Journal of Global Security Studies, 4(1), 2019, 2–17

doi: 10.1093/jogss/ogy041
Research Article

Norms under Challenge: Unpacking the Dynamics

of Norm Robustness
Nicole Deitelhoff and Lisbeth Zimmermann

Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/jogss/article/4/1/2/5347906 by guest on 12 November 2020

Leibniz-Institut Hessische Stiftung Friedens- und Konfliktforschung/Zeppelin University Friedrichshafen

Abstract
The introduction develops this special issue’s main research question: under which conditions are
challenges to norms likely to decrease their robustness? The issue presents current research on con-
testation and norm robustness and discusses its limitations. We conceptualize a norm’s robustness by
examining both the practical and discursive dimensions. Robustness is high when norm addressees
express widespread discursive acceptance of a norm’s claims (validity) that also generally guide ad-
dressees’ actions (facticity). When normative claims are discursively rejected by most addressees
and do not guide their actions, robustness is low. The contributions develop four broad indicators for
measuring robustness (concordance, third-party reactions to norm violation, compliance, and imple-
mentation). The norms analyzed here were not easily eroded; despite direct challenges, they remained
surprisingly robust. This indicates that norm robustness is not determined by the relative power of
norm challengers, but rather types of contestation and structural factors. These include being embed-
ded in larger normative structures, institutionalization, and legal character, although effects of these
factors are more ambivalent than norm research has usually supposed.
Keywords: international norms, norm robustness, norm strength, norm erosion, challenges to the global order, norm
contestation

Introduction ber states? Do the violations in Syria indicate that the

norm prohibiting the use of chemical weapons is losing
Observers and researchers of international politics are
relevance?
concerned about the international order, which they
At first glance, the debate does not appear to much
widely agree to be in crisis. More and more state and
affect “classic” security studies, which have generally not
nonstate actors are contesting the efficacy and/or legiti-
examined international norms and institutions but ad-
macy of central norms and institutions. The obligation
hered instead to a narrow definition of security. This has
to respect norms and institutions seems to be diminish-
caused the field to remain focused on power distribu-
ing, as even well-established institutions such as the Eu-
tions and the threat or use of violence (Waltz 1982; Walt
ropean Union (EU) confront the departure of some of
1991; Art and Waltz 1993; for an overview, see Buzan
their member states. Norm research focuses on the ef-
and Hansen 2009). Expansions of how scholars and prac-
fects of contestation and violations: Does increased con-
titioners consider security—for example, as including not
testation spell the death of these norms and institutions?
only the national security (territorial integrity) of states,
Is the International Criminal Court (ICC), for instance,
but also other threats such as environmental degradation,
on the verge of losing global acceptance because of con-
pandemics, and the well-being of individuals or “human
testation by the African Union (AU) and some of its mem-

Deitelhoff, Nicole, and Lisbeth Zimmermann. (2019) Norms under Challenge: Unpacking the Dynamics of Norm Robustness. Journal of Global Security Studies,
doi: 10.1093/jogss/ogy041
© The Author(s) (2019). Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of the International Studies Association. This is an Open Access article distributed under the
terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/http://), which permits unrestricted reuse, distribution, and
reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.
NICOLE DEITELHOFF AND LISBETH ZIMMERMANN
security” (see Schlag, Junk, and Daase 2016)—have not
fundamentally shifted this focus.
In contrast, major institutionalist and constructivist
works of the 1990s and 2000s began to focus on the
relevance of norms and institutions to security studies,
largely in an effort to explain state behavior where real-
ist or liberal approaches fell short (among others, Price
1995; Finnemore 1996; Katzenstein 1996; Risse-Kappen
1995; Adler and Barnett 1998; Tannenwald 1999). While
some realists still perceive norms and institutions as
epiphenomenal to security politics (for the most pro-
nounced version of this argument, see Mearsheimer
1994/1995), the number, quality, and importance of in-
ternational norms and institutions related to security pol-
itics have significantly increased since the 1990s—albeit
more slowly and less intensely than in other policy fields
(see Section 2). Given this pattern, the current crisis of
international norms and institutions could be a test of
whether and how norms and institutions matter in se-
curity politics. Can norms withstand current contesta-
tion, even when it comes from powerful states? If so, un-
der which circumstances, and why (see also Vinjamuri
2018)?
For this special issue, we have assembled case stud-
ies on central norms in security and humanitarian law
that have become contested in recent years, or are said
to be on the verge of decay. We asked contributors to
apply the analytical framework described below to an-
alyze the conditions in which challenges to norms are
likely to decrease their robustness. These cases cover
the main differences in types of norms, challengers,
and institutionalization—all factors assumed to affect
norm robustness. We analyze contestations of both newly
emerged and long-established norms, including the in-
ternational prohibitions on torture, women in combat,
the use of chemical weapons and force, international
criminal accountability, and the Responsibility to Protect
(RtoP).
The various contributions are case-based and use dif-
ferent methods and data to explore the link between
norm challenges and norm robustness. Some primarily
apply quantitative methods to explore how robustness
trends can be mapped beyond state discourse and state
practice, but most use qualitative methods such as dis-
course analysis and process tracing. Data sources range
from interviews and negotiation protocols to historical
archives, newspapers, and statistics.
To introduce this special issue, we begin by linking
the debate about norm erosion and contestation to secu-
rity studies. We define contestation and challenge (Panke
and Petersohn 2016) following the work of Antje Wiener,
who describes contestation as an “interactive practice”
3
that involves “at least two participating agents,” is “gen-
erally directed toward norms (of whatever type),” and
expresses “disapproval” of these norms.1 In Section 3,
we review the literature on norm dynamics in interna-
tional relations (IR) and develop the analytical frame-
work for robustness that guides the contributions to this
special issue. We define norm robustness as encompass-
ing a norm’s validity and facticity; norm robustness is
said to be “high” when its claims are widely accepted
by norm addressees (validity) and generally guide the
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actions of these addressees (facticity).2 We study four
dimensions of robustness: concordance, third-party re-
actions to norm violations, compliance, and imple-
mentation. In the next section, we discuss potential
explanations arising from current research on norm
dynamics, focusing on different factors at the actor, pro-
cess, and structural levels, as well as their limits. Sec-
tion 5 then makes the argument that the relative power
of “contesters” is not the most important factor for ex-
plaining trends in norm robustness—despite frequent as-
sumptions in the literature. Instead, the type of contesta-
tion and structural factors, such as norm embeddedness
in larger normative structures, norm institutionalization,
and legal character are all highly influential, although
they have more ambivalent effects than researchers usu-
ally envision. We conclude by pointing out that these
factors, while not exhaustive, provide a solid basis for
analyzing the relationship between contestation and ro-
bustness and teach us a great deal about the dynamics
of norms and how to assess the state of the international
order.
Challenged Norms and Security Studies
The standard liberal perspective generally held that in-
ternational interdependence and a web of related norms,
institutions, and organizations were steadily growing
within the international order—despite setbacks along
the way. Cross-border transactions steadily increased, es-
pecially during the 1970s and 1980s (Zürn 2013, 404–5),
with international treaties multiplying exponentially—
from roughly nine hundred in 1962 to more than
1
While this understanding of contestation as normative
suggests that the dispute is “mostly expressed through
language,” the term also encompasses nondiscursive
forms of contention (Wiener 2014, 12, 1) that are often
driven by acts of noncompliance.
2
We use general (as opposed to universal) guidance as
our benchmark because all norms encounter a certain
amount of noncompliance.
4 Unpacking the Dynamics of Norm Robustness
six thousand in 2010.3 Norms and institutions have
also changed qualitatively. International institutions now
have more regulatory and monitoring capacities (Barnett
and Finnemore 2004; Kahler and Lake 2009). This dy-
namic has affected security politics, which have seen a
steady growth of norms and institutions (see Vinjamuri
2018), albeit with less autonomy relative to international
institutions in other policy fields (Müller 1993, 608;
Rittberger and Zangl 2006). An increasing number of in-
dividual rights has been institutionalized, including the
ICC, established in 1998 to prosecute individuals, and
the Responsibility to Protect (RtoP) of 2005, which re-
quires the international community to act when states fail
to protect their populations.
However, recent developments such as the recurring
contestations of normative innovations like the ICC and
RtoP belie this view of steady growth and increasing co-
operation. The same is true with respect to long-standing
norms and institutions such as the international prohibi-
tion on torture and the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty
(NPT). While challenges to the international order are
not new, the sheer sum of challenges to its major norms
and institutions leads many observers to contemplate its
fate and that of its central norms (Acharya 2017; Nye
2017). Disagreement abounds regarding what “the in-
ternational order” means precisely, but it is commonly
accepted to be an ensemble of rules, norms, and institu-
tions that are based on multilateralism, free trade, and
individual rights (Acharya 2017; Nye 2017; Ikenberry
2014, 2015). The international liberal order is generally
seen as an antidote to both unilateralism and a security
dilemma (Ikenberry 2018, 11). Some scholars equate it
with economic prosperity (Niblett 2017), where specific
rules represent normative “progress” (Price 2008). At the
same time, deep-seated power asymmetries inscribed in
many international treaties and organizations that create
an unfair distribution of resources and opportunity also
shape the international order (Cox 1992). Moreover, the
“global liberal order” is built on European concepts and
models, which often blatantly ignore other parts of the
world (Acharya 2017).
No matter how one views the nature or normative
quality of the global liberal order, scholarship needs to
better understand if, and when, challenges weaken norms
and institutions. This is particularly true for the fields of
security and humanitarian law that are directly or indi-
rectly concerned with controlling the use of force in the
international order. Since traditional security studies have
tended to not regard international norms and institutions
3
Collection available at http://treaties.un.org/ (accessed
December 1, 2017).
as independent factors, current debate about the fate of
major norms and institutions could serve to test the im-
portance of international norms.4 In light of the poten-
tial for security dilemmas, it is surprising that any states
cooperate on security issues at all (Müller 2013), espe-
cially as related norms and institutions are regarded as
very weak (Mearsheimer 1994–1995). The expectation
is that norms and institutions will be cast aside during
conflicts or when they are contested by major powers
(Glennon 2001). Our collection of norms under challenge
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in the fields of security and humanitarian law allow us to
probe this assumption, which seems widespread in cur-
rent media discourse, and learn which factors might help
norms withstand such challenges.
To do this, we draw on research about norms. IR
norms researchers have primarily focused on emergence
and diffusion (Price 1995; Finnemore and Sikkink 1998;
Kelley 2008; Deitelhoff 2009), as well as incremental
norm change (Sandholtz and Stiles 2009; Krook and True
2012). Only recently have scholars begun to study chal-
lenges to norms. It is generally agreed that contestation
affects the robustness of international norms, but em-
pirical assessments of the outcomes of challenges reach
different conclusions. For example, some researchers
consider that the George W. Bush administration’s rein-
terpretation of the torture ban weakened the ban signifi-
cantly (McKeown 2009), while others postulate that the
norm is stable (Hurd 2013). Some think RtoP is being
neglected because of ongoing contestation (Rieff 2011),
while others view it as strengthened (Bellamy 2015). In
short, IR research has not yet developed a yardstick for
assessing robustness trends. There is also significant dis-
agreement about how contestation affects norms: some
researchers argue that contestation necessarily weakens
international norms (McKeown 2009; Panke and Peter-
sohn 2012, 721; Heller, Kahl, and Pisoiu 2012, 283),
while others hold that contestation is necessary for norms
to be robust (Wiener 2008). We need systematic analyses
to help us understand why challenges cause some inter-
national norms to lose their influence, others to remain
robust, and still others to become stronger.
Norm Dynamics and Robustness
IR norm research has evolved since the late 1980s (Wendt
1987; Kratochwil 1989; Onuf 1989), when it aimed to
4
Of course, security studies are much more varied than
this traditional perspective. For an excellent overview,
see Buzan and Hansen (2009). For an early research
program on norms in security studies, see also Farrell
(2002).
NICOLE DEITELHOFF AND LISBETH ZIMMERMANN
demonstrate that norms “matter” in international poli-
tics.5 Since the 1990s, both norm emergence and norm
diffusion, as summarized in the framework of the norm
life cycle (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998), had defined
the international research agenda. Norm emergence was
described as a process of contestation.6 Internationally
adopted norms were depicted as being relatively uncon-
tested, with stable definitions; only domestic adoption
processes and the socialization activities of international
organizations were described as contested (in a second
phase of diffusion) (Katzenstein 1993; Checkel 1999;
Risse, Ropp, and Sikkink 1999; Schimmelfennig, Engert,
and Knobel 2006). The idea that such controversies in-
fluence the international stability of norms and their
meanings went largely unrecognized. Contested norms,
in other words, were believed to be ineffective.7 On the
other hand, a norm’s unquestioned presence—its habitu-
alization and internalization—indicated its validity and
stability (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998, 895–96; Risse
and Sikkink 1999, 17). While norms’ inherent dynamism
was a conceptual part of early constructivist research,8
empirical research depicted global norms as static. Con-
testation was seen as undermining the argument for the
explanatory power of norms.
A Refocus on Norm Dynamics
Recent research emphasizes the inherent dynamism of
norms, which are described as still being contested—
even after they have been cast as international treaties
and institutionalized (Wiener 2008). Furthermore, norms
are interpreted differently across contexts and time
(Zimmermann 2017) and can strengthen or weaken.
Nevertheless, we do not know when to expect strength-
ening or weakening.
Research on contestation and norm change investi-
gates how interpretations of norms change at the in-
ternational level.9 Sandholtz (2008) and Sandholtz and
Stiles (2009) present a very elaborate model of such pro-
cesses and argue that norms change through dispute res-
olution: Disputes over “which norms apply and what
the norms require or permit” lead to contestation pro-
5
See Nadelmann (1990), Klotz (1995), Price (1995), and
Finnemore (1996).
6
See Finnemore and Sikkink (1998), Price (1998), and
Deitelhoff (2009).
7 discuss when we can expect to observe either.
E.g., Katzenstein (1993, 286).
8 11
See Kratochwil and Ruggie (1986) and Keck and Sikkink
(1998).
9
See Badescu and Weiss (2010), Krook and True (2012),
Müller and Wunderlich (2014), and Sandholtz and Stiles
(2009).
5
cesses “making them stronger or weaker, more specific
(or less), broader or narrower” (Sandholtz and Stiles
2009, 6). Change can occur with regard to content,
formality, specificity, and authoritativeness (Sandholtz
and Stiles 2009, 7). Empirical studies reveal that al-
terations range from rather subtle changes to complete
replacement (as a result of the discursive power of con-
testing actors, a link to shared metanorms, and prece-
dents), but they do not explain when we should expect
which outcome.10 A similar move to dynamically inter-
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pret international law exists in constructivist accounts of
international law: “[L]aw is most persuasive when it is
created through processes of mutual construction by a
wide range of participants in a legal system” (Brunnée
and Toope 2000–2001, 19). A “practice of legality re-
quires a sustained and continuous effort to realize all the
criteria of legality” (Brunnée and Toope 2010, 283). In
such an international perspective on law, the social mean-
ings and formal legality of norms can change and allow
us to study the ebbs and flows of norms—without, how-
ever, knowing when to expect either ebbs or flows.
Analyzing Norm Robustness
Only in recent years has a specific focus on norm ro-
bustness emerged, with particular interest in norms’
potential decay (loss of robustness) stimulated by
developments such as global power shifts; a transnation-
ally active, fundamentalist Islamist movement; and cur-
rent US foreign policy. The latest research on norm de-
cay (also norm “regression,” “erosion,” “decline,” and
“backlash”) mostly focuses on domestic controversies
over norms (Rosert and Schirmbeck 2007; McKeown
2009; Heller et al. 2012; Sikkink 2013; Kutz 2014;
Barnes 2016). Research has also begun to study the
possible weakening of norms at the international level
(Deibert and Crete-Nishihata 2012; Panke and Petersohn
2012, 2016; Keating 2014; Birdsall 2016; Clark et al.
2018, Vinjamuri 2018).11 Related work evaluates norm
10
Sandholtz and Stiles (2009, 17–18). Müller and
Wunderlich (2014) also suggest factors for norm
change, such as norm entrepreneurship, conflicts
between regimes, exogenous events, and technologi-
cal developments. Krook and True (2012, 109) refer to
the strengthening or weakening of norms, but do not
This is not to say that this question had never been
addressed in IR. In the 1970s, a research project in
the United States aimed at measuring the “growth and
decay of transnational norms” (Kegley 1975, 425; also
Kegley and Raymond 1990).
6 Unpacking the Dynamics of Norm Robustness
legitimacy and legitimacy crises in global politics (Hurd
1999, 2007; Reus-Smit 2007; Ralph and Gallagher
2015).
Scholars have widely differing ideas about how to
conceptualize robustness. While some focus primarily on
state practice, others rely on the discursive dimension. A
third approach, including this project, combines these di-
mensions. In subsequent sections of this article, we intro-
duce four indicators for norm robustness: concordance,
reactions to norm violations, compliance, and implemen-
tation.
“Practice Only” Versus “Discourse Only”
In the first research strand, norm robustness is primarily
linked to compliance: the stability of a norm is measured
exclusively by its facticity. Glennon (2005) presents the
strictest formulation, arguing that a “valid rule of inter-
national law . . . is a rule that few states often violate”
(Glennon 2005, 940). When a norm is excessively vio-
lated (“by a sufficient number of states,” Glennon 2005,
940), violation is no longer an issue. Instead, the free-
dom principle applies—“another rule that permits un-
restricted freedom of action” (Glennon 2005, 940).12
Glennon considers that state practice alone indicates
norm robustness. However, he does not address norms
whose legitimacy has long been uncontested, such as
the prohibition of murder—which is violated worldwide
every day.
Other scholars focus mainly on the dimension of
discourse: the degree of contestation per se indicates a
norm’s robustness. Norm robustness resides in the de-
gree of “verbal” acceptance of a norm’s claims by its ad-
dressees (legitimacy). At the highest level of robustness,
a norm is taken for granted (addressees have completely
internalized and habitualized it). In such cases, any kind
of discourse (even supportive discourse) about the norm
opens a window of opportunity for erosion to begin.
As McKeown (2009, 11) argues, “even if defenders are
quite successful in rolling back some of the revisionists’
gains, the norms will always lose some salience just in
virtue of it being publicly challenged” (our emphasis).13
“Challengers” who set off a “domino effect of unthink-
ables” cause a norm to erode completely (Rosert and
Schirmbeck 2007, 281, our translation; also McKeown
2009, 6). However, if international norms are contested
12
For a less rigorous application see Panke and Petersohn
(2012, 721), where the erosion process kicks in when a
noncompliance cascade has started.
13
See also Rosert and Schirmbeck (2007, 256) and Heller,
Kahl, and Pisoiu (2012, 283).
so often, why do we not observe more cases of norm de-
cay?
Some scholars suggest that we disregard state practice
and compliance and instead focus on legitimacy (Hurd
2013; Clark et al. 2018, 325–27). Hurd believes that
claims of norm compliance are always contested and
that claims about compliance in the international arena
will remain contested because there are no institutions to
legally resolve such conflicts (Hurd 2013, 167–68, 183).
Hurd further argues that studying compliance and re-
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lated discursive claims reveals nothing about the actual
robustness of norms. Norms are legitimate if they are
widely ratified and used rhetorically—and if “[t]here is
little dissent from the idea that the rules are binding on
the states that have accepted them” (Hurd 2013, 172).
This school of thought ignores practical compliance
and defines norm robustness with reference to norm
support (not contestation), as measured by treaty rat-
ifications or rhetorical acceptance by states. It cannot
interpret formal norms that are relatively uncontested
rhetorically, but no longer attract significant compliance.
Examples might include the norm prohibiting the use
of mercenaries in conflict, or the Kellogg-Briand Pact
of 1928 that bans warfare—which is technically still in
effect.
Combining Practice and Discourse
A third line of research synthesizes these two approaches
to evaluating norm robustness by examining both prac-
tice and discourse: it views norm robustness as com-
posed of the norm’s validity and facticity. A norm whose
claims enjoy widespread verbal acceptance by norm ad-
dressees (validity), and which generally guides addressee
actions (facticity), is said to be highly robust. Conversely,
if most addressees reject a norm’s claims and the norm
also does not guide their actions, the norm is not robust.
We broadly follow this conceptualization, linking it to
a flexible set of indicators for studying robustness: con-
cordance, third-party reactions to violations, compliance,
and implementation. The list encompasses both the prac-
tical and discursive dimensions of robustness and avoids
conflating the dependent and independent variables by
not employing contestation as an indicator for robust-
ness.
In their seminal article of 1986, Kratochwil and
Ruggie (1986) argued that norm compliance alone does
not explain robustness. They proposed combining the
dimensions of robustness: “[W]hether or not violations
also invalidate or refute a law (norm) will depend upon
a host of other factors, not the least of which is how
the community assesses the violation and responds to
NICOLE DEITELHOFF AND LISBETH ZIMMERMANN
it” (Kratochwil and Ruggie 1986, 767).14 Price (2004,
2006) approached norm robustness by linking it concep-
tually to debates about customary law. International law
identifies this through the presence of both consuetudo
(state practice) and opinio juris (the belief that a norm is
legally binding) (Article 38[1][b] of the Statute of the In-
ternational Court of Justice: “general practice accepted
as law”). Nonetheless, practical assessment of both di-
mensions is often controversial, as observed in the Inter-
national Law Commission’s work on customary interna-
tional law.
Price (2006, 254) adapted this two-fold legal focus on
state practice and opinio juris to social science research
on norm robustness and listed a range of possible indi-
cators for assessing norm robustness. These include the
following: general support (treaty status, general govern-
ment statements, and government statements that only
cover definitional questions or tackle claims of central
validity); reactions to norm violations (does the violating
state reject the norm entirely, show no reaction, provide
a special justification, deny violation, or support criti-
cism?); and third-party reactions (do third parties pas-
sively react, condemn, or sanction violations, and do ac-
cusing parties instrumentalize accusations or not?). Price
uses also indicators to answer a series of questions re-
lated to (non)compliance practices: how often is a norm
violated? Is noncompliance routine, widespread, normal,
uncontroversial—or politicized, exceptional, aberrant, or
abhorrent? Who decides what constitutes a violation? Fi-
nally, does the norm have any practical regulations? Our
project adapts Price’s approach in a series of articles that
includes cases studies of different types of norms (pre-
scriptive, proscriptive, and permissive) from various pol-
icy fields. We have sought to respond to a number of
typical challenges to comparative research on norm
robustness:
(1) Norm types: Some norms are not appropriate for
assessing compliance. Proscriptive norms, such as
compliance with trade regulations, lend themselves
more readily to the quantitative analysis of com-
pliance than do prescriptive norms, such as those
surrounding the declaration of war (Brunnée and
14
In his earlier work, Hurd similarly argues for assess-
ing legitimacy based on rates of compliance, reasons
given for (non)compliance, and third-party reactions to
such violations (Hurd 1999, 390–91). Sandholtz and Stiles
(2009, 14) also suggest that noncompliance and mild
condemnation by third parties signal a norm’s weaken-
ing.
7
Toope, this issue).15 A complex norm with various
prescriptive elements like the RtoP might also re-
quire using other indicators, such as regional and
domestic implementation, to make an informed as-
sessment of practices related to the norm (Welsh
2014).
(2) State discourse and practice: The bulk of research
in this field focuses on government statements and
state compliance. To depict robustness trends more
accurately, we need information beyond the state
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level. Simmons and Jo (this issue) show how an-
alyzing general beliefs in norm legitimacy and the
compliance records of nonstate actors can improve
analysis of norm robustness trends.
(3) Weighting the dimensions: There are also problems
in weighting various dimensions of norm robust-
ness. For instance, how do we judge a norm that is
discursively strong but regularly violated (such as
the prohibition on torture)? Are such norms more
or less robust than those that are hardly ever vi-
olated, but also hardly ever discussed? Price dis-
cusses how Kirgis (1987) assessed customary law
by placing opinio juris and practice on a con-
tinuum: both frequent practice with no opposing
opinio juris and opinio juris that is practiced in-
frequently constitute customary law.16 In this area
of international law, the challenge is to establish
exactly when a norm can be considered customary
law. We offer no definitive statements regarding the
condition of norms at any point in time and focus
instead on trends that are weakening or strengthen-
ing over time. We do not regard the discourse- and
practice-related dimension as dichotomous, but in-
stead use several dimensions of robustness to allow
for a broader interpretation of trends.
(4) Dynamic versus static: Although we might be able
to observe variation in the number of norm vio-
lations over time, we may not notice weakening
trends in treaty ratifications, among other types of
international agreements. States very seldom leave
international treaties, and when they do, the ac-
tion sends a very strong signal. Thus, while some
indicators might be helpful for determining norm-
strengthening, they only show them stagnating, not
weakening. To assess robustness trends, we still
15
However, it can be very difficult to gather reliable data
on compliance even for prohibition norms such as the
prohibition on torture.
16
This is about a specific understanding of opinio juris. For
an account of finding evidence for opinio juris in prac-
tices of legality, see Brunnée and Toope (in issue).
8 Unpacking the Dynamics of Norm Robustness
need to interpret a flexible set of indicators (some
of which might be more dynamic than others).
(5) Tautology: There is one last problem in the study
of norm robustness that focuses on the type of
contestation and state reactions to accusations of
norm violations. If we conceptualize contestation
as a part of norm robustness, we cannot study
how contestation affects norm robustness. In addi-
tion, reactions to norm violations by the violating
state, another indicator proposed by Price (2006)
for norm robustness, are often hard to distinguish
from norm contestation. For example, in the 1980s,
Chile never openly contested the torture ban per se.
It only reacted to accusations of norm violations.
Because we are interested in the conditions that
cause contestation to weaken norm robustness, we
only study third-party reactions to violations as an
indicator of robustness (excluding the reactions of
noncompliant actors).
In sum, we adapt Price’s conceptualization to include
a broader set of dimensions for studying robustness. De-
pending on the type of norm, as well as its age (whether
a track record of compliance is available or not), we uti-
lize different combinations of the following dimensions
and their indicators (see Table 1) to assess the dynamics
of norm robustness:
Mainly Discourse-Based Dimensions
(1) Concordance with the norm:17 acceptance of a
norm’s legitimacy by a state and the general pub-
lic;18 belief in the legitimacy of the institution
tasked with monitoring/implementing norms (as
discursively expressed in international fora or as
polled for a broad public); the absolute and rela-
tive number of ratifications by addressees; and the
level/quality of opt-out clauses
(2) Third-party reactions to norm violations: reactions
of other norm addressees to norm violations (in-
cluding discursive and/or material sanctioning)19
17
Following Legro (1997, 35), “concordance means how
widely accepted the rules are in diplomatic discus-
sions and treaties (that is, the degree of intersub-
jective agreement).” This contribution also includes
acceptance in a broader context, including by non-
governmental organizations (NGOs) and private citi-
zens.
18
This can include UN member states and an extended in-
ternational community including NGOs and private citi-
zens.
19
We do not assume that the ability to materially sanction
norm violations (e.g., through embargos) makes a norm
Mainly Practice-Based Dimensions
(1) Compliance: level of behavior consistent with
norms
(2) Implementation: level of norm inclusion in pol-
icy papers, protocols, standards of international
and regional organizations, creation of domestic,
regional, international institutions, and adoption
into domestic law
Despite these efforts, we cannot derive a fully satisfac-
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tory, standardized quantification of norm robustness ac-
cording to these indicators for all types of norms. For ex-
ample, exactly which addressees’ normative reactions to
a particular norm are important to assess depends on the
group of norm addressees and can differ depending on
the norm. In addition, what should be interpreted as “fre-
quent” and what is “rare”—for example, with regard to
compliance rates or third-party reactions—similarly de-
pends on the norm in question.20 Nevertheless, our indi-
cators are useful representations of general developments
regarding the robustness of various types of norms.
The objective of the conceptualization is to analyze
the robustness of norms over time and across cases. We
do not assume that complete robustness has an ideal
“endpoint,” nor do we expect that norms will completely
disappear. Instead, we expect to observe norms being
constantly strengthened or weakened—or replaced by al-
ternative norms (see also Sandholtz, this issue). Our aim
is not to describe norms as either perfectly robust or ir-
relevant, but rather to indicate trends of weakening or
strengthening and to explain these trends.
We do not approach robustness by invariably tying
it to norm change. For Panke and Petersohn (2016, 4),
“[a] norm may be weakened if its applicatory scope is
restricted through practice. In this process, actors still re-
fer to the norm, but previously inappropriate behavior
is now considered to be in accordance with the norms.”
However, we do not necessarily regard change in a norm’s
scope a sign of weakening or strengthening (see also
Sandholtz, this issue). For example, widening the scope
of a proscriptive norm such as the chemical weapons ban
does not imply it is being strengthened, only that it is
changing. Only widening that is accompanied by higher
acceptance, more third-party sanctioning, greater com-
pliance, or implementation increases norm robustness.21
more robust than when only discursive criticism is pos-
sible.
20
See also Chayes and Chayes (1993) and Nadelmann
(1990).
21
For the prohibition of mercenaries as an example of
change rather than decay, see Percy (2014).
NICOLE DEITELHOFF AND LISBETH ZIMMERMANN 9

Table 1. Assessing trends in norm robustness

Discourse-based dimensions Practice-based dimensions

Concordance (acceptance
in discussions and treaties) Third-party reactions Compliance Implementation

Strengthening High acceptance Addressees almost Compliance is (nearly) High implementation on

For the subset of legal universally sanction universal more than one level (e.g.,
norms: High/rising23 violations—discursively domestic, regional,
↑ number of ratifications, and/or practically international)
low number of opt-out

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clauses24
Widespread acceptance Most addressees sanction Compliance is Moderate
For the subset of legal violations—discursively widespread implementation on at
norms: Moderately rising and/or practically least one level
number of ratifications,
moderate number of
reservations
Rare acceptance Addressees passively react Compliance is rare Little implementation on
For the subset of legal to violations any level
norms: Considerable
number of reservations
engage in interpretive
widening
↓ No acceptance Addressees applaud Very little/no compliance No implementation on
Weakening For the subset of legal violations any level
norms: Low/stagnating
number of ratifications,
high number of opt-out
clauses

Nevertheless, because norm change and norm robustness Explanations of Norm Dynamics in IR
are clearly interrelated, it is important to consider the
Why certain norms lose robustness when they are un-
point at which fundamental changes to and reinterpre-
der challenge, and others do not, remains an open ques-
tations of a norm signal norm replacement. Specifically,
tion. Most studies focus less on structural factors, such
how much can actors translate and adjust the content of
as legal quality, institutionalization, and normative em-
a norm before it is considered a different norm? We an-
beddedness, and instead present (actor-related) power as
alyze the central normative claims a norm makes on its
the reason behind norm decay. In addition, hardly any
addressees and regard claims that imply derivative duties
research examines the concept of contestation. We will
or applicatory conditions to be located at a norm’s pe-
discuss how existing research treats these different ex-
riphery.22 Only if the former are changed do we observe
planatory factors.
norm replacement.

Actor-Level Approaches: The Relative Power of

Norm Challengers
Most research on challenges to norms draws on research
22
We are aware of the limits of such a strategy. about their emergence—focusing on “norm challengers”
23
Stagnation can be observed at both high and low levels and their power resources. Research presents “erosion
of overall ratifications. cascades” and a “norm death cycle” that complement
24
Intermediate stages must be studied here; high ratifica- the life cycle described by Finnemore and Sikkink (1998)
tion rates could be accompanied by high rates of opt-out (Panke and Petersohn 2012; Rosert and Schirmbeck
clauses or reservations. 2007; McKeown 2009). Erosion cascades are explained
10
as actions by norm challengers that can trigger crises
of legitimacy (McKeown 2009, 9–11) or whose coher-
ent contestation over time causes norms to decay (Heller
et al. 2012, 301). With regard to the ban on practicing
torture in the United States, Sikkink (2013, 162) empha-
sizes the influence of a “relatively small group of pow-
erful political operators” who were intent on undermin-
ing the norm. This points to the relative power of such
norm challengers (Panke and Petersohn 2016, 6). Robust-
ness is more likely to decrease when challenged by ac-
tors with relatively high (discursive and material) power
(Sandholtz and Stiles 2009).
It is plausible to assume that challenges by major
states or powerful groups will undermine the robustness
of norms more than contestations by other groups. Be-
cause the former are usually less vulnerable to sanctions
and require less cooperation from others to pursue their
goals, they can more easily afford noncompliance. They
can be confident that other actors will bandwagon or
can be easily bribed or persuaded. Supporters of par-
ticular norms might also be reluctant to openly shame
violators for fear of retaliation—for example, the way
European states were reluctant to criticize US torture
practices in the 2000s. Another important factor might be
the breadth of challenges. If challenges originate from a
coalition of diverse actors, rather than one specific group,
they might cause more harm (see Simmons and Jo, this
special issue). Diversity in challenge signals to norm ad-
dressees that a norm is being questioned from multiple
angles.
Structural Factors: Legal Character and
Institutionalization
More research is needed on structural factors that af-
fect norm robustness, most importantly norm institu-
tionalization, the broader normative structure, and the
legal character of norms. Researchers describe the pres-
ence of these factors as shielding norms against challenge.
Wiener (2008, 204–8; 2010, 203), for example, empha-
sizes the role that institutionalization plays in process-
ing challenges to norms. By developing normative under-
standings and organizational scripts, institutions limit the
range of acceptable arguments (Deitelhoff 2009, 44, 61).
In such cases, contestation helps strengthen rather than
destabilize norms—assuming there is a proper frame-
work for deliberating their meaning. Courts are a form of
institutionalization that ensures that normative disputes
remain within the confines of the law, because rules of
procedure and a judge or jury can determine the appro-
priateness and legality of claims. A similar argument has
been made for international negotiations, where institu-
Unpacking the Dynamics of Norm Robustness
tional mechanisms such as procedural fairness or the ab-
sence of a hierarchy encourage effective arguing (Risse
2000, 15; Sikkink 2002; Deitelhoff 2009, 306).
Some researchers also point to the fact that norms
often belong to broader structures that have similar un-
derpinnings (such as liberal human rights or natural re-
sources norms that refer to the “metanorm” of sustain-
ability).25 It is argued that it is harder to undermine a
“bundled” norm (see also Lantis and Wunderlich 2018).
A particular bundle might help or hinder norm chal-
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lenges, as shown by the anti-assassination norm once
also associated with liberal norms. In recent decades,
the norm has ceased to be connected to these ideas
(Großklaus 2017).
A norm’s “legal” character might also play an impor-
tant role in isolating it from challenge, by depoliticizing
it and strengthening its obligations (Abbott and Snidal
2000); a legal norm might be less prone to weakening
by contestation, relative to a “softer” political norm. The
scholarship has applied this argument to the case of RtoP.
Along these lines, a norm’s precision might be another
factor to consider because giving actors more certainty
about what a norm requires them to do (and not) might
decrease contestation and increase compliance.26
Less attention has been given to the ambivalent effects
of these factors. Percy (2007), for example, points to how
legal quality can negatively affect robustness. Precision
might also have a flip side in limiting the scope of toler-
able actions—making it harder for addressees to comply
and fix temporary meanings.27
Process-Related Factors: Types of Contestation
The concept of contestation, which is generally accepted
as influencing norm robustness, needs to be clarified.
Wiener (2008, 31) assumes that under specific conditions,
contestation strengthens norms. Contestation can trig-
ger processes of understanding and create joint meanings
that legitimize norms (Wiener 2014, 30). Other schol-
ars have also indicated that contestation can strengthen
norms. For example, citing contestation of RtoP, Badescu
and Weiss (2010, 354) argue that contestation about
“misapplications”28 could help clarify and strengthen
25
Fukuda-Parr and Hulme (2011, 18) describe a “‘super-
norm,’ a cluster of interrelated norms grouped into a uni-
fied and coherent framework.”
26
See Finnemore and Sikkink (1998, 906–7) and Legro
(1997, 34). For an alternative view on the legal quality
of norms, see Finnemore and Toope (2001).
27
See Percy (2014), van Kersbergen and Verbeek (2007),
and Krook and True (2012).
28
In contrast to only positive precedents.
NICOLE DEITELHOFF AND LISBETH ZIMMERMANN
the concept of a norm: “misguided justifications” would
backfire—“clarifying matters and fostering the norm”
(Badescu and Weiss 2010, 358–59). However, Wiener
(2014, 59) also considers that too much contestation can
create (dangerous) international conflict. Similarly, Clark
et al. (2018, 321) search for the “tipping point” and won-
der “how much subversion of the regime is tolerable be-
fore its legitimacy becomes undermined.” More empirical
research is needed on the various outcomes of contesta-
tion.
Only a few, mainly descriptive, studies have elabo-
rated on contestation. Welsh (2013, 382) differentiates
between RtoP’s procedural contestation (about the ap-
propriate forum for making decisions about a specific
norm) and its substantive contestation (the norm’s con-
tent). In the same vein, Ralph and Gallagher (2015,
558) argue that international legitimacy can be contested
on both procedural (decision-making) and substantive
grounds (dealing with their outcomes). Clark et al. (2018,
332) describe rejectionist, revisionist, and denialist chal-
lenges to norms and argue: “the crisis is driven by this
confluence of rejection, revision, and denial in ways that
question the very purpose of the regime.”
Deitelhoff and Zimmermann (forthcoming) argue
that contestation discourses about norms take two main
forms that have different effects: they either contest
the validity of norms, or they contest their application.
Contestations that question a norm’s application are
“applicatory.” Norm application discourses are about
whether a given norm is appropriate for a given situ-
ation (Günther 1993, 70). Application discourses also
negotiate the actions required by a norm in a specific
situation and which norm should be prioritized in a spe-
cific situation—without making such a ranking perma-
nent (Günther 1993, 40; Peterson 2015, 225–26).29 Con-
sider the torture ban, in which application discourses
could include the following hypothetical statement: “We,
the government of state X, do not think that this case
constitutes an act of torture, as it was not committed by
a public official.”
Application discourses like these often cause the inter-
pretations of a particular norm to evolve over time, for
example, by specifying or widening its scope (Peterson
2015, 221, 227). A hypothetical application discourse
regarding the prohibition of torture might involve dis-
29
See also Chayes and Chayes (1993, 188–89). In this con-
text, O’Mahoney (2014) outlines three different types of
tension that can lead to disputes over the application
of norms: the ambiguity of a norm, inconsistencies (two
norms conflict), and inadequacies (there are no conse-
quences if norms are broken).
11
cussion about how government interpretations differ on
identifying who is a public official and the degree of in-
volvement that makes an official complicit or culpable.
Ideally, a commonly accepted interpretation about how
to identify public officials would evolve at the interna-
tional level.
In contrast, discourses about norm validity question
the norms actors want to uphold in the first place: inde-
pendent of the context, what can actors expect from each
other (Günther 1993, 6–7)? Validity contestation ques-
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tions whether the normative claims are righteous. Previ-
ous research has suggested that this distinction is impor-
tant for norm robustness, with several works describing
contestation at the applicatory level as an indicator of
ongoing norm strength (Hurd 2013, 172; Bellamy 2015,
167–68; Price 2006, 262; Barnes 2016, 103). However,
no empirical analysis has shown that this relationship
does indeed exist or where the limits of applicatory con-
testation are found.
Other studies present applicatory contestation as
a backdoor strategy for watering down norms, argu-
ing that changing norms slowly leaves them empty
and toothless (Panke and Petersohn 2012, 723–24;
Bloomfield 2016, 319). Although dilution can of course
result from applicatory contestation, “strategic” appli-
catory contestation can also reinvigorate the validity
claims of norms,30 and sometimes even creating consen-
sus about when and how to apply norms. In another con-
text, this was called the “rhetorical entrapment” (Risse,
Ropp, and Sikkink 1999). Nevertheless, when the tempo-
rary stabilization of norm meanings is no longer possible,
the norms become weaker.31
This differs from covert validity contestation. Often,
after a norm has emerged internationally, its validity is
not bluntly contested. In order to avoid strong reactions
by third parties, actors contest its validity by apparently
contesting its application—all the while slowly eroding
its acceptance. Research has shown how grafting new
norms upon previously accepted norms often facilitates
acceptance (Price 1998; Acharya 2004). Similar processes
can also be effective in reverse. In an approach that may
be more acceptable than a direct, wholesale rejection of
the norm, challenges are not leveled directly at the norm,
but instead toward related concepts. For example, the
prohibition on torture is nonderogable. All calls to allow
torture in emergencies or to permit the torture of people
30
See also Barnes (2016, 103).
31
See also Brunnée and Toope (this issue) on contin-
uously reactualizing norms by temporarily stabilizing
their meanings.
12
determined to be “terrorists” ignore the essence of the
norm itself.32
In sum, research indicates that norms are mainly
weakened by powerful norm challengers. However,
existing scholarship does not sufficiently explore the role
of legal status, institutionalization, and normative em-
beddedness, and in particular the potentially ambivalent
effects of these conditions. Many researchers suggest that
contestation can both weaken and strengthen norms.
Although Deitelhoff and Zimmermann (forthcom-
ing) distinguish between “applicatory” and “validity”
contestation, no comparative research exists thus far on
the effects of these types of contestation. While neither
the state of research nor our set of cases allow us to
systematically test hypotheses, contributions to this
special issue explore the general dynamics regarding the
robustness of norms linked to security and humanitarian
law and make it possible for us to probe the relevance of
a number of these explanatory factors.
The Case Studies and Their Findings
The contributions to this special issue are grouped in
three sections, the first of which generally theorizes norm
robustness. Simmons and Jo examine the norm of in-
ternational criminal accountability to discuss different
ways of measuring norms and normative contestation
and their implications. The authors paint a more compre-
hensive picture of trends by looking beyond state prac-
tice and discourse to explore regional, domestic, and
local levels for additional indicators of general belief
and rhetorical support, along with actions by norm ad-
dressees. The international criminal accountability norm
clearly shows a positive trend in robustness, but the au-
thors urge caution in interpreting applicatory contesta-
tion.
The second section includes contributions on chal-
lenged norms, some of which do not apply the complete
conceptual framework. Instead, the authors have adapted
it to their case studies. Each contribution explains how
and why specific dimensions of robustness are explored
or not and which of the explanatory factors discussed
above are particularly significant. Three case studies ap-
pear to show little, if any, decrease in norm robustness.
Price explores challenges to the Convention on Chemical
Weapons (CWC) in Syria and argues that only one state
has made very significant violations. While there have
been other small-scale violations, indicators give us good
reason to conclude that the norm prohibiting the use of
32
For “covert validity contestation,” see Schmidt and
Sikkink (this issue).
Unpacking the Dynamics of Norm Robustness
chemical weapons in war is not experiencing a signifi-
cant loss of robustness. Welsh claims that the RtoP shows
increasing robustness. Both of these contributions cau-
tion against too much optimism, with Price emphasizing
that, although CWC’s global institutionalization has pre-
vented erosion, strong institutionalization can also cause
“sanctioning fatigue.” Welsh explores a “political prin-
ciple” rather than a legal norm and the attendant risks
of erosion. Brunnée and Toope argue that, despite open
challenges, we observe hardly any decrease in the robust-
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ness of the right to self-defense under customary law. The
authors point to the distinctive role of applicatory con-
testation in law, where requirements of legality channel
and discipline contestation.
Two other case studies report slight decreases in norm
robustness. Bower analyzes how the AU and its member
states challenged the ICC with modest success and ar-
gues that institutionalization and legal character helped
channel and successfully counter the attacks on the ICC.
With regard to the prohibition on torture, Schmidt and
Sikkink show that the norm remained more or less con-
stantly robust at the international level, but decreased in
those states without strong national rule-of-law systems
that cooperated with the United States. These cases il-
lustrate how the norm’s international and national insti-
tutionalization made individual collaborators fear being
held criminally accountable.
Percy’s analysis of the prohibition on women in com-
bat defies easy classification. Despite major challenges,
the norm remained surprisingly robust over significant
periods of time. According to Percy, the norm has re-
mained robust because it is embedded in a norm clus-
ter and is not legally institutionalized internationally or
domestically. We have only observed a decrease in its
robustness in recent decades (for a slightly different as-
sessment of this trend, see Sandholtz, this issue), a trend
that remains surprisingly slow and centered on Western
democratic states.
The final section reflects on the overall research
project. Sandholtz discusses the findings of the case stud-
ies with regard to the framework set forth in this article
and maps the robustness trends for the different cases.
He also advances the argument that norms rarely die and
discusses the general trajectories of norms.
Comparing the robustness trends in the different con-
tributions, the only norm that is clearly becoming less
robust is the prohibition on women in combat. While
RtoP had been becoming more robust, according to the
Welsh, this trend seems to be changing. Only a slight de-
crease of robustness is observed, however, with regard to
the ICC, the right to self-defense, the torture ban, and the
chemical weapons taboo, while the more general norm
NICOLE DEITELHOFF AND LISBETH ZIMMERMANN
on international criminal accountability is trending to-
ward greater robustness. What accounts for such stabil-
ity, given the often alarmist comments about the state of
these norms and institutions?
A first, and somewhat surprisingly, insight from the
case studies is that actor-level factors have less explana-
tory power than is often anticipated, particularly in secu-
rity studies. Most of the case studies found that, although
enduring norms often had no powerful challengers (for
example, the ICC and the chemical weapons taboo), even
they cannot easily do away with a norm. This is obvious
with regard to the prohibition on torture and the right
to self-defense. Well-established norms display a sticki-
ness that withstands even the blatant use of power. How-
ever, some contributors point to the danger that norm
challengers will carve out exceptions and weaken robust
norms.33 Welsh also stresses how certain states can cre-
atively engage with a norm by reshaping meanings in
their favor (for example, China with regard to Pillar 3
of RtoP).
We also found that the factors related to structure,
such as institutionalization, normative embeddedness,
and legal character, that were prominent in all case stud-
ies can help explain robustness trends, although sev-
eral contributors stress their ambivalent character. In-
stitutionalization protected the ICC and the chemical
weapons taboo, whereas active sanctioning through in-
ternational or domestic institutions largely explains how
challenges failed to significantly affect the prohibition on
torture. Legal character and precision made it more diffi-
cult to erode the torture prohibition, the ICC, the chem-
ical weapons taboo, and the right to self-defense. At the
same time, legal status and precision did not protect some
norms from weakened robustness, for instance in the
cases of the ICC and the prohibition on torture.34 RtoP,
which features a political principle, nicely illustrates the
potential vulnerabilities of challenges to political, as op-
posed to legal, norms. Nearly all the case studies—the
prohibitions on torture and women in combat, the ICC,
the CWC, and RtoP—reveal that being embedded in a
dense normative environment helps norms remain robust
or significantly limits the ability of challenges to weaken
them.
Both Price and Percy illustrate the ambivalent ef-
fects. Price shows that widespread international institu-
tionalization permitted third parties to strongly react to
challenges to the CWC, thus reinforcing the norm’s ro-
33
Brunnée and Toope (this issue) link this risk to circum-
stances in which applicatory contestation might amount
to validity contestation; see also Percy (this issue).
34
See also discussion in Sandholtz (this issue).
13
bustness. If, however, violations of a norm go unsanc-
tioned despite high institutionalization (sanction fatigue),
a norm might be even more damaged. Furthermore, the
case study on the prohibition of women in combat shows
that legal institutionalization can trigger contestation by
helping challengers locate the target. This could be due to
the particular type of norm: the prohibition on women in
combat is a deeply entrenched ethical norm that is very
entangled with societal role models and identities. This
suggests that the norm’s legal status and precision have
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less impact on its robustness. Legal status and institution-
alization are particularly important for modern liberal
norms related to human rights that are not underpinned
by similarly deep-seated societal views.
Third, and finally, contestation types matter. All the
case studies confirm that applicatory contestation is not
correlated with decreasing norm robustness. Most of the
studies reveal that applicatory contestation is linked to
fairly stable, or increasing, norm robustness. Neverthe-
less, a certain level of validity contestation does not au-
tomatically cause complete erosion.35 With regard to
RtoP, there is concern that continual applicatory con-
testation will make it impossible to temporally stabilize
norm meanings.
Norm Challenges and Robustness
We started this project with a simple goal: to understand
how contestation and norm robustness are related in the
area of security politics, traditionally viewed as a par-
ticularly weak field for norms and institutions. Litera-
ture that expresses alarm about the sweeping erosion of
international norms and institutions, as well as overly
optimistic readings about how contestation benefits
normative integration, inspired us to seek out specialists
to examine the conditions in which contestation is weak-
ening norms and institutions. At first, we did not realize
how the numerous challenges to international norms and
institutions during the last years have made this a virulent
question.
Our findings indicate that norms and institutions—
even those related to security—are more robust than
many observers tend to believe. These case studies show
that norms can weather a certain amount of contestation
without becoming less robust. The numerous challenges
to norms—such as individual criminal accountability and
the prohibition on torture—have not managed to signifi-
cantly unravel them. The most endangered norm studied
in this issue is the prohibition on women in combat.
35
As in the torture prohibition or the ICC case, see also
Sandholtz (this issue).
14
While our findings suggest that concerns over the fate
of these norms are exaggerated, we do not deny that cur-
rent challenges might be affecting central norms and in-
stitutions. Our focus on a small set of norms and institu-
tions does not allow us to judge the state of the overall
order, although we studied norms and institutions that
directly or indirectly concern the control and use of vi-
olence, making them central to any order. Moreover, the
factors that are assumed to stabilize international norms
can have ambiguous effects. While dense institutionaliza-
tion does help stabilize norms, this stability is fragile; the
chemical weapons taboo illustrates that upholding cer-
tain norms creates new costs for actors in terms of tak-
ing specific actions (e.g., violating sanctions). Similarly,
norms might be protected from the adverse effects of con-
testation because they are stabilized in a normative clus-
ter. However, once the core norms in a cluster have been
weakened, an entire normative regime over a specific is-
sue might begin to unravel.
Our findings lead us to infer that factors related to
the power of norm challengers are less important than
factors related to process and structure. Robustness fol-
lows from the type of contestation that targets a partic-
ular norm, how well that norm is embedded in a nor-
mative cluster, and whether it is institutionalized and
able to deploy legal discourse and practice. Importantly,
we do not argue that power as such does not help ex-
plain robustness trends. Instead, power works in subtle
ways (see Barnett and Duvall 2005). International in-
stitutions are expressions of (asymmetrically enshrined)
power, as shown by the AU’s call in 2010 for the United
Nations (UN) Security Council to halt ICC proceedings
over Darfur so that it could develop a regional approach
to peace building. The Security Council ignored the call,
frustrating the AU and fueling contestation of the ICC.
Institutions similarly present hegemonic discourses that
establish what can be said and done, thus creating insid-
ers and outsiders or outspoken “deviators” (Adler-Nissen
2014). Moreover, norm research is described as funda-
mentally flawed because it creates narratives about norm
emergence, diffusion, and change from Western or Eu-
rocentric vantage points, ignoring non-Western perspec-
tives and the colonial and postcolonial power asymme-
tries in the production and stabilization of international
norms.36 Our research agenda focused on challenges to
norm robustness, and its effects are not immune to these
charges. However, our focus in this special issue proac-
tively includes the perspectives of non-Western actors.
It rejects the assumption that contestation is inherently
bad and instead considers challenges to norms by many
36
See, for example, Epstein (2014, 2012).
Unpacking the Dynamics of Norm Robustness
different non-Western state actors, along with their con-
tents and effects. The project’s normative baseline is that
such challenges and their effects should not automatically
provoke critical normative judgments. Robustness in it-
self is not a normative value. In fact, many international
norms and regimes represent deep-seated inequalities and
hierarchies that require change, and the case studies that
contribute to this project each present different standards
and perspectives for fostering such change.
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Acknowledgements
We would like to thank the Journal of Global Security
Studies editors and the reviewers for their many help-
ful comments and suggestions. The article has been pro-
foundly shaped and has benefited from the discussions
at joint workshops with all contributors to this special
issue at PRIF (2015, 2016) as well as at an ISA work-
shop in 2016. We also would like to thank Antonio Ar-
cudi, Tanja Börzel, Christopher Daase, Bud Duvall, Max
Lesch, Phil Orchard, Thomas Risse, Elvira Rosert, Nina
Tannenwald, Antje Wiener, and Carmen Wunderlich for
their valuable input and feedback to this project.
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