety
Culture: A Preliminary
Analysis
a a
Nick McDonald & Fiona Ryan
a
Trinity College , Dublin
Published online: 13 Nov 2012.

To cite this article: Nick McDonald & Fiona Ryan (1992) Constraints on the
Development of Safety Culture: A Preliminary Analysis, The Irish Journal of
Psychology, 13:2, 273-281, DOI: 10.1080/03033910.1992.10557886

To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/03033910.1992.10557886

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 The Irish Journal of Psychology, 1992, 13, 2, 273-281
.........................................................................................................
Constraints on the Development of Safety
Culture: A Preliminary Analysis
Nick McDonald
& Fiona Ryan
Trinity College, Dublin
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Recent developments in the concept of safety culture have ignored some of the
background factors which may influence and constr~ the development of a
positive safety culture. both within organisations and in different industries.
A brief overview of some of these background factors is presented within the
context of the road transport industry. In conclusion. it is argued that an
adequate theory of safety culture cannot be reached unless the role and
influence of these variables operating in the environment of the organisation
is taken fully into account.

The concept or sarety culture

Although the concept of safety culture has appeared in the organisational
literature for over twenty years. there is still dispute about what it means. how
it is measured and whether it can be manipulated and therefore changed. The
purpose of this article is to begin an analysis of some of the background
factors which may influence and constrain the development of safety culture.
and which may underlie differences in safety culture between industries.
Many recent industrial accident studies have noted that various characteristics
of organisations (e.g .• management-worker communication. management
commitment to safety, training programmes and worker involvement) can
have a high impact on accident occurrence (Cohen. 1977; Dawson. Poynter &
Stevens. 1983; Robinson, 1982). What was really under analysis during these
investigations was the safety culture of the organisation. Safety culture was
first distinguished as a separate field of enquiry relating first to production
workers (Brown & Holmes. 1986; Zohar. 1980) and later to construction
workers (Dedobbeleer & Beland. 1991). Recently it has come under new
scrutiny due to the large-scale technologically-based systems and enterprises
which have become established during what is sometimes called the 'second
industrial revolution' (fumer, Pidgeon, Blockley & ToCt, 1989).

Address for correspondence: Or Nick McDonald, Department of Psychology. TrinitY

College, Dublin 2.
 274 McDonald & Ryan
••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• I •••••••••••••••••

Increasingly. organisations and corporate entities have been given the

responsibility of managing technically complex production sequences with
potentially C3laStrophic results if a breach in safety occurs (Chemobyl, Three
Mile Island, Piper Alpha and Bhopal being some pertinent examples of such
disasters).
Over the last decade it has become clear that to analyse failures in these
systems in terms of technology alone gives a very limited picture of what
actually happened. A common explanatory device for failure in complex
systems is 'human error' which locates the blame for the accident on what has
come to be viewed as the most vulnerable, unreliable and, therefore,
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expendable part of the system -the human operator. 'Human error' has come
to be seen as too facile an explanation for system failure as the realisation has
grown that the 'human factors' which undermine safety are of a more subtle
kind. They are complex, interactive and deeply integrated into the
organisational design (pidgeon & Turner 1986; Reason, 1989 ).
The design and culture of an organisation exert powerful influences on how
safely it functions. Employees do not act in a vacuum; instead they mirror the
policies and practices of the organisations to which they belong. This is the
essence of safety culture. Turner et al. (1989) provided an initial
characterisation of a safety culture as the set of beliefs, norms, attitudes, roles
and social and technical practices that are concerned with minimizing the
exposure of employees, managers, customers and members of the public to
conditions considered dangerous or injurious. This preliminary definition
encompasses the concept of a shared system of meanings through which
employees and management alike perceive hazards in the work environment.
It has also been noted for a long time that certain occupational subgroups,
which have danger as an inherent part of the job (e.g., mining, deep sea
diving), display group norms and attitudes to safety which can be labelled as
cultural in nature. Indeed different types of safety cultures can be found within
the same organisations depending on the cohesive nature of the group and their
self-sufficiency in relation to the external environment. But usually the
internal safety culture of the organisation is dependent and determined by the
industry safety culture at the more global level. But the 'machismo' approach
to safety which these occupational subgroups sometimes project is not the
ideal safety culture which one is looking for in the management of todays
technologically complex organisations.
If one is to truly understand the concept of safety culture, it has to be viewed
not only through the technological design of the organisation but also through
the social groupings which make up the corporate body. The significance of
social inputs for the generation of accidents and disasters has been noted by a
growing number of analysts (B1ockley, 1980; Kletz, 1985; Perrow, 1984;
Turner, 1978). Major breakdowns in safety within an organisation are usually
 Safety culture 275
.........................................................................................................
due to the complex and unforeseen interactions between the social and
technological components of the system. This socio-technical perspective of
safety culture is gaining acceptance among major theorists in the fields of
occupational health and safety and organisational design as the only way in
which one can interpret the functioning and management of safety within
modem organisations. In 1988 the public enquiry into the Clapham Junction
rail disaster in London found that a poor safety culture within the organisation
of British Rail was a key determinant underlying the accident (Investigation,
1989). The results of this enquiry was a major step forward for the
socio-technical perspective of accident causation.
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Perrow (1984) offered an interesting view of socio-technical systems in

analysing the steps leading up to major disasters as well as the small mishaps
in everyday life (see Figure 1). This interactive chan views organisations as
dynamic entities with technological and social systems which can be broken
down into two, bipolar variables: linear vs. complex interactions and tight vs.
loose coupling. Linear interactions are those in expected and familiar
production or maintenance sequences and those that are quite visible even if
unplanned. Complex interactions are those of unfamiliar sequences or
unplanned and unexpected sequences and either not visible or not immediately
comprehensible. Tightly-coupled systems, as their name suggests, are
complexly interactive: what happens in one part of the system directly affects
what happens in another part, in sometimes unforeseen and inexplicable ways.
Loosely-coupled systems, on the other hand, tend to be predictable in nature
and offer plenty of opportunities for rectification in the event of an accident.
The development of safety culture as an integral concept in organisational
analysis occurred in parallel with developments in health and safety
legislation. The Report of the Committee (1974) in the UK and the Report of
the Commission (1983) in Ireland, both advocated the notion of 'self
regulation' in relation to health and safety in the workplace. The Robens
committee, for example, concluded that a change of emphasis was needed,
away from over-reliance on negative regulation by external agencies towards a
situation in which "those who create the risks and those who work with them
take primary responsibility for doing something about the present levels of
occupational accidents and disease" (p. 11), thus creating the conditions within
organisations for effective safety management. The EC directive on
occupational health and safety (Council Resolution, 88/C28/01) provided an
impetus and framework for the Safety, Health and Welfare at Work Act of
1989. The new act applies to all workers, whereas, under the oid system, only
20% ,of ,the workforce was covered by legislation. Now very diverse
orgamsauons, both large and small, have to consider not only how to meet the
legal and technical requirements but also the organisational preconditions'of
effective safety management
 276 McDonald & Ryan
.........................................................................................................
Figure 1. The approximate positions or some example activities In
the two-dImensional spac:e c:reated by a c:lasslfic:atlon based on the
dimensions or Hnear vs. c:omplex Interactions and tight vs. loose
coupling.

Interaction
Linear Complex
•
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• Continuous processing Nuclear

power
• Chemical
plants
• Rail transport
• Space
.-Q.=
~
missions
::s
o
U
• Assembly line
production
• Mining
• Most
Manufacturing

• Single goal
Agencies • Multi-goal
(Road transport industry) agencies

Safety culture has been developed as a more complete explanation of

accident causation within organisations. One major problem that exists with
safety culture is that many theorists have seen it as being relatively
autonomous and open to manipulation by both external agencies, like
consultants, and internally. from management and employees alike. One
question which has not been adequately addressed yet and which this paper
addresses in a preliminary way is the environment in which safety culture
operates: the constraints. limitations and opportunities for the development
that it places on the organisation and its members. It is argued that the
 Safety cuhur• 277
..................................... .............. ..................... .................................
possibility for the development of a positive safety culture and effective safety
management depends on the degree of .control which the organisation and its
management can exercise over the work process and on the consequences of
safety, or lack of it. Both the degree of control and the consequences are
conditioned by factors inside and outside the organisation.
As a vehicle for developing these ideas the road transport industry will be
taken as a particular example. An analysis of safety in the road transport
industry was described by McDonald (1984).
Some constraints arrecting the development of safety culture
The socio-technical system of road goods transport favours the autonomy of
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the operator and does not lend itself to effective organisational control over the
work process. On the road the driver is effectively alone and away from direct
supervision or co-ordinative constraints with co-workers. This has gone with a
strong professional culture of freedom and autonomy which persists even in
the most routinised sections of the industry. Automatic recording devices -
tachographs - have some potential to be used as a management control tool.
However, prominent examples of organisational methods to foster safety
consciousness and safe performance standards involve crude overall measures of
safety recorded over extended periods of time. This contrasts markedly with
commercial air transport where the work process of piloting an aircraft is
controlled by an elaborate set of standard operating procedures, checklists and
explicit training to enhance the social effectiveness of the work team on the
flight deck. The possibility of effective control over the work process is thus a
function of the complexity and structure of the socio-technical system itself.
The role of the organisation and its work processes within the cycle of
production and commercialisation of goods conditions many factors which
govern safe working practices. The efficiency of the overall cycle often depends
on the extreme flexibility of the transport interface, particularly in the 'for
hire' section of the industry (Hamelin, 1989). An extreme form of this
concerns 'just in time' or stockless production systems, but similar
constraints exist in relation to other transport operations (e.g., fresh produce).
The pacing and scheduling of work. which have large implications for safety.
are set by factors outside the control of the transport operation. The handling
of aircraft on the ground (passengers, baggage, fuel and other services) is
another example of a work process which needs to be flexible to adapt to time
and schedule constraints located elsewhere - in this case the airlines'
schedules and the requirements of air traffic.
A related factor concerns the organisational structure of the industry. The
road transpon industry has a wide spread between large fleets and numerous
small firms and individual operators. The terms of competition or market share
are not equal or evenly distributed amongst all transpon operators who ply for
hire and reward. Relationships between transport organisations can be
 278 McDonald & Ryan
................................................................_.. -................... _...,............... .
characterised by dominance and dependence. For example. work which is
regular and predictable is more attractive to a large scale transport operation
which may contract out to smaller operators work which is less regular and
more unpredictable. The latter is, by its nature, less easy to reconcile with
maintaining optimal standards of safety, including the scheduling and pacing
of work.
Legislation governing safety in the road transport industry is anomalous:
unlike most workers. road transport drivers' working conditions have been
governed by regulations designed primarily to enhance traffic safety rather than
occupational safety. This anomaly highlights some of the difficulties and
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contradictions involved in legislating for occupational safety and health: in

particular. the effectiveness of enforcement policies and the balance between
individual and corporate responsibility. Legislation can only be seen as being
effective in so far as there is compliance with its provisions and the manner of
its enforcement promotes that compliance. This has always been a problem in
the road transport industry. The legislative environment of road transport
(particularly in relation to hours of work) is regarded with ambivalence by
many drivers as, on the one hand, in principle providing protection against
extreme working hours, but, on the other, as not reflecting the commercial
realities of making a living or a profit, and with an enforcement system which
is not sufficiently stringent to influence norms of work, but only to act as an
additional source of stress and pressure. Apart from the issue of enforcement
there is the issue of responsibility: where should responsibility for
contraventions of safety regulations lie - with the individual driver or with
the transport company or corporate entity for which the work is being carried
out? An effective legal framework for establishing corporate liability for
breaches of safety has been elusive. Should one be found, it remains to be seen
how effective such a mechanism would be in actually influencing management
practice.
Apart from the legal consequences and responsibilities for breaches of safety
regulations, another factor which may influence an organisation's safety
practices, beliefs and norms concerns the consequences of lack of safety, in
terms of material damage, injury and death. Not only must these consequences
be perceived and appraised but they must be attributable or accountable to
particular actions or policies and responsibility allocated to particular
individuals or positions in the organisation. Misperceplions or biases can be
very influential, as in the common bias that a given number of deaths in a
single disaster is less preferable to the same number of deaths occurring singly
or in small groups (Jones-Lee, 1989). This bias obviously acts to the
disadvantage of the promotion of safety in road transport (apart from dangerous
goods transport) compared to industries like commercial aviation or nuclear
power. Considering the material damage and commercial costs of accidents ,
 Safety cuhur. 279
.........................................................................................................
there are gross disparities both within and between different modes of
transport. To take one comparison which holds relatively constant the basic
machinery and technology involved - commercial road transport and the
ground handling of aircraft at airports - in the laner case the potential of a
relatively minor collision with a stationary aircraft 10 lead 10 not only major
direct repair costs but even more massive indirect commercial costs (as
schedules are disrupted) provides a strong commercial incentive to cut costs
and wastage attributable to safety which would rarely be matched in
commercial road transport. However, for this commercial incentive to be
realised there must be mechanisms and procedures within the organisation to
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account for and attribute these costs appropriately. Even in an activity like
aircraft ground handling it is surprising how frequently effective procedures to
achieve this are not followed.

Conclusion
The concept of safety culture has proved to be a very useful descriptive tool
which can discriminate between organisations which perform well or poorly
from a safety point of view. Within any particular industry it has the potential
to be used to identify 'best practice' in the management of safety, and can
inform both operational and strategic management thinking. However, there is
a problem of implementation: how does one manage change in safety culture?
There is also a problem of comparison across industries: the dynamics of the
factors which influence safety culture in one industry may not hold in another.
Perrow's analysis makes an interesting starting point for such a comparison of
contrasting industries, but ultimately it is not broad or comprehensive enough
to account for all the differences between major industries or indeed differences
between different technical sectors within an industry (flight operations and
ground operations in commercial aviation, for example). The purpose of this
paper is to suggest that it is important to understand the role and influence of a
range of factors in the environment (such as structural, commercial and legal)
of the organisation and which influence its capacity to control the work
process in critical safety related areas. This is a prerequisite for building a more
adequate theory of safety culture which encompasses differences between
industries and organisations, which points to some of the constraints and
limitations which have to be overcome if more effective safety management is
to be developed and which can help identify possibilities and opportunities for
new solutions to old problems.
For commercial road transport a critical issue must be the very stability,
since the beginnings of mass motorised transport sixty years ago, of
conceptualisations of where the core issues of safety lie in relation to working
hours (McDonald, 1984). It is likely that the factors outlined in this paper
have inhibited the development of a more positive safety culture within
 280 McOonald & Ryan
.........................................................................................................
significant sections of the industry. By the same token one can identify a range
of sites for investigation or action concerning interventions which might effect
levels of safety. However, the arguments presented in this paper are
preliminary rather than complete and represent the mere beginnings of a
theaetical and empirical programme of work.

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