Bridging The Objective/Subjective Divide Towards A Meta-Perspective of Science and Experience

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Bridging the Objective/Subjective Divide Towards a Meta-Perspective of

Science and Experience
Article · January 2015

DOI: 10.15502/9783958570405
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Bridging the Objective/Subjective
Divide
Towards a Meta-Perspective of Science and Experience
Jonathan Schooler
In this paper I use the thesis that perspective shifting can fundamentally alter Author
how we evaluate evidence as the backdrop for exploring the perennial challenge
of bridging the divide between the subjective first-person perspective of experi-
Jonathan Schooler
ence, and the objective third-person perspective of science. I begin by suggesting
jonathan.schooler @ psych.ucsb.edu
that reversible images provide a metaphor for conceptualizing how the very same
situation can be understood from two very different perspectives that appear to University of California
produce seemingly irreconcilable accounts of their contents. However, when one Santa Barbara, California, United
recognizes that both views are different vantages on some deeper structure, a States of America
meta-perspective can emerge that potentially offers a vantage by which the op-
posing perspectives can be reconciled. Building on this notion of a meta-perspect- Commentator
ive, I outline a framework for conceptualizing how science can draw on individuals’
first-person experience in order to explicate those experiences within the neces- Verena Gottschling
sarily third-person perspective of science. I then show how this approach can illu - vgott @ yorku.ca
minate one of the most private yet ubiquitous aspects of mental life: mind-wan- York University
dering. Finally and most speculatively, I attempt to tackle the enduring ontolo - Toronto, Ontario, Canada
gical tensions that emerge from the disparities between the first- versus third-per-
son perspectives. Specifically, I suggest that the present prevailing third-person Editors
perspective of material reductionism fails to adequately account for the first-per-
son experience of subjectivity, the flow of time, and the present. While I argue
Thomas Metzinger
that these differences are an intrinsic property of each perspective, and thus irre-
metzinger @ uni-mainz.de
concilable from the vantage of either, I raise the possibility of a meta-perspective
in which these clashes might be better accommodated. Toward this end, I specu- Johannes Gutenberg-Universität
latively suggest that experience, the flow of time, and the unique quality of “now” Mainz, Germany
might be accommodated by the postulation of a subjective dimension or dimen-
sions of time. Jennifer M. Windt
jennifer.windt @ monash.edu
Keywords Monash University
Consciousness | Heterophenomenology | Meta-awareness | Meta-perspective | Melbourne, Australia
Mind wandering | Mind/body problem | Neurophenomenology | Neutral monism |
Panpsychism | Phenomenology | Time
1 Introduction
I am the proud owner of a philosopher’s stone. an ordinary river rock is that it has engraved
Although it does not hold any of the mysterious upon it the statement “Nothing is written in
powers (e.g., turning lead to gold, providing stone.” In pondering its irony, I’ve come to real-
endless youth) that the alchemists attributed to ize that my philosopher’s stone can be viewed
its namesake, I nevertheless feel its title fitting, in at least three ways, each leading to a differ-
as it offers some rather deep insights into the ent accounting of its merit. From one vantage
importance of perspective in defining what the statement on the stone is self-evidently
seems true. What distinguishes my stone from false, as clearly revealed by where it is carved.
Schooler, J. (2015). Bridging the Objective/Subjective Divide - Towards a Meta-Perspective of Science and Experience.
In T. Metzinger & J. M. Windt (Eds). Open MIND: 34(T). Frankfurt am Main: MIND Group. doi: 10.15502/9783958570405 1 | 40
www.open-mind.net
From another it is demonstrably true, as the ample of the manner in which perspective can
word “nothing” is written in stone right there. alter how we understand the world.
Finally, the fact that the presentation of the In this paper I attempt to nudge the field
stone’s message simultaneously reveals it to be towards a rapprochement between the subject-
both true and not true enables the stone to cla- ive first-person perspective of experience and
rify the paradoxical essence of its meaning. the objective third-person perspective of sci-
Nothing is definitive because a change in per- ence. My efforts are divided into three some-
spective may shift what is seen as factual. How- what distinct sections; all united by the goal of
ever, the stone further illustrates that when one illustrating how the divide between the subject-
recognizes how the perspectives that one takes ive and objective might begin to be bridged by
influence the conclusions that one draws, one a broader perspective that acknowledges that
gains a larger meta-perspective that can accom- while neither can be reduced to the other, they
modate them both. may be alternative vantages of a larger meta-
perspective.
In the first section, I use the analogy of re-
versible images to emphasize the importance of
perspective shifting in recognizing that views
that seem one way from one perspective may
seem quite different from another. However,
when one recognizes that both views are differ-
ent vantages on some deeper structure, a meta-
perspective can emerge that potentially offers a
vantage by which the opposing perspectives can
be reconciled. I propose that the relationship
between the first-person perspective of subject-
ive experience and the third-person perspective
of objective science can be conceptualized in
this manner, and that at least some of the
Figure 1: From one perspective, as evident from the place heated debate between scholars on this topic
onto which it is carved, “Nothing is Written in Stone” is a may stem from their exclusively favoring one
contradictory statement. However, from another perspective, vantage over the other.
“Nothing” is in fact written in stone, making the statement In the second section, I illustrate how the
true. Thus, “Nothing is Written in Stone” illustrates that third-person perspective of science can both
when one recognizes how the perspectives that one takes in- draw on and elucidate first-person experiences,
fluence the conclusions that one draws, one gains a larger and in particular the ubiquitous internal state
meta-perspective that can accommodate them both. of mind-wandering. I argue that although
people’s self-reports of private internal experi-
Although it is relatively straightforward to ences such as mind-wandering necessarily rely
describe the manner in which my philosopher’s on a re-representation of the experience to
stone conveys how shifting perspective can alter themselves (meta-awareness), we can neverthe-
what is seen as true, such descriptions do not less draw inferences about their underlying ex-
do justice to the impact the stone has when one perience by examining the relationship between
actually encounters it. The stone not only con- self-reports and physiological and behavioral
veys its message, it embodies it. Its message measures. Triangulation between these measures
thus speaks not only to one’s capacities of logic has highlighted both the strengths and limita-
but also viscerally, physically, through one’s tions of people’s meta-awareness of their drift-
senses. Indeed this difference between the third- ing minds: although people frequently fail to no-
person account of something and the first-per- tice that their minds are wandering, when quer-
son experience of it is perhaps the ultimate ex- ied they are quite accurate at reporting whether
www.open-mind.net
or not their minds were on task. This analysis tual understanding, we routinely use perceptual
thus reveals the value of using empirical third- metaphors (Schooler et al. 1994). We speak of
person science to clarify the nature of first-per- “thinking out of the box,” or of “stepping back
son experience. and looking at the bigger picture.” Even the
In the final section I consider how first- term that we use for gaining a fresh perspective
person experience may inform our understand- on an old problem, i.e., “insight,” directly al-
ing of objective reality. Current views of science ludes to the parallels between perceptual and
offer no way of accounting for the existence of conceptual perspective shifting. It is no coincid-
subjective experience, the flow of time, or the ence that the Gestalt psychologists who pion-
privileged present, leading mainstream science eered research on visual perspective shifting
to marginalize these essential elements of con- (Wagemans et al. 2012) also were the first to in-
sciousness as irrelevant or illusory. However, vestigate the processes of conceptual insight
from my vantage these aspects of existence are (Duncker 1945). And indeed, research in our lab
at least as certain as physical reality itself. It (Schooler & Melcher 1995) reveals a strong cor-
seems nonsensical to characterize experience as relation between people’s ability to make per-
an illusion, because even an illusory experience ceptual insights (e.g., recognizing out-of-focus
(i.e., where the contents have no bearing on pictures) and conceptual insights (e.g., solving
physical reality) is still an experience. Moreover, insight word problems). Thus, in order to ex-
experience exclusively resides in an ever-chan- plore how perspective may constrain our con-
ging present. A characterization of reality that ceptual understandings, it is helpful to start by
has no place for subjective experience, the flow briefly considering the ways in which perspect-
of time, or importance of the present seems ive can influence perceptual experiences. As will
devoid of the core aspects of my existence. In be argued, the manner in which alternative
keeping with others who have speculated that first-person perceptual perspectives constrain
theories of physical reality will need to be ex- our experiences, provides a compelling meta-
panded to accommodate subjective experience, I phor for the broader contrast between first- and
conjecture that consciousness may correspond third-person perspectives that individuals face
to movement in an additional subjective dimen- in reconciling their personal subjective experi-
sion (or dimensions) of time. Although this hy- ences with objective reality.
pothesis is highly speculative, it provides an ex- One of the greatest challenges of visual
ample of the kind of meta-perspective that may perspective is recognizing how fluid it really
be necessary to successfully accommodate sub- is. Typically, when we view an object or a
jective and objective views. scene, we apprehend it from a particular vant-
Clearly I have my work cut out for me. age and rarely consider the possibility that it
However, before embarking on the more ambi- may be seen in a different way. If and when a
tious aspects of this journey, let us first step shift occurs, the experience is typically char-
back and consider the nature of perspective and acterized by a marked surprise that the very
the impact that it can have on understanding. same view could afford such a different under-
standing. The Gestalt reversible figures are a
2 Applying perspective shifts to quintessential example of images that startle
conceptualizing human experience from us with their alternative perspectives. At first
the first- versus third-person when we encounter them we often perceive
perspective them from only one perspective; that is, al-
though there are several possible interpreta-
The striking parallels between perceptual and tions of the image, we assign one set of per-
conceptual perspective shifts exemplify the em- ceptual properties to the elements of the im-
bodiment of mental capacities in physical exper- age (front or back, figure or ground), and one
ience (Schubert & Semin 2009). Colloquially, conceptual interpretation of the object (e.g.,
when we talk about dramatic shifts in concep- duck or rabbit, young woman or old hag).
www.open-mind.net
When presented with an image of a duck/rab-

bit as a duck, those unfamiliar with the image
may initially see only a duck. However, if aler-
ted to the possibility of another embedded im-
age, suddenly a rabbit may virtually pop out.
Other classic examples of reversible images in-
clude: a Necker cube facing one way or an-
other, a vase or a pair of faces, a young wo-
man or an old hag. A particularly compelling
recent addition is the spinning dancer illusion,
where a perceptual shift not only changes
one’s perspective of her orientation but also
the direction in which she appears to be spin-
ning.
Figure 3: The Necker cube is a reversible image that,

depending on the perspective taken by the observer, ap-
pears to be facing one way or another. Shifting one’s per-
spective allows the observer to view the cube either from
slightly above or slightly below. Necker, L.A. (1832). Ob-
servations on some remarkable optical phaenomena seen
in Switzerland; and on an optical phaenomenon which oc-
curs on viewing a figure of a crystal or geometrical
solid. London and Edinburgh Philosophical Magazine and
Journal of Science, 1 (5), 329–337.
There are several notable aspects of all the

aforementioned visual perspective shifting ex-
amples. First, before one knows that there are
multiple interpretations, it is common to only
perceive one or the other. Second, once one is
aware of both perspectives, one can experience
an oscillation between the two, shifting from
Figure 2: The duck-rabbit illusion is a classic example one perspective to the other, and back again.
of a perspective-dependent reversible image. When Third, at any one moment in time, it is im-
presented as a duck, those unfamiliar with the image possible to simultaneously see both interpreta-
may initially see only a duck. However, if alerted to the tions. The Necker cube is either seen facing one
possibility of another embedded image, suddenly a rab- way or the other; the spinning dancer only ro-
bit may pop out. McManus, I. C., Freegard, M., tates in one direction at a time. Finally, al-
Moore, J., & Rawles, R. (2010). Science in the making: though one can only perceive one interpretation
Right hand, left hand. II: The duck–rabbit figure. Lat- at a time, one can nevertheless know that mul-
erality, 15, 167. tiple perspectives exist, and this knowledge
www.open-mind.net
provides a meta-perspective, whereby we appre- the three-dimensional perception to arise from

ciate that what we perceive one way at one mo- the two-dimensional image, but the experiences
ment can be perceived in a very different way in of the two images are wholly of a different sort.
the next. Those who have not gotten into a Magic Eye
image can have no idea what the underlying im-
age looks like, and even if they are shown what
the form is, they cannot appreciate what it is
like to actually witness the two-dimensional
page miraculously open up into a three-dimen-
sional world that is somehow residing within it.
However, those who have experienced this
transformation gain a wholly different appreci-
ation for the image, recognizing that it affords
two entirely different vantages, even while ap-
preciating that only one can be apprehended at
any particular time.1
The lessons learned from perceptual per-
spective shifting are relevant to the long-stand-
ing tension between conceptualizing human ex-
perience from the first- versus third-person per-
spective. Not unlike the shifting perspectives of
a reversible image, the field of psychology has
vacillated back and forth between focusing on
Figure 4: Rubin’s vase (sometimes referred to as “The people’s self-reported internal experiences (the
Two Face, One Vase Illusion”) depicts the silhouette of a first-person perspective) and their observable
vase in black and the profiles of two inward-looking faces behaviors (the third-person perspective).
in white. The figure-ground distinction made by the brain Moreover, just as the spinning dancer can move
during visual perception determines which image is seen. in one direction for a while, then flip back and
Ittelson, W. H. (1969). Visual Space Perception, Springer forth in direction, and then carry on in the op-
Publishing Company, LOCCCN 60-15818 posite direction, the field has had periods of rel-
ative steady focus on one or the other vantage
A particularly remarkable class of percep- and other periods in which the vantage was
tual shift that enables us to switch to a meta- more variable.
perspective comes from “Magic Eye” stereo- 1 A possible objection to the Magic Eye stereogram as an illustration
grams that can reveal a full holographic three- of a shifting perspective is that it can be enabled merely by a muscu-
dimensional realm that is not initially percept- lature action (the crossing of the eyes). One reviewer suggested that
the new representation that emerges from these images may be no
ible at all. These stereograms entail images that “more interesting than the muscular action of opening a closed eye
first are viewed as a two-dimensional pattern. which also allows the appearance of a suddenly unseen picture.”
While a worthwhile observation, I do not think it challenges the rel-
However, if one stares at the image long enough evance of the example. First, closing one’s eyes is not a different
in just the right way (this requires a little eye vantage of an image; it is a lack of a vantage at all. Second, like
crossing) and believes that it is possible to actu- other reversible images whose shifting interpretation can be en-
hanced by movement of the eyes, the muscular adaptations required
ally see into it, an entirely different and fully for seeing the alternate image of a Magic Eye stereogram is a neces-
three-dimensional image emerges. What is so sary but not sufficient condition for its reinterpretation. This is illus-
trated by the fact that many people, despite all efforts of eye cross-
striking about these “Magic Eye” stereograms is ing, are incapable of entering them and that those who do have the
that the embedded three-dimensional images good fortune to be of being able to experience them typically must
engage in sustained cognitive effort to unpack the image once they
have absolutely no resemblance to the two-di- begin to get into them. The central point of the Magic Eye example
mensional images from which they emerge. is that it illustrates how changing vantages on what one is looking at
There is of course a sophisticated algorithm can profoundly influence what one believes to be true about it. The
fact that this changing vantage may require a little eye crossing does
(based on principles of stereopsis) that enables not, in my view, lessen this observation.
www.open-mind.net
some researchers (notably the Gestalt psycholo-

gists and other researchers in the domain of hu-
man perception, e.g., Katz 1925/1989) contin-
ued to maintain a concern with inner experi-
ence, for a significant period of time the behavi-
orist reign caused a shift toward disregarding
people’s first-person perspectives. Internal ex-
perience was a taboo topic. In short, psychology
switched to a fixed third-person perspective.
Then, with the rise of information processing
and the cognitive era, the field again began to
vacillate back and forth between considering
people’s internal experiences and focusing on
their behavior.
Figure 5: The young girl-old woman illusion (otherwise

known as “My Wife and My Mother-in-Law”) is a revers-
ible image in which the viewer may either observe a
young girl with her head turned to the right or an old
woman with a large nose and protruding chin, depending
on one’s perspective. Wright, E. (1992) The original of E.
G. Boring’s Young Girl/Mother-in-Law drawing and its
relation to the pattern of a joke. Perception, 21, 273–275.
The inception of psychology was marked

by a concern with the inner experience of the
individual (Schultz & Schultz 1992). Introspec-
tion was the tool of choice, and research en-
tailed asking participants to scrutinize the com-
ponents of their experiences. In short, psycho-
logy began with a fixed first-person perspective.
In fact, it was during this time that psychology
created some of its most robust laws of psycho-
physics demonstrating strikingly rigorous rela- Figure 6: The spinning dancer illusion, or silhouette illu-
tionships between changes in various perceptual sion, depicts a woman spinning in a circle. The direction
estimates (e.g., perceived brightness, weight, of the dancer’s spinning (clockwise or counterclockwise) is
volume) and changes in the physical stimuli dependent on the perspective taken by the observer.
themselves (for a history, see Murray 1993). Kayahara, Nobuyuki (2003). Silhouette Illusion. ProCreo.
Then, concerns about the value of introspection Retrieved from http://www.procreo.jp/labo/labo13.html
arose, and researchers began to vacillate regard-
ing the value of introspection relative to more While psychology again finds itself in an
“objective” third-person perspectives. Although age of flipping perspectives about first- versus
www.open-mind.net
third-person accounts, much consternation still sarily reflect what they are actually experien-
arises from this fact. Science in general (Wilber cing but rather “what the subject believes to be
1998) and psychology in particular (Wallace true about his or her conscious experience”
2000) still find it challenging to fully integrate (Dennett 2003, p. 2). Although such an ap-
subjective experience into their accounts. Just proach refrains from necessarily taking people’s
as it is impossible to see a Necker cube simul- first-person reports on face value, it does not
taneously facing in its alternative directions, so abandon the prospect of making inferences
too psychology has struggled to reconcile its va- about what people are actually experiencing.2
cillation between first- and third-person per- Rather it posits that we must evaluate people’s
spectives. On the one hand, ignoring the inner self-reports in light of other third-person meas-
realm of experience seems to leave out much of ures. As Dennett (1993) puts it:
“what it is like” to be human (Nagel 1974). On
the other hand, researchers are rightly con- My suggestion, then, is that if we were to
cerned about the validity and meaning of find real goings-on in people’s brains that
people’s first-person reports (Wilson 2003). had enough of the ‘defining’ properties of
With no alternative window into people’s the items that populate their het-
minds, how can we know that their reports ac- erophenomenological worlds, we could
curately correspond to their inner experience? reasonably propose that we had discovered
After all, science necessarily relies on mutually what they were really talking about—even
agreed-upon observations. So how can we evalu- if they initially resisted the identifications.
ate the first-person perspective that by its very And if we discovered that the real goings-
nature eludes such consensus? The challenge is on bore only a minor resemblance to the
how to translate these first-person experiences heterophenomenological items, we could
into third-person data that can be scientifically reasonably declare that people were just
investigated. The most straightforward answer mistaken in the beliefs they expressed, in
of course is simply to ask people about their ex- spite of their sincerity. (p. 95)
perience; their observable verbal statements
thus become the third- person window onto As will be argued there are at least some situ-
their first-person experiences. But here we run ations in which external observers may have
up against the challenge that caused psychology better knowledge of a person’s internal state
to abandon the first-person perspective in the than does the person in question. Moreover,
first place: How do we know if self-reports line there are some mental states (e.g., mind-wan-
up with first-person experiences without some dering) for which the crucial bottleneck in
independent measure of people’s internal states people’s introspective awareness stems not from
(Bayne this collection)? their capacity to classify the experience, but
Fortunately, self-reports are not the only rather from the fact that people only intermit-
third-person window into people’s inner experi- tently take stock of what is going on in their
ence. We can also examine other behaviors as own minds.
well as measure physiological and brain activity In the following section, I review some of
in order to make reasoned inferences about the insights about first-person experience that
what individuals are genuinely experiencing. In can be gained when it is assessed from a third-
this manner, we can begin to discern when
people are accurately characterizing their in- 2 In the past (Schooler & Schreiber 2004) I characterized Dennett as dis-
missing the notion of underlying experience altogether, noting that he
ternal experience, and when they may be over- has written “Nobody is conscious… we are all zombies” (Dennett 1993, p.
looking or distorting key aspects. The approach 406). Although I still find his views on this issue somewhat slippery, I
now believe that he endorses the existence of genuine phenomenal experi-
that I am advocating here is very much in keep- ence that can be validated with third- person evidence. For example
ing with Dennett’s notion of heterophenomeno- Dennett (2003) argues that evidence about briefly presented stimuli
logy (2003) that takes at its starting point the could help to inform subjects about their actual conscious experience ob-
serving “Subjects would learn for the first time that they were, or were
premise that people’s self-reports do not neces- not, conscious of these stimuli” (p. 9).
www.open-mind.net
person perspective. By adopting a “trust but to a goodly proportion of the readers whom
verify” approach to first-person reports, we not have made it this far. The immediate question
only gain a more objective understanding of that this common experience raises is: why do
subjective states, but also potentially glean a we continue to simultaneously read and mind-
more astute perspective of our own experience. wander even though we know that it is im-
possible to fully do both at the same time? The
answer I suggest, and I’ll offer more evidence
for this contention shortly, is that we routinely
lose track of the contents of our own minds.
People continue mind-wandering while reading
because once they begin to mind-wander they
often temporarily fail to notice (i.e., become
meta-aware of) the fact that their minds are
thinking about something unrelated to the text.
Figure 7: “Magic Eye” stereograms can reveal a holo-

graphic three dimensional realm that is not initially per-
ceptible at all. Consisting of abstract visual patterns con-
structed from an algorithm based on the principles of ste-
reopsis, “Magic Eye” illusions require the viewer to blur
their vision for a period of time, thereby revealing a
three-dimensional imprint once perspective has shifted.
Additional (superior) examples can be found at
http://www.magiceye.com/3dfun/stwkdisp.shtml
Figure 8: The three-dimensional image is a sitting
3 Gaining a third-person perspective on Buddha, which the original Magic Eye image would not
people’s first-person experience have revealed without a shift in perspective. The embed-
ded three dimensional image has absolutely no resemb-
On some occasions we simply have experiences, lance to the two dimensional image from which it
but at other times we reflect on those experi- emerges.
ences; that is, we intermittently take stock of Magic Eye Answer. Retrieved from http://www.ma-
our ongoing experience and re-represent it to giceye.com/3dfun/answer.html
ourselves. This distinction between having an
experience (experiential consciousness) and ex- The notion that people routinely shift in
plicitly re-representing it to ourselves (meta- perspective (from simply experiencing to at-
awareness) is illustrated by the example of tempting to re-represent their experience to
mind-wandering while reading (Schooler 2002). themselves) provides the foundation for a
All of us have had the experience of reading framework for scientifically investigating first-
along and suddenly realizing that, despite our person experience. Specifically, the distinction
best intentions, our eyes have been moving between experiential consciousness and meta-
across the page but our minds have been en- awareness raises the prospect of two types of
tirely elsewhere. Indeed this has likely happened dissociations between these vantages that are
www.open-mind.net
empirically tractable (Schooler 2002). Temporal lar time, they had been engaging in that mental
dissociations of meta-awareness involve situ- state. If people are caught engaging in the state
ations in which individuals engage in an experi- before they notice it themselves (via self-catch-
ence without explicitly realizing that they are ing), this provides a metric of episodes of that
doing so. The example of temporarily failing to state that have eluded meta-awareness. As will
notice that one is mind-wandering is an ex- be detailed later, this approach has proven ef-
ample of a temporal dissociation. Translation fective in documenting temporal dissociations of
dissociations of meta-awareness occur when one a variety of different mental states including
distorts or otherwise mischaracterizes their ex- both mind-wandering (Schooler et al. 2004; Say-
perience to themselves. Shouting “I am not ette et al. 2009; Sayette et al. 2010) and un-
angry” at the top of one’s lungs is an example wanted thoughts (Baird et al. 2013).
of this latter dissociation. In the following dis- A second approach for identifying tem-
cussion I briefly outline the empirical approach poral dissociations of meta-awareness is to rely
for exploring these two types of dissociations. exclusively on experience sampling probes (i.e.,
probe-catching) but to additionally query
3.1 Temporal dissociations of meta- people when they are caught in a particular
awareness state (e.g., mind-wandering) regarding whether
or not they had been previously aware of that
Although failing to notice that one is mind-wan- fact. Again, as will be seen, this strategy
dering is a particularly apt example of a tem- routinely reveals that people can be caught en-
poral dissociation of meta-awareness, there are gaging in mental activities that they were previ-
numerous other examples of experiences that ously experiencing but were not explicitly aware
can temporarily go without being explicitly no- of. Intriguingly, the findings with this measure
ticed, including unnoticed emotions (Lambie & of temporal dissociation align with those re-
Marcel 2002; Schooler & Mauss 2010) sup- vealed by the self-caught/probe-caught method-
pressed thoughts (Baird et al. 2013), and vari- ology to reveal consistent systematic differences
ous mindless behaviors (Schooler et al. in between mental states associated with meta-
press). Temporal dissociations of meta-aware- awareness and those that lack it.
ness readily lend themselves to empirical invest-
igation. Two approaches have proven effective in 3.2 Translation dissociations of meta-
delineating situations in which people temporar- awareness
ily fail to notice a particular mental state: self-
catching versus probe-catching and retrospect- Translation dissociations correspond to situ-
ive measures (Schooler et al. 2011). ations in which, while in the process of re-rep-
The self-catch/probe-catch methodology resentation, one omits, distorts, or otherwise
pits two common self-report techniques against misrepresents one’s mental state to oneself
one another. Participants are asked to indicate and/or others. The basic strategy for assessing
every time they notice a particular mental state translation dissociations is to examine the cor-
(e.g., mind-wandering). If an individual reports respondence between individuals’ self-reports of
that they have just noticed themselves engaging their mental states and indirect measures that
in that mental state, then this is by definition a might reasonably be expected to correspond to
demonstration that the mental state has that state (Schooler & Schreiber 2004). If the
reached meta-awareness. Thus, self-caught epis- correspondence is high, there is good reason to
odes provide a straightforward measure of men- think that individuals are accurately reporting
tal states of which individuals have become their internal state. If the correspondence is
meta-aware. However, within this methodology, low, one needs to at least be suspicious that
participants also periodically receive experience- people are mischaracterizing their mental state.
sampling probes (Hurlburt & Heavey 2001) in Emotions are likely to be a particularly
which they are asked whether, at that particu- common source of translation dissociations. For
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example, when individuals report experiencing ally replicated in a variety of contexts (Wilson
anxiety, a host of physiological measures (includ- & Schooler 1991), suggest that sometimes self-
ing heart rate and galvanic skin response) typic- reflection may be a source of translation dissoci-
ally become elevated (Marks 1987). Such corres- ations. That is, in the process of trying to un-
pondence gives us confidence that people are ac- derstand why people feel the way they do, they
curately characterizing their internal state; in may construct a faulty meta-conscious repres-
other words, there is no translation dissociation. entation and thereby lose touch with their feel-
However, there is a class of individuals, referred ings.
to as repressors, who show the standard physiolo-
gical changes when put in situations that would 3.3 Investigating temporal and translation
cause most people to experience anxiety, but who dissociations of meta-awareness in
fail to report any change in anxiety (Asendorpf & the context of mind-wandering
Scherer 1983). In these cases, it seems reasonable
to speculate that the repressors are misrepresent- In recent years, a growing body of research has
ing their internal experience to themselves; they addressed the nature of mind-wandering as it per-
are experiencing anxiety but not acknowledging it tains to the occurrence of temporal and transla-
(Lambie & Marcel 2002; Schooler et al. in press). tion dissociations of meta-awareness. This re-
As another example, consider that when males search suggests that mind-wandering is highly
experience sexual arousal they typically show susceptible to temporal dissociations of meta-
changes in their penile tumescence (a technical awareness; that is, individuals routinely fail to no-
way of saying they become erect). Intriguingly, tice that their minds are wandering despite the
men who reported disgust for homosexual activity considerable disruption to performance that such
were shown to actually exhibit greater increases unnoticed lapses often incur. This claim is sup-
in penile tumescence when witnessing males enga- ported by various strands of evidence revealing
ging in sex, than men who did not report aversive the frequency with which participants are
feelings toward homosexuality (Adams et al. routinely “caught” mind-wandering before they
1996). One reasonable account of these findings is notice it themselves. In contrast, mind-wandering
that these so-called homophobics experience a appears to be relatively resistant to translation
translation dissociation, such that they are unable dissociations of meta-awareness. Although indi-
to acknowledge the arousal that they feel towards viduals regularly fail to notice when their minds
men, and instead misattribute the experience to a are wandering, when meta-awareness is directed
feeling of disdain. toward the current state of thought, they are gen-
A final example of translation dissoci- erally quite accurate in characterizing whether or
ations involves situations in which individuals not their minds were on-task. This latter claim is
analyze why they feel the way they do about an supported by numerous demonstrations of sys-
affective experience. For example, in one study tematic differences in performance and neurocog-
(Wilson et al. 1993), participants viewed various nitive activity as a function of individuals’ self-
art posters and then both rated the posters and classifications of their mental state as on-task
selected one to take home with them. Prior to versus mind-wandering.
engaging in this assessment, some participants
were further asked to analyze why they felt the 3.3.1 On the veracity of self-reports of
way they did about the posters, whereas others mind-wandering: How susceptible is
were not. When contacted several weeks later, mind-wandering to translation
people who had attempted to reflect on the dissociations?
basis of their preferences were less satisfied with
their choice and were less likely to have hung A fundamental challenge to the investigation of
the poster on their wall than those who had not mind-wandering is its necessary reliance on self-
analyzed their reasons. The disruptive effects of report. Mind-wandering is, by its very nature,
analyzing reasons, which have been conceptu- defined in terms of internal mental states. Given
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psychology’s long suspicions about introspective found a strong correlation between the fre-
evidence (Nisbett & Wilson 1977), this reliance quency of mind-wandering reports in response
on self-reports likely contributed to why, until re- to experience sampling probes and comprehen-
cently, consideration of this important topic was sion accuracy. Subsequent work demonstrated
largely limited to a few stalwart researchers (An- that mind-wandering specifically disrupts the
trobus 1999; Klinger 1999; Singer 1988; Giambra development of a detailed situational model
1995). However, accumulating evidence suggests Smallwood et al. 2008).
that when individuals are directly queried regard- Another way in which the absence of read-
ing whether they are mind-wandering, their self- ing comprehension following mind-wandering
reports accurately reflect their internal mental has been documented is through the examina-
state. Evidence for this claim is largely based on tion of people’s capacity to detect when the text
the logic of triangulation (Schooler & Schreiber becomes gibberish. In one study (Zedelius et al.
2004). Accordingly, if self-reports of mind-wander- 2014) participants were asked to read simple
ing consistently co-vary with behavior and neuro- children’s texts and report every time they no-
cognitive activity in a manner that might reason- ticed that the sentences no longer made any
ably be expected to be impacted by mind-wan- sense (some of the sentences were constructed
dering, then we can have increased confidence so that the nouns of the sentences were re-
that such introspective evidence accurately re- arranged in a nonsensical manner, e.g., “This
flects the underlying mental state. In the follow- sense makes no sentence”). The results revealed
ing review, I detail at some length numerous find- that participants sometimes continued reading
ings in support of this relationship from a host of for a number of sentences before noticing that
paradigms in which potential behavioral or the text had become gibberish. Moreover, parti-
physiological proxies of mind-wandering are re- cipants who received thought probes after sev-
lated to individuals’ responses to randomly timed eral sentences of gibberish were more than twice
queries regarding whether they were just mind- as likely to report mind-wandering without
wandering. This review provides a review of the meta-awareness, relative to those who were
extensive literature on mind-wandering and evid- probed at random times.
ence for the general contentions that: 1) the con-
cordance between behavioral and physiological Eye-movements
measures and self-report data indicate that
people’s self-reports of mind-wandering corres- If individuals’ self-reported mind-wandering
pond to actual instances of this mental state; and episodes during reading correspond to genuine
2) while people are routinely able to recognize mental lapses, then we might also reasonably
mind-wandering after the fact, they often fail to expect to see differences between the patterns of
notice it while it is occurring. Readers willing to gaze durations following periods in which indi-
take my word on these two points may want to viduals report reading attentively versus mind-
scan or skip this section and jump ahead to its wandering. These predictions were confirmed in
Summary (on page 18) or to the Implications of an experiment in which subjects read the en-
this approach for the more general enterprise of tirety of Jane Austen’s Sense and Sensibility
the science of first-person perspective (on page while their eye movements were recorded
16) if the general topic of mind-wandering is not (Reichle et al. 2010). Relative to eye movements
of primary interest. obtained during intervals of normal reading, the
fixations measured during intervals that pre-
3.3.1.1 Behavioral measures ceded reports of mindless reading were both
longer in duration and less modulated by vari-
Reading comprehension ables that are known to influence fixation dura-
tions (e.g., word frequency, Rayner 1998). These
Although long overlooked as a source of reading results suggest that the fairly tight coupling
comprehension failure, Schooler et al. (2004) between the mind and eye during normal read-
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ing (Reichle 2006) becomes disengaged during ported attentional drifts (e.g., Carriere et al.
self-reported mind-wandering. 2008; Smallwood et al. 2004; Weissman et al.
2006) and that they are less likely to recollect
Sustained Attention to Response Task external events during these periods (Small-
(SART) wood et al. 2003, 2007, 2004).
More direct support for a relationship
Another paradigm that has proven effective in between self-reports of mind-wandering and
documenting the validity of mind-wandering re- dampened external processing comes from sev-
ports is the SART task. The SART is a simple eral ERP studies. In one study (Smallwood et
go/no-go task in which participants are asked to al. 2008), participants intermittently received
refrain from responding to an infrequent no-go experience sampling probes while performing a
target (Manly et al. 1999; Robertson et al. simple target discrimination task. Analysis of
1997). Studies have documented that the brief the ERP responses to the targets revealed that
lapses associated with this task share important the amplitude of the P3 ERP component eli-
features associated with reports of off-task cited by the targets was significantly reduced
thought. For example, individual difference for targets associated with “off-task” relative to
measures such as cognitive failures (Smallwood “on-task” reports. Given that the P3 component
et al. 2004), depression (Carriere et al. 2008; reflects the degree to which external events are
Farrin et al. 2003; Smallwood et al. 2007), and cognitively analyzed (e.g., Donchin & Coles
poor executive control (McVay & Kane 2009) 1988), these initial data support the proposal
have been associated both with greater mind- that mind-wandering reports are associated
wandering reports and more errors on the with an attenuation in stimulus processing at
SART. Similarly, both off-task reports and er- relatively late, post-perceptual processing
rors in this task share similar information pro- stages.
cessing features in terms of measures such as re- A more recent ERP study examined
action time (RT) and evoked response poten- whether mind-wandering might also attenuate
tials (ERPs; Smallwood et al. 2008, 2004, 2007). sensory-level cortical processing (Kam et al.
2011). Participants again performed a simple
3.3.1.2 Neurocognitive measures discrimination task (at fixation) while being
prompted at random intervals to report on
Evoked Response Potential their attentional state, but this time we also
included task irrelevant probes in the visual
When the brain faces situations in which it periphery. The results revealed that the initial
toggles between alternative perspectives, it sensory-evoked response to probes was signi-
routinely temporarily inhibits one perspective in ficantly attenuated prior to reports of “off-
favor of the other. This dampening of the non- task” attentional states, as measured via the
dominant perspective is shown in reversible fig- visual P1 ERP component. A second experi-
ures, where brain activation of one interpreta- ment that included irrelevant auditory probes
tion is inhibited while the other is consciously similarly revealed that sensory-level auditory
experienced (Tong et al. 2006). This same pro- processing in the cortex is also dampened dur-
cess of dampening the nondominant vantage ing self-reported “off-task” states, as measured
also appears to operate when people favor their via the auditory N1 ERP component. Another
internal train of thought over external events. recent study from our lab (Baird et al. 2014)
Accordingly, reports of mind-wandering should replicated the finding that mind-wandering re-
be associated with a dampening of attention to duced the P1 ERP, and further revealed that
external stimuli. Indirect support for this “de- mind-wandering was associated with decreased
coupling hypothesis” comes from studies phase-locking of electroencephalograph (EEG)
demonstrating that participants are more prone neural oscillatory activity to sensory stimuli,
to errors during periods associated with self-re- suggesting that mind-wandering disrupts the
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temporal fidelity with which the brain re- that, in addition to the activation of several core
sponds to a stimulus. structures in the DMN, areas normally observed
Taken together, the collective ERP and in controlled processing (including the dorsolat-
EEG evidence demonstrates that self-reports of eral prefrontal cortex and the dorsal anterior cin-
mind-wandering correspond to attenuated sensory gulate) were also engaged during self-reported off-
processing and cognitive appraisals of external task thought. This pattern of brain activation
stimuli. This finding further confirms the validity suggests that executive and default network re-
of self-reports of mind-wandering and suggests sources are jointly recruited during episodes of
that a central feature of the mind-wandering state mind-wandering. One possible account explaining
is an attenuation of the processing of external this joint activation is that executive network re-
stimuli. sources play a role in transforming the self-refer-
ential content supported by the DMN into the in-
Functional magnetic resonance imaging ternal train of thought that we experience when
(fMRI) the mind wanders. Further support for this hypo-
thesis is provided by evidence that the ability to
One of the challenges facing the burgeoning dis- engage in autobiographical planning (such as
cipline of cognitive neuroscience is making sense “how do I get out of debt?”) requires cooperation
of the observation that several brain areas, includ- between the DMN and a system involving atten-
ing the posterior parietal cortex and the pre- tional control (Spreng et al. 2010).
cuneus, the medial prefrontal cortex, and the me- Christoff et al. (2009) also compared the
dial temporal lobe (which are collectively known pattern of activations associated with introspective
as the default mode network (DMN), Raichle et reports of mind-wandering, on the one hand and
al. 2001), all exhibit high levels of activity when the pattern of activations associated with behavi-
participants have no external task to perform. oral errors, on the other hand. Although a variety
One candidate process that the DMN could serve of factors are known to contribute to behavioral
is the generation of the stimulus-independent errors during the SART, mind-wandering is be-
thoughts that occur during the mind-wandering lieved to be one important source of such errors.
state, a hypothesis that is supported by a growing Consistent with this view, SART errors (Figure 9)
body of evidence. For example, McGuire et al. and the introspective reports of mind-wandering
(1996) used the technique of retrospective (Figure 10) were associated with similar patterns
thought sampling to demonstrate that reports of of brain recruitment, providing further validation
mind-wandering were associated with activity in for the use of introspective experience sampling re-
the medial prefrontal cortex. More recently, sev- ports for the study of mind-wandering.
eral studies have documented that situations as-
sociated with greater mind-wandering reports (as
assessed outside of the scanner) also lead to
greater activity in many of the key elements of
the DMN (Mason et al. 2007; McKiernan et al.
2006).
While activity in the DMN is correlated
with high probability of retrospective reported
mind-wandering, it was originally unclear whether
particular episodes of self-reported mind-wander- Figure 9: Activations preceding reports of mind wandering (off-
ing are linked to recruitment of the DMN. To as- task versus on-task). Upward green arrows: default network re-
sess whether this was the case, we conducted a gions; downward blue arrows: executive network regions. Regions
study in which experience sampling was combined of activation included (A) Dorsal ACC (BA32); (B) Ventral ACC
with fMRI to assess the neural activity that oc- (BA 24/32); (C) Precuneus (BA7); (D) Left temporoparietal junc-
curred during particular episodes of mind-wander- tion (BA 39); (E) Bilateral DLPFC (BA 9). Height threshold
ing (Christoff et al. 2009). This study revealed P<0.005, extent threshold k>5 voxels (from Christoff et al. 2009).
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A number of studies have effectively used

the self-caught/probe-caught methodology to il-
luminate the relationship between mind-wander-
ing and meta-awareness. This approach was ini-
tially used to examine mind-wandering while
reading (Schooler et al. 2004) and revealed that
whereas participants regularly caught them-
selves mind-wandering, they nevertheless were
Figure 10: Activations preceding SART errors (interval often caught mind-wandering by the probes.
prior to incorrect versus correct targets). Upward green Strikingly, and in support of a fundamental dif-
arrows: default network regions; downward blue arrows: ference between mind-wandering episodes that
executive network regions. Regions of activation included: are accompanied by meta-awareness and those
(F) Ventromedial PFC (BA10/11); (G) Dorsomedial PFC that are not, there was a strong correlation
(BA9). Height threshold P<0.005, extent threshold k>5 between probe-caught mind-wandering and
voxels (from Christoff et al. 2009). comprehension performance but no such rela-
tionship between self-caught mind-wandering
3.3.2 The intermittent meta-awareness of and comprehension.
mind-wandering: How susceptible is Additional studies have examined the im-
mind-wandering to temporal pact of two mind-altering experiences hypothes-
dissociations? ized to undermine individuals’ meta-awareness:
alcohol intoxication and cigarette craving. In
Although when queried individuals are quite re- one study (Sayette et al. 2009), social drinkers
liable in their capacity to self-report whether or consumed a moderate dose of alcohol or a
not they were mind-wandering, a variety of placebo beverage and then performed a reading
strands of evidence suggest that people task (implementing a self-caught/probe-caught
routinely fail to spontaneously notice when mind-wandering assessment methodology).
mind-wandering takes place. Two paradigms, re- Compared with those who drank the placebo,
viewed earlier, have documented the intermit- participants who drank alcohol were more likely
tent meta-awareness of mind-wandering. to report that they were “zoning out” when
probed. After accounting for this increase in
3.3.2.1 Self-caught/probe-caught mind-wandering, alcohol also lowered the prob-
methodology ability of catching oneself zoning out (i.e., self-
catching). These data suggest that alcohol in-
One approach for documenting mind-wandering creases mind-wandering while simultaneously
in the absence of meta-awareness is combining reducing the likelihood of noticing one’s mind-
self-catching and experience sampling measures wandering.
into a single paradigm. Recall that the self-catch- In another study (Sayette et al. 2010),
ing measure asks participants to press a response smokers, who were either nicotine-deprived
key every time they notice for themselves that (crave condition) or non-deprived (low-crave
they have been mind-wandering. This measure condition), performed the same mind-wandering
provides a straightforward assessment of the task used in Sayette et al. (2009). Smokers in
mind-wandering episodes that have reached meta- the cigarette-crave condition were significantly
awareness. The experience sampling measure, on more likely than the low-craving smokers to ac-
the other hand, randomly probes people regard- knowledge that their mind was wandering when
ing whether they were at that particular moment they were probed. When this more-than-
mind-wandering. When used in conjunction with threefold increase in zoning out was accounted
the self-caught measure, experience sampling can for, craving also lowered the probability of
catch people mind-wandering before they notice it catching oneself mind-wandering. Similar to the
themselves. alcohol consumption findings, it appears that ci-
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garette craving simultaneously increases mental during mind-wandering without awareness. These
lapses while reducing the metacognitive capa- brain regions, however, were more strongly activ-
city to notice them. ated when mind-wandering occurred without
awareness (see Figure 11). The anterior prefrontal
3.3.2.2 Retrospective classification of cortex (BA10) was one of the brain regions signi-
mind-wandering episodes ficantly more strongly recruited during unaware
episodes of mind-wandering. Notably, anterior
A second methodology that has been used to ex- prefrontal cortex (PFC) recruitment has been dir-
amine fluctuations in meta-awareness of mind- ectly linked to engagement of cognitive meta-
wandering entails combining the experiential awareness (McCaig et al. 2011). The observation
sampling methodology with a judgment of parti- that this same brain region became specifically
cipants’ immediately prior state of awareness. Re- more recruited during unaware episodes of mind-
call that, in the experience sampling procedure, wandering may seem surprising at first. However,
participants are intermittently queried regarding the anterior PFC may be involved in mind-wan-
whether or not they were mind-wandering; in this dering through its role in the maintenance of
combined approach, if they report mind-wander- thought. As discussed further below, its recruit-
ing to the probe, then they are also asked to in- ment during mind-wandering in the absence of
dicate if they were aware that they were mind- awareness may make it more difficult for meta-
wandering. In response to such queries, parti- awareness to be implemented.
cipants routinely indicate that they had been un-
aware of their mind-wandering up until the time
of the probe. Moreover, when participants classify
mind-wandering episodes as unaware, their per-
formance and neurocognitive activity systematic-
ally differ from when they report having realized
they were mind-wandering.
Consistent with findings using the self-
caught/probe-caught methodology, retrospective
classifications of unaware mind-wandering epis-
odes (termed zoning out) and aware episodes
(termed tuning out), indicate that the former are
more associated with comprehension failures than
the latter (Smallwood et al. 2008). By contrast,
reports of zoning out seem to be most closely
linked to failures in response inhibition (Small- Figure 11: Mind-wandering in the (a) absence and (b)
wood et al. 2008, 2007) and to poor mental mod- presence of meta-awareness. (a) Regions of activation as-
els during reading (Smallwood et al. 2008). To- sociated with mind-wandering in the absence of awareness
gether these results suggest that while maintain- (off-task unaware versus on-task): (A) Dorsal ACC
ing streams of stimulus-independent thought in- (BA32); (B) Ventral ACC (BA32); (C) Precuneus (BA7);
terfere with the integrity of external attention, (D) Posterior Temporoparietal Cortex (BA39); (E) Dorsal
the absence of awareness of mind-wandering is es- Rostromedial Prefrontal Cortex (BA10); (F) Right
pecially damaging to task performance. Rostrolateral Prefrontal Cortex (BA10); (G) Posterior &
Neurocognitive measures also reveal differ- Anterior Insula; (H) Bilateral Temporopolar Cortex; (b)
ences in the degree of activation between mind- Similar regions were activated during mind-wandering
wandering episodes that have been classified as with awareness (off-task aware versus on-task compar-
aware versus unaware. In the combined experi- ison) but to a lesser degree, including: (A) Dorsal ACC
ence sampling/fMRI study conducted by Chris- (BA32); (B) Ventral ACC (BA24/32); (G) Posterior &
toff et al. (2009), mind-wandering with awareness Anterior Insula. Height threshold P<0.005, extent
activated similar brain regions to those observed threshold k>5 voxels (from Christoff et al. 2009).
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3.3.3 Summary of mind-wandering, as this mental state may

only be notable when the explicit spotlight of
In sum, the investigation of mind-wandering attention is metaphorically turned on itself. In-
from the vantage of the distinction between deed the tendency to only notice mind-wander-
having an experience (experiential conscious- ing after the fact may similarly apply to other
ness) and explicitly realizing that one is having mental states that routinely curtail the occur-
an experience (meta-awareness) has provided a rence of meta-awareness. Like mind-wandering,
fertile ground for developing a third-person un- other subjective states such as sleep, anesthesia,
derstanding of first-person experience. This re- dreaming, and flow states are typically not no-
search has begun to chart the stream of con- ticed while they are occurring, but are readily
sciousness, demonstrating that individuals regu- acknowledged after the fact. Sleep (in the ab-
larly vacillate between the outer realm of per- sence of dreaming) and anesthesia are typically
ception and the inner realm of thoughts and lacking conscious experience entirely and so
feelings. This fluctuation routinely evades expli- clearly are not candidates for meta-awareness.
cit meta-awareness, enabling people’s minds to The mental states associated with gradually
move on to a new topic without explicitly real- drifting off to sleep and dreaming do have phe-
izing this fact. Nevertheless, when directly quer- nomenal content but typically lack meta-aware-
ied, people are remarkably capable of intro- ness. This is why people routinely don’t notice
specting and noticing whether or not they were that they are falling asleep (a grave danger for
mind-wandering. The fluctuation of perspectives driving) or dreaming (except in the case of lucid
on the mind that this approach affords raises dreaming, Laberge 1980). Another example is
numerous questions. Here, I address three: 1) If that of flow states (Csikszentmihalyi 1988), dur-
people are so competent at recognizing that ing which people engage in highly demanding
they are mind-wandering when queried, then tasks at close to their optimum level of perform-
why do they find it so difficult to notice this ance. In such cases, people lack the additional
fact on their own? 2) Are there ways of enhan- resources to take stock of their experience,
cing the capacity to catch one’s mind in flight? which may be why meta-awareness of a flow
3) What are the implications of this approach state often leads to its sadly premature termina-
for the more general enterprise of the science of tion. Nevertheless, as in the other cases, after a
first-person perspective? I consider these ques- flow state has ended, individuals are quite able
tions in turn. to acknowledge its occurrence. In all of these
cases, the common denominator may be that
3.3.3.1 Why is mind-wandering so easy these various states (for one reason or another)
to report but so difficult to catch? curtail the occurrence of meta-awareness, and
thus are only noticed after the fact once the op-
The observation that meta-awareness is so ef- portunity for meta-awareness reoccurs.
fective at discerning mind-wandering when One reason why mind-wandering may un-
queried about it, yet so poor at catching it on dermine meta-awareness may stem from its reli-
its own, raises the natural question of why this ance on the very same brain regions that may
discrepancy exists. Two potentially interrelated be necessary for noticing its occurrence. A strik-
explanations may contribute to this striking dis- ing aspect of the brain regions associated with
crepancy. mind-wandering is that they involve many of
Like mind-wandering, meta-awareness ap- the systems that might be expected to contrib-
pears to be associated with rhythms of atten- ute to the monitoring of the state. For example,
tional flux (Schooler et al. 2011). Sometimes we elements of the medial prefrontal cortex are re-
are explicitly aware of our mental states, and cruited both during mind-wandering and in
other times we are not. Such vacillations in tasks that require theory of mind (Gallagher &
meta-awareness could readily contribute to indi- Frith 2003). As mental state attribution in-
viduals’ frequent tendency to overlook episodes volves the application of meta-cognitive pro-
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cesses to information of a stimulus-independent Of course, just because episodes of mind-

nature (e.g., inferences about the mental state wandering routinely end with a moment of
of another individual), the engagement of these meta-awareness (“shoot, I drifted off again”)
brain regions during mind-wandering could pro- does not mean that the meta-awareness neces-
hibit their utility in the service of catching the sarily was responsible for its ending (Schooler et
wandering mind. Similarly, in the combined al. 2011). Meta-awareness could be a con-
fMRI/experience sampling study conducted by sequence rather than the source of the termina-
Christoff et al. (2009), periods of mind-wander- tion of a mind-wandering episode. According to
ing engaged regions such as the dorsal ACC, in- this view, the intuition that meta-awareness ter-
volved in error-detection and conflict monitor- minates mind-wandering episodes is another ex-
ing, and the anterior PFC, involved in cognitive ample of an over-reach of the attribution of de-
meta-awareness. If mind-wandering engages liberate intention (Metzinger 2013). While this
both meta-cognition and error-detection sys- remains a viable possibility, it is also the case
tems in the service of generating a coherent that mindfulness techniques aimed at enhancing
stream of stimulus-independent thought, the awareness of one’s internal states can curtail the
fact that these systems are already engaged negative effects of mind-wandering.
may make them less capable of detecting a In one study (Mrazek et al. 2013), parti-
mind-wandering episode. The observation that cipants were randomly assigned to one of two
mind-wandering and meta-cognitive processes interventions that they were told were expected
both engage the same systems does not neces- to enhance their performance: two weeks of
sarily establish a causal relationship between training either in mindfulness meditation, or in
these two. Nevertheless, it remains an intriguing good nutrition practices. Both interventions in-
speculation that our persistent failure to catch volved similar time commitments, expectations,
ourselves mind-wandering may occur because and homework (either daily mediation or a nu-
mind-wandering hijacks the precise meta-cognit- trition journal). Before and after the interven-
ive brain regions that are necessary for noticing tion, participants were given both reading com-
it. Future research might profitably explore this prehension and working memory tasks, and
hypothesis by examining whether mind-wander- their mind-wandering during each was assessed.
ing episodes that are experimentally induced to Compared to the nutrition control, the mindful-
emphasize meta-cognitive reflection are particu- ness intervention significantly reduced mind-
larly likely to evade detection. wandering, improved performance on both
tasks, and these benefits were mediated by the
3.3.3.2 Are there ways of enhancing reduction in mind-wandering for those who were
people’s awareness of their high in mind-wandering to begin with. These
mind-wandering? findings dovetail with other recent studies indic-
ating that the general tendency for mindfulness
One of the clear findings of research on mind- (being present in the moment) is negatively cor-
wandering is that it can be extremely disrupt- related with mind-wandering (Mrazek et al.
ive to performance. Reading (Smallwood et al. 2012), and that even a simple mindfulness exer-
2008), working memory (McVay & Kane cise conducted with non-meditators (focusing on
2009), vigilance (Cheyne et al. 2009), and gen- one’s breath for eight minutes) can temporarily
eral intellectual functioning (Mrazek et al. reduce mind-wandering (Mrazek et al. 2012).
2012) can be seriously disrupted by mind-wan- Although research on the impact of mind-
dering, especially when it occurs without fulness training in dampening mind-wandering
awareness (Smallwood et al. 2008). This raises is consistent with the notion that part of its ef-
the natural question of whether enhancing ficacy is due to enhancing meta-awareness,
people’s meta-awareness of their minds can there is one finding that does not completely
help to curtail the disruptive consequences of square with this account. Specifically, Mrazek et
mind-wandering. al. (2012) found that mindfulness training re-
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duced people’s tendency to spontaneously no- ports of mind-wandering (following experience

tice mind-wandering episodes. However, this re- sampling cues) and both behavioral and
duction in self-caught mind-wandering could physiological measures, we have identified situ-
have occurred because the mindfulness practice ations in which all evidence suggests that
enhanced people’s awareness of the focus of people’s opinions about the content of their
their attention, thereby preventing them from private experience is generally quite accurate.
initiating mind-wandering episodes in the first At the same time, by introducing the self-
place. Consistent with this speculation, another caught procedure in combination with retro-
recent study (Baird et al. in press) demon- spective assessments of people’s awareness of
strated that a similar mindfulness program can prior states of mind-wandering, we have also
enhance at least one meta-cognitive skill, documented critical lacunae in people’s know-
namely, the ability to assess the accuracy of ledge of their mental states. Specifically we find
memory recognition judgments. Although more that people routinely fail to spontaneously no-
research is clearly needed, it remains quite tice when their minds have wandered. When
plausible that one mechanism by which mind- tasked with reporting mind-wandering whenever
fulness training reduces mind-wandering is by they become aware of it, people routinely
increasing people’s meta-awareness of when demonstrate behavior indicative of mind-wan-
their minds are beginning to wander. dering while failing to report it. If they are
probed during periods in which these measures
3.3.3.3 What are the implications of this suggest they are mind-wandering, they routinely
approach for the more general indicate that they now realize that they were
enterprise of the science of first- mind-wandering, but they had not noticed this
person perspective? state until the time of the probe. We are thus
also able to identify situations in which all evid-
The program of research outlined above demon- ence suggests people are routinely lacking in
strates the insights into first person experience their current knowledge of their ongoing mental
that can be gleaned by assessing it from a third- state.
person perspective. In many respects , the ap- By triangulating between people’s first-
proach described here exemplifies the program person reports and multiple other third-person
of heterophenomenology that Dennett advoc- measures we have begun to reveal the relation-
ates. We are systematically assessing people’s ship between people’s beliefs about their experi-
reports about their conscious experiences while ence and empirical indices of their underlying
explicitly acknowledging that those reports cor- mental states (for related approaches, see Hurl-
respond to people’s beliefs about their experi- burt & Heavey 2001; Jack & Roepstorff 2002;
ence (i.e., their meta-awareness) and not neces- Lambie & Marcel 2002; Lutz & Thompson
sarily their actual experience. However, by using 2003). Moreover, the theory of the intermittent
various reasonable markers of people’s internal and imperfect nature of meta-awareness as a re-
states we have been able to examine the condi- representation of experience (Schooler &
tions under which people’s reports are more or Schreiber 2004; Schooler 2002; Schooler et al.
less likely to be aligned with their experience. 2015) provides a scaffold for conceptualizing the
In this regard, we find that when people are ex- situations in which beliefs and underlying ex-
plicitly asked whether they were just mind-wan- perience converge and diverge. Of course, one
dering, their self-reports align with a host of be- could always counter that we cannot be sure
havioral and physiological measures that should that the variety of behavioral and physiological
co-vary with mind-wandering. These findings measures that correlate with self-reported men-
suggest that people are quite accurate in retro- tal states such as mind-wandering are necessar-
spectively assessing whether or not they were ily indicative of those states. Perhaps there is
just mind-wandering. In other words, by trian- some third variable that is responsible for both
gulating between people’s retrospective self-re- mind-wandering and the host of measures that
www.open-mind.net
we find to be correlated with people’s self-re- encing both at the same time. I believe this is
porting of it. But it seems a stretch to suggest the case with interpreting scientific third-person
that this entirely unknown third variable could accounts of first-person experience. If one is
account for why, when people say they were capable of recognizing both the strengths and
mind-wandering, their performance on primary limitations of each perspective, then they can
tasks is impaired, their eye movements become use each to inform the other. If, however, they
less sensitive to what they are looking at, their solely look at a problem from one or the other
physiological measures indicate a dampening of perspective, then this may lead to a logically
attention to external processes, and their brain consistent view, but one that omits an import-
activation corresponds to that which occurs ant vantage. I turn now to a consideration of
when they are unoccupied. In short, a strong this larger issue: namely, conceptualizing a
case can be made for the value of using empir- meta-perspective that can accommodate the va-
ical third-person science to inform not only our cillating manner in which first-person experi-
understanding of people’s beliefs about their ex- ence is both that which we know best and un-
perience, but also to discern when those beliefs derstand least.
are likely to be accurate and when they may be
inaccurate or incomplete. 4 Toward a meta-perspective for
It seems likely that those with strong alle- considering the metaphysics of first-
giances to either an exclusively first- or third- versus third-person perspective
person account of experience will balk at the
notion that third-person empirical indices can It is my contention that debates about how to
be used to corroborate people’s first-person ac- reconcile the first- and third-person perspective
counts. Traditional phenomenologists (e.g., on reality arise in part from the distinct vant-
Husserl 1963) may contend that first-person ex- ages that different scholars take on the issue.
perience is privileged and so, when discrepancies The problem in a nutshell is that while the pre-
arise between it and third-person data, that the vailing third-person perspective of science (ma-
former should invariably be favored. Those with terial reductionism) does an admirable job of
a behaviorist bent may argue that making accounting for all aspects of reality that are re-
claims about underlying subjective states revealed from its vantage, it robustly fails to ac-
mains a dead end because ultimately they can commodate several self-evident aspects of exist-
never truly be verified. Personally I find myself ence that are uniquely apparent from a first-
sympathetic to both of the vantages; however, I person perspective. If one simply dismisses
argue that the striking disparity of these views, those aspects of the first-person perspective
both from each other and from the one pro- that are incongruent with the third-person per-
moted here, stems from the incongruence that spective, (as most scientists and many philo-
naturally arises from shifting perspectives. sophers do), then there is no problem. However,
From the vantage of one perspective of a here I will argue that there exist self-evident ob-
Necker cube, the alternative perspective makes servations derived from the first-person per-
little sense. When the spinning dancer is mov- spective that are as compelling as any objective
ing in one direction, it is hard to imagine how fact. Such observations should not be simply
she could possibly shift directions. Those who dismissed as irrelevant or illusory but rather
have never entered the third dimension of a Ma- suggest the need of serious revision to current
gic Eye image could reasonably doubt that such accounts of physical reality (for related argu-
a perspective could possibly exist. But once one ments see Chalmers 2002; Nagel 2012). In the
realizes that there are distinctly different per- following section, I first review the material re-
spectives to be had on a situation, and that ductionist account suggested by the prevailing
these alternative perspectives each offer their third-person perspective view. I then consider
own valuable vantage, then that knowledge can several elements of existence revealed by a first-
be held even as one remains incapable of experi- person perspective that seem to have no place
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in this account, most notably subjective experi- that have led to the remarkable progress of sci-
ence, the flow of time, and the distinctiveness of ence. To appeal to the existence of some other
the present. Finally, I offer some speculative re- distinct realm of reality beyond the objectively
marks about the nature of a meta-perspective physical smacks of ghosts and fairy dust (e.g.,
that might be able to accommodate both vant- Jackson 1982). To date, while the previous ana-
ages. lysis has revealed the marked advances to our
understanding that emerge when we consider
4.1 Ontological third-person people’s first-person perspectives, no explana-
perspective—Material reductionism tion in science has required abandoning an ex-
clusive reliance on mutually verifiable third-per-
When reality is conceived of strictly from the son observations. In other words, although I will
vantage of a third-person perspective, it quite soon suggest cases that may challenge this tra-
naturally leads to the premise of material reduc- dition, to date there are no third-person ac-
tionism, namely that everything including the counts of physical phenomena that have been
arising of subjective experience can be accom- undermined solely because they conflict with
modated on the basis of physical principles that first-person experience. Given the track record
do not themselves make any appeal to con- of third-person accounts, it may seem hard to
sciousness. This account is arguably the prevail- justify why one scientific question (the arising
ing view among both scientists (e.g., Crick of conscious experience) should challenge an on-
1994; Bloom 2009; Graziano 2013) and philo- tological perspective that is not problematic for
sophers (e.g., Dennett 1993; Churchland 1989; anything else.
Metzinger 2004). Its strength comes from its re-
markable record of success. Having abandoned 4.2 Ontological first-person perspective—
the superstitions and spiritual whimsies of the What material reductionism leaves out
past, hard-nosed science has an amazing track
record for explaining everything it has been dir- Although material reductionism provides an
ected toward with purely physical constructs. outstanding vantage for accounting for the
Aspects of reality that were once thought to be physical world, it comes up wanting when the
beyond the ken of the third-person perspective mind is inspected from a first-person perspect-
of science, for example the notion of some sort ive. The essential challenge is that even if a ma-
of mystical force of life, élan vital, have been re- terialistic explanation is able to account for how
duced to rigorous formalisms (e.g., DNA code). the mind functions, this does not explain how it
Admittedly, we do not currently have a full ac- is that there is a subjective experience associ-
counting of how it is that we experience a first- ated with it, or why that experience is as it is.
person perspective on reality, but given science’s As Jackson (1982) puts it:
track record, it is presumed to be merely a mat-
ter of time before these experiences are ex- Tell me everything physical there is to
plained with precisely the same type of accounts tell about what is going on in a living
that have been used so successfully to explain brain, the kind of states, their functional
so much so far (Churchland 1989). People may role, their relation to what goes on at
feel as if they have some type of privileged per- other times and in other brains, and so
spective, as if the view from within their own on and so forth, and be I as clever as can
minds could never be reduced to and explained be in fitting it all together, you won’t
by the machinations of atoms, but this is just have told me about the hurtfulness of
shortsightedness, perhaps fueled by some evolu- pains, the itchiness of itches, pangs of
tionary advantage to view mind and matter as jealousy, or about the characteristic ex-
different (Bloom 2009). perience of tasting a lemon, smelling a
There is much to be said for material re- rose, hearing a loud noise or seeing the
ductionism, as it draws on the very assumptions sky. (p. 127)
www.open-mind.net
Jackson introduces the canonical example of be actually enjoying a genuine experiential

Mary the color scientist to illustrate this point. state. If zombies that are physically indistin-
Imagine that Mary is a color scientist who has guishable from experiencing humans could in
been brought up in a black and white room and principle exist, then there is nothing inherent in
has never experienced red; nevertheless, she what is known about physical systems that
knows all there is to know about the physical speaks to the arising of consciousness. This
processes relevant to color vision. Jackson’s presents a major problem to the prevailing ma-
point is that if she later experiences red terial reductionist view because it offers no way
firsthand, she will learn a new fact (the experi- to distinguish between philosophical zombies
ence of red) that all of her physical knowledge and the non-zombies.
was insufficient to provide. Complete physical The essential problem of the exclusively
knowledge about a subjective experience is in- third-person perspective of material reduction-
sufficient to entirely know all there is to know ism is that it is forced to ignore all aspects of
about that experience. One has to actually have experience that cannot be reduced to a third-
the first-person experience to fully understand person perspective. A thought experiment
it. may help to provide a further “intuition
A second criticism of material reduction- pump” (Dennett 2014) for illustrating just
ism involves its inability to explain the arising how special that extra something might be.
of conscious experience. It is quite straightfor- Consider the following science fiction variant
ward to imagine how physical processes could on the classic Faustian bargain (Goethe 1867).
account for the structure and function of the One day, to your amazement, a flying saucer
mind in much the same way that they can ex- lands in front of you and a member of a
plain the structure of computer hardware and clearly more advanced species emerges and
the functions of computer software. But such an says that he/she (it’s unclear) has been enjoy-
account would not explain how subjectivity it- ing our debates about the mind -body prob-
self arises or what it is like from the vantage of lem, which his/her civilization has solved. If
the experiencer. Similarly, even if we were to philosophical zombies are logically 3 possible,
create a computer that perfectly emulated a you can be turned into one. He/she offers you
conscious being, we could not know whether it all the gold you can imagine (they’ve also
was genuinely conscious, and if it were, “what it mastered alchemy) if you are willing to accept
is like to be” (Nagel 1974) a computer. the risk of becoming a zombie. If a zombie is a
The inherent difficulty of conceptualizing logical possibility, you will be transformed
how material objects enjoy subjective experi- into one. From everyone else’s perspective
ence is further illustrated by a third criticism of (i.e., the third-person perspective), you will be
material reductionism, namely that it is possible exactly as you were before (just much richer).
to conceive of a system that has all of the phys- However, you will not actually have any ex-
ical characteristics of a conscious being, but perience at all; you will simply seem to others
nevertheless lacks consciousness. Philosophical as if you do. Would you take the bargain?
zombies (Chalmers 1995) are hypothetical hu- Hard-nosed material reductionists say they
man beings who have no internal experience but would (D. Dennett, personal communication,
are otherwise identical to normal people in all 7/15/2014; M. Graziano, 6/10/2014, personal
other physical measurements and behaviors (in- communication), but many of the rest of us
cluding claiming that they are conscious). Al- might not. What is the value of untold wealth,
though there is no way of demonstrating that if there is no inner experience by which it can
such creatures could ever exist, there is also no be enjoyed?
way of demonstrating that they couldn’t. Find- 3 Let’s just assume, for the sake of argument, that the aliens had
ing the neural correlates of consciousness helps solved the tricky issue of moving from logical to nomological possibil-
not an iota, as even a zombie who reported con- ity, that is that if it is possible for a philosophical zombie to exist in
any conceivable universe, that it would be possible for you to become
sciousness in certain brain states would still not one.
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The Zombie Faustian Bargain serves as a and time are combined in this theory into one
useful intuition pump for illustrating the im- concept: space-time. The spatialization of time
portance of the extra something that is left out allows the depiction of a “block universe” in
of the third-person material reductionist per- which the traditional spatial dimensions are re-
spective. Nevertheless, it is clearly a fanciful duced (for purposes of visual illustration) to two
proposition and material reductionists might dimensions from three, and time is added as a
reasonably argue that there is not much to third dimension. Such a depiction can be
worry about if the only cost to adopting their thought of as a space-time “loaf of bread,”
view is not knowing how to respond to such an where each narrow cross- section of the loaf
unlikely scenario. However, there are numerous (“slice”) constitutes a moment in time of the
other examples closer to home where the limits entire universe. According to the block universe
of a third-person accounting of consciousness view (widely held by today’s physicists), all
become relevant. Issues surrounding the nature slices—past, present, and future—already exist.
and existence of consciousness in other species, This arises from the relativity of simultaneity,
fetuses, and computers all revolve around infer- which means that “now” is different for differ-
ences about first-person experiences that ent observers. It is simply that each individual
gravely exceed all known or conceived ways of observer is privy to only one moment (slice) at
reconciliation. a time. From the vantage of a block universe,
A less obvious domain for a clash between the only thing that seems to actually move in
the current prevailing third-person perspective time is consciousness itself (i.e., the observer).
of science and first-person experiences arises in, This means that from the vantage of the pre-
of all places, physics. Although there has been vailing view of physics, the flow of time is not a
some speculation, now largely disregarded by part of objective reality but simply an artifact
the mainstream, that consciousness could have of subjective experience. As Stanford physicist
something to do with the collapse of the wave Linde (2004) notes: “Thus we see that without
function in quantum physics (Wigner & Mar- introducing an observer, we have a dead uni-
genau 1967), in general, consciousness is as- verse that does not evolve in time” (p. 25).
sumed to have little relevance to physics. How- What is more, once we conceive of the temporal
ever, there are two current assumptions in phys- dimension as the equivalent of another spatial
ics that seem to squarely contradict first-person dimension, then there are not enough degrees of
experience. Specifically, physicists believe that freedom for the observer to move in time; that
the flow of time is an illusion and that there is is, movement requires a rate in time, but time
nothing special about the present. Before con- in the block universe is already represented as a
sidering why these claims are so problematic for spatial dimension, and thus cannot also be used
the existence of subjective experience, let us as the metric that establishes the rate of move-
first consider why physics makes this claim. ment through time. As the physicist Paul Dav-
ies (2002) puts it:
4.3 Why physicists dismiss the flow of
time and the privileged present Nothing other than a conscious observer
registers the flow of time. A clock meas-
In considering the nature of time, physicists of- ures durations between events much as a
ten “spatialize” it. In other words, they attempt measuring tape measures distance between
to place it on a similar footing to the traditional places; it does not measure the ‘speed’
three dimensions of space (see Figure 10). with which one moment succeeds another.
Though differing from spatial dimensions in im- Therefore it appears that the flow is sub-
portant respects (Einstein 2001), the notion of jective, not objective. (p. 36)
time as similar to a spatial dimension is a key
feature of the prevailing Einstein/Minkowski in- The upshot of this reasoning is that the flow of
terpretation of special relativity theory. Space time is an illusion, an artifact of consciousness.
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Again, as Davies (2002) puts it: “From the fixed sciousness are less problematic from a third-per-
past to the tangible present to the undecided son perspective than the first-person perspect-
future, it feels as though time flows inexorably ive. If there is no ultimate reality to subjectiv-
on. But that is an illusion” (p. 32). ity, then there is no problem making claims that
are directly in opposition to subjective experi-
ence. At a recent public lecture, I asked the
noted physicist Brian Greene how he reconciled
physics’ static view of nature with the self-evid-
ently dynamic experience of consciousness. His
reply was that he “sees a psychiatrist,” that
consciousness is capable of all sorts of illusions,
and that the flow of time is just another ex-
ample of the artifacts of consciousness.
Figure 12: Although the conventional view derived from While as detailed in the earlier section of
experience is that the present is real and moves through this paper, I am the first to concede that our
time, current views in physics say this is erroneous. Ac- first-person reports can be fallible, as conscious-
cording to the standard block universe view in physics, all ness is capable of all sorts of illusions, it is hard
moments—past, present, and future—are equally real. for me to conceive of how consciousness could
The flow of time and the privileged present are seen as il- create an illusion of the flow of time, or the
lusions of consciousness (from Davies 2002). privileged present. There are several reasons
why I am skeptical of this claim. First, just as
The characterization of reality as a block matter must have extension in space in order to
universe, with the flow of time as an illusion of exist, so too it seems that consciousness must
consciousness, also leads to the conclusion that have extension in time. If consciousness had no
the privileged present is an illusion. One of the “thickness” in time, then I simply do not under-
most pronounced aspects of consciousness is its stand how it could exist any more than an ob-
extension in time. Consciousness extends in time ject could exist without some extention in
and thereby gains the “now” in which it resides. space. Time is the dimension in which con-
First-person observers may remember the past or sciousness extends. Although the objective dur-
imagine the future (as often happens during ation of the specious present (James 1918) may
mind-wandering) but ultimately mental time be rather modest (Pöppel 1997) without at least
travel always takes place in the present. The ob- some extension in time I do not see how there
server perpetually and exclusively resides in the can be any consciousness at all. Second, my ex-
present. In this sense, it seems intuitively self- perience is defined in terms of the flow of time
evident that the “now” is privileged. But not so and a privileged present; the stream of my con-
from the current vantage of the block universe in sciousness is essentially a succession of “nows,”
physics, where the present is treated exactly the with the present always entailing the bridge
same as the past and the future. As Einstein him- between the past now and the future now. In a
self observed, “The past, present and future are nutshell, from my first-person perspective I find
only illusions, even if stubborn ones” (quoted in the reality of the flow of time and the privileged
Hoffmann & Dukas 1972, p. 258). Again, the present as compelling as the existence of phys-
problem is that the only thing that defines the ical reality itself (which also could in principle
present from the vantage of a block universe is be an illusion, Descartes 1641/1996).
that it is where the observer perceives itself to be
at any particular moment in time. But from the 4.4 Reconciling first- and third-person
vantage of a block universe, all moments of time perspectives of reality
exist simultaneously.
The notions that the flow of time and the Those who subscribe to a strict material reduc-
privileged present are merely illusions of con- tionist perspective insist that when first-person
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experience suggests characteristics of reality if we grant subjective experience an ontological

that are not readily handled by a third-person status equivalent to that of objective reality
account, that those aspects must be rejected. then we must seriously question any character-
From a strict materialist perspective, the seem- ization of objective reality that challenges the
ingly privileged knowledge afforded by subject- essential qualities of subjective reality. While
ive experience, the flow of time, and the unique much of our subjective experience may be an il-
significance of the present all must be disreg- lusion, it is very difficult to see how the priv-
arded as illusions of consciousness. But herein ileged vantage of subjective experience, the flow
lies the rub. The third-person perspective on of time, or the unique status of the present
reality is adequate as long as it provides con- could be such. To quote the philosopher David
structs that correspond to the core aspects of Ray Griffin (2007): “The reality of time is a
the first-person perspective. However, when more fundamental and stubborn fact than the
that perspective requires me to abandon abso- alleged facts on which its denial is based” (p.
lutely fundamental aspects of my experience, 119).
then I am forced to question the assumptions A variety of approaches has been offered
that impose that requirement. to accommodate the seeming limitations of a
Whether we acknowledge it or not, all of purely physical accounting of consciousness.
us must discern for ourselves what aspects of Idealism (Berkeley 1878; Goswami 1993; Hoff-
existence to take as axiomatic. By definition, man 2008) responds to the seemingly superior
axioms cannot be empirically proven or logically ontological status of subjective experience (i.e.,
deduced, rather they are self-evident truths that its existence is more certain than an inferred ex-
must be taken as givens. Perhaps the most fun- ternal reality) by suggesting that if one must be
damental of all such axioms is that physical reduced to the other, then it should be physical
reality exists; i.e., that I am not residing in a reality that is seen to be an outgrowth of sub-
solipsistic mirage. Ultimately, while I grant the jectivity, rather than the other way round (as
ontological reality of the physical world, in an the material reductionists contend). Although
important sense I am less epistemologically cer- difficult to refute, idealism (at least in the
tain of it than I am of partaking in subjective macro sense of conscious beings creating reality
experience. Ultimately, the only thing that I can with consciousness) appears to discount the in-
know with absolute confidence is that I am cur- dependent existence of a natural world, and
rently enjoying a first-person experience thus seems at odds with a scientific vantage.
(Descartes 1996). Physical reality Reality could Another approach for reconciling the
be a dream, I could be a brain in a vat or the seemingly incommensurate existence of the sub-
matrix, indeed even my past could be an illu- jective and objective is to pose that they both
sion, but there is simply no question but that I exist as two interacting yet distinct realms. This
am currently having an experience. It might be approach (substance dualism) was favored by
an illusory experience4, but even an illusory ex- Descartes, but it has a serious logical deficiency
perience is still experienced. Thus, although it is (at least as originally formulated): if two realms
conceivable that physical reality could be an il- are truly incommensurate and distinct, then
lusion, it is inconceivable (at least to me) that there seems to be no way for them to interact.
the occurrence of my subjective experience To posit a “ghost in the machine” (Ryle 2009)
could be entirely baseless. This leads me to con- is to assume that the ghost can affect the ma-
clude that the existence of subjective experience chine, which means that they share some com-
and all premises that necessarily underpin its mon ground and therefore are not entirely dis-
existence must be treated on equal ontological tinct realms. This difficulty has proven a major
grounds to that of physical reality. Accordingly, problem for substance dualism (Armstrong
1999), although see Chalmers (2002) for argu-
4 An illusory experience being defined as an experience that does not correspond
to actual reality, such as a hallucination. Note that a philosophical zombie does
ments as to why the challenge of understanding
not have an illusory experience of being conscious, it has no experience at all. the causal nexus between the mental and phys-
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ical is not unlike similar issues of causality ob- For Bertrand Russell, the neutral realm was the
served within the physical realm. event: “Everything in the world is composed of
In my view, the seeming impasse between ‘events.’… An ‘event,’ as I understand it … is
the third- and first-person perspectives on real- something occupying a small finite amount of
ity strongly suggests the existence of some other space-time.” For Alfred North Whitehead
meta-perspective that can accommodate them (1929), the present also served as the nexus of
both. Like the reversible images that can ini- conjunction between the objective and the sub-
tially invoke one of two entirely opposed inter- jective. In Whitehead’s panpsychic characteriza-
pretations, but that can subsequently be recon- tion of reality, the interface between first- and
ciled from a vantage that recognizes the reality third-person perspectives occurs in the “creative
of both, (even if they cannot be both apprehen- advance” of the present in which time marches
ded simultaneously) so too it seems there must forward in a continual alternation among all ele-
be some meta-perspective for reconciling first- ments of reality between subjective and object-
and third-person vantages on reality. In other ive states (for further discussions of White-
words, it seems likely that there exists a higher head’s account, see Griffin 2007; Hunt 2011).
order outlook that simultaneously acknowledges Information represents a second element
the manner in which neither perspective can that unites several efforts to find the neutral
simply be reduced to the other, yet still offers a realm from which both subjectivity and ob-
mode of resolution. It is clearly easier to recog- jectivity arise. As Chalmers (1996) observes:
nize the need for a meta-perspective than to
identify precisely what such a view might be. Perhaps, then, the intrinsic nature re-
Nevertheless, it seems a goal well worth pursu- quired to ground the information states is
ing. closely related to the intrinsic nature
Over the years, a number of scholars have present in phenomenology. Perhaps one is
tried their hand at envisioning a vantage that even constitutive of the other. That way,
neither tries to reduce the subjective to the we get away with a cheap and elegant on-
physical, nor the physical to the subjective, but tology, and solve the two problems in a
rather conceives of some common ground or single blow. (pp. 304–305)
property that may be reflective of both. This
approach, often referred to a neutral monism Sayre (1976) similarly argues that “the concept of
(Chalmers 2002; Feigl 1958; James 1904; Russell information provides a primitive for the analysis
1927), though with close affinities to dual as- of both the physical and the mental.” The notion
pect theories (e.g., Jackson 1982; Nagel 1986; that information somehow serves as the interface
Spinoza 1677/1985; Velmans 2009), attempts to between the subjective and the objective is also a
identify a neutral realm of existence that can be central component of Tononi’s (2008) recent sug-
alternately characterized as mental, physical, or gestion that consciousness arises when matter
neither. produces “integrated information,” which is
The ever -changing present represents a defined as “the amount of information generated
core element of the common ground between by a complex of elements, above and beyond the
subjectivity and objectivity that is invoked in information generated by its parts” (p. 216). The
several accountings of neutral monism. For Wil- basic idea is that complex systems that integrate
liam James, the neutral realm was the present: information, even potentially non-nonbiological
ones, will experience some minimal amount of
The instant field of the present is at all consciousness: something it is like to be that sys-
times what I call the ‘pure’ experience. It tem (see also Koch 2012, 2013).
is only virtually or potentially either ob- In sum, although there is considerable vari-
ject or subject as yet. For the time being, ability in the manner in which scholars have con-
it is plain, unqualified actuality, or exist- ceptualized the common ground of reality from
ence, a simple that. (1904, p. 23) which both the objective and subjective emerge,
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two common elements are 1) that the interface cesses? Will it not turn out, with the fur-
occurs within the ongoing march of the present, ther development of science, that the
and 2) that it is constituted within the shared in- study of the universe and the study of
formational properties entailed in both objective consciousness are inseparably linked, and
and subjective states. A final shared aspect of that ultimate progress in the one will be
many of these approaches is that subjectivity rep- impossible without progress in the other?
resents a fundamental attribute of the universe (p. 27)
that either permeates all aspects of matter (pan-
psychism), or exists as a potentiality of matter The critical question, of course, is: What in the
that emerges when certain conditions are met physical universe might correspond to the
(protopanpsychism; Chalmers 2002). Drawing on arising of consciousness?
these general observations, I turn now to offering To recap, the physical realm as currently
my own highly speculative conjectures regarding construed offers no place for subjective experi-
a meta-perspective on reality that may provide ence, the flow of time, or the uniqueness of the
the shared foundation for first- and third-person present. In order to bridge the gap between phys-
perspectives. ical reality and subjectivity, scholars have posited
the existence of a neutral realm that gives rise to
4.5 The possibility of a subjective both. Though varied in their emphasis, two ele-
dimension of reality ments have emerged as likely components of this
neutral ground: the evolving present and informa-
Many scholars who posit that subjectivity is an tion. Together these considerations suggest that a
essential aspect of reality argue that ultimately conjoined first-person/third-person meta-per-
physics may need to be expanded to include con- spective will likely conceptualize subjectivity, the
structs corresponding to subjective states. As the present, and the flow of time within an architec-
philosopher David Chalmers (1995) observed: ture that closely links information to an ever-
changing now. Toward this end I offer the follow-
I propose that conscious experience be con- ing conjecture: consciousness arises via the chan-
sidered a fundamental feature, irreducible to ging informational states associated with an ob-
anything more basic. … In the 19th century server’s movement through objective time relative
it turned out that electromagnetic phenom- to a currently unacknowledged dimension or di-
ena could not be explained in terms of pre- mensions of subjective time.
viously known principles. As a consequence, Although speculative and highly underspe-
scientists introduced electromagnetic charge cified, the above account has intuitive appeal.
as a new fundamental entity and studied the The sense of moving through time from one in-
associated fundamental laws. Similar reason- formational state to the next is clearly central to
ing should be applied to consciousness. If experience. Indeed it could well be said that it is
existing fundamental theories cannot en- the defining aspect of our existence. It is difficult
compass it, then something new is required. to conceive of experience without invoking move-
(p. 96) ment in time and change in informational state.
Recall however that the current block universe
Eminent physicist Andrei Linde (1990) has also portrayal of time provides no way to conceptual-
speculated that consciousness may some day be re- ize moving through time, as movement in time
cognized as part of our understanding of physics: would require change in time at a rate that could
never be specified. As the Physicist Paul Davies
Could it be that consciousness is an observes:
equally important part of the consistent
picture of our world, despite the fact that But what meaning can be attached to the
so far one could safely ignore it in the de- movement of time itself? Relative to what
scription of the well-studied physical pro- does it move? Whereas other types of mo-
www.open-mind.net
tion relate one physical process to another, tualized) to afford the flow of time or inner ex-
the putative flow of time relates time to it- perience may require the postulation of an addi-
self. Posing the simple question ‘How fast tional subjective dimension (or dimensions) in
does time pass?’ exposes the absurdity of which the observer moves relative to physical
the very idea. The trivial answer ‘One space-time (e.g., Smythies 2003). Noting the in-
second per second’ tells us nothing at all. ability of current theories of physics to account
(2002, p. 8) for the flow of time or the existence of subject-
ive experience, physicist Linde speculates that
Thus to move in time requires movement in rela- dimensions of consciousness may be required to
tionship to some dimension other than time itself. provide the necessary degrees of freedom. Linde
The postulation of an additional temporal dimen- (2004) observes:
sion allows observers to change information states
in objective time relative to subjective time. In- Is it possible that consciousness, like space-
deed, it seems possible (and perhaps even a math- time, has its own intrinsic degrees of free-
ematical necessity) that in order to extend in and dom, and that neglecting these will lead to a
move through space-time (i.e., the block uni- description of the universe that is funda-
verse), there needs to be at least one additional mentally incomplete? What if our percep-
dimension to provide the degree of freedom neces- tions are as real (or maybe, in a certain
sary to enable such movement (Schooler et al. sense, are even more real) than material ob-
2011). In other words, if we accept the block uni- jects? What if my red, my blue, my pain,
verse model5 of reality, then in order to move are really existing objects, not merely reflec-
through objective time, we have to move relative tions of the really existing material world?
to something, and that something cannot itself be Is it possible to introduce a ‘space of ele-
time because all time exists simultaneously in the ments of consciousness’….? (p. 451)
block universe. A seemingly reasonable solution is
to posit an additional dimension (or dimensions) I remain agnostic regarding precisely how many
of time. Although the postulation of additional additional dimensions may be required in order to
dimensions of reality should not be taken lightly, provide the degrees of freedom necessary for time
it is not without precedent. In physics, string the- to flow and consciousness to have extensions in
ory has postulated seven additional spatial di- the present. Indeed, I am not even committed to
mensions beyond the three dimensions of space the notion that such a realm must necessarily be
and one dimension of time that are customarily thought of as possessing all of the mathematical
acknowledged (Greene 2004). If there can be mul- formalities of spatial dimensions. My point is
tiple dimensions of space, then might there not simply that the current material reductionist
also be additional dimensions of time? Indeed, model of reality has left no room for time to flow
some physicists have argued that an additional di- or now to exist. It is as if physics has built a pen-
mension of time might be very useful for concep- dulum clock but left no space for the pendulum
tualizing various issues in physics (Bars et al. to swing. In statistics, there always must be one
1998). If the postulation of an additional dimen- more degree of freedom than the total number of
sion (or dimensions) of subjective time could also subjects and conditions so as to leave the freedom
resolve the paradox of time and provide a realm for variables to vary. I believe that such degrees of
for subjectivity, then surely that would also war- freedom are similarly required to enable experi-
rant its consideration as a possibility. ence to flow through time.
I am not the first to suggest that the fail- A dynamic depiction of the value of adding a
ure of objective time (as it is currently concep- second temporal dimension is illustrated in the fol-
lowing three examples depicting a simple event of
5 Another possible way of reconciling the challenges of the flow of time bottles breaking. The first (Figure 13; see video
and the present is to discard the notion of the block universe. While
this vantage is the prevailing view in physics (Greene 2004), some
clip in its description) depicts the event as it would
have suggested that it needs revising (Hunt 2014; Smolin 2013). unfold from the first-person perspective, a dra-
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matic shattering of initially intact colored bottles.

The second example (Figure 14) transforms this
event into a block universe depiction in which ob-
jective time is spatialized, and each slice corres-
ponds to a separate moment of the event. Notice
that in the block universe representation there is
no motion (and hence no video clip), and no singu-
lar frame (i.e., slice) corresponds to “now.” How-
ever, in the third example (Figure 15; see video Figure 14: The breaking vases event is depicted as a block
clip in its description), an additional temporal di- universe, with the temporal dimension spatialized, and each
mension is introduced so that the observer can moment corresponding to a separate “slice.” Notice that
move through the block universe. Frame by frame there is no way to depict “now” and no way to move
a moving “now” marches through the block uni- through it.
verse. By adding a second temporal dimension to
the block universe, the dynamical experience of
events unfolding is once again achieved.
A spatialized depiction of the notion of ob-
servers moving through subjective time relative
to physical space and objective time is presen-
ted in Figures 16–18. As previously, noted, in
the standard presentation of the block universe
the three dimensions of space are, for graphical
depiction, reduced down two dimensions (Figure Figure 15: The breaking vases event is again depicted as a
16). Here, in order to provide room to depict an block universe, with the addition of a second temporal di-
additional dimension, physical space is further mension. The moving present is represented as successive il-
reduced to one dimension (Figure 17). Within luminated slices that progress from moment to moment
this characterization, it is possible to see how through the block universe. Notice that witnessing move-
the introduction of an additional dimension of ment through the block universe requires an additional di-
subjective time (Figure 18) provides the neces- mension of time as the standard dimension of objective time
sary degree of freedom to enable an observer to is already dedicated to spatializing the block universe. Click
move through time, as they can now move here to see the dynamic version of this demonstration.
through physical time via a succession of mo-
ments in subjective time.
Figure 16: The observer depicted in the standard block uni-

verse with two dimensions of space. In the standard block uni-
Figure 13: An event of breaking vases as it would be ex- verse, the observer is static and exists simultaneously in all loc-
perienced from a first-person perspective. Click here to ations. There is an insufficient number of degrees of freedom for
see a dynamic portrayal. the existence of a genuine now or movement in time.
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to support this view: recent findings suggest

that smaller vertebrates may have a different
“temporal grain size” relative to larger verteb-
rates. Specifically, Healy et al. (2013) report a
negative correlation between vertebrate size and
the highest rate at which they can detect the
flickering of a light (the flicker fusion rate).
From the vantage of the current discussion,
these findings suggest that the consciousness of
smaller animals may move through subjective
time relative to physical time at a faster rate
Figure 17: The observer depicted in a standard block
than larger animals. This may be why it is so
universe with one dimension of space. As with the stand-
hard to swat a fly: from its vantage, we are
ard convention of depicting the block universe in two spa-
moving in slow motion.
tial dimensions instead of three, the reduction to one spa-
A critical question that arises in postulat-
tial dimension is useful for illustrative purposes.
ing an additional subjective dimension (or di-
mensions) of time is: what are the properties of
this dimension? I have left the answer to this
question intentionally vague as I believe under-
specification leaves greater room to flesh out
the rudimentary idea out in various possible
ways. With that said, it seems plausible that
the subjective temporal dimension(s) could cor-
respond to subjective informational states in the
same way that objective informational states
correspond to different moments of objective
time. As noted, subjective informational states
are aligned with but not identical to objective
Figure 18: The observer depicted moving through a dy- informational states (recall Mary, the color sci-
namic block universe with one dimension of physical space entist). Moreover, current theories of neutral
and the introduction of an additional subjective temporal monism posit information as being one of the
dimension. In this model, there are a sufficient number of core potential interfaces between the objective
degrees of freedom to enable the observer to move in object- and the subjective. Thus, characterizing sub-
ive time relative to subjective time. The present can also be jective time as corresponding to distinct sub-
depicted as a series of moments extending in subjective jective informational states that are aligned
time, objective time, and physical space. with but not identical to objective informational
states seems a promising characterization of the
An interesting implication of this charac- nexus between the objective and the subjective.
terization is that observers can vary in the gran- A further potential benefit of the conjec-
ularity (i.e., extent) of their moments. Notice ture that experience emerges from movement in
how in Figure 17, the observer with the smaller a subjective temporal dimension relative to ob-
spatial extent also occupies smaller successive jective time is that it provides a potential way
moments in time.6 Intriguingly, there is evidence of conceptualizing the nature of experience in
6 Although subjective agents may move in subjective time relative to the universe. Many scholars throughout history,
objective time in varying sized steps, it does not appear that there is and particularly those sympathetic to neutral
necessarily a single temporal grain size for the processing of all sens-
ory stimuli. Specifically, Pöppel (1997) finds that the duration of monism, have articulated some type of pan-
what constitutes a single moment (as assessed by temporal discrim- psychic vision of nature, where all elements of
ination of successive sensory events) varies between sensory modalit-
ies. This observation seems potentially consistent with the suggestion conscious systems (Schooler et al. 2011; Zeki 2003) corresponding to
that even within a single individual there may be multiple distinct different sensory levels and systems.
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matter are seen as partaking in some rudiment- Rather, the claim is that at some level, the con-
ary experience or proto-experience. Advocates stituent elements of a rock (and all other mater-
of some version of panpsychism include Spinoza ial objects) partake in at least some very rudi-
(1677/1985), Leibniz (1989), James (1909), mentary kind of experience, what the
Bergson (1896/1912), and Whitehead (1929). physicist/philosopher Alfred North Whitehead
More recent adopters of this view include (1929) referred to as “actual entities”. In other
Hameroff & Powell (2009), Chalmers (1995), words, according to the panpsychic tradition,
Hunt (2011, 2014), Koch 2013, Schooler et al. matter is constituted of collections of individual
(2011), Skrbina (2005), and Strawson (2008). elements each of which partake in some minimal
The notion that the flow of time emerges by experience. The subjective state of these indi-
virtue of movement in a subjective temporal di- vidual experiential elements (or “actual entit-
mension relative to an objective one provides a ies”) is presumed to be extremely simple, and
potential way of conceptualizing how all of mat- for the most part, when they combine, it is as-
ter may partake in experience at varying levels sumed that they form “mere aggregates” that
of complexity. Accordingly, if experience do not entail a higher-order experience. How-
emerges by movement through a dimension of ever, under some circumstances, and in particu-
subjective time relative to objective time, then lar when present in certain organic structures,
it seems quite plausible that elements associated these simple actual entities may combine to
with all of matter may be on a shared traject- form higher-order actual entities corresponding
ory through these two (or more) temporal di- to the conscious agents that we typically ac-
mensions, and thus may be enjoying some form knowledge as such.
of experience. In other words, if consciousness The notion of observers moving through
emerges from something as potentially ubiquit- objective time relative to a subjective temporal
ous as movement through an additional time di- dimension may offer a possible direction toward
mension, then it seems plausible that all matter solving the perennial “combination problem” of
could enjoy some modicum of experience. panpsychism, namely discerning how rudiment-
ary proto-experiences of individual elements can
combine to form the larger higher -order experi-
ences that we enjoy (Hunt 2011). Accordingly, it
seems possible that experience may correspond
to oscillations in objective time relative to sub-
jective time. As depicted in Figures 18 and 19, I
have speculated that observers may move in
subjective time relative to objective time in dis-
crete steps. The precise timing of these steps
from one moment to the next could potentially
provide the foundation for a unified experience
among elements (i.e., an approach to the com-
Figure 19: Two observers depicted moving through a bination problem). When elements oscillate in
dynamic block universe. Notice how this account enables synchrony (i.e., when they all jump from one
varying temporal grain sizes between observers. moment in subjective time to the next), this
may produce a unity of conscious experience.
Although the present view provides a way Nervous systems may provide an organizational
of conceptualizing how matter might partake in structure that enables material elements to os-
at least some rudimentary form of experience, it cillate in synchrony and thereby produce larger,
need not suggest that all objects—collections of more organized fields of subjective experience.
matter—are themselves sentient beings. To use In this sense, the combination problem may be
Nagel’s (1974) terminology, there need be noth- addressed by, and our holistic experience may
ing “that it is like to be” a rock, for example. result from, the common wavelength of oscilla-
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tion through objective time relative to subject- to a “location” within continually changing in-
ive time that constituent elements of a singular formation states. Thus, conceptualizing the ex-
experience partake in. Put colloquially, each of perience of the observer requires understanding
us may have our own unique wavelength moving how that observer moves between informational
through subjective time relative to objective states over time. Given that the present prevail-
time. ing view of physics does not afford the degrees
Importantly, these speculations are presen- of freedom to actually move in time, under-
ted as an example of the kind of meta-perspect- standing how an observer changes informational
ive that might enable an acknowledgement of states relative to time seems to require at a
the reality of both first- and third-person vant- minimum the postulation of a virtual dimension
ages. This is far from a formal model, and of subjective time. Whether that dimension is
leaves much unspecified. For example, although given ontological status as a genuine aspect of
I believe it could be possible to formalize the re- reality depends on one’s perspective, but that of
lationship between subjective time and informa- course is precisely the point.
tional states, this remains a major conjecture. For those who are willing to entertain the
Other elements of the framework, such as the possibility of the kind of meta-perspective that
notion that observers move in discrete steps in I am envisioning, there are a number of possible
subjective and objective time, and that the pat- ways forward. Perhaps, and most dramatically,
tern of oscillation may provide a way of ad- it seems plausible that the existence of an addi-
dressing the “combination problem,” also are tional temporal dimension may have empirical
merely conjectures. I suspect that there are po- consequences. Although received with under-
tentially a great variety of ways of conceptualiz- standable skepticism, evidence continues to ac-
ing how observers might move in a dimension of cumulate for precognition (i.e., that the mind is
subjective time relative to objective time. My sensitive to events that have not yet occurred).
goal in attempting a rudimentary depiction of There is a long tradition of research in this area
this notion is simply to fuel the conversation.7 (Honorton & Ferrari 1989). For example, Bem
Even if scientists resist the suggestion of (2011) recently published a series of nine studies
an additional temporal dimension of reality, in a highly respected journal that seem to sug-
characterizing how experience can reside in a gest evidence of genuine precognition and a sub-
physical world will require explicating how ob- sequent meta-analysis of 90 additional findings
servers move in physical time relative to appear to further substantiate these findings
changes in subjectively apprehended informa- (Bem et al. 2014). Not surprisingly, these claims
tion. In other words, to be an observer in reality have been met with considerable skepticism
is arguably to reside in a now that corresponds (e.g., Ritchie et al. 2012; Wagenmakers et al.
2011). Given their profound challenge to our
7 Several years ago, I presented the idea that consciousness entails current scientific understanding of reality,
movement through a subjective dimension of time using the depic-
tion in Figure 15 and illustrated by clicking the link: http://open- claims of this sort will require studies that offer
mind.net/videomaterials/schooler-bottles-loaf-1.mp4/view. One of highly tangible evidence that cannot be attrib-
the attendees, Robert Forman (see his description of the event,
Forman 2008), suggested that although he was intrigued by my de- uted to artifact or statistical anomaly, e.g., tak-
piction, that it did not square with his intuitions. In my model, the ing advantage of people’s alleged precognitive
block universe is fixed and consciousness marches through it. He sug-
gested that his intuition was the opposite: namely that the field of
capacities to make consistent future predictions
the observer remains fixed and time passes by, or changes within it. of real world events, such as the future outcome
This alternative vantage in which time evolves through a fixed ob- of roulette wheel spins or the stock market
server seems a worthy alternative perspective for conceptualizing the
ever -changing now that may be closer to approximating several (Franklin et al. in press). Nevertheless, the
other neutral monist vantages (e.g., Whitehead 1929, and Hunt demonstration of robust findings of precognition
2014). While I think this alternative viewpoint is worthy of consider-
ation, I also think it is likely that the two vantages are logically equi- might provide the type of data that could in-
valent—it is simply a question of which one is taken as the fixed form theories of how consciousness interfaces
frame of reference. Nevertheless the manner in which we construe the
movement of time relative to the individual may have important psy-
with time in a manner not currently considered
chological consequences (Casasanto & Boroditsky 2008). in modern science.
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Other approaches for fleshing out the kind not mean that the consideration or rejection of
of meta-perspective suggested here may include this view should be arbitrary. There are many
quantitative reconceptualization of existing find- judgments in life that rely on leanings that are
ings. Although quantum theory is one of the most not purely objective in nature. From ethics to
precisely predictive theories ever conceived, its ex- art we routinely favor some views over others
planation remains a mystery. In particular, the for reasons besides purely objective facts. In-
manner in which measurement seems to affect deed the adoption or rejection of views close to
outcomes, and the theoretical relationship those under discussion here are often based on
between measurement, consciousness, and the col- subjective considerations. For example some
lapse of the wave function are not at all under- physicists embrace string theory because of the
stood (Chalmers 2002). It seems possible that the elegance of its mathematics, whereas others re-
postulation of an additional subjective dimension ject it because there is no physical evidence to
of time might lead to alternative ways of concep- support it. Similarly there is great debate on
tualizing current formalism.8 Indeed it seems pos- how far down the phylogenetic scale we should
sible that once psychological constructs (such as a postulate the existence of consciousness. Most
dimension of subjective time) are integrated with of us have an opinion on this matter, but it re-
physical principles, that new psycho/physical laws mains entirely unclear whether there will ever
of nature may emerge (Chalmers 2002; J. N. be a purely objective way to resolve it. In the
Schooler 2010). Alternatively, the notion that absence of objective evidence, our positions on
subjective experience emerges from movement these issues are far from arbitrary, rather they
through another dimension of time may resist em- are based on the same sorts of sensibilities and
pirical documentation, but may nevertheless re- intuitions that underpin many of our most
main a conjecture that appeals to some intuitions heartfelt convictions.
but not others. In a final further effort to appeal to read-
Even if ultimately there is no conclusive ers’ intuitions, let me introduce one last meta-
ways of determining whether there exists an ad- phor for the meta-perspective I am striving for:
ditional subjective dimension of time this does consider the allegorical tale of Flatland, written
by Edwin Abbott (1885) more than a century
8 Although not a mathematician it seems plausible to me that existing ago. Flatland depicts a two-dimensional world
mathematical formalisms might be adopted to accomodate some of the
present conjectures. Most speculatively, a quantative characterization of that is visited by a three-dimensional being (a
additional dimensions of time might correspond in some manner to the sphere). The sphere takes a citizen of Flatland
many worlds account of quantum mechanics (Everett 1957) that postu-
lates that every potential altnernative outcome of quantum events entails
(a square) on a journey through the third di-
a different branching parallel universe. It strikes me as possible that mension, offering the square a vantage on his
these so called “many worlds” could correspond to different coordinates
in additional temporal dimensions. From this vantage, the block universe
reality that he never had before. The story of
might be better concievedconceived of as a block multiverse, with innu- Flatland offers a number of useful lessons for
merable distinct temporal projections. Several multi-dimensional theories the present discussion. First, it provides a
of objective time might (e.g., Bars et al. 1998; Craig & Weinstein 2008)
might also be relevant. Also potentially pertinent are various existing powerful metaphor for thinking about the exist-
quantative efforts to reconcile experience and phyiscal matter. For ex- ence of additional dimensions of reality. Long
ample, the magnitude of a conscous observer’s extension in subjective
time might correspond to Tononi’s (2008) quantitative assessment of Φ preceding relativity theory, which treats time
(pronounced “fi”) which he characterizes as corresponding to the amount like a fourth dimension, or string theory, which
of integrated information that a conscious observer apprehends at any
particular moment. Other potentially relevant formal approaches for re-
currently posits the existence of up to seven ad-
conciling consciousness with physical matter include: Hameroff & Pen- ditional spatial dimensions (Greene 2004), Ab-
rose’s (2014) efforts to explain how consciousness may “consists of a se- bott’s tale introduces us to the concept of
quence of discrete events, each being a moment of ‘objective reduction’
(OR) of a quantum state” (p. 73), and Tegmark’s (2014) suggestion that higher-order dimensions. Flatland describes how
“consciousness can be understood as a state of matter, ‘perceptronium’, additional dimensions can be both embedded in
with distinctive information processing abilities” (p. 1). The relevance of
these various approaches is highly speculative, and indeed given their dis- and yet simultaneously transcend what we
parities it is unlikely that they could be mutually accomodated. My know. The parallels to consciousness are also
point in mentioning them is simply to point the way towards some more
formal approaches that might hold potential for advancing this discus-
striking: when the square is taken through the
sion. third dimension, he suddenly sees inside the ob-
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jects of Flatland. Like consciousness, movement sion between the first- and third-person per-
in an additional dimension in Flatland enables spective for understanding human experience.
the perception of an inside where none could Both researcher and the field of science itself
otherwise be possible. Like consciousness’s rela- have been divided on whether to take perspect-
tionship to reality, an additional dimension in- ives on human nature that emphasize inner ex-
tersects with the lower dimensions and yet is perience or external behaviors. While historic-
distinct from them. And like the recognition of ally this has been a debate on which researchers
an additional dimension in Flatland, positing have been forced to take sides, I argue that we
consciousness as moving through objective time should strive towards a meta-perspective in
relative to a dimension (or dimensions) of sub- which the two vantages can inform one another.
jective time provides an example of a meta-per- In the second section I sought to show how
spective that potentially offers observers a new the third-person perspective of objective science
way of conceptualizing their relationship with can elucidate our understanding of first-person
physical reality. Although I make no claims as experience. Towards this end, I introduced the
to having fleshed out this meta-perspective, it is distinction between having an experience (ex-
my hope that my arguments have persuaded at periential consciousness) and one’s explicit un-
least some readers that it is a vantage worth derstanding of that experience (meta-aware-
considering. ness). Historically when researchers have sought
to understand people’s actual experience they
5 Summary and final conclusions have relied on people’s self-reports about what
they believe they were experiencing. This has
In this paper I used the thesis that perspective led some to argue that it is impossible to gain
shifting can fundamentally alter how we con- insight into underlying experience. However, I
ceive and evaluate evidence as the backdrop for argue that through triangulation between self-
exploring one of the most perennial and challen- reports and behavioral and physiological meas-
ging of all perspectives shifts: namely, between ures, it is possible to make reasoned inferences
the subjective first-person perspective that about people’s actual experience; identifying
provides each of us with a unique window onto both situations in which meta-awareness over-
reality, and the objective third-person perspect- looks experience (temporal dissociations of
ive that serves as the consensual foundation for meta-awareness) and cases in which it distorts
science. My arguments were divided into three them (translations dissociations of meta-aware-
sections, which though admittedly distinct in ness). This framework was fleshed out within an
their focus, all converge in attempting to elucid- extensive review of research on mind-wandering
ate a rapprochement between the subjective and that, because of its inherently private nature,
objective perspectives on human experience. provides an ideal testing ground for developing
In the first section I introduced the notion a third-person science of first-person experience.
of perspective shifting in the context of classic By assessing the relationship between people’s
reversible images. Here I argued that reversible behavioral and physiological measures and self-
images provide a context for conceptualizing report this review concludes that while people’s
how the very same situation can be understood self-reports of mind-wandering routinely corres-
from two very different perspectives that appear pond to genuinely experienced instances of this
to produce seemingly irreconcilable accounts of mental state, they nevertheless often fail to no-
their contents. However, once this juxtaposition tice mind-wandering while it is occurring.
is recognized, a meta-perspective emerges that In the final and most speculative section of
enables the appreciation of both perspectives this paper, I turned the tables around. Instead of
even if they cannot be apprehended simultan- asking how third-person science clarifies first-per-
eously. The perspective shifting and meta-person experience, I asked how first-person experi-
spective that arise from reversible images ence may inform third-person science. Here I ar-
provide a metaphor for conceptualizing the ten- gued that there are certain aspects of first-person
www.open-mind.net
experience that are so fundamental that they may science, while others will conceive of reality ex-
reasonably serve as axioms of existence that any clusively from their own personal first-person
construal of physical reality must be able to ac- point of view. In conceptualizing this breadth of
commodate. As detailed in the prior section it is perspectives, it is important to remain mindful of
clear that many aspects of experience may be il- an essential insight of Bayes’ theorem of probabil-
lusory but several can reasonably be construed as ity. Bayes’ theorem states that in calculating the
unassailable, including: the occurrence of experi- probability of something one must integrate new
ence, the flow of time and the privileged present. evidence with one’s a priori probabilities. From a
Notably, current accounts of physical reality offer Baysian perspective, for those who believe that
no way of accommodating these inherent aspects something is impossible (i.e., infinitely unlikely)
of first-person experience. This conflict between there is no amount of evidence or argument that
seemingly self-evident aspects of personal experi- should sway them. The ontological reality of first-
ence and current accounts of physical reality leads person experience seems very much to fit in this
me to posit that, like the reversible images that category. My arguments on this point will likely
can only be accommodated by recognizing a lar- remain wholly unpersuasive to those who cannot
ger meta-perspective in which they both reside, so conceive of subjective experience as offering an
too there must exist some meta-perspective that epistemological authority that rivals science. How-
can accommodate both objective scientific facts ever, for those open to the possibility that science
and personally experienced ones. Towards this will need to find a way to accommodate the real-
end I introduced a highly speculative conjecture ity of both the subjective and objective perspect-
about the larger framework in which both object- ives, I hope my discussion offers some glimmers as
ive and subjective perspectives might reside. to what such a meta-perspective might be like.
Namely that consciousness involves a funda-
mental aspect of the universe that arises via the Acknowledgements
changing informational states associated with an
observer’s movement through objective time relat- The writing of this paper was possible with the
ive to a currently unacknowledged dimension or support of grants from the Templeton Founda-
dimensions of subjective time. Although highly tion, the Institute of Educational Studies, and
speculative, I offer this account as an example of the Fetzer Frankin Fund. I am grateful to nu-
the kind of meta-perspective that may simultan- merous individuals who commented on earlier
eously accommodate extant objective observations versions of this manuscript, including Ben
and certain aspects of subjective experience that I Baird, Robert Bernstein, James Broadway, Ash-
find as compelling as the existence of physical ley Brumett, Michael Franklin, Tam Hunt, Jack
reality itself. Loomis, Ben Mooneyham, Michael Mrazek,
In my view, bridging the objective/subject- Brett Ouimette, John Protzko, Claire Zedelius,
ive divide will require adopting a meta-perspect- and two anonymous reviewers. This work has
ive in which the two points of view are viewed as also benefited from conversations with David
alternative vantages on an underpinning reality Chalmers, Daniel Dennett, Daniel Gilbert,
that corresponds to both but can be fully accom- Mark Laufer, Wolfgang Lukas, Merrill McSpad-
modated by neither alone. As I attempted to il- den, Brianna Morseth, Dawa Tarchin Phillips
lustrate at the outset, it is quite possible to hold Daniel Povinelli, Carmi Schooler, Lael Schooler,
inaccurate or incomplete beliefs about one’s ex- Nina Schooler, Rachel Schooler, Edward
perience, and third-person science can help to il- Slingerland, Jan Wallecezk, Dan Wegner,
luminate such errors. However, from my vantage Timothy Wilson, Sid Zagri, and many others
there are certain elements of subjective experience too numerous to mention. Though they aided in
that are as axiomatic as any aspect of the phys- the project and/or influenced my thinking, none
ical realm. Nevertheless, I recognize that not all of these individuals or organizations should be
will see it this way. Some will remain exclusively viewed as endorsing the sentiments presented
fixed to the third-person perspective of objective here.
www.open-mind.net
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10.1016/j.tics.2011.11.016
Bridging the Gap
A Commentary on Jonathan Schooler
Verena Gottschling
In my commentary on this rich paper, I will focus on the methodological approach Commentator
proposed by Schooler. The main goal of this commentary is to introduce an im-
proved and more detailed interpretation of Schooler’s distinction between experi-
Verena Gottschling
ential consciousness and meta-awareness. I will address four issues. After sum-
vgott@
yorku.ca
marizing Schooler’s main ideas, I will discuss some general problems regarding
the proposed distinction between experiential consciousness and meta-awareness. York University
I will relate the distinction to the more general debate. I then discuss some con- Toronto, ON, Canada
ceptual claims to which Schooler seems to be committed to making, and show how
they relate to one another. I point to some tension between them. As I will argue, Target Author
the central issue has to do with the underspecified notion of “reflection”. Different
kinds of reflection are required for Schooler’s “pure experience” and for Jonathan Schooler
meta-awareness. I will try to get a better grasp on the author’s underlying posi- jonathan.schooler@
psych.ucsb.edu
tion by discussing the main empirical evidence motivating the account, namely University of California
mind-wandering, in section two. I argue that the evidence does not support the Santa Barbara, CA, U.S.A.
distinction as introduced, but does give us some insight into the complexity of the
required meta-cognitive processes. I will suggest some conceptual changes in the Editors
underlying framework, which I believe make the main project stronger and help to
avoid some of the problems we have encountered. Specifically, I want to introduce
Thomas Metzinger
a taxonomy of different kinds of reflection and show which kinds of reflections
metzinger@
uni-mainz.de
might required both for Schooler’s “pure experience” and for his meta-awareness.
In the third section, I turn to the author’s main claim, which is the existence of a Johannes Gutenberg-Universität
new meta-perspective. According to Schooler, this is the central proposal of his Mainz, Germany
paper, and it follows from his initial perceptual-perspective-shifting analogy and
the distinction he proposes. Schooler claims that the meta-perspective helps us to Jennifer M. Windt
overcome the limitations of both perspectives: the first person perspective and the jennifer.windt@
monash.edu
third person perspective. In effect, by introducing the meta-perspective we can Monash University
bridge the gap between self-reported experiences and observable behavior, and Melbourne, Australia
get a completely new perspective on the mind–body problem. As I will argue, this
ontological element is relatively independent of the rest of his methodological
project. Moreover, it is an unnecessary strategic move.
Keywords
Accessibility | Cognitive | Consciousness | Higher-order accounts | Phenomenal |
Reportability | Stream of consciousness
1 Introduction
Starting from perceptual perspective shifting, paper is to introduce a new methodology for
Schooler focuses on the gap between self-repor- studying conscious versus unconscious states
ted experiences (the first-person perspective) and processes. Although this is a very rich pa-
and observable behavior (the third-person per- per, we are not given too much information
spective). So consciousness versus self-awareness about the conceptual framework and the way in
of being in a certain state, and the relationship which Schooler’s proposal relates to the contem-
of both of these to observable behavior is at the porary philosophical debate about conscious-
heart of the project. The main goal of the target ness, reportability, and accessibility. This aspect
Gottschling, V. (2015). Bridging the Gap - A Commentary on Jonathan Schooler.
In T. Metzinger & J. M. Windt (Eds). Open MIND: 34(C). Frankfurt am Main: MIND Group. doi: 10.15502/9783958570658 1 | 23
www.open-mind.net
will be my focus: the relationship between or incomplete. (Schooler this collection, p.

philosophical theories of consciousness and 20, emphasis added)
Schooler’s account.
Schooler’s (this collection) project uses the A similar transition from a statement about in-
combined strategy of self-reports, observable be- ternal states to a statement about conscious in-
havior, and physiological measurements of the ternal states, which as a result can be reported,
body: a “trust but verify” (p. 8) approach to re- can also found slightly earlier:
ports of subjects’ experience. He is interested in:
by using various reasonable markers of
the relationship between people’s belief people’s internal states we have been able
about their experience and empirical in- to examine the conditions under which
dices of their underlying mental states. [..] people’s reports are more or less likely to
Moreover, the theory of the intermittent be aligned with their experience. (Schooler
and imperfect nature of meta-awareness this collection, p. 19, emphasis added)
as a re-representation of experience […]
provides a scaffold for conceptualizing the To summarize, it seems that “what is going on
situations in which beliefs and underlying in someone’s mind”, in Schooler’s terminology,
experience converge and diverge. (p. 19, refers to the conscious mind. His approach loc-
emphasis added) ates him in a group of thinkers1 who challenge
the notion of accurate reportability, or who
Though it sounds at the beginning as if challenge access as the main criterion for con-
Schooler is making a claim about internal states scious experience. There is a very active con-
in general in general, it quickly becomes clear temporary dispute between defenders of what
that he indeed makes a claim about the person- have been dubbed cognitive accounts of con-
al-level, or conscious internal states. In so do- sciousness and proponents of non-cognitive ac-
ing, he transitions from internal states to a cer- counts (Overgaard & Grünbaum 2011). Oppon-
tain kind of internal state—a conscious one. ents of cognitive approaches associate conscious-
Later in the paper we find similar transitions: ness with cognitive functions like controlled
first we find a statement that can be inter- processing, working memory, selective atten-
preted as talking about all internal states, or tion, or some network of different cognitive pro-
verbally reportable knowledge of one’s states, cesses.2 Because of this association, these func-
but then he immediately makes a statement tions can be used to study consciousness from a
about the underlying experience. For example, third-person perspective. In contrast, non-cog-
he informs us that in mind-wandering we can nitive approaches assume that consciousness
“identify situations in which all evidence sug- cannot be operationalized in terms of cognitive
gests people are routinely lacking in their cur- function. Consequently, these accounts dissoci-
rent knowledge of their on-going mental states” ate consciousness from cognitive capacities.
(Schooler this collection, p. 19, emphasis Which leaves us (typically) with just subjective
added). A little later we find a statement about criteria as acceptable for studying conscious-
experience, thus knowledge or beliefs about ness. Obviously Schooler’s account is an ex-
conscious states: ample of a cognitive approach. In my opinion,
this general dispute cannot be resolved by em-
In short, a strong case can be made for the pirical evidence because neither of these ap-
value of using 3rd person science to inform proaches can be empirically falsified, or at least
not only our understanding of people’s be- the empirical evidence can in principle be ex-
liefs about their experience, but also to plained both ways—in essence we have a clash
discern when those beliefs are likely to be
accurate and when they may be inaccurate 1 See for example Seth et al. (2005), who presented a proposal close in spirit.
2 See Overgaard & Grünbaum (2011); Block (2011); Cohen & Dennett
(2011); Kouider et al. (2010).

www.open-mind.net
of intuitions, and the evidence can be inter- (2) He then presents empirical evidence
preted as supporting opposing views.3 However, that this conceptual distinction corresponds to
the approach one favors will obviously determ- reality, in mind-wandering and other cases.
ine one’s criteria of consciousness, the experi- (3) He then uses this evidence to suggest a
mental methodology used, and, consequently, general list of testable features for those inter-
one’s findings. Nonetheless, I do not want to go ested in the empirical investigation of conscious-
too much into this very wide dispute, partly be- ness. The last issue is particularly important: in
cause I think it would be rather fruitless. 4 So for effect, Schooler suggests replacing the classical
the purposes of this commentary, I will focus on testable criterion for consciousness, (oral) re-
issues within cognitive approaches alongside portability, or accessibility to introspection, by
Schooler’s cognitive account. But the objections several criteria, which are testable and available
against cognitive accounts of consciousness in from the third-person perspective.
general are issues that Schooler, given his intro- (4) He claims that this gives us a prin-
duction of a cognitive methodological approach cipled new way of reconciling the tension
for studying consciousness, potentially needs to between the first- and third-person perspective
address. by introducing a higher meta-perspective, an
By using mind-wandering as his main ex- ontological claim; in essence, this meta-per-
ample, Schooler then proposes a list of criteria spective allows for a new strategy to solve the
that—so the idea goes—might help us to get a mind-body problem. We are promised the
better grasp on the conscious experience, and above-mentioned new “framework for scientific-
not just conscious states to which we attend or ally investigating first-person experience”
states of which we are meta-aware. This under- (Schooler (this collection, p. 9) resulting from
lying conceptual distinction turns out to be es- the analogy of perspective shifting.
sential for Schooler’s overall project.
One way of interpreting Schooler’s ac- 2 The revised view
count is to see it as a combination of a number
of claims, which is evident in the quote above. There is much more in the target paper than I
He himself, right after introducing the distinc- have mentioned here. For the purposes of this
tion, argues that the two cases come apart in commentary, I will focus on four issues related
mindreading, and the fact that “people to the general issue of consciousness, which then
routinely shift perspective (from simply experi- result in the presentation of a revised version of
encing to attempting to re-represent their ex- the author’s account. Now that I have summar-
perience to themselves) provides the foundation ized what I take to be the author’s most im-
for a framework of scientifically investigating portant ideas, I will discuss some general prob-
first person perspective” (Schooler this collec- lems the underlying distinction seems to bring
tion, p. 9). The implicit main argument of the with it. This section receives my main atten-
paper can be reconstructed in the following tion. I will try to localize the distinction within
way: theories of consciousness. I then discuss some
(1) Schooler introduces a conceptual dis- underlying conceptual claims to which Schooler
tinction between experience and meta-qware- is committed to making, and show how they re-
ness as a re-representation of experience. late to one another. I will point out that there
is serious tension between them. In the second
3 See the debate about alternative explanations of the findings of atypical percep- section, I will discuss in more detail the main
tual conditions (for example of the Sperling paradigm) in the references above.
4 By this I mean that the evidence does not allow us to rule out empirical evidence that motivates the account—
the whole class of cognitive versus non-cognitive accounts. I mind-wandering—, and introduce the proposed
think however, that certain accounts within theses classes are
vulnerable to evidence; for example, explicit accessibility ac- criteria. My epistemic goals in the commentary
counts (Prinz 2012) seem to have a lot less room to maneuver. are, first, to determine the exact relationship
But as a debate between cognitive versus non-cognitive ac-
counts, the possibilities for interesting general insights seem
between the initial distinction, the evidence
limited. presented, and the proposed list of criteria.
www.open-mind.net
Second, to discuss of how we should evaluate In general, if we have a conscious state

certain criteria, and what they tell us about un- and a corresponding unconscious state, there
derlying concepts of meta-awareness, access, are two possibilities for how the two can differ. 5
and reflection. Third, to gain some insight into The first option is that the representational
the relationship between one’s position regard- content of a state determines the experience, at
ing the mind–body problem and the suggestion least in part, so that both states differ in con-
the author draws from his perceptual perspect- tent. My conscious belief that my partner is
ive shifting analogy. According to Schooler, this cheating on me has a different representational
is the central proposal of his paper; he claims content than the corresponding unconscious be-
the existence of a new-meta-perspective, which lief. These accounts are first-order accounts.
helps to overcome the limitations of both per- The second option is that the states have
spectives and thereby solves the mind–body identical representational content, but there is a
problem. As I shall argue, this element is relat- difference in kind in the way in which they are
ively independent from the rest of the project. embedded in the system—in philosophical jar-
Moreover, I think it weakens the main project. gon, the functional role that each state plays
As a positive contribution, I will suggest differs. According to this position, my conscious
some conceptual changes of the underlying and unconscious suspicious beliefs that my part-
framework. The changes I will suggest include ner is cheating on me are two states with the
giving up some claims and revising others. I same content—expressed in the that-clause—
think these changes make the main project, but the conscious belief causes different internal
which I take to be a methodological strategy for states and different behavior to my unconscious
studying consciousness, stronger. They also help belief. For example, in the conscious case, I will
to avoid some problems we encountered in the have the conscious thought that he is not treat-
discussion of the main argument. I also suggest ing me respectfully, and I might verbally con-
a finer-grained specification of different kinds of front him right away; in the second, uncon-
reflection and taking stock. This will help to scious case, neither of these activities will hap-
give us a better understanding of meta-cogni- pen.
tion in general as well as of consciousness and The first option is consistent with the
awareness of being in a certain state as distinct standard view of what determines a difference
phenomena. I take this to be a driving idea in in experience. However, it has a disadvantage:
Schooler’s initial distinction. we cannot explain why the two states “corres-
pond” unless there is some significant semantic
3 The category of “conscious but overlap between them. The functional role view
un-accessed” states has the advantage that it can explain the simil-
arity between the two states, but the disadvant-
Traditionally, we find a distinction in the literat- age that we need an explanation of what ex-
ure between two categories: on the one hand con- actly it is that makes a state conscious, and we
scious experiences, states, and processes to which have to show why this difference results in a dif-
subjects have access, and on the other hand un- ference in experience.
conscious processes to which they do not have ac- Schooler seems to opt for the content or
cess (Cohen & Dennett 2011). According to this representational view. Picking up Dennett’s idea6
general picture, access to these states and pro- that people can be inaccurate about their own
cesses then includes in many cases accurate re- mental going-ons and internal states, Schooler
portability, which is the reason why reportability, concludes that, at least in some situations, ex-
or accessibility to introspection, is central to any ternal observers can have better insight into a
judgment about conscious states. But access can
also be understood more broadly: not all access is 5 Of course hybrids are possible, so we might have combinations of
conscious itself, and not all access results in beha- functional differences and differences in content. I take Tye (1995) to
defend such an account.
vioral or verbal reportability. 6 See Schooler (this collection), p. 8.

www.open-mind.net
subject’s experience than the subject themselves ness” (2002, p. 339), while a later he says it is
(p. 8). However, as we saw in the quotes above, “knowing that one is having that experience”
Schooler seems to interpret the internal states in (2002, p. 339). So meta-awareness is about a
question as conscious internal states. certain kind of access.
This is consistent with the idea that the Because we can clearly distinguish both,
access to internal states changes the content of mind-wandering seems an excellent empirical
the state, i.e., the content view: accessing a candidate for the study of consciousness. At one
state changes the content of the state. Since the point we notice our mind-wandering; but what
content determines the experience, the experi- we notice, the mind-wandering itself, occurs
ence of a non-accessed and an accessed state earlier. In the meta-aware case, we re-represent
differ. Understood this way, Schooler’s criteria the former state; in order to do this, we access
give us opportunities to know better than the it by re-representing it, and we “take stock”.
subject himself what he consciously experiences. Then the subject becomes meta-aware of the
Access and the reports of subjects about their state, and we know that we are in this state,
experience, and the experience itself can come but this very process changes the content. Our
apart. If this is right, it would be unexpected experience of mind-wandering is different once
and not what the commonsense understanding we become meta-aware that we are mind-wan-
of conscious states predicts. As for the first as- dering.
pect, Schooler believes that mind-wandering But this seems conceptually puzzling.
gives us an empirical case, where accessing (in Access and (verbal) reportability are clearly
the sense of attending to) a process or state not the same, such that missing (verbal) re-
changes that very state. portability cannot not be equated with general
lack of access, especially at the subpersonal
3.1 The general distinction between level. With knowledge, reflection, re-represent-
conscious experience and ation and meta-awareness, as well as
meta-awareness meta-consciousness, we get additional and dif-
fering concepts. First, often “knowledge” is
I will start with a discussion of the motivation used as something that is itself conscious. Is
for the distinction (see p. 3), and some general the idea that we are aware only of the
problems we seem to invite if we accept this mind-wandering, or also of our knowledge that
distinction. Schooler, and with him others, pre- we are mind-wandering? The author altern-
suppose that conscious experience and accessib- ates between both phrases. But both claims
ility can come apart; moreover, there is an ex- differ. I can be aware of an experience without
perience before it is accessed. In other words, being aware of my knowledge that I have this
we postulate a third category, besides conscious experience. The latter includes a meta-level of
and unconscious states: there are now “con- a different kind. While the first contains a
scious but not accessed” states. These thoughts meta-process regarding the experience, the
seem to be in line with other considerations in second is a meta-process referring to a propos-
this debate, which propose a new category of itional state, knowledge, of the experience. As
phenomenal consciousness with no access (Block a result I am aware of being in the state and
2011; Lamme 2003). not just of the experience. Moreover, reflec-
Schooler distinguishes between simply tion is a vague term. How exactly do we re-
“having experiences”, which he calls that exper- flect on a state, process, or content of a state?
iential consciousness, and explicitly “taking What exactly does this entail? So the question
stock” or re-representing this experience, which is: what is meta-awareness and what distin-
he calls meta-awareness or meta-consciousness guishes it from simple awareness? Finally,
(Schooler 2002, p. 339). Meta-consciousness re-representation is mentioned, yet another
then, is “defined as the intermittent explicit concept used to characterize meta-awareness.
re-representation of the contents of conscious- Without further explanation, re-reflection
www.open-mind.net
seems a very broad and vague concept that Dennett explicitly state that they do not see
would include all kinds of re-represented con- many reasons to think such conscious informa-
tents. Do most of these occur unconsciously, tion exists before it is accessed (Cohen & Den-
as certain kinds of functional accounts, nett 2012, p. 140). So they reject the very op-
higher-order accounts, predict (Jackendoff tion, the third category, that Schooler wants to
1987; Rosenthal 2005)? How is something postulate. There seems to be a sharp tension
re-represented? How exactly do the represen- between Schooler’s distinction and his agree-
tion and the re-representation relate to one ment with Cohen and Dennett’s general ap-
another? proach: Whereas Cohen and Dennett argue that
The question of which types of neural pro- theories postulating inaccessible conscious states
cesses might be sufficient for awareness is are intrinsically off-limits to investigation,
highly controversial in current debate, as is Schooler not only defends an account along
whether there can be any awareness of a state those lines, but also argues that his account
without access (see the exchange between gives us a solution strategy to overcome the
Fahrenfort & Lamme 2012 and Cohen & Den- tension between the first- and third-person. Ob-
nett 2011, 2012). Relatedly, the status of local viously, there is a need for conceptual clarifica-
recurrences is debated. Block and Lamme argue tion of this highly original idea.
that there are perceptual cases in which sub- However, I think we can learn a few inter-
jects do not attend to a stimulus (in change esting things from this. First, we can rule out a
blindness, inattentional blindness, and atten- very general understanding of reflection or
tional blink) and as a result are not able to re- meta-cognitive processes. Most theorists agree
port the presence of the stimulus. They might that part of what it is to be in a conscious state
nonetheless be phenomenally conscious of the is to have a unified perspective on the world. So
stimulus because it induces local recurrence in the possibility of distinguishing between me and
perceptual brain regions. As a result, a subject’s the world, or a self, or some kind of self-con-
reports are not to be trusted in all cases: sub- sciousness is required as an indispensable part
jects could be conscious of stimuli even when of conscious experiences of many kinds. One
they themselves deny it. This sounds very close way of describing this is to say that experience
in spirit to Schooler’s idea. However, Schooler includes some kind of categorization. In other
doesn’t tell us how his account, and pure words, it is a kind of meta-cognition on this
mind-wandering versus meta-awareness of highest and most general level. At least, we as
mind-wandering, relates to this debate. humans keep track of this interdependence of
Despite these unclear aspects, the underly- action and perception/experience at the per-
ing intuitive idea is clear: Schooler wants to dis- sonal level. To mention a classical example, it
tinguish phenomenally-conscious experience seems very hard to experience pain if one
from a meta-level of consciousness, in the liter- doesn’t classify something as painful, or without
ature also referred to as meta-awareness, and seeing it as painful for me. Indeed, some kind of
sometimes as reflective awareness, reflexivity, or evaluation, conscious or not, seems to be re-
reflexive consciousness. But what exactly char- quired for something to classify as pain; just as,
acterizes this meta-level remains unclear. We in order to see something visually as a cow, we
are simply not told, the used concepts seem have to classify or categorize it as a cow (Dret-
vague, and, without further explanation, under- ske 1993).
specified. But, of course, this does not imply At first glance, an account like Schooler’s
that the main idea is not helpful, or that it is cannot allow for this because the standard view
not possible to specify them. requires meta-cognition for conscious experi-
However, Schooler seems to sympathize ence. Experience is cognitively penetrable, such
with Cohen and Dennett, so I take it that he that knowledge about categories influences how
thinks (like them), that awareness differs from we experience an object. In contrast, Schooler
behavioral reportability. However, Cohen and distinguishes both, and wants to allow for ex-
www.open-mind.net
perience before (any?) meta-level involved. At to a well-known Bach piece, how I experience
least he talks sometimes as if meta-cognition in this piece of music might change. Chances are
general is the issue when it comes to that I am still not able to hear the references to
meta-awareness of mind-wandering. When he Bach and the coded references to passages in
talks about theory of mind and the areas in- Lucas in the middle of all the dense tone
volved in meta-cognition (Schooler this collec- clusters. But my belief that it is a homage to
tion, p. 17), he suspects that because certain my beloved Bach will change my experience in
meta-cognitive processes and mind-wandering general. Other states, beliefs, and emotions in-
occupying both engage the same systems, spe- fluence my auditory experience and make it, in
cially the dorsal ACC and the anterior PFC, this case, somehow more enjoyable.7 It is also
this might explain why it is so hard to catch well known that crossmodal influences change
oneself mind-wandering, i.e., to gain experience: ones taste experience changes with
meta-awareness of mind-wandering. However, conflicting visual experience. So a pure straw-
he notices that identity of brain regions does berry juice tastes less like strawberry to us if it
not imply a causal relationship, and that fur- is colored blue, even if the juice itself is not
ther research is necessary. altered.8 How we experience a certain wine de-
However, it would be hasty to conclude pends on knowledge about price, how famous
that Schooler cannot concede that meta-cogni- the winery is, and many situational aspects. In
tion can be involved in experience on his ac- these examples, the real question seems to be
count. Though he talks frequently as if the issue how exactly our experience changes, and how
were meta-cogniton in general, he is not com- do particular internal and external factors con-
mitted to excluding any kind of meta-cognitive tribute to the change. What changes in how we
process. But what is needed is a differentiation re-represent, and how fundamental is this
between different kinds of meta-reflection or change? And what is meant by these terms?9
re-representation. Schooler needs to address the So Schooler’s meta-awareness can come in
question of whether we see the same kind of many forms. “Meta-cognition” includes a broad
meta-cognitive processes in different kinds of range of phenomena. What they have in com-
experiences, and how exactly this changes the mon is that subjects have some insight into
experience. Interpreted this way, only a certain their own cognitive functioning. It is not clear
kind of meta-reflection or meta-cognition might to me that it is an all-or-nothing affair between
establish meta-awareness. As I will show, this pure experience and meta-awareness or reflec-
move avoids a number of other problems. 7 Bayne & Montague (2011) provide a nice overview of the com-
We know that experience depends on plex cognitive phenomenology debate in his introduction to his
background knowledge, and that our knowledge volume. One might think that other contents causally influence
the phenomenology of a state. A second option would be that
and our classification processes change our ex- “what it is likeness” is not a useful conceptual distinction at all
perience in many cases. This seems to be the (Lycan 1996, p. 77; Papineau 2002, p. 227). A third option would
be that there are several meanings of “what its likeness”—indeed,
case not just in mind-wandering, Schooler’s fa- in the literature different distinctions have been suggested. I will
vorite example, but also in many other cases. go into more detail in a later section, when I introduce elements
of an improved taxonomy.
What matters is not just how I classify a state 8 See further discussion in Grush (this collection).
or process; many other internal states and con- 9 Regarding visual perception Siegel (2005) has argued that that learn-
textual factors influence experience. Let’s as- ing to recognize an object can change the way that it looks—in the
phenomenal sense of “look”, which is taken to imply that the cognit-
sume that I am a big fan of Baroque music, but ive components of such states are necessary for explaining the
cannot stand twelve-tone music. I happen to change in phenomenal character. In contrast, one could argue that
the phenomenology does change, but the change can be explained in
blunder into a concert with music by Pend- sensory terms instead of in terms of cognitive components. Either a
erecki, and of course do not like what I hear. subject’s concepts do not directly constitute the subject’s phenom-
enal states, such that they can have a causal influence on their phe-
Simply by gazing at the program and learning nomenology (Carruthers & Veillet 2011), or the contrast between
that I am listening to Penderecki’s Saint Luke both is the result of differences in the way that one processes the in-
Passion, which uses references to motives by Jo- formation within the sensory system (Tye & Wright 2011). For my
purposes here, what matters most is that the phenomenology differs,
hann Sebastian Bach and is in a sense a homage and that we need an explanation for it.

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tion. So a specification of what exactly is meant ated with the phenomenon differ? We would
by meta-awareness, re-reflection, and access just be talking about different things. I have
seems necessary. We also need to answer the already ruled out two kind of meta-cognitive
question of how the two categorically differing processes the author cannot use for a more de-
states differ in content, and which exact kinds tailed characterization of the difference between
of meta-processes are relevant. “Reflection” and conscious states and meta-aware states: categor-
“re-representation” are notoriously vague terms. ization under concepts is one kind of meta-cog-
Some kind of reflection at least seem indispens- nitive reflection that itself is unconscious, but
able for a state to be conscious. But that necessary for conscious experience. Distinguish-
doesn’t mean the distinction above is not justi- ing between self and world is another dimension
fiable. We just need to determine and specify of reflection, at the highest level, that seems ne-
the kind of reflection and/or re-representation. I cessary. Meta-cognition always requires repres-
will make some suggestions later in this paper entational use (of some kind), because within it
(see p. 15). we find monitoring of cognitive affordances. But
To be fair, while Schooler does not distin- there are several ways in which this monitoring
guish between different kinds of reflections, he can take place. As I argue below, meta-cogni-
indirectly assumes that there are differences. tion, the ability to monitor and control one’s
But in his view the phenomenon dictates what owns cognition, and the ability to attribute
the criterion for introspective awareness is. He mental states to oneself and others can occur in
distinguishes classification under the concept of different ways; and both the self-other distinc-
“taking stock”: “there are some mental states tion, and self-awareness can occur in a number
(e.g., mind-wandering) for which the crucial of ways.
bottleneck in people’s introspective awareness
stems not from their capacity to classify the ex- 3.2 Meta-cognitive accounts of
perience, but rather from the fact that people consciousness: Content vs. function
only intermittently take stock of what is going
in in their own minds” (Schooler this collection, A core idea in the target paper is the claim that
p. 8). there is a difference between an experience and
This obviously implies that for other phe- an experience one is aware of having. Both
nomena the crucial difference does stem from states are experienced, but the idea seems to be
their capacity to classify an experience. As a that reflection could potentially change an ex-
result, we in effect have different criteria for in- perience in a certain way, because it focuses on
trospective awareness and for mind-wandering the content of the intentional formerly un-re-
and visual perception. I believe a more prom- flected state. Interpreted this way, Schooler
ising route is to allow for dimensions of reflec- seems to defend the content view, though I do
tion and complexity of experience along mul- not think he is committed to it. He doesn’t ex-
tiple dimensions, but to try to find as uniform plicitly subscribe to it, but it seems implicit in
criteria as possible. The experience and phe- what he says when he talks about the content
nomenology in cases of thought and sensory of states and frequently switches back and forth
states (broadly construed) might be different. 10 between content talk and talk of experience. He
But some properties or property clusters have seems to think that these are related. And he
to bind instances of introspective or doesn’t say much about the functional role that
meta-awareness together.11 Otherwise, what the states in question play in other states, or
would justify classifying them as the same, if how cognitive processes use them—something
both the phenomenon and the properties associ- one would expect if he held the functional view.
10 As the complex debate about of the possibility of a phenomenology So it is tempting to interpret him as having the
of thought suggests. view that content determines experience (Block
11 At the very least we would need to insist that there is a family of
co-occurring properties playing an explanatory role within theories
2005). For example, in writing that there are
(Boyd 1999). “some situations in which observers might have
www.open-mind.net
better knowledge about a person’s mental state In the class of functional14 accounts we
than does the person in question” (Schooler find a great range of different accounts, includ-
(this collection, p. 8), what he must mean is ing second-order accounts, accessibility accounts
that observers have better insight into the con- (Prinz 2012), and global workspace accounts
tent of people’s states. A little later, he claims, (Baars 1988). Many of these are close in spirit
regarding misrepresentations, “while in the pro- to Dennett’s. Though they differ, they have one
cess of re-representing, one omits, distorts or thing in common: it is a certain functional rela-
otherwise misrepresents one’s mental state to tionship the states in question have to other
oneself and/or others” (Schooler this collection, states or within the system, which makes these
p. 10). Again, what we misrepresent is obvi- states conscious states.
ously the content of the state.12 If he has a con- Second-order accounts, for example, would
tent view, than his view is that (at least in claim that what makes a state a conscious state
some cases) I have an experience first, and then, is that the state is (or is disposed to be, in some
when I reflect on it, that very process changes versions) the object of a higher-order represent-
the content of the initial intentional state. That ation of a certain sort. This state is a meta-level
then is the reason why the experience differs state, a mental state directed at another mental
between mind-wandering as “purely experi- state. Higher-order accounts differ on how ex-
enced”, and mind-wandering experienced with actly this higher-order representation is charac-
awareness. The phenomenon of mind-wandering terized and what the exact relationship between
indeed introspectively changes after we reflect both states is. In some versions the higher-order
upon it, and become aware that we are representation is a higher-order thought
mind-wandering. (Rosenthal 1986, 2005), in others a higher or-
But I think there is a larger issue here. In- der-order perceptual or experiential state
terpreted this way, it is tempting to judge that (Lycan 1996), yet other versions see the
accounts claiming that what makes a state a con- higher-order state as dispositional (Carruthers
scious state is its functional role are inconsistent 2000). There are also differences concerning the
with Schooler’s account. Again, I think this would question of whether the higher-order state
be too hasty. Let me explain. Assuming a repres- should be understood as entirely distinct from
entational theory of phenomenal consciousness,13 its target state (Rosenthal), or whether the
there are accounts that provided in purely higher-order thought is better viewed as in-
first-order terms and accounts that implicate trinsic to the target state, which would imply
higher-order cognition of one sort or another (see that we have a complex conscious state with
below) with conscious experience. If we accept parts. There exist different versions of the in-
Schooler’s distinction, a state is conscious before trinsic view, which all have in common the idea
we are aware of it, or know that we are in this that instead of a separate higher-order state
state, and, when we become aware of it, this there is a global meta-representation within a
changes the state, or its content, to be more pre- complex brain state (Gennaro 1996; Van Gulick
cise, as Schooler seems to suggest. Thus, Schooler 2000; Metzinger 1995). For the purposes of this
seems to defend a first-order account, namely an commentary, I will focus on Rosenthal’s
account in which it is claimed that the conscious- higher-order thought theory, but my considera-
ness of a state is partly (or entirely) determined tions generalize to many of the higher-order ac-
by its representational content, or sometimes the counts. The existence of the higher-order state
format of its representational content, not and the right connection between both (one is
primarily at first the function it plays (Byrne the object of the other) makes the lower level
2001; Dretske 1993; Kriegel 2009). one a conscious state. The higher-level state,
however, is itself unconscious, unless there ex-
ists a third-level state—the existence of which
12 See also, for example Schooler (this collection), pp. 16-17.
13 For the purposes of this commentary I neglect biological state theories. 14 On a very broad reading of “functional”.

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would result in awareness of being in a con- by the thought that I am in pain, I am experi-
scious state. In effect, the existence of a certain encing pain, but the thought itself is uncon-
kind of meta-cognition is what makes the lower scious. Only if there is a third-order state, the
level state a conscious state, or even a state thought that I have the thought of being in
that we are aware of being in. In this frame- pain, am I aware that I think that I am in pain.
work, Schooler’s meta-awareness would require To me, this sounds close to Schooler’s
a third-order state. meta-awareness of taking “stock of our ongoing
Accessibility accounts, for example that of experience and re-represent[ing] it to ourselves”
Jesse Prinz’ (2012), would claim that attention (this collection, p. 8). However, there is an im-
is both necessary and sufficient for states to be portant difference: for Rosenthal there are only
conscious. In global availability accounts15 it is conscious and unconscious states; the presence
claimed that the functional role is the global of the third-order state gives us what Schooler
availability, or the workspace. The idea is that might call meta-awareness. However, Rosenthal
there is competition among neural coalitions; denies the very possibility Schooler claims ex-
the winning coalitions are the conscious ones. ists, that one can be in a conscious state but
There are a lot of similarities between not aware of it. “No mental state is conscious if
higher-order theories and the neuronal glob- the individual that is in that state is in no way
al-workspace theory, but we should not see aware of it” (Rosenthal 2012, p. 1425). Due to
them as theories of the same type. According to the existence of a third-order state with the
the neuronal global-workspace theory, a state is right content, we get introspective awareness of
conscious due to the global availability of its a conscious state: a third-order awareness that
content, whereas higher-order theories see a makes one aware of the second-order awareness.
state’s being conscious as “consisting of one’s Rosenthal expects such cases, in which we “are
being aware of oneself as being in that state” aware of focusing attentively on that state”
(Rosenthal 2012, p. 1433). If one interprets (2012, p. 1427), to be rare. It seems to me that
Rosenthal’s reference to “oneself” as Metzinger’s there is a natural fit between Schooler’s
phenomenal self-model (2003), then a meta-aware states, in which we know that we
higher-order theory requires the integration of are having a certain experience and Rosenthal’s
an individual state in a coherent representation introspective awareness of a conscious state. In
or inner model of oneself, in contrast to a glob- Rosenthal’s framework, meta-awareness neces-
al-workspace theory, in which all that is re- sarily requires a third-order representation.
quired is availability of the content. Both as- In addition, Schooler’s suspicion that
pects, the kind of meta-representation (the “meta-awareness appears to be associated with
number of higher-order steps) and a certain rhythms of attentional flux” (this collection, p.
identification of the original state as my state 17) relates nicely to accessibility accounts.16 But
are dissociable, and they are examples of what I as I will claim in the next section, global avail-
mean by different dimensions of reflection. ability accounts stand in another obvious alli-
I think Schooler’s account stands in nat- ance with Schooler. Again, it seems that it all
ural alliance with both kinds of accounts, in depends upon our understanding and further
contrast to what one might initially think. It is specification of “reflection” or the “meta” in
the vagueness of the term “meta-awareness” Schooler’s meta-awareness. Is reflection itself
that is causing this unjustified reluctance. For necessarily a conscious process? Is it a thought,
example, higher-order thought accounts seem a or just any kind of representation for the pur-
natural way to specify what Schooler might poses of monitoring one’s owns cognition or an
have in mind when he talks about meta-aware explicit higher-order classification? Unfortu-
states. According to Rosenthal, there can be un-
conscious pain states, if these are accompanied
16 However, in the end accessibility accounts will not be Schooler’s best
15 Initially introduced by Baars (1988, also 1996). More modern pro- bet—after all, I interpreted him above as agreeing that access and
ponents would be, for example, Dehaene et al. (2006). awareness differ.

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nately, Schooler does not describe his cessed” from unconscious activity? Are they de
meta-awareness in more detail. facto not explicitly re-represented, or is it im-
It seems to me that we should concede possible to re-represent them? What does it
that some kind of “reflection” might be required then mean to say that something is
for something to be an experience. This leaves “conscious”? On might suspect that this new
still plenty of room to specify different kinds of concept of “conscious” is not compatible with
reflections, some of which might constitute our common-sense intuitive understanding of
more than awareness, namely meta-awareness. the term. Moreover, the stronger reading of
This becomes the real question. Is this reflection Schooler’s position might invite further prob-
itself unconscious or even necessarily conscious? lems. If we claim that access to a state would
Is it a re-representation of some kind? If that is necessarily change the status of its content (or
the case, what kind of re-representation is re- the content itself), it would be impossible to ad-
quired? Schooler’s meta-awareness might re- dress whether it was of a phenomenal or uncon-
quire a rather demanding kind of reflection, and scious nature prior to this conscious access. If
the relationship Rosenthal describes seems a such an “observer-effect” exists, it could poten-
good candidate. But perhaps what we have in- tially render the whole issue completely immune
stead of a simple dichotomy between pure ex- to scientific investigation (Kouider et al. 2012).
perience and meta-awareness is a full spectrum Another open question is how Schooler’s
of dimensions of meta-representation. Then the account relates to others that seem close in
question is, what are the dimensions of reflec- spirit. Dehaene et al. (2006) have presented a
tion required for Schooler’s “pure experience” more modern and updated version of Freud’s
and those for meta-awareness, and which other concept of preconscious activity. They intro-
reflections are there? This search for a proper duce a proposal with a carefully defended tax-
taxonomy of “reflection” seems the most press- onomy of three categories: subliminal, pre-
ing need. It will hence be my main focus, and I conscious, and conscious activity. According to
will suggest some building blocks for such a tax- Dehaene and Changeux’s workspace model de-
onomy (p. 15). Rosenthal’s introspective aware- veloped a little later, dominant neural coali-
ness of a conscious state as an possibility for tions involving the workspace are accessed. In
characterizing Schooler’s meta-awareness will be contrast, existing other weaker activations in
one element of this. the workspace, such as a connection that could
be activated, for example by a shift of atten-
3.3 A general concern for scientific tion, are only accessible. Processes that are po-
practice and a conceptual worry tentially accessible, but are not accessed at the
moment because of sufficient top-down atten-
This brings us to another and more problematic tional amplification, are “preconscious” phe-
issue. I find the general line of thought behind a nomenal conscious processes in Dehaene et al.’s
rigid distinction between pure experience and terminology (2006, pp. 206-207). I am not sure
meta-awareness of this experience problematic. whether what Schooler is proposing is another
First, it presupposes that we accept the distinc- version of Dehaene et al.’s “preconscious” phe-
tion between access-consciousness and phenom- nomenal consciousness. This is consistent with
enal consciousness—a distinction not everybody what he writes. In debates on the third cat-
(to say the least) is happy to accept. 17 Second, egory of phenomenally conscious but not ac-
and more fundamentally, such a new category cessed states, their distinction between cognit-
would have to be motivated. How do we distin- ive access and cognitive accessibility is often
guish “conscious processes, which are not ac- used to defend the possibility of the aforemen-
17 However, one might be able to resist the distinction between ac - tioned third category (see for example Block
cess-consciousness and phenomenal consciousness and at the same 2011). My own suggestion is related, although
time allow for Schooler’s distinction between experienced conscious-
ness and meta-awareness if one claims that access is not what char-
I will suggest more closely specifying different
acterizes the meta-level in Schooler’s meta-awareness. kinds of access (see p. 11) and multiple levels
www.open-mind.net
of representation, instead of just distinguishing in a certain state and noticing that one is in a
between accessibility and access. state (meta-awareness). So he moves onto his
I think Schooler’s account would profit second claim, the claim that his conceptual dis-
from directly relating his terminology to other tinction is empirically supported (see p. 3). Ac-
concepts already in use in the debate. However, cording to Schooler, there are two forms of dis-
there are problems looming: Dehaene at al. de- sociations, temporal dissociations one the one
fend a version of a functional account, which hand and translation dissociations (misinter-
Schooler seems to explicitly reject when he pretations) on the other. Let me begin with
seemingly advocates a first-order account. But temporal dissociations. Examples of temporal
if Dehaene’s taxonomy is not what the author dissociations are mind-wandering vs. noticing
has in mind, what is the difference between the one’s mind-wandering, but also mindless beha-
Schooler’s phenomenally conscious but unac- viors, suppressed thoughts, and unwanted emo-
cessed activities and Dehaene’s preconscious tions. Schooler mostly uses mind-wandering,
activities? however, characterized as situations, in which
Let us take stock. I have argued so far for we “lose track of the contents of our own
three closely related points. The basic distinc- minds” (Schooler this collection, p. 9). This is
tion between being experientially conscious of a the starting point for the introduction of
state and being meta-conscious of being in a Schooler’s new “framework for scientifically in-
state needs further conceptual clarification. vestigating first-person experiences” (Schooler
Moreover, the combination of a first-order ac- this collection, p. 9).
count of consciousness (the content view) and I find this focus on mind-wandering a little
this very distinction might not be the optimal puzzling, because I am not sure why this is an
strategy. In fact, a functional or hybrid account example supporting the general claim that the
seems to provide a more natural strategic alli- content of individual states changes in the spe-
ance for Schooler’s main project. Finally, it cific intentional states. Why is it an individual
seems there is no strict dichotomy between ex- intentional state that changes? Mind-wandering
periential consciousness and meta-awareness; we (at least intuitively) seems to be a complex pro-
rather face a difference in many dimensions. cess, and involves a number of states. In
From my perspective, both higher-order ac- mind-wandering the issue is creature conscious-
counts as well as global workspace accounts ness, not the experience or phenomenal charac-
might be helpful regarding this issue. They con- ter of an individual state, i.e., state-conscious-
nect nicely with Schooler’s main project, and ness. Mind-wandering is about a train of
would help to clarify his basic distinction. But thoughts, often accompanied by emotions, and
we might very well end up with a more complex autobiographical memories. In mind-wandering,
understanding of different meta-cognitive di- we mostly think about issues related to our own
mensions and differentiations instead of a life. For example we consider our “to-do” lists
simple conceptual dichotomy. This is what I for today, what to have for dinner, our relation-
will provide later in this paper. In order to do ship to people close to us, telephone calls we
this we need to take a closer look at Schooler’s need to make, and even our next lecture. At
second step; his argument that his conceptual least the phenomenal character we experience
distinction is something we find in cognitive ca- during mind-wandering seems to include these
pacities. the associated sensory states—broadly con-
strued to include feelings of emotions, images,
4 Mind-wandering—and noticing it. The moods—which have a distinctive “phenomenal
bundle of critera character” or “what it’s likeness”. But the
stream of consciousness also contains episodes
On the basis of the former considerations he of conscious thought.18 If we use this standard
presents, Schooler argues that in many capacit- 18 Schooler (2013) gives a good overview of the performance costs asso-
ies we actually find a difference between being ciated with mind-wandering (including reading comprehension,

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understanding of mind-wandering, it would acter differs from sensory states (Siewert 1998;
rather be a bundle of thoughts, associations, or Pitt 2004; Robinson 2005; Prinz 2004).
states, in other words a number of many more So there are a lot of further issues to con-
or less related thoughts, emotions, or other sider, for a project like Schooler’s; we need to
states and processes, not all of them necessarily analyze the experience of mind-wandering and
fully specified in terms of content. And if so, it contrast it with meta-awareness or reflective ex-
is not necessarily the content of individual perience in mind-wandering. However, Schooler
states that changes—we seem to have multiple gives some other examples for temporal dissoci-
options for characterizing what changes once we ations, which can more obviously be explained
are aware that we are mind-wandering. An al- in terms of individual states we do not notice or
ternative interpretation would be that the net- misinterpret. He doesn’t go into detail, but has
work of associated elements might change, or mentioned mindless behaviors, suppressed
even the kind of associations involved. For a thoughts, and unwanted emotions. The idea
conceptual analysis, whether one should include seems to be that we are not aware of an indi-
these autobiographic sensory states in the phe- vidual unwanted emotion, or a thought that
nomenon itself or just say the “train of causes behavior. However, these case could also
thoughts in mind-wandering” causes them, is be explained as processes rather than individual
unclear. But it will determine how we analyze states. Mindless behavior is in many cases
the experience of mind-wandering and the caused by a bundle of connected states, un-
meta-awareness of mind-wandering, and its im- wanted emotions relate to other internal states
plications for theories of consciousness. There is (which make them unwanted), and suppressed
also evidence that it has different functions and thoughts are suppressed due to other internal
might itself be a heterogenic phenomenon states.
(Northoff 2014, especially chap. 26; Metzinger Nonetheless, if Schooler means by “state”
2013). For example, it is not clear whether the “general state of mind”19 rather than indi-
mind-wandering is the same as day-dreaming, vidual states, his examples become more con-
and if not, what the differences are. vincing. But this seems inconsistent. Schooler
Moreover, it is controversial whether takes inspiration from Dennett, who is inter-
thoughts even have a phenomenal character, ested in beliefs subjects have about phenomenal
and if so, how to analyze it (Bayne & Montague experience of individual states. Schooler
2011). The orthodox view is that conscious switches between talk of phenomenal experience
thoughts themselves do not have a distinctive of individual states, and talk about the stream
“phenomenal character”. They are either con- of consciousness the subject experiences. This is
sidered conscious without phenomenal charac- evident in the way he introduces the core dis-
ter, or it is conceded that conscious thoughts tinction, namely in terms of the phenomenal ex-
might possess phenomenal character, but only perience of a state. At other times he talks
in virtue of the sensory states with which they about states of which I am aware, and some-
are associated (for example Braddon-Mitchell & times about “what is going on in one’s mind”,
Jackson 2007; Carruthers 2005; Nelkin 1989; which I take to refer to the stream of conscious-
Tye 1995). However, recently, a number of au- ness, or more precisely the sequence or combin-
thor introduced views according to which con- ation of contents of individual states, rather
scious thoughts themselves possess a “distinct- than a classification of the experience of just
ive” phenomenology, but the phenomenal char- one state. So the pressing question is really:
what kind of reflection is “taking stock” ex-
model building, and impairment of the veto-option to automatized actly? How should we characterize what we do
responses) and suggests that mind-wandering may represent a pure
failure of cognitive control. For this reason it is so useful to study when we “take stock” and reach meta-aware-
consciousness. He argues that mind-wandering offers little benefit, ness? In the following section I present more de-
though it might have a positive role in topics related to autobio-
graphic episodes and information, for example in autobiographical 19 As formulations such as “take stock what’s going in their own
planning and creative problem-solving. minds” (Schooler this collection, p. 8) suggest.

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tailed suggestions for a taxonomy of different with others. In both cases we have rather com-
kinds of reflection. For now let me just say that plex scenarios. And if one defends a multi-com-
one possible view would be that the content of ponent account of emotions, it might very well
these states (or the states) are accessed by be that the components of these emotions differ
other states, and maybe (unconsciously) evalu- —it could be an element in a network that real-
ated. In that case, we should talk about com- izes the state, instead of the content of an indi-
plex processes rather than re-accessed individual vidual state. This might seem like a minor
states. Such a view would also be compatible point, but I think it is important. It undermines
with certain higher-order theories of conscious- a central second part of the strategy, namely
ness. the empirical support for the theoretical distinc-
Later in the paper, Schooler discusses ex- tion. Schooler needs more than a theoretical dis-
amples of misrepresentation, in his terminology tinction (his first claim); he needs to show that
“translational dissociations”: emotions, or cases this very distinction is helpful for understanding
in which it is less controversial whether a phe- certain aspects of consciousness, mind-wander-
nomenal character is involved than in case of ing, and other cases (his second claim; see p. 3).
thoughts. He gives two examples of such mis- Otherwise the conclusion he draws, the new
representations: emotions of anxiety, which are methodological approach to studying conscious-
not reported, and reported disgust for homo- ness, would not follow or would lose its plausib-
sexuality. In his first example we find a correla- ility. So undermining Schooler’s second claim by
tion with the inconsistent behavioral measures showing that in the case of his examples related
of heart rate and galvanic skin response, as in- to emotions (as well as in case of mind-wander-
dicators of existing unreported anxiety. In his ing) this evidence is not as clear as one might
second example we have a correlation with think, results in a problem for his view.
penile tumescence (an erection). In both cases But there is another important issue here.
we know the bodily aspects of the emotion well The empirical evidence seems to be relevant to
(or the caused bodily changes associated with the stream of consciousness rather than to the
the feeling on an emotion), and thus, so the ar- experience versus meta-awareness of individual
gument goes, have evidence for the occurrence intentional states. The formulation of the main
of the emotion. But in both cases there is also a claims suggests that state consciousness is the
discrepancy between the subject’s reports (as- issue. However, in other sections Schooler refers
suming the subject is honest) and its potential to the stream of consciousness (See quote
reportability. Schooler interprets the behavioral above, p. 8). If this is correct, Schooler’s empir-
facts as indication of the real emotion the sub- ical project, or more precisely the evidence he
jects experiences, but in the first case fails to has gathered, is about a central aspect of
acknowledge, and in the second misinterprets. creature consciousness. Philosophers distinguish
I am not so sure. First, the theory of emo- creature consciousness from mental-state con-
tion one feels committed to certainly plays a sciousness: the first is about a subject that is
central role. Schooler seems to presuppose that conscious (either in general or of something in
unconscious emotions are not possible. Further- particular), whereas state-consciousess is about
more, it seems to me that both cases are open conscious states of a creature that it is con-
to a different interpretation, in fact the same scious. Though Schooler’s project (especially
interpretation I suggested for mind-wandering. claim (1)) is formulated in terms of state con-
Both unreported (or unreportable?), emotions sciousness, the empirical support targets a dif-
of anxiety and reported disgust for homosexual- ferent kind of consciousness. This also under-
ity are complex cases. It might very well be mines Schooler’s second claim by showing that
that we do not have an individual content of a the meaning of consciousness differs in claims
state that differs, but we rather simply struggle (1) and (2). But, as I pointed out in section 1,
with a number of different but conflicting emo- the stream of consciousness claim would be
tions, the reported one simply being in conflict compatible with a more functional interpreta-
www.open-mind.net
tion of claim (1) as well. There is a way to re- Schooler’s “pure experience” and for his
vise claim (1) in a way that avoids this prob- meta-awareness, and to get a better grasp on
lem. what is meant by “taking stock” and “re-repres-
Using mostly the empirical evidence of entation”. I also argued that the difference
mind-wandering, Schooler then suggest a bundle between consciousness and meta-awareness
of criteria we might use for the third-person should not be understood as a dichotomy.
evaluation of what is actually going on in some- Rather, we should understand reflection itself as
body’s mind; in my analysis of his main argu- a hierarchical and multidimensional process. So,
ment this is the third step (see p. 3). These be- what exactly is the “taking stock” required for
havioral criteria include behavioral measures meta-awareness? According to Schooler,
(eye-movements, reading comprehension, sus- meta-awareness requires an explicit representa-
tained attention to response) and neurocognit- tion of the current contents of thought (2011, p.
ive criteria (ERP, fMRI, behavioral, neuros- 321). But at least two of the terms involved in
cientific, fMRI and others). His list is in the this characterization are used in several and dis-
spirit of a cognitive account, and similar to oth- tinct meanings: knowledge, and explicit repres-
ers (Seth et al. 2005; Seth et al. 2008). For entation.20 Explicit representation might be in-
protagonists of non-cognitive accounts there terpreted as being itself conscious, or as having
seems to be room for attack. But, as I have symbolic or conceptual content. The notion of
mentioned, this is not my project (see p. 2). In knowledge is also problematic, simply because
this commentary, I prefer to focus on concep- knowledge is a factive verb. It implies that we
tual issues within cognitive accounts, rather cannot be wrong.21 As a result, Schooler built
than the debate between cognitive vs. noncog- the impossibility of misrepresentation into his
nitive accounts (See p. 2). As long as one com- definition of meta-awareness. This might be
mits to such a cognitive account, Schooler’s list consistent with his claim that the first-level per-
of criteria turns out to be very useful for our spective inhabits its own ontological realm. But
evaluation of the meta-components we need for it also creates a problem, because any view that
a fined-grained understanding of reflection and understands introspection or reflection as an in-
re-representation. And this is the case inde- ner perception or re-representation automatic-
pendently of the worries I presented regarding ally has to allow that this process can go wrong.
his first two claims. However, I think there is a In other words, it has to allow for mispercep-
problem looming: Schooler is challenging both tion/misrepresentation. Moreover, Schooler
the reliability of first-person reports and the himself want to allow for a certain kind of mis-
view that conscious states are accessible states. representation, in his terminology translational
With a position that is in such sharp tension dissociations—cases in which at the personal
with our commonsense understanding, he needs level we misinterpret what we experience.
to motivate this radical move: he needs to In my discussion of the distinction I
provide an answer to why we have this deep claimed that we are able to rule out two kinds
pre-theoretic entrenchment of the first-person of reflections that are not helpful. First, cat-
accessibility of our own conscious states (Cohen egorization under concepts is one kind of
& Dennett 2011). meta-cognitive reflection that is itself uncon-
scious, but necessary for conscious experience.
5 A new taxonomy of different kinds of Second, being able to distinguish between self
reflection and world is another dimension of reflection, at
the highest level, that seems necessary for any
It’s time for a positive proposal. I claimed that conscious experience. Neither of these can be
I would introduce suggestions for the building the kind of reflection that distinguishes
blocks of a new taxonomy of different kinds of Schooler’s experience from meta-awareness. In
reflections. As I argued, we need to further spe- 20 For a more detailed discussion of the same issue see Metzinger (2013, p. 11).
cify the kind of reflections required for 21 Otherwise we would have a false belief, not knowledge.

www.open-mind.net
addition I claimed that both the self–other dis- accounts analyze consciousness as a certain
tinction and self-awareness can happen in a form of self-awareness. As a result, we can grant
number of ways. Different kinds of meta-cogni- that for the experience of mind-wandering
tion, the general ability to monitor and control without meta-awareness there is some
one’s owns cognition, and the ability to attrib- self-awareness required, and for meta-awareness
ute mental states to oneself and others, can as a another more demanding kind of self-awareness
result be further specified and characterized is necessary. Rosenthal’s higher-order account
along those dimensions. would give Schooler this kind of distinction:
But again, what is the kind of reflection or meta-awareness would include a third-order
“taking stock” required for meta-awareness? At state, in his terminology a re-re-representation,
the end of the last section I suggested that the whereas the experience of mind-wandering
kind of reflexion involved in “taking stock” would involve only a second-order state, a
could be characterized as a case in which the re-representation (see p. 10).
content of these states (or the states) are ac- The literature on phenomenology offers
cessed by other states, and maybe (uncon- more helpful distinctions of how we can further
sciously) evaluated. So at issue are complex evaluate these different dimensions. Most of
processes rather than re-accessed individual these distinctions are orthogonal. Several au-
states. Such a view is compatible with certain thors claim that “what is likeness” comes in dif-
higher-order theories of consciousness. And this ferent forms. For example, Carruthers distin-
would allow that misrepresentation is in fact guishes the “what it’s likeness” of the world (or
possible. However, not only do authors like worldly subjectivity—what the world is like for
Rosenthal build several meta-representational the subject—from experiential subjectivity—
levels into their theories, the content of the what the subject’s experience is like for the sub-
higher level thought contains an element of self, ject; Carruthers 1998, 2000). Rosenthal uses a
a reference to “oneself”. Self-awareness is built similar distinction. He distinguishes thin from
in the analysis, not just any kind of reflection, thick phenomenality, whereby thin phenomenal-
access, or re-representation. This interpretation ity is the occurrence of a certain qualitative
uses a certain reading of creature consciousness. character. Thick phenomenality is richer:
It requires that an organism is not only aware “[t]hick phenomenality is just thin phenomenal-
but also self-aware. This is a notion of creature ity together with there being something it’s like
consciousness that at first seems to be in ten- for one to have that thin phenomenality”
sion with Schooler’s main distinction. However, (Rosenthal 2002, p. 657, emphasis added). So
as I argued, this is not necessarily the case. thick phenomenality includes a certain kind of
Self-awareness itself comes in degrees and varies reflexion or extra level; it includes an awareness
along multiple dimensions. Creature conscious- of a richer kind. For Rosenthal this is identical
ness in mind-wandering can than be understood with the existence of an appropriate
as an intentional relation between the organism higher-order representation. But it is a specific
and some object or item of which it is aware, in kind of meta-cognitive process, one that con-
our case a train of thoughts (and/or the sensory tains a representation of “oneself”, or in other
states associated with it). This is where the con- terminology, a selfmodel (Metzinger 2003). But
trast between content theories and functional the self-model itself, our understanding of
theories comes into play. As I have argued, pure ourselves and of the difference between oneself
content or representationalist theories, which and others, might itself come in degrees and on
claim that conscious states have their mental different levels. So the issue is not meta-cogni-
properties due to their representational proper- tion or reflexion in general, but different levels
ties, are not a good strategic partner for and involvements of self-awareness.
Schooler. In contrast, a certain class of func- Instead of focusing on the differing phe-
tional accounts, especially higher-order theories, nomenology, one might also try to specify the
turn out to be a nice fit for his account. These notion of access in further detail (Kouider et al.
www.open-mind.net
2010), a suggestion that I think helps us to bet- as resulting from the integration of signals with
ter understand what is meant by states refer- contextual prior information, processes that are
ring to other states or accessing them. In the also influenced by other internal factors (for ex-
workspace model discussion a simple distinction ample attentional factors or vigilance); this in-
between cognitive access and cognitive accessib- tegration is further assumed to be modulated by
ility is introduced to defend the possibility of the degree of confidence of the subject. The res-
the abovementioned third category, unaccessed ult is a more fine-grained perspective on con-
but conscious states. Instead of just access vs. scious experience; instead of simply conscious or
accessibility, I suggest that we distinguish dif- unconscious, we can talk about different dimen-
ferent kinds of access (see p. 11). Rather than sions of experience. And this is done at the
assuming a rich phenomenology and differing sub-personal level by a specification of access.
forms of consciousness, one could also propose This also avoids another problem. As I pointed
that awareness itself might come in degrees and out, Schooler’s account seems very close in
that something like partial awareness might ex- spirit to modern versions of workspace ac-
ist (Kouider et al. 2010). Instead of distinguish- counts. However, these accounts typically as-
ing dissociable forms of consciousness or differ- sume all-or-nothing mechanisms for access. This
ent kinds of personal level phenomenal charac- is no problem for Schooler, who proposes his
ter like the above accounts, Kouider et al. core distinction as a dichotomy. However, it is a
(2010) use sub-personal descriptions explaining potential problem for the revised view I suggest.
what awareness might be. More exactly, dissoci- But I think this can in fact be an advantage.
able levels of access are distinguished and differ- We can indeed grant that representations
entiated by a hierarchy of representational within each level might be accessed in an
levels. In case of partial awareness, we have in- all-or-nothing manner (as is assumed in work-
formational access at some but not all repres- space models), but none the less insist that the
entational levels. The crucial idea is that in- full set of all the representations associated with
formation at other levels can remain inaccess- this process do not have to be conscious.
ible. Or, in some situations, information at Different terminologies aside, I think this
these levels could be accessed, but plausible fits nicely with the spirit of Schooler’s general
content is filled, which than potentially results distinction, and his distinction between experi-
in misrepresentation. ence and meta-awareness. I admit that these
I prefer this line of thinking, and I believe are just first steps towards a better conceptual
it gives us an improved understanding of the understanding. But interpreted this way, there
sub-personal processes involved in the different is not just conscious experience of mind-wander-
levels of reflection and “taking stock” we want ing versus meta-awareness. The situation is
to characterize. This framework is very suitable more complex. Reflection comes in many forms
for a revised understanding of Schooler’s main and involves representations at many levels, as
distinction. However, Kouider et al. (2010) pos- well as access at all these levels of representa-
tulate partial access as an alternative explanation. In addition, whether, and to what degree,
tion for conscious visual perception,22 not for in- self-awareness and a self-model is involved
ternal cases like mind-wandering. But I think makes a difference as well.
the analyses might be useful for our purposes as
well. According to this framework, accessible 6 Perceptual perspective shifting. The
contents at each level of representation are seen Analogy and the mind-body problem
22 Like most authors, they focus for the most part on the discussion of
conscious perception, and especially Sperling (Block this collection; Let me take stock. I have been through the
Fink this collection) and Stroop’s paradigms (see Mroczko-Wąsowicz
this collection) and what we can learn from them for consciousness. claims made in Schooler’s main underlying ar-
For a more detailed discussion of the pros and cons or an under- gument (see p. 3) So far, I have discussed claim
standing of consciousness as graded within conscious perception see
the debate between Cleeremans (2008), Sergent & Dehaene (2004),
(1), the initial conceptual distinction been ex-
Seth et al. (2008), and Overgaard et al. 2006). periential consciousness and meta-awareness, a
www.open-mind.net
distinction Schooler sets up as a dichotomy. I admit that there is a gap, but it is an explanat-
then discussed his second claim that there is ory gap between physical processes and con-
empirical evidence that this conceptual distinc- scious experience. One could even state that the
tion is something we find in cognitive abilities gap may be uncloseable in principle, but that
in cases of dissociations, especially in temporal consciousness is nonetheless physical (Levine
dissociations like mind-wandering and in emo- 1983). That is, there is an epistemological gap,
tional transitional dissociations. I then argued but no ontological gap. That we intuitively see
that his empirical criteria developed in claim (3) a gap might be true; it does not follow that
are useful for cognitive accounts in general, in- there actually is a gap in what exists. All one
dependently of the worries one might have can conclude is that, epistemologically, there is
about claims (1) and (2). Finally I suggested a gap. In addition, our intuitions might simply be
finer-grained conceptual distinction between dif- wrong: we might be “innate dualists” and that
ferent levels of awareness, different kinds of re- this is the reason why to so frequently slip back
flection, and “taking stock”. I will turn now to in dualist talk (despite knowing better;
the last issue we shall examine, which is Papineau 2011). That is the real reason why
Schooler’s last and main claim (see p. 3): commonsense intuition pumping thought exper-
Schooler claims that this can be used for a new iments work so well. According to this view, the
theoretical and ontological framework for study- feeling that some part of reality is “left out”,
ing consciousness, and this is the declared goal i.e., the “explanatory gap”, arises only because
of the target paper. He claims that his percep- we simply cannot stop ourselves thinking about
tual perspective-shifting analogy, together with the mind–brain relation in a dualist way,
insights from the sections before, gives us a new though this is actually the wrong thing to do.
ontological perspective on the mind–body prob- One can be a reductive physicalist without hav-
lem, not just a new methodological strategy. I ing to reject the phenomenon of conscious ex-
found this section of the paper surprising. In my perience, despite the fact that we cannot (yet)
opinion, it is relatively independent of the main reduce it or have proper explanations available
project he undertakes. Schooler starts by de- as to why we experience certain phenomena the
scribing the main thought experiments in the way we do. We can experience a gap, have the
philosophical literature used to challenge re- intuition that something is “left out”, and non-
ductive physicalism.23 He concludes that the etheless that very intuition might very well be
main problem with the reductive positions is wrong. I simply do not see the need for
that it needs to “reject” those aspects of first Schooler’s solution, the postulation of a new
person experience “that are not readily handled realm, that gives rise to both the physical and
by a third-person account” (Schooler this collec- subjective reality.
tion, p. 25). I am also not sure about the meaning of
I am not convinced that this is correct. It the perceptual perspective-shifting analogy it-
seems a viable alternative solution to me to just self. Because it rests on a purely metaphorical
subscribe to the traditional reply, and point to use of “perspective”, the analogy does not go
some kind of epistemic gap between the through. Perceptual perspective-shifting hap-
third-person approach and the first-person ap- pens at a personal level, moreover, shifting ex-
proach instead of an ontological one. One can perience at the personal level. The supposedly
analogous case occurs at the level of theories or
23 However, this section of the target paper goes beyond the discussion accounts, which emphasize either the first- or
of the well-known traditional arguments from the phikosophical de-
bate, including the explanatory gap argument, the Mary argument, third-person perspective. But individual experi-
and others. Schooler adds a section on the phenomenon of time ex- ences differ in principle from the focus certain
perience and reductive accounts that explain time. I found the last
example very inspiring, because in contrast to the other arguments it theories have. Schooler suggests that the resol-
is not just based on thought experiments. However, the implications ution of the conflicting perspectives lies in a
of this for my purposes here do not matter; they are used as a intu -
ition punp to appeal to the necessity of a meta-level, so I cannot
meta-perspective that acknowledges the exist-
cover this aspect in this commentary. ence and irreducibility of both, even though
www.open-mind.net
both are somehow equally valid, such that the ively independent from the main project, which
solution to this tension is a new realm, a I take to be the development of a useful
meta-perspective which gives us a strategy to study consciousness and mind-wan-
“higher-order outlook” (Schooler this collec- dering. Schooler’s strategy might be helpfully
tion, p. 26). However, Schooler agrees “that [i]t independently of whether one is a reductive or
is easier to recognize the need for a meta-per- non-reductive physicalist. I think that such a
spective than to identify precisely what such a methodological reading of his approach
view might be” (Schooler this collection, p. strengthens the project, because it disassociates
26). He admits the character of the introduced it from a completely different issue.
meta-perspective is “speculative and highly un-
derspecified” (Schooler this collection, p. 28) 7 Conclusion
but thinks that it has intuitive appeal. He also
concedes that this is the most speculative part Having noted the initial plausibility of the
of the paper. I must admit that I struggle with general outline of Schooler’s account, I poin-
the concept. I fail to see the intuitive appeal. ted out some problems and expressed some
Mostly because it eludes my understanding general reservations about its scope. First, I
what the proposed meta-perspective might be argued that the postulation of a third kind of
and how it is helpful despite acknowledging conscious but not accessed or reflected state is
our commonsense intuition, not at an epistem- not justified. As a result, the account is too
ological but an ontological level. As a result, I narrow, because one of the underlying general
do not find it explanatory. Moreover, it does assumptions is not justified. This assumption
not follow from the analogy. For an argument causes a number of problems and a few misun-
by analogy one needs properties shared by derstandings. However, the assumption seems
both parts of the analogy. Even if we admit conceptually independent of the main project,
that in perceptual perspective-shifting both which is to allow us to bridge the gap between
personal-level interpretations of an ambiguous first- and third-person criteria for conscious-
figure are equally valid, it does not seem to fol- ness. I suggested that the main distinction is
low that the first-person perspective and the underspecified and needs further clarifications
third-person perspective in strategies to study of the elements involved: access, reportability,
consciousness require a meta-perspective not and levels of awareness.
identical with either of these perspectives. Second, although it is tempting to attrib-
Both the cases seem to have only one thing in ute a first-order account to Schooler, a more
common, “persepective shifting”. But “per- convincing alliance would actually be certain
spective” is used purely metaphorical in the functional accounts, especially higher-order
second case. Moreover, bridging the first- and accounts and global workspace accounts. And
third-person perspectives seems to be an epi- I argued that we should replace the intro-
stemic challenge. But from an epistemic obser- duced dichotomy by a finer-grained distinc-
vation or claim an ontological claim does not tion of different kinds of meta-cognitive pro-
follow. Even if we admit an epistemic gap and cesses and meta-reflections in several dimen-
agree that we cannot help but see an explanat- sions.
ory gap in all these cases, the postulation of an In discussing support for the underlying
independent higher-order meta-level, an ontolo- conceptual framework, I then argued that the
gical claim, is not well supported. In addition, evidence offered is actually about complex
both of these issues, the ontological as well as cases. As exciting as the empirical results are,
the epistemological claim, differ from the they seem not to be about individual states, but
methodological approach defended by Schooler. rather about the connection between many
To summarize, in my opinion this section, and states or even the stream of consciousness. The
the preferences regarding solutions of the project is about creature consciousness, not
mind–body problem, are conceptually relat- state consciousness—though the initial distinc-
www.open-mind.net
tion suggests otherwise. This is the first result ence and the activities of the mind. For
of my commentary. example, the behavioral criteria24 will be
I would suggest giving up the idea that caused by these very meta-processes,
the account offers a new meta-perspective, which we try to identify in more detail.
which for Schooler is a preferable alternative to d) Finally, we keep the insight that factors
reductive physicalist accounts. I do not think accessible through the third-person per-
there is a need for this ontological element in spective can give us insight into what is
his account, and it does not seem to fit with the going on in the mind, as well as in con-
rest of the methodological project. In addition, scious processes.
the claim seems independent of the rest of the 2. The remaining task, then, is to specify the
project and there are reductive accounts avail- aspects and dimensions that are relevant,
able that fit very nicely with his project. This is and the kinds of meta-processes, access, or
the second result. reflection in question. I suggested building
In essence I suggested a few conclusions blocks for an improved taxonomy of different
and recommendations, mostly based on concep- kinds of reflections and “taking stock”. I sug-
tual considerations, which clarify and gested that awareness itself might come in
strengthen the main project, with which I sym- degrees and at different levels of representa-
pathize. tion. By distinguishing dissociable levels of
access differentiated at hierarchical represent-
1. We keep many main insights of the paper: ational levels, we allow for partial awareness.
a) The account is still be a cognitive account, In effect, this allows for a fine-grained per-
and we allow that cognitive factors help to spective on conscious experience. Instead of
get a grasp on consciousness; the project is just unconscious, conscious, and a meta-re-
still to bridge the gap between the first- flective level of awareness, we have different
and third-person perspective. dimensions of experience. And this is done at
b) We also keep the insight that further pro- the sub-personal level by a specification of
cessing and certain kinds of further pro- the term “access”. But we should restrain
cesses might either change the state itself from simply postulating a third category,
and/or the state’s content. But we ac- namely a state that is unaccessed (or un-ac-
knowledge that we need to consider the cessible) but conscious, thereby avoiding the
embeddedness of the state to determine problems associated with the postulation of
the experience. In other words, we focus this third category. The resulting
on processes and phenomena, instead of finer-grained taxonomy allows an improved
individual states. This allows Schooler to understanding of how exactly meta-aware-
associate his project with either a hybrid ness and conscious experience differ. Of
account or a version of a functional ac- course there is a price to pay if we accept
count, more specifically a workspace ac- this change of focus. While we can still claim
count or higher-order account. Which in that the criteria give an insight into what is
turn helps to specify the dimensions of going on in the mind, “the mind” includes
meta-processing in more detail and get a unconscious states, conscious states, and sev-
better grasp of the necessary conceptual eral levels of re-representational processes.
clarifications. Nonetheless, we still see
meta-awareness and consciousness as dis- There are a number of advantages of a view like
tinct phenomena. I take this to be the this. First, it is not in conflict with some of the
driving idea in his initial distinction. most promising candidates for philosophical
c) The proposed list of potential criteria is theories of consciousness. Moreover, one can
still extremely useful, since it helps to de- still account for the similarity of an unconscious
termine these very reflective dimensions
and factors, which determine both experi- 24 For example in the the discussion of emotions p. 13.

www.open-mind.net
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Stepping Back and Adding Perspective
Reply to Gottschling
Jonathan Schooler
In this reply, I circumvent (some might say dodge) a number of Gottschling’s Author
fine-grained comments by stepping back and reviewing the key points of the three
major sections of my target paper in light of her more general concerns. I first
Jonathan Schooler
consider Gottschling’s primary criticism of the first section of my paper, namely
jonathan.schooler@
psych.ucsb.edu
that insights that might emerge from considering the perspective shifting associ-
ated with reversible images do not apply in the context of differences between University of California
first and third-person perspectives. Although I concede there are differences in the Santa Barbara, CA, U.S.A.
meaning of “perspective” in conceptual and perceptual domains, I argue that the
common element of a reliance on a frame-of-reference is sufficient to make the Commentator
analogy helpful. I contend that a necessary element in overcoming the limitations
of particular perspectives in both conceptual and perceptual domains is attempt- Verena Gottschling
ing to consider alternative vantages. This approach is then used to justify the tack vgott@
yorku.ca
of the next two sections: considering first-person experience from the vantage of York University
third-person science and considering third-person science from the vantage of Toronto, ON, Canada
first-person experience. I note that Gottschling is largely sympathetic to the broad
goals of the second section of my paper, and observe that her major concern with Editors
the construct of experiential consciousness emerges from her burdening it with un-
warranted assumptions. I use her constructive suggestion for the need for further
Thomas Metzinger
development of the notion of meta-awareness as a springboard for introducing a
metzinger@
uni-mainz.de
previously overlooked element (experiential monitoring) that may be useful for ex-
plaining how people can knowingly monitor performance without explicit verbal Johannes Gutenberg-Universität
re-representation. Finally, I consider Gottschlings’ view that the third section fails Mainz, Germany
to add to the value of the paper. Although I acknowledge that the arguments in
the second section stand independently, I argue that discussion of how science Jennifer M. Windt
can inform experience gains greater balance by also considering how experience jennifer.windt@
monash.edu
informs science. I close by challenging the view that knowledge gained from sci- Monash University
ence necessarily trumps that gained by experience, and conclude that it remains a Melbourne, Australia
worthy goal to seek a meta-perspective that accommodates both first- and
third-person perspectives without reducing one to the other.
Keywords
Consciousness | Explanatory gap | Frame-of-reference | Heterophenomenology |
Meta-awareness | Meta-perspective | Mind-wandering | Mind/body problem |
Mindfulness | Monitoring | Neurophenomenology | Neutral monism | Panpsych-
ism | Phenomenology | Time
1 Introduction
Reviewing a commentary on one’s work, even one metaphoric Photoshop and doctor up every im-
as thoughtful as that provided by Gottschling perfection. There is another option, however, and
(this collection), is much like viewing a close-up that is to step back and consider whether from a
picture of one’s face on a large high-definition broader perspective the blemishes are really as
screen; every blemish seems patently visible and disfiguring as they might initially appear.
appears to overshadow even the most genuine of Inspired by this analogy, I will not at-
expressions. The temptation is to pull out one’s tempt to rebut all of Gottschling’s consistently
Schooler, J. (2015). Stepping Back and Adding Perspective - Reply to Gottschling.
In T. Metzinger & J. M. Windt (Eds). Open MIND: 34(R). Frankfurt am Main: MIND Group. doi: 10.15502/9783958570832 1|9
www.open-mind.net
incisive remarks about my paper. Rather I will from the perspective of the individual, under-
use this essay as an opportunity to step back standing consciousness necessarily invites a reli-
and review the broad strokes of my arguments ance on introspection and first-person analysis.
in light of Gottschling’s more general concerns. Taken from the perspective of conventional
In so doing, I hope to demonstrate that while third-person science, understanding conscious-
Gottschling offers a number of insightful sug- ness necessarily requires objectively observable
gestions for clarification and elaboration, the facts (e.g., behaviors, physiological responses)
general logic of my arguments remain largely that can be derived independently of any single
intact. Nevertheless, Gottschling’s critique of- individuals’ experience
fers an excellent opportunity to clarify some I argue that both of these views have
points that may have been lost in the expanse merit, that both researchers and schools of
of my initial paper. thought have debated (often vehemently) about
which of these two vantages is more appropri-
2 Reflections on section 21: Applying ate, and that part of the heat of this contro-
perspective shifts to conceptualizing versy may stem from people’s disinclination to
human experience from the first- versus switch back and forth between perspectives and
third-person perspective thereby gain a larger view that treats neither as
decisively superior.
My paper opens with the contention that seem- Gottschling rejects the notion that the al-
ingly opposing arguments can often reflect alternative perspectives afforded by reversible im-
ternative vantages of a larger meta-perspective ages has relevance to conceptualizing the chal-
from which both views can be understood. I il- lenges of reconciling first- and third-person per-
lustrate this point using the example of revers- spectives. Her difficulty with this analogy stems
ible images that can be seen as corresponding to (at least in part) from her view that the mean-
two entirely different objects depending on ing of “perspective” in these two contexts does
one’s perspective. I argue that when one recog- not align. As she puts it: “Because it rests on a
nizes that both vantages are true from their purely metaphorical use of ‘perspective’, the
particular perspective, one gains an understand- analogy does not go through” (Gottschling this
ing of the larger context (i.e., a meta-perspect- collection, p. 18). To be sure there are signific-
ive). Although most of my examples are percep- ant differences between the meaning of “per-
tual illustrations, I suggest that there is a close spective” in the context of perceptual experi-
correspondence between the processes involved ence, such as reversible images, and conceptual
in perspective taking in perceptual and concep- ideas, such as the difference between first- and
tual domains, and that an appreciation of third-person approaches to the study of con-
meta-perspectives in the perceptual domain sciousness. However, I argue that there are
may help the formulation of meta-perspectives some deep parallels between the meanings of
in the conceptual domain. In the spirit of this “perspective” in these two contexts that make
argument I suggest that the long-standing de- the analogy a useful one. I’ll begin by consider-
bate between approaches that emphasize the ing the broader issue of the parallels between
subjective first-person perspective of experience perceptual and conceptual perspectives and
and those that emphasize the objective then the more specific question of how these
third-person perspective of science, may be akin parallels might usefully apply to the conceptual
to debating which direction the dancer is rotat- distinction between first- and third-person per-
ing in the spinning dancer illusion (see figure 6 spectives.
in Schooler this collection). In both cases, it Critically, in both perceptual and concep-
simply depends on your perspective. Taken tual contexts “perspective” is defined by a
frame-of-reference that determines how the con-
1 The paper begins with a very brief introduction that is numbered
section 1. As a result the first major section of the paper is
stituent elements are understood and related to
numbered section 2. one another, as well as which elements are
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taken as central and which as more peripheral. frame-of-reference. If one considers conscious-
In perceptual contexts, the frame-of-reference is ness from a first-person perspective, one is un-
defined in terms of the assignment of spatial ar- derstanding it in relationship to one’s own per-
rangements; i.e., what is to the left and the sonal experience, taking subjectivity as the fore-
right, what is in the foreground and background ground and objective reality as the background.
etc. In conceptual contexts, the frame-of-refer- One is considering consciousness through one’s
ence is defined in terms of the assignment of own experience, and grounding assumptions on
conceptual arrangements; i.e.; which elements what is real and important on the basis of that
are conceptually closer or further apart, which personal subjective vantage. In contrast, a
are more essential and which more peripheral. third-person perspective takes the objective
In both cases, frame-of-reference can have pro- world as the frame-of-reference. Personal experi-
found effects as evidenced by the reversible im- ences that cannot be independently verified are
age research in perception (Chambers & Reis- therefore suspect and inferences must be drawn,
berg 1992) and research on cognitive framing as they are in all of science, on the basis of
(Tversky & Kahneman 1981) in cognition. A people’s measurable behaviors and physiological
further striking parallel between perceptual and responses. In my view, it is no accident that
conceptual perspectives is that they both be- these two approaches to thinking about con-
come easily entrenched. When one watches the sciousness have historically been described in
spinning dancer (figure 6) it is very difficult to terms of differences in perspective as they
recognize that at any time she can be seen as self-evidently entail thinking about conscious-
facing in one of two different directions. In a ness from distinctly different frames-of-refer-
very similar way, when one works on a concep- ence.
tual problem it is very easy to interpret it in a In short, I maintain that the notion of dis-
particular way that creates a “mental set” that tinct conflicting perspectives akin to those asso-
can impede its solution. There is even a com- ciated with perceptual reversible images aptly
mon cognitive ability (Schooler & Melcher 1995; applies to many conceptual distinctions, but es-
see also, Wiseman et al. 2011) for overcoming pecially apply when it comes to characterizing
the mental sets associated with solving concep- the objective/subjective divide. The corollary of
tual problems (e.g., insight problems) and per- this claim is the possibility that, like the altern-
ceptual problems (e.g., recognizing out-of-focus ative perspectives of reversible images, the ob-
pictures). In short, perceptual reversible images jective/subjective divide may be usefully in-
elegantly illustrate a fundamental aspect of not formed by recognizing that both perspectives
just perception but of human cognition more represent equally meaningful interpretations
generally; namely, that we routinely consider that cannot be reduced to one another, but may
things (be they objects or ideas) within the con- be better understood from a meta-perspective
text of a particular frame-of-reference (be that that acknowledges the larger context in which
frame perceptual or conceptual), and we can they are both embedded.
have a very hard time reconsidering those In my view, the importance of the distinct
things from a different perspective. perspectives that emerge from alternative
Even if it is appropriate to draw a parallel frames-of-reference simply cannot be overstated.
between the meaning of “perspective” in percep- In addition to its self-evident effects in the con-
tual and conceptual contexts, it does not neces- text of perception, frames-of-reference are a
sarily follow that the analogy can be extended powerful determinant of the actions that people
to the particular conceptual problem of distin- take in important real-life situations. For ex-
guishing between the first- and third-person ample, doctors’ prescriptions of how to treat an
perspective approaches. But I maintain that it epidemic is profoundly influenced by whether
is in fact particularly applicable in this context. the treatment is framed in terms of lives saved
The essence of the distinction between first- and or lives lost even when it corresponds to pre-
third-person perspectives has to do with one’s cisely the same scenario (Tversky & Kahneman
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1981). In physics, fundamental breakthroughs merit regardless of whether one ascribes to any
have repeatedly taken place as a function of of the ontological speculations I suggest in the
changes in scientists’ frame-of-reference. For ex- third section of my paper. Independent of the
ample, Newton’s laws of gravity emerged when conclusions that one derives, there seems to be
he realized that the same frame-of-reference great value in systematically considering sub-
that applies to forces on the ground equally ap- jective experience from the vantage of a
plies to the motion of the heavens (Westfall third-person perspective, and objective reality
1980). Einstein’s special theory of relativity was from the vantage of a first-person perspective,
fostered by his replacement of the notion of an which are the goals of section 2 and section 3
absolute frame-of-reference with a respectively.
frame-of-reference defined relative to the ob-
server (2001) . Given the significance of per- 3 Reflections on section 3: Gaining a
spective and frame-of-reference in other con- third-person perspective on people’s
texts it stands to reason that something so sali- first-person experience
ent as whether one is thinking about conscious-
ness from their own perspective or from the ob- In the second section of my paper I review re-
jective perspective of science should profoundly search that attempts to inform our understand-
impact the questions that they ask and the an- ing of the first-person experience using the
swers that they reach. third-person perspective of science. This ap-
In the case of reversible images, the best proach takes at its starting point a theoretical
way to understand how they can correspond to distinction between experiential consciousness
two so entirely distinct yet self-consistent rep- (corresponding to the contents of on-going ex-
resentations is to practice alternating between periences) and meta-consciousness (or
vantages. Although at first it is very difficult to meta-awareness—the terms are used inter-
see how the spinning dancer alternatively ro- changeably) corresponding to the explicit
tates in two different directions, with practice re-representation of the contents of experiential
one comes to appreciate the two vantages that consciousness. These levels are illustrated by
the image affords, and thus to understand why the case of mind-wandering while reading. In
her direction changes. The primary goal of my this context, experiential consciousness corres-
paper is to explore the hypothesis that a deeper ponds to the content of the mind-wandering
understanding of the subjective/objective divide episode and meta-awareness is initially absent
can emerge in a similar fashion. By thoroughly but suddenly emerges with the realization that
considering each vantage from the perspective one was mind-wandering rather than attending
of the other, it is hoped that a meta-perspective to the text.
will emerge that recognizes the logical consist- An important implication of the distinc-
ency of each, while not attempting to reduce tion between experiential consciousness and
either one to the other. meta-consciousness is that people can have ex-
Gottschling suggests that my emphasis on periences (e.g., mind-wandering) that they
“meta-perspective” is an unnecessary strategic either fail to notice explicitly (temporal dissoci-
move that ultimately detracts from the primary ations) or notice but manage to mischaracterize
value of my paper. Part of her difficulty with (translation dissociations). I review a program
the meta-perspective emphasis may arise from of research that has fleshed out this distinction
my inadequately situating the second section of in various contexts, with a particular focus on
my paper in the context of this construct, and mind-wandering. Using assorted methodologies
the seeming equation of meta-perspective with including the combination of experience
non-reductionism in the third section. However, sampling measures, self-catching, and behavi-
the value of considering alternative perspectives oral measures, we find evidence that people
in overcoming the limitations that can emerge routinely fail to notice episodes of mind-wander-
when one solely considers a single vantage has
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ing but are nevertheless accurate at reporting it (Rosenthal 1986), I have no problem with Gott-
when they are directly queried.2 schling’s attempted revision to my notion of ex-
Gottschling devotes the bulk of her re- periential consciousness, namely that it repres-
marks to discussing efforts to develop a ents a third-order level of consciousness. Indeed
third-person science of first-person experience. I have speculated about this possibility in the
In general, she is sympathetic to the approach. past (see Schooler et al. 2015). I am therefore
However, she raises a variety of concerns and entirely comfortable with Gottschling’s sugges-
makes a number of useful suggestions. As noted, tion that “meta-awareness would include a
I will not endeavor to respond to all of her con- third-order state, in his terminology a re-re-rep-
cerns; however, there are several that stand out, resentation whereas the experience of
and so I will consider them in turn. mind-wandering would involve only a
Gottschling’s primary reservation about second-order state, a re-representation” (this
the distinction between experiential conscious- collection, p. 16). Just so long as the
ness and meta-awareness is that she is not per- second-order cognition is not experienced as a
suaded by my characterization of experiential reflection about experience, I have no problems
consciousness. Essentially she does not see how with whatever non-conscious higher-order cogni-
it is possible to “distinguish conscious processes tions may be required to produce it.
which are not accessed from unconscious activ- Although Gottschling’s concerns with the
ity” (Gottschling this collection, p. 11). Al- notion of experiential consciousness seem to be
though it is true that there are some situations largely a product of her reading into my distinc-
where it may be difficult to distinguish experi- tion more than was intended, her suggestion that
enced but not meta-aware from unconscious it may be helpful to consider more fine-grained
processes (as in the case of potentially uncon- levels of meta-awareness is a worthwhile idea that
scious emotions, see Schooler et al. 2015), often merits development. As Gottschling observes,
this distinction is quite straightforward. For ex- there is a need for “an improved taxonomy of dif-
ample, when people are surprised to suddenly ferent kinds of reflection and ‘taking stock’ ...
realize that they are mind-wandering instead of awareness itself might come in degrees and at dif-
paying attention to what they reading. In this ferently levels of representation” (this collection,
case, it is evident that they were experiencing p 20). Indeed, one feature that has been notably
the contents of the mind-wandering as they are absent from my discussion of meta-consciousness
typically able to report them. It is simply that (here and elsewhere) is consideration of the pos-
they had not engaged in the reflective process of sibility of monitoring processes that may take
noting that they were mind-wandering instead place at the experiential level, without explicit
of reading. In short, Gottschling is unpersuaded re-representation at the meta-level For example,
by a mental state--“conscious processes which sometimes when people are on-task they may ex-
are not accessed”--that I never actually postu- perience a palpable sense of sustained attention
lated. Essentially, she layered onto the con- without having explicitly to note to themselves
struct the notion that experiential consciousness that they are on-task. Similarly, when mind-wan-
is not accessed, and then criticized it for this dering, people sometimes report that they knew
reason. they were mind-wandering. This awareness, how-
In fact, although I am not committed to ever, may not necessarily be associated with an
the notion that non-conscious higher order explicit acknowledgment of that fact. Rather they
thoughts underpin all conscious thoughts maintain a continuous unstated awareness that
they are off-task. In short, a further distinction
2 A very recent paper (Seli et al. in press) suggests some variablity in may be needed between a non-propositional “feel-
the accuracy of mind-wandering reports as assessed by the corres-
pondence of such reports to behavioral indices of lapses. Neverthe- ing of awareness” that one is doing something
less, people appear to have some access to when their reports are (“experiential monitoring”) and the verbal/ pro-
likely to be more vs less accurate as evidenced by a significant cor-
relation between confidence in self-reports and correspondence to the
positional state of meta-awareness that may occur
behavioral indices of mind-wandering. when people intermittently take stock of their
www.open-mind.net
mental state, as when one suddenly thinks to cussed in other locations (e.g., Schooler et al.
themselves, “Darn! I was mind-wandering again!” 2015). While she points out a number of other
The notion that sometimes people expli- modest blemishes that I will not address, ulti-
citly re-represent their state to themselves mately the approach for gaining a third-person
(meta-awareness) whereas other times they perspective of first-person experience that I ar-
simply “just know” they are in that state (ex- ticulated in section 2 of my paper appears logic-
periential monitoring) would also be consistent ally intact.
with alternative mindfulness practices
(Thompson 2014). For instance, open-monitor- 4 Reflections on section 4: Toward a
ing involves monitoring the content of experi- meta-perspective for considering the
ence from moment-to-moment without deliber- meta-physics of first- versus third-
ately attending to any particular object (Lutz person perspective
et al. 2008). Open-monitoring cultivates an as-
pect of mindfulness described as “observing”, Gottschling seems less optimistic about the con-
measured with items such as “When I walk, I tribution of the third section of my paper. She
deliberately notice the sensation of my body dismisses speculations I derive from considering
moving” (Baer et al. 2006). This seems akin to third-person science from the vantage of
what I am referring to as experiential monitor- first-person experience, as a “largely unneces-
ing. A somewhat different practice involves la- sary strategic move” (Gottschling this collec-
beling one’s experiences as they occur with tion, p. 1) that “does not seem to fit with the
short tags like “thinking,” “feeling,” or “sensa- rest of the project” (p. 22). I concur with Gott-
tion.” This cultivates an aspect of mindfulness schling that first person experience can be as-
called “describing”, measured with items such sessed from the third person perspective of sci-
as: “My natural tendency is to put my experience without also considering objective science
ences into words.” This process of re-represent- from a first-person perspective. In the past I
ing experience in words seems akin to have routinely considered what science has to
meta-awareness. say about first-person experience without con-
The distinction between experiential mon- sidering the other side of the coin (e.g., Schooler
itoring and meta-awareness might also speak to 2002; Schooler et al. 2011; Schooler et al. 2015).
another of Gottschling’s concerns, namely the Clearly the two sides of the discussion are not
question of whether meta-awareness is necessar- logically co-dependent on one another.
ily all-or-none (as I intimated) or more continu- I acknowledge that the final section of the
ous (as she proposes). Although research would paper was not necessary for shoring up any of my
be required to tease out this conjecture, it seem arguments in the second section. Nevertheless I
quite plausible to me that experiential monitor- maintain that it adds an important balance to
ing might take place at a continuous level with the discussion by illustrating the potential value
individuals ranging from either dimly to expli- of considering both first- and third-person ap-
citly aware of what they are doing. In contrast, proaches from the vantage of the alternative per-
a more discrete process may occur when indi- spective. In this concluding section of my paper, I
viduals suddenly realize that they are engaging change my frame-of-reference from a third- to a
in a mental state (e.g., mind-wandering) that first-person perspective, and consider the current
they had not previously noticed. assumptions of science from this vantage. I
Several other concerns that Gottschling identify three aspects of existence that I argue are
raises about my paper, including the possibility axiomatic from a first-person perspective, includ-
of unconscious emotions and how the distinc- ing: the existence of experience, the flow of time,
tion between experiential consciousness and and the fact that the present is qualitatively dif-
meta-awareness relates to other distinctions of ferent from the past or the future. I argue that all
consciousness (including those of Dehaene et al. three of these essential elements are either unex-
2006; Block 1995 and Rosenthal 1986) are dis- plained by science (i.e., experience) or outright
www.open-mind.net
discounted as an illusion of consciousness (i.e., the ological level but at an ontological level” (Gott-
flow of time, the privileged present). I contend schling this collection, p. 23).
that while many aspects of experience could be il- Gottschling’s reaction to the third section of
lusory, it is hard (indeed impossible for me) to my paper was not unexpected. As I noted in the
conceive of how experience, the flow of time, or close of my paper, “my arguments on this point
the privileged nature of the present could be will likely remain wholly unpersuasive to those
among them. On these grounds, I suggest that who cannot conceive of subjective experience as
there may be something missing from the current offering an epistemological authority that rivals
account of objective science and speculate that an science.” I recognize that it will be an uphill
additional subjective dimension of time might fit battle to persuade philosophers and scientists
the bill. I argue that a subjective dimension of steeped in the supremacy of the third-person per-
time would provide: 1) a realm of reality for ex- spective to consider that conclusions drawn from
perience to reside, 2) the additional degree of free- our own experience could possibly carry ramifica-
dom necessary to enable the flow of time in phys- tions comparable to conventional objective sci-
ics’ current “block universe”, and 3) a way to ence. But at the end of the day all of the science
conceptualize the present. I readily acknowledge that we believe we know is necessarily delivered
that such an account is highly speculative, but I to us through our subjective experience. While
offer it as an example of the type of meta-per- what we know about objective reality is necessar-
spective that I think could emerge by attempting ily dependent on experience, the same is not the
to reconcile the axioms required for both object- case for experience. Objective reality could con-
ive and subjective frames-of-reference. ceivably be an illusion. This could all be a dream
Gottschling’s assessment of my arguments or we could be the proverbial brain in a vat. But
in this section are largely a rehash of standard the experience of objective reality is unquestion-
critiques of the “explanatory gap” (Levine 1983) able, as even an illusory experience is still an ex-
and the hard problem of consciousness (Chalmers perience. Given that the existence of objective
1996). The standard refrain is that the inability reality is ultimately on less certain ground than
of science to account for subjectivity corresponds the existence of experience, it is far from obvious
to an epistemological gap not an ontological one. why the third-person frame-of-reference holds its
The fact that we cannot explain something, and current unchallenged dominion.
perhaps never will be able to, does not require us
to assume a different ontological foundation for 5 Conclusion
reality. I concede that this kind of mysterian
(McGinn 1989) account of the explanatory gap, I suspect that my big-picture approach to reply-
although profoundly unsatisfying, is difficult to ing to Gottschling’s very detailed analysis may be
dispute. However, she largely ignores the more unsatisfying to some (Gottschling included) who
novel aspects of my arguments. Namely, she dis- might have expected point-by-point replies to
regards my claim that not only is the current each of her concerns. However, I hope that my
physicalist account unable to explain conscious- stepping-back tactic enabled me to address the
ness, it outright rejects two additional subject- major concerns that were raised. At the outset I
ively self-evident aspects of reality. It rejects the noted the close parallels between the factors that
flow of time and the privileged present. While she contribute to conceptual and perceptual pro-
acknowledges in a footnote that she finds this as- cesses. In addition to the value of perspective
pect of the paper “inspiring,” it does not impact shifting, it might also be noted that stepping-back
her overall dismissal of the need for a meta-per- is another strategy that is useful in both concep-
spective. As she puts it, “what the proposed tual and perceptual domains. For example, it is
meta-perspective might be and how it is helpful easier to decipher a highly pixelated photo from a
despite acknowledging our common sense intu- distance than up close. Similarly, when people
ition eludes my understanding not at an epistem- confront conceptual insight problems from a more
distant perspective (e.g., imagining themselves a
www.open-mind.net
year from now) they are often better able reach a Windt (Eds.) Open MIND. Frankfurt a. M., GER:
solution (Förster et al. 2004). Conceptual step- MIND Group.
ping back can enable one to distinguish the meta- Levine, J. (1983). Materialism and qualia: The explanat-
phorical “forest from the trees.” It remains un- ory gap. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 64, 354-361.
clear whether there could be a genuine meta-per- Lutz, A., Slagter, H. A., Dunne, J. D. & Davidson, R. J.
spective that enables us to accommodate the as- (2008). Attention regulation and monitoring in medita-
sumptions of both the first- and third- person tion. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 12 (4), 163-169.
perspectives. But if such a perspective does exist, 10.1016/j.tics.2008.01.005
it seems likely that finding it will require stepping McGinn, C. (1989). Can we solve the mind-body prob-
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Acknowledgements Philosophical Studies, 49 (3), 329-359.
10.1007/ BF00355521
I thank Ashley Brumett and Tam Hunt for Schooler, J. W. (2002). Re-representing consciousness:
comments on an earlier version of this paper. Dissociations between experience and meta-conscious-
The writing of this reply was supported by a ness. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 6 (8), 339-344.
grant from the Institute of Educational Science 10.1016/S1364-6613(02)01949-6
grant R305A110277. The content of this reply (2015). Bridging the Objective/Subjective Divide.
does not necessarily reflect the position or In T. Metzinger & J. M. Windt (Eds.) Open MIND.
policy of the US government, and no official en- Frankfurt a. M., GER: MIND Group.
dorsement should be inferred. Schooler, J. W., Smallwood, J., Christoff, K., Handy, T.
C., Reichle, E. D. & Sayette, M. A. (2011).
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Bridging the Objective/Subjective Divide Towards a Meta-Perspective of

Article · January 2015

Meta awareness View project

Psychophysiology of mind-wandering View project

The user has requested enhancement of the downloaded file.

When presented with an image of a duck/rab-

Figure 3: The Necker cube is a reversible image that,

There are several notable aspects of all the

provides a meta-perspective, whereby we appre- the three-dimensional perception to arise from

some researchers (notably the Gestalt psycholo-

Figure 5: The young girl-old woman illusion (otherwise

The inception of psychology was marked

Figure 7: “Magic Eye” stereograms can reveal a holo-

A number of studies have effectively used

3.3.3 Summary of mind-wandering, as this mental state may

cesses to information of a stimulus-independent Of course, just because episodes of mind-

duced people’s tendency to spontaneously no- ports of mind-wandering (following experience

Jackson introduces the canonical example of be actually enjoying a genuine experiential

experience suggests characteristics of reality if we grant subjective experience an ontological

matic shattering of initially intact colored bottles.

Figure 16: The observer depicted in the standard block uni-

to support this view: recent findings suggest

References Bergson, H. (1912). Matter and memory (original work

Wallace, A. (2000). The taboo of subjectivity: Toward a

will be my focus: the relationship between or incomplete. (Schooler this collection, p.

Gottschling, V. (2015). Bridging the Gap - A Commentary on Jonathan Schooler.

Second, to discuss of how we should evaluate In general, if we have a conscious state

Gottschling, V. (2015). Bridging the Gap - A Commentary on Jonathan Schooler.

Gottschling, V. (2015). Bridging the Gap - A Commentary on Jonathan Schooler.

Gottschling, V. (2015). Bridging the Gap - A Commentary on Jonathan Schooler.

Gottschling, V. (2015). Bridging the Gap - A Commentary on Jonathan Schooler.

Gottschling, V. (2015). Bridging the Gap - A Commentary on Jonathan Schooler.

Gottschling, V. (2015). Bridging the Gap - A Commentary on Jonathan Schooler.

Gottschling, V. (2015). Bridging the Gap - A Commentary on Jonathan Schooler.

Gottschling, V. (2015). Bridging the Gap - A Commentary on Jonathan Schooler.

state and its conscious counterpart. And third, References

Gottschling, V. (2015). Bridging the Gap - A Commentary on Jonathan Schooler.

Gottschling, V. (2015). Bridging the Gap - A Commentary on Jonathan Schooler.

(2005). Consciousness and mind. Oxford, UK: Ox- 28 (2), 275-305.

Gottschling, V. (2015). Bridging the Gap - A Commentary on Jonathan Schooler.

Schooler, J. (2015). Stepping Back and Adding Perspective - Reply to Gottschling.

Westfall, R. S. (1980). Never at rest: A biography of

Schooler, J. (2015). Stepping Back and Adding Perspective - Reply to Gottschling.

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