Re - Letter Complaint of Merlita B. Fabiana Against Presiding Justice Andres B. Reyes, Jr.

3/11/2021 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 700
A.M. No. CA-13-51-J. July 2, 2013.*
Re: LETTER COMPLAINT OF MERLITA B. FABIANA

AGAINST PRESIDING JUSTICE ANDRES B. REYES,
JR., ASSOCIATE JUSTICES ISAIAS P. DICDICAN AND
STEPHEN C. CRUZ; CARAG JAMORA SOMERA AND
VILLAREAL LAW OFFICES AND ITS LAWYERS ATTYS.
ELPIDIO C. JAMORA, JR. AND BEATRIZ O.
GERONILLA-VILLEGAS, LAWYERS FOR MAGSAYSAY
MARITIME CORPORATION AND VISAYAN SURETY
AND INSURANCE CORPORATION.
Administrative Proceedings; Burden of Proof; In

administrative proceedings, the burden of substantiating the
charges falls on the complainant who must prove her allegations
in the complaint by substantial evidence.—In administrative
proceedings, the burden of substantiating the charges falls on the
complainant who must prove her allegations in the complaint by
substantial evidence. Here, the allegation of willful disobedience
against respondent CA Justices was unsubstantiated and
baseless. The issues raised in the first petition (C.A.-G.R. No.
109382) were limited to the NLRC’s jurisdiction over the appeal
by Magsaysay Maritime Corporation and its principal, and to the
reduction of the amounts awarded as moral and exemplary
damages. In contrast, the second petition (C.A.-G.R. SP. No.
109699) concerned only the propriety of awarding monetary
benefits. Under the circumstances, the promulgation by the Court
of the resolution of January 13, 2010 in G.R. No. 189726 did not
divest the respondents as members of the First Division of the CA
of the jurisdiction to entertain and pass upon the second petition
(C.A.-G.R. SP. No. 109699), something that they sought to explain
through their resolution promulgated on June 4, 2010. The
explanation, whether correct or not, was issued in the exercise of
judicial discretion. It is not for us to say now in a resolution of this
administrative complaint whether the explanation was
appropriate or not, nor for the complainant to herself hold them in
error. The recourse open to
_______________
* EN BANC.
www.central.com.ph/sfsreader/session/00000178209c6d6e9f8b1b8f003600fb002c009e/t/?o=False 1/19
349
VOL. 700, JULY 2, 2013 349
Re: Letter Complaint of Merlita B. Fabiana Against Presiding

Justice Andres B. Reyes, Jr., et al.
the heirs of Fabiana, including the complainant, was to move for

the correction of the resolution, if they disagreed with it, and,
should their motion be denied, to assail the denial in this Court
through the remedy warranted under the law.
Administrative Law; Judges; Although the Supreme Court
does not shirk from the responsibility of imposing discipline on the
erring Judges or Justices and employees of the Judiciary, it shall
not hesitate to shield them from baseless charges that only serve to
disrupt rather than promote the orderly administration of justice.
—In Re: Verified Complaint of Engr. Oscar L. Ongjoco, Chairman
of the Board/CEO of FH-Gymn Multi-Purpose and Transport
Service Cooperative, against Hon. Juan Q. Enriquez, Jr., Hon.
Ramon M. Bato, Jr. and Hon. Florito S. Macalino, Associate
Justices, Court of Appeals, 664 SCRA 465 (2012), the Court
ruminates: In this regard, we reiterate that a judge’s failure to
correctly interpret the law or to properly appreciate the evidence
presented does not necessarily incur administrative liability, for
to hold him administratively accountable for every erroneous
ruling or decision he renders, assuming he has erred, will be
nothing short of harassment and will make his position doubly
unbearable. His judicial office will then be rendered untenable,
because no one called upon to try the facts or to interpret the law
in the process of administering justice can be infallible in his
judgment. Administrative sanction and criminal liability should
be visited on him only when the error is so gross, deliberate and
malicious, or is committed with evident bad faith, or only in clear
cases of violations by him of the standards and norms of propriety
and good behavior prescribed by law and the rules of procedure,
or fixed and defined by pertinent jurisprudence. To be clear,
although we do not shirk from the responsibility of imposing
discipline on the erring Judges or Justices and employees of the
Judiciary, we shall not hesitate to shield them from baseless
charges that only serve to disrupt rather than promote the orderly
administration of justice.
Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Consolidation of Cases; The
consolidation of two or more actions is authorized where the cases
arise from the same act, event or transaction, involve the same or
like issues, and depend largely or substantially on the same
evidence, provided that the court has jurisdiction and that

consolidation will
350
350 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

not give one party an undue advantage or that consolidation will

not prejudice the substantial rights of any of the parties.—The
consolidation of two or more actions is authorized where the cases
arise from the same act, event or transaction, involve the same or
like issues, and depend largely or substantially on the same
evidence, provided that the court has jurisdiction and that
consolidation will not give one party an undue advantage or that
consolidation will not prejudice the substantial rights of any of
the parties. As to parties, their substantial identity will suffice.
Substantial identity of parties exists when there is a community
of interest or privity of interest between a party in the first case
and a party in the second, even if the latter has not been
impleaded in the first case. As to issues, what is required is mere
identity of issues where the parties, although not identical,
present conflicting claims. The justification for consolidation is to
prevent a judge from deciding identical issues presented in the
case assigned to him in a manner that will prejudice another
judge from deciding a similar case before him.
Same; Same; Same; Under the Rules of Court, the
consolidation of cases for trial is permissive and a matter of
judicial discretion; But the permissiveness of consolidation does
not carry over to the appellate stage where the primary objective is
less the avoidance of unnecessary expenses and undue vexation
than it is the ideal realization of the dual function of all appellate
adjudications.—It is true that under the Rules of Court, the
judicial discretion. This is because trials held in the first instance
require the attendance of the parties, their respective counsel and
their witnesses, a task that surely entails an expense that can
multiply if there are several proceedings upon the same issues
involving the same parties. At the trial stage, the avoidance of
unnecessary expenses and undue vexation to the parties is the
primary objective of consolidation of cases. But the
permissiveness of consolidation does not carry over to the
appellate stage where the primary objective is less the avoidance
of unnecessary expenses and undue vexation than it is the ideal
realization of the dual function of all appellate adjudications.
Same; Same; Same; In the appellate stage, the rigid policy is

to make the consolidation of all cases and proceedings resting on
the same set of facts, or involving identical claims or interests or
parties
351
VOL. 700, JULY 2, 2013 351

mandatory.—In the appellate stage, therefore, the rigid policy is

to make the consolidation of all cases and proceedings resting on
the same set of facts, or involving identical claims or interests or
parties mandatory. Such consolidation should be made regardless
of whether or not the parties or any of them requests it. A
mandatory policy eliminates conflicting results concerning similar
or like issues between the same parties or interests even as it
enhances the administration of justice.
Same; Same; Same; The Supreme Court reminds all attorneys
appearing as counsel for the initiating parties of their direct
responsibility to give prompt notice of any related cases pending in
the courts, and to move for the consolidation of such related cases
in the proper courts.—In this connection, the Court reminds all
attorneys appearing as counsel for the initiating parties of their
direct responsibility to give prompt notice of any related cases
pending in the courts, and to move for the consolidation of such
related cases in the proper courts. This responsibility proceeds
from their express undertakings in the certifications against
forum-shopping that accompany their initiatory pleadings
pursuant to Section 5 of Rule 7 and related rules in the Rules of
Court, to the effect that they have not theretofore commenced any
actions or filed any claims involving the same issues in any court,
tribunal or quasi-judicial agency and, to the best of their
knowledge, no such other actions or claims are pending therein;
that if there were such other pending actions or claims, to render
complete statements of the present status thereof; and if they
should thereafter learn that the same or similar actions or claims
have been filed or are pending, they shall report that fact within
five days therefrom to the courts wherein the said complaints or
initiatory pleadings have been filed.
ADMINISTRATIVE MATTER in the Supreme Court. Open

Defiance of Supreme Court Resolution.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
Mario G. Aglipay for Merlita B. Fabiana.
352

Re: Letter Complaint of Merlita B. Fabiana Against
Presiding Justice Andres B. Reyes, Jr., et al.
BERSAMIN, J.:
This administrative matter stems from the claim for
death benefits by the heirs of the late Marlon Fabiana
(heirs of Fabiana) against manning agent Magsaysay
Maritime Corporation and its principal Air Sea Holiday
GMBH-Stable Organizations Italia.
Complainant Merlita B. Fabiana, Marlon’s surviving
spouse, hereby accuses Court of Appeals (CA) Presiding
Justice Andres B. Reyes, Jr., Associate Justice Isaias P.
Dicdican and Associate Justice Stephen C. Cruz, as the
former Members of the CA’s First Division, of having
openly defied the resolution promulgated by the Court on
January 13, 2010 in G.R. No. 189726 entitled Heirs of the
Late Marlon A. Fabiana, [herein represented by Merlita B.
Fabiana] v. Magsaysay Maritime Corp., et al., whereby the
Court had allegedly “fixed with finality complainant’s
claims for death benefits and other monetary claims,
including damages and attorney’s fees, against the
Maritime Company arising from the death of her
husband.”1
The relevant antecedents follow.
On December 19, 2007, the Labor Arbiter granted the
following claims to the heirs of Fabiana, to wit:
WHEREFORE, considering all the foregoing premises,

respondents are liable to pay the following to the complainants:
1. US $82,500.00 death benefits to complainant Merlita B.
Fabiana;
2. US $16,500.00 to complainant Jomari Paul B. Fabiana;
3. Salary differentials from July 17, 2006 to April 23, 2007
computed at US $1,038 deduct-
_______________
1 Rollo, p. 2.
353
VOL. 700, JULY 2, 2013 353

ing the US $424.00 monthly salaries already paid by the

respondents;
4. The difference of 1,500.00 Euro contributed by fellow
Filipino seafarer and US $1,000 remitted by respondents
computed at the rate of exchange at the time of payment;
5. Sick benefits from April 23, 2007 to May 11, 2007 computed
at US $1,038.00 monthly salary rate;
6. US $331.00 guaranteed overtime pay;
7. P7,574.00 actual damages;
8. P100,000.00 for moral damages;
9. P1,000,000.00 exemplary damages;
10. Ten percent (10%) attorney’s fees computed on the total
awards.2
On December 10, 2008, the National Labor Relations

Commission (NLRC) rendered its decision,3 disposing:
WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, the

appeal is MODIFIED in the sense that the award of moral
and exemplary damages are reduced to P50,000.00 each
while the other awards are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
The parties then separately brought their respective

petitions for certiorari to the CA, specifically:
(a) C.A.-G.R. SP No. 109382 entitled Heirs of the late Marlon A.
Fabiana, herein represented by Merlita B. Fabiana v. National
Labor Relations Commission, Magsaysay Maritime Corporation and
Air Sea Holi-
_______________
2 Id., at pp. 3-4.
3 Id., at pp. 26-35.
354

Re: Letter Complaint of Merlita B. Fabiana Against Presiding Justice
Andres B. Reyes, Jr., et al.
day GMBH-Stab[i]le Organizations Italia (Hotel), assailing the

jurisdiction of the NLRC in entertaining the appeal of Magsaysay
Maritime Corporation and its principal, and seeking the
reinstatement of the moral and exemplary damages as awarded by
the Labor Arbiter (first petition);4 and
(b) C.A.-G.R. SP No. 109699 entitled Magsaysay Maritime
Corporation, Eduardo Manese, Prudential Guarantee (Surety), and
Air Sea Holiday GMBH-Stable Organizations, Italia v. Heirs of the
late Marlon Fabiana, and National Labor Relations Commission
challenging the propriety of the monetary awards granted to the

heirs of Fabiana (second petition).5
In the second petition, the petitioners averred that the

late Marlon Fabiana had died from a non-work related
disease after his employment contract had terminated.
On August 20, 2009, when the heirs of Fabiana filed
their comment vis-à-vis the second petition, they sought
the consolidation of the two petitions. Their request for
consolidation was not acted upon, however, but was soon
mooted a month later by the First Division of the CA
promulgating its decision on the first petition (C.A.-G.R.
No. 109382) on September 29, 2009,6 to wit:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is

partly GRANTED. Accordingly, the challenged Decision is
AFFIRMED but MODIFIED insofar as interest at the
_______________
4 Id., at pp. 42-59 (entitled Heirs of the Late Marlon A. Fabiana, herein
represented by Merlita B. Fabiana v. National Labor Relations Commission, et al.,
respondents).
5 Id., at pp. 60-79.
6 Id., at pp. 16-25; penned by Associate Justice Apolinario D. Bruselas, Jr., with
the concurrence of Presiding Justice Conrado M. Vasquez, Jr. (retired) and
Associate Justice Jose C. Reyes, Jr.
355
VOL. 700, JULY 2, 2013 355

rate of six percent per annum (6% p.a.) is imposed on all the
monetary awards, reckoned from the Labor Arbiter’s
judgment on 19 December 2007, except moral and
exemplary damages to which the same rate of interest is
imposed, but reckoned from the time the aforementioned
decision was promulgated on 10 December 2008 by the
NLRC Sixth Division. An additional interest of twelve
percent per annum (12% p.a.) is applied on the total amount
ultimately awarded upon finality of the decision until fully
paid.
The petitioners’ motion for preliminary mandatory
injunction is deemed resolved by this decision.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Magsaysay Maritime Corporation filed on October 25,

2009 a motion for clarification in C.A.-G.R. No. 109382
instead of a motion for reconsideration.7 In response, the

CA issued its clarification on November 26, 2009 by stating
that the “affirmance with modification” was but the
“consequence of the certiorari petition being merely
‘partially granted.’”8
On their part, the heirs of Fabiana filed a motion for
reconsideration in C.A.-G.R. No. 109382, which the CA
denied. Hence, on November 23, 2009, they appealed to the
Court by petition for review on certiorari (G.R. No. 189726).
However, the Court, through the Third Division,9 denied
the petition for review on certiorari through the resolution
of January 13, 2010,10 quoted as follows:
_______________
7 Id., at pp. 82-85.
8 Id., at p. 86.
9 Associate Justice Renato C. Corona, Chairperson; Associate Justice
Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr., Associate Justice Antonio Eduardo B. Nachura,
Associate Justice Diosdado M. Peralta, and Associate Justice Jose C.
Mendoza, as Members.
10 Rollo, pp. 14-15.
356

Acting on the petition for review on certiorari assailing

the Decision dated 29 September 2009 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 109382, the Court resolves to
DENY the petition for failure to sufficiently show that the
appellate court committed any reversible error in the
challenged decision as to warrant the exercise by this Court
of its discretionary appellate jurisdiction.
A careful consideration of the petition indicates a failure
of the petitioners to show any cogent reason why the actions
of the Labor Arbiter, the National Labor Relations
Commission and the Court of Appeals which have passed
upon the same issue should be reversed. Petitioners failed
to show that their factual findings are not based on
substantial evidence or that their decisions are contrary to
applicable law and jurisprudence.
SO ORDERED.

In the meanwhile, on October 16, 2009, the heirs of

Fabiana moved to dismiss the second petition (C.A.-G.R.
SP. No. 109699) on the ground that the intervening
promulgation on September 29, 2009 by the First Division
of the decision on the first petition (C.A.-G.R. No. 109382)
had rendered the second petition moot and academic.11
On June 4, 2010, however, the First Division of the CA,
then comprised by Presiding Justice Reyes, Jr., Associate
Justice Dicdican (ponente) and Associate Justice Cruz,
denied the motion to dismiss filed in C.A.-G.R. SP. No.
109699,12 holding thusly:
This has reference to the motion filed by the private

respondents, through their counsel, to dismiss the petition
in the case at bench on the ground that it has been rendered
moot and academic by the decision prom-
_______________
11 Id., at pp. 87-88.
12 Id., at pp. 94-95.
357
VOL. 700, JULY 2, 2013 357

ulgated on September 29, 2009 by this Court in CA-G.R. SP

No. 109382.
After a judicious scrutiny of the whole matter, we find
the said motion to dismiss to be wanting in merit. It is not
true that the petition in this case has been rendered moot
and academic by the decision promulgated by this Court on
September 29, 2009 in CA-G.R. SP No. 109382. The said
decision rendered by this Court passed upon two limited
issues only, namely, the NLRC’s jurisdiction to allow the
petitioners’ appeal thereto despite flaws in their verification
and non-forum shopping papers and the propriety of the
reduction by the NLRC of the amount of damages awarded
to the private respondents. A reading of the said decision
will unmistakably bear this out. However, in the case at
bench, the petitioners have assailed omnibously the NLRC’s
awards in favor of the private respondents for death
benefits, sickness allowance, salary differentials and other
monetary claims. We have to pass upon the propriety of all
these monetary awards.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing premises, we
hereby DENY the aforementioned motion to dismiss filed in
this case.
We hereby give the parties a fresh period of fifteen (15)

days from notice hereof within which to file memoranda in
support of their respective sides of the case.
SO ORDERED.
The second petition (C.A.-G.R. SP. No. 109699) was

ultimately resolved on September 16, 2011 by the Sixth
Division of the CA, composed of Associate Justice Amelita
G. Tolentino, Associate Justice Normandie B. Pizarro
(ponente) and Associate Justice Rodil V. Zalameda,
dismissing the petition upon not finding the NLRC to have
gravely abused its discretion.
358

As earlier adverted to, the complainant accuses

Presiding Justice Reyes, Jr., Associate Justice Dicdican and
Associate Justice Cruz with thereby willfully disobeying
the resolution of January 13, 2010 promulgated by the
Court.
The complaint lacks merit.
In administrative proceedings, the burden of
substantiating the charges falls on the complainant who
must prove her allegations in the complaint by substantial
evidence.13 Here, the allegation of willful disobedience
against respondent CA Justices was unsubstantiated and
baseless. The issues raised in the first petition (C.A.-G.R.
No. 109382) were limited to the NLRC’s jurisdiction over
the appeal by Magsaysay Maritime Corporation and its
principal, and to the reduction of the amounts awarded as
moral and exemplary damages. In contrast, the second
petition (C.A.-G.R. SP. No. 109699) concerned only the
propriety of awarding monetary benefits. Under the
circumstances, the promulgation by the Court of the
resolution of January 13, 2010 in G.R. No. 189726 did not
divest the respondents as members of the First Division of
the CA of the jurisdiction to entertain and pass upon the
second petition (C.A.-G.R. SP. No. 109699), something that
they sought to explain through their resolution
promulgated on June 4, 2010. The explanation, whether
correct or not, was issued in the exercise of judicial
discretion. It is not for us to say now in a resolution of this
administrative complaint whether the explanation was
appropriate or not, nor for the complainant to herself hold
them in error. The recourse open to the heirs of Fabiana,

including the complainant, was to move for the correction
of the resolution, if they disagreed with it, and, should their
motion be denied, to assail the denial in this Court through
the remedy warranted under the law.
_______________
13 Dayag v. Gonzales, A.M. No. RTJ-05-1903, June 27, 2006, 493
SCRA 51, 60-61.
359
VOL. 700, JULY 2, 2013 359

The complainant’s initiation of her complaint would take

respondent Justices to task for their regular performance of
their office. Yet, as the surviving spouse of the late-
lamented Marlon, she was understandably desirous of the
most favorable and quickest outcome for the claim for
death benefits because his intervening demise had
rendered her and her family bereft of his support.
Regardless of how commendable were her motives for
initiating this administrative complaint, however, she
could not substitute a proper judicial remedy not taken
with an improper administrative denunciation of the
Justices she has hereby charged. That is impermissible. If
she felt aggrieved at all, she should have resorted to the
available proper judicial remedy, and exhausted it, instead
of resorting to the unworthy disciplinary charge.
Truly, disciplinary proceedings and criminal actions
brought against any Judge or Justice in relation to the
performance of official functions are neither
complementary to nor suppletory of appropriate judicial
remedies, nor a substitute for such remedies.14 The Court
has fittingly explained why in In Re: Joaquin T.
Borromeo,15 to wit:
_______________
14 In Re: Wenceslao Laureta, March 12, 1987, 148 SCRA 382, 420,
where the Court stated:
To allow litigants to go beyond the Court’s resolution and claim that the
members acted “with deliberate bad faith” and rendered an “unjust
resolution” in disregard or violation of the duty of their high office to act
upon their own independent consideration and judgment of the matter at
hand would be to destroy the authenticity, integrity and conclusiveness of
such collegiate acts and resolutions and to disregard utterly the

presumption of regular performance of official duty. To allow such
collateral attack would destroy the separation of powers and undermine
the role of the Supreme Court as the final arbiter of all judicial disputes.
15 A.M. No. 93-7-696-0, February 21, 1995, 241 SCRA 405, 459-460.
360

Given the nature of the judicial function, the power

vested by the Constitution in the Supreme Court and the
lower courts established by law, the question submits to
only one answer: the administrative or criminal remedies
are neither alternative nor cumulative to judicial review
where such review is available, and must wait on the result
thereof.
Simple reflection will make this proposition amply clear,
and demonstrate that any contrary postulation can have
only intolerable legal implications. Allowing a party who
feels aggrieved by a judicial order or decision not yet final
and executory to mount an administrative, civil or criminal
prosecution for unjust judgment against the issuing judge
would, at a minimum and as an indispensable first step,
confer the prosecutor (Ombudsman) with an incongruous
function pertaining, not to him, but to the courts: the
determination of whether the questioned disposition is
erroneous in its findings of fact or conclusions of law, or
both. If he does proceed despite that impediment, whatever
determination he makes could well set off a proliferation of
administrative or criminal litigation, a possibility hereafter
more fully explored.
Such actions are impermissible and cannot prosper. It is
not, as already pointed out, within the power of public
prosecutors, or the Ombudsman or his deputies, directly or
vicariously, to review judgments or final orders or
resolutions of the Courts of the land. The power of review —
by appeal or special civil action — is not only lodged
exclusively in the Courts themselves but must be exercised
in accordance with a well-defined and long established
hierarchy, and long standing processes and procedures. No
other review is allowed; otherwise litigation would be
interminable, and vexatiously repetitive.
Moreover, in Re: Verified Complaint of Engr. Oscar L.

Ongjoco, Chairman of the Board/CEO of FH-Gymn Multi-
Purpose and Transport Service Cooperative, against Hon.

Juan Q. Enriquez, Jr., Hon. Ramon M. Bato, Jr. and Hon.
Florito S.
361
VOL. 700, JULY 2, 2013 361

Macalino, Associate Justices, Court of Appeals,16 the Court

ruminates:
In this regard, we reiterate that a judge’s failure to

correctly interpret the law or to properly appreciate the
evidence presented does not necessarily incur
administrative liability, for to hold him administratively
accountable for every erroneous ruling or decision he
renders, assuming he has erred, will be nothing short of
harassment and will make his position doubly unbearable.
His judicial office will then be rendered untenable, because
no one called upon to try the facts or to interpret the law in
the process of administering justice can be infallible in his
judgment. Administrative sanction and criminal liability
should be visited on him only when the error is so gross,
deliberate and malicious, or is committed with evident bad
faith, or only in clear cases of violations by him of the
standards and norms of propriety and good behavior
prescribed by law and the rules of procedure, or fixed and
defined by pertinent jurisprudence.
To be clear, although we do not shirk from the

responsibility of imposing discipline on the erring Judges
or Justices and employees of the Judiciary, we shall not
hesitate to shield them from baseless charges that only
serve to disrupt rather than promote the orderly
administration of justice.17
Even as we dismiss the administrative charge, we deem
it necessary to observe further, in the exercise of our
administrative supervision over the CA, that the matter
addressed here was really simple and avoidable if only the
CA had promptly implemented its current procedure for
the consolidation of petitions or proceedings relating to or
arising from
_______________
16 A.M. OCA I.P.I. No. 11-184-CA-J, January 31, 2012, 664 SCRA 465,
475-476.
17 Mataga v. Rosete, A.M. No. MTJ-03-1488, October 13, 2004, 440
SCRA 217, 221-222.
362

the same controversies. Section 3(a), Rule III of the 2009

Internal Rules of the Court of Appeals has forthrightly
mandated the consolidation of related cases assigned to
different Justices, viz.:
Section 3. Consolidation of Cases.—When related

cases are assigned to different justices, they shall be
consolidated and assigned to one Justice.
(a) Upon motion of a party with notice to the other
party/ies, or at the instance of the Justice to whom any or
the related cases is assigned, upon notice to the
parties, consolidation shall ensue when the cases
involve the same parties and/or related questions of
fact and/or law. (Emphases supplied)
x x x x
A perusal of the two petitions showed that they involved

the same parties and the same facts. Even their issues of
law, albeit not entirely identical, were closely related to one
another. It could not also be denied that they assailed the
same decision of the NLRC. For these reasons alone, the
request for consolidation by the heirs of Fabiana should
have been granted, and the two petitions consolidated in
the same Division of the CA.
The consolidation of two or more actions is authorized
where the cases arise from the same act, event or
transaction, involve the same or like issues, and depend
largely or substantially on the same evidence, provided
that the court has jurisdiction and that consolidation will
not give one party an undue advantage or that
consolidation will not prejudice the substantial rights of
any of the parties.18 As to parties, their substantial identity
will suffice. Substantial identity of par-
_______________
18 Caños v. Peralta, No. L-38352, August 19, 1982, 115 SCRA 843,
846.
363
VOL. 700, JULY 2, 2013 363

ties exists when there is a community of interest or privity

of interest between a party in the first case and a party in
the second, even if the latter has not been impleaded in the
first case.19 As to issues, what is required is mere identity
of issues where the parties, although not identical, present
conflicting claims.20 The justification for consolidation is to
prevent a judge from deciding identical issues presented in
the case assigned to him in a manner that will prejudice
another judge from deciding a similar case before him.
We are perplexed why the CA did not act on and grant
the request for consolidation filed on August 20, 2009 by
the heirs of Fabiana. In fact, the consolidation should have
been required as a matter of course even without any of the
parties seeking the consolidation of the petitions,
considering that the two cases rested on the same set of
facts, and involved claims arising from the death of the late
Marlon Fabiana.
It is true that under the Rules of Court,21 the
judicial discre-
_______________
19 Heirs of Trinidad De Leon Vda. de Roxas v. Court of Appeals, G.R.
No. 138660, February 5, 2004, 422 SCRA 101, 116.
20 Hacienda Bigaa, Inc. v. Chavez, G.R. No. 174160, April 20, 2010,
618 SCRA 559, 576.
21 For civil trials, the rule on consolidation is Section 1, Rule 31, Rules
of Court, which provides:
Section 1. Consolidation.—When actions involving a common
question of law or fact are pending before the court, it may order a
joint hearing or trial of any or all the matters in issue in the
actions; it may order all the actions consolidated; and it may make
such orders concerning proceedings therein as may tend to avoid
unnecessary costs or delay. (1)
For criminal trials, Section 22, Rule 119, Rules of Court states:
Section 22. Consolidation of trials of related offenses.—Charges
for offenses founded on the same facts or forming part of a series of
offenses of similar character may be tried jointly at the discretion of
the court. (14a)
364

tion.22 This is because trials held in the first instance

require the attendance of the parties, their respective
counsel and their witnesses, a task that surely entails an
expense that can multiply if there are several proceedings
upon the same issues involving the same parties. At the
trial stage, the avoidance of unnecessary expenses and
undue vexation to the parties is the primary objective of
consolidation of cases.23 But the permissiveness of
consolidation does not carry over to the appellate stage
where the primary objective is less the avoidance of
unnecessary expenses and undue vexation than it is the
ideal realization of the dual function of all appellate
adjudications. The dual function is expounded thuswise:
An appellate court serves a dual function. The first is the

review for correctness function, whereby the case is reviewed
on appeal to assure that substantial justice has been done.
The second is the institutional function, which refers to the
progressive development of the law for general application
in the judicial system.
Differently stated, the review for correctness function is
concerned with the justice of the particular case while the
institutional function is concerned with the articulation and
application of constitutional principles, the authoritative
interpretation of statutes, and the formulation of policy
within the proper sphere of the judicial function.
The duality also relates to the dual function of all
adjudication in the common law system. The first pertains
to the doctrine of res judicata, which decides the
_______________
22 Mega-Land Resources and Development Corporation v. C-E Construction
Corporation, G.R. No. 156211, July 31, 2007, 528 SCRA 622, 636; People v.
Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 149495, August 21, 2003, 409 SCRA 419, 423.
23 Yu, Sr. v. Basilio G. Magno Construction and Development Enterprises, Inc.,
G.R. Nos. 138701-02, October 17, 2006, 504 SCRA 618, 631.
365
VOL. 700, JULY 2, 2013 365

case and settles the controversy; the second is the doctrine

of stare decisis, which pertains to the precedential value of
the case which assists in deciding future similar cases by
the application of the rule or principle derived from the

earlier case.
With each level of the appellate structure, the review for
correctness function diminishes and the institutional
function, which concerns itself with uniformity of judicial
administration and the progressive development of the law,
increases.24
In the appellate stage, therefore, the rigid policy is to

make the consolidation of all cases and proceedings resting
on the same set of facts, or involving identical claims or
interests or parties mandatory. Such consolidation should
be made regardless of whether or not the parties or any of
them requests it. A mandatory policy eliminates conflicting
results concerning similar or like issues between the same
parties or interests even as it enhances the administration
of justice.
In this connection, the Court reminds all attorneys
appearing as counsel for the initiating parties of their
direct responsibility to give prompt notice of any related
cases pending in the courts, and to move for the
consolidation of such related cases in the proper courts.
This responsibility proceeds from their express
undertakings in the certifications against forum-shopping
that accompany their initiatory pleadings pursuant to
Section 5 of Rule 7 and related rules in the Rules of
Court, to the effect that they have not theretofore
commenced any actions or filed any claims involving the
same issues in any court, tribunal or quasi-judicial agency
and, to the best of their knowledge, no such other actions or
claims are pending therein; that if there were such other
pending actions or claims, to render complete statements of
the present status
_______________
24 Bersamin, L.P., Appeal and Review in the Philippines, 2000
(2nd Edition), Central Professional Books, Inc., Quezon City, p. 355.
366

thereof; and if they should thereafter learn that the same

or similar actions or claims have been filed or are pending,
they shall report that fact within five days therefrom to the
courts wherein the said complaints or initiatory pleadings

have been filed.
WHEREFORE, the Court DISMISSES the
administrative complaint against Presiding Justice Andres
B. Reyes, Jr., Associate Justice Isaias P. Dicdican and
Associate Justice Stephen C. Cruz of the Court of Appeals
for its lack of merit.
The Court of Appeals is DIRECTED to forthwith adopt
measures that will ensure the strict observance of Section
3, Rule III of the 2009 Internal Rules of the Court of
Appeals, including the revision of the rule itself to make
the consolidation of cases and proceedings concerning
similar or like issues or involving the same parties or
interests mandatory and not dependent on the initiative of
the parties or of any of them.
All attorneys of the parties in cases brought to the third
level courts either on appeal or interlocutory review (like
certiorari) are REQUIRED to promptly notify the
reviewing courts of the pendency of any other cases and
proceedings involving the same parties and issues pending
in the same or other courts.
Let this decision be FURNISHED to the Court of
Appeals, Sandiganbayan, Court of Tax Appeals and the
Office of the Court Administrator for their guidance; and to
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for dissemination to
all its chapters.
SO ORDERED.
Sereno (CJ.), Carpio, Velasco, Jr., Leonardo-De Castro,

Brion, Peralta, Del Castillo, Abad, Villarama, Jr., Perez,
Mendoza, Reyes, Perlas-Bernabe and Leonen, JJ., concur.
367
VOL. 700, JULY 2, 2013 367

Administrative complaint dismissed.
Notes.—Consolidation of cases, when proper, results in

the simplification of proceedings, which saves time, the
resources of the parties and the courts, and a possible
major abbreviation of trial. (Villarica Pawnshop, Inc. vs.
Gernale, 582 SCRA 67 [2009])
The rule allowing consolidation is designed to avoid
multiplicity of suits, to guard against oppression or abuse,
to prevent delays, to clear congested dockets, and to
simplify the work of the trial court — in short, the

attainment of justice with the least expense and vexation
to the parties-litigants. (Domdom vs. Third and Fifth
Divisions of the Sandiganbayan, 613 SCRA 528 [2010])
——o0o——
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3/11/2021 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 700

A.M. No. CA-13-51-J. July 2, 2013.*

Re: LETTER COMPLAINT OF MERLITA B. FABIANA

Administrative Proceedings; Burden of Proof; In

VOL. 700, JULY 2, 2013 349

Re: Letter Complaint of Merlita B. Fabiana Against Presiding

the heirs of Fabiana, including the complainant, was to move for

evidence, provided that the court has jurisdiction and that

350 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Re: Letter Complaint of Merlita B. Fabiana Against Presiding

not give one party an undue advantage or that consolidation will

Same; Same; Same; In the appellate stage, the rigid policy is

VOL. 700, JULY 2, 2013 351

Re: Letter Complaint of Merlita B. Fabiana Against Presiding

mandatory.—In the appellate stage, therefore, the rigid policy is

ADMINISTRATIVE MATTER in the Supreme Court. Open

352 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

WHEREFORE, considering all the foregoing premises,

VOL. 700, JULY 2, 2013 353

ing the US $424.00 monthly salaries already paid by the

On December 10, 2008, the National Labor Relations

WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, the

The parties then separately brought their respective

2 Id., at pp. 3-4.

3 Id., at pp. 26-35.

354 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

day GMBH-Stab[i]le Organizations Italia (Hotel), assailing the

challenging the propriety of the monetary awards granted to the

In the second petition, the petitioners averred that the

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is

VOL. 700, JULY 2, 2013 355

Magsaysay Maritime Corporation filed on October 25,

instead of a motion for reconsideration.7 In response, the

356 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Acting on the petition for review on certiorari assailing

In the meanwhile, on October 16, 2009, the heirs of

This has reference to the motion filed by the private

VOL. 700, JULY 2, 2013 357

ulgated on September 29, 2009 by this Court in CA-G.R. SP

We hereby give the parties a fresh period of fifteen (15)

The second petition (C.A.-G.R. SP. No. 109699) was

358 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

As earlier adverted to, the complainant accuses

them in error. The recourse open to the heirs of Fabiana,

VOL. 700, JULY 2, 2013 359

The complainant’s initiation of her complaint would take

such collegiate acts and resolutions and to disregard utterly the

360 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Given the nature of the judicial function, the power

Moreover, in Re: Verified Complaint of Engr. Oscar L.

Purpose and Transport Service Cooperative, against Hon.

VOL. 700, JULY 2, 2013 361

Macalino, Associate Justices, Court of Appeals,16 the Court

In this regard, we reiterate that a judge’s failure to

To be clear, although we do not shirk from the

362 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

the same controversies. Section 3(a), Rule III of the 2009

Section 3. Consolidation of Cases.—When related

A perusal of the two petitions showed that they involved

VOL. 700, JULY 2, 2013 363

ties exists when there is a community of interest or privity

364 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Re: Letter Complaint of Merlita B. Fabiana Against