Alfeo Vivas vs The Monetory Board of the BSP and
the Philippine Deposit Insurance Corporation
August 7, 2013 | J. Mendoza
Facts:
• The Rural Bank of Faire, Incorporated (RBFI)
was a duly registered rural banking
institution with principal office in Centro Sur,
Sto. Niño, Cagayan. With a corporate life
which expired on May 2005.
• Notwithstanding, Vivas and his principals
acquired the controlling interest in RBFI
sometime in January 2006.
• At the initiative of Vivas and the new
management team, an internal audit was
conducted on RBFI and results thereof
highlighted the dismal operation of the rural
bank. In view of those findings, certain
measures calculated to revitalize the bank
were allegedly introduced.
• The BSP issued the Certificate of Authority
o extending the corporate life of RBFI
for another fifty (50) years.
o It also approved the change of its
corporate name to EuroCredit
Community Bank, Incorporated,
o as well as the increase in the
number of the members of its BOD,
from five (5) to eleven (11)
• The BSP conducted a general examination on
ECBI and after the completion of the general
examination, an exit conference was held
where the BSP officials and examiners
apprised Vivas, the Chairman and President
of ECBI, as well as the other bank officers and
members of its BOD, of the advance findings
noted during the said examination. The ECBI
submitted its comments on BSP’s
consolidated findings and risk asset
classification through a letter
• The examiners from the Department of
Loans and Credit of the BSP arrived at the
ECBI and cancelled the rediscounting line of
the bank. Vivas appealed the cancellation to
BSP.
• Thereafter, the Monetary Board (MB) issued
a resolution placing ECBI under Prompt
Corrective Action (PCA) framework because
of serious findings and supervisory concerns
noted during the general examination:
o negative capital of PHP 14.674
million and capital adequacy ratio
of negative 18.42%;
o CAMEL (Capital Asset Management
Earnings Liquidity) composite rating
of "2" with a Management
component rating of "1"; and
o serious supervisory concerns
particularly on activities deemed
unsafe or unsound.
• Vivas claimed that the BSP took the above
courses of action due to the joint influence
exerted by a certain hostile shareholder and
a former BSP examiner.
• Through its letter, the BSP furnished ECBI
with a copy of the Report of Examination
(ROE) as of December 31, 2007. In addition,
the BSP directed the bank’s BOD and senior
management to:
o infuse fresh capital of PHP 22.643
million;
o book the amount of PHP 28.563
million representing unbooked
valuation reserves on classified
loans and other risks assets on or
before October 31, 2008; and
o take appropriate action necessary
to address the
violations/exceptions noted in the
examination.
• Vivas moved for a reconsideration of on the
grounds of non-observance of due process
and arbitrariness.
• The ISD II, on several instances, had invited
the BOD of ECBI to discuss matters
pertaining to the placement of the bank
under PCA framework and other supervisory
concerns before making the appropriate
recommendations to the MB. The proposed
meeting, however, did not materialize due
to postponements sought by Vivas.
• In its letter, the BSP directed ECBI to explain
why it transferred the majority shares of
RBFI without securing the prior approval of
the MB in apparent violation of the Manual
of Regulation for Banks (MORB).
• Still in another letter, the ISD II required ECBI
to explain why it did not obtain the prior
approval of the BSP anent the establishment
and operation of the bank’s sub-offices.
• Also, the scheduled March 31, 2009 general
examination of the books, records and
general condition of ECBI with the cut-off
date, did not push through. According to
Vivas, ECBI asked for the deferment of the
examination pending resolution of its appeal
before the MB.
• Vivas believed that he was being treated
unfairly because the letter of authority to
examine allegedly contained a clause which
pertained to the Anti-Money Laundering
Law and the Bank Secrecy Act.
• The MB, on the other hand, posited that ECBI
unjustly refused to allow the BSP examiners
from examining and inspecting its books and
records, in violation of Sections 25 and 34 of
R.A. No. 7653.
• In its letter, the BSP informed ECBI that it
was already due for another annual
examination and that the pendency of its
appeal before the MB would not prevent the
BSP from conducting another one as
mandated
• In view of ECBI’s refusal to comply with the
required examination, the MB issued a
Resolution imposing monetary penalty/fine
on ECBI, and referred the matter to the
Office of the Special Investigation (OSI) for
the filing of appropriate legal action.
• The BSP also wrote a letter, advising ECBI to
comply with the MB Resolution, which
essentially required the bank to follow its
directives.
• Later on, the ISD II reiterated its demand
upon the ECBI BOD to allow the BSP
examiners to conduct a general examination
• In its Letter-Reply, ECBI asked for another
deferment of the examination due to the
pendency of certain unresolved issues
subject of its appeal before the MB, and
because Vivas was then out of the country.
The ISD II denied ECBI’s request and ordered
the general examination to proceed as
previously scheduled.
• Thereafter, the MB issued another
resolution, approving the issuance of a cease
and desist order against ECBI, which
enjoined it from pursuing certain acts and
transactions that were considered unsafe or
unsound banking practices, and from doing
such other acts or transactions constituting
fraud or might result in the dissipation of its
assets.
• On June 10, 2009, the OSI filed with the
Department of Justice (DOJ) a complaint for
Estafa Through Falsification of Commercial
Documents against certain officials and
employees of ECBI.
• Meanwhile, the MB issued a Resolution
denying the appeal of ECBI from the previous
resolution which placed it under PCA
framework.
• The general examination of the books and
records of ECBI with the cut-off date of
September 30, 2009, was commenced and
ended in December 2009.
• Later, the BSP officials and examiners met
with the representatives of ECBI, including
Vivas, and discussed their findings.
• The ISD II reminded ECBI of the non-
submission of its financial audit reports for
the years 2007 and 2008 with a warning that
failure to submit those reports and the
written explanation for such omission shall
result in the imposition of a monetary
penalty.
• In a letter, the ISD II informed ECBI of MB
Resolution No. 1548 which denied its
request for reconsideration of Resolution
No. 726.
• The MB issued a resolution placing ECBI
under receivership in accordance with the
recommendation of the ISD II on the basis of
the examination findings as of as reported by
the Integrated Supervision Department (ISD)
II, in its memorandum which showed that
the Eurocredit Community Bank, Inc. – a
Rural Bank (Eurocredit Bank)
o is unable to pay its liabilities as they
become due in the ordinary course
of business;
 o has insufficient realizable assets to
meet liabilities;
o cannot continue in business
without involving probable losses
to its depositors and creditors; and
o has willfully violated a cease and
desist order of the Monetary Board
for acts or transactions which are
considered unsafe and unsound
banking practices and other acts or
transactions constituting fraud or
dissipation of the assets of the
institution,
o and considering the failure of the
Board of Directors/management of
Eurocredit Bank to restore the
bank’s financial health and viability
despite considerable time given to
address the bank’s financial
problems,
o and that the bank had been
accorded due process,
• The Board, approved the recommendation
of ISD II
• Assailing MB Resolution No. 276, Vivas filed
this petition for prohibition before the Court,
ascribing grave abuse of discretion to the MB
for prohibiting ECBI from continuing its
banking business and for placing it under
receivership.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the petition is dismissible because it
ignored the doctrine of hierarchy of courts
RULING:
YES. The Petition Should Have Been Filed in the CA.
Even if treated as a petition for certiorari, the petition
should have been filed with the CA which is reiterated
under Sec. 4 of Rule 65
The petition shall be filed in the Supreme Court only
if it relates to the acts or omissions of a lower court
or of a corporation, board, officer or person, in the
Regional Trial Court exercising jurisdiction over the
territorial area as defined by the Supreme Court.
It may also be filed in the Court of Appeals whether
or not the same is in aid of its appellate jurisdiction,
or in the Sandiganbayan if it is in aid of its appellate
jurisdiction.
Moreover, If it involves the acts or omissions of a
quasi-judicial agency, unless otherwise provided by
law or the Rules, the petition shall be filed in and
cognizable only by the Court of Appeals. The MB is a
quasi-judicial agency
Even in the absence of such provision, the petition is
also dismissible because it simply ignored the
doctrine of hierarchy of courts.
True, the Court, the CA and the RTC have original
concurrent jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari,
prohibition and mandamus. The concurrence of
jurisdiction, however, does not grant the party
seeking any of the extraordinary writs the absolute
freedom to file a petition in any court of his choice.
The petitioner has not advanced any special or
important reason which would allow a direct resort to
this Court. Under the Rules of Court, a party may
directly appeal to this Court only on pure questions of
law.In the case at bench, there are certainly factual
issues as Vivas is questioning the findings of the
investigating team.
Strict observance of the policy of judicial hierarchy
demands that where the issuance of the
extraordinary writs is also within the competence of
the CA or the RTC, the special action for the
obtainment of such writ must be presented to either
court.
As a rule, the Court will not entertain direct resort to
it unless the redress desired cannot be obtained in
the appropriate lower courts; or where exceptional
and compelling circumstances, such as cases of
national interest and with serious implications,
justify the availment of the extraordinary remedy of
writ of certiorari, prohibition, or mandamus calling
for the exercise of its primary jurisdiction. The
judicial policy must be observed to prevent an
imposition on the precious time and attention of the
Court.
 Purok Bagong Silang Association, Inc. vs. Hon.
Evangeline S. Yuipco
May 4, 2006 | J. Callejo, Sr.
Facts:
• Lydia, Victoria, Noemi, Carlos, Rogelio,
Venecio, Degracia and Jose Nolan, all
surnamed Kaimo, and their siblings,
Henedina Kaimo Bringas and Florida Kaimo
Clerego, were the co-owners of three parcels
of land located in Kaskag, Surigao City,
However, about 400 private individuals
constructed their houses and other
improvements on the property. In 1982, the
occupants formed an association known as
the Purok Bagong Silang Association, Inc.
(PBSAI).
• The Kaimos filed a Complaint in the RTC for
the recovery of possession of real property,
damages and attorney’s fees against 64
occupants.
• In their answer to the complaint, most of the
defendants declared that the subject
property was classified as timberland and, as
such, part of the public domain; thus, the
plaintiffs had no cause of action against
them.
• Seven other defendants alleged in their
answer that they had stopped paying rentals
to plaintiffs at P10.00 a month when they
discovered that the property was
timberland.
• After due proceedings, the trial court
rendered judgment in favor of the plaintiffs.
• The defendants did not appeal the decision.
Consequently, it became final and
executory.
• On motion of the plaintiffs, the court issued
an Order for the issuance of the writ.
• Some of the defendants’ personal properties
were levied upon, but the latter refused to
remove their houses and improvements on
the property and vacate the same despite
demands.
• On motion of the plaintiffs, the court issued
an Alias Writ of Execution. The Deputy
Sheriff failed to cause the eviction of the
defendants. The plaintiffs filed a Motion
before the trial court for a special order
authorizing the Deputy Sheriff to demolish
the houses and other improvements on the
property. The court granted the motion and
issued a Special Order directing the eviction,
not only of the defendants, but also those
occupying and squatting on the property.
• As gleaned from the reports of the four
deputy sheriffs, the defendants refused to
remove their houses and vacate the
property despite their receipt of copies of
the court’s Special Order. This time, the
plaintiffs filed a Motion, praying that the
court issue an order for the demolition of the
houses and improvements of the defendants
on the subject property.
• During the hearing, the parties agreed that
the three parcels of land would be relocated
by a geodetic engineer to be appointed by
the court.
• Then, the trial court issued an Order
appointing Engineer Honorato Bisnar to
conduct a relocation survey of the property,
and to submit his report thereon.
• The Engineer complied, and submitted his
report. The trial court approved the same,
there being no opposition thereto from any
of the parties.
• However, the defendants still refused to
demolish their houses and improvements on
the property.
• Meanwhile, the PBSAI and the defendants in
Civil Case No. 3203, as petitioners, filed a
petition for certiorari
• However, the Court resolved to dismiss the
petition for failure of petitioners to comply
with Revised Circular No. 1-88 and to submit
a verified statement of their receipt of the
RTC’s Order. The resolution of the Court
became final and executory after the denial
of the petitioners’ motion for
reconsideration.
• On motion of the plaintiffs, the trial court
issued an Order for the issuance of a writ of
demolition of all the buildings, houses,
structures or improvements found inside the
properties of the plaintiffs, without
 indicating that such house or improvement
should belong to the defendants.
• Later, the trial court issued a Writ of
Demolition ordering the Ex-Officio Sheriff to
demolish all the improvements, buildings,
houses and structures erected by the
defendants found within or inside Lot
belonging to plaintiffs.
• However, the Deputy Sheriff served copies
of said notice not only on the defendants but
also on 309 other individuals (who were not
defendants in Civil Case No. 3203) whose
houses stood on the plaintiffs’ property.
• This prompted eight of the defendants
namely, Eduardo Cuizon, Dionie Gersano,
Emel Jamero, Eladio Marapao, Manuel
Mustajo, Victor Tubal, Carlos Ausa and
Ruben Babatayon, to file a Petition for
Certiorari in the Court of Appeals (CA)
• The appellate court issued a Temporary
Restraining Order enjoining the
enforcement of the writ of demolition
• The Deputy Sheriff tried to implement on
two occasions the Writ of Demolition issued
by the trial court to no avail.
• Later on, the Deputy Sheriff, this time
accompanied by 50 members of the PNP
Reserve Unit, some Geodetic Engineers and
laborers, tried to implement the writ.
However, the residents, armed with steel
bars, sticks, and other deadly weapons
blocked the way of the sheriff and his
escorts. Again, the Deputy Sheriff failed to
implement the Writ of Demolition because
he was shown a copy of the temporary
restraining order issued by the CA. The
Deputy Sheriff opted to stop altogether the
demolition of the houses and structures in
the plaintiffs’ property.
• The PBSAI approved a Resolution authorizing
the filing of a petition before the Court or
any court or administrative body in behalf of
its 309 members whose houses and
structures the Deputy Sheriff earlier
threatened to demolish.
• Then the PBSAI filed a Petition for
Prohibition in the Court against the plaintiffs
and the Presiding Judge as the respondents.
It alleged therein that it was an association
of homeowners and settlers, occupants of
portions of the property of the private
respondents. It claimed that the respondent
Judge acted with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction
when she issued the Writ of Demolition
• The petitioner also alleged that not being a
party to the first Civil Case it cannot appeal
from the said questioned Order of the
respondent Judge, and that it had no plain,
speedy and adequate remedy therefrom in
the ordinary course of law except through
the filing of the petition.
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not the petitioner is the real – party in
interest in this case
2. Whether the petition filed in the Court is
appropriate
RULING:
1. YES. The rule is that all actions must be prosecuted
and defended by the real parties-in-interest and in
the name of the real party-in-interest. The party
whose legal right has been invaded or infringed or
who sustained an injury is the only one who can
maintain the action; or the party who stands to be
benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit. He
must appear to be the present owner of the right
sought to be enforced.
An association has the legal personality to represent
its members and the outcome of the case will affect
their vital interests. An association has standing to file
suit for its members despite its lack of direct interest
if its members are affected by the action; similarly, an
organization has standing to assert the concern of its
constituents.
2. NO. The Court, however, note that petitioner
sought relief from this Court for a writ of prohibition
under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. Where the
issuance of an extraordinary writ is also within the
competence of the CA or the RTC, it is in either of
these courts that the specific action for the issuance
of such writ must be proscribed unless special and
important laws are clearly and specifically set forth in
the petition. The reason for this is that the Court is a
court of last resort and must so remain if it is to
satisfactorily perform the functions assigned to it by
the Constitution and immemorial tradition. It cannot
and should not be burdened with the task of deciding
cases in the first instance. Its original jurisdiction to
issue extraordinary writs should be exercised only
where absolutely necessary or where serious and
important reasons exist therefor.

Petitioner has not alleged, in its petition, any special

and important reasons why it sought relief from this
Court for a writ of prohibition before seeking relief in
the respondent court or the CA.
 Ferdinand A. Cruz vs Judge Henrick F. Gingoyon
September 28, 2011 | J. Del Castillo
Facts:
• This case stemmed from a Civil Complaint
filed by petitioner against his neighbor,
Benjamin Mina, Jr. (Mina), 1 in the RTC for
abatement of nuisance.
• In the said case, petitioner sought redress
from the court to declare as a nuisance the
"basketball goal" which was permanently
attached to the second floor of Mina’s
residence but protrudes to the alley which
serves as the public’s only right of way.
• Mina was declared in default hence Cruz
presented his evidence ex-parte.
• After trial, Judge Gingoyon, in his Decision
declared the basketball goal as a public
nuisance but dismissed the case on the
ground that petitioner lacked "locus standi."
Judge Gingoyon ruled that the action for
abatement of nuisance should be
commenced by the city or municipal mayor
and not by a private individual like the
petitioner.
• In the same Decision, Judge Gingoyon also
opined that:
o Plaintiffs must learn to accept the
sad reality of the kind of place they
live in. x x x Their place is bursting
with people most of whom live in
cramped tenements with no place
to spare for recreation, to laze
around or doing their daily
household chores.
o Thus, residents are forced by
circumstance to invade the alleys.
The alleys become the grounds
where children run around and
play, the venue where adults do all
sorts of things to entertain them or
pass the time, their wash area or
even a place to cook food in. Take
in a few ambulant vendors who
display their wares in their choice
spots in the alley and their
customers that mill around them,
and one can only behold chaos if
not madness in these alleys. But for
the residents of the places of this
kind, they still find order in this
madness and get out of this kind of
life unscathed. It’s because they all
simply live and let live.
• Cruz sought reconsideration of the Decision.
In his Motion for Reconsideration, he took
exception to the advice given by Judge
Gingoyon stating that the 12th and 13th
paragraphs of the assailed decision, though
only an advice of the court, are off-tangent
and even spouses illegality;
o Since when is living in cramped
tenements become a license for
people to invade the alleys and use
the said alley for doing all sorts of
things, i.e., as wash area or cooking
food? In effect, this court is making
his own legislations and providing
for exceptions in law when there
are none, as far as nuisance is
concerned;
o The court might not be aware that
in so doing, he is giving a wrong
signal to the defendants and to the
public at large that land grabbing,
squatting, illegal occupation of
property is all right and justified
when violators are those people
who live in cramped tenements or
the underprivileged poor, as the
court in a sweeping statement
proclaimed that "residents are
forced by circumstance to invade
the alleys;"
o For the enlightenment of the court,
and as was proven during the ex-
parte presentation of evidence by
the plaintiff, Edang estate
comprises properties which are
subdivided and titled (plaintiffs and
defendants have their own titled
properties and even the right of
way or alley has a separate title)
and not the kind the court
wrongfully perceives the place to
be;
 o Moreover, the court has no right to
impose upon the herein plaintiffs to
accept their alleys as a jungle of
people and the site of myriad of
activities that it is. For the
information of the court, plaintiffs
have holdings in upscale residential
areas and it is a misconception for
the court to consider the Pasay City
residence of the plaintiffs as a
blighted human settlement.
Apparently the court is very much
misinformed and has no basis in his
litany of eye sore descriptions;
o Undersigned is at quandary what
will this court do should he be
similarly situated with the
plaintiffs? Will the court abandon
his residence, giving way to
illegality in the name of live and let
live principle?
o Nonetheless, what remains bugling
[sic] is the fact that the court in his
unsolicited advice knows exactly
the description of the alley where
the complained nuisance is located
and the specific activities that the
defendants do in relation to the
alley. The court should be reminded
that the undersigned plaintiff
presented his evidence ex-parte
and where else can the court gather
these information about the alleys
aside from the logical conclusion
that the court has been
communicating with the
defendant, off the record, given
that the latter has already been in
default. (Emphasis supplied.)
• Petitioner requested the respondent court
to hear his motion for reconsideration
• In an Order, Judge Gingoyon set the motion
for hearing on a date chosen by petitioner,
and directed him to substantiate his serious
charge or show cause on even date why he
should not be punished for contempt.
• On said date Cruz, however, did not appear.
Judge Gingoyon then motu proprio issued an
Order in open court to give petitioner
another 10 days to show cause.
• In his Compliance to the Show Cause Order,
Cruz maintained that the alleged
contumacious remarks he made have a leg
to stand on for the same were based on the
circumstances of the instant case.
• Judge Gingoyon issued an Order finding
petitioner guilty of direct contempt of court.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the respondent court abused its
discretion in denying petitioner’s motion to fix bond
RULING:
NO, the denial is proper. The respondent court was
well within the bounds of its authority when it denied
petitioner’s Ex-Parte Motion.
A person may be adjudged in direct contempt of court
pursuant to Section 1, Rule 71 of the Rules of Court
without need of a hearing but may thereafter avail of
the remedies of certiorari or prohibition.
In this case, the Court find that the respondent court
properly denied petitioner’s Ex-Parte Motion there
being no proof that he already filed a petition for
certiorari. Notably, the Ex-Parte Motion was filed with
the respondent court on December 1, 2005 at 10:00
A.M. and therein petitioner stated that he already
filed a Petition for Certiorari with the Court. However,
perusal of the records would show that the Petition
for Certiorari was filed with the Supreme Court on the
same day but at 1:06 P.M.
Clearly, when the motion was filed with the
respondent court, it cannot be accurately said that a
petition for certiorari was already duly filed with this
Court. Significantly, the records show that
respondent court was furnished a copy of the Petition
for Certiorari by registered mail and which was
received only on December 5, 2005.
It is therefore clear that at the time that petitioner
filed the Ex-Parte Motion with the respondent court,
he has not yet availed of the remedy of certiorari. In
fact, it was only after filing the Ex- Parte Motion with
respondent court that petitioner filed the Petition for
Certiorari with the Supreme Court. This explained
why no proof of such filing was presented by
petitioner to the respondent court thus prompting it
to declare that unless petitioner has shown proof of
filing said petition for certiorari, he cannot avail of the
remedy provided in Section 2, Rule 71 of the Rules of
Court.
filed with the CA as there is no allegation of any
special or compelling reason to warrant direct
recourse to this Court. However, to avoid further
delay, the Court deem it practical to resolve the
controversy.

Petitioner thus cannot attribute abuse of discretion

on the part of respondent court in denying the Ex-
Parte Motion. To reiterate, at the time the said Ex-
Parte Motion was filed and acted upon by the
respondent court, petitioner was not yet entitled to
the remedy prayed for. Clearly, the respondent court
did not commit error, nor did it overstep its authority
in denying petitioner’s Ex-Parte Motion.

The Court also find the necessity to emphasize strict

observance of the hierarchy of courts. "A becoming
regard for that judicial hierarchy most certainly
indicates that petitions for the issuance of
extraordinary writs against first level (‘inferior’)
courts should be filed with the [RTC], and those
against the latter, with the Court of Appeals (CA).

A direct invocation of the Supreme Court’s original

jurisdiction to issue extraordinary writs should be
allowed only when there are special and important
reasons therefor, clearly and specifically set out in the
petition."

For the guidance of the petitioner, "the Court’s

original jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari (as well
as prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, habeas
corpus and injunction) is not exclusive." Its
jurisdiction is concurrent with the CA, and with the
RTC in proper cases. "However, this concurrence of
jurisdiction does not grant upon a party seeking any
of the extraordinary writs the absolute freedom to file
his petition with the court of his choice. The Court is
a court of last resort, and must so remain if it is to
satisfactorily perform the functions assigned to it by
the Constitution and immemorial tradition."
Unwarranted demands upon this Court’s attention
must be prevented to allow time and devotion for
pressing matters within its exclusive jurisdiction.

Adhering to the policy on judicial hierarchy of courts,

"[w]here the issuance of an extraordinary writ is also
within the competence of the [CA] or a [RTC], it is in
either of these courts that the specific action for the
writ’s procurement must be presented.” In
consequence, the instant petition should have been
 Francisco L. Rosario, Jr. vs. Lellani De Guzman
July 10, 2013 | J. Mendoza
Facts:
• Spouses de Guzman engaged the legal
services of Atty. Francisco L. Rosario, Jr.
(petitioner) as defense counsel in the
complaint filed against them by Loreta A.
Chong (Chong) for annulment of contract
and recovery of possession with damages
involving a parcel of land in Parañaque City,
• Petitioner’s legal services commenced from
the RTC and ended up in the Court.
• Spouses de Guzman, represented by
petitioner, won their case at all levels. While
the case was pending before the Court,
Spouses de Guzman died in a vehicular
accident. Thereafter, they were substituted
by their children.
• Rosario, Jr. filed the Motion to Determine
Attorney’s Fees before the RTC. He alleged,
among others, that he had a verbal
agreement with the deceased Spouses de
Guzman that he would get 25% of the
market value of the subject land if the
complaint filed against them by Chong
would be dismissed. Despite the fact that he
had successfully represented them,
respondents refused his written demand for
payment of the contracted attorney’s fees.
Rosario, Jr. insisted that he was entitled to
an amount equivalent to 25% percent of the
value of the subject land on the basis of
quantum meruit.
• The RTC rendered the assailed order denying
Rosario’s motion on the ground that it was
filed out of time. The RTC stated that the said
motion was filed after the judgment
rendered in the subject case, as affirmed by
this Court, had long become final and
executory. The RTC wrote that considering
that the motion was filed too late, it had
already lost jurisdiction over the case
because a final decision could not be
amended or corrected except for clerical
errors or mistakes. There would be a
variance of the judgment rendered if his
claim for attorney’s fees would still be
included. Rosario filed a motion for
reconsideration, but it was denied by the
RTC for lack of merit. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the petition for review on certiorari
under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court as a remedy for
the denial of petitioner’s motion to determine
attorney’s fees by the RTC is proper
RULING:
NO. Apparently, the petitioner pursued the wrong
remedy. Instead of a petition for review under Rule
45, he should have filed a petition for certiorari under
Rule 65 because this case involves an error of
jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion on the part of
the trial court.
Moreover, petitioner violated the doctrine of
hierarchy of courts which prohibits direct resort to
the Court unless the appropriate remedy cannot be
obtained in the lower tribunals.
In this case, petitioner should have first elevated the
case to the Court of Appeals (CA) which has
concurrent jurisdiction, together with this Court, over
special civil actions for certiorari. Even so, this
principle is not absolute and admits of certain
exceptions, such as in this case, when it is demanded
by the broader interest of justice.
Indeed, on several occasions, this Court has allowed a
petition to prosper despite the utilization of an
improper remedy with the reasoning that the
inflexibility or rigidity of the application of the rules of
procedure must give way to serve the higher ends of
justice. The strict application of procedural
technicalities should not hinder the speedy
disposition of the case on the merits. Thus, the Court
deems it expedient to consider this petition as having
been filed under Rule 65.
 Republic of the Philippines vs. Hon. Ramon S.
Caguioa
February 20, 2013 | J. Brion
Facts:
• Indigo Distribution Corporation and 13 other
petitioners (collectively referred to as lower
court petitioners) filed before the
respondent judge a petition for declaratory
relief with prayer for temporary restraining
order (TRO) and preliminary mandatory
injunction against the Honorable Secretary
of Finance, et al. The petition sought to
nullify the implementation of Section 6 of
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9334, otherwise
known as "AN ACT INCREASING THE EXCISE
TAX RATES IMPOSED ON ALCOHOL AND
TOBACCO PRODUCTS, AMENDING FOR THE
PURPOSE SECTIONS 131, 141, 142, 143, 144,
145 AND 288 OF THE NATIONAL INTERNAL
REVENUE CODE OF 1997, AS AMENDED," as
unconstitutional.
• The provision of any special or general law to
the contrary notwithstanding, the
importation of cigars and cigarettes, distilled
spirits, fermented liquors and wines into the
Philippines, even if destined for tax and duty-
free shops, shall be subject to all applicable
taxes, duties, charges, including excise taxes
due thereon. This shall apply to cigars and
cigarettes, distilled spirits, fermented liquors
and wines brought directly into the duly
chartered or legislated freeports of the Subic
Special Economic and Freeport Zone,
created under Republic Act No. 7227; the
Cagayan Special Economic Zone and
Freeport, created under Republic Act No.
7922; and the Zamboanga City Special
Economic Zone, created under Republic Act
No. 7903, and such other freeports as may
hereafter be established or created by law:
Provided, further, That importations of
cigars and cigarettes, distilled spirits,
fermented liquors and wines made directly
by a government- owned and operated duty-
free shop, like the Duty-Free Philippines
(DFP), shall be exempted from all applicable
duties only
• The lower court petitioners are importers
and traders duly licensed to operate inside
the Subic Special Economic and Freeport
Zone (SSEFZ).
• On May 4, 2005, the respondent judge
granted the lower court petitioners’
application for preliminary injunction
despite the Republic’s opposition, and 7 days
after, he issued the preliminary injunction.
• The Republic filed before the Court a petition
for certiorari and prohibition to annul the
respondent judge’s order and the writ issued
pursuant to this order. The petition asked for
the issuance of a TRO and/or a writ of
preliminary injunction.
• By motion filed before the lower court, the
Republic asked the respondent judge to
suspend the proceedings pending the
resolution
• On August 5, 2005, the private respondents
(in the present petition now before the
Court) filed before the respondent judge
motions for leave to intervene and to admit
complaints-in-intervention. They also asked
in these motions that the respondent judge
extend to them the effects and benefits of
his order, in the lower court petitioners’
favor, and the subsequently issued writ of
preliminary mandatory injunction.
• Without acting on the Republic’s motion to
suspend the proceedings, the respondent
judge granted the private respondents’
motions and complaints-in-intervention. The
respondent judge found the private
respondents to be similarly situated as the
lower court petitioners; they stood, too, to
be adversely affected by the implementation
of R.A. No. 9334.
• The Republic moved to reconsider the
respondent judge’s order, arguing that it had
been denied due process because it never
received copies of the private respondents’
motions and complaints-in-intervention.
• On July 5, 2006, the respondent judge
denied the Republic’s motion for
reconsideration and the previously filed
motion to suspend the proceedings. The
respondent judge held that all of the parties
 in the case had been duly notified per the compelling circumstances calling for the Court’s
records. To justify the denial of the motion direct and immediate attention.
to suspend the proceedings, the respondent
judge pointed to the absence of any
restraining order. The Republic responded to
the respondent judge’s actions by filing the
present petition.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Republic did not observe the

hierarchy of courts in filing the instant petition

RULING:

NO. While the principle of hierarchy of courts does

indeed require that recourses should be made to the
lower courts before they are made to the higher
courts, this principle is not an absolute rule and
admits of exceptions under well-defined
circumstances. In several cases, the Court have
allowed direct invocation of this Court’s original
jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari on the ground
of special and important reasons clearly stated in the
petition;

• when dictated by public welfare and the

advancement of public policy;
• when demanded by the broader interest of
justice;
• when the challenged orders were patent
nullities; or
• when analogous exceptional and compelling
circumstances called for and justified our
immediate and direct handling of the case.

The Republic claims that the respondent judge

violated and continues to violate its right to due
process by allowing the private respondents and
several others to intervene in the case sans notice to
the Republic; by extending to them the benefit of the
original injunction without the requisite injunction
bond applicable to them as separate injunction
applicants; and by continuing to suspend the
Republic’s right to collect excise taxes from the
private respondents and from the lower court
petitioners, thus adversely affecting the
government’s revenues. To the Court’s mind, the
demonstrated extent of the respondent judge’s
actions and their effects constitute special and