ASCRIPTIONSOF RESPONSIBILITY/ 77

that we hold him responsible for his actions, that Clarence caused the explosion through
his character, intentions, the outcome of some action
of his own, and that it is ap?
?
these, and the like for the things he does propriate that Clarence give an account of
(or is), and for those he is expected to do having caused the explosion. Whether
(or be). On this view, the judgment "X is Clarence actually gives an account is not

responsible for Y" will express the beliefs the issue; we are only claiming that it is
"X did Y (or is Y), X possesses the qualities appropriate that he give an account. As?
of a responsible agent, and X is account? suming Clarence is not a Robinson
able or answerable for Y".11 Crusoe, but a member of society, the
On this view, when we say a person is judgment "Clarence is responsible for
morally responsible for something, we are the explosion" might, following Baier,
essentially saying that the person did or be analyzed as follows:
caused some act (or exhibits some trait of 1. Clarence is accountable to others in the
character) for which it is fitting that she sense that it is fitting that he explain his
give an account.In judging that an account role in the action leading up to the ex?
ought to be given, we presume that the in? plosion; Clarence is "answerable
dividual from whom an accounted is responsible".
expected has
(a) antecedently met the re?
2. If the explanation fails to excuse or ex?
quirements of responsible agency, and (b)
onerate Clarence on moral grounds, he is
has performed some act (or has exhibited
"culpable-responsible".
some characteristic) of the sort subject to
certain accepted standards of morality and, 3. Others are in a position to take rectifying
(c) typically has fallen short of these stan? or corrective measures against Clarence.
dards.18 The accountability interpretation a Baier-type
On model, holding persons
assumes the actor possesses and is able to
responsible is part of a social practice of
exercise certain capacities?rationality,
ascribing responsibility, first by making
self-awareness, an ability to appreciate and
clear any moral expectations we have of
reply to telling questions, and the like. persons vis ? vis behavior and character,
I will formulate
the accountability inter?
and then by having in place certain social
pretation as a biconditional: a person is
instruments that ensure adequate redress
responsible for an act if and only if it ought where necessary.19 Making moral expec?
to be the case that the person account for
tations clear presumes the existence of a
her behavior, where doing so involves giv? normative moral ac?
system against which
ing some statement of the person's beliefs
tions and traits of character are assessed.
or intentions regarding the act. Thus "X is
Note that the practice of reacting to an
accountable for Y" can be unpacked as "It
actor in light of his behavior does not
is appropriate thatX explain her intentions
demonstrate that such a normative system
in doing (or being) Y".
is in place.
The process by which a person is deemed
"account-responsible" involves a number Must an account be given
of (usually sequential) components. Con? to affirm responsibility?
sider the claim "Clarence is responsible for
the explosion in the chemistry lab." Ac? Of course, situations exist in which it
cording to the accountability approach, seems sensible to claim that a person is
when we judge that Clarence is responsible for her behavior even where
responsible
for this event, we are expressing the belief that person is, for reasons other than an

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78 / AMERICAN PHILOSOPHICALQUARTERLY

absence of moral agency, in no position to Suppose you are a spiteful person. You
resent the fact that your arguably more de?
give an account of her behavior. Four such
situations come to mind: 1. Cases involv? serving colleague has been awarded a
2. Cases
of promotion. As a result, you refuse to in?
ing subsequent incapacitation;
extreme 3. Cases of private moral clude her in social gatherings at which
evil;
4. The Robinson Crusoe case. she might meet persons who would be
failure;20
us examine instrumental in furthering her career.
Let each of these in turn.
Surely that you are morally
it is correct
1. Suppose I have slandered you but have for
responsible your action. But, it is
subsequently become insane, or have not obvious that anyone may appropri?
died. We might wish that an account
ately ask for an account of that action.
could be given in these circumstances;
Since some moral failures may be
we might hope for an account that would
nobody's business, an account needn't be
explain, excuse, or justify my conduct. in order for ascriptions of re?
forthcoming
But, of course, no account can be pro?
sponsibility to be warranted.
duced by me. (Let us assume that
accounts by proxy are not an option.) In 4. Imagine Robinson Crusoe, alone on his
what sense, then does it remain appro? island (or in the company of the mute
priate that an account be provided? you most
Friday) slandering bitterly.
What force is there to the claim that, in
2. Imagine that an act of gross wickedness
calling Crusoe responsible for this act we
has been perpetrated, such that no ac?
are claiming an account is owed us? To
count would be meaningful.21 If Alice
tortures baby Bernie in or? whom is Crusoe able to give an account?
maliciously
der to obtain from his parents a greater Does it make sense to say an account
we ought to be given if there is no one
baby-sitting wage, any expectation
have that she account for her behavior present to receive it?
seems beside the point. The act is so In each of these the intuition is that
cases,
abominable that merely to ask for an are responsible
the actors for their behav?
account suggests a potential for justifi?
ior, and that their inability to account for
cation the act does not possess. The
this behavior does not alter this responsi?
ready answer in this case, of course, is
that Alice fails to meet the requisite cri? bility in the slightest. Although each
teria for moral agency (she is plainly performs an act for which it seems
appro?
imbalanced). But let us assume Alice is priate that an account be forthcoming, the
not so imbalanced as to be ignorant of circumstances insulate the agent from ac?
what she is doing; she appreciates fully So, it seems, in calling a
countability.
the measure of her evil, but embraces it we must be express?
person responsible,
nonetheless. The fact that no account
ing something other than the view that
would be comprehensible in these cir?
an explanation or account is expected
cumstances, and anything presented as
an attempt would seem hollow, does not and fitting.
Moreover, while such cases appear to
appear to lessen the burden of responsi?
If a block for the account?
bility Alice bears for her conduct. present stumbling
characterizing a person as responsible ability interpretation, the responsiveness
means that an account is expected and account can, it seems, indi?
explain why
appropriately forthcoming from the per? viduals whose moral failures are "private"
son, is Alice not responsible? are ap?
are responsible. These individuals

3. There are moral failures that are the propriate targets of the reactive attitudes.
concern of none but the actor alone. Does this show that the responsiveness

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 ASCRIPTIONSOF RESPONSIBILITY/ 79

account is better equipped to explain re? It is most important that the merits of the
sponsibility ascriptions? two accounts be appraised for the usual run
Certain cases of the first, second, and of cases. And, in the usual cases, it would
fourth varieties can be handled by the ac? be inappropriate (or unnecessary) to take
at least as easily as a reactive attitude toward one from whom
countability approach
we did not first have cause to expect an
they can by alternative accounts. Itmakes
as little sense to react with resentment or account. regard a person as a suitable
We
to the actions of an insane per? candidate for the reactive attitudes, and we
indignation
son as it does to expect an account of him. take these attitudes to the person, because
If it ismeaningful to treat evil Alice as an we think the person is accountable for his
or her behavior. The person who fails to
agent toward whom reactive attitudes and
conduct are appropriate, then it is equally offer an account is open to criticism or re?
to regard her as someone who proach because of this failure.22 Also, in
meaningful
can and ought to account for her actions. the usual cases, it would not be unreason?

lacks an audience, able to expect an account from one whose

Finally, although Crusoe
he is a moral agent who in typical circum? behavior elicited no reaction from us to

stances would be asked for an account of speak of. We can the person
think of as
accountable even if we never assume a
his conduct (an account that would, vari?
?
or responsive stance towards him responsi?
ously, minimize the harm, redress,
can be "attitude neutral".
justify the act that has been done). bility ascriptions
Moreover, it ismeaningful to say in cases
IS ACCOUNTABILITY LIMITED
of the third sort that the propriety of an
TO UNDESIRABLE ACTS?
account from the jealous colleague explains
the fact that we ascribe responsibility to One might that the accountability
protest
him or her, although in this case no right makes sense only with re?
interpretation
to demand or exact an account exists. Af? to untoward actions or traits of
spect
ter all, neither does a right exist to respond as the second of evalua?
character, stage
to the moral failures of others. The appar? tion makes explicit.23 After all, it is unlikely
ent ease with which the reactive attitudes we would think it appropriate that the agent
deals with cases of private moral
analysis who has done nothing untoward supply an
failures is due to the fact that it bypasses account of her behavior; to give an ac?
the idea of requiring a right to intervene in count is to give something like a defense,
private affairs; attitudes emerge, right or or a justification. Hence Baier's charge
no right. that "accountability" is reserved for
The central point is that the concept of cases of and the need to decide
liability
? the idea that it is fitting
accountability moral sanctions.
that the agent explain her intentions ? In general, moral evaluation will occur
enables us to charge a person with respon? because someone has performed an unde?
sibility even where she fails to explain her sirable action, or has failed to follow
behavior. The accountability analysis of through with a task, or has exhibited a sub?
responsibility ascriptions does not insist standard character. But the fact that our
that the person in fact give an account to concern in attributing is pri?
responsibility
someone, or that there be someone (or to decide cases of moral violation
marily
some institution) to whom the agent must does not mean that the general function of
deliver the account, or that the account isn't to seek ac?
responsibility judgments
elicit a response. countability. The accountability approach

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80 / AMERICAN PHILOSOPHICALQUARTERLY

works for the usual run of cases (those reasons for action in a way that makes

involving blameworthy conduct), and ex? the action comprehensible for the pur?

plains responsibility for morally neutral pose of moral evaluation.

actions as well. Morally neutral cases do A third advantage of the accountability
not as a rule call for an account, but itmay approach is that, as a rule, our interest in
still be appropriate that the actor state his determining whether an agent is free or not
or her point of view about the action he or arises only if the agent has done something
she has performed. that gives us reason to seek an account
from her. It is only fair to expect an ac?
The merits OF count of a person if the person in fact acted

freely (the belief that someone is a free

THE ACCOUNTABILITY APPROACH

agent is implicit in our belief that the per?

Construing judgments about moral respon? son is someone we hold accountable), and
sibility as judgments about accountability so free agency is a condition upon which
is preferable for a number of reasons. One
accountability rests. But the condition of
reason is that the accountability approach freedom is one in which we take an inter?
focuses on the activity of the agent whose
est after we have cause to hold
the person
responsibility is at issue?the subject accountable for her behavior; that a per?
himself? rather than inviting and then ex?
son may have been lacking in freedom is
trapolating responsibility ascriptions noticed in the context of
typically asking
indirectly, by way of the feelings, attitudes,
for an excuse.24 Thus, questions about ac?
and punitive or rewarding practices of oth?
countability are epistemically prior to
ers. These signal that someone other than
concerns about agent freedom.
the agent believes the agent to be respon?
sible, but accountability places the burden Conclusion
squarely upon the actor, whether or not
others assume certain attitudes and prac? I have defended the view that what we
tices of a responsive sort. The expectation mean when we
say "X is responsible for
of an account from an actor a Y" is that X has done (or caused, or is) Y,
signals
of him as a respon? and that it is fitting that X account for do?
straightforward regard
autonomous his ing (or causing, or being) Y. A theory of
sible, agent; deriving
from the stance taken to him moral responsibility spelled out in terms
responsibility
others does not. of the conditions for responsible agency,
by
a theory of responsibility as? or in terms of the having of responsibili?
Second,
built upon the notion of account? ties, or in terms of responsiveness, is of
criptions
the propriety of our reactive explanatory value only where there first
ability explains
attitudes. We can't react to exists some reason to think the individual
properly
someone unless the person is one from accountable for her actions. This calls for
whom an account is expected. It would be a prior sense of what it means to hold a
to resent the actions of a small body responsible. Hence, the accountabil?
improper
or a or a senile friend since ity view offers a general answer to the
child, dog,
these are creatures of appre? question of what is meant by ascriptions
incapable
no less than their of responsibility.
ciating, explaining,

California State University, Sacramento

Received September 20, 1996

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