Republic of the Philippines

NATIONAL CAPITAL REGION

Regional Trial Court
Branch 197
Las Pinas City

Sps. Jose and Margarita Romero Civil Case No. ________

Plaintiff, For: Injunction with prayer
For Writ of Preliminary In-
Junction and/or Mandatory
Injunction and Temporary
-versus- Restraining Order

Department of Public Works and

Highways (DPWH), Office of the
District Engineer, Las Pinas-Muntinlupa
District Engineering Office,
Represented by Elpidio Y. Trinidad,
OIC-District Engineer, and Housing
And Estate Development Board
(HED-BOARD) represented by
Walsur S. Espinosa, Board Sec.,
Officer in charge, EMDO/UPAO
Anti-Squatting and Illegal Structure
Task Force
Defendants.
X-------------------------------------------------/

OMNIBUS MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION AND 2ND

MOTION FOR INHIBITION

COMES NOW, plaintiff by counsel, states:

1. The constitutional guarantee of due process dictates that cases

should be tried and decided by no less than an impartial tribunal. As in
the case of Mateo, Jr. vs. Villaruz (50 SCRA 18, 1973), the Supreme
Court Stated that:
 “It is now beyond dispute that due process cannot be satisfied in
the absence of that degree of objectivity on the part of a judge
sufficient to reassure litigants of his being fair and being just.
Thereby there is the legitimate expectation that the decision or order
arrived at would be the application of the law of the fact as found by a
judge who does not play favorites. For him, the parties stand on equal
footing.”

2. Indeed, justice and due process dictates that a judge must not
only be impartial but must also appear and be perceived to be impartial.
This appearance of impartiality runs at the core of the public’s
perception of the effectivity and credibility of our justice system to ferret
the truth.

3. Thus, in the case of Tan vs. Gallardo (73 SCRA 306, 1976), the
Supreme Court held:

“It is undisputed that the sole purpose of courts of justice is to

enforce the law uniformly and impartially without regard to persons or
their circumstances or the opinions of men. A judge, according to
Justice Castro, now Chief Justice of this Court, should strive to be at all
times wholly free, disinterested, impartial and independent.
Elementary due process requires a hearing before an impartial and
disinterested tribunal. A judge has both the duty of rendering a just
decision and the duty nof doing it in a manner completely free from
suspicion as to its fairness and as to his integrity. Thus, it has always
been stressed that judges should not only be impartial but also appear
impartial. For impartiality is not a technical conception. It is a state of
mind and consequently, the appearance of impartiality is an essential
manifestation of its reality. It must be obvious, therefore, that while
judges profess proficiency in law and order that they can competently
construe and enforce the law, it is more important that they should act
and behave in such a manner that the parties before them should have
confidence in their impartiality.

4. Likewise, the Supreme Court, in the case of Borromeo-Herrera

vs. Borromeo, (152 SCRA 171, 1987), stated that:

“the judge must maintain and preserve the trust and faith of the
parties’ litigants. He must hold himself above reproach and suspicion.
At the first sign of lack of faith and trust to his actions, whether
well-grounded or not, the judge has no other alternative but to
inhibit himself from the case. A judge may not be legally prohibited
from sitting in a litigation, but when circumstances appear that will
induce doubt to his honest actuations and probity in favor of either party,
or incite such state of mind, he should conduct a careful self-
examination. He should exercise his discretion in a way that people’s
faith in the court of justice is not impaired. The better course for a
judge under the circumstances is to disqualify himself. That way, he
avoids being misunderstood, his reputation for probity and objectivity is
preserved. What is more important, the ideal of impartial administration
of justice is lived up to.”

5. In the landmark case of Estrada vs. Desierto (353 SCRA 452,

2001), Supreme Court Justice Artemio Panganiban, in a separate
opinion, laid down the rules regarding disqualification, inhibition and
recusal of judges to sit in a case. There, Justice Panganiban cited Rule
3.12 of the Code of Judicial Responsibility which states that:

“Rule 3.12. a judge should take no part in a proceeding where the

judges impartiality might reasonably be questioned. These cases include
proceedings where:

*The judge has personal bias or prejudice concerning a party, or

personal knowledge of disputed evidentiary facts concerning the
proceeding;

*The judge served as the executor, administrator, guardian, trustee

or lawyer in the case or matters in controversy, or a former associate of a
judge served as counsel during their association, or the judge or lawyer
served as a material witness therein;

*The judge ruling in the lower court is the subject of review;

*The judge is related by consanguinity or affinity to a party litigant

within the sixth degree or to counsel within the fourth degree;

*The judge knows that the judge’s spouse or child has a financial
interest, as heir, legatee, creditor, fiduciary, or otherwise, in the subject
matter in controversy or in a party to the proceeding, or any other
interest that could be substantially affected by the outcome of the
proceeding,”

6. In the said case, through Justice Panganiban, ruled the above

cited rule is MANDATORY, thus:
 “a closer look at the construction of the afore quoted provisions
reveals their mandatory or compulsory nature. They clearly mandate that
a judge should take no part of a proceeding, in which any of the
circumstances enumerated therein is present. Indeed, the court explicitly
stated in Garcia vs. Dela Pena the first paragraph of section 1, Rule 137
of the Rules of Court, was compulsory.”

7. In the very same case, the Supreme Court also laid down the
rationale behind the said rule in this wise:

“the rule on compulsory disqualification of a judge to hear a case

where, as in the instant case, the respondent judge is related to either
party within the sixth degree of consanguinity or affinity rest on the
salutary principle that no judge should preside in a case in which he is
not wholly free, disinterested, impartial and independent. A judge has
both the duty of rendering a just decision and the duty of doing it in a
manner completely free from suspicion as to its fairness and as to his
integrity. The law conclusively, presumes that a judge cannot objectively
and impartially sit in such a case and, for that reason, prohibits him and
strikes at his authority to hear and decide it, in the absence of a written
consent of all parties concerned. The purpose is to preserve the people’s
faith and confidence in the courts of justice.”

“the rationale for the rule on the compulsory disqualification of a

judge or judicial officer is predicated on a long standing precept that no
judge should preside in a case ikn which he or she is not wholly
independent, disinterested or impartial. Judges should not handle cases
in which they might be perceived, rightly or wrongly, to be susceptible
to bias and partiality. The rule is aimed at preserving at all times the
people’s faith and confidence in our courts, which are essential in the
effective administration of justice.”

8. In the present case, plaintiff herein perceived that this presiding

judge has appeared to show prejudice, if not hostility, to the claims and
interest of plaintiff, the spouses Romero, and partiality towards the
respondents.

9. The apparent principled stand of the Honorable Presiding judge

in handling this case and the delayed if not ignored prayer for temporary
restraining order and thus continued in a full blown trial, among others,
demonstrates that which herein plaintiff’s doubts with the Honorable
judge, thus this motion for his inhibition to hear this case.
 10. With all due respect and with highest humility, given the
foregoing circumstance, plaintiff can no longer exercise the lingering
belief that the Honorable Presiding Judge has lost the ability to decide
the pending incidents with the cold neutrality of an impartial tribunal.
Rightly or wrongly, plaintiff anticipate that its claims and interest will
not be resolved consistent with existing facts.

11. This motion is being filed in good faith and for the reasons
herein stated. It is not intended to delay the proceedings nor impair the
substantive rights of the other parties herein.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed that

the Honorable Presiding Judge Ismael Duldulao immediately recuse and
inhibit himself from trying and participating in the instant proceedings
and defer action on the pending incidents until the same has been raffled
to another sala of the Honorable Court.

Other reliefs, just and equitable under the premises, are likewise
prayed for.

Respectfully submitted.

Quezon City for Las Pinas City, Philippines, October 10, 2019.

DIEGO M. PALOMARES, JR.

Counsel for the Plaintiffs
26C Traballo Bldg., Justice
Lourdes Paredes San Diego Ave.,
Cubao, Quezon City
PTR NO. 084190 07-01-19
IBP NO. 8483162 07-02-19
ROLL NO 29835
MCLE NO. V-0020852 04-25-16
 EXPLANATION

Copy Furnished to the personalities mentioned below are served through

registered mail and not through personal service due to distance and lack of office
personnel.

OFFICE OF THE SOLICITOR GENERAL

134 Amorsolo street, Legaspi Village,
Makati City

WALSUR S. ESPINOSA
Board Secretary
Housing and Estate Development Board
Office of the Secretriat (Urban Poor Affairs Office)
Administrative Building, Las Pinas City Hall Complex
Pamplona Tres, Las Pinas City

THE CLERK OF COURT

Regional Trial Court
Branch 197
Las Pinas City

Please submit motion for inhibition to the Honorable Court for its
consideration and approval sans appearance and arguments.

DIEGO M. PALOMARES, JR.