G.R. NO.

144322             February 6, 2007
METROPOLITAN BANK and TRUST COMPANY, INC., Petitioner,
vs.
NATIONAL WAGES AND PRODUCTIVITY COMMISSION and REGIONAL
TRIPARTITE WAGES AND PRODUCTIVITY BOARD - REGION II, Respondents.
DECISION
Region II to seek exemption from the coverage of the Wage Order since its
member-banks are already paying more than the prevailing minimum wage
rate in the National Capital Region (NCR), which is their principal place of
business.8
In a letter-reply dated July 16, 1996, the NWPC stated that the member-
banks of BCPM are covered by the Wage Order and do not fall under the
exemptible categories listed under the Wage Order.9

AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
Before the Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the
Revised Rules of Court seeking the reversal of the Decision1 of the Court of
Appeals (CA) dated July 19, 2000 in CA-G.R. SP No. 42240 which denied the
petition for certiorari and prohibition of Metropolitan Bank and Trust
Company, Inc. (petitioner).
The procedural antecedents and factual background of the case are as
follows:
On October 17, 1995, the Regional Tripartite Wages and Productivity Board,
Region II, Tuguegarao, Cagayan (RTWPB), by virtue of Republic Act No. 6727
(R.A. No. 6727), otherwise known as the Wage Rationalization Act, 2 issued
Wage Order No. R02-03 (Wage Order), as follows:
Section 1. Upon effectivity of this Wage Order, all employees/workers in the
private sector throughout Region II, regardless of the status of employment
are granted an across-the-board increase of ₱15.00 daily.3
The Wage Order was published in a newspaper of general circulation on
December 2, 19954 and took effect on January 1, 1996.5 Its Implementing
Rules6 were approved on February 14, 1996.7 Per Section 13 of the Wage
Order, any party aggrieved by the Wage Order may file an appeal with the
National Wages and Productivity Commission (NWPC) through the RTWPB
within 10 calendar days from the publication of the Wage Order.
In a letter-inquiry to the NWPC dated May 7, 1996, the Bankers' Council for
Personnel Management (BCPM), on behalf of its member-banks, requested
for a ruling on the eligibility of establishments with head offices outside
In a letter-inquiry to the NWPC dated July 23, 1996, petitioner sought for
interpretation of the applicability of said Wage Order. 10 The NWPC referred
petitioner's inquiry to the RTWPB.
In a letter-reply dated August 12, 1996, the RTWPB clarified that the Wage
Order covers all private establishments situated in Region II, regardless of
the voluntary adoption by said establishments of the wage orders
established in Metro Manila and irrespective of the amounts already paid by
the petitioner.11
On October 15, 1996, the petitioner filed a Petition for Certiorari and
Prohibition with the CA seeking nullification of the Wage Order on grounds
that the RTWPB acted without authority when it issued the questioned
Wage Order; that even assuming that the RTWPB was vested with the
authority to prescribe an increase, it exceeded its authority when it did so
without any ceiling or qualification; that the implementation of the Wage
Order will cause the petitioner, and other similarly situated employers, to
incur huge financial losses and suffer labor unrest.12
On March 24, 1997, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) filed a
Manifestation and Motion in lieu of Comment affirming the petitioner's
claim that the RTWPB acted beyond its authority in issuing the Wage Order
prescribing an across-the-board increase to all workers and employees in
Region II, effectively granting additional or other benefits not contemplated
by R.A. No. 6727.13
In view of the OSG's manifestation, the CA directed respondents NWPC and
RTWPB to file their comment.14
On September 22, 1997, respondents filed their Comment praying that the
petition should be dismissed outright for petitioner's procedural lapses; that
certiorari and prohibition are unavailing since petitioner failed to avail of the
remedy of appeal prescribed by the Wage Order; that the Wage Order has
long been in effect; and that the issuance of the Wage Order was performed
in the exercise of a purely administrative function.15
On July 19, 2000, the CA rendered its Decision denying the petition. The
appellate court held that a writ of prohibition can no longer be issued since
implementation of the Wage Order had long become fait accompli, the
Wage Order having taken effect on January 1, 1996 and its implementing
rules approved on February 14, 1996; that a writ of certiorari is improper
since the Wage Order was issued in the exercise of a purely administrative
function, not judicial or quasi-judicial; that the letter-query did not present
justiciable controversies ripe for consideration by the respondents in the
exercise of their wage-fixing function, since no appeal from the Wage Order
was filed; that petitioner never brought before the said bodies any formal
and definite challenge to the Wage Order and it cannot pass off the letter-
queries as actual applications for relief; that even if petitioner's procedural
lapse is disregarded, a regional wage order prescribing a wage increase
across-the-board applies to banks adopting a unified wage system and a
disparity in wages between employees holding similar positions in different
regions is not wage distortion.16
Hence, the present petition anchored on the following grounds:
4.1 THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN REFUSING TO DECLARE WAGE
ORDER NO. R02-03 NULL AND VOID AND OF NO LEGAL EFFECT.
4.1.1 THE BOARD, IN ISSUING WAGE ORDER NO. R02-03,
EXCEEDED THE AUTHORITY DELEGATED TO IT BY
CONGRESS.
4.1.2 WAGE ORDER NO. R02-03 IS AN UNREASONABLE
INTRUSION INTO THE PROPERTY RIGHTS OF PETITIONER.
4.1.3 WAGE ORDER NO. R02-03 UNDERMINES THE VERY
ESSENCE OF COLLECTIVE BARGAINING.
4.1.4 WAGE ORDER NO. R02-03 FAILS TO TAKE INTO
ACCOUNT THE VERY RATIONALE FOR A UNIFIED WAGE
STRUCTURE.
4.2 PETITIONER'S RECOURSE TO A WRIT OF CERTIORARI AND
PROHIBITION WAS PROPER.17
Following the submission of the Comment18 and Reply19 thereto, the Court
gave due course to the petition and required both parties to submit their
respective memoranda.20 In compliance therewith, petitioner and
respondents submitted their respective memoranda.21
Petitioner poses two issues for resolution, to wit: (1) whether Wage Order
No. R02-03 is void and of no legal effect; and (2) whether petitioner's
recourse to a petition for certiorari and prohibition with the CA was proper.
Anent the first issue, petitioner maintains that the RTWPB, in issuing said
Wage Order, exceeded the authority delegated to it under R.A. No. 6727,
which is limited to determining and fixing the minimum wage rate within
their respective territorial jurisdiction and with respect only to employees
who do not earn the prescribed minimum wage rate; that the RTWPB is not
authorized to grant a general across-the-board wage increase for non-
minimum wage earners; that Employers Confederation of the Philippines v.
National Wages and Productivity Commission 22 (hereafter referred to as
"ECOP") is not authority to rule that respondents have been empowered to
fix wages other than the minimum wage since said case dealt with an
across-the-board increase with a salary ceiling, where the wage adjustment
is applied to employees receiving a certain denominated salary ceiling; that
the Wage Order is an unreasonable intrusion into its property rights; that
the Wage Order undermines the essence of collective bargaining; that the
Wage Order fails to take into account the rationale for a unified wage
structure.
As to the second issue, petitioner submits that ultra vires acts of
administrative agencies are correctible by way of a writ of certiorari and
prohibition; that even assuming that it did not observe the proper remedial
procedure in challenging the Wage Order, the remedy of certiorari and
prohibition remains available to it by way of an exception, on grounds of
justice and equity; that its failure to observe procedural rules could not have
validated the manner by which the disputed Wage Order was issued.
Respondents counter that the present petition is fatally defective from
inception since no appeal from the Wage Order was filed by petitioner; that
the letter-query to the NWPC did not constitute the appeal contemplated by
law; that the validity of the Wage Order was never raised before the
respondents; that the implementation of the Wage Order had long become
fait accompli for prohibition to prosper. Respondents insist that, even if
petitioner's procedural lapses are disregarded, the Wage Order was issued
pursuant to the mandate of R.A. No. 6727 and in accordance with the
Court's pronouncements in the ECOP case;23 that the Wage Order is not an
intrusion on property rights since it was issued after the required public
hearings; that the Wage Order does not undermine but in fact recognizes
the right to collective bargaining; that the Wage Order did not result in wage
distortion.
The Court shall first dispose of the procedural matter relating to the
propriety of petitioner's recourse to the CA before proceeding with the
substantive issue involving the validity of the Wage Order.
Certiorari as a special civil action is available only if the following essential
requisites concur: (1) it must be directed against a tribunal, board, or officer
exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions; (2) the tribunal, board, or
officer must have acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave
abuse of discretion amounting lack or excess of jurisdiction; and (3) there is
no appeal nor any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary
course of law.24
On the other hand, prohibition as a special civil action is available only if the
following essential requisites concur: (1) it must be directed against a
tribunal, corporation, board, officer, or person exercising functions, judicial,
quasi-judicial, or ministerial; (2) the tribunal, corporation, board or person
has acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of
discretion amounting lack or excess of jurisdiction; and (3) there is no appeal
or any other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of
law.25
A respondent is said to be exercising judicial function where he has the
power to determine what the law is and what the legal rights of the parties
are, and then undertakes to determine these questions and adjudicate upon
the rights of the parties.26 Quasi-judicial function is a term which applies to
the action, discretion, etc., of public administrative officers or bodies, who
are required to investigate facts or ascertain the existence of facts, hold
hearings, and draw conclusions from them as a basis for their official action
and to exercise discretion of a judicial nature.27 Ministerial function is one
which an officer or tribunal performs in the context of a given set of facts, in
a prescribed manner and without regard to the exercise of his own
judgment upon the propriety or impropriety of the act done.28
In the issuance of the assailed Wage Order, respondent RTWPB did not act
in any judicial, quasi-judicial capacity, or ministerial capacity. It was in the
nature of subordinate legislation, promulgated by it in the exercise of
delegated power under R.A. No. 6727. It was issued in the exercise of quasi-
legislative power. Quasi-legislative or rule-making power is exercised by
administrative agencies through the promulgation of rules and regulations
within the confines of the granting statute and the doctrine of non-
delegation of certain powers flowing from the separation of the great
branches of the government.29
Moreover, the rule on the special civil actions of certiorari and prohibition
equally mandate that these extra-ordinary remedies are available only when
"there is no appeal or any other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law." A remedy is considered plain, speedy and adequate
if it will promptly relieve the petitioner from the injurious effects of the
judgment or rule, order or resolution of the lower court or agency.30
Section 13 of the assailed Wage Order explicitly provides that any party
aggrieved by the Wage Order may file an appeal with the NWPC through the
RTWPB within 10 days from the publication of the wage order. 31 The Wage
Order was published in a newspaper of general circulation on December 2,
1995.32
In this case, petitioner did not avail of the remedy provided by law. No
appeal to the NWPC was filed by the petitioner within 10 calendar days
from publication of the Wage Order on December 2, 1995. Petitioner was
silent until seven months later, when it filed a letter-inquiry on July 24, 1996
with the NWPC seeking a clarification on the application of the Wage Order.
Evidently, the letter-inquiry is not an appeal.
It must also be noted that the NWPC only referred petitioner's letter-inquiry
to the RTWPB. Petitioner did not appeal the letter-reply dated August 12,
1996 of the RTWPB to the NWPC. No direct action was taken by the NWPC
on the issuance or implementation of the Wage Order. Petitioner failed to
invoke the power of the NWPC to review regional wage levels set by the
RTWPB to determine if these are in accordance with prescribed guidelines.
Thus, not only was it improper to implead the NWPC as party-respondent in
the petition before the CA and this Court, but also petitioner failed to avail
of the primary jurisdiction of the NWPC under Article 121 of the Labor Code,
to wit:
ART. 121. Powers and Functions of the Commission. - The Commission shall
have the following powers and functions:
xxxx
(d) To review regional wage levels set by the Regional Tripartite
Wages and Productivity Boards to determine if these are in
accordance with prescribed guidelines and national development
plans;
xxxx
(f) To review plans and programs of the Regional Tripartite Wages
and Productivity Boards to determine whether these are consistent
with national development plans;
(g) To exercise technical and administrative supervision over the
Regional Tripartite Wages and Productivity Boards;
xxxx
(Emphasis supplied)
Under the doctrine of primary jurisdiction, courts cannot and will not
resolve a controversy involving a question which is within the jurisdiction of
an administrative tribunal, especially where the question demands the
exercise of sound administrative discretion requiring the special knowledge,
experience and services of the administrative tribunal to determine
technical and intricate matters of fact.33
Nevertheless, the Court will proceed to resolve the substantial issues in the
present petition pursuant to the well-accepted principle that acceptance of
a petition for certiorari or prohibition as well as the grant of due course
thereto is addressed to the sound discretion of the court. 34 It is a well-
entrenched principle that rules of procedure are not inflexible tools
designed to hinder or delay, but to facilitate and promote the
administration of justice. Their strict and rigid application, which would
result in technicalities that tend to frustrate, rather than promote
substantial justice, must always be eschewed.35
As to respondents' submission that the implementation of the Wage Order
can no longer be restrained since it has become fait accompli, the Wage
Order having taken effect on January 1, 1996 and its implementing rules
approved on February 14, 1996, suffice it to state that courts will decide a
question otherwise moot if it is capable of repetition yet evading
review.36 Besides, a case becomes moot and academic only when there is no
more actual controversy between the parties or no useful purpose can be
served in passing upon the merits. Such circumstances do not obtain in the
present case. The implementation of the Wage Order does not in any way
render the case moot and academic, since the issue of the validity of the
wage order subsists even after its implementation and which has to be
determined and passed upon to resolve petitioner's rights and consequent
obligations therein.
It is worthy to quote the Court's pronouncements in Tan v. Commission on
Elections,37 thus:
For this Honorable Court to yield to the respondents' urging that, as there
has been fait accompli, then this Honorable Court should passively accept
and accede to the prevailing situation is an unacceptable suggestion.
Dismissal of the instant petition, as respondents so propose is a proposition
fraught with mischief. Respondents' submission will create a dangerous
precedent. Should this Honorable Court decline now to perform its duty of
interpreting and indicating what the law is and should be, this might tempt
again those who strut about in the corridors of power to recklessly and with
ulterior motives commit illegal acts, either brazenly or stealthily, confident
that this Honorable Court will abstain from entertaining future challenges to
their acts if they manage to bring about a fait accompli.38
Having disposed of this procedural issue, the Court now comes to the
substance of the petition.
R.A. No. 6727 declared it a policy of the State to rationalize the fixing of
minimum wages and to promote productivity-improvement and gain-
sharing measures to ensure a decent standard of living for the workers and
their families; to guarantee the rights of labor to its just share in the fruits of
production; to enhance employment generation in the countryside through
industrial dispersal; and to allow business and industry reasonable returns
on investment, expansion and growth.39
In line with its declared policy, R.A. No. 672740 created the NWPC,41 vested
with the power to prescribe rules and guidelines for the determination of
appropriate minimum wage and productivity measures at the regional,
provincial or industry levels;42 and authorized the RTWPB to determine and
fix the minimum wage rates applicable in their respective regions,
provinces, or industries therein and issue the corresponding wage orders,
subject to the guidelines issued by the NWPC. 43 Pursuant to its wage fixing
authority, the RTWPB may issue wage orders which set the daily minimum
wage rates,44 based on the standards or criteria set by Article 12445 of the
Labor Code.
In ECOP,46 the Court declared that there are two ways of fixing the minimum
wage: the "floor-wage" method and the "salary-ceiling" method. The "floor-
wage" method involves the fixing of a determinate amount to be added to
the prevailing statutory minimum wage rates. On the other hand, in the
"salary-ceiling" method, the wage adjustment was to be applied to
employees receiving a certain denominated salary ceiling. In other words,
workers already being paid more than the existing minimum wage (up to a
certain amount stated in the Wage Order) are also to be given a wage
increase.47
To illustrate: under the "floor wage method", it would have been sufficient if
the Wage Order simply set ₱15.00 as the amount to be added to the
prevailing statutory minimum wage rates, while in the "salary-ceiling
method", it would have been sufficient if the Wage Order states a specific
salary, such as ₱250.00, and only those earning below it shall be entitled to
the salary increase.
In the present case, the RTWPB did not determine or fix the minimum wage
rate by the "floor-wage method" or the "salary-ceiling method" in issuing
the Wage Order. The RTWPB did not set a wage level nor a range to which a
wage adjustment or increase shall be added. Instead, it granted an across-
the-board wage increase of ₱15.00 to all employees and workers of Region
2. In doing so, the RTWPB exceeded its authority by extending the coverage
of the Wage Order to wage earners receiving more than the prevailing
minimum wage rate, without a denominated salary ceiling. As correctly
pointed out by the OSG, the Wage Order granted additional benefits not
contemplated by R.A. No. 6727.
In no uncertain terms must it be stressed that the function of promulgating
rules and regulations may be legitimately exercised only for the purpose of
carrying out the provisions of a law. The power of administrative agencies is
confined to implementing the law or putting it into effect. Corollary to this
guideline is that administrative regulation cannot extend the law and amend
a legislative enactment.48 It is axiomatic that the clear letter of the law is
controlling and cannot be amended by a mere administrative rule issued for
its implementation.49 Indeed, administrative or executive acts, orders, and
regulations shall be valid only when they are not contrary to the laws or the
Constitution.50
Where the legislature has delegated to an executive or administrative
officers and boards authority to promulgate rules to carry out an express
legislative purpose, the rules of administrative officers and boards, which
have the effect of extending, or which conflict with the authority-granting
statute, do not represent a valid exercise of the rule-making power but
constitute an attempt by an administrative body to legislate.51
It has been said that when the application of an administrative issuance
modifies existing laws or exceeds the intended scope, as in this case, the
issuance becomes void, not only for being ultra vires, but also for being
unreasonable.52
Thus, the Court finds that Section 1, Wage Order No. R02-03 is void insofar
as it grants a wage increase to employees earning more than the minimum
wage rate; and pursuant to the separability clause 53 of the Wage Order,
Section 1 is declared valid with respect to employees earning the prevailing
minimum wage rate.1awphi1.net
Prior to the passage of the Wage Order, the daily minimum wage rates in
Region II was set at ₱104.00 for the Province of Isabela, ₱103.00 for the
Province of Cagayan, ₱101.00 for the Province of Nueva Vizcaya, and
₱100.00 for the Provinces of Quirino and Batanes.54 Only employees earning
the above-stated minimum wage rates are entitled to the ₱15.00 mandated
increase under the Wage Order.
Although the concomitant effect of the nullity of the Wage Order to those
employees who have received the mandated increase was not put in issue,
this Court shall make a definite pronouncement thereon to finally put this
case to rest. As ruled by the Court in Latchme Motoomull v. Dela Paz,55 "the
Court will always strive to settle the entire controversy in a single
proceeding leaving no root or branch to bear the seeds of future
litigation."56
Applying by analogy, the Court's recent pronouncement in Philippine Ports
Authority v. Commission on Audit,57 thus:
In regard to the refund of the disallowed benefits, this Court holds that
petitioners need not refund the benefits received by them based on our
rulings in Blaquera v. Alcala, De Jesus v. Commission on
Audit  and Kapisanan ng mga Manggagawa sa Government Service
Insurance System (KMG) v. Commission on Audit.
In Blaquera, the petitioners, who were officials and employees of several
government departments and agencies, were paid incentive benefits
pursuant to EO No. 292 and the Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V of EO
No. 292. On January 3, 1993, then President Fidel V. Ramos issued
Administrative Order (AO) No. 29 authorizing the grant of productivity
incentive benefits for the year 1992 in the maximum amount of ₱1,000.
Section 4 of AO No. 29 directed all departments, offices and agencies which
authorized payment of CY 1992 Productivity Incentive Bonus in excess of
₱1,000 to immediately cause the refund of the excess. Respondent heads of
the departments or agencies of the government concerned caused the
deduction from petitioners' salaries or allowances of the amounts needed to
cover the overpayments. Petitioners therein filed a petition for certiorari
and prohibition before this Court to prevent respondents therein from
making further deductions from their salaries or allowances. The Court ruled
against the refund, thus:
Considering, however, that all the parties here acted in good faith, we
cannot countenance the refund of subject incentive benefits for the year
1992, which amounts the petitioners have already received. Indeed,
no indicia of bad faith can be detected under the attendant facts and
circumstances. The officials and chiefs of offices concerned disbursed such
incentive benefits in the honest belief that the amounts given were due to
the recipients and the latter accepted the same with gratitude, confident
that they richly deserve such benefits.
The said ruling in Blaquera  was applied in De Jesus.
In  De Jesus, COA disallowed the payment of allowances and bonuses
consisting of representation and transportation allowance, rice allowance,
productivity incentive bonus, anniversary bonus, year-end bonus and cash
gifts to members of the interim Board of Directors of the Catbalogan Water
District. This Court affirmed the disallowance because petitioners therein
were not entitled to other compensation except for payment of per
diem under PD No. 198. However, the Court ruled against the refund of the
allowances and bonuses received by petitioners, thus:
This ruling in Blaquera applies to the instant case. Petitioners here received
the additional allowances and bonuses in good faith under the honest
belief that LWUA Board Resolution No. 313 authorized such payment. At
the time petitioners received the additional allowances and bonuses, the
Court had not yet decided Baybay Water District. Petitioners had no
knowledge that such payment was without legal basis. Thus, being in good
faith, petitioners need not refund the allowances and bonuses they
received but disallowed by the COA.
Further, in  KMG,  this Court applied the ruling in Blaquera and De Jesus in
holding that the Social Insurance Group (SIG) personnel of the Government
Service Insurance System need not refund the hazard pay received by them
although said benefit was correctly disallowed by COA. The Court ruled:
The Court however finds that the DOH and GSIS officials concerned who
granted hazard pay under R.A. No. 7305 to the SIG personnel acted in
good faith, in the honest belief that there was legal basis for such grant.
The SIG personnel in turn accepted the hazard pay benefits likewise
believing that they were entitled to such benefit. At that time, neither the
concerned DOH and GSIS officials nor the SIG personnel knew that the
grant of hazard pay to the latter is not sanctioned by law. Thus, following
the rulings of the Court in De Jesus v. Commission on Audit, and Blaquera
v. Alcala, the SIG personnel who previously received hazard pay under R.A.
No. 7305 need not refund such benefits.
In the same vein, the rulings in Blaquera, De Jesus  and KMG  apply to this
case. Petitioners received the hazard duty pay and birthday cash gift in good
faith since the benefits were authorized by PPA Special Order No. 407-97
issued pursuant to PPA Memorandum Circular No. 34-95 implementing
DBM National Compensation Circular No. 76, series of 1995, and PPA
Memorandum Circular No. 22-97, respectively. Petitioners at that time had
no knowledge that the payment of said benefits lacked legal basis. Being in
good faith, petitioners need not refund the benefits they
received.58 (Emphasis supplied)
employees, other than minimum wage earners, who received the wage
increase mandated by the Wage Order need not refund the wage increase
received by them since they received the wage increase in good faith, in the
honest belief that they are entitled to such wage increase and without any
knowledge that there was no legal basis for the same.
Considering the foregoing, the Court need not delve on the other arguments
raised by the parties.
WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The Decision of the Court
of Appeals dated July 19, 2000 in CA-G.R. SP No. 42240 is MODIFIED. Section
1 of Wage Order No. R02-03 issued on October 17, 1995 by the Regional
Tripartite Wages and Productivity Board for Region II, Tuguegarao, Cagayan
is declared VALID insofar as the mandated increase applies to employees
earning the prevailing minimum wage rate at the time of the passage of the
Wage Order and VOID with respect to its application to employees receiving
more than the prevailing minimum wage rate at the time of the passage of
the Wage Order.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 179579               February 1, 2012
COMMISSIONER OF CUSTOMS and the DISTRICT COLLECTOR OF THE PORT
OF SUBIC, Petitioners,
vs.
HYPERMIX FEEDS CORPORATION, Respondent.
DECISION
SERENO, J.:
Before us is a Petition for Review under Rule 45,1 assailing the Decision2 and
the Resolution3 of the Court of Appeals (CA), which nullified the Customs
Memorandum Order (CMO) No. 27-20034 on the tariff classification of wheat
issued by petitioner Commissioner of Customs.
The antecedent facts are as follows:
On 7 November 2003, petitioner Commissioner of Customs issued CMO 27-
2003. Under the Memorandum, for tariff purposes, wheat was classified
according to the following: (1) importer or consignee; (2) country of origin;
and (3) port of discharge.5 The regulation provided an exclusive list of
corporations, ports of discharge, commodity descriptions and countries of
origin. Depending on these factors, wheat would be classified either as food
grade or feed grade. The corresponding tariff for food grade wheat was 3%,
for feed grade, 7%.
CMO 27-2003 further provided for the proper procedure for protest or
Valuation and Classification Review Committee (VCRC) cases. Under this
procedure, the release of the articles that were the subject of protest
required the importer to post a cash bond to cover the tariff differential.6
A month after the issuance of CMO 27-2003, on 19 December 2003,
respondent filed a Petition for Declaratory Relief7 with the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Las Piñas City. It anticipated the implementation of the
regulation on its imported and perishable Chinese milling wheat in transit
from China.8 Respondent contended that CMO 27-2003 was issued without
following the mandate of the Revised Administrative Code on public
participation, prior notice, and publication or registration with the
University of the Philippines Law Center.
Respondent also alleged that the regulation summarily adjudged it to be a
feed grade supplier without the benefit of prior assessment and
examination; thus, despite having imported food grade wheat, it would be
subjected to the 7% tariff upon the arrival of the shipment, forcing them to
pay 133% more than was proper.
Furthermore, respondent claimed that the equal protection clause of the
Constitution was violated when the regulation treated non-flour millers
differently from flour millers for no reason at all.
Lastly, respondent asserted that the retroactive application of the regulation
was confiscatory in nature.
On 19 January 2004, the RTC issued a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO)
effective for twenty (20) days from notice.9
Petitioners thereafter filed a Motion to Dismiss.10 They alleged that: (1) the
RTC did not have jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case, because
respondent was asking for a judicial determination of the classification of
wheat; (2) an action for declaratory relief was improper; (3) CMO 27-2003
was an internal administrative rule and not legislative in nature; and (4) the
claims of respondent were speculative and premature, because the Bureau
of Customs (BOC) had yet to examine respondent’s products. They likewise
opposed the application for a writ of preliminary injunction on the ground
that they had not inflicted any injury through the issuance of the regulation;
and that the action would be contrary to the rule that administrative
issuances are assumed valid until declared otherwise.
On 28 February 2005, the parties agreed that the matters raised in the
application for preliminary injunction and the Motion to Dismiss would just
be resolved together in the main case. Thus, on 10 March 2005, the RTC
rendered its Decision11 without having to resolve the application for
preliminary injunction and the Motion to Dismiss.
The trial court ruled in favor of respondent, to wit:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Petition is GRANTED and the
subject Customs Memorandum Order 27-2003 is declared INVALID and OF
NO FORCE AND EFFECT. Respondents Commissioner of Customs, the District
Collector of Subic or anyone acting in their behalf are to immediately cease
and desist from enforcing the said Customs Memorandum Order 27-2003.
SO ORDERED.12
The RTC held that it had jurisdiction over the subject matter, given that the
issue raised by respondent concerned the quasi-legislative powers of
petitioners. It likewise stated that a petition for declaratory relief was the
proper remedy, and that respondent was the proper party to file it. The
court considered that respondent was a regular importer, and that the latter
would be subjected to the application of the regulation in future
transactions.
With regard to the validity of the regulation, the trial court found that
petitioners had not followed the basic requirements of hearing and
publication in the issuance of CMO 27-2003. It likewise held that petitioners
had "substituted the quasi-judicial determination of the commodity by a
quasi-legislative predetermination."13 The lower court pointed out that a
classification based on importers and ports of discharge were violative of
the due process rights of respondent.
Dissatisfied with the Decision of the lower court, petitioners appealed to the
CA, raising the same allegations in defense of CMO 27-2003.14 The appellate
court, however, dismissed the appeal. It held that, since the regulation
affected substantial rights of petitioners and other importers, petitioners
should have observed the requirements of notice, hearing and publication.
Hence, this Petition.
Petitioners raise the following issues for the consideration of this Court:
 I. THE COURT OF APPEALS DECIDED A QUESTION OF SUBSTANCE
WHICH IS NOT IN ACCORD WITH THE LAW AND PREVAILING
JURISPRUDENCE.
II. THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN DECLARING THAT
THE TRIAL COURT HAS JURISDICTION OVER THE CASE.
The Petition has no merit.
We shall first discuss the propriety of an action for declaratory relief.
Rule 63, Section 1 provides:
Who may file petition. – Any person interested under a deed, will, contract
or other written instrument, or whose rights are affected by a statute,
executive order or regulation, ordinance, or any other governmental
regulation may, before breach or violation thereof, bring an action in the
appropriate Regional Trial Court to determine any question of construction
or validity arising, and for a declaration of his rights or duties, thereunder.
The requirements of an action for declaratory relief are as follows: (1) there
must be a justiciable controversy; (2) the controversy must be between
persons whose interests are adverse; (3) the party seeking declaratory relief
must have a legal interest in the controversy; and (4) the issue involved
must be ripe for judicial determination.15 We find that the Petition filed by
respondent before the lower court meets these requirements.
First, the subject of the controversy is the constitutionality of CMO 27-2003
issued by petitioner Commissioner of Customs. In Smart Communications v.
NTC,16 we held:
The determination of whether a specific rule or set of rules issued by an
administrative agency contravenes the law or the constitution is within the
jurisdiction of the regular courts. Indeed, the Constitution vests the power
of judicial review or the power to declare a law, treaty, international or
executive agreement, presidential decree, order, instruction, ordinance, or
regulation in the courts, including the regional trial courts. This is within the
scope of judicial power, which includes the authority of the courts to
determine in an appropriate action the validity of the acts of the political
departments. Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to
settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable
and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of
any branch or instrumentality of the Government. (Emphasis supplied)
Meanwhile, in Misamis Oriental Association of Coco Traders, Inc. v.
Department of Finance Secretary,17 we said:
xxx [A] legislative rule is in the nature of subordinate legislation, designed to
implement a primary legislation by providing the details thereof. xxx
In addition such rule must be published. On the other hand, interpretative
rules are designed to provide guidelines to the law which the administrative
agency is in charge of enforcing.
Accordingly, in considering a legislative rule a court is free to make three
inquiries: (i) whether the rule is within the delegated authority of the
administrative agency; (ii)  whether it is reasonable; and (iii) whether it was
issued pursuant to proper procedure. But the court is not free to substitute
its judgment as to the desirability or wisdom of the rule for the legislative
body, by its delegation of administrative judgment, has committed those
questions to administrative judgments and not to judicial judgments. In the
case of an interpretative rule, the inquiry is not into the validity but into the
correctness or propriety of the rule. As a matter of power a court, when
confronted with an interpretative rule, is free to (i)  give the force of law to
the rule; (ii) go to the opposite extreme and substitute its judgment;
or (iii) give some intermediate degree of authoritative weight to the
interpretative rule. (Emphasis supplied)
Second, the controversy is between two parties that have adverse interests.
Petitioners are summarily imposing a tariff rate that respondent is refusing
to pay.
Third, it is clear that respondent has a legal and substantive interest in the
implementation of CMO 27-2003. Respondent has adequately shown that,
as a regular importer of wheat, on 14 August 2003, it has actually made
shipments of wheat from China to Subic. The shipment was set to arrive in
December 2003. Upon its arrival, it would be subjected to the conditions of
CMO 27-2003. The regulation calls for the imposition of different tariff rates,
depending on the factors enumerated therein. Thus, respondent alleged
that it would be made to pay the 7% tariff applied to feed grade wheat,
instead of the 3% tariff on food grade wheat. In addition, respondent would
have to go through the procedure under CMO 27-2003, which would
undoubtedly toll its time and resources. The lower court correctly pointed
out as follows:
xxx As noted above, the fact that petitioner is precisely into the business of
importing wheat, each and every importation will be subjected to constant
disputes which will result into (sic) delays in the delivery, setting aside of
funds as cash bond required in the CMO as well as the resulting expenses
thereof. It is easy to see that business uncertainty will be a constant
occurrence for petitioner. That the sums involved are not minimal is shown
by the discussions during the hearings conducted as well as in the pleadings
filed. It may be that the petitioner can later on get a refund but such has
been foreclosed because the Collector of Customs and the Commissioner of
Customs are bound by their own CMO. Petitioner cannot get its refund with
the said agency. We believe and so find that Petitioner has presented such a
stake in the outcome of this controversy as to vest it with standing to file
this petition.18 (Emphasis supplied)
Finally, the issue raised by respondent is ripe for judicial determination,
because litigation is inevitable19 for the simple and uncontroverted reason
that respondent is not included in the enumeration of flour millers classified
as food grade wheat importers. Thus, as the trial court stated, it would have
to file a protest case each time it imports food grade wheat and be
subjected to the 7% tariff.
It is therefore clear that a petition for declaratory relief is the right remedy
given the circumstances of the case.
Considering that the questioned regulation would affect the substantive
rights of respondent as explained above, it therefore follows that petitioners
should have applied the pertinent provisions of Book VII, Chapter 2 of the
Revised Administrative Code, to wit:
Section 3. Filing. – (1) Every agency shall file with the University of the
Philippines Law Center three (3) certified copies of every rule adopted by it.
Rules in force on the date of effectivity of this Code which are not filed
within three (3) months from that date shall not thereafter be the bases of
any sanction against any party of persons.
x x x           x x x          x x x
Section 9. Public Participation. - (1) If not otherwise required by law, an
agency shall, as far as practicable, publish or circulate notices of proposed
rules and afford interested parties the opportunity to submit their views
prior to the adoption of any rule.
(2) In the fixing of rates, no rule or final order shall be valid unless
the proposed rates shall have been published in a newspaper of
general circulation at least two (2) weeks before the first hearing
thereon.
(3) In case of opposition, the rules on contested cases shall be
observed.
When an administrative rule is merely interpretative in nature, its
applicability needs nothing further than its bare issuance, for it gives no real
consequence more than what the law itself has already prescribed. When,
on the other hand, the administrative rule goes beyond merely providing for
the means that can facilitate or render least cumbersome the
implementation of the law but substantially increases the burden of those
governed, it behooves the agency to accord at least to those directly
affected a chance to be heard, and thereafter to be duly informed, before
that new issuance is given the force and effect of law.20
Likewise, in Tañada v. Tuvera,21 we held:
The clear object of the above-quoted provision is to give the general public
adequate notice of the various laws which are to regulate their actions and
conduct as citizens. Without such notice and publication, there would be no
basis for the application of the maxim "ignorantia legis non excusat." It
would be the height of injustice to punish or otherwise burden a citizen for
the transgression of a law of which he had no notice whatsoever, not even a
constructive one.
Perhaps at no time since the establishment of the Philippine Republic has
the publication of laws taken so vital significance that at this time when the
people have bestowed upon the President a power heretofore enjoyed
solely by the legislature. While the people are kept abreast by the mass
media of the debates and deliberations in the Batasan Pambansa – and for
the diligent ones, ready access to the legislative records – no such publicity
accompanies the law-making process of the President. Thus, without
publication, the people have no means of knowing what presidential
decrees have actually been promulgated, much less a definite way of
informing themselves of the specific contents and texts of such decrees.
(Emphasis supplied)
Because petitioners failed to follow the requirements enumerated by the
Revised Administrative Code, the assailed regulation must be struck down.
Going now to the content of CMO 27-3003, we likewise hold that it is
unconstitutional for being violative of the equal protection clause of the
Constitution.
The equal protection clause means that no person or class of persons shall
be deprived of the same protection of laws enjoyed by other persons or
other classes in the same place in like circumstances. Thus, the guarantee of
the equal protection of laws is not violated if there is a reasonable
classification. For a classification to be reasonable, it must be shown that (1)
it rests on substantial distinctions; (2) it is germane to the purpose of the
law; (3) it is not limited to existing conditions only; and (4) it applies equally
to all members of the same class.22
Unfortunately, CMO 27-2003 does not meet these requirements. We do not
see how the quality of wheat is affected by who imports it, where it is
discharged, or which country it came from.
Thus, on the one hand, even if other millers excluded from CMO 27-2003
have imported food grade wheat, the product would still be declared as
feed grade wheat, a classification subjecting them to 7% tariff. On the other
hand, even if the importers listed under CMO 27-2003 have imported feed
grade wheat, they would only be made to pay 3% tariff, thus depriving the
state of the taxes due. The regulation, therefore, does not become
disadvantageous to respondent only, but even to the state.
It is also not clear how the regulation intends to "monitor more closely
wheat importations and thus prevent their misclassification." A careful
study of CMO 27-2003 shows that it not only fails to achieve this end, but
results in the opposite. The application of the regulation forecloses the
possibility that other corporations that are excluded from the list import
food grade wheat; at the same time, it creates an assumption that those
who meet the criteria do not import feed grade wheat. In the first case,
importers are unnecessarily burdened to prove the classification of their
wheat imports; while in the second, the state carries that burden.
Petitioner Commissioner of Customs also went beyond his powers when the
regulation limited the customs officer’s duties mandated by Section 1403 of
the Tariff and Customs Law, as amended. The law provides:
Section 1403. – Duties of Customs Officer Tasked to Examine, Classify, and
Appraise Imported Articles. – The customs officer tasked to examine,
classify, and appraise imported articles shall determine whether the
packages designated for examination and their contents are in accordance
with the declaration in the entry, invoice and other pertinent documents
and shall make return in such a manner as to indicate whether the articles
have been truly and correctly declared in the entry as regard their quantity,
measurement, weight, and tariff classification and not imported contrary to
law. He shall submit samples to the laboratory for analysis when feasible to
do so and when such analysis is necessary for the proper classification,
appraisal, and/or admission into the Philippines of imported articles.
Likewise, the customs officer shall determine the unit of quantity in which
they are usually bought and sold, and appraise the imported articles in
accordance with Section 201 of this Code.
Failure on the part of the customs officer to comply with his duties shall
subject him to the penalties prescribed under Section 3604 of this
Code.1âwphi1
The provision mandates that the customs officer must first assess and
determine the classification of the imported article before tariff may be
imposed. Unfortunately, CMO 23-2007 has already classified the article
even before the customs officer had the chance to examine it. In effect,
petitioner Commissioner of Customs diminished the powers granted by the
Tariff and Customs Code with regard to wheat importation when it no
longer required the customs officer’s prior examination and assessment of
the proper classification of the wheat.
It is well-settled that rules and regulations, which are the product of a
delegated power to create new and additional legal provisions that have the
effect of law, should be within the scope of the statutory authority granted
by the legislature to the administrative agency. It is required that the
regulation be germane to the objects and purposes of the law; and that it be
not in contradiction to, but in conformity with, the standards prescribed by
law.23
In summary, petitioners violated respondent’s right to due process in the
issuance of CMO 27-2003 when they failed to observe the requirements
under the Revised Administrative Code. Petitioners likewise violated
respondent’s right to equal protection of laws when they provided for an
unreasonable classification in the application of the regulation. Finally,
petitioner Commissioner of Customs went beyond his powers of delegated
authority when the regulation limited the powers of the customs officer to
examine and assess imported articles.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Petition is DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 126594 September 5, 1997
IMELDA R. MARCOS, petitioner,
vs.
The Honorable COURT OF APPEALS; Honorable Judge GUILLERMO L. LOJA,
SR., the Presiding Judge of Branch 26 of the RTC at Manila; and the PEOPLE
OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
RESOLUTION
REGALADO, J.:
In a petition for review on certiorari filed on November 5, 1996, petitioner
Imelda R. Marcos prays this Court to set aside the decision of respondent
Court of Appeals promulgated in CA-G.R. SP No. 35719 on May 23, 1996, as
well as its resolution of September 27, 1996 denying her motion for the
reconsideration of the judgment in said case.1
Preliminarily, her motion for extension of time to file this petition was
denied for non-compliance with Revised Circular No. 1-88 and Circular No.
19-91 because the affidavit of service, although otherwise sufficient in form
and substance, was not signed by the affiant, and the registry receipt
proving service of a copy of said motion to the Solicitor General was not
attached thereto. Hence, the petition subsequently filed by her was
dismissed for having been filed out of time in this Court's resolution of
November 27, 1996.2
Petitioner then moved for reconsideration, explaining the cause for the
procedural lapses and contending that, on the merits, the trial court had no
jurisdiction over the offenses charged; that no offenses were actually
charged or that the facts alleged do not constitute the imputed offenses;
and, consequently, that the court a quo gravely abused its discretion in
denying the motion to quash.
Considering the number of criminal cases filed against petitioner, relief from
which is sought in the petition at bar and the issues wherein may possibly
be raised again in other cases of a similar nature, the Court resolved on
February 24, 1997 to require the Solicitor General to comment thereon, in
order that the adjudication of petitioner's plaints may not go off only on
procedural points. In due time, such comment was filed, albeit in
abbreviated form, the Solicitor General correctly pointing out that all the
substantive issues now being raised before us had also been extensively
argued in and resolved by respondent appellate court.
Indeed, an overall review of the allegations in the present petition reveals
that the same are merely a rehash of those already submitted to respondent
court and that this petition is apparently a reprise of the certiorari petition
in CA-G.R. SP No. 35719 filed in the Court of Appeals.
For facility of presentation, therefore, we need merely to reproduce herein
the findings in the assailed decision of respondent appellate court, which
are fully sustained by the records, excluding therefrom those cases
pertaining to CA-G.R. SP No. 35928 (except when involved in the narration
of the antecedents of this case) which was jointly resolved by it but from
which no appeal or other recourse was taken by the petitioners therein.
We accordingly give credit to respondent court and adopt its recital of the
antecedents of the instant petition, to wit:
In CA-G.R. SP No. 35719, petitioner Marcos assails the Order dated
June 9, 1994 which denied her Motion to Quash the eight (8)
informations filed against her in the consolidated Criminal Case Nos.
91-101732 to 91-101739 and the other fourteen (14) informations
filed against her, Benedicto and Rivera in the consolidated Criminal
Case Nos. 91-101879 to 91-101892, and Order dated August 30,
1994 which denied her Motion for Reconsideration.
xxx xxx xxx
On October 21, 1983, pursuant to Monetary Board Resolution Nos.
1632 and 1718 dated September 30, 1983 and October 21, 1983,
respectively, the Central Bank (CB) of the Philippines (now Bangko
Sentral ng Pilipinas) issued Circular No. 960. The circular, which
consolidated the various rules and regulations promulgated by the
CB concerning foreign exchange non-trade transactions including
those on gold and silver, prohibits in its Section 4 residents, firms,
associations, or corporations from maintaining foreign exchange
accounts abroad without prior authorization from the CB or without
being permitted by CB regulations; and requires in Section 10
thereof all residents who habitually earn or receive foreign
exchange from invisibles locally or from abroad to submit reports of
such earnings or receipts in prescribed form with the proper CB
department and to register with the Foreign Exchange Department
of the CB within 90 days from October 21, 1983. Violation of the
provisions of the circular is punishable as a criminal offense under
Section 34 of R.A. No. 265, as amended (the Central Bank Act).
On December 20, 1991 or nearly six years after the 1986 EDSA
Revolution which toppled the Marcos regime, Marcos was, for
allegedly opening and maintaining foreign exchange accounts
abroad on various dates from 1968 to 1991 without prior
authorization from the CB or otherwise allowed by CB regulations,
charged with violating Section 4 of CB Circular 960 before the RTC of
Manila in eight (8) essentially identically worded informations
docketed as Criminal Case Nos. 91-101732 to 101739, one of which
reads as follows:
That from 1968 to June 6, 1991, both dates
inclusive, the above-named accused, in conspiracy
with her late husband, then President Ferdinand E.
Marcos, while both residing in Malacañang Palace in
the City of Manila, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court did, then and
there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously open and
maintain foreign exchange accounts abroad,
particularly in Swiss Bank Corporation (SBC) in
Geneva, Switzerland, in the name of Maler
Establishment, later transformed into Maler
Foundation, which was organized by their dummies,
nominees, fronts, agents or duly appointed
administrators among them Jean Louis Sunier who
received instructions from the accused and her
husband who signed with their alias "JOHN LEWIS"
in order to maintain two accounts, one of which is
Account No. 98929 NY under Maler II with a balance
of SF 16,195,258.00, without prior permission from
the Central Bank of the Philippines, and such act of
maintaining foreign account abroad was not
permitted under Central Bank regulations.
— (Rollo, CA-G.R. SP No. 35719, pp. 45-46)
The wordings of the other seven (7) informations differed only in
the dates of commission of the offense charged, the name/s of the
dummy/dummies, the balance of the foreign exchange accounts
maintained abroad and the name/s of the foreign bank/s where
such accounts were maintained.
Likewise, for allegedly failing to submit a report of their foreign
exchange earnings from abroad and/or to register with the Foreign
Exchange Department of the CB within the period mandated by
Section 10 of CB Circular No. 960, Marcos, Benedicto and Rivera
were similarly indicted on December 27, 1991 for violation of
Section 10, CB Circular No. 960 in relation to Section 34 of the
Central Bank Act in five (5) informations filed with the RTC of Manila
which were docketed as Criminal Case Nos. 91-101879 — 91-
101883. On the same date, nine (9) more informations essentially
charging the same offense were filed with the RTC of Manila, but
this time only against Marcos and Benedicto, which were docketed
as Criminal Case Nos. 91-101884 to 91-101892. One of the
informations reads:
That from September 21, 1983 up to December 26,
1985, both dates inclusive, and for sometime
thereafter, all accused, conspiring and
confederating with one another and with the late
President Ferdinand E. Marcos, all residing and/or
doing business in Manila, Philippines, within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, and assisted by
their foreign agent or attorney-in-fact Stephen G.
Cattaui, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously fail to submit reports in the prescribed
form and/or register with the Foreign Exchange
Department of the Central Bank within 90 days
from October 21, 1983 as required of them being
residents habitually/customarily earning,
acquiring/receiving foreign exchange from
whatever source or from invisibles locally or from
abroad, despite the fact that they actually earned
interests regularly for their investment of FIFTEEN
MILLION ($15-million) DOLLARS, U.S. Currency, in
Philippine-issued dollar-denominated treasury
notes with floating rates and in bearer form, in the
name of Banque de Paris et des Pays-Bas (also
known as Banque Paribas) in Geneva, Switzerland
but which was transferred on May 17, 1984 to
Lombard, Odier et Cie, a bank also in Geneva, for
the account of COGES 00777 being managed by Mr.
Stephane Cattaui for the Marcoses who also
arranged the said investment of $15-million through
respondents Roberto S. Benedicto and Hector T.
Rivera by using the Royal Traders Bank in Manila as
the custodian of the said dollar-denominated
treasury notes, which earned, acquired or received
for the accused Imelda Romualdez Marcos and her
late husband an interest of $13,229.16 for delay
(December 16-19, 1995) plus redemption of $15-
Million which was remitted to Lombard, Odier et Cie
through Chicago International Banking Corporation
in New York, United States of America, for the credit
of said Account COGES 00777 of the Marcoses for
further investment outside the Philippines without
first complying with the reporting/registering
requirements of the Central Bank.
— (Rollo, CA-G.R. SP No. 35928, pp. 45-46)
On January 3, 1992, eleven (11) more informations for alleged
violation of the aforesaid Section 10, CB Circular 960 were filed
against Marcos and Benedicto with the same court which were
docketed as Criminal Case Nos. 92-101959 to 92-101969.
xxx xxx xxx
All these thirty-three (33) cases were consolidated before Branch 26
of the RTC of Manila presided by herein public respondent Judge
Loja, Sr.
Marcos was arraigned on February 12, 1992 while Benedicto and
Rivera were arraigned on February 28, 1994.
During the pendency of these cases, CB Circular No. 1318 (Revised
Manual of Rules and Regulations Governing Non-Trade Foreign
Exchange Transactions) dated January 3, 1992 and CB Circular No.
1353 (Further Liberalizing Foreign Exchange Regulations) dated
August 24, 1992 were issued by the CB. CB Circular No. 1318 repeals
insofar as inconsistent therewith all existing provisions of CB
 Circular No. 960, among other circulars, while CB Circular No. 1353
repeals all the provisions of Chapter X of CB Circular No. 1318 only
insofar as they are inconsistent therewith. Both circulars, however,
contain a saving clause excepting from the circular pending criminal
actions involving violations of CB Circular No.  960 and CB Circular
No.  1318. (Emphasis supplied)
Invoking the abovementioned repeal as one of her grounds, Marcos
filed a Motion to Quash on May 23, 1994 seeking the dismissal of
the cases or the quashal of the in formations filed against her in
Criminal Case Nos. 91-101732 to 91-101739 and 91-101879 to 91-
101892. Respondent People of the Philippines opposed the same on
June 2, 1994.3
Petitioner Marcos' aforesaid motion was denied by the trial court in an
order dated June 9, 1994 and her motion for reconsideration was likewise
repudiated in an order of August 30, 1994. She then filed a petition
for certiorari and prohibition with respondent Court of Appeals ascribing
abuse of discretion on the part of respondent trial judge. What transpired
there is best taken from the account thereof in the following portion of the
impugned decision of respondent appellate court.
In CA-G.R. SP No. 35719, Marcos relied on two grounds in taking
respondent court to task, to wit: (1) respondent court has no
jurisdiction over the offenses charged; and (2) respondent court
acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of
jurisdiction in denying her Motion to Quash.
Anent the first ground, Marcos argues that respondent court has no
jurisdiction over the cases as the informations clearly allege that the
acts complained of were committed outside Philippine territory, and
that her constitutional right to equal protection of the laws was
violated, the saving clause contained in CB Circular No. 1318 which
repealed CB Circular No. 960 being patently discriminatory as it was
purposedly designed to preserve the criminal cases lodged against
her and her co-accused.
As to the second ground, Marcos argues that the facts alleged in the
informations, even if true, do not constitute offenses and that in any
event the offenses charged have "disappeared" due to repeal.
Marcos asseverates that the saving clause (Section 111, Chapter X)
of CB Circular No. 1318 is invalid since the Monetary Board has no
authority to except therefrom pending criminal prosecutions, the
power being purely legislative and is not expressly granted in its
charter; that even assuming ad arguendo  that the Monetary Board
has the power, the same is still invalid for being an encroachment
and an invalid delegation thereof, the power to declare what
constitutes a crime and how it should be punished being vested
solely and exclusively in the legislature; that even further assuming
that there is no invalid delegation of power to incorporate the
saving clause, it is still invalid for being ultra vires as it is not
germane to the object and purpose of the Central Bank Act which is
to stabilize the monetary system; and in any event, even if the
power is unquestioned, the clause is still invalid for being violative
of the equal protection of (t)he law clause of the Constitution, it
having been designed solely for the purpose of preserving the
criminal cases against her and her co-accused.
As regards the assertion that the facts alleged in the informations
do not constitute an offense, Marcos contends that since the
allegations unequivocally state that foreign foundations or trusts,
not the Marcoses, opened and maintained the subject Swiss
accounts and earned and received the interests therefrom, she has
no duty to report any earnings and if at all, she was a mere
beneficiary of the foreign foundations or trusts; and that the acts
having been committed abroad, they are beyond the jurisdiction of
respondent court.
xxx xxx xxx
Petitioners do not dispute the validity of CB Circular No. 960, the
law under which they are being prosecuted, and of CB Circular Nos.
1318 and 1353 which they allege repealed CB Circular No. 960, nor
do they challenge the authority of the Monetary Board to issue
them.
Petitioners likewise do not dispute that violation of Section 4 of CB
Circular No. 960, as amended, which provides:
Sec. 4. Foreign exchange retention abroad. No
person shall promote, finance, enter into or
participate in any foreign exchange transactions
where the foreign exchange involved is paid,
retained, delivered or transferred abroad while the
corresponding pesos are paid for or are received in
the Philippines, except when specifically authorized
by the Central Bank or otherwise allowed under
Central Bank regulations.
Residents, firms, associations, or corporations
unless otherwise permitted under CB regulations
are prohibited from maintaining foreign exchange
accounts abroad.
or of Section 10 thereof, the pertinent portions of which provide:
Sec. 10. Reports of foreign exchange earners. All
resident persons who habitually/customarily earn,
acquire, or receive foreign exchange from invisibles
locally or from abroad, shall submit reports in the
prescribed form of such earnings, acquisition or
receipts with the appropriate CB department. Those
required to submit reports under this section shall
include, but need not necessarily be limited to the
following:
x x x           x x x          x x x
Residents, firms or establishments
habitually/customarily earning, acquiring or
receiving foreign exchange from sales of
merchandise, services or from whatever source
shall register with the Foreign Exchange
Department of the Central Bank within ninety (90)
days from the date of this Circular.
is punishable as a criminal offense under Section 34 of the Central
Bank Act the pertinent portion of which provides:
Sec. 34. Proceedings upon violation of laws and
regulations. — Whenever any person or entity
wilfully violates this Act or any order, instruction,
rule or regulation issued by the Monetary Board,
the person or persons responsible for such violation
shall be punished by a fine of not more than twenty
thousand pesos and by imprisonment of not more
than five years.4
In respondent Court of Appeals, however, it was petitioner's insistent
position that violations of CB Circular No. 960, specifically Sections 4 and 10
thereof, ceased to be punishable upon the issuance in 1992 of CB Circular
Nos. 1318 and 1353, on the theory that the latter circulars completely
repealed the former, and that the reservations made in each of the
repealing clauses of the latter circulars are invalid. She now reiterates the
same contentions before us. Respondent appellate court rejected her thesis
on this score; we are sufficiently persuaded to do likewise.
The saving clause in CB Circular No. 1318, which petitioner questions,
provides:
Sec. 111. Repealing Clause. All existing provisions of
Circulars 363, 960 and 1028, including amendments
thereto, with the exception of the second
paragraph of Section 68 of Circular 1028, as well as
all other existing Central Bank rules and regulations
or parts thereof, which are inconsistent with or
contrary to the provisions of this Circular, are
hereby repealed or modified accordingly: Provided,
however, that regulations, violations of which are
the subject of pending actions or investigations,
shall not be considered repealed insofar as such
pending action or investigations are concerned, it
being understood that as to such pending actions or
investigations, the regulations existing at the time
 the cause of action accrued shall govern (Emphasis
ours).
The assailed saving clause in CB Circular No. 1353 is as follows:
Sec. 16. Final Provisions of CB Circular No. 1318. All the provisions in
Chapter X of CB Circular No. 1318 insofar as they are not
inconsistent with, or contrary to the provisions of this Circular, shall
remain in full force and effect: Provided, however, that any
regulation on non-trade foreign exchange transactions which has
been repealed, amended or modified by this Circular, violations of
which are the subject of pending actions or investigations, shall not
be considered repealed insofar as such pending actions or
investigations are concerned, it being understood that as to such
pending actions or investigations, the regulations existing at the
time of the cause of action accrued shall govern (Emphasis also
supplied).
We agree with respondent appellate court that such amendments and
saving clauses are valid and were authorized enactments under a delegated
power of the Monetary Board. Section 14 of the Central Bank Act expressly
grants the Monetary Board the power to "prepare and issue rules and
regulations necessary for the effective discharge of the responsibilities and
exercise of the powers assigned to the Monetary Board and to the Central
Bank under this Act," and to report the same thereafter to the President and
Congress. In fact, this power of subordinate legislation and its validity was
admitted by petitioner in the respondent appellate court.5
It cannot be plausibly, claimed that there was undue delegation of
legislative power in this particular instance since it was the Central Bank
itself which defined the offense and provided the penalty therefor. As
respondent Court of Appeals points out, administrative bodies have the
authority to issue administrative regulations which are penal in nature
where the law itself makes the violation of the administrative regulation
punishable and provides for its penalty.6 This is still the rule on the matter
and, in the instant case, the Central Bank Act defined the offense and its
penalty while the questioned circular merely spelled out the details of the
offense. Ironically, petitioner concedes the greater power of the Board to
repeal CB Circular No. 960 through CB Circular No. 1318, yet she inexplicably
questions the lesser and incidental power to provide for saving clauses
therein.
Petitioner's argument that the saving clauses are not germane to the
purposes of the Central Bank Act, and consequently ultra vires, has been
roundly confuted by respondent Court of Appeals. If, as she claims, one of
the objectives of that law is to stabilize the monetary system, that is
precisely why Congress punished as criminal offenses the violations of the
issuances of the Monetary Board necessary for the effective discharge of its
responsibilities, and to carry out which the Board deemed it necessary to
provide for the challenged saving clauses. Obviously, these saving clauses
were dictated by the need to continue the prosecution of those who had
already committed acts of monetary destabilization. The opposite view
posited by petitioner would result in an absurdity.
Her lamentations that the aforementioned provisions are discriminatory
because they are aimed at her and her co-accused do not assume the
dignity of a legal argument since they are unwarranted conjectures belied
by even the text of the circulars alone. Hence, as respondent appellate court
correctly concludes, the foregoing facts clearly disprove petitioner's claim
that her constitutional right to equal protection of the law was violated.
Should she nonetheless desire to pursue such objection, she may always
adduce additional evidence at the trial of these cases since that is the
proper stage therefor, and not at their present posture.
Lastly, there is no need for us to tarry on petitioner's hypothesis that the
acts charged in the questioned informations were committed by foreign
agents or juridical persons outside Philippine territory and that, she being
supposedly a mere beneficiary, this scenario divests the trial court of
jurisdiction over her insofar as the violations resulting from such acts abroad
are concerned. This is too simplistic an argument because it would have the
Court assume that she only had a passive participation thereon or, if she is
to be believed, none at all.
That is why respondent Court of Appeals decided to just graciously quote, in
refutation of such imposition on judicial credulity, the perceptively, succinct
observation of respondent trial judge, to wit:
 . . . In no uncertain terms, the corresponding informations clearly
state that the accused, in conspiracy with the late president . . .
opened and maintained foreign accounts abroad in the name of
foundations organized by their dummies. The same observation
holds true in Criminal Cases Nos. 91-101879-92 where the accused
and her co-accused are charged (with) violation of Section 10, CB
Circular 960. As easily gleaned therefrom, (the) criminal
informations are not only sufficient but clear in alleging that the
accused earned foreign exchange without proper reporting thereof
although camouflaged in the name of foundations.
xxx xxx xxx
. . . accused's contention that the acts charged were committed by
persons or agents who managed said foundation outside the
country and therefore beyond the jurisdiction of this court is
misplaced argument. As already stated and discussed, it is the
accused who (was alleged to have) maintained foreign accounts and
earned foreign exchange abroad camouflaged in the name of
foreign agents and/or foundations but neither obtained authority to
do so nor reported the earnings to the Central Bank.7 (Words in
emphasis supplied).
All the way from the trial court, through the Court of Appeals, and now
before this Court, petitioner has insistently repeated the selfsame issues
and arguments for the quashal of the charges against her, with the result
that the same have been deep-frozen since 1991. Inevitably, the three-
tiered adjudicature to which they have been subjected has merely resulted
in reiterations by the parties of their set issues, congealed arguments and
invariable conclusions.
It is time then to thaw those cases from the frigidity of their present status
so that petitioner may have the opportunity to prove her defenses on the
merits, instead of having those cases indefinitely sidelined by legal strategy
contingent on expectancies. For, in the present posture thereof, it does not
appear that respondent Court of Appeals has committed any abuse of
discretion, much less of a grave or arbitrary nature, as would call for the
extraordinary writ of certiorari. We accordingly uphold the denial of
petitioner's motion to quash so that the interlocutory proceedings may now
move on to trial wherein she can present such evidence as may possibly
place her protestations in another light as she claims.
WHEREFORE, the petition at bar is DENIED and the challenged judgment of
respondent Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED, with costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 152214             September 19, 2006
EQUI-ASIA PLACEMENT, INC., petitioner,
vs.
DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS (DFA) represented by the HON.
DOMINGO L. SIAZON, JR., SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT OF LABOR AND
EMPLOYMENT (DOLE), represented by HON. BIENVENIDO
LAGUESMA, respondents.
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO,  J.:
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari of the Decision dated 4 October
20011 and Resolution dated 18 February 2002 of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. SP No. 61904. The Decision denied petitioner's petition
for certiorari while the Resolution denied its Motion for Reconsideration.
The Court of Appeals summarized the facts of this case in this wise:
On September 16, 2000, Manny dela Rosa Razon, a native of
Lemery, Batangas and an overseas Filipino worker, died of acute
cardiac arrest while asleep at the dormitory of the Samsong Textile
Processing Factory in South Korea. Informed thereof, the Philippine
Overseas Labor Office (POLO) at South Korea immediately relayed
the incident to the Philippine Embassy in South Korea. Forthwith,
the [Labor] Attaché of the Philippine Embassy dispatched a letter to
Eleuterio N. Gardiner, administrator of the Overseas Workers
Welfare Administration (OWWA). The letter reads:
 "VERY URGENT, POLO has recently received a report that
OFW Manny dela Rosa RAZON, an undocumented worker,
died last Saturday, 16 September, from an apparent
pancreatic attack or 'bangungot.'
According to the verbal reports of Moises and Ronald
Recarde, Manny's co-workers, he was found already lifeless
inside their quarters at around 11:00 in the morning of the
above date. They rushed him to Uri Hospital where the
Doctor declared him dead on arrival.
Per information gathered, the deceased is single, 29 years
old, from Bukal, Lemery, Batangas. His next-of-kins are Mrs.
Rowena Razon (Auntie) and Mr. Razon (Uncle) with
telephone number (043)411-2308.
POLO is awaiting signed statements from the
aforementioned workers who promised to send it by fax
this afternoon.
We are also coordinating with the deceased's employer for
documentation requirements and financial assistance for
the repatriation of the remains.
We will highly appreciate if Home Office could advise the
next-of-kins of the urgent need to issue a Special Power of
Attorney (SPA) to facilitate the repatriation requirements of
the subject.
In anticipation of the next-of-kins' likely move to seek
financial assistance from OWWA for the repatriation of their
loved [one], please be advised in advance that we will need
about US$4,000.00 to repatriate the cadaver (to include
hospital and morgue costs) to Manila. xxx"
In turn, the OWWA, through Atty. Cesar L. Chavez, indorsed the
matter, for appropriate action, to Director R. Casco of the Welfare
Employment Office of the Philippine Overseas Employment
Administration (WEO-POEA).
Upon verification by the WEO-POEA on its data base, it was
discovered that Manny Razon was recruited and deployed by
petitioner Equi-Asia Placement, Inc., and was sent to South Korea on
April 3, 2000 to work-train at Yeongjin Machinery, Inc. Thereupon,
POEA addressed the herein first assailed telegram-directive dated
September 22, 2000 to the President/General Manager of the
petitioner. We quote the telegram:
"PLEASE PROVIDE PTA [Prepaid Ticket Advice] FOR THE
REPATRIATION OF REMAINS AND BELONGINGS OF OFW
MANNY DELA ROSA RAZON AS PER REQUEST OF PHILIPPINE
EMBASSY, KOREA, YOU CAN COORDINATE WITH YOUR
FOREIGN EMPLOYER AND TO WAD/OWWA (MLA) AS
REGARDS TO THIS MATTER. YOU ARE GIVEN TWO (2) DAYS
FROM RECEIPT HEREOF WITHIN WHICH TO PROVIDE SAID
TICKET AND ASSISTANCE, KINDLY SUBMIT YOUR REPORT TO
ASSISTANCE AND WELFARE DIVISION (AWD), 2/F POEA,
FAILURE TO DO SO WILL CONSTRAIN US TO IMPOSE
APPROPRIATE SANCTION UNDER OUR RULES"
Responding thereto, petitioner, thru its President Daniel Morga, Jr.,
faxed on September 26, 2000 the following message to the
Assistance and Welfare Division of the POEA:
"In connection with your telegram, dated 09/22/2000,
requiring us to report the circumstances surrounding the
death of OFW MANNY DELA ROSA RAZON in Korea and
requesting us to issue a PTA, etc., for the repatriation of the
remains of said OFW, this is to report to your good office
the following:
1. The deceased was deployed by our agency on April 3,
2000 to Yeongjin Machine Company in South Korea;
2. He violated his employment/training/dispatching
contracts on June 25, 2000 by unlawfully escaping/running
away (TNT) from his company assignment without prior
KFSMB authorization and working/staying in unknown
company/place;
 3. He allegedly died of 'bangungot' thereafter;
In view thereof, we cannot heed your requests as embodied
in your telegram. However, his relatives can avail of the
benefits provided for by OWWA in cases involving
undocumented/illegal Filipino workers abroad.
Trusting for your kind understanding"
On the same date – September 26, 2000 – Director Ricardo R. Casco
of the WEO-POEA sent to the petitioner the herein second assailed
letter-directive, which pertinently reads:
"We have received a copy of your fax message dated 26
September 2000 as regards to your response to our request
for PTA for aforesaid deceased OFW. Nevertheless, may we
remind you that pursuant to Sections 52, 53, 54 and 55 of
the Implementing Rules Governing RA 8042, otherwise
known as the Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipino Act of
1995, the repatriation of OFW, his/her remains and
transport of his personal effects is the primary responsibility
of the principal or agency and to immediately advance the
cost of plane fare without prior determination of the cause
of worker's repatriation. The Rules further provide for the
procedure to be followed in cases when the foreign
employer/agency fails to provide for the cost of the
repatriation, compliance of which is punishable by
suspension of the license of the agency or such sanction as
the Administration shall deem proper. Hence, you are
required to provide the PTA for the deceased OFW in
compliance with the requirement in accordance with R.A.
8042. You are given forty-eight (48) hours upon receipt
hereof within which to provide said ticket. Failure in this
regard will constrain us to impose the appropriate sanction
under our rules."
On September 27, 2000, petitioner wrote back Director Ricardo R.
Casco, thus:
"In connection with your fax letter dated September 26,
2000, re: the repatriation of the remains of the deceased,
ex-trainee (OFW) MANNY DELA ROSA RAZON, please be
informed that the provisions of Section 53 as well as, and in
relation to, Section 55 of the Omnibus Rules and
Regulations Implementing the Migrant Workers and
Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995 on the matters covering the
following:
1. The responsibility of the agency to advance the
cost of plane fare without prior determination of
the cause of the deceased worker's termination.
2. The recovery of the same costs from the estate of
the dead worker before the NLRC.
3. The action to be imposed by POEA for non-
compliance therewith within 48 hours are violative
of due process and/or the principle on due
delegation of power.
This is so because Sec. 15 of R.A. 8042 clearly contemplates
prior notice and hearing before responsibility thereunder
could be established against the agency that sets up the
defense of sole fault – in avoidance of said responsibility -.
Besides, the sections in question unduly grant the powers to
require advance payment of the plane fare, to impose the
corresponding penalty of suspension in case of non-
compliance therewith, within 48 hours and to recover said
advance payment from the dead worker's estate upon the
return of his remains to the country before the NLRC, when
the law itself does not expressly provide for the grant of
such powers.
x x x x x x x x x.
Please provide us immediately with the death
certificate/post mortem report/police report pertinent to
above as proof of death and cause thereof."
 Nonetheless, and apprehensive of the adverse repercussions which
may ensue on account of its non-compliance with the directive,
petitioner, on September 29, 2000, advanced under protest the
costs for the repatriation of the remains of the late Manny dela
Rosa Razon.
Thereafter, petitioner went to this Court via the instant petition for
certiorari, posing, for Our consideration, the sole issue of –
"WHETHER OR NOT SECTIONS 52, 53, 54 AND 55 OF THE
OMNIBUS RULES AND REGULATIONS IMPLEMENTING THE
MIGRANT WORKERS AND OVERSEAS FILIPINOS ACT OF 1995
(R.A. 8042), ISSUED BY DFA AND POEA, WHICH POEA
SUMMARILY ORDERED THE HEREIN PETITIONER TO COMPLY
VIZ-A-VIZ THE PAYMENT IN ADVANCE OF THE EXPENSES
FOR THE REPATRIATION OF THE REMAINS OF A DECEASED
WORKER-TRAINEE WHO, AT THE TIME OF HIS DEATH, HAS
NO EXISTING EMPLOYMENT (DISPATCHING) CONTRACT
WITH EITHER SAID PETITIONER OR HIS FOREIGN PRINCIPAL
AND NO VALID VISA OR IS NOT WORKING WITH THE
FOREIGN PRINCIPAL TO WHICH PETITIONER DEPLOYED HIM,
IS ILLEGAL AND/OR VIOLATIVE OF DUE PROCESS SUCH THAT
POEA ACTED WITHOUT [OR IN] EXCESS OF ITS JURISDICTION
AND/OR IN GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN ISSUING SAID
ORDER TO PAY SAID EXPENSES."2
On 4 October 2001, the Court of Appeals rendered the Decision which is
now the subject of the present petition. The dispositive portion of the Court
of Appeals' Decision states:
WHEREFORE, for lack of merit, the instant petition is DENIED and is
accordingly DISMISSED.3
In dismissing the petition for certiorari, the Court of Appeals stated that
petitioner was mainly accusing the Philippine Overseas Employment
Administration (POEA) of grave abuse of discretion when it ordered
petitioner to pay, in advance, the costs for the repatriation of the remains of
the deceased Manny dela Rosa Razon.
The Court of Appeals ruled that the POEA did not commit any grave abuse
of discretion as its directives to petitioner were issued pursuant to existing
laws and regulations.4 It likewise held that a petition for certiorari, which
was the remedy availed of by petitioner, is not the proper remedy as the
same is only available when "there is no appeal, or any plain, speedy, and
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law."5 Section 62 of the Omnibus
Rules and Regulations Implementing the Migrant Workers and Overseas
Filipinos Act of 1995 or Republic Act 8042 ("Omnibus Rules") states that "the
Labor Arbiters of NLRC shall have the original and exclusive jurisdiction to
hear and decide all claims arising out of employer-employee relationship or
by virtue of any law or contract involving Filipino workers for overseas
deployment including claims for actual, moral, exemplary and other forms
of damages, subject to the rules and procedures of the NLRC." There is,
therefore, an adequate remedy available to petitioner.
Lastly, the Court of Appeals declared that it could not strike down as
unconstitutional Sections 52, 53, 54, and 55 of the Omnibus Rules as the
unconstitutionality of a statute or rules may not be passed upon unless the
issue is directly raised in an appropriate proceeding.6
In the present recourse, petitioner submits the following issues for our
consideration:
1. The Court of Appeals erred in the appreciation of the issue as it
mistakenly considered, in dismissing the petition before it, that
petitioner is contesting the compliance and conformity of the POEA
directives with Sections 52, 53, 54, and 55 of the Omnibus Rules and
Regulations implementing in particular Section 15 of RA 8042;
2. The Court of Appeals, in dismissing the petition, again erred in
ruling that constitutional questions cannot be passed upon and
adjudged in a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure;
3. The Court of Appeals erred in not holding that, under the facts of
the case that gave rise to the petition before it, the same sections of
the said rules and regulations are illegal, invalid and/or violative of
the right of petitioner to due process of law and, therefore, the
POEA directives issued pursuant thereto constitute acts committed
 without, or in excess of, jurisdiction and/or in grave abuse of
discretion.7
In Our Resolution of 20 November 2002, we gave due course to the present
petition and directed the parties to submit their respective memoranda.8 On
28 August 2006, we resolved to dispense with the memorandum of the
estate/heirs of deceased Manny dela Rosa Razon.
At the center of this petition are the following provisions of the omnibus
rules:
Section 52. Primary Responsibility for Repatriation. – The
repatriation of the worker, or his/her remains, and the transport of
his/her personal effects shall be the primary responsibility of the
principal or agency which recruited or deployed him/her abroad. All
costs attendant thereto shall be borne by the principal or the
agency concerned.
Section 53. Repatriation of Workers. – The primary responsibility to
repatriate entails the obligation on the part of principal or agency to
advance the cost of plane fare and to immediately repatriate the
worker should the need for it arise, without a prior determination of
the cause of the termination of the worker's employment. However,
after the worker has returned to the country, the principal or
agency may recover the cost of repatriation from the worker if the
termination of employment was due solely to his/her fault.
Every contract for overseas employment shall provide for the
primary responsibility of agency to advance the cost of plane fare,
and the obligation of the worker to refund the cost thereof in case
his/her fault is determined by the Labor Arbiter.
Section 54. Repatriation Procedure. – When a need for repatriation
arises and the foreign employer fails to provide for it cost, the
responsible personnel at site shall simultaneously notify OWWA and
the POEA of such need. The POEA shall notify the agency concerned
of the need for repatriation. The agency shall provide the plane
ticket or the prepaid ticket advice (PTA) to the Filipinos Resource
Center or to the appropriate Philippine Embassy; and notify POEA of
such compliance. The POEA shall inform OWWA of the action of the
agency.
Section 55. Action on Non-Compliance. – If the employment agency
fails to provide the ticket or PTA within 48 hours from receipt of the
notice, the POEA shall suspend the license of the agency or impose
such sanctions as it may deem necessary. Upon notice from the
POEA, OWWA shall advance the costs of repatriation with recourse
to the agency or principal. The administrative sanction shall not be
lifted until the agency reimburses the OWWA of the cost of
repatriation with legal interest.
Said provisions, on the other hand, are supposed to implement Section 15
of Republic Act No. 80429 which provides:
SEC. 15. Repatriation of Workers; Emergency Repatriation Fund. –
The repatriation of the worker and the transport of his personal
belongings shall be the primary responsibility of the agency which,
recruited or deployed the worker overseas. All costs attendant to
repatriation shall be borne by or charged to the agency concerned
and/or its principal. Likewise, the repatriation of remains and
transport of the personal belongings of a deceased worker and all
costs attendant thereto shall be borne by the principal and/or the
local agency. However, in cases where the termination of
employment is due solely to the fault of the worker, the
principal/employer or agency shall not in any manner be
responsible for the repatriation of the former and/or his belongings.
Petitioner contends that the Court of Appeals misappreciated the issue it
presented in its petition for certiorari when, instead of resolving whether
Sections 52, 53, 54, and 55 of the Omnibus Rules are illegal and violative of
due process, it merely confined itself to the question of whether or not the
POEA committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing its directives of 22
September 2000 and 27 September 2000.
Petitioner also contends that, contrary to the finding of the Court of
Appeals, a special civil action for certiorari is the appropriate remedy to
raise constitutional issues.
Also, petitioner insists that the subject portions of the omnibus rules are
invalid on the ground that Section 15 of Republic Act No. 8042 does not
impose on a recruitment agency the primary responsibility for the
repatriation of a deceased Overseas Filipino Worker (OFW), while Section 52
of the Omnibus Rules unduly imposes such burden on a placement agency.
Moreover, petitioner argues that the word "likewise" at the start of the
third sentence of Section 15 of Republic Act No. 8042 is used merely as a
connective word indicating the similarity between a recruitment agency's
financial obligation in the repatriation of living and a deceased OFW. It does
not, however, necessarily make a placement agency primarily responsible
for the repatriation of a deceased OFW unlike in the case of an OFW who is
alive.
As for Section 53 of the Omnibus Rules, petitioner submits that the same is
invalid as Section 15 of Republic Act No. 8042 clearly states that a
placement agency shall not in any manner be responsible for the
repatriation of the deceased OFW and his or her belongings should the
termination of the OFW's employment be due to his or her fault. However,
as Section 53 of the Omnibus Rules stipulates that a placement agency or
principal shall bear the primary responsibility of repatriating an OFW and of
advancing the payment for his or her plane fare, the omibus rules, as far as
this section is concerned, is an invalid exercise of legislative power by an
administrative agency.
In addition, petitioner claims Section 53 of the Omnibus Rules violates the
due process clause of the constitution as it deprives the deploying agency of
the right to prior notice and hearing through which it can prove that it
should not bear the burden of repatriating an OFW.
Finally, petitioner points out that it should be the Overseas Workers Welfare
Administration which should advance the costs of repatriation of the
deceased Razon with the resources coming out of the emergency
repatriation fund of said agency.
The Solicitor General for its part counters that Sections 52, 53, 54, and 55 of
the Omnibus Rules are valid quasi-legislative acts of respondents
Department of Foreign Affairs and Department of Labor and
Employment.10 Because of this, the requirements of prior notice and hearing
are not essential. Besides, there are cases where even in the exercise of
quasi-judicial power, administrative agencies are allowed, sans prior notice
and hearing, to effectuate measures affecting private property, such as:
1) [F]or the summary abatement of nuisance per se which affects
the immediate safety of persons and property, or 2) in summary
proceedings of distraint and levy upon the property of delinquent
taxpayers in the collection of internal revenue taxes, fees or charges
or any increment thereto, or 3) in the preventive suspension of a
public officer pending investigation. x x x.11
The Solicitor General also adds that since petitioner is engaged in the
recruitment of Filipino workers for work abroad, the nature of its business
calls for the exercise of the state's police power in order to safeguard the
rights and welfare of the Filipino laborers. One such measure is the primary
responsibility imposed upon placement agencies with regard to the
repatriation of an OFW or of his remains.
The Solicitor General also argues that the wording of Section 15 of Republic
Act No. 8042 leaves no doubt that a recruitment agency shall bear the
primary responsibility for the repatriation of an OFW whether the latter is
dead or alive.
Lastly, the Solicitor General insists that actions assailing the validity of
implementing rules and regulations are within the original jurisdiction of the
regional trial courts.
We shall first address the procedural question involved in the present
petition.
There is no denying that regular courts have jurisdiction over cases involving
the validity or constitutionality of a rule or regulation issued by
administrative agencies. Such jurisdiction, however, is not limited to the
Court of Appeals or to this Court alone for even the regional trial courts can
take cognizance of actions assailing a specific rule or set of rules
promulgated by administrative bodies. Indeed, the Constitution vests the
power of judicial review or the power to declare a law, treaty, international
or executive agreement, presidential decree, order, instruction, ordinance,
or regulation in the courts, including the regional trial courts.12
Section 1, Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure states:
SECTION 1. Petition for Certiorari. – When any tribunal, board or
officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions has acted
without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and there is
no appeal, nor any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law, a person aggrieved thereby may file a
verified petition in the proper court, alleging the facts with certainty
and praying that judgment be rendered annulling or modifying the
proceedings of such tribunal, board or officer, and granting such
incidental reliefs as law and justice may require.
The petition shall be accompanied by a certified true copy of the
judgment, order or resolution subject thereof, copies of all
pleadings and documents relevant and pertinent thereto, and a
sworn certification of non-forum shopping as provided in the third
paragraph of Section 3, Rule 46.
From this, it is clear that in order for a petition for certiorari to prosper, the
following requisites must be present: (1) the writ is directed against a
tribunal, a board or an officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions;
(2) such tribunal, board or officer has acted without or in excess of
jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction; and (3) there is no appeal or any plain, speedy and adequate
remedy in the ordinary course of law.
It bears emphasizing that administrative bodies are vested with two basic
powers, the quasi-legislative and the quasi-judicial.13 In Abella, Jr. v. Civil
Service Commission,14 we discussed the nature of these powers to be –
In exercising its quasi-judicial function, an administrative body
adjudicates the rights of persons before it, in accordance with the
standards laid down by the law. The determination of facts and the
applicable law, as basis for official action and the exercise of judicial
discretion, are essential for the performance of this function. On
these considerations, it is elementary that due process
requirements, as enumerated in Ang Tibay, must be observed.
These requirements include prior notice and hearing.
On the other hand, quasi-legislative power is exercised by
administrative agencies through the promulgation of rules and
regulations within the confines of the granting statute and the
doctrine of non-delegation of certain powers flowing from the
separation of the great branches of the government. Prior notice to
and hearing of every affected party, as elements of due process, are
not required since there is no determination of past events or facts
that have to be established or ascertained. As a general rule, prior
notice and hearing are not essential to the validity of rules or
regulations promulgated to govern future conduct.
In this case, petitioner assails certain provisions of the Omnibus Rules.
However, these rules were clearly promulgated by respondents Department
of Foreign Affairs and Department of Labor and Employment in the exercise
of their quasi-legislative powers or the authority to promulgate rules and
regulations. Because of this, petitioner was, thus, mistaken in availing
himself of the remedy of an original action for certiorari as obviously, only
judicial or quasi-judicial acts are proper subjects thereof. If only for these,
the petition deserves outright dismissal. Be that as it may, we shall proceed
to resolve the substantive issues raised in this petition for review in order to
finally remove the doubt over the validity of Sections 52, 53, 54, and 55 of
the Omnibus Rules.
It is now well-settled that delegation of legislative power to various
specialized administrative agencies is allowed in the face of increasing
complexity of modern life. Given the volume and variety of interactions
involving the members of today's society, it is doubtful if the legislature can
promulgate laws dealing with the minutiae aspects of everyday life. Hence,
the need to delegate to administrative bodies, as the principal agencies
tasked to execute laws with respect to their specialized fields, the authority
to promulgate rules and regulations to implement a given statute and
effectuate its policies.15 All that is required for the valid exercise of this
power of subordinate legislation is that the regulation must be germane to
the objects and purposes of the law; and that the regulation be not in
contradiction to, but in conformity with, the standards prescribed by the
law.16 Under the first test or the so-called completeness test, the law must
be complete in all its terms and conditions when it leaves the legislature
such that when it reaches the delegate, the only thing he will have to do is
to enforce it.17 The second test or the sufficient standard test, mandates
that there should be adequate guidelines or limitations in the law to
determine the boundaries of the delegate's authority and prevent the
delegation from running riot.18
We resolve that the questioned provisions of the Omnibus Rules meet these
requirements.
Basically, petitioner is impugning the subject provisions of the Omnibus
Rules for allegedly expanding the scope of Section 15 of Republic Act No.
8042 by: first, imposing upon it the primary obligation to repatriate the
remains of the deceased Razon including the duty to advance the cost of the
plane fare for the transport of Razon's remains; and second, by ordering it
to do so without prior determination of the existence of employer-
employee relationship between itself and Razon.
Petitioner's argument that Section 15 does not provide that it shall be
primarily responsible for the repatriation of a deceased OFW is specious and
plain nitpicking. While Republic Act No. 8042 does not expressly state that
petitioner shall be primarily obligated to transport back here to the
Philippines the remains of the deceased Razon, nevertheless, such duty is
imposed upon him as the statute clearly dictates that "the repatriation of
remains and transport of the personal belongings of a deceased worker and
all costs attendant thereto shall be borne by the principal and/or the local
agency." The mandatory nature of said obligation is characterized by the
legislature's use of the word "shall." That the concerned government
agencies opted to demand the performance of said responsibility solely
upon petitioner does not make said directives invalid as the law plainly
obliges a local placement agency such as herein petitioner to bear the
burden of repatriating the remains of a deceased OFW with or without
recourse to the principal abroad. In this regard, we see no reason to
invalidate Section 52 of the omnibus rules as Republic Act No. 8042 itself
permits the situation wherein a local recruitment agency can be held
exclusively responsible for the repatriation of a deceased OFW.
Nor do we see any reason to stamp Section 53 of the Omnibus Rules as
invalid for allegedly contravening Section 15 of the law which states that a
placement agency shall not be responsible for a worker's repatriation should
the termination of the employer-employee relationship be due to the fault
of the OFW. To our mind, the statute merely states the general principle
that in case the severance of the employment was because of the OFW's
own undoing, it is only fair that he or she should shoulder the costs of his or
her homecoming. Section 15 of Republic Act No. 8042, however, certainly
does not preclude a placement agency from establishing the circumstances
surrounding an OFW's dismissal from service in an appropriate proceeding.
As such determination would most likely take some time, it is only proper
that an OFW be brought back here in our country at the soonest possible
time lest he remains stranded in a foreign land during the whole time that
recruitment agency contests its liability for repatriation. As aptly pointed
out by the Solicitor General –
Such a situation is unacceptable.
24. This is the same reason why repatriation is made by law an
obligation of the agency and/or its principal without the need of
first determining the cause of the termination of the worker's
employment. Repatriation is in effect an unconditional responsibility
of the agency and/or its principal that cannot be delayed by an
investigation of why the worker was terminated from employment.
To be left stranded in a foreign land without the financial means to
return home and being at the mercy of unscrupulous individuals is a
violation of the OFW's dignity and his human rights. These are the
same rights R.A. No. 8042 seeks to protect.19
As for the sufficiency of standard test, this Court had, in the past, accepted
as sufficient standards the following: "public interest," "justice and equity,"
"public convenience and welfare," and "simplicity, economy and welfare."20
In this case, we hold that the legislature's pronouncements that Republic
Act No. 8042 was enacted with the thought of upholding the dignity of the
Filipinos may they be here or abroad and that the State shall at all times
afford full protection to labor, both here and abroad, meet the requirement
and provide enough guidance for the formulation of the omnibus rules.
WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review is DENIED. The Court of Appeals'
Decision dated 4 October 2001 and Resolution dated 18 February 2002 are
hereby AFFIRMED. With costs.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 148579             February 5, 2007
GMA NETWORK, INC., Petitioner,
vs.
MOVIE AND TELEVISION REVIEW AND CLASSIFICATION
BOARD, Respondent.
DECISION
CORONA, J.:
Subject of this petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court is the
June 18, 2001 decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) affirming the January 7,
2000 order2 of respondent Movie and Television Review and Classification
Board (MTRCB) which read:
In view thereof, the BOARD, by the undersigned, hereby imposes the
administrative penalty of SUSPENSION FROM AIRING/BROADCASTING any
program on EMC Channel 27 for a period of seven (7) days which period
shall commence immediately upon receipt of this Order. Your failure to
comply with this ORDER shall be construed by the BOARD as defiance on
your part of a lawful order of the BOARD.
The facts follow.
Petitioner GMA Network, Inc. operates and manages the UHF television
station, EMC Channel 27. On January 7, 2000, respondent MTRCB issued an
order of suspension against petitioner for airing "Muro Ami: The Making"
without first securing a permit from it as provided in Section 7 of PD 1986.3
The penalty of suspension was based on Memorandum Circular 98-17 dated
December 15, 19984 which provided for the penalties for exhibiting a
program without a valid permit from the MTRCB.
Petitioner moved for reconsideration of the suspension order and, at the
same time, informed MTRCB that Channel 27 had complied with the
suspension order by going off the air since midnight of January 11, 2000. It
also filed a letter-protest which was merely "noted" by the MTRCB thereby,
in effect, denying both the motion for reconsideration and letter-protest.
Petitioner then filed with the CA a petition for certiorari which was
dismissed in the now assailed June 18, 2001 decision. The January 7, 2000
suspension order issued by MTRCB was affirmed in toto.
Hence, this recourse.
The pivotal issues for our resolution are:
(1) whether the MTRCB has the power or authority to review the
show "Muro Ami: The Making" prior to its broadcast by television
and
(2) whether Memorandum Circular No. 98-17 was enforceable and
binding on petitioner.
First, Section 3 of PD 19865 empowers the MTRCB to screen, review and
examine all motion pictures, television programs including publicity
materials. This power of prior review is highlighted in its Rules and
Regulations, particularly Section 7 thereof, which reads:
SECTION 7. REQUIREMENT OF PRIOR REVIEW. -- No motion picture,
television program or related publicity material shall be imported, exported,
produced, copied, distributed, sold, leased, exhibited or broadcasted by
television without prior permit issued by the BOARD after review of the
motion picture, television program or publicity material.
The only exemptions from the MTRCB’s power of review are those expressly
mentioned in Section 7,6 such as (1) television programs imprinted or
exhibited by the Philippine Government and/or departments and agencies,
and (2) newsreels.
According to the CA, the subject program was a publicity for the movie,
"Muro Ami." In adopting this finding, we hold that "Muro Ami: The Making,"
did not fall under any of the exemptions and was therefore within the
power of review of MTRCB.
On the other hand, petitioner claims that "Muro Ami: The Making" was
a public affairs  program.7 Even if that were so, our resolution of this issue
would not change. This Court has already ruled that a public affairs program
-- described as a variety of news treatment; a cross between pure television
news and news-related commentaries, analysis and/or exchange of opinions
-- is within the MTRCB’s power of review.8 Clearly, "Muro Ami: The Making"
(which petitioner claims to be a public affairs program) was well within the
purview of MTRCB’s power of prior review.1awphi1.net
However, while MTRCB had jurisdiction over the subject program,
Memorandum Circular 98-17, which was the basis of the suspension order,
was not binding on petitioner. The Administrative Code of 1987, particularly
Section 3 thereof, expressly requires each agency to file with the Office of
the National Administrative Register (ONAR) of the University of the
Philippines Law Center three certified copies of every rule adopted by it.
Administrative issuances which are not published or filed with the ONAR are
ineffective and may not be enforced.9
Memorandum Circular No. 98-17, which provides for the penalties for the
first, second and third offenses for exhibiting programs without valid permit
to exhibit, has not been registered with the ONAR as of January 27,
2000.10 Hence, the same is yet to be effective.11 It is thus unenforceable
since it has not been filed in the ONAR.12 Consequently, petitioner was not
bound by said circular and should not have been meted the sanction
provided thereunder.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The decision of
the Court of Appeals dated June 18, 2001, insofar as it affirmed the public
respondent Movie and Television Review and Classification Board’s
jurisdiction over "Muro Ami: The Making," is hereby AFFIRMED with the
MODIFICATION that the suspension order issued against petitioner GMA
Network, Inc. pursuant to Memorandum Circular No. 98-17 is hereby
declared null and void.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 192128 & 192135-36, September 13, 2017
GMA NETWORK, INC., Petitioner, v. NATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS
COMMISSION, Respondent.
DECISION
CAGUIOA, J.:
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court assailing the Decision2 of the Court of Appeals3 (CA) dated April 29,
2010 in CA-G.R. SP Nos. 109954, 110145 and 110148, denying the petitions
filed by petitioner GMA Network, Inc. (petitioner GMA), against the assailed
Orders issued by the respondent National Telecommunications Commission
(respondent NTC) dated January 11, 2007, February 26, 2009 and May 25,
2009.
Facts
The Decision of the CA dated April 29, 2010 states the facts as follows:
Petitioner GMA Network, Inc. (GMA), formerly known as Republic
Broadcasting System, Inc., is a Filipino-owned domestic corporation engaged
in the business of radio and television broadcasting as a grantee of a
legislative franchise by virtue of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7252 enacted on
March 20, 1992, to construct, install, operate and maintain radio and
television broadcasting stations in the Philippines for a period of 25 years.
Respondent National Telecommunications Commission (NTC) is the
government agency that exercises jurisdiction over the supervision,
adjudication and control of all telecommunications and broadcast services
in the country.
Following the enactment of R.A. No. 7252 and pursuant to Section 3
thereof, GMA filed before the NTC three (3) applications for Certificate of
Public Convenience respectively docketed and entitled as follows:
 BMC Case No. 91-336 :  "In Re: Application for
Certificate of Public Convenience to Install, Operate
and Maintain a VHF-TV Station in Dumaguete City."
 NTC Case No. 96-038 :  "In Re: Application for a
Certificate of Public Convenience to Install, Operate
and Maintain DXLA-TV Station in Zamboanga City."
  BMC Case No. 96-499 :  "Re: CPC for a 10KW Radio (C.A. No. 146) or the Public Service Act.
Station in Zamboanga City."
In an Order dated May 25, 2009 in NTC Case No. 96-038, NTC issued a
Pending the resolution of these applications, NTC granted GMA three Certificate of Public Convenience (CPC) for the operation of GMA's DXLA-TV
Provisional Authorities ([PA]) to install, operate and maintain DXRC-AM Station in Zamboanga City. With respect to BMC Case Nos. 93-499 and 91-
broadcasting station and DXLA-TV Station both in Zamboanga City and a 336, NTC issued Orders dated January 11, 2007 and February 26, 2009
VHF-TV station in Dumaguete City. The said [PAs] were issued on and valid respectively renewing GMA's [PA] to install, operate and maintain DXRC-AM
until the following dates: broadcasting station in Zamboanga City and VHF-TV Station in Dumaguete
City.
Date issued Valid Until
VHF-TV September 16, 1996 November 16, 1998 The three Orders also fined GMA for operating with an expired [PA] at the
rate of Php 200 per day of violation for DXRC-AM and P100 per day of
DXRC-AM December 9, 1996 June 9, 1998 violation for VHF-TV and DXLA-TV computed from the date of expiration of
DXLA-TV January 27, 1997 July 27, 1998 [PA] until the date of filing of the Motions for Renewal of Provisional
Authority/Issuance of CPC. The aggregate amount of the fine imposed for
Upon the lapse of their respective expiration dates, the [PAs] were not the three stations was Php 674,600.00 broken down as follows:
renewed and it took 4-5 years before GMA was able to file Ex-Parte Motions
for Renewal of Provisional Authority - on September 29, 2003 for VHF-TV in DXRC-AM Broadcasting Station, Zamboanga City:
BMC Case No. 91-336 and on September 3, 2003 for DXLA-TV in NTC Case 06-09-98 (Date of expiration of [PA])
No. 96-038. For its DXRC-AM broadcasting station, it filed an Ex-Parte 09-13-02 (Date when the Ex-Parte Motion for Issuance of Certificate of
Motion for the Issuance of a Certificate of Public Convenience (CPC) in BMC Public Convenience was filed.)
Case No. 93-499 on September 13, 2002[.]
Computation:
Before acting on the motions in BMC Case No. 91-336 and NTC Case No. 96-
038, the NTC scheduled the cases for clarificatory hearing and directed GMA 06-09-98 to 12-31-98 (205 days x Php 200.00) = Php 41,000.00  
to explain why it should not be administratively sanctioned for late filing
01-01-99 to 12-31-99 (365 days x Php 200.00) = Php 73,000.00  
and/or for operating with an expired [PA] No similar action was taken in
BMC Case No. 93-499. 01-01-00 to 12-31-00 (365 days x Php 200.00) = Php 73,000.00  

GMA filed two separate pleadings entitled Compliance containing 01-01-[01] to 12-31-01 (365 days x Php 200.00) = Php 73,000.00  
substantially the same declarations in BMC Case No. 91-336 and NTC Case 01-01-02 to 09-13-02 (257 days x Php 200.00) = Php 51,400.00  
No. 96-038. GMA explained that its failure to renew the [PAs] on time was
not done with deliberate intent but due to pure inadvertence in the     Php 311,400.00  
maintenance of its records and confusion in the turn-over of documents VHF-TV Station, Dumaguete City:
from its previous handling lawyers. The delay was also allegedly caused by 11-16-1998 (Date of Expiration of [PA])
the economic crisis that hit. the Philippines in 1998 and the consequent 09-29-2003 (Date when the Motion for Renewal of Provisional Authority
downturn in the broadcast industry which adversely affected GMA's and/or Certificate of Public Convenience was filed)
expansion plans and existing projects. GMA also alleged that it can no longer
be sanctioned for the late filing of the Motions because its violation already Computation:
prescribed pursuant to Sec. 28, Chapter IV of Commonwealth Act No. 146
DUE DATE NO. OF DAYS FINE PER TOTAL (T) (T = D BSD-0263-2009 January 27, 2009 to January
April 30, 2009
DATE SUBMITTED OF DELAY DAY x F) (REN/MOD) 26, 2012
Nov. 17, September 29, For VHF-TV Station, Dumaguete City:
1,770 P100 Php 177,000.00
1998 2003 Permit No. Date issued Period

DXLA-TV Station, Zamboanga City: BSD-0388-96 September 28, 1996 to September

August 7, 1996
(REN) 27, 1999
July 27, 1998 (Date of Expiration of [PA]) BSD-0855-97 September 5, September 28, 1996 to September
Sept. 3, 2003 (Date when the Motion was filed) (MOD) 1997 27, 1999

Computation: BSD-0162-99 September 21, September 28, 1999 to September

7/27/98 to 9/2/2003 = 1,862 days x PI00.00 = P186,200.00 (REN) 1999 27, 2002
GMA moved for the partial reconsideration of the three Orders praying that September 28, 2002 to September
BSD-0236-2002 August 6, 2002
the fine be lifted on the ground that GMA's violation already prescribed 27, 2005
pursuant to Section 28 of C.A. No. 141 which states that violations of the
BSD-0268-2005 September 28, 2005 to September
terms and conditions of any certificate issued by the NTC shall prescribe August 30, 2005
(REN) 27, 2008
after sixty (60) days. GMA also argued that the amount of fine imposed was
[exorbitant] and contrary to Chapter IV of C.A. No. 141 which states that September 28, 2008 to September
BSD-0252-2008 August 27, 2008
fines imposed against any public service corporation must not exceed the 27, 2011
amount of P25,000.00. Finally, GMA maintained that although it operated For DXLA-TV Station, Zamboanga City:
with expired [PAs], it was granted the following temporary permits by the
NTC during the period that the [PAs] for the subject stations were not Permit Date issued Period
renewed, viz:
September 5, January 1, 1997 to December
BSD-0835-97 (MOD)
1997 31, 1999
For DXRC-AM Broadcasting Station, Zamboanga City:
September 21, January 1, 2000 to December
Permit No. Date issued Period BSD-0167-99 (REN)
1999 31, 2002
February 11, January 27, 1997 to January
BSD-0427-97 (NEW) BSD-0032-2003 January 1, 2003 to December
1997 29, 2000 May 14, 2004
(REN/MOD) 31, 2005
January 27, 2000 to January
BSD-0092-2000 (REN) January 24, 2000 November 23, January 1, 2006 to December
29, 2003 BSD-0343-2005 (REN)
2005 31, 2008
November 17, January 27, 2003 to January
BSD-0330-2003 (REN) January 1, 2009 to December
2004 26, 2006 BSD-0090-2009 (REN) January 28, 2009
31, 2011
January 27, 2006 to January The NTC partly granted GMA's motions for partial reconsideration by
BSD-0046-2006 (REN) January 23, 2006
26, 2009 reducing the rate of the fine to Php 50 per day of violation for each of the
three stations. In BMC Case No. 93-499, the NTC Order was dated August 4,
2009. In BMC Case No. 91-336, the NTC Order was dated July 17, 2009. In considering that the subject broadcasting stations were
NTC Case No. 96-038, the Order was dated August 4, 2009. The total operated under temporary permits duly issued by the NTC.
reduced fine for all the stations was Php 259,450.00, viz:
2. The NTC erred in imposing a penalty of fine against
DXRC-AM Broadcasting Station, Zamboanga City: petitioner GMA in spite of the fact that its violation, if any,
has long prescribed under Section 28, Chapter IV of
DATE NO. OF DAYS OF FINE PER TOTAL (T) Commonwealth Act No. 146,5 otherwise known as the
DUE DATE Public Service Act.
SUBMITTED DELAY DAY (T=DXF)
June 9, Php 3. The imposition against petitioner GMA of a fine in an
Sept. 13, 2002 1557 P50
1998 77,850.00 amount more than P25,000 is contrary to the policy implied
in Chapter IV of the Public Service Act.6
VHF-TV Station, Dumaguete City:
The CA dismissed the petitions on the following disquisition:
DATE NO. OF DAYS FINE PER TOTAL (T) The NTC proceedings in Sambrano and in the instant case are both
DUE DATE administrative in nature as they involve the NTC's exercise of its regulatory
SUBMITTED OF DELAY DAY (T=DXF)
powers over public service operators. Both cases entailed an examination of
November 17, Php a public service operator's licenses and permits, the certificate of public
Sept. 29, 2003 1,770 P50
1998 88,500.00 convenience of PRBI and, in the present case, petitioner GMA's provisional
authority to maintain and operate the subject broadcasting stations. Thus,
DXLA-TV Station, Zamboanga City: the pronouncement in Sambrano in so far as Section 28 is concerned, is
squarely applicable in the instant controversy. Hence, petitioner GMA
DATE NO. OF DAYS OF FINE PER TOTAL (T) cannot avoid payment of the fine, as the 60-day prescriptive period under
DUE DATE Sec. 28 is available as a defense only in criminal or penal proceedings not in
SUBMITTED DELAY DAY (T=DXF)
purely administrative proceedings, as in the case at bench.
July 27, Php
Sept. 2, 2003 1862 P50
1998 93,100.00 x x x x

Dissatisfied, GMA interposed the herein consolidated Petitions for Review
respectively docketed as C.A. G.R. SP. No. 110148 assailing NTC Orders
dated January 11, 2007 and August 4, 2009 in BMC Case No. 93-499; C.A.
G.R. SP. No. 109954 assailing NTC Orders dated February 26, 2009 and July
17, 2009 in BMC Case No. 91-336; and C.A. G.R. SP. No. 110145 assailing
NTC Orders dated May 25, 2009 and August 4, 2009 in NTC Case No. 96-
038.4
The petitions filed before the CA was anchored on the following grounds:
1. The NTC erred in imposing fines against petitioner GMA for
allegedly operating with an expired Provisional Authority
In the present case, the fine imposed on GMA pursuant to Section 21 is an
administrative fine because, as stated above, it involved the NTC's
regulatory and supervisory powers over GMA's legislative franchise. The
determinant factor in the application of Section 28 is the nature of the
proceedings and the forum which imposed the fine and not the nature of
the statute imposing it. The Orders imposing the fine stemmed from
GMA's Ex-Parte Motions to Renew Provisional Authority and Certificate of
Public Convenience and not from any criminal complaint or information
seeking to prosecute GMA for violation of the penal provisions of the Public
Service Law, specifically Sections 23, 24, 25 and 26 thereof.
x x x x
 As can be gleaned from the attached copies of petitioner's Provisional
Again, We disagree. A reading of the foregoing provisions readily shows that Authorities and Temporary Permits, their purposes and extent are different.
petitioner's interpretation is self-serving and misplaced. It is clear that A Provisional Authority is issued by the NTC to a franchise holder authorizing
Section 23 speaks of fine that is imposable by court as a criminal sanction the latter to operate [as] a public utility for a limited period pending the
and not the administrative fine imposed by Section 21. Hence the Php issuance of its Certificate of Public Convenience (CPC). It is general in scope
25,000.00 ceiling provided under Section 23 is not applicable to the fine in contrast to a Temporary Permit which specifically contains the necessary
imposed under Section 21. particulars of a broadcasting station such as the call sign, authorized power,
frequency/channel, class station, hours of operation, points of
We thus concur with the NTC in that the monetary fine imposed under communication and equipments used together with their serial number and
Section 21 of the Public Service Act is an administrative sanction imposed by frequency range. Simply stated, a Provisional Authority is GMA's authority
the NTC on a service provider on the latter's violation or failure to comply or license to operate a broadcasting station while a Temporary Permit
with the terms and conditions of its authorization, or any other order, pertains to the details and specifications under which GMA will undertake
decision or regulation. On the other hand, the P25,000.00 fine specified the operation of a broadcasting station. The concurrence of both is
under Section 23 is a penal sanction imposed by the courts in addition to imperative for the lawful operation of the GMA broadcasting stations. In
imprisonment of the responsible officer of the service provider when it fails fact, in the Provisional Authorities initially issued, GMA was obligated to
to perform, commit, or do any act or thing forbidden or prohibited or shall secure the necessary permits for its equipment and facilities, x x x[.]7
neglect, fail or omit to do or perform any act or thing required by the Public The dispositive portion of the CA Decision states:
Service Act to be done or performed. WHEREFORE, for lack of merit, the Petitions are hereby DISMISSED.
x x x x SO ORDERED.8
The fine imposed on petitioner is also not exorbitant or unconscionable. As Petitioner GMA did not file a Motion for Reconsideration questioning the
a matter of fact, We find the same to be rather conservative considering the subject CA Decision. Instead, it directly filed this Petition for Review on
prot[r]acted duration of petitioner's violation. The Php 674,600.00 original Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
amount of fine imposed by NTC was in accordance with the P200 daily rate Issues
mandated by Section 21. This was even modified to Php 259,450.00 at the
reduced rate of P50 per day of violation. 1. Whether petitioner GMA violated Section 21 of the Public
Service Act;
Finally, petitioner states that its operation of the subject broadcasting
stations was authorized by the NTC thru Temporary Permits which covered 2. Whether the prescription set forth in Section 28 of the
the period during which GMA was operating on expired Provisional Public Service Act applies to administrative proceedings for
Authorities. violations of orders, decisions and regulations of respondent
NTC or the terms and conditions of the certificate issued by
This argument deserves no consideration as it is inconsistent with GMA's the latter; and
admission that its failure to timely renew the Provisional Authorities was
3. Whether the P25,000.00 limit set under Section 23 of the
due to sheer inadvertence and confusion in the handling of its corporate
Public Service Act shall apply to the fines that may be
documents, x x x:
imposed by respondent NTC under Section 21.
x x x x
The Court's Ruling

The petition is denied.
While petitioner GMA admits that it failed to file its Motion for Extension of
Provisional Authority on time,9 it argues that it should nonetheless not be
sanctioned for operating without the authority of respondent NTC because
respondent NTC allowed it to operate under the temporary permits it had
issued in its favor.
Respondent NTC, on the other hand, anchors its imposition of fines against
petitioner GMA on Section 21 of the Public Service Act, which states:
Sec. 21. Every public service violating or failing to comply with the terms
and conditions of any certificate or any orders, decisions or regulations of
the Commission shall be subject to a fine of not exceeding two hundred
pesos per day for every day during which such default or violation
continues; and the Commission is hereby authorized and empowered to
impose such fine, after due notice and hearing.
The fines so imposed shall be paid to the Government of the Philippines
through the Commission, and failure to pay the fine in any case within the
time specified in the order or decision of the Commission shall be deemed
good and sufficient reason for the suspension of the certificate of said public
service until payment shall be made. Payment may also be enforced by
appropriate action brought in a court of competent jurisdiction. The remedy
provided in this section shall not be a bar to, or affect any other remedy
provided in this Act but shall be cumulative and additional to such remedy
or remedies. (Emphasis supplied)
Assuming arguendo that its failure to apply for an extension of its
Provisional Authority is a violation of the terms and conditions of its
previously issued Provisional Authority, petitioner GMA posits that such
failure is within the ambit of the phrase "violations of xxx the terms and
conditions of any certificates issued by the Commission" under Section 28 of
the same law, and therefore subject to the prescriptive period set by the
said provision.10 Petitioner GMA asserts that the 60-day prescriptive period
in Section 28 is available as their defense in administrative proceedings that
may result into penal sanctions.11
Petitioner GMA maintains that Section 21 of the Public Service Act is
expressly limited by Section 28 of the same chapter of the same law, which
provides:
Sec. 28. Violations of the orders, decisions, and regulations of the
Commission and of the terms and conditions of any certificates issued by
the Commission shall prescribe after sixty days, and violations of the
provisions of this Act shall prescribe after one hundred and eighty days.
(Emphasis supplied)
The Court disagrees.
The Sambrano12 case, cited by petitioner GMA, has already settled that the
60-day prescriptive period under Section 28 of the Public Service Act can be
availed of as a defense only in criminal proceedings filed under Chapter IV
thereof and not in proceedings pertaining to the regulatory or
administrative powers of the NTC over a public service utility's observance
of the terms and conditions of its Provisional Authority:
This Court has already held, in Collector of Internal Revenue el al. vs. Buan,
G. R. L-11438; and Sambrano vs. Public Service Commission, G. R. L-11439
and L-11542, decided on July 31, 1958, that the 60-day prescriptive period
fixed by section 28 of the Public Service Law is available as a defense only
in criminal or penal proceedings filed under Chapter IV of the Act.
Consequently, the Public Service Commission is not barred from receiving
evidence of the prescribed violations for the purpose of determining
whether an operator has or has not faithfully kept the conditions of his
certificate of permit, whether he failed or not to render the services he is
required to furnish to the customers, and whether or not the infractions
are sufficient cause to cancel or modify the certificate. Proceedings of this
kind are held primarily to ensure adequate and efficient service as well as to
protect the public against the operator's malfeasances or abuses; they are
not penal in character. True, the cancellation of the certificates may mean
for an operator actual financial hardship; yet the latter is merely incidental
to the protection of the traveling public. Hence, in refusing to admit
evidence of prescribed violations as part of the complainant's case against
the Philippine Rabbit Lines for a modification or cancellation of the latter's
permit, we hold that the Commission committed error. 13 (Emphasis and
italics supplied)
In Globe Telecom, Inc. v. The National Telecommunications
Commission,14 the Court ruled that the NTC's imposition of a fine pursuant
to Section 21 of the Public Service Act is made in an administrative
proceeding, and thus, must comply with the requirements of notice and
hearing. The same ruling also categorized the fine imposed under Section 21
as a sanction, regulatory and punitive in character, viz.:
Section 21 requires notice and hearing because fine is a sanction,
regulatory and even punitive in character. Indeed, the requirement is the
essence of due process. Notice and hearing are the bulwark of
administrative due process, the right to which is among the primary rights
that must be respected even in administrative proceedings. The right is
guaranteed by the Constitution itself and does not need legislative
enactment. The statutory affirmation of the requirement serves merely to
enhance the fundamental precept. The right to notice and hearing is
essential to due process and its non-observance will, as a rule, invalidate the
administrative proceedings.
In citing Section 21 as the basis of the fine, NTC effectively concedes the
necessity of prior notice and hearing. Yet the agency contends that the
sanction was justified by arguing that when it took cognizance of Smart's
complaint for interconnection, "it may very well look into the issue of
whether the parties had the requisite authority to operate such services." As
a result, both parties were sufficiently notified that this was a matter that
NTC could look into in the course of the proceedings. The parties
subsequently attended at least five hearings presided by NTC.
That particular argument of the NTC has been previously disposed of. But it
is essential to emphasize the need for a hearing before a fine may be
imposed, as it is clearly a punitive measure undertaken by an
administrative agency in the exercise of its quasi-judicial
functions. Inherently, notice and hearing are indispensable for the valid
exercise by an administrative agency of its quasi-judicial functions. x x
x15 (Emphasis supplied)
Contrary to the position taken by petitioner GMA, the P25,000.00 limit
provided under Section 23 does not also apply in this case. Section 23 of the
Public Service Act provides:
Sec. 23. Any public service corporation that shall perform, commit, or do
any act or thing herein forbidden or prohibited or shall neglect, fail, or
omit to do or perform any act or thing herein required to be done or
performed, shall be punished by a fine not exceeding twenty-five
thousand pesos, or by imprisonment not exceeding five years, or both, in
the discretion of the court. (Emphasis supplied)
Respondent NTC asseverated that a careful reading and comparison of
Section 21 and Section 23 would clearly show that the monetary fine
imposed under Section 21 at the rate of P100.00 per day is an
administrative sanction imposed by respondent NTC on a service provider
for the latter's violation or failure to comply with the terms and conditions
of its authorization, or any other order, decision or regulation of respondent
NTC.16 Respondent NTC explained that the P25,000.00 monetary fine
specified under Section 23 of the same Public Service Act is a penal sanction
imposed by the court of law in addition to imprisonment on the responsible
officer of a service provider when it fails to perform, commit, or do any act
or thing forbidden or prohibited, or shall neglect, fail or omit to do or
perform any act or thing required by the Public Service Act to be done or
performed.17
The case of GMA Network, Inc. v. National Telecommunications
Commission18 (GMA Network) pertaining to petitioner GMA's failure to
renew its Provisional Authority to operate a radio station in Puerto Princesa,
Palawan, is illustrative:
The argument is untenable.
The applicable provision is Section 21 of the Public Service Act as it
specifically governs the NTC's imposition of a fine not exceeding P200.00 per
day for every day during which the public service utility's violation or non-
compliance with the terms and conditions of the certificate/s issued by the
NTC continues. On the other hand, Section 23 of the Public Service Act deals
with a public service corporation's performance, commission or doing of any
forbidden or prohibited act under the same law, as well as its neglect,
failure or omission to do or perform an act or thing required thereunder. As
earlier mentioned, the proceedings under Section 23 pertain to criminal
proceedings conducted in court, whereby the fine imposed, if so
determined, is made in the court's discretion, whereas Section 21 pertains
to administrative proceedings conducted by the NTC on the grounds
stated thereunder. As the present case evidently involves the latter
violation, Section 21 and not Section 23 of the Public Service Act applies.
Thus, finding that the fine imposed by the NTC at the reduced rate of P50.00
per day is consistent with the P200.00 per day limitation under Section 21 of
the Public Service Act, the fine of P76,500.00 for GMA's failure to comply
with the terms and conditions of its PA for a period of 1,521 days was
proper. The conscionability of the amount imposed should not be at issue as
it is the law itself which had provided the allowable threshold for the Act.
amount therefor.19 (Emphasis supplied)
The Court sees no reason here to deviate from the unequivocal clarifications WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby DENIED for lack of merit.
made in GMA Network.20
SO ORDERED.
Petitioner GMA finally insists that the subject broadcasting stations were
operated with the knowledge and direct authority of respondent NTC, as
evidenced by the temporary permits issued in their behalf. But this
argument was likewise disregarded in GMA Network when the Court ruled
that a temporary permit does not substitute for a Provisional Authority, viz.:
[A] [Provisional Authority] refers to an authority given to an entity qualified
to operate a public utility for a limited period during the pendency of its
application for, or before the issuance of its Certificate of Public
Convenience (CPC). It has a general scope because it is akin to a provisional
CPC in that it gives a public utility provider power to operate as such and be
bound by the laws and rules governing public utilities, pending issuance of
its actual CPC.

On the other hand, a [T]emporary [P]ermit is a document containing the call

sign, authorized power, frequency/channel, class station, hours of
operation, points of communication and equipment particulars granted to
an authorized public utility. Its scope is more specific than a [Provisional
Authority] because it contains details and specifications under which a
public utility [like petitioner] should operate [its tv/radio station] pursuant
to a previously updated [Provisional Authority]. x x x21 (Emphasis and
underscoring in the original omitted; emphasis supplied)
The Court has held that the respondent NTC, being the government agency
entrusted with the regulation of activities coming under its special and
technical forte, and possessing the necessary rule-making power to
implement its objectives,22 is in the best position to interpret its own rules,
regulations and guidelines.23 The Court has consistently yielded and
accorded great respect to the interpretation by administrative agencies of
their own rules unless there is an error of law, abuse of power, lack of
jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion clearly conflicting with the letter
and spirit of the law.24

In fine, the Court agrees with respondent NTC that, notwithstanding the
temporary permits issued in its favor, petitioner GMA was operating on an
expired Provisional Authority, in violation of Section 21 of the Public Service