Facilities

Biological

Information regarding potential biological warfare pursuits on the part of India

remains scarce. India is a signatory of the Biological and Toxin Weapons
Convention (BTWC) and has pledged not to develop an offensive biological
warfare (BW) program. Open source data indicating the existence of a covert
program is scarce, but India is theoretically capable of redirecting peaceful or
defensive research toward offensive applications. There is a multitude of facilities
across India undertaking research on a variety of biotechnology-related issues.
Having a strong agricultural base, India has a number of laboratories and facilities
that conduct research on various pesticides and diseases affecting agricultural
crops. Furthermore, like most developing nations, India conducts research on
several endemic diseases that have been weaponized by other nations in the past.
For instance, given the plague outbreak of 1994 and several anthrax-related
scares in 2001, India's research on these pathogens is understandable. Ultimately,
while there is a strong biological infrastructure in place that could mask a covert
offensive BW program, no open source data indicates that this is the case.

India does conduct defensive BW research, brought to light in statements made

by military spokespersons regarding various defensive exercises involving nuclear,
chemical, and biological (NBC) warfare. Since 11 September and the anthrax
attacks in the United States, there has been an increasing interest in NBC defense
in India, and a number of NBC-related courses have been established in both the
government and private sectors.

Control over India's BW program officially starts with the government of India,
which is responsible for ensuring the country's defense. Although the office of the
president is nominally in command of the armed forces, the executive
responsibility for national defense and for the chemical warfare program rests
with the Union Cabinet headed by the prime minister. The next subordinate level
is the defense minister. Within the Ministry of Defence, the BW program is
overseen by the Department of Defence Research & Development (DDR&D),
headed by a Secretary who also serves as Scientific Adviser to the Defense
Minister. The main function of the DDR&D is the formulation of research, design,
and development plans for equipment used by the three military services.
Reporting to the DDR&D is the Defense Research & Development Organization
(DRDO), which administers the government laboratories working in the BW arena.

Facilities Descriptions

Biological-Education and Training

 All India Institute of Medical Sciences

 Bioinformatics Center, University of Pune
 Center for Advanced Studies in Veterinary Parasitology

Biological-Production

 Bio-Instruments
 Hitech Bio-Services

Biological-Research and Development

 BCG Laboratory, Madras

 Biological Evans Ltd.
 Center for Biochemical Technology
 Central Research Institute
 Defence Food Research Laboratory
 Defence Institute of Physiology & Allied Sciences
 Defence Material and Stores R&D Establishment
 Defense Bioengineering and Electro-Medical Lab
 Indian Council of Medical Research
 Indian Institute of Chemical Biology

Chemical

A high level of secrecy surrounds India's chemical warfare (CW) program, making
it difficult to determine the exact number of chemical weapons facilities and
organizations involved. India publicly acknowledged that it had a CW program
after ratifying the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) in 1997, but information
on its chemical weapon stockpiles and production facilities remains strictly
confidential. Under the CWC, India has declared three chemical weapon
production facilities (CWPFs), two chemical weapon storage facilities (CWSFs),
and two chemical weapon destruction facilities (CWDFs). India has also declared
one Schedule 1 facility, four Schedule 2 facilities, 30 Schedule 3 facilities, and 19
discrete organic chemicals (DOC) facilities in its industry declaration.

Inspectors from the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons

(OPCW), which oversees the implementation of the CWC, have conducted routine
inspections at a number of Defence Research & Development Organisation
(DRDO) facilities involved in chemical weapon production, including sites in
Gwalior, Madhya Pradesh; at Ojhar, near Nashik, Maharashtra; and at Ozra
(location unknown). India has been more forthcoming about its chemical defense
facilities. At least four government-owned facilities are involved in some type of
chemical defense activity. Since 11 September 2001, and the anthrax attacks in
the United States, there has been an increasing interest in nuclear, biological, and
chemical (NBC) defense in India, and a number of NBC-related courses have been
established in both the government and private sectors.

Control over India's CW program officially starts with the government of India,
which is responsible for ensuring the country's defense. Although the office of the
president is nominally in command of the armed forces, the executive
responsibility for national defense and for the CW program rests with the Union
Cabinet headed by the prime minister. The next level down is the Raksha Mantri
(defense minister). Within the Ministry of Defense, the CW program is overseen
by the Department of Defence Research & Development (DDR&D), which is
headed by a secretary, who is also the scientific adviser to the Defense Minister.
The main function of the DDR&D is the formulation of research, design, and
development plans for equipment used by the three military services. Reporting
to the DDR&D is the Defense Research & Development Organization (DRDO),
which administers the government laboratories working in the CW area.

The government-owned facilities involved in CW research, manufacturing, testing,

and other related activities are located in various states throughout India. Two
key DRDO facilities involved in CW defense research include the Defence Research
& Development Establishment (DRDE), in Gwalior, Madhya Pradesh, and the
Defence Materials & Stores Research & Development Establishment (DMSRDE), in
Kanpur, Uttar Pradesh. A number of other DRDO facilities, including the Research
& Development Establishment (Engineering) (R&DE), in Pune, Maharashtra, and
the Vehicles Research & Development Establishment (VRDE), in Ahmednagar,
Maharashtra, also participate in chemical defense research. The DRDO
laboratories interact with a number of academic institutions across India,
including the Indian Institutes of Technology, and work closely with the private
sector for the manufacture of DRDO laboratory-produced technologies. The
DRDO laboratory in Gwalior is also a regional training center for the OPCW.
Chemical defense-related activities also occur outside the DRDO within the three
military services: The Indian government has set up NBC warfare directorates in
the Army, located in Pune, Maharashtra; the Navy, at INS Shivaji, in Lonavla,
Maharashtra; and the Air Force, in Chandigarh.

Sources:
[1] Defence Research and Development Organisation, "DRDO — An Organisation
of the Ministry of Defence," www.drdo.com;
[2] Defence Research and Development Organisation, "Site Map,"
www.drdo.com;
[3] Rezaul H. Laskar, "DRDO gears up to counter bio-terrorism," 15 October 2001,
www.rediff.com.

Facilities Descriptions

Chemical-Military Organizations

 Defence Research and Development Establishment

Chemical-Production

 Department of Defence Production and Supplies

 Dundahera Industrial Complex
 Hindustan Fluorocarbons Ltd.
 Hindustan Insecticides Ltd.
 Tata Chemicals Ltd.
 Transpek Industry Ltd.

Chemical-Regulatory

 Department of Chemicals and Petrochemicals

 State Trading Corporation of India, Ltd.

Chemical-Research and Development

  Armament Research and Development Establishment
 Center for Advanced Technology
 Defence Laboratory
 Defence Materials and Stores Research and Development Establishment
 Defence Research and Development Laboratory
 Defence Research and Development Organisation
 Defence Science Centre
 Defense Laboratory, Jodhpur
 Department of Defence Research and Development
 Directorate of Combat Vehicles and Engineering
 Vehicles Research and Development Establishment

Chemical-Storage

 Unidentified Chemical Weapons Storage Site, Assam

 Unidentified Chemical Weapons Storage Site, Dehra Dun
 Unidentified Chemical Weapons Storage Site, Madurai
 Unidentified Chemical Weapons Storage Site, Ranchi

Missiles

The below entries provide analytical descriptions of selected missile facilities in

India. Since definitive information on India's missile facilities is often classified, the
descriptions and locations of these facilities are sometimes speculative, based on
the most credible available open source material. Entries are regularly updated as
further information becomes available.

Facilities Descriptions

Missile-Base

 Sriharikota High Altitude Range

Missile-Design

 Defence Electronics Research Laboratory

 Metallurgical and Engineering Consultants (India) Ltd.

Missile-Production
  Bharat Dynamics Limited
 Bharat Earth Movers Limited
 Bharat Electronics Limited
 Electronics Corporation of India Limited
 Godrej and Boyce Manufacturing Co. Ltd.
 Hindustan Aeronautics Limited
 IBP Company Limited
 Instrumentation Limited
 Larsen and Toubro
 Mishra Dhatu Nigam Limited (MIDHANI)
 Pantex Gee Bee Fluid Power Ltd.
 S.K. Machine Tools Private Ltd.
 Srijan Control Drives
 The KCP Limited

Missile-Research and Development

 Aeronautical Development Establishment

 Armament Research and Development Establishment
 Centre for Environment and Explosive Safety
 Combat Vehicles R&D Establishment
 Defence Electronics Applications Lab
 Defence Metallurgical Research Laboratory
 Defence Research and Development Laboratory
 Defence Terrain Research Laboratory
 Electronics and Radar Development Establishment
 Gas Turbine Research Establishment
 High Energy Materials Research Laboratory
 Institute of Armament Technology
 Laser Science and Technology Centre
 Microwave Tube Research and Development Centre
 Research & Development Establishment, Engineering
 Research Center Imarat
 Semiconductor Complex Limited (SCL)
 Solid State Physics Laboratory
 Terminal Ballistics Research Laboratory
 Vehicles Research & Development Organization
  Vikram Sarabhai Space Center

Missile-Testing

 Integrated Test Range

Uncategorized

 Indian Eastern Naval Command

Nuclear

The below entries provide analytical descriptions of selected nuclear facilities in

India. Since definitive information on India's nuclear facilities is often classified,
the descriptions and locations of these facilities are sometimes speculative, based
on the most credible available open source material. Entries are regularly updated
as further information becomes available.

Facilities Descriptions

Nuclear-Component Production

 Beryllium Machining Facility

 Bharat Heavy Electricals Limited
 Central Workshops
 HMT Machine Tools Limited
 Indian Institute of Science

Nuclear-Enrichment

 Boron Enrichment Plant (BEP)

 Rattehali Enrichment Facility
 Uranium Enrichment Plant

Nuclear-Exploration and Mining

 Atomic Minerals Directorate for Exploration and Research

 Bhatin Mine
 Jaduguda Uranium Mine
  Mineral Separation Plant

Nuclear-Fuel Fabrication

 Advanced Fuel Fabrication Facility (AFFF)

 Ceramic Fuel Fabrication Facility (CFFF)
 New Uranium Fuel Assembly Plant
 New Zirconium Sponge Plant (New ZSP)
 Nuclear Fuel Complex (NFC)
 Special Materials Plant
 Zirconium Fabrication Plant (ZFP)

Nuclear-Heavy Water Production

 Baroda Heavy Water Plant

 Hazira Heavy Water Plant
 Heavy Water Board
 Manuguru Heavy Water Plant
 Nangal Heavy Water Plant
 Talcher Heavy Water Plant
 Thal Heavy Water Plant
 Tuticorin Heavy Water Plant

Nuclear-Power Reactor

 Kaiga Atomic Power Station

 Kakrapar Atomic Power Station (KAPS)
 Madras Atomic Power Station (MAPS)
 Narora Atomic Power Station (NAPS)
 Prototype Fast Breeder Reactor (PFBR)
 Rajasthan Atomic Power Station (RAPS)
 Tarapur Atomic Power Station (TAPS)

Nuclear-Reprocessing

 Fast Reactor Fuel Reprocessing Plant (FRFRP)

 Kalpakkam Atomic Reprocessing Plant
 Plutonium Reprocessing Plant
  Power Reactor Fuel Reprocessing Plant

Nuclear-Research Reactors

 Advanced Heavy Water Reactor (AHWR)

 Apsara Research Reactor
 Canadian-Indian Reactor, U.S.
 Dhruva Research Reactor
 Fast Breeder Test Reactor
 Kalpakkam Mini Reactor
 Kota Heavy Water Plant
 Prototype Fast Breeder Reactor
 Purnima I-II-III
 Zerlina

Nuclear-Research and Development

 Bhabha Atomic Research Center

 Center for Advanced Technology
 Center for Development of Advanced Computing
 Indian Rare Earths Limited
 Indira Gandhi Center for Atomic Research
 Institute for Plasma Research
 Institute of Mathematical Sciences
 Institute of Physics
 Mineral Research and Development Center
 National Center for Compositional Characterization of Materials
 Saha Institute for Nuclear Physics
 Supercomputer Education and Research Center
 Tata Institute of Fundamental Research
 Variable Energy Cyclotron Center

Facility Types
  Biological
 Chemical
 Missile
 Nuclear

Interactive Facilities Map

Get the Facts on India

 2008 Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) waiver permits nuclear trade even
though it is not an NPT member
 Abandoned its offensive chemical weapons (CW) program by 1997 and
destroyed its entire CW stockpile by 2009
 Developing a hypersonic cruise missile in collaboration with the Russian
Federation
Nuclear

Last Updated: November, 2019

India possesses both nuclear weapons and extensive nuclear fuel

cycle capabilities. India tested its first nuclear device in May 1974, and remains
outside both the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and
the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). However, India has a facility-
specific safeguards agreement in place with the International Atomic Energy
Agency (IAEA) and a waiver from the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) allowing it to
participate in global civilian nuclear technology commerce. India has a sizable and
growing nuclear arsenal, primarily due to decades of conflict with its nuclear-
armed neighbor Pakistan.

Capabilities

According to the 2019 SIPRI Yearbook, the Indian arsenal includes 130 to 140
warheads. [1] The ranges of such estimates are generally dependent on analyses
of India's stockpile of weapons-grade plutonium, which is estimated at 0.58 ± 0.15
tons. [2] India has also stockpiled roughly 4.0 ± 1.4 tons of highly enriched
uranium (HEU), some of which is intended for use in nuclear submarines and
research reactors. [3]

The plutonium for India's nuclear arsenal is obtained from the 100 MWt research
reactor, Dhruva, which began operations in 1988. [4] Another 40 MWt CIRUS
reactor produced about 4 to 7 kg of weapons-grade plutonium annually until it
was decommissioned in 2010 under the separation plan of the U.S.-India nuclear
cooperation agreement. [5] Irradiated fuel from the reactors is reprocessed at the
Plutonium Reprocessing Plant in Trombay, which has a capacity of roughly 50 tons
of spent nuclear fuel per year. [6] A 500MW prototype fast breeder reactor
(PFBR) at Kalpakkam in the South Indian state of Tamil Nadu was expected to
reach criticality by 2019 to increase India’s plutonium production capacity, but
has not yet reached this goal. Starting in 2021, India plans to construct six more
PFBR-type reactors. [7] [8]

Assessments of the yield and reliability of India's nuclear devices vary

considerably. When India tested its first fission device in May 1974, Indian
scientists claimed the device had a yield of about 12 kilotons (kt), while other
independent analysts estimated a much lower yield. [9] Similar disputes
surrounded India's May 1998 tests. After its first of round of tests on 11 May,
India announced that it had simultaneously tested three nuclear devices: a
thermonuclear device, a fission device, and a sub-kiloton device with a combined
yield of around 65 kt. [10] However, analysts and scientists outside of India –
citing evidence from geologic and seismic data – concluded that the cumulative
yield of the Indian tests was lower. [11] [12] Some scientists in India seem to
agree with this analysis and argue that India should therefore refrain from signing
the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) and conduct further tests. [13]
[14] [15] However, former leaders of the Atomic Energy Commission of India who
oversaw these tests dispute such claims, maintaining that their original estimates
were correct and that further testing is unnecessary. [16] [17] [18]

History

Developing a Peaceful Nuclear Program: 1947 to 1974

India's nuclear program was mainly conceived by Homi Bhabha, an influential

scientist who persuaded political leaders to invest resources in the nuclear sector.
[19] The first Indian Prime Minister, Jawaharlal Nehru, launched an ambitious
nuclear program to boost the country’s prestige and self-reliance in energy with
primary focus on producing inexpensive electricity. However, the decision to
develop the complete nuclear fuel cycle also gave India the technical capability to
pursue nuclear weapons. [20]

In the years that followed, the internal debate over whether India should develop
a nuclear explosive device continued. On one hand, the scientific establishment
wanted to prove that it was technically capable of detonating a nuclear device,
whereas hawks within the security establishment pointed to security
developments in China and elsewhere as necessitating a nuclear deterrent. [21]
Many politicians opposed nuclear weapons both for economic and moral reasons,
arguing that nuclear weapons would not make India safer, and that the solution
to nuclear proliferation was comprehensive global nuclear disarmament. [22] As a
result, a consensus emerged on both sides that India should not sign the Treaty
on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) when it was opened for
signature in 1968 unless the nuclear weapon states agreed to a clear plan for
nuclear disarmament. [23]
Prime Minister Lal Bahadur Shastri authorized theoretical work on the
Subterranean Nuclear Explosion for Peaceful Purposes (SNEPP) project in
November 1964. [24] In the late 1960s nuclear scientists continued to develop the
technical capacity for a nuclear explosion, although the political decision had not
yet been made to carry out the test. [25] Ultimately, on 18 May 1974, under
orders from Prime Minister Indira Gandhi, India tested a fission device which it
described as a “peaceful nuclear explosion” (PNE). [26]

The Slow Path Toward Weaponization: 1974 to 1998

India’s 1974 nuclear test was condemned by many countries as a violation of the
peaceful-use agreements underlying U.S. and Canadian-supplied nuclear
technology and material transfers, and was a major contributing factor to the
formation of the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG). [27] However, due to
international alarm about the military implications of its nuclear explosion, India
did not follow the 1974 test with subsequent tests, nor did it immediately
weaponize the device design that it had tested. [28] Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi
authorized weaponization of India's nuclear capability in late 1980s as a response
to oblique nuclear threats issued by Pakistan in the wake of the 1986 to 1987
Brasstacks crisis. [29] [30] At the same time, India continued to support efforts for
nuclear disarmament. In 1988, Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi submitted an Action
Plan for a Nuclear-Weapons-Free and Non-Violent World Order to the United
Nations General Assembly. [31]

As negotiations on the CTBT rapidly progressed in the early 1990s, India came to
regard the CTBT as an instrument of nonproliferation that sought to freeze
countries’ nuclear capabilities. This, along with the indefinite extension of the
NPT, reignited domestic political pressure to conduct further tests. [32] In 1995,
the Narasimha Rao government considered an accelerated program of nuclear
tests but test preparations were detected by U.S. intelligence agencies, and the
resultant U.S. diplomatic pressure convinced the Rao government to postpone
the tests. [33] When Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee came to power in 1998,
his government authorized two rounds of nuclear tests on 11 and 13 May 1998,
after which India formally declared itself to be a nuclear-weapon state. [34]
Almost no one outside of India foresaw the test; however, geospatial analysis by
Vipin Gupta and Frank Pabian had identified a likely site and timeframe for the
test. [35]
India as an Emerging Nuclear Power: 1998 to 2009

India’s nuclear tests were followed within a month by a similar set of tests by
Pakistan, resulting in fears in the international community of an arms race or an
escalation of conflict between the two openly declared nuclear powers in South
Asia. [36] The 1999 Kargil War and the 2001 to 2002 Twin Peaks Crisis heightened
tensions between the two countries, although these conventional conflicts did
not escalate to the nuclear level. [37] [38] The US government imposed sanctions
on both India and Pakistan in response to their 1998 nuclear tests [39].

After the 1998 tests the Indian government established a National Security
Advisory Board, which issued a Draft Report on Indian Nuclear Doctrine in 1999
that broadly outlined India’s nuclear no-first-use policy and defensive posture of
“credible minimum nuclear deterrence.” [40] In January 2003, a Ministry of
External Affairs press release maintained adherence to no-first-use, although with
the condition that nuclear weapons could also be used in retaliation for a
biological or chemical attack, or to protect Indian forces operating in Pakistan.
[41] In line with this posture, India does not keep its nuclear force at a heightened
state of alert. The country’s nuclear weapons remain under the control of the
civilian Nuclear Command Authority (NCA), comprising of a Political Council,
chaired by the Prime Minister, and an Executive Council, led by the National
Security Advisor. [42]

A turning point in U.S.-India relations occurred when plans for negotiating a U.S.-
India nuclear cooperation agreement were unveiled in July 2005 under the
George W. Bush administration. This agreement, and the subsequent
endorsement of India's case by the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), enabled India
to engage in international nuclear trade. In return, India agreed to allow
safeguards on a select number of its nuclear facilities that are classified as
"civilian" in purpose. The remaining "military" facilities remained off-limits to
international inspectors. The U.S. Congress passed the Hyde Act in January 2006
to exempt nuclear cooperation with India from provisions of the U.S. Atomic
Energy Act, allowing for the adoption of a bilateral 123 nuclear cooperation
agreement in August 2007. [43] In September 2008, the NSG approved an
exemption allowing the members of this export control regime to conduct nuclear
trade with India. [44] Finally, a safeguards agreement for select civilian nuclear
facilities was concluded between India and the International Atomic Energy
Agency (IAEA) in February 2009, after approval by the IAEA Board of Governors
the previous year. [45]

India as an Established Nuclear Power: 2009 to Present

In October 2009, India submitted a separation plan to put its civilian nuclear
facilities under IAEA safeguards by 2014. [46] In late July 2010, India and the
United States signed a bilateral agreement allowing India to reprocess U.S.-
obligated nuclear material at two new reprocessing facilities, to be constructed
and placed under IAEA safeguards. [47] However, the nuclear power industry did
not grow as expected because India's liability laws regulating civilian nuclear
power plants far exceeded the international standards for nuclear liability and
held suppliers legally liable for any damages resulting from accidents. To address
these concerns and give impetus to nuclear power industry, India ratified the IAEA
Convention on Supplementary Compensation for Nuclear Damage in 2016. [48]

By 2019, India had put total of 26 reactors under IAEA safeguards. [49] Enabled by
the NSG waiver granted to it in 2008, India has signed nuclear cooperation
agreements with Russia, United States, France, United Kingdom, South Korea,
Canada, Argentina, Kazakhstan, Mongolia, Australia, Sri Lanka, Japan, Vietnam,
Bangladesh, Czech Republic and Namibia. [50] Additionally, India continues to
participate in international nuclear trade and has signed agreements with Canada,
Kazakhstan and Australia to supply uranium to fuel its civilian nuclear reactors.
Negotiations are currently underway for concluding negotiations to construct six
reactors in the Indian state of Andhra Pradesh by Westinghouse. [51]

Recent Developments and Current Status

India was recently accepted as a member of three of the four major export
control regimes. It was admitted as a member into the Missile Technology Control
Regime (MTCR) in 2016, Wassenaar Arrangement in 2017 and Australia Group in
2018. [52] [53] [54]

India has been actively pursuing membership into the NSG and has received
explicit support for its membership from many current NSG members including
the United States, Russia, Switzerland and Japan. [55] [56] [57] [58] In arguing for
NSG membership, India has portrayed itself as a responsible nuclear power,
pointing to its positive record on nonproliferation and consistent support for
complete nuclear disarmament. [59] However, China does not support an explicit
membership in the NSG for India but instead proposes a two-step approach: first
would be to reach consensus on a non-discriminatory resolution that would apply
to all non-NPT countries alike and then discuss individual membership
applications by non-NPT countries. [60] India argues that its membership should
be considered under current rules because NSG is an export-control mechanism
and not a nonproliferation one so question of linking NSG membership to the NPT
membership does not arise. [61] Furthermore, India argues that there is a
precedent for non-signatories of NPT joining the NSG when France became a
founding member of the NSG in 1974 but did not accede to the NPT until 1992.
[62]

India’s declared nuclear posture is of credible minimum deterrence and has

successfully developed a strategic triad of nuclear delivery systems. [63] [64] India
has not signed the CTBT, but maintains a unilateral moratorium on nuclear testing
and supports negotiations for a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT) that is
"universal, non-discriminatory, and internationally verifiable." [65] The Indian
mission to the United Nations has also submitted several draft recommendations
on “reducing nuclear danger,” which include “steps to reduce the risks of
unintentional and accidental use of nuclear weapons, including through de-
alerting and de-targeting nuclear weapons.” [66] At the same time, India has
remained firmly outside of the NPT, arguing that “nuclear weapons are an integral
part of our national security and will remain so pending the global elimination of
all nuclear weapons.” [67] India maintains its official commitment to no-first-use
of nuclear weapons. However, during prepared remarks at the Pokhran nuclear
test site in August 2019, Indian Defence Minister Rajnath Singh implied that
India’s no first use policy would not be continued indefinitely. [68]
 

India

In this Section:

 Overview
 Analysis
 Treaties
 Official Documents
 Facilities

 Nuclear
 Biological
 Missile
 Chemical

Missile

Last Updated: November, 2019

India views its nuclear weapons and long-range power projection programs as the
key to maintaining strategic stability in the Asia-Pacific region and attaining great-
power status. India's strategic missile programs have matured such that it
currently has the capacity to deploy short-, medium-, and long-range ballistic
missiles. Four decades of investment in indigenous missile-related design,
development, and manufacturing infrastructure, necessary due to India’s non-
membership in the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) until 2016, have
made the Indian missile sector nearly invulnerable to long-term disruption by
export controls.

India has demonstrated its continued commitment to wide-ranging ballistic and

cruise missile capabilities with the development of the Agni-V land-based
intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM), K series sea-based ballistic missile, and
BrahMos cruise missile. Recently, Indian defense planners have begun to shift
their focus from the development of new missile technologies towards serial
production of existing missiles. In a shift from previous self-sufficiency-centered
policy, India is increasingly pursuing foreign collaboration, suggesting confidence
in its indigenous missile capabilities. [1]

Capabilities

Ballistic Missiles

The Prithvi-II, Agni-I, Agni-II, Agni-III, and Agni-IV are India's fully operational land-
based ballistic missiles and form the foundation of the country's ballistic missile
arsenal. [2] In 2018 India conducted three tests of its first indigenous ICBM, the
Agni-V. [3]

The Prithvi-II and Agni-I are short-range ballistic missiles (SRBMs) with ranges of
300 and 700 km respectively. Agni-II, deployed in 2011, has a range of 2000 km
and can strike anywhere in Pakistan and most parts of south and southeastern
China. Agni-III, with a range of between 3,500 and 5,000 km was deployed in
2014. [4] India has also developed but not yet deployed Agni-IV and Agni-V
missiles with range of 3500km and 5200 km respectively. [5]

India also has submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) capabilities. The

Dhanush SLBM, deployed in 2013, has a range of 400 km. India is developing
other SLBMs to equip its planned indigenous nuclear-powered ballistic missile
submarine (SSBN) fleet. The K-15 (Sagarika or B-05) was deployed in 2017 and has
a range of 700 km. The K-15 has been successfully tested from the Indian SSBN,
INS Arihant. [6] A 3500 km range K-4 SLBM is under development and has been
successfully tested multiple times but the latest test in 2017 reportedly failed. [7]
Other K family SLBMs, namely K-5 and K-6 with ranges of 5000 km and 6000 km
respectively are also rumored to be under development. [8]

Cruise Missiles

The BrahMos supersonic cruise missile, a joint Indian-Russian project, is the

mainstay of Indian cruise missile capabilities. The BrahMos can travel at speeds up
to Mach 3.0, is equipped with advanced satellite navigation, and has a range
between 300-500 km. [9] Sea-, air- and submarine-launched variants of BrahMos
have also been developed. An improved variant, BrahMos-NG with speeds up to
Mach 3.5 is under development as well. [10]
In 2014, India successfully tested its first indigenously designed and developed
long-range cruise missile, the Nirbhay. [11] The Nirbhay can travel at speeds up to
Mach 0.7 and has an operational range of 1,000km. [12]

Space Program

India has one of the world's most advanced space programs. The Indian Space
Research Organization (ISRO) launched the first Indian space launch vehicle (SLV)
in 1980, and has since become a leader in scientific and commercial spaceflight.
ISRO has developed newer and improved SLVs such as Polar Satellite Launch
Vehicle (PSLV), Geosynchronous Satellite Launch Vehicle (GSLV) and
Geosynchronous Satellite Launch Vehicle Mark-III (GSLV III). ISRO also frequently
contracts with other countries to launch their satellites into orbit. As of November
2019, India had successfully launched 243 domestic and foreign satellites into
orbit aboard its PSLV rocket. [13]

Missile Defense Systems

Indian missile defense is a double-tiered system. The first tier uses the Prithvi Air
Defence (PAD/Pradyumna) and Prithvi Defense Vehicle (PDV) for exo-atmospheric
intercepts. The PAD is slated to be replaced by the PDV system because the latter
is equipped with an indigenous Imaging Infrared (IIR) seeker that can distinguish
between incoming warheads and decoys. [14] The second tier uses the
Advanced/Ashvin Air Defense (AAD) for endo-atmospheric intercepts. [15] The
AAD system can reach top speeds of up to Mach 4.5. [16] Assistance from Russia,
Israel and France has increased the development and capabilities of the AAD. [17]
India’s indigenous BMD system can reportedly intercept medium-range ballistic
missiles traveling at speeds of Mach 3 to 8. [18] In March 2019 India completed
an anti-satellite (ASAT) test using a modified PDV Mark-II, which may become a
more integrated part of its missile defense. [19]

In addition to development of indigenous missile defense capabilities, India is also

looking to augment its ballistic missile defenses by importing radars and other
systems from elsewhere. In 2018, India signed an agreement with Russia to buy
Russian S-400 Triumf air defense missile system. [20] India is also in talks with the
United States to buy the National Advanced Surface to Air Missile System-II to
protect its capital, New Delhi. [21] There are also reports that India is trying to
develop lasers or Directed energy weapons (DEW) to bolster its missile defense
capabilities. Although a successful technology demonstration test for DEWs was
conducted in 2018, officials conceded that “The weapon is not ready yet and it
will take years for it to happen,” [22]

Import and Export Behavior

Russia continues to play a significant role in India's missile program. Strong

defense ties between Russia and India date back to the Cold War and have
continued despite the collapse of the Soviet Union. [23] The BrahMos missile
program was conceived as a joint venture between the DRDO and Russia's State
Unitary Enterprise NPO Mashinostroyenia (NPOM) in 1998 and consequently,
India successfully tested the land-based variant of BrahMos in 2001. [24] Since
then, sea-, air- and submarine-launched variants of BrahMos have also been
developed and deployed. The Sagarika SLBM is reported to have received
technical assistance from Russia's NPOM, which also supplied the missile's
guidance hardware. [25]

Between 2012-2016, India was consistently the largest importer of major arms in
the world with arms imports from USA, Russia, France, Israel, South Korea and
other countries. [26] In 2016, the DoD notified the sale of 22 Harpoon anti-ship
missiles to India to be fitted on their submarines. [27]

India has historically been wary of exporting defense equipment, which it believes
indirectly fuels conflicts. [28] However, India’s position seems to be evolving on
this issue. In 2017, it signed a deal to supply indigenously developed lightweight
torpedoes to Myanmar (Burma). [29] Vietnam is also in talks with India to buy
BrahMos anti-ship cruise missile system and surface-to-air Akash missiles. [30]

History

1958 to 1970: The Push for Self-Reliance

India's first missile program began in 1958 - the same year Prime Minister Nehru
approved the construction of a plutonium reprocessing plant at Trombay. [31]
The project was a modest attempt to construct anti-tank guided missiles. [32] In
addition, the missile group examined the development of a liquid fueled sustainer
engine - most likely based on the SA-2 from the Soviet Union. [33] Both projects
were undertaken by the DRDO and its principal missile laboratory, the Defence
Research and Development Laboratory (DRDL). The program emphasized gaining
scientific expertise and creating a technological base for eventually building
modern missiles indigenously. [34] No plans were made in the short-term for the
mass production of missile systems. However, the DRDO's technical and
organizational shortcomings, opposition from the armed services, and weak
support from politicians and civilian bureaucrats in the federal government
resulted in the failure and ultimate termination of both projects. [35]

India received the French Centaure research rocket in May 1964 and began
reproducing it with modifications. [36] Indian engineers therefore had 20 years of
rocket experience, including satellite launches and recovery, before the country
commenced a dedicated missile program in 1985.

1971 to 1980: Technological Setbacks

Two major programs occupied Indian missile efforts in the 1970s - Project Devil
and Project Valiant. Project Valiant explored the development of a long-range
ballistic missile with a range approaching 8,000 km but for technological and
bureaucratic reasons, leading officials in the DRDO were unenthusiastic about the
project and cited a crippling shortage of the scientific and engineering expertise
needed to complete such an ambitious project. [37] [38] After technical problems
with the missile's engine proved too great to overcome, the project was shelved
in 1974. [39] In 1972, work began on Project Devil, an attempt to "acquire
detailed knowledge" of an operational missile by reverse-engineering the Soviet-
designed SA-2 surface-to-air missile (SAM). [40] The SA-2 was powered by a liquid
fueled sustainer engine and a solid fueled booster; Project Devil engineers hoped
to be able to produce it indigenously by the end of the decade. [41] The project
suffered monumental technological and capacity setbacks but fulfilled the core
components of its mission: "two solid-fuel boosters and a three-ton liquid
sustainer engine" emerged from the effort, which would later serve as the
platform for the Prithvi missile series. [42] Nevertheless, the project failed to
replicate the SA-2, and funding for the project ended in 1980. [43]

Similar to India's "peaceful nuclear explosion" in 1974, these projects appear to

have been a function of the political leadership's desire to demonstrate the
country's technological prowess and project India as a great power, rather than
an initiative to meet a pressing security concern. The armed forces' indifference
to Project Devil and Valiant indicate that political rather than strictly national
security considerations were behind missile development in the 1970s. [44]
The first successful launch of an Indian SLV came in 1980, after more than fifteen
years of research and development. After the launch, the head of India's Space
Sciences Technology Center (SSTC) noted that "India can now walk on two legs"
(i.e., that India had a delivery system for its nuclear warheads). [45]

1981 to 2010: Emergence of a Full-Fledged Missile Program

India began making its first substantive achievements in missile development

after Indira Gandhi, a proponent of nuclear weapons, returned to power in 1980.
In 1982 a committee was formed which studied various options for missile
development and a year later, the committee unveiled the framework for the
Integrated Guided Missile Program (IGMDP). The IGMDP was the organizational
vehicle by which the DRDO engineered India's modern missile systems. [46] Along
with the Trishul short-range surface-to-air missile, the Akash long-range surface-
to-air missile, and the Nag anti-tank missile - of immediate interest to the armed
forces in the early 1980s - the IGMDP produced the Prithvi and Agni missile series.
[47]

Unlike the Indian missile projects in the 1970s, the IGMDP enjoyed consistent
political and financial support throughout the 1980s and 1990s. [48] Amidst
technology-denial sanctions imposed by the international community after India's
1974 nuclear test, political leaders and civilian bureaucrats pushed for increased
research in dual-use civilian technologies such as the SLV. [49] New Delhi
sponsored, for example, the development of the SLV-3, the motor of which was
considered by some to be the first Agni "technology demonstrator." [50]

The simultaneous development of the Prithvi and Agni missile series emerged
from a debate amongst DRDO officials in the early 1980s about whether to pursue
liquid- or solid-fueled missiles. [51] Solid-fuel proponents argued that the simple
design features and easy maintenance of solid-fuel engines outweighed the
limited technological flexibility of liquid-fueled designs. [52] Prior experience with
liquid-fueled motors in the 1970s under Project Devil and Project Valiant
eventually led officials to pursue the liquid-fuel option for the Prithvi series, but
they chose to use solid-fuel engines for the Agni series. [53]

Prithvi-I provided India with a rudimentary short-range (150 km) option for
deploying a limited nuclear strike capability against Pakistan. [54] By 1994, two
successful flight-tests of the 1,400 km-range Agni-1 missile confirmed India's re-
entry vehicle technology and demonstrated mastery of staging. [55] The Agni
program thus served as the foundation for the design and development of longer-
range ballistic missile systems, while the Prithvi remained the country's lone
operational strategic missile. [56]

The latter half of the 1990s and early 2000s were characterized by continued
technological development of the Prithvi and Agni ballistic missiles, and pursuit of
more sophisticated missile delivery options. [57] The DRDO embarked on
programs to develop longer-range versions of the Agni: Agni-II (3000 km) and
Agni-III (5000 km), and Prithvi: Prithvi-II (350 km) and Prithvi-III (600 km). In 2001,
India successfully tested its first supersonic cruise missile, called BrahMos which
was developed with Russian collaboration.

India’s ballistic missile defense got a boost in 2006 when the first tier in India’s
ballistic missile defense system, PAD/Pradyumna was tested. PAD was tested with
a maximum interception altitude of 80 km and is designed to neutralize missiles
within a range of 300-2000 km up to a speed of Mach 5.0. In 2007, the second tier
called the Advanced Air Defense (AAD) was tested. In 2008, DRDO also began
developing a sea-launched ballistic missile, the Sagarika, which was tested from
submersible pontoons. [58]

India and Israel also signed an agreement to jointly develop the Barak-8 surface to
air missile (previously known as LR-SAM and MR-SAM) that is designed to defend
against airborne threats such as aircraft, helicopters, anti-ship missiles, and UAVs.
Sea- and land-based versions of the system exist. The first successful test of the
sea-based version was conducted in 2010. [59]

2011 to the Present: Improvements in Missile Technology and MTCR

Membership

In 2012, India for the first time successfully tested the Dhanush missile. It is a
variant of the surface-to-surface or ship-to-ship Prithvi-3 missile and has been
developed for the Indian Navy. It has a range of 350 km and is capable of carrying
both conventional as well as nuclear warheads. [60]

In July 2013, India announced it would begin withdrawing the 17-year-old Prithvi-I
and replacing it with the 150 km solid-fueled, road-mobile Prahar missile, which
was first tested in 2011. The Prahar is smaller, more maneuverable, and faster to
launch than the Prithvi-I. It has a maximum payload of 200 kg and is capable of
carrying only conventional or tactical nuclear weapons. The timeline for the
switchover from the Prithvi-I to the Prahar has not been announced. [61]

The Agni ballistic missile family has also undergone significant recent
improvements in range and sophistication. Agni-III, with a range of over 3,200 km
was inducted into the armed forces in 2011 after a series of successful tests and
user trials. [62] India also successfully fight tested the Agni-IV, with declared range
of 4000 km multiple times since 2011 before inducting it into the armed forces in
2014. [63]

The long-anticipated Agni-V has also been successfully tested multiple times since
2012. [64] While its tested range of 5000 km falls short of ICBM status, the
missile's range can be increased with relatively minor technological adjustments;
experts therefore consider the Agni-5 to be an ICBM. [65] Even with a range of
only 5,000 km, the Agni-V could hit any target in China, including Beijing. The
Agni-V is also rumored to be equipped with MIRV technology. [66] However, Agni-
V will need to be tested multiple times before it can be operationally deployed
with the Indian armed forces. [67]

The development of the indigenous Nirbhay long-range cruise missile has been
hailed as a hallmark moment in India's missile development. [68] Nirbhay is a long
range, all-weather, subsonic cruise missile designed and developed by DRDO and
is capable of carrying conventional and nuclear warheads. It is currently under
development and undergoing flight trials.

As a member of the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), Russia could not
jointly develop any missile beyond the 300 km range with a non-MTCR member.
However, with India’s acceptance into the MTCR in 2016, those restrictions are no
longer valid. Consequently, India and Russia announced that they will develop an
extended range version of BrahMos cruise missile. [69] [70] In 2017, a longer-
range version of BrahMos, called the BrahMos-ER, with reported range of about
800 km was successfully tested. [71] [72]

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