G.R. No. 157684.
April 27, 2005 "2) Pay petitioners their back salaries from the time their preventive
DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, Petitioners,
vs.
PRISCILLA G. CAMPOSANO, ENRIQUE L. PEREZ, and IMELDA Q.
AGUSTIN, Respondents.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
Administrative due process requires that, prior to imposing disciplinary
sanctions, the disciplining authority must make an independent assessment
of the facts and the law. On its face, a decision imposing administrative
sanctions must show the bases for its conclusions. While the investigation of
a case may be delegated to and conducted by another body or group of
officials, the disciplining authority must nevertheless weigh the evidence
gathered and indicate the applicable law. In this manner, the respondents
would be informed of the bases for the sanctions and thus be able to
prepare their appeal intelligently. Such procedure is part of the sporting
idea of fair play in a democracy.
The Case
1 
Before us is a Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court,
assailing the March 19, 2003 Decision2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-GR
SP No. 67720. The challenged Decision disposed as follows:
"WHEREFORE, based on the foregoing, the petition is GRANTED. The
assailed Resolutions of the CSC are hereby SET ASIDE.
"The Department of Health is hereby ordered to:
"1) Reinstate petitioners without loss of seniority rights but without
prejudice to an administrative investigation that may be undertaken against
them by the DOH should the evidence warrant; and
suspension expired. Mandatory leave credits shall not be charged against
their leave credits."3
The Facts
The facts are narrated by the CA as follows:
"[Respondents] are former employees of the Department of Health–
National Capital Region (hereinafter DOH-NCR). They held various positions
as follows: [Respondent] Priscilla B. Camposano (hereinafter Camposano)
was the Finance and Management Officer II, [Respondent] Imelda Q. Agusin
(hereinafter Agustin) was an Accountant I, and [Respondent] Enrique L.
Perez (hereinafter Perez) was the Acting Supply Officer III.
"On May 15, 1996, some concerned [DOH-NCR] employees filed a complaint
before the DOH Resident Ombudsman Rogelio A. Ringpis (hereinafter the
Resident Ombudsman) against Dir. IV Rosalinda U. Majarais, Acting
Administrative Officer III Horacio Cabrera, and [respondents], arising out of
an alleged anomalous purchase by DOH-NCR of 1,500 bottles of Ferrous
Sulfate 250 mg. with Vitamin B Complex and Folic Acid capsules worth
₱330,000.00 from Lumar Pharmaceutical Laboratory on May 13, 1996.
"On August 6, 1996, the Resident Ombudsman submitted an investigation
report to the Secretary of Health recommending the filing of a formal
administrative charge of Dishonesty and Grave Misconduct against
[respondents] and their co-respondents.
"On August 8, 1996, the Secretary of Health filed a formal charge against the
[respondents] and their co-respondents for Grave Misconduct, Dishonesty,
and Violation of RA 3019. On October 25, 1996, then Executive Secretary
Ruben D. Torres issued Administrative Order No. 298 (hereafter AO 298)
creating an ad-hoc committee to investigate the administrative case filed
against the DOH-NCR employees. The said AO was indorsed to the
Presidential Commission Against Graft and Corruption (hereafter PCAGC) on
October 26, 1996. The same reads:
‘I have the honor to transmit herewith, for your information and guidance, a
certified copy of Administrative Order No. 298 dated October 25, 1996
entitled ‘CREATING AN AD HOC COMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE THE
ADMINISTRATIVE CASES FILED AGAINST NCR HEALTH DIRECTOR ROSALINDA
U. MAJARAIS AND OTHER OFFICERS AND EMPLOYEES OF THE DEPARTMENT
OF HEALTH, NATIONAL CAPITAL REGION.’
"On December 2, 1996, the PCAGC took over the investigation from the
DOH. After the investigation, it issued a resolution on January 23, 1998
disposing [respondents]’ case as follows:
‘WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Commission finds Respondents
Rosalinda U. Majarais, Priscilla G. Camposano, Financial Management Chief
II, Horacio D. Cabrera, Acting Administrative Officer V, Imelda Q. Agustin,
Accountant I and Enrique L. Perez, Acting Supply Officer III, all of the
Department of Health – National Capital Region (DOH-NCR) guilty as
charged and so recommends to his Excellency President Fidel V. Ramos that
the penalty of dismissal from the government service be imposed thereon.
‘SO ORDERED.’
"On April 20, 1998, President Ramos issued [Administrative Order No. 390
(hereinafter AO 390)] that reads:
‘WHEREFORE, premises considered, respondent Dr. Rosalinda U. Majarais is
hereby found guilty as charged and, as recommended by the Presidential
Commission Against Graft and Corruption, is meted the Penalty of dismissal
from the service. The records of the case with respect to the other
respondents are remanded to Secretary Carmencita N. Reodica, Department
of Health for appropriate action.’
"Thereafter, on May 8, 1998, the Secretary of Health issued an Order
disposing of the case against [respondents] and [Horacio Cabrera]. The
dispositive portion reads:
‘WHEREFORE, pursuant to the Resolution rendered by the Presidential
Commission Against Graft and Corruption (PCAGC) dated 23 January 1998
on the above-captioned case, respondents Priscilla G. Camposano, Financial
Management Chief II, Horacio D. Cabrera, Acting Administrative Officer V,
Imelda Q. Agustin, Accountant I and Enrique L. Perez, Acting Supply Officer
III, all of the Department of Health – NCR are hereby DISMISSED from the
service.
‘SO ORDERED.’
"On May 28, 1998 [respondents] filed a motion for reconsideration of the
said Order. The Secretary of Health denied the same on June 5, 1998. Thus,
[respondents] filed a Notice of Appeal on June 29, 1998.
"On July 17, 1998, [respondents] filed their appeal with the CSC. The appeal
was denied by the CSC on May 21, 1999. Horacio Cabrera filed a separate
appeal with the CSC which was denied on August 17, 1999. [Respondents]’
motion for reconsideration was denied on September 30, 1999. While
Cabrera’s motion for reconsideration was denied on January 27, 2000.
[Respondents], however, received the resolution denying their motion for
reconsideration on November 2001. Thus, Horacio Cabrera was able to
appeal to [the CA] the CSC’s resolutions ahead of [respondents]. The
petition of Cabrera was granted [by the CA] in a decision dated October 15,
2001 with a dispositive portion which reads:
‘WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The Assailed Resolutions of
the Civil Service Commission are hereby SET ASIDE.
‘Petitioner Horacio D. Cabrera is exonerated of the administrative charges
against him. The Civil Service Commission is hereby ORDERED[:]
‘(1) To reinstate petitioner immediately, without loss of seniority rights; and
‘(2) To pay petitioner’s back salaries from the time his preventive
suspension expired. Mandatory leave credits shall not be charged against
his leave credits.
‘SO ORDERED.’"4
Not satisfied with the denial by the CSC (Civil Service Commission) of their
appeal, respondents brought the matter to the CA.
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
While the herein assailed Decision made no reference to the separate
appeal of Horacio Cabrera, the CA nonetheless used the same legal bases
for annulling the CSC’s Resolution against respondents.5
The appellate court held that the PCAGC’s jurisdiction over administrative
complaints pertained only to presidential appointees. Thus, the Commission
had no power to investigate the charges against respondents.6 Moreover, in
simply and completely relying on the PCAGC’s findings, the secretary of
health failed to comply with administrative due process.7
Hence, this Petition.8
The Issues
Petitioner raises the following grounds for our consideration:
"I
The Court of Appeals erred in finding that the Presidential Commission
Against Graft and Corruption (PCAGC) did not have jurisdiction to
investigate the anomalous transaction involving respondents.
"II
The Court of Appeals erred in concluding that the authority to investigate
and decide was relinquished by the Secretary of Health and that the
Secretary of Health merely performed a mechanical act when she ordered
the dismissal of respondents from government service.
"III
The Court of Appeals erred in ignoring the fact that an exhaustive
investigation was already conducted by the Presidential Commission Against
Graft and Corruption (PCAGC) which resulted in the finding that the
anomalous contract for the purchase of medicines without the required
public bidding is patently illegal."9
The second and the third grounds will be discussed together, as they are
necessarily intertwined.
The Court’s Ruling
The Petition is partly meritorious.
First Issue:
Jurisdiction to Investigate
Executive Order (EO) No. 15110 granted the PCAGC the jurisdiction to
investigate administrative complaints against presidential appointees
allegedly involved in graft and corruption. From a cursory reading of its
provisions, it is evident that EO 151 authorizes the PCAGC to investigate
charges against presidential, not non-presidential, appointees. In its
Preamble, specifically in its "Whereas" clauses, the EO "specifically tasked
[the PCAGC] to x x x investigate presidential appointees charged with graft
and corruption x x x." More pointedly, Section 3 states that the
"Commission shall have jurisdiction over all administrative complaints
involving graft and corruption filed in any form or manner against
presidential appointees x x x." We quote the pertinent provisions below:
"Section 3. Jurisdiction. – The Commission shall have jurisdiction over all
administrative complaints involving graft and corruption filed in any form or
manner against presidential appointees, including those in government-
owned or controlled corporations." (emphasis supplied)
"Section 4. Powers, Functions and Duties. – The Commission shall have the
following powers, functions and duties:
"(a) Investigation – The Commission shall have the power to investigate
administrative complaints against presidential appointees in the executive
department of the government, including those in government-owned or
controlled corporations, charged with graft and corruption. In the exercise
thereof, the Commission is (1) authorized to summon witnesses, administer
oaths, or take testimony or evidence relevant to the investigation by
subpoena ad testificandum and subpoena duces tecum, and do such other
acts necessary and incidental to the discharge of its function and duty to
investigate the said administrative complaints; and (2) empowered to call
upon and secure the assistance of any department, bureau, office, agency,
or instrumentality of the government, including government-owned or
controlled corporations.
"The Commission shall confine itself to cases of graft and corruption
involving one or a combination of the following criteria:
"1. Presidential appointees with the rank equivalent to or higher than an
Assistant Regional Director;
"2. The amount involved is at least Ten Million Pesos (₱10,000,000.00);
"3. Those which threaten grievous harm or injury to the national interest;
and
"4. Those which may be assigned to it by the President.11
"The Commission may refer to the Office of the Ombudsman, when
warranted and necessary, any case calling for the investigation and/or
prosecution of the party or parties concerned for violation of anti-graft and
corruption laws.
"Administrative investigation of complaints against presidential appointees
currently undertaken by various presidential committees or government
agencies, including government-owned or controlled corporations shall
continue notwithstanding the creation and organization of the Commission.
This, however, shall be without prejudice to the Commission, in its
discretion, taking over the investigation if the matter under investigation is
within its jurisdiction.
"(b) Coordination – The Commission shall coordinate with different
government agencies for the purpose of eradicating opportunities and the
climate favorable to the commission of graft and corruption. x x
x."12 (emphasis supplied)
On the basis of the foregoing verba legis  approach, respondents claim that
the PCAGC did not have jurisdiction over them, because they were not
presidential appointees.
The Court notes, however, that respondents were not investigated pursuant
to EO 151. The investigation was authorized under Administrative Order No.
298 dated October 25, 1996, which had created an Ad Hoc Committee to
look into the administrative charges filed against Director Rosalinda U.
Majarais, Priscilla G. Camposano, Horacio D. Cabrera, Imelda Q. Agustin and
Enrique L. Perez.
The Investigating Committee was composed of all the members of the
PCAGC: Chairman Eufemio C. Domingo, Commissioner Dario C. Rama and
Commissioner Jaime L. Guerrero. The Committee was directed by AO 298 to
"follow the procedure prescribed under Section 38 to 40 of the Civil Service
Law (PD 807), as amended." It was tasked to "forward to the Disciplining
Authority the entire records of the case, together with its findings and
recommendations, as well as the draft decision for the approval of the
President."
The Chief Executive’s power to create the Ad Hoc Investigating Committee
cannot be doubted. Having been constitutionally granted full control of the
Executive Department, to which respondents belong, the President has the
obligation to ensure that all executive officials and employees faithfully
comply with the law.13 With AO 298 as mandate, the legality of the
investigation is sustained. Such validity is not affected by the fact that the
investigating team and the PCAGC had the same composition, or that the
former used the offices and facilities of the latter in conducting the inquiry.
Parenthetically, the perceived vacuum in EO 151 with regard to cases
involving non-presidential appointees was rectified in Executive Order No.
12,14 which created the Presidential Anti-Graft Commission (PAGC). Non-
presidential appointees who may have acted in conspiracy, or who may
have been involved with a presidential appointee, may now be investigated
by the PAGC.15
Second and Third Issues:
Validity of Health Secretary’s Decision
The Administrative Code of 1987 vests department secretaries with the
authority to investigate and decide matters involving disciplinary actions for
officers and employees under the former’s jurisdiction.16 Thus, the health
secretary had disciplinary authority over respondents.
Note that being a presidential appointee, Dr. Rosalinda Majarais was under
the jurisdiction of the President, in line with the principle that the "power to
remove is inherent in the power to appoint."17 While the Chief Executive
directly dismissed her from the service, he nonetheless recognized the
health secretary’s disciplinary authority over respondents when he
remanded the PCAGC’s findings against them for the secretary’s
"appropriate action."18
As a matter of administrative procedure, a department secretary may utilize
other officials to investigate and report the facts from which a decision may
be based.19 In the present case, the secretary effectively delegated the
power to investigate to the PCAGC.
Neither the PCAGC under EO 151 nor the Ad Hoc Investigating Committee
created under AO 298 had the power to impose any administrative
sanctions directly. Their authority was limited to conducting investigations
and preparing their findings and recommendations. The power to impose
sanctions belonged to the disciplining authority, who had to observe due
process prior to imposing penalties.
Due process in administrative proceedings requires compliance with the
following cardinal principles: (1) the respondents’ right to a hearing, which
includes the right to present one’s case and submit supporting evidence,
must be observed; (2) the tribunal must consider the evidence presented;
(3) the decision must have some basis to support itself; (4) there must be
substantial evidence; (5) the decision must be rendered on the evidence
presented at the hearing, or at least contained in the record and disclosed
to the parties affected; (6) in arriving at a decision, the tribunal must have
acted on its own consideration of the law and the facts of the controversy
and must not have simply accepted the views of a subordinate; and (7) the
decision must be rendered in such manner that respondents would know
the reasons for it and the various issues involved.20
The CA correctly ruled that administrative due process had not been
observed in the present factual milieu. Noncompliance with the sixth
requisite is equally evident from the health secretary’s Order dismissing the
respondents thus:
"ORDER
"This refers to the Resolution of the Presidential Commission Against Graft
and Corruption (PCAG[C]) on the above captioned case dated January 23,
1998, the dispositive portion of which reads:
"WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Commission finds Respondents
Rosalinda U. Majarais, Priscilla G. Camposano, Financial Management Chief
II, [Horacio] D. Cabrera, Acting Supply Officer III, all of the Department of
Health–National Capital Region (DOH-NCR) guilty as charged and so
recommends to his Excellency President Fidel V. Ramos that the penalty of
dismissal from the government be imposed thereon."
"Acting on the aforequoted resolution of the PCAGC[,] His Excellency
President Fidel V. Ramos issued Administrative Order No. 390 dated [A]pril
20, 1998, resolving thus:
"WHEREFORE, premises considered, respondent Dr. Rosalinda U. Majarais is
hereby found guilty as charged and, as recommended by the Presidential
Commission Against Graft and Corruption, is meted the penalty of dismissal
from the service. The records of the case with respect to the other
respondents are remanded to Secretary Carmencita N. Reodica, Department
of Health for appropriate action."
WHEREFORE, pursuant to the Resolution rendered by the Presidential
Commission Against Graft and Corruption (PCAGC) dated January 23, 1998
on the above captioned case, respondents Priscilla G. Camposano, Financial
Management Chief II; Horacio D. Cabrera, Acting Administrative Officer V;
Imelda Q. Agustin, Accountant I; and Enrique G. Perez, Acting Supply Officer
III; all of the Department of Health–NCR, are hereby DISMISSED from the
service."21
Concededly, the health secretary has the competence and the authority to
decide what action should be taken against officials and employees who
have been administratively charged and investigated. However, the actual
exercise of the disciplining authority’s prerogative requires a
prior independent consideration of the law and the facts. Failure to comply
with this requirement results in an invalid decision. The disciplining
authority should not merely and solely rely on an investigator’s
recommendation, but must personally weigh and assess the evidence
gathered. There can be no shortcuts, because at stake are the honor, the
reputation, and the livelihood of the person administratively charged.
In the present case, the health secretary’s two-page Order dismissing
respondents pales in comparison with the presidential action with regard to
Dr. Majarais. Prior to the issuance of his seven-page decision, President
Fidel V. Ramos conducted a restudy of the doctor’s case. He even noted a
violation that had not been considered by the PCAGC. 22 On the other hand,
Health Secretary Carmencita N. Reodica simply and blindly relied on the
dispositive portion of the Commission’s Resolution. She even misquoted it
by inadvertently omitting the recommendation with regard to Respondents
Enrique L. Perez and Imelda Q. Agustin.
The Order of Secretary Reodica denying respondents’ Motion for
Reconsideration also failed to correct the deficiency in the initial
Order.23 She improperly relied on the President’s findings in AO 390 which,
however, pertained only to the administrative charge against Dr. Majarais,
not against respondents. To repeat, the Chief Executive recognized that the
disciplinary jurisdiction over respondents belonged to the health
secretary,24 who should have followed the manner in which the President
had rendered his action on the recommendation.
The President’s endorsement of the records of the case for the "appropriate
action" of the health secretary25 did not constitute a directive for the
immediate dismissal of respondents. Like that of President Ramos, the
decision of Secretary Reodica should have contained a factual finding and a
legal assessment of the controversy to enable respondents to know the
bases for their dismissal and thereafter prepare their appeal intelligently, if
they so desired.
To support its position, petitioner cites American Tobacco Co. v. Director of
Patents.26 However, this case merely authorized the delegation of the power
to investigate, but not the authority to impose sanctions. Verily, in requiring
the disciplining authority to exercise its own judgment and discretion in
deciding a case, American Tobacco supports the present respondents’
cause. In that case, the petitioners objected to the appointment of hearing
officers and sought the personal hearing of their case by the disciplining
authority.27 The Court, however, sustained the right to delegate the power
to investigate, as long as the adjudication would be made by the deciding
authority.
By the same token, the Constitution28 grants the Supreme Court disciplinary
authority over all lower court justices and judges, as well as judicial
employees and lawyers. While the investigation of administrative
complaints is delegated usually to the Office of the Court Administrator
(OCA) or the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), 29 the Court nonetheless
makes its own judgments of the cases when sanctions are imposed. It does
not merely adopt or solely rely on the recommendations of the OCA or the
IBP.
Inasmuch as the health secretary’s twin Orders were patently void for want
of due process, the CA did not err in refusing to discuss the merit of the
PCAGC’s (or the Ad Hoc Committee’s) recommendations. Such a discussion
should have been made by the health secretary before it could be passed
upon by the CA.
In representation of petitioner, the Office of the Solicitor General insists that
respondents are guilty of the charges and, like Dr. Majarais, deserve
dismissal from the service. Suffice it to stress that the issue in this case is not
the guilt of respondents, but solely due process.
In closing, the Court reiterates the oft-quoted aphorism that the end does
not justify the means. Guilt cannot be pronounced nor penalty imposed,
unless due process is first observed. This is the essence of fairness and the
rule of law in a democracy.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is  PARTLY GRANTED. The assailed Decision of the
Court of Appeals is MODIFIED  in the sense that the authority of the Ad Hoc
Investigating Committee created under Administrative Order 298
is SUSTAINED. Being violative of administrative due process, the May 8,
1998 and the June 5, 1998 Orders of the health secretary
are ANNULLED  and SET ASIDE. Let the records of this case be REMANDED to
the Department of Health, so that proper steps can be taken to correct the
due-process errors pointed out in this Decision.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 179146               July 23, 2013
HOLY CHILD CATHOLIC SCHOOL, Petitioner,
vs.
HON. PATRICIA STO. TOMAS, in her official capacity as Secretary of the
Department of Labor and Employment, and PINAG-ISANG TINIG AT LAKAS
NG ANAKPAWIS – HOLY CHILD CATHOLIC SCHOOL TEACHERS AND
EMPLOYEES LABOR UNION (HCCS-TELU-PIGLAS), Respondents.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Civil Procedure are the April 18, 2007 Decision1 and July 31, 2007
Resolution2 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 76175, which affirmed
the December 27, 2002 Decision3 and February 13, 2003 Resolution4 of the
Secretary of the Department of Labor and Employment (SOLE) that set aside
the August 10, 2002 Decision5 of the Med-Arbiter denying private
respondent’s petition for certification election.
The factual antecedents are as follows:
On May 31, 2002, a petition for certification election was filed by private
respondent Pinag-Isang Tinig at Lakas ng Anakpawis – Holy Child Catholic
School Teachers and Employees Labor Union (HCCS-TELUPIGLAS), alleging
that: PIGLAS is a legitimate labor organization duly registered with the
Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) representing HCCS-TELU-
PIGLAS; HCCS is a private educational institution duly registered and
operating under Philippine laws; there are approximately one hundred
twenty (120) teachers and employees comprising the proposed appropriate
bargaining unit; and HCCS is unorganized, there is no collective bargaining
agreement or a duly certified bargaining agent or a labor organization
certified as the sole and exclusive bargaining agent of the proposed
bargaining unit within one year prior to the filing of the petition. 6 Among the
documents attached to the petition were the certificate of affiliation with
Pinag-Isang Tinig at Lakas ng Anakpawis Kristiyanong Alyansa ng
Makabayang Obrero (PIGLAS-KAMAO) issued by the Bureau of Labor
Relations (BLR), charter certificate issued by PIGLASKAMAO, and certificate
of registration of HCCS-TELU as a legitimate labor organization issued by the
DOLE.7
In its Comment8 and Position Paper,9 petitioner HCCS consistently noted
that it is a parochial school with a total of 156 employees as of June 28,
2002, broken down as follows: ninety-eight (98) teaching personnel, twenty-
five (25) non-teaching academic employees, and thirty-three (33) non-
teaching non-academic workers. It averred that of the employees who
signed to support the petition, fourteen (14) already resigned and six (6)
signed twice. Petitioner raised that members of private respondent do not
belong to the same class; it is not only a mixture of managerial, supervisory,
and rank-and-file employees – as three (3) are vice-principals, one (1) is a
department head/supervisor, and eleven (11) are coordinators – but also a
combination of teaching and non-teaching personnel – as twenty-seven (27)
are non-teaching personnel. It insisted that, for not being in accord with
Article 24510 of the Labor Code, private respondent is an illegitimate labor
organization lacking in personality to file a petition for certification election,
as held in Toyota Motor Philippines Corporation v. Toyota Motor Philippines
Corporation Labor Union;11 and an inappropriate bargaining unit for want of
community or mutuality of interest, as ruled in Dunlop Slazenger (Phils.),
Inc. v. Secretary of Labor and Employment12 and De La Salle University
Medical Center and College of Medicine v. Laguesma.13
Private respondent, however, countered that petitioner failed to
substantiate its claim that some of the employees included in the petition
for certification election holds managerial and supervisory
positions.14 Assuming it to be true, it argued that Section 11 (II), 15 Rule XI of
DOLE Department Order (D.O.) No. 9, Series of 1997, provided for specific
instances in which a petition filed by a legitimate organization shall be
dismissed by the Med-Arbiter and that "mixture of employees" is not one of
those enumerated. Private respondent pointed out that questions
pertaining to qualifications of employees may be threshed out in the
inclusion-exclusion proceedings prior to the conduct of the certification
election, pursuant to Section 2,16 Rule XII of D.O. No. 9. Lastly, similar to the
ruling in In Re: Globe Machine and Stamping Company,17 it contended that
the will of petitioner’s employees should be respected as they had
manifested their desire to be represented by only one bargaining unit. To
back up the formation of a single employer unit, private respondent
asserted that even if the teachers may receive additional pay for an advisory
class and for holding additional loads, petitioner’s academic and non-
academic personnel have similar working conditions. It cited Laguna College
v. Court of Industrial Relations,18 as well as the case of a union in West
Negros College in Bacolod City, which allegedly represented both academic
and non-academic employees.
On August 10, 2002, Med-Arbiter Agatha Ann L. Daquigan denied the
petition for certification election on the ground that the unit which private
respondent sought to represent is inappropriate. She resolved:
A certification election proceeding directly involves two (2) issues namely:
(a) the proper composition and constituency of the bargaining unit; and (b)
the validity of majority representation claims. It is therefore incumbent
upon the Med-Arbiter to rule on the appropriateness of the bargaining unit
once its composition and constituency is questioned.
Section 1 (q), Rule I, Book V of the Omnibus Rules defines a "bargaining
unit" as a group of employees sharing mutual interests within a given
employer unit comprised of all or less than all of the entire body of
employees in the employer unit or any specific occupational or geographical
grouping within such employer unit. This definition has provided the
"community or mutuality of interest" test as the standard in determining
the constituency of a collective bargaining unit. This is so because the basic
test of an asserted bargaining unit’s acceptability is whether or not it is
fundamentally the combination which will best assure to all employees the
exercise of their collective bargaining rights. The application of this test may
either result in the formation of an employer unit or in the fragmentation of
an employer unit.
In the case at bar, the employees of petitioner, may, as already suggested,
quite easily be categorized into (2) general classes: one, the teaching staff;
and two, the non-teaching-staff. Not much reflection is needed to perceive
that the community or mutuality of interest is wanting between the
teaching and the non-teaching staff. It would seem obvious that the
teaching staff would find very little in common with the non-teaching staff
as regards responsibilities and function, working conditions, compensation
rates, social life and interests, skills and intellectual pursuits, etc. These are
plain and patent realities which cannot be ignored. These dictate the
separation of these two categories of employees for purposes of collective
bargaining. (University of the Philippines vs. Ferrer-Calleja, 211 SCRA 451)19
Private respondent appealed before the SOLE, who, on December 27, 2002,
ruled against the dismissal of the petition and directed the conduct of two
separate certification elections for the teaching and the non-teaching
personnel, thus:
We agree with the Med-Arbiter that there are differences in the nature of
work, hours and conditions of work and salary determination between the
teaching and non-teaching personnel of petitioner. These differences were
pointed out by petitioner in its position paper. We do not, however, agree
with the Med-Arbiter that these differences are substantial enough to
warrant the dismissal of the petition. First, as pointed out by private
respondent, "inappropriateness of the bargaining unit sought to be
represented is not a ground for the dismissal of the petition." In fact, in the
cited case of University of the Philippines v. Ferrer-Calleja, supra, the
Supreme Court did not order the dismissal of the petition but ordered the
conduct of a certification election, limiting the same among the non-
academic personnel of the University of the Philippines.
It will be recalled that in the U.P. case, there were two contending unions,
the Organization of Non-Academic Personnel of U.P. (ONAPUP) and All U.P.
Workers Union composed of both academic and nonacademic personnel of
U.P. ONAPUP sought the conduct of certification election among the rank-
and-file non-academic personnel only while the all U.P. Workers Union
sought the conduct of certification election among all of U.P.’s rank-and-file
employees covering academic and nonacademic personnel. While the
Supreme Court ordered a separate bargaining unit for the U.P. academic
personnel, the Court, however, did not order them to organize a separate
labor organization among themselves. The All U.P. Workers Union was not
directed to divest itself of its academic personnel members and in fact, we
take administrative notice that the All U.P. Workers Union continue to exist
with a combined membership of U.P. academic and non-academic
personnel although separate bargaining agreements is sought for the two
bargaining units. Corollary, private respondent can continue to exist as a
legitimate labor organization with the combined teaching and non-teaching
personnel in its membership and representing both classes of employees in
separate bargaining negotiations and agreements.
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Med-Arbiter dated 10 August 2002 is
hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. In lieu thereof, a new order is hereby
issued directing the conduct of two certification elections, one among the
non-teaching personnel of Holy Child Catholic School, and the other, among
the teaching personnel of the same school, subject to the usual pre-election
conferences and inclusion-exclusion proceedings, with the following
choices:
A. Certification Election Among Petitioner’s Teaching Personnel:
1. Holy Child Catholic School Teachers and Employees Labor
Union; and
2. No Union.
B. Certification Election Among Petitioner’s Non-Teaching
Personnel:
1. Holy Child Catholic School Teachers and Employees Labor
Union; and
2. No Union.
Petitioner is hereby directed to submit to the Regional Office of origin within
ten (10) days from receipt of this Decision, a certified separate list of its
teaching and non-teaching personnel or when necessary a separate copy of
their payroll for the last three (3) months prior to the issuance of this
Decision.20
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration21 which, per Resolution dated
February 13, 2003, was denied. Consequently, petitioner filed before the CA
a Petition for Certiorari with Prayer for Temporary Restraining Order and
Preliminary Injunction.22 The CA resolved to defer action on the prayer for
TRO pending the filing of private respondent’s Comment. 23 Later, private
respondent and petitioner filed their Comment24 and Reply,25 respectively.
On July 23, 2003, petitioner filed a motion for immediate issuance of a TRO,
alleging that Hon. Helen F. Dacanay of the Industrial Relations Division of
the DOLE was set to implement the SOLE Decision when it received a
summons and was directed to submit a certified list of teaching and non-
teaching personnel for the last three months prior to the issuance of the
assailed Decision.26 Acting thereon, on August 5, 2003, the CA issued the
TRO and ordered private respondent to show cause why the writ of
preliminary injunction should not be granted.27 Subsequently, a
Manifestation and Motion28 was filed by private respondent, stating that it
repleads by reference the arguments raised in its Comment and that it prays
for the immediate lifting of the TRO and the denial of the preliminary
injunction. The CA, however, denied the manifestation and motion on
November 21, 200329 and, upon motion of petitioner,30 granted the
preliminary injunction on April 21, 2005.31 Thereafter, both parties filed their
respective Memorandum.32
On April 18, 2007, the CA eventually dismissed the petition. As to the
purported commingling of managerial, supervisory, and rank-and-file
employees in private respondent’s membership, it held that the Toyota
ruling is inapplicable because the vice-principals, department head, and
coordinators are neither supervisory nor managerial employees. It
reasoned:
x x x While it may be true that they wield power over other subordinate
employees of the petitioner, it must be stressed, however, that their
functions are not confined with policy-determining such as hiring, firing, and
disciplining of employees, salaries, teaching/working hours, other monetary
and non-monetary benefits, and other terms and conditions of
employment. Further, while they may formulate policies or guidelines,
nonetheless, such is merely recommendatory in nature, and still subject to
review and evaluation by the higher executives, i.e., the principals or
executive officers of the petitioner. It cannot also be denied that in
institutions like the petitioner, company policies have already been pre-
formulated by the higher executives and all that the mentioned employees
have to do is carry out these company policies and standards. Such being
the case, it is crystal clear that there is no improper commingling of
members in the private respondent union as to preclude its petition for
certification of (sic) election.33
Anent the alleged mixture of teaching and non-teaching personnel, the CA
agreed with petitioner that the nature of the former’s work does not
coincide with that of the latter. Nevertheless, it ruled that the SOLE did not
commit grave abuse of discretion in not dismissing the petition for
certification election, since it directed the conduct of two separate
certification elections based on Our ruling in University of the Philippines v.
Ferrer-Calleja.34
A motion for reconsideration35 was filed by petitioner, but the CA denied the
same;36 hence, this petition assigning the alleged errors as follows:
I.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE RULING
IN THE CASE OF TOYOTA MOTOR PHILIPPINES CORPORATION VS. TOYOTA
MOTOR PHILIPPINES CORPORATION LABOR UNION (268 SCRA 573) DOES
NOT APPLY IN THE CASE AT BAR DESPITE THE [COMMINGLING] OF BOTH
SUPERVISORY OR MANAGERIAL AND RANK-AND-FILE EMPLOYEES IN THE
RESPONDENT UNION;
II
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN ITS CONFLICTING RULING
ALLOWING THE CONDUCT OF CERTIFICATION ELECTION BY UPHOLDING
THAT THE RESPONDENT UNION REPRESENTED A BARGAINING UNIT DESPITE
ITS OWN FINDINGS THAT THERE IS NO MUTUALITY OF INTEREST BETWEEN
THE MEMBERS OF RESPONDENT UNION APPLYING THE TEST LAID DOWN IN
THE CASE OF UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. FERRER-CALLEJA (211
SCRA 451).37
We deny.
Petitioner claims that the CA contradicted the very definition of managerial
and supervisory employees under existing law and jurisprudence when it did
not classify the vice-principals, department head, and coordinators as
managerial or supervisory employees merely because the policies and
guidelines they formulate are still subject to the review and evaluation of
the principal or executive officers of petitioner. It points out that the duties
of the vice-principals, department head, and coordinators include the
evaluation and assessment of the effectiveness and capability of the
teachers under them; that such evaluation and assessment is independently
made without the participation of the higher Administration of petitioner;
that the fact that their recommendation undergoes the approval of the
higher Administration does not take away the independent nature of their
judgment; and that it would be difficult for the vice-principals, department
head, and coordinators to objectively assess and evaluate the performances
of teachers under them if they would be allowed to be members of the
same labor union.
On the other hand, aside from reiterating its previous submissions, private
respondent cites Sections 9 and 1238 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9481 to
buttress its contention that petitioner has no standing to oppose the
petition for certification election. On the basis of the statutory provisions, it
reasons that an employer is not a party-in-interest in a certification election;
thus, petitioner does not have the requisite right to protect even by way of
restraining order or injunction.
First off, We cannot agree with private respondent’s invocation of R.A. No.
9481. Said law took effect only on June 14, 2007; hence, its applicability is
limited to labor representation cases filed on or after said date.39 Instead,
the law and rules in force at the time private respondent filed its petition for
certification election on May 31, 2002 are R.A. No. 6715, which amended
Book V of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 442 (the Labor Code), as amended,
and the Rules and Regulations Implementing R.A. No. 6715, as amended by
D.O. No. 9, which was dated May 1, 1997 but took effect on June 21, 1997.40
However, note must be taken that even without the express provision of
Section 12 of RA No. 9481, the "Bystander Rule" is already well entrenched
in this jurisdiction. It has been consistently held in a number of cases that a
certification election is the sole concern of the workers, except when the
employer itself has to file the petition pursuant to Article 259 of the Labor
Code, as amended, but even after such filing its role in the certification
process ceases and becomes merely a bystander.41 The employer clearly
lacks the personality to dispute the election and has no right to interfere at
all therein.42 This is so since any uncalled-for concern on the part of the
employer may give rise to the suspicion that it is batting for a company
union.43 Indeed, the demand of the law and policy for an employer to take a
strict, hands-off stance in certification elections is based on the rationale
that the employees’ bargaining representative should be chosen free from
any extraneous influence of the management; that, to be effective, the
bargaining representative must owe its loyalty to the employees alone and
to no other.44
Now, going back to petitioner’s contention, the issue of whether a petition
for certification election is dismissible on the ground that the labor
organization’s membership allegedly consists of supervisory and rank-and-
file employees is actually not a novel one. In the 2008 case of Republic v.
Kawashima Textile Mfg., Philippines, Inc.,45 wherein the employer-company
moved to dismiss the petition for certification election on the ground inter
alia that the union membership is a mixture of rank-and-file and supervisory
employees, this Court had conscientiously discussed the applicability of
Toyota and Dunlop in the context of R.A. No. 6715 and D.O. No. 9, viz.:
It was in R.A. No. 875, under Section 3, that such questioned mingling was
first prohibited, to wit:
Sec. 3. Employees' right to self-organization. - Employees shall have the right
to self-organization and to form, join or assist labor organizations of their
own choosing for the purpose of collective bargaining through
representatives of their own choosing and to engage in concerted activities
for the purpose of collective bargaining and other mutual aid or protection.
Individuals employed as supervisors shall not be eligible for membership in
a labor organization of employees under their supervision but may form
separate organizations of their own. (Emphasis supplied)
Nothing in R.A. No. 875, however, tells of how the questioned mingling can
affect the legitimacy of the labor organization. Under Section 15, the only
instance when a labor organization loses its legitimacy is when it violates its
duty to bargain collectively; but there is no word on whether such mingling
would also result in loss of legitimacy. Thus, when the issue of whether the
membership of two supervisory employees impairs the legitimacy of a rank-
and-file labor organization came before the Court En Banc in Lopez v.
Chronicle Publication Employees Association, the majority pronounced:
It may be observed that nothing is said of the effect of such ineligibility upon
the union itself or on the status of the other qualified members thereof
should such prohibition be disregarded. Considering that the law is specific
where it intends to divest a legitimate labor union of any of the rights and
privileges granted to it by law, the absence of any provision on the effect of
the disqualification of one of its organizers upon the legality of the union,
may be construed to confine the effect of such ineligibility only upon the
membership of the supervisor. In other words, the invalidity of membership
of one of the organizers does not make the union illegal, where the
requirements of the law for the organization thereof are, nevertheless,
satisfied and met. (Emphasis supplied)
Then the Labor Code was enacted in 1974 without reproducing Sec. 3 of R.A.
No. 875. The provision in the Labor Code closest to Sec. 3 is Article 290,
which is deafeningly silent on the prohibition against supervisory employees
mingling with rank-and-file employees in one labor organization. Even the
Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V of the Labor Code (Omnibus Rules)
merely provides in Section 11, Rule II, thus:
Sec. 11. Supervisory unions and unions of security guards to cease
operation. - All existing supervisory unions and unions of security guards
shall, upon the effectivity of the Code, cease to operate as such and their
registration certificates shall be deemed automatically cancelled. However,
existing collective agreements with such unions, the life of which extends
beyond the date of effectivity of the Code shall be respected until their
expiry date insofar as the economic benefits granted therein are concerned.
Members of supervisory unions who do not fall within the definition of
managerial employees shall become eligible to join or assist the rank and
file organization. The determination of who are managerial employees and
who are not shall be the subject of negotiation between representatives of
supervisory union and the employer. If no agreement s reached between
the parties, either or both of them may bring the issue to the nearest
Regional Office for determination. (Emphasis supplied)
The obvious repeal of the last clause of Sec. 3, R.A. No. 875 prompted the
Court to declare in Bulletin v. Sanchez that supervisory employees who do
not fall under the category of managerial employees may join or assist in
the formation of a labor organization for rank-and-file employees, but they
may not form their own labor organization.
While amending certain provisions of Book V of the Labor Code, E.O. No.
111 and its implementing rules continued to recognize the right of
supervisory employees, who do not fall under the category of managerial
employees, to join a rank- and-file labor organization.
Effective 1989, R.A. No. 6715 restored the prohibition against the
questioned mingling in one labor organization, viz.:
Sec. 18. Article 245 of the same Code, as amended, is hereby further
amended to read as follows:
Art. 245. Ineligibility of managerial employees to join any labor organization;
right of supervisory employees. Managerial employees are not eligible to
join, assist or form any labor organization. Supervisory employees shall not
be eligible for membership in a labor organization of the rank-and-file
employees but may join, assist or form separate labor organizations of their
own (Emphasis supplied)
Unfortunately, just like R.A. No. 875, R.A. No. 6715 omitted specifying the
exact effect any violation of the prohibition would bring about on the
legitimacy of a labor organization.
It was the Rules and Regulations Implementing R.A. No. 6715 (1989
Amended Omnibus Rules) which supplied the deficiency by introducing the
following amendment to Rule II (Registration of Unions):
Sec. 1. Who may join unions. - x x x Supervisory employees and security
guards shall not be eligible for membership in a labor organization of the
rank-and-file employees but may join, assist or form separate labor
organizations of their own; Provided, that those supervisory employees who
are included in an existing rank-and-file bargaining unit, upon the effectivity
of Republic Act No. 6715, shall remain in that unit x x x. (Emphasis supplied)
and Rule V (Representation Cases and Internal-Union Conflicts) of the
Omnibus Rules, viz.;
Sec. 1. Where to file. - A petition for certification election may be filed with
the Regional Office which has jurisdiction over the principal office of the
employer. The petition shall be in writing and under oath.
Sec. 2. Who may file. - Any legitimate labor organization or the employer,
when requested to bargain collectively, may file the petition.
The petition, when filed by a legitimate labor organization, shall contain,
among others:
xxxx
(c) description of the bargaining unit which shall be the employer unit unless
circumstances otherwise require; and provided further, that the appropriate
bargaining unit of the rank-and-file employees shall not include supervisory
employees and/or security guards. (Emphasis supplied)
By that provision, any questioned mingling will prevent an otherwise
legitimate and duly registered labor organization from exercising its right to
file a petition for certification election.
Thus, when the issue of the effect of mingling was brought to the fore in
Toyota, the Court, citing Article 245 of the Labor Code, as amended by R.A.
No. 6715, held:
Clearly, based on this provision, a labor organization composed of both
rank-and-file and supervisory employees is no labor organization at all. It
cannot, for any guise or purpose, be a legitimate labor organization. Not
being one, an organization which carries a mixture of rank-and-file and
supervisory employees cannot possess any of the rights of a legitimate labor
organization, including the right to file a petition for certification election for
the purpose of collective bargaining. It becomes necessary, therefore,
anterior to the granting of an order allowing a certification election, to
inquire into the composition of any labor organization whenever the status
of the labor organization is challenged on the basis of Article 245 of the
Labor Code.
xxxx
In the case at bar, as respondent union's membership list contains the
names of at least twenty-seven (27) supervisory employees in Level Five
positions, the union could not, prior to purging itself of its supervisory
employee members, attain the status of a legitimate labor organization. Not
being one, it cannot possess the requisite personality to file a petition for
certification election. (Emphasis supplied)
In Dunlop, in which the labor organization that filed a petition for
certification election was one for supervisory employees, but in which the
membership included rank-and-file employees, the Court reiterated that
such labor organization had no legal right to file a certification election to
represent a bargaining unit composed of supervisors for as long as it
counted rank-and-file employees among its members.
It should be emphasized that the petitions for certification election involved
in Toyota and Dunlop were filed on November 26, 1992 and September 15,
1995, respectively; hence, the 1989 Rules was applied in both cases.
But then, on June 21, 1997, the 1989 Amended Omnibus Rules was further
amended by Department Order No. 9, series of 1997 (1997 Amended
Omnibus Rules). Specifically, the requirement under Sec. 2(c) of the 1989
Amended Omnibus Rules - that the petition for certification election
indicate that the bargaining unit of rank-and-file employees has not been
mingled with supervisory employees - was removed. Instead, what the 1997
Amended Omnibus Rules requires is a plain description of the bargaining
unit, thus:
Rule XI
Certification Elections
xxxx
Sec. 4. Forms and contents of petition. - The petition shall be in writing and
under oath and shall contain, among others, the following: x x x (c) The
description of the bargaining unit."
In Pagpalain Haulers, Inc. v. Trajano, the Court had occasion to uphold the
validity of the 1997 Amended Omnibus Rules, although the specific
provision involved therein was only Sec. 1, Rule VI, to wit:
Sec. 1. Chartering and creation of a local/chapter.- A duly registered
federation or national union may directly create a local/chapter by
submitting to the Regional Office or to the Bureau two (2) copies of the
following: a) a charter certificate issued by the federation or national union
indicating the creation or establishment of the local/chapter; (b) the names
of the local/chapter's officers, their addresses, and the principal office of the
local/chapter; and (c) the local/ chapter's constitution and by-laws; provided
that where the local/chapter's constitution and by-laws is the same as that
of the federation or national union, this fact shall be indicated accordingly.
All the foregoing supporting requirements shall be certified under oath by
the Secretary or the Treasurer of the local/chapter and attested to by its
President.
which does not require that, for its creation and registration, a local or
chapter submit a list of its members.
Then came Tagaytay Highlands Int'l. Golf Club, Inc. v. Tagaytay Highlands
Employees Union-PTGWO in which the core issue was whether mingling
affects the legitimacy of a labor organization and its right to file a petition
for certification election. This time, given the altered legal milieu, the Court
abandoned the view in Toyota and Dunlop and reverted to its
pronouncement in Lopez that while there is a prohibition against the
mingling of supervisory and rank-and-file employees in one labor
organization, the Labor Code does not provide for the effects thereof. Thus,
the Court held that after a labor organization has been registered, it may
exercise all the rights and privileges of a legitimate labor organization. Any
mingling between supervisory and rank-and-file employees in its
membership cannot affect its legitimacy for that is not among the grounds
for cancellation of its registration, unless such mingling was brought about
by misrepresentation, false statement or fraud under Article 239 of the
Labor Code.
In San Miguel Corp. (Mandaue Packaging Products Plants) v. Mandaue
Packing Products Plants-San Miguel Packaging Products-San Miguel Corp.
Monthlies Rank-and-File Union-FFW, the Court explained that since the
1997 Amended Omnibus Rules does not require a local or chapter to
provide a list of its members, it would be improper for the DOLE to deny
recognition to said local or chapter on account of any question pertaining to
its individual members.
More to the point is Air Philippines Corporation v. Bureau of Labor
Relations, which involved a petition for cancellation of union registration
filed by the employer in 1999 against a rank-and-file labor organization on
the ground of mixed membership: the Court therein reiterated its ruling in
Tagaytay Highlands that the inclusion in a union of disqualified employees is
not among the grounds for cancellation, unless such inclusion is due to
misrepresentation, false statement or fraud under the circumstances
enumerated in Sections (a) and (c) of Article 239 of the Labor Code.
All said, while the latest issuance is R.A. No. 9481, the 1997 Amended
Omnibus Rules, as interpreted by the Court in Tagaytay Highlands, San
Miguel and Air Philippines, had already set the tone for it. Toyota and
Dunlop no longer hold sway in the present altered state of the law and the
rules.46
When a similar issue confronted this Court close to three years later, the
above ruling was substantially quoted in Samahang Manggagawa sa Charter
Chemical Solidarity of Unions in the Philippines for Empowerment and
Reforms (SMCC-Super) v. Charter Chemical and Coating Corporation.47 In
unequivocal terms, We reiterated that the alleged inclusionof supervisory
employees in a labor organization seeking to represent the bargaining unit
of rank-and-file employees does not divest it of its status as a legitimate
labor organization.48
Indeed, Toyota and Dunlop no longer hold true under the law and rules
governing the instant case. The petitions for certification election involved in
Toyota and Dunlop were filed on November 26, 1992 and September 15,
1995, respectively; hence, the 1989 Rules and Regulations Implementing
R.A. No. 6715 (1989 Amended Omnibus Rules) was applied. In contrast, D.O.
No. 9 is applicable in the petition for certification election of private
respondent as it was filed on May 31, 2002.
Following the doctrine laid down in Kawashima and SMCC-Super, it must be
stressed that petitioner cannot collaterally attack the legitimacy of private
respondent by praying for the dismissal of the petition for certification
election:
Except when it is requested to bargain collectively, an employer is a mere
bystander to any petition for certification election; such proceeding is non-
adversarial and merely investigative, for the purpose thereof is to determine
which organization will represent the employees in their collective
bargaining with the employer. The choice of their representative is the
exclusive concern of the employees; the employer cannot have any partisan
interest therein; it cannot interfere with, much less oppose, the process by
filing a motion to dismiss or an appeal from it; not even a mere allegation
that some employees participating in a petition for certification election are
actually managerial employees will lend an employer legal personality to
block the certification election. The employer's only right in the proceeding
is to be notified or informed thereof.
The amendments to the Labor Code and its implementing rules have
buttressed that policy even more.49
Further, the determination of whether union membership comprises
managerial and/or supervisory employees is a factual issue that is best left
for resolution in the inclusion-exclusion proceedings, which has not yet
happened in this case so still premature to pass upon. We could only
emphasize the rule that factual findings of labor officials, who are deemed
to have acquired expertise in matters within their jurisdiction, are generally
accorded not only with respect but even finality by the courts when
supported by substantial evidence.50 Also, the jurisdiction of this Court in
cases brought before it from the CA via Rule 45 is generally limited to
reviewing errors of law or jurisdiction. The findings of fact of the CA are
conclusive and binding. Except in certain recognized instances,51 We do not
entertain factual issues as it is not Our function to analyze or weigh
evidence all over again; the evaluation of facts is best left to the lower
courts and administrative agencies/quasi-judicial bodies which are better
equipped for the task.52
Turning now to the second and last issue, petitioner argues that, in view of
the improper mixture of teaching and non-teaching personnel in private
respondent due to the absence of mutuality of interest among its members,
the petition for certification election should have been dismissed on the
ground that private respondent is not qualified to file such petition for its
failure to qualify as a legitimate labor organization, the basic qualification of
which is the representation of an appropriate bargaining unit.
We disagree.
The concepts of a union and of a legitimate labor organization are different
from, but related to, the concept of a bargaining unit:
Article 212(g) of the Labor Code defines a labor organization as "any union
or association of employees which exists in whole or in part for the purpose
of collective bargaining or of dealing with employers concerning terms and
conditions of employment." Upon compliance with all the documentary
requirements, the Regional Office or Bureau shall issue in favor of the
applicant labor organization a certificate indicating that it is included in the
roster of legitimate labor organizations. Any applicant labor organization
shall acquire legal personality and shall be entitled to the rights and
privileges granted by law to legitimate labor organizations upon issuance of
the certificate of registration.53
In case of alleged inclusion of disqualified employees in a union, the proper
procedure for an employer like petitioner is to directly file a petition for
cancellation of the union’s certificate of registration due to
misrepresentation, false statement or fraud under the circumstances
enumerated in Article 239 of the Labor Code, as amended.54 To reiterate,
private respondent, having been validly issued a certificate of registration,
should be considered as having acquired juridical personality which may not
be attacked collaterally.
On the other hand, a bargaining unit has been defined as a "group of
employees of a given employer, comprised of all or less than all of the entire
body of employees, which the collective interests of all the employees,
consistent with equity to the employer, indicated to be best suited to serve
reciprocal rights and duties of the parties under the collective bargaining
provisions of the law."55 In determining the proper collective bargaining unit
and what unit would be appropriate to be the collective bargaining agency,
the Court, in the seminal case of Democratic Labor Association v. Cebu
Stevedoring Company, Inc.,56 mentioned several factors that should be
considered, to wit: (1) will of employees (Globe Doctrine); (2) affinity and
unity of employees' interest, such as substantial similarity of work and
duties, or similarity of compensation and working conditions; (3) prior
collective bargaining history; and (4) employment status, such as temporary,
seasonal and probationary employees. We stressed, however, that the test
of the grouping is community or mutuality of interest, because "the basic
test of an asserted bargaining unit's acceptability is whether or not it is
fundamentally the combination which will best assure to all employees the
exercise of their collective bargaining rights."57
As the SOLE correctly observed, petitioner failed to comprehend the full
import of Our ruling in U.P. It suffices to quote with approval the apt
disposition of the SOLE when she denied petitioner’s motion for
reconsideration:
Petitioner likewise claimed that we erred in interpreting the decision of the
Supreme Court in U.P. v. Ferrer-Calleja, supra. According to petitioner, the
Supreme Court stated that the non-academic rank-andfile employees of the
University of the Philippines shall constitute a bargaining unit to the
exclusion of the academic employees of the institution. Hence, petitioner
argues, it sought the creation of separate bargaining units, namely: (1)
petitioner’s teaching personnel to the exclusion of non-teaching personnel;
and (2) petitioner’s non-teaching personnel to the exclusion of teaching
personnel.
Petitioner appears to have confused the concepts of membership in a
bargaining unit and membership in a union. In emphasizing the phrase "to
the exclusion of academic employees" stated in U.P. v. Ferrer-Calleja,
petitioner believed that the petitioning union could not admit academic
employees of the university to its membership. But such was not the
intention of the Supreme Court.
A bargaining unit is a group of employees sought to be represented by a
petitioning union. Such employees need not be members of a union seeking
the conduct of a certification election. A union certified as an exclusive
bargaining agent represents not only its members but also other employees
who are not union members. As pointed out in our assailed Decision, there
were two contending unions in the U.P. case, namely, the Organization of
Non-Academic Personnel of U.P. (ONAPUP) and the All U.P. Worker’s Union
composed of both U.P. academic and non-academic personnel. ONAPUP
sought the conduct of a certification election among the rank-and-file non-
academic personnel only, while the All U.P. Workers Union intended to
cover all U.P. rank-and-file employees, involving both academic and non-
academic personnel.
The Supreme Court ordered the "non-academic rank-and-file employees of
U.P. to constitute a bargaining unit to the exclusion of the academic
employees of the institution", but did not order them to organize a separate
labor organization. In the U.P. case, the Supreme Court did not dismiss the
petition and affirmed the order for the conduct of a certification election
among the non-academic personnel of U.P., without prejudice to the right
of the academic personnel to constitute a separate bargaining unit for
themselves and for the All U.P. Workers Union to institute a petition for
certification election.
In the same manner, the teaching and non-teaching personnel of petitioner
school must form separate bargaining units.1âwphi1 Thus, the order for the
conduct of two separate certification elections, one involving teaching
personnel and the other involving non-teaching personnel. It should be
stressed that in the subject petition, private respondent union sought the
conduct of a certification election among all the rank-and-file personnel of
petitioner school. Since the decision of the Supreme Court in the U.P. case
prohibits us from commingling teaching and non-teaching personnel in one
bargaining unit, they have to be separated into two separate bargaining
units with two separate certification elections to determine whether the
employees in the respective bargaining units desired to be represented by
private respondent. In the U.P. case, only one certification election among
the non-academic personnel was ordered, because ONAPUP sought to
represent that bargaining unit only. No petition for certification election
among the academic personnel was instituted by All U.P. Workers Union in
the said case; thus, no certification election pertaining to its intended
bargaining unit was ordered by the Court.58
Indeed, the purpose of a certification election is precisely to ascertain the
majority of the employees’ choice of an appropriate bargaining unit – to be
or not to be represented by a labor organization and, if in the affirmative
case, by which one.59
At this point, it is not amiss to stress once more that, as a rule, only
questions of law may be raised in a Rule 45 petition. In Montoya v.
Transmed Manila Corporation,60 the Court discussed the particular
parameters of a Rule 45 appeal from the CA’s Rule 65 decision on a labor
case, as follows:
x x x In a Rule 45 review, we consider the correctness of the assailed CA
decision, in contrast with the review for jurisdictional error that we
undertake under Rule 65. Furthermore, Rule 45 limits us to the review of
questions of law raised against the assailed CA decision. In ruling for legal
correctness, we have to view the CA decision in the same context that the
petition for certiorari it ruled upon was presented to it; we have to examine
the CA decision from the prism of whether it correctly determined the
presence or absence of grave abuse of discretion in the NLRC decision
before it, not on the basis of whether the NLRC decision on the merits of the
case was correct. In other words, we have to be keenly aware that the CA
undertook a Rule 65 review, not a review on appeal, of the NLRC decision
challenged before it. This is the approach that should be basic in a Rule 45
review of a CA ruling in a labor case. In question form, the question to ask is:
Did the CA correctly determine whether the NLRC committed grave abuse of
discretion in ruling on the case?61
Our review is, therefore, limited to the determination of whether the CA
correctly resolved the presence or absence of grave abuse of discretion in
the decision of the SOLE, not on the basis of whether the latter's decision on
the merits of the case was strictly correct. Whether the CA committed grave
abuse of discretion is not what is ruled upon but whether it correctly
determined the existence or want of grave abuse of discretion on the part
of the SOLE.
WHEREFORE, the pet1t1on is DENIED. The April 18, 2007 Decision and July
31, 2007, Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 76175, which
affirmed the December 27, 2002 Decision of the Secretary of the
Department of Labor and Employment that set aside the
August 10, 2002 Decision of the Med-Arbiter denying private respondent's
petition for certification election are hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 140079             March 31, 2005
AUGUSTO R. SAMALIO, Petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, DEPARTMENT OF
JUSTICE and BUREAU OF IMMIGRATION, respondents.
DECISION
CORONA, J.:
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court assailing the May 24, 1999 decision,1 as well as the September 1, 1999
resolution, of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 48723 which in
turn affirmed the November 26, 1997 resolution of the Civil Service
Commission (CSC). The aforementioned CSC resolution upheld the August
30, 1996 1st Indorsement of then Justice Secretary Teofisto T. Guingona
confirming the penalty of dismissal from service imposed by the Bureau of
Immigration upon petitioner on the ground of dishonesty, oppression,
misconduct and conduct grossly prejudicial to the best interest of the
service in connection with his act of extorting money from Ms. Weng Sai
Qin, a foreign national.
The facts, as found by the CA and adopted by petitioner himself, are as
follows:
Petitioner Augusto R. Samalio was formerly an Intelligence Officer of
the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation.
In Resolution No. 0-93-0224 dated February 4, 1993, the City
Prosecutor’s office of Pasay City recommended that petitioner
Samalio be prosecuted for the crimes of Robbery and Violation of
Section 46 of the Immigration Law before the Sandiganbayan under
the following facts:
"x x x that on 2 February 1993, Ms. Weng Sai Qin arrived at
the NAIA from Saipan. While waiting for her turn at the
arrival immigration counter, her passport was examined by
Immigration Officer Juliet Pajarillaga. Noting that Ms. Weng,
a Chinese, was holding a Uruguayan passport, Ms.
Pajarillaga suspected that the former’s passport was fake.
Ms. Weng was taken out of the queue and brought to
Respondent who was the duty intelligence officer. Ms.
Weng, who could only speak in Chinese, asked respondent
by sign language that she wanted to meet a friend who was
waiting at the NAIA arrival area. Respondent approved the
request and accompanied Ms. Weng to the arrival area.
Thereafter, Respondent, with Ms. Weng and her male friend
in tow, returned to the immigration area. While inside the
office of Respondent, Ms. Weng asked that her passport be
returned. Sensing a demand for money in exchange for her
passport, Ms. Weng flashed $500.00 in front of Respondent.
The money was grabbed by Respondent. Shortly, her
passport was returned ans [sic] she was allowed to leave.
When Ms. Weng checked her passport later, she discovered
that it did not bear an immigration arrival stamp.
Thereafter, Ms. Weng complained against Respondent."
In a later Indorsement communication dated February 9, 1993 to
the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation (BID), former NAIA
General Manager Gen. Guillermo G. Cunanan enclosed a copy of the
aforesaid City Prosecutor’s Resolution. Reacting, then BID
Commissioner, Zafiro L. Respicio, issued Personnel Order No. 93-
179-93 commencing an administrative case against petitioner
Augusto R. Samalio for Violation of CSMC No. 46, Rule 2, Section 1,
for dishonesty, oppression, misconduct, disgraceful and immoral
conduct, inefficiency and incompetence in the performance of
official duties, violation of reasonable office rules and regulations
and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service, requiring
petitioner to submit his answer to the charges together with
supporting statements and documents, and whether or not he
elects a formal investigation if his answer is not considered
satisfactory. In the same Personnel Order, Samalio was preventively
suspended for a period of ninety (90) days as the charge sheet
against him involves dishonesty, oppression and misconduct.
Forthwith, petitioner attempted the lifting of his preventive
suspension. It was struck down.
Later on, petitioner submitted an answer denying the charges and
expressly electing a formal investigation if such answer be not found
to be satisfactory. Attached thereto are the affidavits of his
witnesses Rodrigo C. Pedrealba, Dante Aquino, Florencio B. Austria
and Winston C. Vitan. The answer was found to be unsatisfactory so
the case was set for formal hearing before the Board of Discipline of
BID.
The case suffered several postponed hearings due to the requests
and non-availability of the parties but mostly due to the absence of
complainant’s witnesses until on September 7, 1993, respondent
was allowed to file a motion to dismiss with the Special Prosecutor
designated given time to comment thereon. When the dismissal
motion was filed, assigned Special Prosecutor Edmund F. Macaraig
interposed no objection thereto. Notwithstanding, the case was not
dismissed and instead, the Special Prosecutor was given five (5) days
to inform the Board whether or not he intends to present additional
witnesses.
On December 16, 1993, the DID Commissioner issued Personnel
Order No. 93-428 reorganizing the Board of Discipline and this case
was assigned to a new Board presided by Atty. Kalaw. Subpoenas
were again sent and hearings were scheduled several times before
the new Board until on February 6, 1995, Special Prosecutor
assigned, Edmund F. Macaraig, moved that Samalio’s Motion to
Dismiss be denied and that the case be considered submitted for
resolution based on the records. On February 16, 1995, the hearing
officer denied Samalio’s Motion to Dismiss but granted his
Comment/Manifestation explaining his absence during the February
6, 1995 hearing and requesting that the case be set anew on
February 22, 1995.
Finally, on July 25, 1996, BID Acting Commissioner Ramon J. Liwag,
issued the decision finding Augusto R. Samalio guilty of the charges
and was ordered dismissed from service.
In the 1st Indorsement dated August 30, 1996, former Justice
Secretary Teofisto T. Guingona, Jr. confirmed the penalty of
dismissal from service of Augusto R. Samalio. Soon after, the Motion
for Reconsideration was denied in a Resolution dated June 2, 1997.
Guingona’s decision was appealed to the Civil Service Commission
which issued Resolution No. 974501 dated November 26, 1997
dismissing the appeal for lack of merit and affirming the decisions of
Acting Commissioner Liwag and Secretary Guingona. Similarly, the
attempt for a reconsideration was likewise dismissed in Civil Service
Resolution No. 981925.
In the meantime, on June 13, 1994, during the pendency of the
instant administrative case, Augusto R. Samalio was convicted (in
Sandiganbayan Criminal Case No. 18679) of the crime of Robbery, as
defined in Articles 293 and 294, paragraph 5 of the Revised Penal
Code and was sentenced to suffer indeterminate penalty of Four (4)
Months and One (1) Day of Arresto Mayor to Four (4) Years, Two (2)
Months and Eleven (11) Days of Prision Correccional  and to
indemnify complainant Weng Sai Qin the amount of US $500.00 and
to pay the costs. Samalio did not appeal the conviction and instead
applied for and was granted probation by the Sandiganbayan for
two (2) years in an Order dated December 12, 1994.2 (Citations
omitted)
Petitioner assailed before the CA, in a petition for review, the correctness
and validity of CSC Resolution Nos. 974501 and 981925. The CA, however,
dismissed the petition for review and subsequently denied the motion for
reconsideration.
Petitioner now comes before us to challenge the CA decision dismissing his
petition for review as well as the resolution denying his motion for
reconsideration. Petitioner claims he was not accorded due process and the
CA failed to consider the proper effects of his discharge under probation.
In support of his contention that he was deprived of due process, petitioner
alleges that no witness or evidence was presented against him, that the CA
erred in the interpretation of Section 47, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court and
that there was no hearing conducted on his case.
Petitioner’s contention is without merit.
The CSC decision and resolution which upheld the resolution of the
Secretary of Justice confirming the decision of the Commissioner of the BID
are supported by substantial evidence. The CSC, as well as the Secretary of
Justice and the Commissioner of the BID, decided the case on the basis of
the pleadings and papers submitted by the parties, and relied on the records
of the proceedings taken. In particular, the decision was based on the
criminal complaint filed by Weng Sai Qin against petitioner before the City
Prosecutor’s Office of Pasay City, as well as Resolution No. 0-93-0224 dated
February 4, 1993 of the same office recommending the prosecution of
petitioner at the Sandiganbayan for the crimes of robbery and violation of
Section 46 of the Immigration Law.
The CSC, as well as the Secretary of Justice, also took cognizance of the
testimony of Weng Sai Qin in Sandiganbayan Criminal Case No. 18679 and
the fact of petitioner’s conviction in that case. Thus, there was ample
evidence which satisfied the burden of proof required in administrative
proceedings – substantial evidence or that quantum of relevant evidence
which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to justify a
conclusion3 ― to support the decision of the CSC.
The CSC and the Secretary of Justice did not err in applying Section 47, Rule
130 of the Revised Rules of Court, otherwise known as the "rule on former
testimony," in deciding petitioner’s administrative case. The provisions of
the Rules of Court may be applied suppletorily to the rules of procedure of
administrative bodies exercising quasi-judicial powers, unless otherwise
provided by law or the rules of procedure of the administrative agency
concerned. The Rules of Court, which are meant to secure to every litigant
the adjective phase of due process of law, may be applied to proceedings
before an administrative body with quasi-judicial powers in the absence of
different and valid statutory or administrative provisions prescribing the
ground rules for the investigation, hearing and adjudication of cases before
it.4
For Section 47, Rule 130 to apply, the following requisites must be satisfied:
(a) the witness is dead or unable to testify; (b) his testimony or deposition
was given in a former case or proceeding, judicial or administrative,
between the same parties or those representing the same interests; (c) the
former case involved the same subject as that in the present case, although
on different causes of action; (d) the issue testified to by the witness in the
former trial is the same issue involved in the present case and (e) the
adverse party had an opportunity to cross-examine the witness in the
former case.5
In this case, Weng Sai Qin was unable to testify in the administrative
proceedings before the BID because she left the country on February 6,
1993,6 or even before the administrative complaint against petitioner was
instituted. Petitioner does not deny that the testimony of Weng Sai Qin was
given in Sandiganbayan Criminal Case No. 18679, a case which sprang from
the information filed pursuant to Resolution No. 0-93-0224 dated February
4, 1993 of the City Prosecutor’s Office of Pasay City, the very same
resolution used by Commissioner Respicio as basis for filing the
administrative complaint. Hence, the issue testified to by Weng Sai Qin in
Sandiganbayan Criminal Case No. 18679 was the same issue in the
administrative case, that is, whether petitioner extorted money from Weng
Sai Qin. Petitioner also had the opportunity to face and cross-examine his
accuser Weng Sai Qin, and to defend and vindicate his cause before the
Sandiganbayan. Clearly, all the requisites for the proper application of the
rule on former testimony, as embodied in Section 47, Rule 130, were
satisfied. Thus, the CSC and the Secretary of Justice committed no error
when they applied it and took cognizance of the former testimony of Weng
Sai Qin in Sandiganbayan Criminal Case No. 18679 where petitioner was
convicted.
Petitioner contends that the CA, as well as the CSC and the Secretary of
Justice, should not have applied Section 47, Rule 130 because there was
failure to lay the basis or predicate for the rule. The argument is specious
and deserves scant consideration. The records of this case reveal that even
in the early stages of the proceedings before the Board of Discipline of the
BID, Weng Sai Qin’s departure from the country and consequent inability to
testify in the proceedings had already been disclosed to the parties.7
Further, administrative bodies are not bound by the technical niceties of law
and procedure and the rules obtaining in courts of law.8 Administrative
tribunals exercising quasi-judicial powers are unfettered by the rigidity of
certain procedural requirements, subject to the observance of fundamental
and essential requirements of due process in justiciable cases presented
before them.9 In administrative proceedings, technical rules of procedure
and evidence are not strictly applied and administrative due process cannot
be fully equated with due process in its strict judicial sense.10
The Uniform Rules of Procedure in the Conduct of Administrative
Investigations in the CSC11 which were applicable to petitioner’s case
provided that administrative investigations shall be conducted without
necessarily adhering to technical rules applicable in judicial
proceedings.12 The Uniform Rules further provided that evidence having
materiality and relevance to the administrative case shall be accepted. 13 Not
only was petitioner’s objection to the application of Section 47, Rule 130 a
technicality that could be disregarded; the testimony of Weng Sai Qin in
Sandiganbayan Criminal Case No. 18679 was also material and relevant to
the administrative case. Hence, the CSC was correct in applying Section 47,
Rule 130 when it took cognizance of the former testimony of Weng Sai Qin
in the aforementioned criminal case.
Petitioner’s assertion that there was no hearing (that he was deprived of the
opportunity to be heard) is likewise without merit. Apparently, petitioner’s
concept of the opportunity to be heard is the opportunity to ventilate one’s
side in a formal hearing where he can have a face-to-face confrontation with
the complainant. However, it is well-settled that, in administrative cases, the
requirement of notice and hearing does not connote full adversarial
proceedings.14
Due process in an administrative context does not require trial-type
proceedings similar to those in courts of justice. Where opportunity to be
heard either through oral arguments or through pleadings is accorded, there
is no denial of procedural due process.15 A formal or trial-type hearing is not
at all times and in all instances essential. The requirements are satisfied
where the parties are afforded fair and reasonable opportunity to explain
their side of the controversy at hand.16 The standard of due process that
must be met in administrative tribunals allows a certain degree of latitude
as long as fairness is not ignored.17 In other words, it is not legally
objectionable for being violative of due process for an administrative agency
to resolve a case based solely on position papers, afidavits or documentary
evidence submitted by the parties as affidavits of witnesses may take the
place of their direct testimony.18
In this case, petitioner was heard through the various pleadings which he
filed with the Board of Discipline of the BID when he filed his answer19 and
two motions to dismiss,20 as well as other motions and papers. He was also
able to participate in all stages of the administrative proceeding. He was
able to elevate his case to the Secretary of Justice and, subsequently, to the
CSC by way of appeal.
We have consistently held that the essence of due process is simply the
opportunity to be heard or, as applied to administrative proceedings, the
opportunity to explain one’s side or the opportunity to seek a
reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of.21 And any seeming
defect in its observance is cured by the filing of a motion for
reconsideration.22 Denial of due process cannot be successfully invoked by a
party who has had the opportunity to be heard on his motion for
reconsideration.23
Petitioner himself admits that he filed a motion for reconsideration24 of the
decision of the BID which was confirmed by the Secretary of Justice. He also
admits that he filed a motion for reconsideration25 with the CSC. Hence, by
his own admission, petitioner’s protestations that he had been deprived of
due process must necessarily fail.
Petitioner claims that when the Sandiganbayan approved his probation in
the criminal case, it restored him to all civil rights lost or suspended as a
result of his conviction, including the right to remain in government service.
Petitioner cites the case of Baclayon v. Mutia, et al. 26 where the grant of
probation suspended the imposition not only of the principal penalties but
of the accessory penalties as well.
Petitioner’s contention is misplaced.
First, the Baclayon case is not in point. In that case, no administrative
complaint was instituted against the public officer, a public school teacher,
during the pendency of the criminal case against her and even after her
conviction. There being no administrative case instituted against the public
officer and no administrative liability having been imposed, there was no
administrative sanction that could have been suspended by the grant of
probation.
Second, dismissal is not an accessory penalty either of prision
correccional 27 or arresto mayor,28 the range of penalty imposed upon
petitioner in Sandiganbayan Criminal Case No. 18679. Hence, even
assuming arguendo that petitioner’s contention was correct, the grant of
probation could not have resulted in the suspension of an accessory penalty
like dismissal that does not even exist.
Third, "to suspend" means "to stop temporarily; to discontinue" 29 or "to
cause to be intermitted or interrupted."30 The records of this case show that
petitioner was granted probation in an order dated December 12, 1992 31 of
the Second Division of the Sandiganbayan. He was dismissed from the
service in the decision dated July 25, 199632 of the BID Commissioner. Since
the grant of probation was granted long before the administrative case was
decided, the probation could not have possibly suspended the imposition of
the penalty of dismissal from the service in the administrative case since
there was no administrative penalty that could have been interrupted by
the probation at the time it was granted. Indeed, petitioner’s discharge on
probation could not have restored or reinstated him to his employment in
government service since he had not been yet been dismissed therefrom at
the time of his discharge.
Finally, even if dismissal had been one of the accessory penalties of the
principal penalty imposed upon petitioner in the criminal case, and even if
the administrative case had been decided earlier than the criminal case, still
the imposition of the penalty of dismissal could not have been suspended by
the grant of probation. As petitioner himself contends, the criminal action is
separate and distinct from the administrative case. And, if only for that
reason, so is administrative liability separate and distinct from penal
liability.33 Hence, probation affects only the criminal aspect of the case,34 not
its administrative dimension.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DEnIed. The assailed decision of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 48723 dated May 24, 1999, affirming the
decision and resolution of the Civil Service Commission is AFFIRMED.
Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 180745, August 30, 2017
ALBERTA DE JOYA IGLESIAS, Petitioner, v. THE OFFICE OF THE
OMBUDSMAN, GEORGE M. JEREOS, ROBERTO G. GEOTINA, JUAN T. TAN,
KRISTINE MORALES, AND ALBERTO LINA, Respondents.
DECISION
LEONEN, J.:
In observing administrative due process, it is essential that the accused be
accorded the right to be informed of the accusations against him or her. Fair
play requires that the accused be equipped with the necessary information
for the preparation of his or her defense.
This is a Petition for Review1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, praying
that the December 22, 2006 Decision2 and November 21, 2007
Resolution3 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 89585 be nullified and
set aside.4 The Court of Appeals affirmed the Office of the Ombudsman
February 7, 2005 Resolution5 and the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for
Luzon February 21, 2005 Joint Order6 in OMB L-C-04-0083-B and OMBL-A-
04-0057-B, dismissing petitioner Alberta de Joya Iglesias (Iglesias) from
service.7 Petitioner prays that judgment be rendered absolving her of any
criminal and administrative liability and reinstating her to her former
position as Acting District Collector in the Port of San Fernando. 8
Petitioner Iglesias was employed as Acting District Collector by the Bureau
of Customs on October 1, 2002. She was assigned at the Port of San
Fernando, La Union by Commissioner Antonio Bernardo.9
On January 28, 2004, the Department of Finance, through Atty. Leon L.
Acuña (Atty. Acuña) and Troy Francis C. Pizarro (Pizarro), filed a Complaint-
Affidavit10 against Iglesias before the Office of the Ombudsman.11 Atty.
Acuña and Pizarro claimed that Iglesias failed to file her Statements of
Assets, Liabilities, and Net Worth (SALNs) prior to the year 2000.12
They also alleged that Iglesias made false entries in her 2000, 2001, and
2002 SALNs with respect to two (2) real properties in Quezon City and
Pangasinan. The Quezon City property's tax declarations revealed that
Iglesias purchased the property on August 1, 1996 from the spouses Rosario
and Elpidio Ablang. Likewise, the Pangasinan property's Transfer Certificate
of Title was issued by virtue of a deed of sale showing that she purchased a
portion of this property from Marina Lopez de Joya (Marina). However, in
her SALNs, Iglesias indicated that these properties were acquired through
inheritance.13
Atty. Acuña and Pizarro also discovered three (3) real properties in
Pangasinan under Iglesias' name that were not declared in her SALNs.14 They
further asserted that Iglesias acquired several real and personal properties c) Engaging in acts of dishonesty and misconduct by making false
from 1999 to 2002 amounting to P15,230,000.00, which was representations about her education to Her Excellency, Gloria
disproportionate to her lawful source of income. They contended that the Macapagal Arroyo and by indicating a false date on her Personal Data
following properties were unlawfully acquired:15 Sheet; and
d) [A]cquiring, during her incumbency an amount of property and/or
Kind of Property Year Purchased Acquisition Cost
money manifestly out of proportion to her salary and to her other
Parañaque lawful income (Section 8,22 [Republic Act No.] 3019); and
 Residential Property 1999 [P]3 Million
e) [C]oncealing unlawfully acquired property (Sections 2 and 12 in
Novaliches relation to Section 1(b)(1-3)23 of Republic Act No. 1379)[.]24
 Residential Property 1997 [P]3.5 Million The administrative case was docketed as OMB-L-A-04-0057-B, while the
Baguio Residential criminal case was docketed as OMB-L-C-04-0083-B.25
 Property 1995 [P]2 Million
On April 12, 2004, Iglesias filed her Counter-Affidavit with Counter-
Baguio Residential Property 1994 [P]2 Million Complaint26 in the administrative case. She produced copies of her filed
annual SALNs since 1989 and attached them to her Counter-Affldavit. 27
Dump Trucks 1991 [P]1.6 Million
Elf 1991 [P]800,000 Iglesias countered that she did not falsify the mode of acquisition of the
Pangasinan and Quezon City properties in her SALNs.28 Iglesias and her
Van 1999 [P]680,000
sister, Rosario de Joya-Ablang (Rosario), inherited the Quezon City property
Van 1999 [P]850,000 from their parents.29 She "merely bought out her sister's share of their joint
inherited property[.]"30 Regarding the Pangasinan property, Iglesias
Car 2002 [P]800,00016 reasoned that she acquired the property through purchase and donation
Finally, Atty. Acuña and Pizarro averred that Iglesias made false when her mother, Marina, sold it to her for an amount well below its true
representations when she dechtred in her letter to then President Gloria value.31
Macapagat-Arroyo that she was taking up Masters in Customs
Administration, instead of Masters in Management.17 They also alleged that Iglesias explained that she did not declare the three (3) Pangasinan
Iglesias falsified her Personal Data Sheet when she antedated its properties because these were classified as public lands and the
execution.18 Department of Environment and Natural Resources had yet to award the
properties to her. She contended that she was merely considered an
They charged Iglesias with the following: applicant for the grant of the public lands. 32
a) Making untruthful statements in her SAL[N]s a,nd failing to disclose
all of her properties in her SAL[N]s (Article 171(4)19 of the Revised On the alleged illegally acquired properties, Iglesias disclosed that she
Penal Code); acquired these properties either by purchase or inheritance. She obtained a
loan of P9,000,000.00 from Philippine National Bank to buy out Rosario's
b) Failing to submit her SAL[N]s as required by Sections (sic) 11 in share and to purchase the Novaliches and Baguio properties. She also sold a
relation to Section 820 of Republic Act No. 6713 and Section 7 21 of property in Baguio to purchase the Parañaque property. To pay her
Republic Act No. 3019; obligations, she leased her Quezon City property from July 15, 2000 to
January 2004. She acquired another loan of P2,000,000.00 from Philippine
National Bank-Dagupan Branch to start her trucking business.33
Iglesias asserted that the foreclosure of the Quezon City property for non-
payment of her loan "belies the false accusation . . . that [she] is a corrupt
government official[.]"34
Iglesias argued that her educational attainment was correctly stated in her
resume. She initially took up a master's degree in Customs Administration
but was not able to finish the degree and eventually shifted to
Management.35 Lastly, the false date on her Personal Data Sheet was a
typographical error.36
She claimed that the allegations against her were false and baseless and
that Atty. Acuña and Pizarro should be held "criminally liable for malicious
prosecution" and "for making unbuthful statements under oath in their
Complaint-Affidavit."37
Iglesias filed a Motion for Extension of Time to File CounterAffidavit in the
criminal case. However, she was still unable to file her counter-affidavit. 38
On April 15, 2004, the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon issued an
Order39 in connection with the administrative case, preventively suspending
Iglesias for six (6) months while the investigation was ongoing.40
On August 27, 2004, the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon issued
an Order requiring the parties to present their arguments in their respective
position papers. Iglesias submitted her position paper on September 20,
2004 reiterating her arguments. The Department of Finance submitted its
position paper on October 5, 2004 and disclosed new information regarding
the business interest of Iglesias in Golden Grove Realty and Development
Corporation. Its position paper also included recorqs of cases filed against
lglesias.41
On October 12, 2004, Graft Investigation and Prosecution Officer I Robert C.
Reñido (Prosecution Officer Reñido) of the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman
for Luzon issued a Joint Resolution42 resolving the administrative and
criminal cases. Prosecution Officer Reñido considered Iglesias' Counter-
Affidavit in the administrative cae as her counter-affidavit in the criminal
case "[f]or purposes of exigency and in the interest of justice and due
process."43
Prosecution Officer Reñido found that Atty. Acuña and Pizarro did not
conduct an intensive investigation before they filed the complaint against
Iglesias,44 who was able to submit uthentic copies of her filed SALNs from
1989 to 1999.45
He gave merit to Iglesias' explanation that the Quezon City and Pangasinan
propertis were part of her inheritance from her parents Since Iglesias
inherited a great portion of the Quezon City property from her parent, she
did not err in declaring the property as acquired through
inheritance.46 Meanwhile, the Pangasinan property was intended to be
donated to Iglesias by her mother. They relied on the credibility of the
lawyer who made a deed of sale instead of a deed of donation to facilitate
the transaction.47
Prosecution Officer Reñido held that Iglesias was correct in not declaring the
three (3) Pangasinan properties in her SALNs, as she had not yet acquired
them,48 On thalleged illegally acquired properties, he stated that Iglesias
"was able to shed light on how she was able to lawfully acquire [these]
assets."49
On the alleg tion that Iglesias falsified her educational attainment,
Prosecution Officer Reñido ruled that Iglesias had sufficiently proven that
she shifted to Management upon learning that the Civil Service Commission
did not require a specific geme of a master's degree.50 He also found that
the alleged falsification of Iglesias' Personal Data Sheet was a mere
typographical error.51
Prosecution Officer Reñido recommended the dismissal of both
cases.52 Likewise, he recommended that the preventive suspension be lifted
upon the Joint Resolution's approval.53
Director Emilio A. Gonzalez III of the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for
Luzon approved the Joint Resolution. However, Deputy Ombudsman for
Luzon Victor C. Fernandez recommended its disapproval.54
On February 7, 2005, the Office of the Ombudsman issued a
Resolution55 reviewing the October 12, 2004 Joint Resolution. Ombudsman
Simeon V. Marcelo (Ombudsman Marcelo) held that Iglesias failed to justify
the substantial increase in her net worth. In just one (1) year, her net worth
as declared in her SALN increased from P245,000.00 in 1989 to
P1,685,000.00 in 1990.56
Ombudsman Marcelo ciiscovered that Iglesias' cash declaration escalated
from P250,000.00 in her 1991 SALN to P1,770,000.00 in her 1992 SALN. She
also acquired the Baguio, Parañaque, and Novaliches properties from 1994
to 2000.57
In examining Iglesias' SALNs, Ombudsman Marcelo found that she obtained
housing loans of P14,000,000.00 in 1994, P26,000,000.00 in 1998, and
P29,000,000.00 in 1999.58 Since the housing loans were not supported by
evidence, Ombudsman Marcelo considered them "spurious or non-existent,
meant only to cover up the rapidly increasing assets of [Iglesias]."59
According to Ombudsman Marcelo, Iglesias also falsified her Personal Data
Sheet "when she denied having any criminal charges ever filed against her . .
. despite evidence to the contrary."60 Iglesias had two (2) pending estafa
cases and three (3) dismissed cases before the lower courts, as stated in the
National Bureau of Investigation's May 22, 2001 Certification.61 She likewise
committed falsification when she did not declare the true value of the
Pampanga property and reported its worth at only P50,000.00.62
As for Iglesias' allegation of leasing her Quezon City property and starting a
trucking business, Ombudsman Marcelo stated that there was np evidence
presented to support her claims. She also failed to declare the alleged
trucking business in her SALN.63
Ombudsman Marcelo held that the acts of Iglesias constitute dishonesty and
grave misconduct, punishable by dismissal from service under Rule IV,
Section 52(A) of the Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil
Service, in relation to Book V, Sections 9 and 22 of the Administrative Code
of 1987.64
The dispositive portion of the Resolution read:
WHEREFORE, the 12 October 2004 Joint Resolution is DISAPPROVED.
Respondent ALBERTA DE JOYA-IGLESIAS is hereby found guilty of the
administrative offense of DISHONESTY and GRAVE MISCONDUCT. Thus, she
is ordered DISMISSED from the service, with cancellation of eligibility,
forfeiture of leave credits and retirement benefits, and disqualification for
reemployment in the government service.
Moreover, sufficient probable cause exists to hold respondent ALBERTA DE
JOYA IGLESIAS liable for violation of Art. 171 (Falsification) and Art. 183
(Perjury) of the Revised Penal Code. Let the Infonnations charging her with
the said offenses be forthwith filed against her before the appropriate court.
Additionally, let a Petition for Forfeiture of Unlawfully Acquired Properties
be filed before the proper court against respondent in view of the herein
found accumulation of unexplained wealth.
The Field Investigation Office (FIO) is hereby ordered to investigate the
matter regarding the false valuation made on the Deed of Sale covering the
Pampanga property transferred in favor of respondent and secure the
necessary documentary evidence for the purpose of filing a criminal
complaint for Falsification against her.
SO ORDERED.65 (Emphasis in the original)
Iglesias moved for reconsideration,66 which was denied by the Office of the
Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon in its February 21, 2005 Joint Order. 67
Iglesias appealed the February 7, 2005 Resolution of the Office of the
Ombudsman and the February 21, 2005 Joint Order of the Office of the
Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon before the Court of Appeals.68
Iglesias argued that she was denied administrative due process. She claimed
that there was failurto meet the substantial evidence requirement in
administrative proceedings.69 Further, she asserted that her defense of
denial and the presence of mitigating circumstances should have been
considered by the Office of the Ombudsman and the Office of the Deputy
Ombudsman for Luzon.70
In its December 22, 2006 Decision,71 the Court of Appeals affinned the
assailed February 7, 2005 Resolution and February 21, 2005 Joint Order.72 It
held that there was no denial of due process since Iglesias was able to
explain her side in her Counter-Affidavit and her Motion for Reconsideration
of the February 7, 2005 Resolution.73
The Court of Appeals declared that the assailed Resolution and Joint Order
rest on substantial evidence; hence, the Office of the Ombudsman and the
Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon did not cmnmit any grave abuse
of discretion.74 It added that Iglesias' defense of denial and the alleged WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN
mitigating circumstances were bereft of merit.75 DISMISSING THE PETITION FOR CERTIORARI

Iglesias moved for reconsideration, which was denied76 by the Court of
Appeals in its November 21, 2007 Resolution.77
78
Hence, on January 17, 2008, Iglesias filed this Petition for Review  with an
application for temporary restraining order against the Office of the
Ombudsman and the Department of Finance officers, namely,
Commissioner George M. Jereos (Commissioner Jereos), Deputy
Commissioner Roberto G. Geotina (Deputy Commissioner Geotina), Acting
Collector Juan T. Tan (Tan), Acting Disbursement Officer Kristine Morales
(Morales), and Commissioner Alberto Lina (Commissioner Lina) (collectively,
respondents).
Petitioner alleges that respondent Tan took her place as Acting District
Collector during her preventive suspension. However, after the termination
of her six (6)-month suspension, she was not automatically reinstated to her
position and respondent Tan was confirmed as Acting District Collector.
Petitioner claims that she was demoted as Deputy Collector for Operations
without due process.79
Petitioner asserts that respondents Commissioner Jereos and Deputy
Commissioner Geotina immediately implemented the dismissal order while
her motion for reconsideration of the February 7, 2005 Resolution was stiil
pending before the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon. Thus,
respondent Morales immediately withheld her salary and other
benefits.80 Respondent Commissioner Lina was included as a nominal party-
respondent.81
Petitioner prays that the December 22, 2006 Decision and November 21,
2007 Resolution of the Court of Appeals be nullified and set aside. Petitioner
likewise prays that judgment be rendered absolving her of any criminal and
administrative liability and reinstating her to her former position as Acting
District Collector at the Port of San Femando.82
Petitioner raises the following issues:
I.
II.
WHETHER OR NOT THE PETITIONER WAS DENIED DUE PROCESS OF LAW
III.
WHETHER PETITIONER WAS DENIED OF HER RIGHT TO BE INFORMED OF
THE CHARGES AGAINST HER83
Petitioner argues that she was not given an opportunity to refute the new
accusations and charges against her which were not stated in the
Complaint-Affidavit. Her filing of a Motion for Reconsideration did "not
address the fact that she was never informed of the true allegations against
her."84 Thus, she claims that "her right to be informed of the accusations
against her and to be afforded with due process of law has been violated." 85
On April 25, 2000, respondents officers of the Department of Finance,
through the Office of the Solicitor General, filed their Comment86 and
prayed for the denial of the Petition.87 They assert that petitioner was
properly informed of the charges against her.88 Moreover, her right to due
process was not violated since she was given enough opportunity to counter
the allegations:
In this case, petitioner was able to file her Counter-Affidavit dated April 6,
2004 in OMB-L-A-04-0057-B. She was likewise given the opportunity to file
her counter-affidavit in OMB-L-C-04-0083-B but she failed to do so despite
her having filed a Motion for Extension of Time to File Counter-Affidavit
dated March 19, 2004. Based on the Comment dated September 21, 2005 of
the Office of the Ombudsman, the petitioner even filed a Motion for Early
Resolution and Lifting of Preventive Suspension, and a Position Paper.
Moreover, she likewise filed her Motion for Reconsideration dated February
14, 2005.
Clearly, petitioner was given opportunity to explain her side and she moved
for reconsideration of the challenged Resolution dated February 7, 2005.
She was never denied her right to due process.89 (Emphasis in the original)
On May 5, 2008, respondent Office of the Ombudsman filed its
Comment90 and likewise prayed for the denial of the Petition. It argues that
the Court of Appeals was correct in ruling "that petitioner was afforded due
process by the Office of the Ombudsman and [that] the questioned
resolutions were supported by substantial evidence and based on the
records and evidence at hand."91
The Office of the Ombudsman counters that petitioner was not denied due
process since "petitioner had the opportunity to present her side, submit
countervailing evidence to refute the Department of Finance's claims and
even move for a reconsideration of the decision."92 Further, it asserts that
"petitioner was sufficiently informed of the charges against her as shown in
her Counter-Affidavit, Motion for Early Resolution and Lifting of Preventive
Suspension, Position Paper and the assailed Resolutions of the Office of the
Ombudsman."93
On May 14, 2008, petitioner filed her Reply and reiterated that she was
denied due process since she was not informed of the offenses charged
against her.94
On July 8, 2009, this Court issued a Resolution 95 requiring the parties to
submit their respective memoranda. Petitioner filed her Memorandum96 on
September 18, 2009, while respondent Office of the Ombudsman filed its
Memorandum97 on October 1, 2009. Both parties reiterated their arguments
in their earlier pleadings. Respondents officers of the Department of Finance
failed to file their memorandum.
On September 30, 2010, petitioner also filed a Supplement to the
Supplemental Memorandum.98
On October 17, 2011, petitioner again filed a Supplemental
Memorandum.99 She stated that Branch 45, Metropolitan Trial Court of
Pasay City issued a Joint Decision100 acquitting her of three (3) counts of
perjury in Criminal Case Nos. 05-1160, 05-1161, and 05-1162.101 The perjury
cases alleged that petitioner made untruthful statements in connection with
three (3) real properties on her December 31, 2000 SALN.102 Petitioner
contends that since she was able to counter the anomalies in her
statements, she "should only be held liable for simple neglect of duty."103
On January 21, 2015, petitioner filed her last Supplemental
Memorandum.104 Petitioner informed this Com1 that the other falsification
and perjury cases related to the present case were dismissed by the trial
courts, particularly:
a. Criminal Case No. Q-05-137 (pending before the Regional
Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 77) - dismissed on 30
January 2008;
b. Criminal Cases (sic) Nos. 05-1160 to 1162 (For Perjury,
pending before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Pasay City,
Branch 45) - acquitting the accused on 21 June 2011[;]
c. Criminal Case Nos. (sic) 421447-62-CR (For Perjury, pending
before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila, Branch 1) -
acquitting the accused on 30 April 2014[;]
d. Criminal Case No. 05-238700 (For Falsification of Public
Document, pending before the Metropolitan Trial Court of
Manila, Branch 30) acquitting the accused on 23 July
2014[;] [and]
e. Criminal Case Nos. 40970 to 72 (For Perjury, pending before
the Municipal Trial Court in Cities of San Fernando City, La
Union) - acquitting the accused on 17 October 2014.105
This Court resolves the main issue of whether or not petitioner was denied
of administrative due process when the Resolution dismissing her appeal
was based on allegations that were not contained in the Complaint.
Resolving this main issue will pass on the issues of whether or not petitioner
was denied of her right to be informed of the charges against her and
whether or not petitioner was denied of her right to due process. Since
these issues are interrelated, they will be addressed jointly.
Petitioner's contention has no merit.
Administrative due process demands that the party being charged is given
an opportunity to be heard.106 Due process is complied with "if the party
who is properly notified of allegations against him or her is given an
opportunity to defend himself or herself against those allegations, and such
defense was considered by the tribunal in arriving at its own independent
conclusions."107
In F/O Ledesma v. Court of Appeals:108
Due process is satisfied when a person is notified of the charge against him
and given an opportunity to explain or defend himself. In administrative
proceedings, the filing of charges and giving reasonable opportunity for the
person so charged to answer the accusations against him constitute the
minimum requirements of due process. The essence of due process is simply
to be heard, or as applied to administrative proceedings, an opportunity to
explain one's side, or an o£portunity to seek a reconsideration of the action
or ruling complained of.109
An important component of due process is the right of the accused to be
informed of the nature of the charges against him or her. 110 A proper
appraisal of the accusations would give the accused an opportunity to
adequately prepare for his or her defense. Otherwise, substantial justice
would be undermined.111
In this case, petitioner insists that the February 7, 2005 Resolution of the
Office of the Ombudsman was based on new accusations that were not
included in the Complaint Affidavit filed by Atty. Acuña and Pizarro. She
anchors her argument on the findings of the Ombudsman:
"In her first year in the government service, respondent reported a net
worth of P245,000.00 in her 1989 SALN, which swiftly grew to
P1,685,000.00 during her second year (1990 SALN). The additional
P1,440,000.00 accumulated by respondent is a 60% jump from her 1989 net
worth. During that same period, respondent was able to purchase a
property in Paco, Manila, in the amount of P800,000.00, acquired additional
jewelry worth P250,000.00, and maintained cash in the bank in the amount
of P400,000.00. This sudden upsurge in respondent's net worth, within the
short period of one (1) year, is unjustified considering that she had no other
employment, business activity or financial interests from which the
acquisitions can be funded other than her employment in the Bureau of
Customs.
"Respondent's 1991 and 1992 SALN likewise reflected the meteoric rise of
her assets. From the declared cash of P250,000.00 in 1991, the same soared
high to the amount of P1,770,000.00 which was not sufficiently justified or
explained by her income from the government, or her reported total new
loans of P610,000.00, consisting of jewelry loan in the amount of
P110,000.00 and an agricultural loan in the amount of P500,000.00.
"Apart from the properties in New Manila, Quezon City, and Pampanga
which respondent justified as to have been inherited by her from her
parents, respondent is likewise the owner of several properties located in
Baguio City, Parañaque City, and Novaliches, Quezon City, which she
acquired beginning 1994 to 2000."112 (Emphasis in the original)
Considering the above, this Court finds that there was a violation of due
process with respect to the other charges which were not in the original
complaint. This Court sternly reminds the Ombudsman that he cannot add
new findings which were not part of the original complaint. To do so would
violate the right of the accused to due process.
However, there were charges in the original complaint which should
prosper. A reading of the Office of the Ombudsman Resolution reveals that
she was dismissed from service not solely on the irregularities found in her
1989 to 1999 SALNs but also because of anomalies found in her 2000 to
2002 SALNs, which she was informed of and was given the opportunity to
refute. Petitioner conveniently left out in her pleadings the following
findings of the Office of the Ombudsman:
It should be noted, however, that respondent has two (2) Baguio properties
indicated in her 2000-2002 SALNs. The first Baguio property was acquired in
1995, thus, its declaration in her 1996 SALN. From 1996-1999, she had been
maintaining that same property. However, as evidenced by her 2000 SALN,
she acquired another property in Baguio. Presuming that, as claimed by
respondent, the PNB loan paid for the acquisition of the first Baguio
property, with what funds did she acquire the second Baguio property?
Moreover, on the same year, respondent also acquired the Para[ñ]aque
property. Although respondent claims that she sold one of the Baguio
properties to buy the Para[ñ]aque property, she continued to declare the
Baguio properties as her own in her SALN for 2000-2002. This, therefore,
would belie any assertion of sale . . .
Incidentally, it should be noted that during the years 2000-2002, respondent
was no longer declaring any cash in bank as part of her assets. She did not
declare the proceeds received from the sale of the Baguio property to Mario
Nicolas despite her admission that she was given the initial payment of
P1,100,000.00. Granted that she used P1,000,000.00 thereof to make the
[down payment] on the Para[ñ]aque property, this would still leave her with
P100,000.00 cash in hand, not to forget the balance of P1,100,000.00 still
owing her, which should have been declared as patt of her assets.
As for the monthly amortization for the Para[ñ]aque property that had to be
paid to BPI, the claim that the rentals on the New Manila property answered
for it does not seem to hold water. First, respondent claims that in view of
the fact that she has defaulted on the payments on the PNB loan, the PNB
has since foreclosed the property. The inscription at the back of the title
states that the property was foreclosed in 1999. This, thus, precludes
respondent from having the place rented. Second, assuming that the said
foreclosure is being contested and is now the subject of pending litigation, it
is a puzzle how the lease was effected and why it was made for a lengthy
period of time. Third, respondent did not specify how much the lease rental
was and if it were sufficient to pay for the monthly mortgage owing BPI,
and, most importantly, respondent failed to present evidence to
substantiate the claim of lease by JIM-Mar Enterprises.
....
As for the trucks and vans, respondent justifies that the same were acquired
by virtue of a loan from PNB-Dagupan Branch in the amount of Two Million
Pe os (P2,000,000.00). She claims that the same loan was used to buy the
dump trucks, van, and other equipment, and as operating capital for her
trucking business. Respondent, however, failed to present evidence
regarding the said loan and the security used to obtain it. She also did not
present any evidence regarding the trucking business. Also, she did not
disclose this in her SALN as one of her business interests.
Further, respondent admitted to committing another act of falsific:ation. In
explaining the classification of the Pampanga property as an
inheritance/donation inter vivos, respondent admitted that she misdeclared
the true value of the said land as merely P50,000.00 in the Deed of Sale
conveying the said property in her favor. This scheme was obviously
resorted to in order to evade the payment of higher taxes. 113 (Emph[lsis
supplied)
Even if the findings in relation to petitioner's 1989 to 1999 SALNs were
disregarded, petitioner would still be liable for the discrepancies in her 2000
to 2002 SALNs. These discrepancies were stated in the Complaint Affidavit
and were given clarification by petitioner in her Counter-Affidavit and
Position Paper. Moreover, she was able to move for reconsideration of the
Office of the Ombudsman February 7, 2005 Resolution. These circumstances
preclude petitioner from claiming that she was denied her right to due
process.
On a final note, this Court endeavors to strike a balance between the
accountability of public officers as a result of public office being a privilege,
on the one hand, and their right to privacy as protected in the Bill of Rights,
on the other. Although this Court has held that the requirement of
submitting a SALN does not violate the right to privacy of public officers,114 it
does not mean that they should completely shed this right. Therefore,
minor or explainable errors in the SALN, which cannot be related to an
attempt to conceal illicit activities should not be punishable. This Court may
relax the rule on strictly complying with the SALN in cases where minor
errors were committed since these may simply be used to harass and
obstruct public officers in the performance of their duties. However, the
errors in this case were so substantial and glaring that they should not
escape prosecution.
WHEREFORE, the Decision dated December 22, 2006 and the Resolution
dated November 1, 4007 of the Court of Appeals in CA G.R. SP No. 89585
are AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION.
Petitioner Alberta de Joya Iglesias is GUILTY of DISHONESTY and GRAVE
MISCONDUCT based on the anomalies found in her 2000 to 2002
Statements of Assets, Liabilities, and Net Worth. Thus, she
is DISMISSED from service, which includes the accessory penalties of
cancellation of eligibility, forfeiture of leave credits and retirement benefits,
and disqualification for re-employment in the government service.
Accordingly, the criminal case against petitioner Alberta de Joya Iglesias
shall proceed on the basis of the anomalies found in her 2000 to 2002
Statements of Assets, Liabilities, and Net Worth.
This is without prejudice to other administrative and criminal charges that
may be filed against her.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 143135            April 4, 2003
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
DAMAYAN NG PUROK 14, INC., respondent.
RESOLUTION
QUISUMBING, J.:
Petitioner assails the decision1 of the Court of Appeals dated March 15,
2000, and its resolution2 dated May 9, 2000, in CA-G.R. SP No. 49274, which
denied for allegedly being a wrong remedy the petition for review filed by
petitioner disputing a resolution of the Commission on the Settlement of
Land Problems (COSLAP). In that resolution, COSLAP declared the area
subject of the present controversy as part of Barangay Signal Village, and
not part of government land as claimed by petitioner for one of its housing
projects.
The facts of the case before us are uncomplicated.
Respondent Damayan ng Purok 14, Inc., is a registered non-stock, non-profit
corporation existing under Philippine laws. Its members are residents of
Purok 14, Zone 3B, Signal Village, Taguig, Metro Manila. They are claiming
an area that forms part of a vast tract of land segregated from Fort
Bonifacio which was declared open for disposition by Presidential
proclamation.3
Petitioner is represented herein by the Armed Forces of the Philippines
Housing Administration (AFPHA), an unincorporated office within the Armed
Forces of the Philippines (AFP), organized pursuant to GHO General Order
No. 91 dated February 27, 1979.
Respondent Damayan ng Purok 14, Inc., filed a complaint before the
COSLAP, alleging that petitioner herein had encroached upon an area
comprising 10,600 square meters of Lot 1, SWO-13-00258, in Barangay
Signal Village. After due hearing, the COSLAP rendered a
resolution4 declaring, among others, some 98,207 square meters of the
contested lot as part of Barangay Signal Village and generally not available
for government projects. Petitioner moved for a reconsideration of this
resolution, but COSLAP denied its motion in an order5 dated September 4,
1998.
Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals via a petition for review under
Rule 43 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. 6 The Court of Appeals
dismissed it in a decision promulgated on March 15, 2000, for being the
wrong mode of appeal, thus:
Both Executive Order No. 561, Creating the Commission on the
Settlement of Land Problems, and the Rules of Procedure adopted
and promulgated by COSLAP explicitly provides that the mode of
appeal from the final order, decision or resolution of the
Commission shall be appealable by certiorari only to the Supreme
Court.
Thus, under par. 4, Supreme Court Circular No. 2-90, an appeal
taken to either the Supreme Court or the Court of Appeals by the
wrong or inappropriate mode shall be dismissed.
WHEREFORE, foregoing considered, the instant petition is hereby
DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.7
Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was likewise denied. Hence, the
instant petition raising as sole issue: To which court should the decision of
the COSLAP be appealed?8
Fortunately, this issue is no longer pristine. In Henry Sy v. Commission on
Settlement of Land Problems and Femina Mina, G.R. No. 140903,
promulgated September 12, 2001, we have ruled squarely on that question.
Private respondent Mina had bought parcels of land that she discovered
were occupied by entities claiming to be owners thereof, including the mall
called SM Fairview. She filed a complaint before the COSLAP, which in turn
summoned Henry Sy as manager of SM Fairview. The latter’s counsel,
through a "Special Appearance," moved to dismiss the complaint for lack of
jurisdiction. The motion was denied, prompting Sy to file before this Court a
petition for certiorari and prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court,
based on Section 3 (2) of EO No. 561, the law creating COSLAP.9
As held in Sy v. Commission, aforecited, the appeal from the orders,
resolutions or decisions of COSLAP shall be taken to the Court of Appeals,
under Rule 43 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. We declared:
It is readily apparent that appeals from the COSLAP may not be
brought directly before us in view of Rule 45, Section 1. Likewise, if a
petition for certiorari under Rule 65 is the prescribed remedy, the
Court of Appeals cannot be bypassed without running afoul of the
doctrine of judicial hierarchy. In this connection, it cannot be
doubted that the COSLAP is among those quasi-judicial agencies
exercising quasi-judicial functions. No convincing reason exists why
appeals from the COSLAP should be treated differently from other
quasi-judicial agencies whose orders, resolutions or decision are
directly appealable to the Court of Appeals under Rule 43 of the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. Moreover, the enumeration of the
agencies therein mentioned is not exclusive. In that sense, Section 3
(2) of E.O. No. 561 declaring that the COSLAP’s orders, resolutions
or decisions are appealable exclusively to this Court is erroneous in
the light of Section 1, Rule 45 and Section 1, Rule 43 of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure, supra.
As with other administrative agencies discharging quasi-judicial
functions, recourse must first be had through the Court of Appeals.
There is nothing novel or objectionable to this, for as we
emphasized in Fabian,
Furthermore, it cannot be said that the transfer of appellate
jurisdiction to the Court of Appeals in this case is an act of
creating a new right of appeal because such power of the
Supreme Court to transfer appeals to subordinate appellate
courts is purely a procedural and not a substantive power.
Neither can we consider such transfer as impairing a vested
right because the parties have still a remedy and still a
competent tribunal to administer that remedy.
Thus, it has been generally held that rules or statutes
involving a transfer of cases from one court to another, are
procedural and remedial merely and that, as such, they are
applicable to actions pending at the time the statute went
into effect or, in the case at bar, when its invalidity was
declared. Accordingly, even from the standpoint of
jurisdiction ex hypothesi, the validity of the transfer of
appeals in said cases to the Court of Appeals can be
sustained.
In other words, all appeals from orders, resolutions or decisions of
public respondent (COSLAP) shall be taken to the Court of Appeals
in accordance with Rule 43 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.10
Accordingly, we rule that the appellate court erred in its assailed decision
dismissing the petition by herein petitioner against respondent Damayan ng
Purok 14, Inc. Petitioner properly brought its petition to the Court of
Appeals seeking a review of a resolution of COSLAP as a quasi-judicial
agency.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The decision of the Court of Appeals
dated March 14, 2000, denying the petition in CA-G.R. SP No. 49274, and its
resolution dated May 9, 2000, denying the motion for reconsideration, are
SET ASIDE. The Court of Appeals is hereby ordered to take cognizance of the
petition for review filed by petitioner Republic of the Philippines for
resolution without further delay.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 175787               February 4, 2009
PHILLIPS SEAFOOD (PHILIPPINES) CORPORATION, Petitioner,
vs.
THE BOARD OF INVESTMENTS, Respondent.
DECISION
TINGA, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari1 under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure, assailing two related resolutions of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. SP No. 89327. The Resolution2 dated 24 May 2006 dismissed
petitioner’s petition for review under Rule 43 and its omnibus motion
seeking to amend the petition and to suspend the period for filing a reply.
The Resolution3 dated 24 November 2006 denied petitioner’s motion for
reconsideration of the earlier resolution.
The following factual antecedents are matters of record.
Petitioner Phillips Seafood (Philippines) Corporation is a domestic
corporation engaged in the export of processed crabmeat and other
seafood products. Petitioner was incorporated on 20 October 1992 and
registered under its previous corporate name of Phillips Seafood Masbate,
Inc.
On 08 January 1993, petitioner registered with respondent Bureau of
Investments (BOI) as an existing and expansion producer of soft shell crabs
and other seafood products, on a non-pioneer status under Certificate of
Registration No. EP 93-219.4 Petitioner’s plant was situated in Piña,
Masbate, while its administrative office was then located in Cebu City
before it was subsequently relocated to Calong-Calong, Airport Subdivision,
Bacolod City.
Petitioner was granted an Income Tax Holiday (ITH) for six (6) years
beginning July 1993 to July 1999,5 for locating in a less-developed area in
accordance with Article 406 of Executive Order (E.O.) No. 226, otherwise
known as The Omnibus Investments Code of 1987.
Petitioner used to supply semi-processed raw materials to Phillips Seafood
(Phils.), Inc. (PSPI), an affiliate corporation also engaged in the export of
seafood products, before the latter’s closure due to financial difficulties. On
21 July 1997, petitioner acquired the right to use the canning facility of PSPI
in Bacolod City during the temporary suspension of PSPI’s operations.
Unable to recover from its financial reverses, PSPI eventually stopped
operations.
On 14 December 1998, petitioner acquired the title to the plant, facilities,
equipment and other assets belonging to PSPI, including its picking facilities
in Cebu City.7 In October 1999, petitioner relocated its plant and office in
Bacolod City to Barangay Banica, Roxas City. Petitioner informed respondent
BOI of said transfer.8 Petitioner also filed with respondent BOI an application
for registration of its new plant having an expanded capacity of 155,205
kilograms a year.
In a letter dated 18 November 1999, respondent BOI informed petitioner
that the latter’s ITH under Certificate of Registration No. EP
93-219 would be extended until 12 August 2000, pursuant to Article 39 (a)
(1) (ii)9 of Executive Order No. 226.10
On 06 January 2000, respondent BOI granted petitioner’s application for
registration of its new plant in Roxas City under Certificate of Registration
No. VI EP 2000-002. Petitioner’s registration was categorized as a new
producer on a non-pioneer status with an ITH for four years beginning
January 2000.11
On 22 June 2000, respondent BOI approved the registration of petitioner as
a "New Producer of Processed Fish" under another Certificate of
Registration No. XI EP 2000-74 with an ITH for four years beginning April
2000.12
On 04 May 2000, petitioner filed with respondent BOI an application for an
ITH for taxable year 1999 under Certificate of Registration No. EP 93-219. It
filed another application for an ITH for the year 2000 under Certificate of
Registration No. VI EP 2000-002 covering its crabmeat products and under
Certificate of Registration No. XI EP 20000-74 covering its processed fish
products.1avvphi1
Petitioner changed its corporate name from PS-Masbate to its current name
of Phillips Seafood (Philippines) Corporation, which was approved by
respondent BOI on 16 February 2001.13
In a letter dated 25 September 2003, respondent BOI informed petitioner
that the ITH previously granted would be applicable only to the period from
13 August 1999 to 21 October 1999 or before petitioner’s transfer to a "not
less-developed area."14 Petitioner wrote respondent BOI requesting for a
reconsideration of its decision.15
On 03 May 2004, petitioner received by fax BOI’s letter denying its motion
for reconsideration.16 Petitioner elevated the matter to the Office of the
President, which dismissed petitioner’s appeal on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction in a Decision dated 22 September 2004.17 The Office of the
President likewise denied petitioner’s motion for reconsideration in an
Order dated 14 March 2005.18 Petitioner received a copy of the order on 01
April 2005.
On 05 April 2005, petitioner filed a petition for review before the Court of
Appeals, questioning the dismissal of its appeal before the Office of the
President. The petition argued that the executive power of control over the
acts of officials under the Office of the President is superior to the appellate
jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals over decisions of quasi-judicial agencies
under the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.19
After respondent BOI filed its comment on the petition, petitioner filed an
omnibus motion asking for leave to file an amended petition to counter the
issues raised in the comment for the first time and to suspend the period for
filing a reply.20
On 24 May 2006, the Court of Appeals rendered the first assailed resolution
denying petitioner’s omnibus motion and dismissing its petition for review.
The appellate court denied petitioner’s omnibus motion on the ground that
the same was filed with intent to delay the case. Simultaneously, the
appellate court dismissed the petition for review for having been filed out of
time as petitioner opted to appeal to the Office of the President instead of
filing a Rule 43 petition to the Court of Appeals within the reglementary
period. On 24 November 2006, the Court of Appeals issued the second
assailed resolution denying petitioner’s motion for reconsideration.
Hence, the instant petition anchored on the following arguments: (1)
petitioner’s omnibus motion asking for the amendment of its petition for
review was filed to avoid the multiplicity of suits; (2) the executive power of
control over the acts of department secretaries must not be rendered
illusory by rules of procedure; and (3) petitioner is entitled to the
ITH.1avvphi1
In the main, petitioner argues that the review by the Office of the President
of the decisions of respondent BOI must be allowed; otherwise, the
President’s constitutional power to review the decisions of department
secretaries will be rendered illusory if said decisions may be reviewed only
by the Court of Appeals.
The right to appeal is not a constitutional, natural or inherent right – it is a
statutory privilege and of statutory origin and, therefore, available only if
granted or provided by statute. It may be exercised only in the manner
prescribed by, and in accordance with, the provisions of the law. 21 Thus, in
determining the appellate procedure governing administrative agencies
exercising quasi-judicial or regulatory functions such as respondent BOI, a
perusal of the legislative enactments creating them is imperative.
The BOI was created by virtue of E.O. No. 226 at the time when then
President Corazon Aquino was exercising legislative powers under the
Freedom Constitution Executive Order (E.O.) No. 226, otherwise known as
the Omnibus Investments Acts of 1987, laid down the powers and duties of
respondent both as a policy-making body and a regulatory agency tasked
with facilitating the growth of investment in the country. Article 7, E.O. No.
226 directs respondent to act as a collegial body when exercising its duties
and powers. In addition to its administrative or policy-making and
regulatory functions, the BOI is also empowered to promulgate rules and
regulations to implement the provisions of E.O. No. 226.22
As a policy-making body, the BOI is charged with the duties, among others,
of preparing an annual investment priorities plan that gives incentives to
specific activities,23 of recommending to the Bureau of Immigration the
entry of foreign nationals for employment purposes,24 and of inspecting
registered enterprises for compliance purposes.25
Among the regulatory functions of the BOI are the processing of
applications for registration,26 the cancellation of registration or suspension
of the enjoyment of certain incentives under E.O. No. 226, 27 and the
resolution of controversies arising from the implementation of E.O. No.
226.28 There is no doubt that the resolution of petitioner’s claim that it is
entitled to the ITH in the instant case calls for the exercise of the BOI’s
regulatory functions.
E.O. No. 226 also provides for various remedies from the action or decision
of the BOI, depending on the nature of the controversy. These remedies,
which are interspersed among the provisions of E.O. No. 226, are as follows:
Art. 7. Powers and Duties of the Board. — The Board shall be responsible for
the regulation and promotion of investments in the Philippines. x x x The
presence of four (4) governors shall constitute a quorum and the affirmative
vote of four (4) governors in a meeting validly held shall be necessary to
exercise its powers and perform its duties, which shall be as follows:
(4) After due hearing, decide controversies concerning the implementation
of the relevant books of this Code that may arise between registered
enterprises or investors therein and government agencies, within thirty (30)
days after the controversy has been submitted for decision: Provided, That
the investor or the registered enterprise may appeal the decision of the
Board within thirty (30) days from receipt thereof to the President;
xxx
Art. 36. Appeal from Board’s Decision. — Any order or decision of the Board
shall be final and executory after thirty (30) days from its
promulgation. Within the said period of thirty (30) days, said order or
decision may be appealed to the Office of the President. Where an appeal
has been filed, said order or decision shall be final and executory ninety (90)
days after the perfection of the appeal, unless reversed.
xxx
Art. 50. Cause for Cancellation of Certificate of Authority or Payment of Fine.
— A violation of any of the requirements set forth in Article 49 of the terms
and conditions which the Board may impose shall be sufficient cause to
cancel the certificate of authority issued pursuant to this Book and/or
subject firms to the payment of fines in accordance with the rules and
regulations issued by the Board: x x x Provided, further, That where the
issuance of said license has been irregular or contrary to law, any person
adversely affected thereby may file an action with the Regional Trial Court
where said alien or foreign business organization resides or has its principal
office to cancel said license. In such cases, no injunction shall issue without
notice and hearing; and appeals and other proceedings for review shall be
filed directly with the Supreme Court.
xxx
Art. 82. Judicial Relief. — All orders or decisions of the Board in cases
involving the provisions of this Code shall immediately be executory. No
appeal from the order or decision of the Board by the party adversely
affected shall stay such order or decision: Provided, That all appeals shall be
filed directly with the Supreme Court within thirty (30) days from receipt
of the order or decision. [Emphasis supplied]
E.O. No. 226 apparently allows two avenues of appeal from an action or
decision of the BOI, depending on the nature of the controversy. One mode
is to elevate an appeal to the Office of the President when the action or
decision pertains to either of these two instances: first, in the decisions of
the BOI over controversies concerning the implementation of the relevant
provisions of E.O No. 226 that may arise between registered enterprises or
investors and government agencies under Article 7;29 and second, in an
action of the BOI over applications for registration under the investment
priorities plan under Article 36.30
Another mode of review is to elevate the matter directly to judicial
tribunals. For instance, under Article 50, E.O. No. 226, a party adversely
affected by the issuance of a license to do business in favor of an alien or a
foreign firm may file with the proper Regional Trial Court an action to cancel
said license. Then, there is Article 82, E.O. No. 226, which, in its broad
phraseology, authorizes the direct appeal to the Supreme Court from any
order or decision of respondent BOI "involving the provisions of E.O. No.
226."
E.O. No. 226 contains no provision specifically governing the remedy of a
party whose application for an ITH has been denied by the BOI in the same
manner that Articles 7 and 36 thereof allow recourse to the Office of the
President in certain instances. Nevertheless, Article 82 of E.O. No. 22 is the
catch-all provision allowing the appeal to the courts from all other decisions
of respondent BOI involving the other provisions of E.O. No. 226. The
intendment of the law is undoubtedly to afford immediate judicial relief
from the decision of respondent BOI, save in cases mentioned under Articles
7 and 36.
In relation to Article 82, E.O. No. 226, Section 1 of Rule 43 of the 1997 Rules
of Civil Procedure expressly includes respondent BOI as one of the quasi-
judicial agencies whose judgments or final orders are appealable to the
Court of Appeals via a verified petition for review. Appeals from judgments
and final orders of quasi-judicial agencies are now required to be brought to
the Court of Appeals on a verified petition for review, under the
requirements and conditions in Rule 43 which was precisely formulated and
adopted to provide for a uniform rule of appellate procedure for quasi-
judicial agencies.31
Thus, petitioner should have immediately elevated to the Court of Appeals
the denial by respondent BOI of its application for an ITH. From the letter
dated 09 October 2003 of respondent BOI, which informed petitioner that
its ITH would be extended only from 13 August 1999 to 21 October 1999,
petitioner appealed to the Office of the President, a recourse that is not
sanctioned by either the Rules of Civil Procedure or by the Omnibus
Investments Code of 1987.
Petitioner cannot invoke Article 36 of E.O. No. 226 to justify its appeal to the
Office of the President. Article 36, along with Article 7, which allows
recourse to the Office of the President, applies to specific instances, namely,
controversies between a registered enterprise and a government agency
and decisions concerning the registration of an enterprise,
respectively. Expresio unius est exclusio alterius. This enumeration is
exclusive so that other controversies outside of its
purview, including petitioner’s entitlement to an ITH, can invoke only the
appellate judicial relief provided under Article 82. In the instant case, the
denial of petitioner’s application for an ITH is not within the cases where the
law expressly provides for appellate recourse to the Office of the President.
That being the case, petitioner should have elevated its appeal to the Court
of Appeals under Rule 43.
Petitioner further contends that from the decision of respondent BOI,
appeal to the Office of the President should be allowed; otherwise, the
constitutional power of the President to review acts of department
secretaries will be rendered illusory by mere rules of procedure.
The executive power of control over the acts of department secretaries is
laid down in Section 17, Article VII32 of the 1987 Constitution. The power of
control has been defined as the "power of an officer to alter or modify or
nullify or set aside what a subordinate officer had done in the performance
of his duties and to substitute the judgment of the former for that of the
latter."
Such "executive control" is not absolute. The definition of the structure of
the executive branch of government, and the corresponding degrees of
administrative control and supervision is not the exclusive preserve of the
executive. It may be effectively limited by the Constitution, by law, or by
judicial decisions.33 All the more in the matter of appellate procedure as in
the instant case. Appeals are remedial in nature; hence, constitutionally
subject to this Court’s rule-making power. The Rules of Procedure was
issued by the Court pursuant to
Section 5, Article VIII34 of the Constitution, which expressly empowers the
Supreme Court to promulgate rules concerning the procedure in all courts.
Parenthetically, Administrative Order (A.O.) No. 1835 expressly recognizes an
exception to the remedy of appeal to the Office of the President from the
decisions of executive departments and agencies. Under Section 136 thereof,
a decision or order issued by a department or agency need not be appealed
to the Office of the President when there is a special law that provides for a
different mode of appeal. In the instant case, the enabling law of
respondent BOI, E.O. No. 226, explicitly allows for immediate judicial relief
from the decision of respondent BOI involving petitioner’s application for an
ITH. E.O. No. 226 is a law of special nature and should prevail over A.O. No.
18.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition for review on certiorari is DENIED and the
resolutions of the Court of Appeals dated 24 May 2006 and 24 November
2006 in CA-G.R. SP No. 89327 are AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 162784             June 22, 2007
NATIONAL HOUSING AUTHORITY, petitioner,
vs.
SEGUNDA ALMEIDA, COURT OF APPEALS, and RTC of SAN PEDRO,
LAGUNA, BR. 31, respondents.
DECISION
PUNO, C.J.:
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 filed by the National
Housing Authority (NHA) against the Court of Appeals, the Regional Trial
Court of San Pedro Laguna, Branch 31, and private respondent Segunda
Almeida.
On June 28, 1959, the Land Tenure Administration (LTA) awarded to
Margarita Herrera several portions of land which are part of the Tunasan
Estate in San Pedro, Laguna. The award is evidenced by an Agreement to
Sell No. 3787.1 By virtue of Republic Act No. 3488, the LTA was succeeded by
the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR). On July 31, 1975, the DAR was
succeeded by the NHA by virtue of Presidential Decree No. 757. 2 NHA as the
successor agency of LTA is the petitioner in this case.
The records show that Margarita Herrera had two children: Beatriz Herrera-
Mercado (the mother of private respondent) and Francisca Herrera. Beatriz
Herrera-Mercado predeceased her mother and left heirs.
Margarita Herrera passed away on October 27, 1971.3
On August 22, 1974, Francisca Herrera, the remaining child of the late
Margarita Herrera executed a Deed of Self-Adjudication claiming that she is
the only remaining relative, being the sole surviving daughter of the
deceased. She also claimed to be the exclusive legal heir of the late
Margarita Herrera.
The Deed of Self-Adjudication was based on a Sinumpaang Salaysay dated
October 7, 1960, allegedly executed by Margarita Herrera. The pertinent
portions of which are as follows:
SINUMPAANG SALAYSAY
SA SINO MAN KINAUUKULAN;
Akong si MARGARITA HERRERA, Filipina, may 83 taong gulang, balo,
kasalukuyang naninirahan at tumatanggap ng sulat sa Nayon ng San
Vicente, San Pedro Laguna, sa ilalim ng panunumpa ay malaya at
kusang loob kong isinasaysay at pinagtitibay itong mga sumusunod:
1. Na ako ay may tinatangkilik na isang lagay na lupang tirikan
(SOLAR), tumatayo sa Nayon ng San Vicente, San Pedro, Laguna,
mayroong PITONG DAAN AT PITUMPU'T ISANG (771) METRONG
PARISUKAT ang laki, humigit kumulang, at makikilala sa tawag na
Lote 17, Bloke 55, at pag-aari ng Land Tenure Administration;
2. Na ang nasabing lote ay aking binibile, sa pamamagitan ng
paghuhulog sa Land Tenure Administration, at noong ika 30 ng Julio,
1959, ang Kasunduang sa Pagbibile (AGREEMENT TO SELL No. 3787)
ay ginawa at pinagtibay sa Lungsod ng Maynila, sa harap ng Notario
Publico na si G. Jose C. Tolosa, at lumalabas sa kaniyang Libro
Notarial bilang Documento No. 13, Pagina No. 4; Libro No. IV, Serie
ng 1959;
3. Na dahilan sa ako'y matanda na at walang ano mang hanap
buhay, ako ay nakatira at pinagsisilbihan nang aking anak na si
Francisca Herrera, at ang tinitirikan o solar na nasasabi sa unahan ay
binabayaran ng kaniyang sariling cuarta sa Land Tenure
Administration;
4. Na alang-alang sa nasasaysay sa unahan nito, sakaling ako'y
bawian na ng Dios ng aking buhay, ang lupang nasasabi sa unahan
ay aking ipinagkakaloob sa nasabi kong anak na FRANCISCA
HERRERA, Filipina, nasa katamtamang gulang, kasal kay Macario
Berroya, kasalukuyang naninirahan at tumatanggap ng sulat sa
Nayong ng San Vicente, San Pedro Laguna, o sa kaniyang mga
tagapagmana at;
5. Na HINIHILING KO sa sino man kinauukulan, na sakaling ako nga
ay bawian na ng Dios ng aking buhay ay KILALANIN, IGALANG at
 PAGTIBAYIN ang nilalaman sa pangalan ng aking anak na si Francisca
Herrera ang loteng nasasabi sa unahan.
SA KATUNAYAN NG LAHAT, ako ay nag-didiit ng hinlalaki ng kanan
kong kamay sa ibaba nito at sa kaliwang gilid ng unang dahon, dito
sa Lungsod ng Maynila, ngayong ika 7 ng Octubre, 1960.4
The said document was signed by two witnesses and notarized. The
witnesses signed at the left-hand side of both pages of the document with
the said document having 2 pages in total. Margarita Herrera placed her
thumbmark5 above her name in the second page and at the left-hand
margin of the first page of the document.
The surviving heirs of Beatriz Herrera-Mercado filed a case for annulment of
the Deed of Self-Adjudication before the then Court of First Instance of
Laguna, Branch 1 in Binan, Laguna (now, Regional Trial Court Branch 25).
The case for annulment was docketed as Civil Case No. B-1263.6
On December 29, 1980, a Decision in Civil Case No. B-1263 (questioning the
Deed of Self-Adjudication) was rendered and the deed was declared null
and void.7
During trial on the merits of the case assailing the Deed of Self-Adjudication,
Francisca Herrera filed an application with the NHA to purchase the same
lots submitting therewith a copy of the "Sinumpaang Salaysay" executed by
her mother. Private respondent Almeida, as heir of Beatriz Herrera-
Mercado, protested the application.
In a Resolution8 dated February 5, 1986, the NHA granted the application
made by Francisca Herrera, holding that:
From the evidence of the parties and the records of the lots in
question, we gathered the following facts: the lots in question are
portions of the lot awarded and sold to the late Margarita Herrera
on July 28, 1959 by the defunct Land Tenure Administration;
protestant is the daughter of the late Beatriz Herrera Mercado who
was the sister of the protestee; protestee and Beatriz are children of
the late Margarita Herrera; Beatriz was the transferee from
Margarita of Lot Nos. 45, 46, 47, 48 and 49, Block 50; one of the lots
transferred to Beatriz, e.g. Lot 47, with an area of 148 square
meters is in the name of the protestant; protestant occupied the
lots in question with the permission of the protestee; protestee is a
resident of the Tunasan Homesite since birth; protestee was born
on the lots in question; protestee left the place only after marriage
but resided in a lot situated in the same Tunasan Homesite; her
(protestee) son Roberto Herrera has been occupying the lots in
question; he has been there even before the death of the late
Margarita Herrera; on October 7, 1960, Margarita Herrera
executed a "Sinumpaang Salaysay" whereby she waived or
transferred all her rights and interest over the lots in question in
favor of the protestee; and protestee had paid the lots in question
in full on March 8, 1966 with the defunct Land Tenure
Administration.
This Office finds that protestee has a better preferential right to purchase
the lots in question.9
Private respondent Almeida appealed to the Office of the President.10 The
NHA Resolution was affirmed by the Office of the President in a Decision
dated January 23, 1987.11
On February 1, 1987, Francisca Herrera died. Her heirs executed an
extrajudicial settlement of her estate which they submitted to the NHA. Said
transfer of rights was approved by the NHA.12 The NHA executed several
deeds of sale in favor of the heirs of Francisca Herrera and titles were issued
in their favor.13 Thereafter, the heirs of Francisca Herrera directed Segunda
Mercado-Almeida to leave the premises that she was occupying.
Feeling aggrieved by the decision of the Office of the President and the
resolution of the NHA, private respondent Segunda Mercado-Almeida
sought the cancellation of the titles issued in favor of the heirs of Francisca.
She filed a Complaint on February 8, 1988, for "Nullification of Government
Lot's Award," with the Regional Trial Court of San Pedro, Laguna, Branch 31.
In her complaint, private respondent Almeida invoked her forty-year
occupation of the disputed properties, and re-raised the fact that Francisca
Herrera's declaration of self-adjudication has been adjudged as a nullity
because the other heirs were disregarded. The defendant heirs of Francisca
Herrera alleged that the complaint was barred by laches and that the
decision of the Office of the President was already final and
executory.14 They also contended that the transfer of purchase of the
subject lots is perfectly valid as the same was supported by a consideration
and that Francisca Herrera paid for the property with the use of her own
money.15 Further, they argued that plaintiff's occupation of the property was
by mere tolerance and that they had been paying taxes thereon.16
The Regional Trial Court issued an Order dated June 14, 1988 dismissing the
case for lack of jurisdiction.17 The Court of Appeals in a Decision dated June
26, 1989 reversed and held that the Regional Trial Court had jurisdiction to
hear and decide the case involving "title and possession to real property
within its jurisdiction."18 The case was then remanded for further
proceedings on the merits.
A pre-trial was set after which trial ensued.
On March 9, 1998, the Regional Trial Court rendered a Decision setting aside
the resolution of the NHA and the decision of the Office of the President
awarding the subject lots in favor of Francisca Herrera. It declared the deeds
of sale executed by NHA in favor of Herrera's heirs null and void. The
Register of Deeds of Laguna, Calamba Branch was ordered to cancel the
Transfer Certificate of Title issued. Attorney's fees were also awarded to
private respondent.
The Regional Trial Court ruled that the "Sinumpaang Salaysay" was not an
assignment of rights but a disposition of property which shall take effect
upon death. It then held that the said document must first be submitted to
probate before it can transfer property.
Both the NHA and the heirs of Francisca Herrera filed their respective
motions for reconsideration which were both denied on July 21, 1998 for
lack of merit. They both appealed to the Court of Appeals. The brief for the
heirs of Francisca Herrera was denied admission by the appellate court in a
Resolution dated June 14, 2002 for being a "carbon copy" of the brief
submitted by the NHA and for being filed seventy-nine (79) days late.
On August 28, 2003, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the
Regional Trial Court, viz:
There is no dispute that the right to repurchase the subject lots was
awarded to Margarita Herrera in 1959. There is also no dispute that
Margarita executed a "Sinumpaang Salaysay" on October 7, 1960.
Defendant NHA claims that the "Sinumpaang Salaysay" is, in effect,
a waiver or transfer of rights and interest over the subject lots in
favor of Francisca Herrera. This Court is disposed to believe
otherwise. After a perusal of the "Sinumpaang Salaysay" of
Margarita Herrera, it can be ascertained from its wordings taken in
their ordinary and grammatical sense that the document is a simple
disposition of her estate to take effect after her death. Clearly the
Court finds that the "Sinumpaang Salaysay" is a will of Margarita
Herrera. Evidently, if the intention of Margarita Herrera was to
merely assign her right over the lots to her daughter Francisca
Herrera, she should have given her "Sinumpaang Salaysay" to the
defendant NHA or to Francisca Herrera for submission to the
defendant NHA after the full payment of the purchase price of the
lots or even prior thereto but she did not. Hence it is apparent that
she intended the "Sinumpaang Salaysay" to be her last will and not
an assignment of rights as what the NHA in its resolution would
want to make it appear. The intention of Margarita Herrera was
shared no less by Francisca Herrera who after the former's demise
executed on August 22, 1974 a Deed of Self-Adjudication claiming
that she is her sole and legal heir. It was only when said deed was
questioned in court by the surviving heirs of Margarita Herrera's
other daughter, Beatriz Mercado, that Francisca Herrera filed an
application to purchase the subject lots and presented the
"Sinumpaang Salaysay" stating that it is a deed of assignment of
rights.19
The Court of Appeals ruled that the NHA acted arbitrarily in awarding the
lots to the heirs of Francisca Herrera. It upheld the trial court ruling that the
"Sinumpaang Salaysay" was not an assignment of rights but one that
involved disposition of property which shall take effect upon death. The
issue of whether it was a valid will must first be determined by probate.
Petitioner NHA elevated the case to this Court.
Petitioner NHA raised the following issues:
 A. WHETHER OR NOT THE RESOLUTION OF THE NHA AND THE
DECISION OF THE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT HAVE ATTAINED
FINALITY, AND IF SO, WHETHER OR NOT THE PRINCIPLE OF
ADMINISTRATIVE RES JUDICATA BARS THE COURT FROM FURTHER
DETERMINING WHO BETWEEN THE PARTIES HAS PREFERENTIAL
RIGHTS FOR AWARD OVER THE SUBJECT LOTS;
B. WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT HAS JURISDICTION TO MAKE THE
AWARD ON THE SUBJECT LOTS; AND
C. WHETHER OR NOT THE AWARD OF THE SUBJECT LOTS BY THE
NHA IS ARBITRARY.
We rule for the respondents.
Res judicata is a concept applied in review of lower court decisions in
accordance with the hierarchy of courts. But jurisprudence has also
recognized the rule of administrative res judicata: "the rule which forbids
the reopening of a matter once judicially determined by competent
authority applies as well to the judicial and quasi-judicial facts of public,
executive or administrative officers and boards acting within their
jurisdiction as to the judgments of courts having general judicial powers . . .
It has been declared that whenever final adjudication of persons invested
with power to decide on the property and rights of the citizen is examinable
by the Supreme Court, upon a writ of error or a certiorari, such final
adjudication may be pleaded as res judicata."20 To be sure, early
jurisprudence were already mindful that the doctrine of res judicata cannot
be said to apply exclusively to decisions rendered by what are usually
understood as courts without unreasonably circumscribing the scope
thereof and that the more equitable attitude is to allow extension of the
defense to decisions of bodies upon whom judicial powers have been
conferred.
In Ipekdjian Merchandising Co., Inc. v. Court of Tax Appeals,21 the Court
held that the rule prescribing that "administrative orders cannot be
enforced in the courts in the absence of an express statutory provision for
that purpose" was relaxed in favor of quasi-judicial agencies.
In fine, it should be remembered that quasi-judicial powers will always be
subject to true judicial power—that which is held by the courts. Quasi-
judicial power is defined as that power of adjudication of an administrative
agency for the "formulation of a final order."22 This function applies to the
actions, discretion and similar acts of public administrative officers or bodies
who are required to investigate facts, or ascertain the existence of facts,
hold hearings, and draw conclusions from them, as a basis for their official
action and to exercise discretion of a judicial nature. 23 However,
administrative agencies are not considered courts, in their strict sense. The
doctrine of separation of powers reposes the three great powers into its
three (3) branches—the legislative, the executive, and the judiciary. Each
department is co-equal and coordinate, and supreme in its own sphere.
Accordingly, the executive department may not, by its own fiat, impose the
judgment of one of its agencies, upon the judiciary. Indeed, under the
expanded jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, it is empowered to "determine
whether or not there has been grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the
Government."24 Courts have an expanded role under the 1987 Constitution
in the resolution of societal conflicts under the grave abuse clause of Article
VIII which includes that duty to check whether the other branches of
government committed an act that falls under the category of grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.25
Next, petitioner cites Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 or the Judiciary
Reorganization Act of 198026 where it is therein provided that the
Intermediate Appellate Court (now, Court of Appeals) shall exercise the
"exclusive appellate jurisdiction over all final judgments, decisions,
resolutions, orders or awards, of the Regional Trial Courts and Quasi-Judicial
agencies, instrumentalities, boards or commissions, except those falling
within the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in accordance with the
Constitution…"27 and contends that the Regional Trial Court has no
jurisdiction to rule over awards made by the NHA.
Well-within its jurisdiction, the Court of Appeals, in its decision of August 28,
2003, already ruled that the issue of the trial court's authority to hear and
decide the instant case has already been settled in the decision of the Court
of Appeals dated June 26, 1989 (which has become final and executory on
August 20, 1989 as per entry of judgment dated October 10, 1989). 28 We
find no reason to disturb this ruling. Courts are duty-bound to put an end to
controversies. The system of judicial review should not be misused and
abused to evade the operation of a final and executory judgment. 29 The
appellate court's decision becomes the law of the case which must be
adhered to by the parties by reason of policy.30
Next, petitioner NHA contends that its resolution was grounded on
meritorious grounds when it considered the application for the purchase of
lots. Petitioner argues that it was the daughter Francisca Herrera who filed
her application on the subject lot; that it considered the respective
application and inquired whether she had all the qualifications and none of
the disqualifications of a possible awardee. It is the position of the
petitioner that private respondent possessed all the qualifications and none
of the disqualifications for lot award and hence the award was not done
arbitrarily.
The petitioner further argues that assuming that the "Sinumpaang Salaysay"
was a will, it could not bind the NHA.31 That, "insofar as [the] NHA is
concerned, it is an evidence that the subject lots were indeed transferred by
Margarita Herrera, the original awardee, to Francisca Herrera was then
applying to purchase the same before it."32
We are not impressed. When the petitioner received the "Sinumpaang
Salaysay," it should have noted that the effectivity of the said document
commences at the time of death of the author of the instrument; in her
words "sakaling ako'y bawian na ng Dios ng aking buhay…" Hence, in such
period, all the interests of the person should cease to be hers and shall be in
the possession of her estate until they are transferred to her heirs by virtue
of Article 774 of the Civil Code which provides that:
Art. 774. Succession is a mode of acquisition by virtue of which the
property, rights and obligations to the extent of the value of the
inheritance, of a person are transmitted through his death to
another or others either by his will or by operation of law.33
By considering the document, petitioner NHA should have noted that the
original applicant has already passed away. Margarita Herrera passed away
on October 27, 1971.34 The NHA issued its resolution35 on February 5, 1986.
The NHA gave due course to the application made by Francisca Herrera
without considering that the initial applicant's death would transfer all her
property, rights and obligations to the estate including whatever interest
she has or may have had over the disputed properties. To the extent of the
interest that the original owner had over the property, the same should go
to her estate. Margarita Herrera had an interest in the property and that
interest should go to her estate upon her demise so as to be able to
properly distribute them later to her heirs—in accordance with a will or by
operation of law.
The death of Margarita Herrera does not extinguish her interest over the
property. Margarita Herrera had an existing Contract to Sell36 with NHA as
the seller. Upon Margarita Herrera's demise, this Contract to Sell was
neither nullified nor revoked. This Contract to Sell was an obligation on both
parties—Margarita Herrera and NHA. Obligations are
37
transmissible.  Margarita Herrera's obligation to pay became transmissible
at the time of her death either by will or by operation of law.
If we sustain the position of the NHA that this document is not a will, then
the interests of the decedent should transfer by virtue of an operation of
law and not by virtue of a resolution by the NHA. For as it stands, NHA
cannot make another contract to sell to other parties of a property already
initially paid for by the decedent. Such would be an act contrary to the law
on succession and the law on sales and obligations.38
When the original buyer died, the NHA should have considered the estate of
the decedent as the next "person"39 likely to stand in to fulfill the obligation
to pay the rest of the purchase price. The opposition of other heirs to the
repurchase by Francisca Herrera should have put the NHA on guard as to
the award of the lots. Further, the Decision in the said Civil Case No. B-1263
(questioning the Deed of Self-Adjudication) which rendered the deed
therein null and void40 should have alerted the NHA that there are other
heirs to the interests and properties of the decedent who may claim the
property after a testate or intestate proceeding is concluded. The NHA
therefore acted arbitrarily in the award of the lots.
We need not delve into the validity of the will. The issue is for the probate
court to determine. We affirm the Court of Appeals and the Regional Trial
Court which noted that it has an element of testamentary disposition where
(1) it devolved and transferred property; (2) the effect of which shall
transpire upon the death of the instrument maker.41
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition of the National Housing Authority is
DENIED. The decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 68370 dated
August 28, 2003, affirming the decision of the Regional Trial Court of San
Pedro, Laguna in Civil Case No. B-2780 dated March 9, 1998, is hereby
AFFIRMED.

No cost.

SO ORDERED.