SUBJECT: Constitutional Law 1

TOPIC: Judiciary – CJ’s quo warranto

TITLE: Calida v. Sereno
CITATION: G.R. Nos. 237428 | May 11, 2018
FACTS:
From 1986 to 2006, Sereno served as a member of the faculty of the
University of the Philippines-College of Law. While being employed at the
UP Law, or from October 2003 to 2006, Sereno was concurrently
employed as legal counsel of the Republic in two international
arbitrations known as the PIATCO cases, and a Deputy Commissioner of
the Commissioner on Human Rights.
The Human Resources Development Office of UP (UP HRDO) certified
that there was no record on Sereno’s file of any permission to engage in
limited practice of profession. Moreover, out of her 20 years of
employment, only nine (9) Statement of Assets, Liabilities, and Net
Worth (SALN) were on the records of UP HRDO. In a manifestation, she
attached a copy of a tenth SALN, which she supposedly sourced from the
“filing cabinets” or “drawers of UP”. The Ombudsman likewise had no
record of any SALN filed by Sereno. The JBC has certified to the existence
of one SALN. In sum, for 20 years of service, 11 SALNs were recovered.
On August 2010, Sereno was appointed as Associate Justice. On 2012, the
position of Chief Justice was declared vacant, and the JBC directed the
applicants to submit documents, among which are “all previous SALNs
up to December 31, 2011” for those in the government and “SALN as of
December 31, 2011” for those from the private sector. The JBC
announcement further provided that “applicants with incomplete or out-
of-date documentary requirements will not be interviewed or considered
for nomination.” Sereno expressed in a letter to JBC that since she
resigned from UP Law on 2006 and became a private practitioner, she
was treated as coming from the private sector and only submitted three
(3) SALNs or her SALNs from the time she became an Associate Justice.
Sereno likewise added that “considering that most of her government
records in the academe are more than 15 years old, it is reasonable to
consider it infeasible to retrieve all of those files,” and that the clearance
issued by UP HRDO and CSC should be taken in her favor. There was no
record that the letter was deliberated upon. Despite this, on a report to
the JBC, Sereno was said to have “complete requirements.” On August
2012, Sereno was appointed Chief Justice.
On August 2017, an impeachment complaint was filed by Atty. Larry
Gadon against Sereno, alleging that Sereno failed to make truthful
declarations in her SALNs. The House of Representatives proceeded to
hear the case for determination of probable cause, and it was said that
Justice Peralta, the chairman of the JBC then, was not made aware of the
incomplete SALNs of Sereno. Other findings were made: such as pieces
of jewelry amounting to P15,000, that were not declared on her 1990
SALN, but was declared in prior years’ and subsequent years’ SALNs,
failure of her husband to sign one SALN, execution of the 1998 SALN only
in 2003
On February 2018, Atty. Eligio Mallari wrote to the OSG, requesting that
the latter, in representation of the Republic, initiate a quo warranto
proceeding against Sereno. The OSG, invoking the Court’s original
jurisdiction under Section 5(1), Article VIII of the Constitution in relation
to the special civil action under Rule 66, the Republic, through the OSG
filed the petition for the issuance of the extraordinary writ of quo
warranto to declare as void Sereno’s appointment as CJ of the SC and to
oust and altogether exclude Sereno therefrom.
Capistrano, Sen. De Lima, Sen. Trillianes, et. al., intervened. Sereno then
filed a Motion for Inhibition against AJ Bersamin, Peralta, Jardeleza,
Tijam, and Leonardo-De Castro, imputing actual bias for having testified
against her on the impeachment hearing before the House of
Representatives.
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not the Court can assume jurisdiction and give due course
to the instant petition for quo warranto.
2. Whether or not Sereno, who is an impeachable officer, can be the
respondent in a quo warranto proceeding, i.e., whether the only way to
remove an impeachable officer is impeachment.
RULING:
1. Yes.
A quo warranto petition is allowed against impeachable officials and SC
has jurisdiction.
The SC have concurrent jurisdiction with the CA and RTC to issue the
extraordinary writs, including quo warranto. A direct invocation of the
SC’s original jurisdiction to issue such writs is allowed when there are
special and important reasons therefor, and in this case, direct resort to
SC is justified considering that the action is directed against the Chief
Justice. Granting that the petition is likewise of transcendental
importance and has far-reaching implications, the Court is empowered to
exercise its power of judicial review. To exercise restraint in reviewing an
impeachable officer’s appointment is a clear renunciation of a judicial
duty. an outright dismissal of the petition based on speculation that
Sereno will eventually be tried on impeachment is a clear abdication of
the Court’s duty to settle actual controversy squarely presented before
it. Quo warranto proceedings are essentially judicial in character – it calls
for the exercise of the Supreme Court’s constitutional duty and power to
decide cases and settle actual controversies. This constitutional duty
cannot be abdicated or transferred in favor of, or in deference to, any
other branch of the government including the Congress, even as it acts
as an impeachment court through the Senate.
To differentiate from impeachment, quo warranto involves a judicial
determination of the eligibility or validity of the election or appointment
of a public official based on predetermined rules while impeachment is a
political process to vindicate the violation of the public’s trust. In quo
warranto proceedings referring to offices filled by appointment, what is
determined is the legality of the appointment. The title to a public office
may not be contested collaterally but only directly, by quo warranto
proceedings. usurpation of a public office is treated as a public wrong
and carries with it public interest, and as such, it shall be commenced by
a verified petition brought in the name of the Republic of the Philippines
through the Solicitor General or a public prosecutor. The SolGen is given
permissible latitude within his legal authority in actions for quo warranto,
circumscribed only by the national interest and the government policy on
the matter at hand.
2. Yes.
Impeachment is not an exclusive remedy by which an invalidly appointed
or invalidly elected impeachable official may be removed from office.
The language of Section 2, Article XI of the Constitution does not
foreclose a quo warranto action against impeachable officers: “Section 2.
The President, the Vice-President, the Members of the Supreme Court,
the Members of the Constitutional Commissions, and the Ombudsman
may be removed from office on impeachment for, and conviction of,
culpable violation of the Constitution, treason, bribery, graft and
corruption, other high crimes, or betrayal of public trust.” The provision
uses the permissive term “may” which denote discretion and cannot be
construed as having a mandatory effect, indicative of a mere possibility,
an opportunity, or an option. In American jurisprudence, it has been held
that “the express provision for removal by impeachment ought not to be
taken as a tacit prohibition of removal by other methods when there are
other adequate reasons to account for this express provision.”

The principle in case law is that during their incumbency, impeachable

officers cannot be criminally prosecuted for an offense that carries with it
the penalty of removal, and if they are required to be members of the
Philippine Bar to qualify for their positions, they cannot be charged with
disbarment. The proscription does not extend to actions assailing the
public officer’s title or right to the office he or she occupies. Even the PET
Rules expressly provide for the remedy of either an election protest or a
petition for quo warranto to question the eligibility of the President and
the Vice-President, both of whom are impeachable officers.
Further, that the enumeration of “impeachable offenses” is made
absolute, that is, only those enumerated offenses are treated as grounds
for impeachment, is not equivalent to saying that the enumeration
likewise purport to be a complete statement of the causes of removal
from office. If other causes of removal are available, then other modes of
ouster can likewise be availed. To subscribe to the view that
appointments or election of impeachable officers are outside judicial
review is to cleanse their appointments or election of any possible defect
pertaining to the Constitutionally-prescribed qualifications which cannot
otherwise be raised in an impeachment proceeding. To hold otherwise is
to allow an absurd situation where the appointment of an impeachable
officer cannot be questioned even when, for instance, he or she has been
determined to be of foreign nationality or, in offices where Bar
membership is a qualification, when he or she fraudulently represented
to be a member of the Bar.