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    127 views19 pages

    Mackie Subjectivity of Values

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    owen reinhart

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    © All Rights Reserved
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    ‘Washington University ERes Cover Sheet Aniol Tite-_The SUBSET TY of VALUES Aube sees Meee eee ‘Source Title: JET NCS | INVENDNE RIGHT AND Wiel Paes S49 Vol Issue: Date ‘Warning Concerning Copyright Restrictions ‘The copyright lew ofthe United Stats (Title 17. United States Code) ‘gover the reproduction and distribution of copyrighted materia ‘Under certain condition specified in the law, Hibrares and archives are suthorized to reproduce materials, One ofthese conditions is that the reproduction not be “used for any purpose other than private study, scholarship, or research." Any person who copies or re-istributes this ‘material in ny way inconsistent with Tite 17 and is "fair use" provisions may be liable or copyright infringement. Chapter} The Subjectivity of Values 1, Moral scepticism ‘There are no objective valves, Tis bald tatement of the ‘hens of thi chapter, bat Before arBug for tT shall try (0 clarify and restrict i'n ways tat may meet some objections fd prevent some misunderstanding "The aaterneat of ths the sabe to provoke one of three ‘ery diferent resetios, Some will ink not merely false bat Dericious they wile ita a heat to moralty and to every. {hing else Watt worthwhile, and dey wil fd the presenting of ‘ach athe in what gurgrts to be book on ets ara ‘diel of even outagecan, Others wil regard tar vid ‘eat, almost too obvious to be worth mentioning and ctaaly {oo pain tobe worth much argument. Others again wil ety hat [tt meaningless or empty that no False is falsed by the ‘oesion wheter vals are or 6 nt part ofthe tbe ofthe ‘word. Put, precisely because ere can be these three diferent ‘ectons much more need o Desi “The aim that values are not objective, are not pat of the tateic ofthe wei is meast Ws nce nat anly marl good. ten, wbich might be mont aturally equated with moral Yale, but ao other things that could be more losely called moral ‘ales or dsvalues rightness and wroagnes ty. obligation, tn action’ being rotten aod contemptible, and #0 08.1 also include non moral values, notably aesthetic ene, beauty apd ‘rious Kinds of artic merit. T shall not discuss these ex pcily. but clearly much the same considerations apply to eshetic and to moral value, and there would be at eat some {nial implausibity a a view that gave the ove & Siereat ‘Hats from the other ‘Since ite with mort sales that Tam primarily concerned, the view Lam adopting may be called moral sceptics, But i ares litly to be misunderstood moral sept’ might ten be ured as 4 name for either of two fist order ves, fx perhap for anincerentmistre of te te. A mea see tic might be the sort of person who sys ‘All this talk of ‘morality stipe: who rejects morality and wil ake a0 noice of it Such a person my be telly eeietng all roral jae: ‘ment; heir more ikl to be aking moral adpements of Bis ‘Own, expreing 4 ponitive mrelcondenmaton of al that c00- ‘entonlly pases for morality, or he may be confusing these {80 logically incompotibe views and eying tat be teeta morality, while he iso fact rejecting only particular morlity {hat scent the society in which he as grown up. But Lm Bot at presen concerned th the merits or fant of soch 2 potton. Thee are fist order moral view, postive of nee {he person who adopt either of them is Shing cetan prac. tial normative, sand By contat what Tam dicosig second ore view, 2 vew about the natu of mal ea and {he nature of moral valuing, about where and how they Bint the worl. These fit and second onde views are not merely iinet uk completely dependents one could be sop ‘fder moral seep without beings first order one, or again te ‘other way round, A man could hold etong mora views, and Indeed ones whose content wos thoroughly convention, wile living at they were smpyatutodes nd Pics With ‘epardto conduct Wat he and other people eld. Convery. & ‘ian coud reject all estaished morality while believing ito be ‘objective uth batt wae or corte With another ort of misunderstanding mora seeps ‘would seem not 50 much peniciows ar abwurd. How could nyone deny that there isa dference between a ind action ad 4 cruel one, oe that a covard an 2 raee than bebave sierently in the face of danger? Ofcourse, thi undeniable but ice no othe point. The kinds of behaviour to which mora “ats anal dialues are sseribed ae indeed part of the fun {ure ofthe world, ond soare thenatural deserve, Sere ‘between thems but not. perhaps, her dferences in vale 1 {hurd fact hat eae scons die from Kind ons and hetce that we ean learn, ae fact we all do, isting hem ty ‘wall in practice nd to ue the Words ‘ere apd Kind” with ‘ail clear descriptive meanings but i it an equally hard fact thal actions wich ze eosin Sch a dsritve sane tet Be condemned? The present sue i with sear tothe object) Speifcally of valve, not with gard to the objectivity of those ‘atural, Gots), diderences on the basis of whlch dieting ‘alu are assigned, 2. Subjectivism ‘Another name often used, a5 an alternative to moral sept: ‘anf the view [am dscssingiebjectvs. But this foo tas more than one meaning. Moral sbjectivm 60 could Bea first onder, normative, view, namely tat everyne really Ought {0 do. whatever he thinks Be shuld. This plainly is Gs ‘ematie) st order view, on examiation it soon cass to be plausible, bt that Beside te pont, fr iis quite independent [tthe second order these at present under consideration, What ‘emoceconfuring I that diferent second ort views compete {or the name sujet, Several of tex are Socrng abo the meaning of moral tens and moral satements What it ‘often called moral subjective iy the doctrine tht, for ‘tample, "This acon bight mea" approve of thir ation, fe more generally that moral judgements are equivalent ‘Fepots of the speaker's wa elingsoratitudes. But the vew I fm eae dlscustng i to be distinguished in owo vital respecte from any such doctrine atti: Fst, what Ye allel soca septic isa negative doctrine, nots positive one: says what there isn, not what there i Tt aaj that there do not exist nes of reais of ctl ind, objective valu oF re uirements, which many people have believed to exit. OF ‘ourse the moral septic aot leave tat hav I i psition t ‘to be atl plauile, be aust give some acount of how other people have fallen into what be regards a8 an ertor, and thir Account will have to ich some postive suggeone about ‘how values fi tobe obctive about what has been mistaken for, or ed to fae Belts about, objetive values But i vil be 3 development of his theory, not core: it core the Sesntion. Secondly what [have called moral septic f= fntological des, nt Tinie ot concept! oe, I is 20h like the other dovtine often called moral subjestivim, a view thout the mesnigs of moral statements. Ags, no dou ‘sto beat al paul, it will have to give some sccoun of their ‘meanings, an! shall say something abot thi in Section 7 of this chapter and agnn in Chapters 2,3, and 4. But hs too Wil ‘bea development ofthe theory, ati cor, ‘str that howe who have accepted the mora subectivism ‘which the doctrine that moral judgements are equivalent 19 report of the speakers own feelings or atitudes have usualy presupposed what Le calling moral scepism. Ii beaue {hey have assured that there ae no objective values that they ‘nave looked elsewhere for an analyst of tat moral statement ‘might mean and have settled upon subjective report Indeed. i {our moral statements were sich subjective reports, i wld follow that atleast vo far at we ae sare, there are no ob == tive moral values If we were awe of ther, we Would By something about them In this srs this sort ‘of subject tls moral scepticism. But the converse entalment doesnot ‘old. The denial that there are objective values doesnot commit ‘ne to any particular view about what mora statements mean, and certanly otto the view thal they are equivalent to rab ‘ctv reports No doubt f moral values are not obetive they ‘ein sme very broad sese subjective and for this reason T (Would accep ‘moral subectivim” at an alerative natn 1o “mora scepticism Bat subectivsm inthis road sense mit be istinguisted fom the specie doctrine about meaning referred to above. Nether name i altogether aisfactory: we simgly ‘ve to guard aginst the (ifeten) misinterpret which each may suggest. " | 3. The multiplicity of second order questions “The distinctions drawn in the last two sections rst nt only 0a the welltnown and severly recognized diference betwee fit and second order questions, but also on the more com ‘overs lim that thete ate several kings of second de? ‘moral question. ‘Those most often mentioned are questions bout the meaning an we of ethical terms, or the anti of tthial concepts: With thet go questions about the foie of moral statements: thre may be special patterns of moral arR- ‘ment, Heensed, perhaps, by aspects of the meanings of moral term - for example, may be part of the meaning of mora ‘Hatement that they ae unversalzabe. But there a a0 oo- {ological as contrasted with Ungustie or concept, questions shout the mature and satu of goodaes or rihtnes or what ver it Is tht fit order moral statements a6 distinctively bout. These are questions of factual rather than conceptual fraysx: the problem of what goodness i cannot be settled ‘onclsively or exhaustively by finding out what the word ‘good meats or what it conventional wsed to say oft do. ‘Recent philosophy biased ari bas been towards various nds of linguists Inquiry, bas tended to doubt this, bat the Alistinton Between conceptual apd factual analysis in ethics fan be supported iy snalgies wit oer areas. The question ot ‘what perception, what goes sa When someone percaves ome: thing Is not adequately anrweted by ling out what worde ike ee and “hear mean, or what someone ding in saying 'T perceive. by analysing, however flly and accurately, sy fatablished concep of perception. There sa sl closer aralgy ‘its colours Robert Boyle and hn Face called colours: ndary unites’ meaning Wat colours ar they coeur in ‘material things conat simply In pater of rangement 0d ‘movement of minute parties onthe surfaces of abject, which ‘make them, aa we wuld now sy, elect light of sme fequen les tetter than bers. and ao enable these objects to preset flour sensations in ws, but that colour as we see ther 30 not » erally belong tothe surfaces of material things, Whether Boyle and Locke were right aboot this cannot be seed by Seding out Bow we use colour words and what we mean in ‘wing them, Natve realism about colours might bea correct cass not only of our presleti colour concepts bat abo ‘ofthe convetional meanings of colour word and even ofthe ‘Meanings with which sceniicily sophisticated people. We {em when they ae off thst guard, a yet I might nt Be ‘corec account ofthe sate of colour. "Eror could well ret then, tom a falure to distnguich fatal trom coneepal seals with regard to colours frm {aking an acount of the meaning of statements as fall a ‘count of what thre i, There ss sila and in practice even (seater risk of err ia moral plosophy. ‘There i another ‘Feason, to, why i Would be mistake to concentrate second ‘Order ethical decusions on qustion of theaning. The mote ‘Mork philosophers have done on meaning, bath i ethics ed chewbere, the more complications have come to light Tt is by ‘ow prety pain that no simple account ofthe meanings of et ‘order moral statements wil be creek, wll cover adequately fren the standard, conventional ase of the main moral {erm T thik, none the les, that thee is rlatvelyclearcat lssue about the objectivity of moral values which isin danger of bing lost among the complications of meaning 4. Is objectivity a real issue? ‘has, however, been doubted whether hee fa realise ere, [Trust concede tha it sa rather odasioned one 1 40 not ‘mean merely that it was raised by Home, who arfwed that “The ‘ise ately exapes you vt you tm your resin it YoU own Beat and before him by Hobbes, and long before that by some ofthe Grek sophists. I mean rate that wat lscosed vigorous in the minteen thirties and forts, bat loc then bas received mach les stetion. Th not Beane ‘hasbeen solved or because agreement has been reached la- ead itssoms to have been politely shaved. ‘But was thee ever a gene problem? R.M. Hare has eld that he doesnot undetand what i meant by the objectivity of ‘alu. and that he has not met anyone who doe. Weal know how co Fecoglze the activity called aying, thinking tobe 20, that some act wrong” and be thinks rte to thi activi) that the subjctivst and the objectivat are both alluding. though one cals i'n atiide of ditpproval” and the shee ‘moral ination: these ate only diferent names forthe te {hing 1s tre and antes ‘re contracting one another: but this yes no signet di ‘timinaton between objectvsm and sobectivim, because the Subjectivist too wil concede that the second person meting ‘what the fist hat said, and Hare ses no ference between contradicting and negating. Again, the objesivist wil ay that ‘one ofthe two mt be wrong: but Hare argues hao sy that the judgement that a certain act is wrong is itself wrong is ‘merely to negate that fogement, and the sblctvist too must negate one o other of the two Jgements, 0 that sl no clear iderene between objectviam and sbjestivsm bas emerged ‘esums uphisease thts: "Think of oneworld into whose fabric ‘ales ae objectively bull; and think of another in which those ‘aluer have been annibilted. And remember that in both worlds the people in tem go on being concerned about the Sine things there no dierence Inthe which people have for things on fa their “objective” vale Now ask, "What isthe dilference between the tater of aie In these two world@” Can any answer be given xcept "None whatever ™ "Now itr gute true that i logically posible thatthe sub fective concer, the activity of tluing or of thinking things ‘wrong, should go on in ust the same way whether thee are ‘bjectve values oe not Butt say this nly to rlerate that there is loical distinction between fist and second rer smn sravus oF erates eis fst onde jadgemens are not necessarily afcted by the Twat ot flit of «second order view: Butt doesnot fllow, dit is ao rue, that there no dieence whatever between these two worlds. Inthe one tere ie someting that Backs Up ‘nd validates some of the subjective concern which people ave for things, i the ther tere snot Hare’ argument isa 10 the pontvi aim that there it Bo iference between Phenomena or Beskelean world in which tere are slg ‘ind an ele dea and the commotsenae reais one in which there are also matecal thing, because itis logically pouibe ‘Mat geople should have the same expeiencer fa both Tt we “Hare's similarly supported dsminal ofthe nue of the obo tivity of vals, “i any case, Hare has minimized the diference between his two worlds by considering only the ston where people already have jst sich subjective concer; frtber diferences ome tog i we consider how subjective concer acquired ‘or changed. I there were something tn the fare of the world that vafdaed erate binds of concen, then it Would be Pos ible Yo aie these merely by finding something os, Wy Te fing one's hnking be controlled by how things were. itn the world in which objestiv valies have Been apalilatd the ae: iting of some new subjective concern means the development ‘of seething new othe emAive side bythe person who ac ‘ies something that eigheenth-centary writers oud Pot der the hea of passion or sertiment. "The issue ofthe objectivity of tales needs, however, tobe ‘isinguited rom others with Which might be confuted. To ‘ay that there are objective values wos yet be to say merely {hat thee are some things which ae valued by everyone, nor does tena tar There could be agreemeat in valuing even if ‘alin ss soneting that people do, even if this activity it ot futher alia. Subjective agreement would give iter Sabjestie vals, but intersubjectivity not ebjiy. Noe ‘Sbjct simply univeraliabitye someone might well be prepared to univeralize his pesriptve judgements 96 29+ Provalr~ that i, to prescribe and approve infu the same Ways In all rclevaniy similar can, even one In Which he Was Savnved dileretiy oF ot at al and yet he could recopnize that such prescribing and appreving wee bis activities, nothing ‘more, Of course If there were objective values they woul presumably belong f0 Kinds of things or actions of states of Maia 20 thatthe fadgements tat reported them would Be ‘ives; hut the converse doe nor ald. 'A more subtle distinction needs to be ade between ble. Livan and’ deserptivam. Descptvism 1 again a doctrine bout the meanings of ehial terms and statements, namely that their meanings are purely descriptive rather tan een party prescriptive oe emotive or evaluative oF hat it i nt 3 ‘anal feature of the convetlonal mening of mera sae. ‘ments that they have some Special lloctionary force say of onmending rather than aceting. I ontrasts with the view ‘haccommendation isin picil dstngushable from descr tion however ical they abet arate in prwtce) and that moral statements have I ata lest Pat of thei? meaning that they are commendstory aod hence In some ses Inn: Sally acon puding. But eseipve meaning neither eta for i enatel by objetivity. Bereleys subjective idealism bout material objects would be quite compute with the a Ison that terial objet statement have purely descriptive reaning. Conversely, the main tradition of Earepean moral ‘hlosophy from Pio oawards has combined the View that moral values ae objective withthe recognition that moral Iudgements sre partly prescriptive of directive o atom gud. Ing. Vales themsctves have ban san a8 At once prescriptive and objective. tn Plato's theory the Poms, nd in Particular the ‘Foca ofthe Good, are etemal extra menial, reais. They are a vary central strctual element ihe bri ofthe world. But itis held also that jst knowing ther or Seeing” therm Wil not merely tel men what 10 40 bot will ensire tat they do ‘veraling any contrary Inlinaton. The phiorepher Kings is he Republic an, Plato thinks, he trusted with unchecked 2 power because ir edcaton wil ave gives them knowledge {ofthe Forms. Being acqaited with the Forms ofthe Good ‘pd Josie and Beauty and the ret wil bY the knowedge lone, without any frther motivation, be imple to parse ‘3nd promote these ideals. Silay. Kant believes that gure ‘eon can by iself be practical, thoi be doesnot pretend to beable to explain how tean be 20. Aes, Sgwick argues hat IC there isto bea seenc of ether - and be assures tha there fan be, indeed he define-ethice as “ie sence of conduct = ‘what ought to be ‘must in another sense have objective exist. ce: it most be an object of Knowledge and as such the same {or all minds’: bathe Say thatthe aration of thi science ‘are ako precept and he speaks of happiness aan end aro: Iitey prescribed by reson Since many piiloropers have ths ‘hi hat values are objectively prescriptive, it clear thatthe ‘niolgial deine of objectivism most be dtngsished fom ‘eserves theory avout eanig ‘Bot perhaps when Hare sys at e doesnot understand what is meant by "the objectivity of valet he meine that he annot understand how values could be objective, he annot {tame for himself any cleat ete, pitare of what woul be lke for values to te part ofthe fabric of the world, This ‘would bea much more plausible lam, a8 we ave sen, even Kant hints ata similar ilealty Indeed, even Pato ware os that is only through dificult star spread over many years that one can approach the knowledge of the Forms. The ‘itil of seeing how value could be objective Isa f8Y ‘strong reason for hiking that they are nts; tix point wil be {taken up in Section 9 (pp. 3642) But fk nota good reason fOr saying tha thi pot aa stue. Thetive (ht os well 6 being areal ie tan important ‘one. It clearly matters fo general philosophy. Rk would ke ‘lal diference to our metaphssif we had to find oom for ‘Objective values ~ perhaps something Tike Pat's Forme = {omen in out pctore ofthe world would sity make 4 diference 1 out epistemology i nd fo explain HOW sch ‘Sbjectve vans are or ean Be known, and to our plosophical psychology if we had to allow such knowlege, or Kan's pure Dratcal reason, to direct choices and actions. Less obviously, ‘ow this ise i sted wl affet the possiblity of certain kinds ‘of moral argument. For example, Slgtick considers + di fusion between an gout anda itarin, and points oat that ‘tthe egitim that his happiness or pleasure is objectively esrable or good, the wtltarian can argbe thatthe poise ‘mppiness‘camot be more obyectivay desirable or moe a good than the smar happiness of anyother person: the mere fact, ‘that he i he ean save nothing to do With it obecsive de- Sirabliy or goodness In other sot if ethics i But onthe ‘concept of objective goodness, hen easom as 4 fist order ‘System or method of eis ean De refuted, whereas if tra. med tht goodness i only subeetive it cannot Bvt Sidgwick forecty trees what a umber of other philosophers have tied, tat this argument aganst egos would require the objectivity apeifeally of goodness: the objectivity of what ‘Sugtt be or of mhat te ratonal todo would not be enough. the epost claimed that twas objectively rational, oF obliga: {ory upon him, to sek his Own happnes, a sini argument shout the relevance of theft that he she Would ead only to the conclsion that it was objectively rational or obliatory for ‘ah oer person to sek hi wn happiness, tha toa une {sized frm of egolas 201 the refutation of epbtm, And of ‘oure insting on te universizablity of meal judgement, 1 opposed to the Siectv'y of goodnes. would yield onl) the mae rest 5. Standards of evaluation ‘One way of stating the thesis that thee are no objective vals Feta say that value statements nnnot be either tre or false. But ‘his formulation, oo, lends tale to misinterpretation, For there ‘a cera ibd of Value tstemens which andoubeely can be trac rfl, ven fin the sense intend, there reo objective ‘alse Evalatons of many sorts ae commonly fade in re Tntlon to agreed and assumed standards. The chasing of wool the grading of apples, the awarding of prizes at sheepdog tral flower shows, skating and diving championship, and even the ‘marking of examination papers are eatied ott in elation to Standards of qualy of merit which are pecliar to each pare Weular sebiect-matter ar type of contest which may be ex pliily hid down but whic, even they are nowhere explcly Stated, are fry well understood and agreed by those who ae ‘Fecogized ss judges or expert la euch particular fet Given any suffeentiy determinate standard, it wil be an objective issue, mater o{ wuth and falehood, how well any particular specimen measures up to those standards Comparative fodae. ‘ments In particular wil be eapsble of truth and flchoods it ‘wll bes factual question whether this sheepdog has performed {etter than that one “The subjctivst about values, then, ¢ not denying that there ‘an be objective evaluation relative ta standard, and these ae {8 posible inthe aesthetic ard moral fils asin any of those jst mentioned. More than tir, there is an objective di fiction which applies ln many sch elds, and yet woul et be regarded asa peculaly moral ene: the distinction between justice and injustice. tn one importart sense ofthe Word it rs paradigm case of injustice i 2 court decvessomeoce to be ‘uly ofan olence of which it knows i to bennocent, More severly a fining Ie unj ft at varance with what the felevant law and the fact together equire, aed partly tit Is known bythe court foe 50. More general sill any award ‘ot marks, prizes, ote Tike is unjust if rat vatance with the ‘greed standard forthe contest In question: fone divers pet. {ermance in fact menses up biter tothe aceoptes santana for diving than anothers, i wil be unjst if the later It amarded higher macks or the prize. tn this way the justice ot injustice of decisions celative to standards can bea thoroesy ‘objective mater, though there may stl bea sbetie elt fn the interpretation or appization of standards But the sate ‘eat thats certain decison is thus jst oF injst wil ot be objectively prescriptive: in so far as team be simply tue it 6 leaves open the question whether there is any objective r= _qirement to do wha is jist and to relia from whats unjas {nd equally leaves open the practical decison to actin et oy. ‘Recognizing the objectivity of justice in relation to standard, and of evaluative jodgements relative to standards, then, merely ‘shit the iestion ofthe objectivity of values back to ‘dards themelves The eubjectivit ay ty to make hs pont By Initing that thee ir no objec validity about the choie of standard. Yet he mou clearly be wrong It he said that the ‘choice of even the most Basie standards Im any eld was com. Dleely arbitrary The standard wed In abeepdog tril leary bear sme flation to the work that sheepdog are Kept to do, the standards for grading apples bear some relation to what people generally want ao lke about apples and 30 co. Oa the ‘ther hand, standards are not as a ule tet validated by suck Durposes. The appropriateness of standards i either fly de- Terminate nor eal indeterminate in relation to independetiy ‘speciale aims or desires Dot however determinate iy the Objective appropriateness of standards i flan to me OF ese is no mare ofa threat tothe denial of objective vales than isthe objectivity of evaluation relative to standards In {act tis lopieally no diferent from the cbjectivity of goodies relative to desites, Something maybe called ood simply in so far att sain or sch a to satya certain ds, Wot the objectivity of such reltons of satisfaction doesnot conte Inourseavean objective value. 6. Hypothetical and categorical imperatives ‘We may make this issue clearer by selec to Kant's di tinction” between hypothetical and. categorical imperative, ‘hough what he called imperatives are more ntrally expres 5 oUght statements than in the imperative mood "t you want 1, d0'Y (or"You cuph todo ¥) wil bea hypothetial impr: ‘iveit tis based onthe sopposed fact that Yi, ia the cecum. stance, the only or the best) aailable means to X, that son a ‘ul elton between ¥ and X."The reason for doing tes im fis eau connection with the sired end, X; the oughiness comings upon the dere. But "You ought to do ¥" wil bea ‘ategri imperative it you oust to do Y irrespetive of any sich dere for any end to which Y would comivte, the ‘ugha snot thus contingent upon any desire. But thi i UUnetion needs to be angled ith some care. An “OuEh?. statement ist in this sense hypothetial merely because it Incorporates conditional clause. "t you promised todo Y, You ‘veh to do Ye ota hypothe imperative merely one: count ofthe sated ifase: what meant may be citer & Hypothetical or categarical Imperative, depending upon the Implied reavon for keepne te sppored promise IC thi ets 'upon some teh further unstated conditional asf you want be trusted another time, then i 8a hypothetial imperative: if fot it i eategorical: vem # desire of the agent's can ure la the antecedent of what. though conditional In grammatical form, is lly Kant sense 3 cteporieal imperative. “Tt You te tonely attracted sexually to young children you ovght not to ron for school teaching f notin vue of what explicitly ‘ym 3 hypothetical imperative the avoidance of school teach ina it not being offered as a means tothe satisfaction of the dirs in question, OF couse it could sil be 2 bypothetical lnmperative, ifthe implied reason ware a prudential one; bat ould abo be 2 categoral imperative, a moral requirement ‘wcte the reson for the recommended action (ily svoud- {nce} docs not rest upon that actions being 4 means tothe {Stifacton of any deste that the agents supposed to have. Not ‘very conditional ought statement or command, then AyPo- {hell imperative; eal, not every bow-cndtionl one le & ‘eatoorcal imperative. AM appropriate ifclause may be let ‘untted Inded, a siape command inthe imperative mowed, ‘sy 2 parade ground ore, which might seem most eal ‘quality forte il of categorical pera, wil hardly ever ‘Bone inthe sense we need here. The implied reason for com. plying with such an order wil almost alvays be some dsr of 2 the perion address, pernaps simply the desire to heep out of trouble If 0, sac an apparently ctepoical order wil be in fur sense 4 Bypothetial imperative. Again an imperative emai hypothetical even if we change the i to ‘snc the {Get that the desice for Xi actly preset doesnot iter the fact thatthe reason for doing ¥ ix contingent upon the desire for X by way of Y's beng 4 means to X. In Kans own tat sent, while imperative of Sil relate todeses which am seat tay oF may not have, imperatives of prodeace relate tothe esce for happiness which, Kant assumes, everyone has. So nstrued, imperatives of prudence ae n0 les Hypothetical than imperatives of sl, ne less contingent upon denier that the agent hata the time the imperatives are addressed to him Dutt we think rather of a counsel of prdenceas beng elated to the agents future welfare, othe stifaction of dss that be doce not yet have not evento 2 present desire that his fhnure desires shoul be satisfied then acounel of prodence it {Natgoricl imperative dierent indeed from & moral on, bat “nalogous toi 'A categorical imperative, then, would express a reason for acting which was meonitionl inthe sense of not being con {ingot upon any present desire ofthe agent to whose satisac: tion the recommended action would contribute a3 means ‘more dtety "You ought to dance the implied reason urt. {hat you want to dance or lke dancing il a hypothetleal Impertive Now Kant himself held that moral judgements are {ogorical imperatives or petaps are all applications af one ‘Steperical imperative, and can plssibiy be matined at Tet that any moral judgements contains eategoricaly i peratve clement 80 fa as tice concerned, my thesis that {here are no objective values is specially the dena that any ‘ch categorically imperative slment i oblectvely valid. The ‘bjstive values whieh Tam denying would be action dieting brluey, not conngety (in the way incited) pon the aens desires and intnations “Another way ot trying to clarity thi sue to refer to mor restoning of moral argument. In practise, of ori, wach reasoning i seldom fully expt: but let us suppose that we ould make expt the reasoning tat sports some evaluative conclusion, where this conclosion hassome ston guiding force {hati net contingent upon desires or porposes or chosen ends ‘Then what Iam saying is that somewhere io the input to this argument ~ perhaps in one or more ofthe presiees perhaps in ome part ofthe form of the argument = thee il be rome thing which cannot be objectively validated ~ sore premise which i not capable of Being siply true, or some form of {rgument which snot valid asa matter of general loge whose authority or cogsncy is not objective, but is contd by a ‘choosing o desing to think na certain way 7. The claim to objectivity 111 have sucended in specifying pecelya20ugh the mol ‘ais wow abject Lam denpng my hs may now seem tebe wally te. OF cou, sme wit shy, vag, peer ‘ing, choosing. recommending ese condemn Ss {re human sel, hte oS fk fe vals {iat are prior oan oily independent os voch ater ‘There maybe wieprendareonet in aug, and plat ‘ale judgements are notin pneal arbitrary er plated: ey pial eobre wt tern or an be led hy do a ‘aso can be gven for them, and son bat it a tat th subjective maintaining tht ees end purpese ihelte gare somewhere nthe rye fran a tno that or parpre we objective at oppor tong mel ier. ‘Sbjct, hens ay be conceal without mac fe ut Ld nr hint this shoold be conceded se ean. AST have a he man tadon of Europecn moral plrophy Incaes te conay ci, tat there ar eject lcs ot fit th sort I have denied Ihave refered aeady to Ps ane and Sect parca eet te a oral impertiveisnt only eto td imperative Bt ‘ete to though ala bln ives the mora law to imsef the iw that he thus make ie determinate and neces: Sry Aristotle begins the Nicomacheon Eihies by saying that ‘he god that at which al things im, and that ethics s part of ‘scence which he calls pole, whose goal i not knowledge but practice; yet he does not doubt that there canbe knowledge ‘of what is the good for man nr, once he has ented this as ‘welk-being or Rappines, endaimonia, that i ean be known, ‘aonally determined in what happiness cons and it pals ‘hate thinks that this happiest intrinsieally desirable, not ood simply because its desired. The rationalist Samoel Clarke hott that these eral and necessary diernces of things make I i ond ‘atonal for erentarn 2010 2c even separate fom the con ‘ldraton of thse useing the poe wl or comand of God nd abo antecedent to nny respect or fear, expectation appre sin, of 99 pacar private and peonaladvomaze ort tivanaye, remard or pahment cher praetor fare Even the sentimentalst Hutcheron defines moral goodnest ‘some quality apprehended in actions, which procures 2p probation. while saying that the moral sense by which we ereive vr and vce has been given to us (bythe Author of fatre) to diet our actions Hume ladeed Was on the other ‘de, bt he is atia witness to the dominance ofthe oletvist Lraton, since e cms that when we se that the distinction ‘of view and virtue isnot founded merely on the relations of ‘objet, nor i perceiv' by reason’ hi ‘wou'd sve! al the ‘ular systems of morality. And Richard Price nai that right find wrong are ‘eal characters actions, not ‘quali of our ‘mind’ and ae perceived by the unéerstanding; he critlzs the ‘ollon of moral sense onthe erond tat R would make vite fm alla of taste, and mal right and wrong “nothing in he objets themselves he rejects Hutchexn’s ew berate (perhaps mistaken) he ses ts collapsing inte Hume’. But thir objective about value isnot only a feature of the philosophical tation. It as alo a Sm base in oraary ‘ought and even athe meanings of mora terms. No Eoubt it BY wa an entavagance for Moore to say that "good? the name fof non-natural quality, Bot it would not beso fat wrone © ‘sy that in moral contexts itis weed as if Here the mare ‘ts supped non-natural qual, ete the desrption "aon futur” leaves roont Tor the. pecolar evaluative, pre {eriotive, nensically action guiding aspects of this supposed ‘Sualiy. This pont can be iluatrated by reflection onthe onfits and swings of opinion in recent years between aon ‘ogntvst and naturalist Views about the central, tase, men Ings of ethical tems. If we reject the view thats the fonction cofsuch terms to intoduce objective values into discourse about fondoct and choice of action, there sem to be two main ternative types of account. “One (which has importantly Aiderentsutivisions) i that they conventionally expres eet uludes which the speaker purports to adopt towards whatever i is that e characterizes morally. or preseptions ot recor ‘mendations, subject perhaps to the logical consrait of univer: {Slab Dilferent views ofthis type share the central thesis that ethical terms have, at least party and primarily, some sort ‘of non cognitive, son descriptive, meaning. Views ofthe oer ‘ype hold that they are descriptive in meaning, but deseipuve of satura features, partly of suc features a everyone, even the roncognitvt, would recopnize as distinguishing Kind actions {rom erel ones, courage from cowardice, politeness frm rade fs, ands on. and partly (hough these two overlap) of Fe Incas between the setions and tome human want, ais factions, and the ke. I blleve that views of both these ‘per eaptore part ofthe truth, Each apcoach can account for the fact that moral jdgements are action guiding o pacts ‘Yeteach guns much of plaunbiity from the fl ade) ofthe other. [eis «very natural reaction to an now-copntve tapi of ethical terms to potest that there more to ties {an this, something more extemal tothe maker of moral Ilgrent more authoritative over Both him and thove of ot fo whem be speaks, and thi reaction i key to pert even when fll allowance fas bets made for the logical forma, onsrans of fll blooded presceptvity and aiversalzabty. thie, we are inclined to believe, it more a matter of koow- flge and las & matter of decsion than any po0-cogaitve Says allows, And ofcourse naturalism Satis this demand. Teil ntbea matter of choice o cecson whether an action s cruel or unjust or imprudent or Wher it ikly to produce ‘more distress than pleasure. But ia ststying this demand, it Introduces a converse deficiency. On a matralt analysis mora jingerments can be practic, but thet practicality is wholly relative to devices posble ttsfacons of the pesoa of persone whose aetons are to be guided: tat moral judgements {eem to my more than thi Thi ie leaves tthe categorical ‘galt of moral requirements, Infact both naturalist and non- opnitve analyser leave out the apparent authority of eis, the one by excluding the cateporiallyimpestive aspect, the ter the clam to objective valldity or truth Twe ordinary wer of moral language means to sy something abou! whatever itis {hat he characterizes moaly for example a possible action as Ii in ituet, o would be tt were realized, and nt about of ven simply exprensive of, hs, or anyone elas, atte ort [tion to it But the somthing be wants to sty is sot purely kescrptiv, certainly not inert, but something that lnvlves 2 ‘el for ation ofr the retaining (om action, and ore thats ‘bsolute not condngent upon any deste or prefreac policy Or ehle, his own of anyone ees Someone in state ofmoral perplenty, wondering whether it would be Wrong for hen to (opage, ay, in rescore elated Yo bacteriological warare, rans fone at some judgement about this conerete carat ‘doing this work a ths time ia thee actual cicumtance is Felevant characteristics willbe pat of th subject of the ge ‘ment, but no relation between him and the proposed ation wil be part of the predate. The question i not, for expe, ‘whether he really ants todo thi work, wheter i wil sty ‘or disnnty him, whether he wil in the long ron have s pro Ste towards itor even whether this san action of ort {hat he can happily and sincerely recommend in all eerily Sir cases. Nor ise even wondering jst whether ofecom- ‘mend such ation i all elevanty similar case He wants now wheter this course of sion would be wrong in ital, Something ike this i the everyday objecuist concept of ‘which tak abou non atural qualities isa piloophers econ “The prevalence of this tendency to obectty values - and not ‘only moral ones Is confined bya patter of thinking that we find in exsetaists and those induenced by them. The deal ‘of objective values ean ear with ian eateme emotional eae- tion a feling that noting matters at all hat fe has lot te Prpose. OF sou this doe ot folow; the lack of obetive “alesis not a good reason for abandoning subjective concern or for ceasing to want anything. But the abandonment of Telit tn objective vale can eaute, at lat temporary, & decay of subjective concern and seas of purpose. That doce ‘sos evidence that the people in whom this Faction occ hive been tending to objectfy their concerns and. purporer, have ‘been giving them cious extemal authority. Asli t9 objectivity hasbeen 20 strongly associated with thei subjective ‘concer and porpose that the colaeeof the former seems ‘Undermine theater aswel. "This view, that conceptual analysis would reveals claim to objectivity. ie sometimes dramatically confirmed by pil. frophers who are ofiialy on the oer side Bertrand Ruse {er example, says that ‘etal proposition shouldbe expeesed In the optative mood, aot in te ndiatives he defends hinse effectively agains the charge of iconstency in both Boling timate ethical valuations to be subjective and expresting em ‘hate opinions on ethical questions. Yet atthe end he adits Cranly there seems to be something more. Supess, for ample, that sme ane wee 1o advocate the intdocton of bal Shien is country n opposing the Props Thos Je ot nly tat Iwas exroning my Sen, bot tat ny dee the [Brae igh, whatever at may enn Anamater of arguments 2, Thnk how tat Ta tel f ny fog inconency In olin tothe above Interpretstion of fie andthe ee preming suohe eit preferences BU i feelag Tam sat Sten “ ut he conches, reasonably enough, with the remark: can only ay that, while my own opinions a to ethics do not say ne other people's satsty mes less” 1 eonclide, then, that crdinary moral judgements inclode © cixim to objectivity, an sasumption that tere are objective ‘alee in ast dhe stage in which Yam concerned to deny his. ‘And do at think its going to far to say that this asmption as been incorporated inthe basic. conventional. meanings of ‘moral terms Any analis of the meanings of moral tems Suhich omits this lam to objective ints presciptvityis to {hat extent incomplete, and this is te of any non cognitive ‘tapes any natural one, and any combination ofthe if second order eis Were confined, then, olingusic and concepual anal, it ought w conclude that moral ales at leastae objective: thatthe ares a part of what our ordinary mora statements ment the traditional moral concepts of the frdnary man az wal a8 of the main line of western phil ‘toners are concepts of objective value. But itis precisely for this reason th Inguistie and coneepual analysis not enough. ‘The chim (0 objectivity, however ingrained in our Language nd thought sat sl validating. Ian and shuld Be ae. ‘one But the denial of objective values il have to be pot forward not a the result ofan analyte approach, but aan ‘etor theory’ theory that although mort people in making moral Judgements implcty enim, song ober things, to be Dointing to something obigetvey prescriptive, these clams are Bil fae. It this that makes the name "oral scepicin? Seoropriate, But snc this isan ertor theory since it goes anne assy ns ingrained in our thought and bt nto some ofthe ways In which language 5 wed, since ft cond with what i ome. times ealled common rns, neds very acid supprt. nat something we can acept lightly of casually and then quely fst on It me ae to adopt this view, we must ereue exlcly fort Tradkionalyithas been supported by arguments of t0 ‘main Kind, which Thal ell he argument fon relativity Sed the argument from queers, but thee eas, a sal show, be ‘supplemented in several ways as 8. The argument from relativity “The scgument fom relativity has a its prema the well-known ‘rrition in moral codes from one society to another and fom fone period to another, and ao the ferences fn moral belts theween diferent groupe and clase within a complex com ‘nly. Such variation isin self pry 2 rth of deserve ‘morally, fact of anthropology which ental ether fist order ‘or second order ethical views. Yet may indirect support Second order sbjectivim radical diferences between st ‘order moral jgernents make it feat to teat thove jude" rents at apprehensions of objective tris. But its oot the mere occurrence of disagreements hat tls against the obj tivity of values Disagreement on queons in istry of Bio- logy or cosmology does 20% show that there are no objective lises in these fields for investigators to disagree about But sch sient disagreement results from speculative inferences ‘or explanatory hypotheses based on inadequate evident, and it Shady plausible wo interpret moral disagreement inte sare vay. Disagreement about moral coder seems 10 reflect people's adherence to and participation Ia diferest ways of lite The causal connection ees to be mainly that way round: itis that people approve of monogamy because they participate ina monogamous Way of lle rater than that they paripate ‘na monogamous way of fe because they apProve of mono- samy. Ofcourse, the standards may be an iealiation of the ‘ay of life from which they arse: the monogamy in which cope participate may be les complete, les ret, than that of ‘which fe leads them to approve. This otto say that moral Judgements are purely conventional. Of course there have been And are mora herecs and moral reformer, people who have fared against the extainhed rales and prac o€ thee Owe ‘communis for moral reasons, and offen for moral reasons {that we would endorse, But ths cam usally be understood at the exesion, in ways Which though new and unconventional seemed other tobe required fr consistency, of ues o which * they sendy adhered at arising out ofan existing way of ie. Ja short, the argument from relativity has some force amply De ‘nur the actual variation lathe moral codes are more rudy ‘ipained bythe hypothe that they rect ways of ife than ‘by the hypothesis at they express perceptions, most of them seciouayInadequat and badly distorted, of objective valves. ‘But there ies wellknown counter to this argument from relativity, mamely to my thatthe items for which objective val Faityis inthe it plac tobe claimed ar ot specie nora ues ‘or codes bot very genecal base pincpes which are recognized St leat imply to some extent in a society ~s0eh prin Cipla provide the foundations of what Sidgrick bas ced ‘erent methods of ethic: the principle of univecsalzaility, perhaps, ofthe rule that one ought to conform tothe specie Files of any way of hfe in which one aks par rom which one ‘Profs, and on ‘which one elle, ot some ulitaran principle ot doing what tends, of seems likely, to promote the geaerl hippines Ils eaxy to show that such geaeal principe, ma ried with difering concrete circumstances, diferent existing foci patterns of diferent prefeence. wil beget diferent Specie mora roles, and there i ome plait a the cai hat the pei roles hus generated wl vary from community {to community oF from group to group in close agreement with the actual variations in accepted cole. “The argument from relativity eam be only partly countered in this way To take thine the moral objectivist has to sy tha it |s aly in thee principles thatthe objective moral character Attaches immediately to i descriptively specifed. ground of fects other moral Judgements are objectively vald or ews, Sut only serivatively and. ontngeatly ~ i things had been ‘thernite, quite diferent sort of ations would have been ight ‘And despite the prominesce ln recent philosophical ethics of Siveralization,wtltari pelncles, and the like, thee are ‘er far fom constituting the whole of what i actual afm ts tsi in ordinary atl thought. Much ofthis coneemed father with what Fae call eat or les kindy, fanatic ‘That people jg that some tings are good or riaht and ” ‘ters are bad or wrong not because ~ oF at any rate not only because ~ they exemplify some general principle for which widespread implicit seeptance could be chimed, but beease {omething shout thove things arostes certain responses iamedi- {ely in them, hough they would arouse racally a irs {bly diferent responses in cthece ‘Moral sense’ rnin” {an italy mocepaulbe desepon of What supplies many oh fur Base moral fodgemente tan reason’. With regard to all ‘eve starting points of mora thinking the argument fom rae ‘Uy remains nfl fore 9. The argument from queerness certainly more generally qucere. This has two pat, ‘ne metaphyseal the otter epistemological It there were ob fective value, then they would be entes or qualities oe rela. Alon of «very range 20 tery ifeent from anything ese Jn the univers, Correspondingly we were amae of them, t Woulé have tobe by some special faculty of moral perception of Intuition, uterty diferent from our ordinary ways of knowing ‘everything else. These points were recopaized by Moore when be spoke of non-natral quali, and by the intltioiots In their ak sbouts “faculty of moral intuition Intiionism bas Jong been out of fvour, and it indeed easy to point out is Inplaies, What i nt 0 often srested, but more a ‘portant that the ceatal thesis of intitionism is one to Which ny obietvit view of vales isin the end committed I Tutionam merely makes upalatably plan what eter forms of ‘objective wa UP- Of coure the sgzttion that moral see tment are made of mol probleme solved by ju siting down find having an thi ition fxs travey of acthal moral {inking Dut, however comple the el rosa tl reqlre {GLI eto yield authoritatively prescriptive conchaiens) some Input of this distinctive sor, ether premises or forms of ae rent or both: When We atk the awkward question, how we ean to aware of this authoritative poscrptivity, of the truth of these ditnctively thal premises or ofthe eogency ofthis

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