A. G.R. No.

L-6355-56 August 31, 1953

PASTOR M. ENDENCIA and FERNANDO JUGO, plaintiffs-appellees, vs.

SATURNINO DAVID, as Collector of Internal Revenue, defendant-appellant.

FACTS: Saturnino David, then Internal Revenue Collector, was ordered by the Court of
First Instance of Manila to refund to Justice Pastor M. Endencia the sum of
P1,744.45, representing the income tax collected on his salary as Associate
Justice of the Court of Appeals in 1951, and to Justice Fernando Jugo the amount
of P2,345.46, representing the income tax collected on his salary from January
1,1950 to October 19, 1950, Associate Justice of the Supreme Court. The CFI ruled
that under the doctrine laid down by the Supreme Court in Perfecto vs. Meer, the
collection of income taxes from the salaries of said justices was a diminution of their
compensation and therefore was in violation of the constitution.

The Solicitor General on behalf of appellant Collector of Internal Revenue contends that
after the SC’s promulgation of the decision in the case of Perfecto vs. Meer, Congress
enacted Republic Act No. 590 to authorize and legalize the collection of income tax on
the salaries of judicial officers, if not to counteract the ruling in said case.

ISSUE: Whether or not the legislature can enact a law counteracting a ruling of the
Supreme Court, which is tantamount to an interpretation of a law.

HELD: No. Only the Judicial Department has the exclusive power to interpret and
apply laws. Congress makes laws but courts interpret them. Defining and
interpreting the law is a judicial function and the legislative branch may not limit or
restrict the power granted to the courts by the Constitution.

In Sec. 13, R.A. 590, Congress is already encroaching upon the court’s power to
interpret laws when it inserted the phrase: “payment of which tax is hereby declared not
to be a diminution of his compensation fixed by the Constitution or by law.” By inserting
the said phrase, Congress is already making an interpretation or ascertainment of
the meaning of the phrase "which shall not be diminished during their
continuance in office," found in section 9, Article VIII of the Constitution. This act
of interpreting the Constitution by the Legislature is an invasion of the well-defined and
established province and jurisdiction of the Judiciary.

The court reiterates the doctrine laid down in the case of Perfecto vs. Meer, to the effect
that the collection of income tax on the salary of a judicial officer is a diminution thereof
and so violates the Constitution. Hence, the decision appealed from is affirmed by the
Supreme Court.

Hence, the decision appealed from is affirmed.

B. G.R. No. 78780 July 23, 1987

DAVID G. NITAFAN, WENCESLAO M. POLO, and MAXIMO A. SAVELLANO, JR.,

petitioners, vs. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE and THE FINANCIAL
OFFICER, SUPREME COURT OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

FACTS: Petitioners are the appointed Judges of Branches 52, 19 and 53 of the
Regional Trial Court, Manila, who sought to prohibit and/or perpetually enjoin
respondents from making any deduction of withholding taxes from their salaries.
They submit that "any tax withheld from their emoluments or compensation as judicial
officers constitutes a decrease or diminution of their salaries, contrary to the provision of
Section 10, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution which mandates that "during their
continuance in office, their salary shall not be decreased.”

The Court had already dealt with the matter administratively when it reaffirmed the Chief
Justice's previous and standing directive to the Fiscal Management and Budget Office
of this Court to continue with the deduction of the withholding taxes from the salaries of
the Justices of the Supreme Court as well as from the salaries of all other members of
the judiciary.

ISSUE: Whether or not the members of the Judiciary exempt from payment of income
tax based on Section 10, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution.

HELD: No. The provision in the 1987 Constitution, which petitioners rely on,
reads:

The salary of the Chief Justice and of the Associate Justices of the Supreme
Court, and of judges of lower courts shall be fixed by law. During their
continuance in office, their salary shall not be decreased.

The debates, interpellations and opinions expressed regarding the constitutional

provision in question disclosed that the true intent of the framers of the 1987
Constitution, in adopting it, was to make the salaries of members of the Judiciary
taxable. The ascertainment of that intent is but in keeping with the fundamental
principle of constitutional construction that the intent of the framers of the organic law
and of the people adopting it should be given effect.

The primary task in constitutional construction is to ascertain and thereafter assure the
realization of the purpose of the framers and of the people in the adoption of the
Constitution. It may also be safely assumed that the people in ratifying the Constitution
were guided mainly by the explanation offered by the framers.

The ruling that "the imposition of income tax upon the salary of judges is a dimunition
thereof, and so violates the Constitution" in Perfecto vs. Meer, as affirmed in Endencia
vs. David must be declared discarded. The framers of the fundamental law, as the
alter ego of the people, have expressed in clear and unmistakable terms the
meaning and import of Section 10, Article VIII, of the 1987 Constitution that they
have adopted.

Hence, the petition for Prohibition is dismissed.

C. G.R. No. 82511 March 3, 1992

GLOBE-MACKAY CABLE AND RADIO CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. NATIONAL

LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION and IMELDA SALAZAR, respondents

FACTS: Private respondent Imelda L. Salazar, was employed as general systems

analyst of Globe-Mackay Cable and Radio Corp. (GMRC). Meanwhile, Delfin Saldivar,
whom Imelda was allegedly very close, was employed as technical operations' support
manager was also an employee of the petitioner.

Petitioner GMCR, prompted by reports that company equipment and spare parts worth
thousands of dollars under the custody of Saldivar were missing, caused the
investigation of the latter's activities. An investigation was made by the company's
internal auditor, Mr. Agustin Maramara, indicating that Saldivar had entered into a
partnership styled Concave Commercial and Industrial Company with Richard A.
Yambao, owner and manager of Elecon Engineering Services (Elecon), a supplier of
petitioner often recommended by Saldivar. The report also disclosed that Saldivar had
taken petitioner's missing Fedders airconditioning unit for his own personal use without
authorization and also connived with Yambao to defraud petitioner of its property. The
airconditioner was recovered only after petitioner GMCR filed an action for replevin
against Saldivar. The investigation also revealed that Imelda Salazar violated the
company’s regulations by involving herself in transactions conflicting with the
company's interests. Evidence showed that she signed as a witness to the
articles of partnership between Yambao and Saldivar. It also appeared that she
had full knowledge of the loss and whereabouts of the Fedders airconditioner but
failed to inform her employer.

Hence, petitioner placed private respondent Salazar under preventive suspension for
one (1) month, giving her thirty (30) days within which to, explain her side. However,
private respondent filed a complaint against petitioner for illegal suspension, which she
subsequently amended to include illegal dismissal, vacation and sick leave benefits,
13th month pay and damages, after petitioner notified her in writing that she was
considered dismissed "in view of her inability to refute and disprove the findings.

The Labor arbiter ruled in favor of Salazar and ordered the company to reinstate her
with an equivalent position and to pay her full back wages and benefits, plus moral
damages. National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) affirmed the labor arbiter's
decision but limited back wages for only two years and deleted the award of moral
damages.
ISSUE: Whether or not the private respondent Salazar was illegally dismissed and
should be reinstated and entitled to backwages.

HELD: Private respondent’s dismissal was not for cause and she should be
reinstated and entitled to backwages.

The Constitution recognizes “security of tenure" as one of the rights of labor which the
State is mandated to protect. An illegally dismissed employee is entitled to the twin
remedies of reinstatement and payment of backwages. However, in lieu of
reinstatement, the Court has variously ordered the payment of backwages and
separation pay or solely separation pay. 

The wording of the Labor Code is clear and unambiguous: "An employee who is
unjustly dismissed from work  shall  be entitled to reinstatement. . . . and to his full
backwages. . . ."  Under the principles of statutory construction, if a statute is
clears plain and free from ambiguity, it must be given its literal meaning and
applied without attempted interpretation. This plain-meaning rule or verba
legis  derived from the maxim index animi sermo est  (speech is the index of intention)
rests on the valid presumption that the words employed by, the legislature in a statute
correctly express its intent or will and preclude the court from construing it differently. 
The legislature is presumed to know the meaning of the words, to have used words
advisedly, and to have expressed its intent by the use of such words as are found in the
statute. Verba legis non est recedendum , or from the words of a statute there should
be no departure. Neither does the provision admit of any qualification . If in the
wisdom of the Court, there may be a ground or grounds for non-application of the
above-cited provision, this should be by way of exception, such as when the
reinstatement may be inadmissible due to ensuing strained relations between the
employer and the employee.

In private respondent’s case, there is no evidence to show an authorized, much less a

legal, cause for the dismissal of private respondent. Moreover, it has not been proved
that the position of private respondent as systems analyst is one that may be
characterized as a position of trust and confidence such that if reinstated, it may
well lead to strained relations between employer and employee. This does not
constitute an exception to the general rule mandating reinstatement for an
employee who has been unlawfully dismissed. Thus, private respondent had every
right, not only to be entitled to reinstatement, but as well, to full backwages.
D. G.R. No. L-42050-66 November 20, 1978

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. HONORABLE JUDGE AMANTE

P. PURISIMA, et.al., respondents.

FACTS: Twenty-six (26) Petitions for Review filed by the People of the Philippines
are consolidated as they involve one basic question of law.

These Petitions or appeals involve three Courts of First Instance, namely: the Court of
First Instance of Manila, Branch VII, the Court of First Instance of Manila, Branch
XVIII, and, the Court of First Instance of Samar. Before those courts, Informations
were filed charging the respective accused with "illegal possession of deadly
weapon" in violation of Presidential Decree No. 9. On a motion to quash filed by
the accused, the three CFIs mentioned above issued an Order quashing or
dismissing the Informations, on a  common ground, that the Information did not
allege facts which constitute the offense penalized by Presidential Decree No. 9
because it failed to state one essential element of the crime, viz: that the carrying
outside of the accused's residence of a bladed, pointed or blunt weapon is in
furtherance or on the occasion of, connected with or related to subversion, insurrection,
or rebellion, organized lawlessness or public disorder.

ISSUES:
(1) Whether or not Ordinance No. 3820, as amended by Ordinance No. 3928 of the
City of Manila and Section 26 of Act No. 1780 are deemed repealed by P.D. 9
(3).
(2) Whether or not a simple act of carrying any of the weapons described in P.D. 9, if
concealed, is a criminal offense in itself.

HELD:
(1) No, Ordinance No. 3820, as amended by Ordinance No. 3928 of the City of
Manila and Section 26 of Act No. 1780 are not deemed repealed by P.D. 9 (3). P.D.
9(3) does not contain any repealing clause or provision, and repeal by implication
is not favored.  This principle holds true with greater force with regards to penal
statutes which as a rule are to be construed strictly against the state and liberally in
favor of the accused. 
 
(2) No, there must be criminal intent for the carrying and concealment of the
weapons before the act becomes an offense punishable under P.D.9. The offense
under P.D. 9 carries two elements: first, the carrying outside one's residence of any
bladed, blunt, or pointed weapon, etc. not used as a necessary tool or implement
for a livelihood; and second, that the act of carrying the weapon was either in
furtherance of, or to abet, or in connection with subversion, rebellion,
insurrection, lawless violence, criminality, chaos, or public disorder. Meanwhile,
petitioner contends that P.D. 9(3) covers one and all situations where a person carries
outside his residence any of the weapons mentioned or described in the decree
irrespective of motivation, intent, or purpose. Thus, an ambiguity exists, which calls
for judicial interpretation of the true meaning and scope of the measure, guided
by the basic principle that penal statutes are to be construed and applied liberally
in favor of the accused and strictly against the state.

In the construction or interpretation of a legislative the primary rule is to search for and
determine the intent and spirit of the law. Legislative intent is the controlling factor,
for whatever is within the spirit of a statute is within the statute, and this has to
be so if strict adherence to the letter would result in absurdity, injustice and
contradictions. In this case, certain aids available are available to ascertain the intent
or reason for P.D. 9(3). First, the presence of events which led to or precipitated
the enactment of P.D. 9, which are clearly spelled out in the "Whereas" clauses of
the presidential decree. To determine what acts fall within the purview of P.D. 9, it
is necessary to inquire into the intent and spirit of the decree and this can be
found among others in the preamble or, whereas" clauses which enumerate the
facts or events which justify the promulgation of the decree and the stiff
sanctions stated therein. Second, the result or effects of the presidential decree
must be within its reason or intent. Thus, it follows that it is only that act of
carrying a blunt or bladed weapon with a motivation connected with or related to
the events mentioned in the whereas clauses that is within the intent of P.D. 9(3),
and nothing else.

The court denies these 26 Petitions for Review and We AFFIRM the Orders of
respondent Judges dismissing or quashing the Information concerned, subject however
to Our observations made in the preceding pages 23 to 25 of this Decision regarding
the right of the State or Petitioner herein to file either an amended Information under
Presidential Decree No. 9, paragraph 3, or a new one under other existing statute or city
ordinance as the facts may warrant.

E. G.R. No. L-44143 August 31, 1988

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff, vs. EUSEBIO NAZARIO, accused-

appellant.

FACTS: Appellant, Nazario was charged with violation of Municipal Ordinance No. 4
of Pagbilao, Quezon Province which mandates that any owner or manager of
fishponds should pay a municipal tax amounting to 3 pesos per hectare after the
lapse of 3 years following the approval of the fishponds by the Bureau of
Fisheries.

The trial Court finds appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
violation of Municipal Ordinance No. 4, series of 1955, as amended by Ordinance
No. 15, series of 1965 and further amended by Ordinance No. 12, series of 1966, of
the Municipal Council of Pagbilao, Quezon; and sentenced him to pay a fine of P50.00,
with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency at the rate of P8.00 a day, and to
pay the costs of this proceeding.
Appellant admitted to the said violations but argued that such ordinances were
unconstitutional or do not apply to his case on the ground that the assailed ordinances
are vague. He contends that he is a mere lessee of the fishpond hence he is not
contemplated in the does not fall within those who are “owners” or “manager”.
He also imputes such vagueness on the date of for the reckoning of payment because
Ordinance 4 provides that parties shall commence payment after the lapse of 3
years following the approval of the fishpond, Ordinance 12 states that liability for
the tax will begin from 1964 if the fishpond started operating before said year.

ISSUE: Whether or not the assailed ordinances are null and void for being ambiguous
and uncertain.

HELD: No, the assailed ordinances are valid. It is a well-settled rule that the
statute may be said to be vague if it lacks comprehensible standards that men of
common intelligence would necessarily guess its meaning and differ to its
application. It is said to be repugnant to the Constitution because it violates the due
process for failing to accord the parties of fair notice of what conduct to avoid and
because it grants law makers unbridled discretion in enforcing the statute. However, to
be declared utterly vague, the assailed statute must not be able to be clarified by a
saving clause of through construction.

In this case, the Court held that assailed ordinances are not vague and ambiguous. As
an operator of a fish pond, the appellant falls within the term manager. In fact, he
never denied the fact that he financed the construction of the fishponds,
introduced fish fries and had employed laborers to maintain them. Moreover, there
is also no merit to the other contention that Ordinance 12 and 15 are applied
retroactively for they are in the nature of curative measures intended to facilitate the
collection Ordinance 4 has prescribed (May 14, 1955).

Hence, it is suffice to say that as the actual operator of the fishponds in question,
and as the recipient of profits brought about by the business, the appellant is
clearly liable for the municipal taxes in question. He cannot say that he did not
have a fair notice of such a liability to make such ordinances vague.

The appeal is DISMISSED.

F. G.R. No. L-9274 February 1, 1957

RUFINO LOPEZ & SONS, INC., petitioner, vs. THE COURT OF TAX APPEALS,
respondent.

FACTS: Petitioner Lopez & Sons imported hexagonal wire netting from Hamburg,
Germany. The Manila Collector of Customs assessed the corresponding customs
duties on the importation on the basis of consular and supplies invoices. Said
customs duties were paid and the shipments were released. Subsequently,
however, and freight of said wire netting and as a result of the reassessment, additional
customs duties (P 1,966.59) were levied and imposed upon petitioner.

Failing to secure a reconsideration of the reassessment and levy of additional

customs duties, petitioner appealed to the Court of Tax Appeals but was
dismissed on the ground that it had no jurisdiction to review decisions of the
Collector of Customs of Manila, citing section 7 of Republic Act No. 1125,
creating said tax court.

On appeal with the Supreme Court, petitioner contends that the literal meaning of
Section 11 of Republic Act No. 1125 should be adopted in the sense that the
Court of Tax Appeals has concurrent jurisdiction with the Commissioner of
Customs over Appeals from decisions of Collectors of Customs , so that a person
adversely affected by a decision of a Collector of Customs is given the choice of
appealing the said decision either to the Commissioner of Customs or to the Court of
Tax Appeals.

ISSUE: Whether Section 11 of RA 1125 allows the Court of Tax Appeals to review
decisions of the Collector of Customs.

HELD: No, the CTA has no jurisdiction to review by appeal decisions of the Collector of
Customs. Section 11 of Republic Act 1125 may well be regarded as a mere
complement or implementation of section 7. Since section 7 provides that the Tax
Court has jurisdiction to review by appeal, decisions of the Collector of Internal
Revenue, decisions of the Commissioner of Customs, and decisions of provincial
or city Boards of Assessment Appeals, so section 11 naturally provides that
persons adversely affected by said decisions may appeal to the Tax Court.
However, in enumerating the governmental bodies or agencies rendering said
decisions that may be appealed, it erroneously listed the Collector instead of the
Commissioner, of Customs. When the interpretation of a statute according to the
exact and literal import of its words would lead to absurd or mischievous results,
or would contravene the clear purposes of the Legislature, it should be construed
according to its spirit and reason, disregarding as far as necessary, the latter of
the law. Statutes may be extended to cover cases not within the literal meaning of the
terms, for that which is clearly within the intention of the Legislature in enacting the law
is as much within the statute as if it were within the latter. Here the error (clerical and
misprint) is plain and obvious.

Moreover, the two remedies suggested by petitioner are entirely different. An

appeal to the Commissioner of Customs is purely administrative, whereas, appeal
to the Court of Tax Appeal is manifestly judicial. And it is a sound rule that before
one resort to the Courts, the administrative remedy provided by law should first be
exhausted. In the second place, the two remedies suggested by the petitioner
would result in confusion because a person adversely affected by a decision of a
Collector of Customs could not be sure where to seek the remedy, whether with
the Commissioner of Customs or with the Court of Tax Appeals, and it might even
be difficult for him to decide because, if he took the appeal directly to the Tax Court,
that would ordinarily cut off his remedy before the Commissioner of Customs for
the reason that, should the Court of Tax Appeals decide against him, he may not
appeal said decision to the Commissioner of Customs because the
Commissioner as an administrative officer may not review the decision of the
Court. On the other hand, if the person affected by a decision of a Collector of
Customs took his appeal to the Commissioner of Customs, and there receives an
adverse decision, he may yet appeal therefrom to the Court of Tax Appeals. In the
third place, even if the person affected by an adverse ruling of the Collector of
Customs took his appeal to the Court of Tax Appeals, as advocated by counsel
for the petitioner, under the literal meaning of section 11, the Tax Court may
refuse to entertain said appeal, as was done in the present case, on the ground
that under section 7 of Republic Act No. 1125, it had no jurisdiction to review a
decision of the Collector of Customs, section 7 clearly limiting its appellate
jurisdiction to review decisions of the Commissioner of Customs.

The Supreme Court ruled that under the law, particularly, the Customs Law and
Republic Act No. 1125, the Court of Tax Appeals has no jurisdiction to review by
appeal, decisions of the Collector of Customs. The appealed order of dismissal is
affirmed.