The Relational Subject' According To A Critical Realist Relational Sociology

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The ‘Relational Subject’ According to a Critical Realist Relational Sociology
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DOI: 10.1080/14767430.2016.1166728
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The ‘Relational Subject’ According to a Critical

Realist Relational Sociology
Pierpaolo Donati
To cite this article: Pierpaolo Donati (2016) The ‘Relational Subject’ According to a
Critical Realist Relational Sociology, Journal of Critical Realism, 15:4, 352-375, DOI:
10.1080/14767430.2016.1166728
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Download by: [Professor Pierpaolo Donati] Date: 15 July 2016, At: 13:13
journal of critical realism, Vol. 15 No. 4, August, 2016, 352–375
The ‘Relational Subject’ According to a

Critical Realist Relational Sociology
Pierpaolo Donati
University of Bologna, Italy
Downloaded by [Professor Pierpaolo Donati] at 13:13 15 July 2016
The article aims at clarifying the viewpoint of a critical realist relational

sociology when dealing with the notion of ‘relational subject’. The term
‘relational subject’, as developed by Donati and Archer, The Relational
Subject (Cambridge: CUP, 2015), indicates individual and social subjects
as ‘relationally constituted’, i.e. in as much as they acquire qualities and
powers through their internal and external social relations. The validity of
the relational (not transactional, and not relationist) perspective can be
seen on different levels in social ‘collective’ subjects: on the micro level
(for example, in the couple relation), on the meso level (civil associations
and organizations) and on the macro level (for example, in citizen/state
relations).
keywords relational goods, relational realism, relational sociology, relational

subject, relationism
The concept of relational subject

In his later work Philosophy and Social Hope, Richard Rorty makes an intriguing
statement: ‘Everything that can serve as a term of relation can be dissolved into
another set of relations, and so on forever’ (1999, 54). This ontological perspective
raises a question: when we speak of a subject (as an individual or collective agent/
actor), should we conceive of it in this way? Moreover, should we think that
Rorty’s new pragmatism can be the right way to interpret the famous sentence of
Marx (sixth thesis on Feuerbach) according to which ‘the essence of man is no
abstraction inherent in each separate individual. In its reality it is the ensemble
(aggregate) of social relations’?
In this article, I will try to reply to both questions basing my arguments on what is
called ‘critical realist relational sociology’.
A subject is, first and foremost, an agent/actor apprehended in their individuality
as a human person. Indeed, the human being qualifies and distinguishes herself with
respect to all other living beings by being a person who possesses her own
© 2016 Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group DOI 10.1080/14767430.2016.1166728
THE ‘RELATIONAL SUBJECT’ 353
subjectivity (see Archer 2000). The problem that the human and social sciences must
address is that of understanding and explaining how this subjective individuality
forms itself from the moment the newborn begins to interact with the external
world, that is, the world of nature and people with which she enters into relation,
something that happens even before birth when the child is still in the mother’s
womb.
The path indicated by relational realism tries to avoid both subjectivism, whatever
may be its form (including autopoiesis and self-referentiality), and its opposite,
which today is represented not only by positivism (‘objectivism’), but above all by
‘relationalism’. For relational sociology, saying that subjectivity consists of the
person’s ‘consciousness’ (or Mind), as rationalist and idealist thinkers assert (from
Descartes to Hegel and after) is quite reductive because no subject is an isolated
monad. Likewise, it is reductive to maintain that consciousness exists if and in as
much as it is formed by its relations, as relationalist thinkers would have it, based
on the argument according to which the relation has ontological priority over the
existence of consciousness (Emirbayer 1997; Laflamme 1995; Vautier 2008).
When Donati states that, ‘in the beginning (of social facts), there is the relation’
(2011a, 25), he does not intend to state that the relation determines in toto con-
sciousness. Consciousness (or Mind) is an autonomous reality, whereas autonomy
means the capability of a subject to make a selection about whom/what to depend
on. What the statement means is that consciousness, in its functioning, must necess-
arily relate to an Other than the Self, and that only ‘in relation’ can the person
develop.1 Like every social phenomenon, consciousness also has a relational
essence in that it is a ‘related’ reality. But this does not mean that the relation
‘creates’ consciousness, but only that it contributes to giving it a form.
The relational realism holds that personal subjectivity consists in consciousness
(or mind), which operates in relation to itself through the external world that it per-
ceives. Consciousness and relationality are co-constitutive. But there is no ontologi-
cal priority of one over the other because they exist as autonomous and distinct
realities. Consciousness and its relations do not emerge in a simultaneous manner
(in which case we would be faced with a central conflation between the subject
and her context). Rather, they emerge through different temporal phases in which
consciousness and relation influence each other in turn. Subjectivity and the external
context are different layers of reality that reciprocally condition each other over time
through the phases that characterize the sequence illustrated by the scheme of mor-
phostasis/morphogenesis (Archer 1995, 2013).
The question to be answered is: in what way and to what extent do the relations
that the individual establishes with the outside (everything that is not-I) influence the
subject and go towards constituting her personal and social identity?
In the first place, I speak of ‘relational subject’ to refer to the human person in as
much as s/he is apprehended in the making of these relations. As soon as we observe
the human individual ‘in relation’ to others, we see a ‘relational I’ that not only acts
and is involved as Self in these relations, but re-elaborates itself in/through/with
these relations.2
The question becomes: is the I that is situated in the existing relation [to ‘ex-ist’
means ‘being outside’ the terms of the relationship] the same I that converses
354 PIERPAOLO DONATI
internally with itself? The answer is certainly affirmative, because only the I reflects,
but it is the way in which it ‘reflects’ that is different. Why and how is it different?
And what does this diversity engender?
The I that converses with itself inside its own mind (reflexive inner conversation)
has as an outcome the fact of rethinking and reprogramming its own deliberations,
which, as such, will influence external relations.3 But one could ask: what outcome is
had by the I that reflects, not only on itself within itself, and not only on itself in
relation to the world, but reflects in/on/with the relation as such with the Other
(the world)? Certainly the outcome will consist of personal deliberations that will
influence external relations: but will these deliberations influence in the same way
as the purely internal conversation? One can hypothesize that deliberations in/on/
with the relation as such will influence the production of social phenomena in a
different way. This is even more true when the relationship with the Other is the
relationship emerging from the dynamics of a social network.

Let us take the example of a musician in an orchestra when she reflects on the
quality of her personal performance and when she thinks about and within the per-
formance of the orchestra as a whole and, from this standpoint, evaluates her own
performance: are these two ways of reflecting the same thing? This is the problem of
the ‘relational subject’. If the musician only thinks about herself, she will seek her
personal model of perfection and nothing more (autonomous reflexivity). If she
thinks about her contribution as a function of the orchestra, she will seek her best
‘adaptation’ to the orchestra’s performance (communicative reflexivity). If,
instead, she reflects on/in/with the orchestra’s performance and on how this per-
formance can be improved in the event that the musicians relate to each other in a
different way, she will seek to alter the performance of the orchestra as a whole,
that is, she will seek to produce a different emergent effect — which is to say, a
more satisfying performance of the orchestra. In this latter case, we can speak of
meta-reflexivity. However, it is necessary to distinguish between individual and col-
lective (or social) meta-reflexivity. The meta-reflexivity of single musicians remains
an individual fact that has certain repercussions on the orchestra. It becomes ‘social’
— that is, relational — when each musician looks (relates) to the orchestra conduc-
tor who represents and interprets the We-relation. Therefore, in the conducting of
the orchestra, meta-reflexivity appears as the reflexivity of the ‘collective subject’
that is thus because it behaves in a ‘fully’ relational manner.
Sociologists are used to speaking of ‘collective (or social) subjects’ to indicate
groups of individuals which act ‘collectively’ in the sense of a collective entity that
is supposed to evaluate objectives (discernment), deliberate on its own concerns
(deliberation) and strive to achieve them (dedication).4 Examples of collective sub-
jects are the couple, the family, a voluntary association, a cooperative, a labour
union, a political party, a foundation, a local community and a social movement,
although, of course, with different relational qualities and causal properties. Both
in common parlance and in scientific studies, it is claimed that these collective enti-
ties evaluate, deliberate and ‘act’ as ‘subjects’.
Therefore, besides single persons, primary social groups (primary agents/actors)
and organizations (corporate agents/actors) are held to be ‘subjects’. The same
problem that Archer highlighted for single persons presents itself with respect to
these entities. The problem is: how do we define ‘internal subjectivity’ — the collec-
tive Ego (the We) — of these entities when they evaluate, deliberate and act in them-
selves, and when they evaluate, deliberate and act in relation to other (individual or
collective) subjects?
The term ‘relational subject’ indicates individual and social subjects in that they
are ‘relationally constituted’, that is, in as much as they acquire qualities and
powers through their internal and external social relations. The term ‘relational
subject’ refers to both the individual subject and the collective (social) subject as
regards the role that the relation with the Other plays in defining and redefining
one’s own identity, whether personal (the identity that the I has of itself) or social
(the identity that the I has for Others).
Obviously this comes about in different ways depending on whether the subject is
individual or collective. In the individual subject, the relation to the Other enters into
the individual consciousness and plays a role in the internal self-definition of the
individual Self. In the collective subject, the relation to the Other alters the
network of relations between the members of the collective subject and, therefore,
also the processes that lead to discernment, deliberation and dedication on the
part of the social subject when it acts as a collective subject.
The term ‘social subject’ indicates a collective subject in that it is constituted by
internal relations between individuals that form part of it, and by the external
relations that it has in as much as it is expressed in a ‘We’. However, this We is
not a ‘thing’; it is not an artificial entity, a symbol, an idea, an entity superimposed
as a sort of ‘collective mind’, and not even a collective intentionality. We have a ‘rela-
tional social subject’ when this We is configured as a relation (We-relation).5
It is relatively easy to think about and describe the individual relational subject,
even in the formula of the multiple-self (Bazin and Ballet 2006). Understanding
and explaining the collective (or, better, social) relational subject is rather more
complex. The difficulty resides in the fact that — at first sight, and properly speaking
— only individual persons ‘think’ (reflect). Extending the concept of the single
human individual’s reflexivity to a social group (primary or corporate agent)
appears to be problematic. Nevertheless, I hold that this is possible, under certain
conditions. In order to understand how the reflexivity of a collective (social)
subject — called relational reflexivity — is possible, it is necessary to adopt a specific
sociological approach, which can be called ‘relational realism’.
While personal reflexivity can be defined as ‘the regular exercise of the mental
ability, shared by all (normal) people, to consider themselves in relation to their
(social) contexts and vice versa’ (Archer 2007, 4), relational (or collective) reflexivity
is ‘the regular exercise of the mental ability, shared by all (normal) people, to con-
sider the influence of their relation(s) with relevant others on to themselves and
vice versa’ (Donati 2011b, 31–5).6
What is ‘social’ in the relational subject?

The human individual is relational by nature, but relations are created in time and
space, that is, in a situated sociocultural context. The human person’s identity, as
reflexive consciousness of the Self,7 is not a substance in and of itself lacking

relations, but is constituted by relations with other human individuals (Donati
2010, 145).
In order to understand how the human person is a ‘relational subject’ in a more
profound way than the simple Aristotelian assertion that man is a political animal
and exists only in society, which is a conclusion drawn from first level empirical
observation, we need a sophisticated theory of social relations that is missing
from classical ancient thought. Saying that the human individual exists only
because he was conceived and raised by other human beings and, moreover, needs
other people in order to live, etc. is banal. This says little or nothing about how
the human individual is effectively structured (configured) in as much as he is a con-
crete and situated ‘relational being’. We need second-order observations, as well as
second-order (relational) feedbacks.
The problem is to understand how social relationality structures the human indi-
vidual’s personal and social identity as well as agency. When the personal I meets the
social realm in the form of Me, We and You (Archer 2003, 124), it is necessary to see
how it considers these social identities, that is, what relation the Self establishes with
them. The relations that the Self establishes with Me, We and You are very different
from one another. An analysis of these dynamics is not within the scope of this
article, however.
A relational subject is a subject that exists only in relation and is constituted by the
relations that she cares for. What does this mean?
By this I do not mean to assert that the social relation is a subject in and for itself, but
that the relation has its own (sui generis) reality in that it has causal powers and its
own qualities. Sui generis (= of its own kind) here means that social relations are
the effect or creation of human activities, actions or agency, but they are an emergent
phenomenon that corresponds to a different (autonomous and peculiar in its charac-
teristics) order of reality in respect to human behaviour/agency. This relationality (the
relation as a real entity) is activity-dependent, but has its own structure (Donati 1991,
ch. 4; 2015a), which can be seen in the power that it exercises in retroacting on the
terms (Ego and Alter) of the relation itself.
It is quite rare that the terms of the relation (Ego and Alter) personally reflect on
how the relation between them can be generated or altered by their action. Nor-
mally, the relation remains implicit and latent. In the social world something akin
to the physical world happens. We do not see light, we see with light. In the same
way, in the social world we do not see relations, but we see with relations, which
themselves remain unseen.
A subject becomes relationally reflexive when it reflects on how the relation with
the Other, which is coming into existence or altering itself, produces changes on itself
or on the Other, that is, on their social and personal identity (Donati 2010, 149–53).
Most of the time, individual subjects treat the relation with the Other in an implicit
and latent manner. They become reflexive subjects in the relational sense (‘relation-
ally reflexive’) when they succeed in observing the relation that they have with other
agents/actors as an entity in and of itself and, thus, they consider it as a reality that,
while depending on themselves, can in turn determine their identity and action.
(Here the verb ‘determine’ means that the Ego-Alter relation ‘circumscribes’ the
agent/actors with boundaries, ‘delimits’ them, ‘identifies’ them with a certain pre-
cision, ‘specifies’ them.)
The underlying question that arises is that of understanding what ‘the social’ is
(what we mean by the word ‘social’) when we use it in the expression ‘social relation’.
The term ‘social’ is notorious for being extremely ambiguous and riddled with misun-
derstandings. In general, it is used as a synonym of ‘collective’, in the sense of an aggre-
gation of many individuals. But here, instead, I use it as a synonym of ‘relational’:
saying that something or someone is social means saying that it is relational, in the
sense that it exists and is relevant for society (not on other planes of reality) in that
it is defined by its social relations (Donati 2011a). So, the seemingly tautological
expression ‘social relation’ means the relationality inherent in the relation.8
To clarify this point, it is worthwhile remembering that the social is usually under-
stood in the following two ways:
(i) as resulting from individual actions, psychological projections or exchanges

between individuals who orient themselves reciprocally; here the social is under-
stood as an aggregate effect of a multitude of individuals who produce a collec-
tive result;9 in this case, the orchestra players would not need the orchestra
conductor or a soccer team would not need a coach.
(ii) or as the structure that overshadows (impinges upon) individuals and makes
them think and act in a certain way (see, for instance, Douglas 1986); in this
case, the orchestra players would be no more than the orchestra conductor’s
executors or the soccer players would be no more than their coach’s executors.
If one adopts these two meanings of ‘social’, it is not possible to see the relational
subject. In the first case, the relation is reduced to an ‘event’ lacking structure or
that produces an entirely contingent structure (in a certain sense, a sort of upward
conflation is performed); in the second case, the relation is reduced to a structure
lacking agency (in a certain sense, a sort of downward conflation is performed).
It is thus necessary to arrive at another meaning of ‘social’, the one that I am proposing here.
(iii) The social can be understood as ‘another’ order of reality (I call it ‘the relational
order’, not to be confused with Goffman’s ‘interaction order’),10 different from
an aggregate reality and from that of a structure overshadowing the agents/
actors and which determines them because it consists of relations. On this point,
however, it is necessary to draw some distinctions among those scholars who
share the idea that the analytical unit is the social relation, and that it is neither
the individual nor structures conceived as a ‘whole’ that determine individuals.
For various reasons, I do not follow those authors who declare themselves to be
‘relational’ but who, in reality, propose a ‘transactional’ sociology because they con-
ceive of the social as ‘transaction’ between individuals (see Dépelteau and Powell
2013; Emirbayer 1997). They should be called transactional sociologies. The
defects of such transactional sociologies are principally these two: in the first
place, since they conceive of social relations as mere interactions of exchange
between individuals, they do not see the sui generis reality of the relations and, in
particular, the reality of the social structures constituted by those relations that
are not transactional; secondly, since they reduce the relation to an interaction or
multiple interactions, they run into some form of central conflation between individ-
uals and social and cultural structures.11 On the other hand, I would not call rela-
tional sociologies those structural approaches where the social is defined as an
outcome of network mechanisms (such as in Crossley’s network analysis).12
I call relationist (instead of relational) those approaches that get into some kind of
conflationary thinking by assuming that agents and social structures co-determine
themselves through a web of relations of relations in which the distinctions
between the relational terms are missing.
Together with Margaret Archer, I think that we can speak of a relational subject,
whether individual or collective, when social relations go towards constituting the
personal identity of whoever is involved through their social reflexivity (i.e. when
the inner conversation takes into account the feedbacks originating from the reflex-
ivity of the network of social relations in which the person is involved). The rela-
tional subject does not exist if the relation does not go towards constituting the
participants’ personal identity. For example, the couple is a relational subject if
and to the degree that the personal identities of the two partners are defined reflex-
ively through their unique couple relation, while the doctor–patient or seller–buyer
relation does not constitute a relational subject to the extent that their relation does
not enter into the two actors’ personal identities but remains external (purely social).
The validity of the relational (not transactional and not relationist!) perspective
can be seen on different levels in social ‘collective’ subjects: on the micro level (for
example, in the couple relation), on the meso level (social associations and organiz-
ations) and on the macro level (for example, in citizen/state relations).
Examples of relational subjects

Examples of social subjects can be organized in a framework based on the level, type
and degree of mediation of the relations.
There are three levels: micro, meso and macro.13 The type of mediation has to do
with the specific qualities of the social relations in play. There can be various typol-
ogies; one of them, the most simple, differentiates them into four types of spheres:
mediations in spheres of family, kinship, friendship, acquaintances of the lifeworld;
mediations in spheres of the voluntary associations of civil society; mediations in the
economic market; mediations in the sphere of the political-administrative system
and its apparatus. The degree of mediation goes from a minimum (face-to-face,
direct relationships) to a maximum (hyper-mediated, indirect relations, as in
social mass movements).14
The three criteria are correlated among themselves, but are not identical. They are
mapped in Figure 1.
Let me give several examples of relational subjects.
At the micro level: the couple and informal relations.

The couple — as a stable relation between two partners — is a relational subject if
and to the extent to which the two partners act in reference to their relation (to its
figure 1. A map of relational subjects: the probability (p) of having relational subjects.
structure, its needs and conditions), rather than considering the relation as a func-
tion of the Self. It becomes evident to an external observer when the subject-
partner says ‘I am willing (or unwilling) to break the relationship’, or ‘the
(couple) relationship tells me what I am, it makes me discover my feelings, my
identity in everyday life’. The same occurs in informal relations (kinship, neigh-
bourhood, friendship between two people or the friendship of a group, etc.).
The single partner is increasingly a relational subject — as a person — the more
her action (agency) is ‘centred’ on the relation with the Other. The couple as such
is a relational social subject if and to the extent to which the partnership relation
emerges as a distinct reality from the two individual subjects and, in turn, influ-
ences each of them.
The existence of the relational social subject (the couple) requires that:
(i) Ego must ‘see the relation’ with Alter and vice versa; ‘seeing’ means considering
the relation as a reality that is distinct from the Self;
(ii) this means that the Ego–Alter relation must not be considered simply as a projec-
tion of Ego onto Alter and vice versa (as Edmund Husserl does with his notion of
‘appresentation’),15 nor as an expectation that Ego has vis-à-vis Alter’s thoughts
and vice versa, as J. Searle does;16
(iii) the relation must be defined as a ‘We’;
(iv) the ‘We’ must be ‘symbolized’ (Ego and Alter admit to being ‘a couple’ and
often qualify it in a specific way), even if the symbol is interpreted with different
thoughts and meanings by Ego and by Alter. The symbol indicates the reality of
the relation (We, not-Them)17 — it is an indicality — in such a way that what-
ever the We does or must do (for example, eating a meal together, spending a
holiday together) is defined and lived as a relation (reciprocal action). The
We-relation is conceived of as a relational good; according to relational soci-
ology, ‘at a certain level of social differentiation, the common good becomes
a specific good, that I call ‘relational’, i.e. a good that can be produced only
together, it is not excludable for anyone who partakes in it, it cannot be
divided, nor it is conceivable as the sum of individual goods’; ‘saying that a
good is a common good means to say that it is a relational good as it
depends on the relations implemented by the subjects toward one another, and
can be enjoyed only if they orient themselves accordingly’ (see Donati 1991,
150–71; quotations from 156 and 157);
(v) the ‘We’ arises from interactions between Ego and Alter and is reflected onto
them, becoming part of their personal and social identity and conditioning
their action, as is synthetically illustrated in a diagram that presents the case
of the couple, David and Helen (Figure 2).18
To say that the Ego (David) and Alter (Helen) are personal relational subjects
means seeing them as single agents/actors in Figure 2, while they constitute a collec-
tive relational subject, which we call ‘couple’, if a We-relation emerges from the
dynamics of their relations over time.19
It is worth emphasizing the differences among ways of defining relation. There
exists, in fact, a radical difference between relational sociology based on critical

realism, which observes the emergent structure, and those relationist sociologies
that see the couple relation as essentially a ‘transaction’ in the interactions
between individuals (Emirbayer 1997), or as ‘communicative exchange’ that gener-
ates emotions (Laflamme 1995), or a ‘pure relationship’ as theorized by Giddens.20
From the viewpoint of relational sociology, the relation implies an exchange, and
therefore a communication, but is not reducible to either exchange, mere communi-
cation or contingent individual satisfaction. The social relation, such as that of the
couple, is a reality that emerges from interactions, but has its own reality (life)
figure 2. The We-relation (relational good) of a couple (David and Helen). Source: Donati
(2012, figure 4) and expanded by Archer in Donati and Archer (2015, figure 2.1, 71).
because it exists even when the exchange or the communication falls silent and thus
has a reality that goes beyond the contents of the exchange and the communication.
If a partner goes to work far away from the other partner and does not exchange or
communicate anything for a certain time, the couple relation remains there. In that
period of time, the couple relation ceases to exert some of its effects, but it persists as
a relational structure that places specific requirements and conditions on the part-
ners. The couple relation can exist even if the communication and exchanges
between the partners are not satisfying, or if they do not give them what they indi-
vidually expect or hope for at some given point in time.
Let us give another example.21 In a city like London, a gang of young men grow
up together and offend together. They develop close relationships of friendship over
the years. Different people in the gang develop intimate/marital relationships which
incrementally assume paramount importance among the constellation of their con-
cerns. At some time, a violent feud erupts between gang members dividing the gang
into two sides. Barry, the original gang leader, moves to another area where he starts
work. He reaches out to those other gang members whom he remains close to. He
suggests that they too move to this other area to enable them to make a fresh start
and enjoy a better way of life. He provides them with support to move and trains
them with the skills to work. This provides them with an opportunity to give up
crime and they do. He also offers them advice when they encounter challenges in
adapting to this new way of life. Obviously other individual processes of reflexivity
occur within the individuals he supports.
Now, the question is: could this outlined process/scenario be described as an
example of relational/social reflexivity at the micro level? I think so. As far as I
can see, it is an example of relational reflexivity in so far as: (1) Barry has realized
that he should break the links with the old gang (leave the previous social
network); (2) he felt that a new social context (network) was needed (in a sense,
he realized that the gang network was a relational evil); (3) he took care of the
relations with and among those gang members who joined him. To me, relational
reflexivity appears in this example as a way of changing people’s attitudes and beha-
viours by acting upon their relational context and networking. Barry’s personal
reflexivity was applied neither to his internal conversation as such, nor to his indi-
vidual social mobility, but to the relations with his friends as a way of exercising
his leadership in a different way, that is, by building up a new relational subject
(the new network) which can produce relational goods.
At the meso level: voluntary associations

Let us take the case of the voluntary associations of civil society. At first glance, the
meso level can appear to be only an extension of the micro level. But this is not the
case, for many reasons (see Figure 3).
(i) The first difference between the micro and meso levels consists in the fact that
interactions between the N members are multiplied out of all proportion;
(ii) consequently, the level of relations that emerge from single interactions among
the N members create problems in the definition of the We, problems that
emerge on the meso level;
figure 3. The relational social subject at a meso level.
(iii) we are in the presence of a relational social subject if and only if the N members
of the association have the same We that is emergent from their interactions;
(iv) this process leads to describing the association as a network of nodes (the N
members) that have certain relations among themselves, which must converge
toward the same We;
(v) whether there exists or not a relational social subject constituted by the associ-
ation’s N members depends on how their network of relations (internal, but
clearly related to the exterior) operates;
(vi) the simplest case is that in which the intermediate (meso) level of the vertical
relations created by the horizontal relations is ‘absorbed’ by totalizing
symbols, as happens in mass movements (such as the Greens or the Anti-Global
movement). When the symbol that unites the We is more opaque (for example,
in the case of the symbol of peace, as compared to more precise symbols, such
as the degree of environmental pollution), it becomes more unlikely that a rela-
tional subject will be created (for example, peace movements are very divided
among themselves because their goal has different meanings, according to
members’ ideologies or political positions).
All of this means that a relational social subject comes into existence on the meso
level when at least two conditions are met:
(i) the symbol of We must be held ‘in common’, but not in the sense of being under-
stood and interpreted in an identical way by the N members, but rather in as
much as it is represented and perceived as a task held in common (co-munus),
which consists in having and being in a certain relation (the We-relation,
which means to carry out the munus together, that is, relationally).
(ii) in interactions among the N members, whether on an interpersonal level or on a
level of emergent relations on the meso level, the We must be enacted as the
relation that binds/connects the N members in the shared enterprise.
In as much as these two conditions are not satisfied, a relational social subject does
not emerge. The fact that there exists a ‘joint commitment’ (Gilbert 1989, 1990,
2009) does not guarantee that there will be a ‘genuine’ social subject because a
joint commitment does not ensure that an authentic relation among the members
will be constituted (that is, a relation that can effectively produce, or cause, the exist-
ence of a social subject, given that the sharing of a commitment can indicate the exist-
ence of a solidarity that is purely mechanical, and not solidarity of a relational type).
Relational goods can be produced only by means of that specific type of relation
that connects the various members of the association. It is necessary to verify
whether that relation can realize (or not, and to what extent) the shared goal that
is represented by the symbol of We.
Achieving the We is the problem of all voluntary associations. Often, in the phase
of establishing an association, the We seems clear because of its nascent state (statu
nascendi). However, one then needs to see how the actual relations evolve among the
members.22 A negative outcome (the weakening or disappearance of the relational
subject) is seen in many associative processes: for example, those in which some
members come to dominate over others (in keeping with Robert Michels’s (2001)
‘iron law of oligarchy’). In these cases, the meso level is immune from the micro
level of primary relations.
The vicissitudes of organizations should be evaluated in light of what has just been
said. It is necessary to understand whether the organization in question has an
associative character or not, and of what type. The case of companies (corporations)
is quite different from voluntary associations, in as much as the company of a single
entrepreneur (individual, but also corporate) does not have an associative consti-
tution; the ‘constitutive relation’ of the social subject is missing from them (see
Baker 2000). On the other hand, enterprises of a cooperative type as, for
example, the Italian cooperatives of social solidarity (established by national Law
n. 381/1991 as no profit organizations that must pursue the collective interests of
the community where they operate), have an associative constitution due to their
founding statute. Nevertheless, in this latter case as well, it is necessary to always
verify whether and how the associative life actually achieves the relational networks
that make a We (as in Figure 3).
Another example that deserves a separate analysis is that of social networks and
the creation of commons on the internet, such as, for example, Peer2Peer production
(Bauwens 2008).
At the macro level: public institutions

The macro level is represented by public institutions, such as the State and its appar-
atus (public administration), local authorities, international organisms (such as the
UN) or supranational organisms (such as the European Union), and the like. These
institutions differ from meso subjects, which are intermediate corporate agents/
actors between individuals and macro-systems.
The question is: in what sense can we say that macro-institutional entities — for
example, a State or a country’s judicial system — are (or can be) relational social
subjects?
Their characteristic is that of being constituted by relations that:

(i) are hyper-mediated, that is, highly impersonal, due to the fact that they are enti-
ties which are normatively obliged to act according to formal, public criteria;
(ii) involve individuals whose personal qualities, ideas, cultures and social origins
differ greatly from one another.
These two characteristics are such that it is highly improbable that the N macro-
institutional members (for example the citizens of a State qua citizens) can give
life to a social relational subject. Mostly they originate class actions, advocacy move-
ments, etc. that are of an aggregative type. The distance between micro (interperso-
nal) relations and membership in a public macro-institution becomes so wide as to
render quite improbable the constitution of a We.
Yet these macro-institutions are considered ‘moral persons’23 because they
operate (can we say: they act?) as a We. In fact, we say that the State, the EU,
the public administration and local authorities all take decisions, behave in a
certain way, and so on. Whether this attribution of a We that decides and oper-
ates as a social subject is only a fiction, as the social sciences based on nominal-
ism claim (Winch 1958), or whether, instead, it identifies a structural reality, as
realist critics assert (Porpora 1989), is a question that I cannot debate here in
detail. Between the two options, however, together with Archer I lean towards
the second.
Our thesis is that a public macro-institution can generate a relational social
subject only in extremely exceptional cases, that is, when very particular conditions
are created. Which conditions? Those conditions that make an institution sensitive
to what happens in the life worlds when the latter change their relationality through
processes of social morphogenesis (i.e. through a ‘state of being revived’ of that insti-
tution — statu nascendi, in Max Weber’s sense, as the opposite condition of mere
reproduction, of routine and ordinary life). Specifically, what are these conditions?
From the theoretical standpoint, the conditions are those that create a reflexive
interpenetration between the institution’s systemic integration and social inte-
gration. This means that the systemic mechanisms are enacted with a subjective
sense by the participants in the interaction and do not operate as mere systemic func-
tions or automatic devices. In these cases, public institutions work through relational
feedbacks (Donati 2015b).
Let us take, for example, an institution, such as a department of the public admin-
istration, which is configured as a network structured in a bureaucratic way. We
know that a social network’s structural holes create dependencies by certain
nodes (the more isolated ones) on other nodes called brokers (the mediating
ones). We can say that a statu nascendi of a relational subject is generated by the
network as soon as a broker of the structural network, instead of operating auto-
matically as a mediator between the nodes that it connects, seeks to foster a ‘subsidi-
ary mediation’ between the more isolated agents/actors by putting them into a
creative relation with one another (Fleming et al. 2007). In such a case, the
broker seeks to give the nodes more space and power by fostering their direct
contact, which reduces the asymmetries and conditioning powers of the broker
itself. The statu nascendi consists in the redistribution of power to (the empower-
ment of) the weakest nodes, in such a way as to create the conditions through
which it is possible that a relational subject can emerge.
Clearly, this happens rarely. Much depends on the type of social sphere in which
we find ourselves. Sometimes it happens in the public administration system when
the brokers of a welfare service team are freed from formal constraints and can
operate on the field in an interactive and cooperative way with informal helpers.24
It is highly improbable, if not impossible, in the political system because the poli-
tician’s quest for power entails the strengthening of structural mechanisms, certainly
not their weakening (although the outcome can be the opposite of what they want).
The same occurs in the economic sphere oriented towards making profits. Much
more ambivalent is what happens in the sphere of third sector organizations and net-
works, where much effort is made to enforce the rules of subsidiarity and solidarity
oriented towards empowering the weak and marginalized. As to family spheres and
informal relations, we can observe that, on the empirical plane, the level of reflexivity
is normally very low, in fact, so that it is quite unlikely that an explicit intertwine-
ment between processes of social and systemic integration will be activated. Differ-
ently from the state and market fields, where social normativity is ruled by state laws
and market mechanisms (working together in what Donati calls the lib/lab arrange-
ments), within the spheres of the third sector and in the informal sector we can
observe processes of relationship-building in a trans-normative sense (Fitzi 2012).
In these spheres it is more probable that new relational subjects can emerge.
Relational subjectivities within social policies

The issue becomes more complex when it comes to social policies. The intertwine-
ment between systemic mechanisms and forms of social integration must be pro-
duced only with supplementary reflexive efforts. Let us take as an example the
case of the apparatus that distributes welfare benefits and entitlements. Simplifying,
we can say that there exist — roughly — three modes of distributing welfare services.
(i) According to conditional models based on the rule, ‘if … then’ [‘if X (the need
situation) occurs → then follow the norm Y’] (Marston and Mcdonald 2006).
Here the procedures that the operator must adopt are bureaucratic (automatic)
so that, normally, no relational reflexivity is activated.
(ii) According to models of incremental evolution (such as opportunistic models,
muddling through models, mixed scanning, policy by objectives, etc.), which
operate by modifying procedures based on the efficacy of objectives and the
efficiency of means calculated according to the contingencies of the single situ-
ation. A particular model of systemic, evolutionary and instrumental opportu-
nism is given by Luhmann (1971, 165–80). Although in these cases it may seem
that there is more subjectivity on the part of the actors (workers and clients)
than in the conditional model, nevertheless the agents’/actors’ subjectivity is
expressed as a problem-solving strategy within a system of action that presents
many normative and instrumental constraints, which often do not make it poss-
ible to activate a true relationality between the agents/actors.
(iii) According to relational models that organize welfare interventions through the
creation of a relational social subject constituted by formal and informal
workers that operate as a network endowed with its own subjectivity
(Donati 1991, ch. 5). A practical example of this is found in groups of families
which share a problem and are guided by experts who operate as facilitators
and catalysers of auto-therapeutic processes of self-help and mutual help by
the participants (an empirical case is that of family group conferences)
(Heino 2009). In general, this model is practised by all those interventions
for people’s well-being and welfare that follow the practices of relational
‘observation-diagnosis-guidance’ (ODG).25 The formal workers of the action
system open a dialogue with the subjects in need of assistance (persons, families,
small social groups), involving formal and informal helpers, and proceed by
activating a conversation among all of the participants. They rely on narrative
methodologies that function to stimulate the participants’ personal and social

reflexivity, which — nurtured by the interactions — facilitates solving each par-
ticipant’s problems.
The process develops as follows. All of the participants together create an obser-
vation of the relations in which the needy subjects find themselves ensnared. This
observation (O of ODG) is not held ‘in common’ because each person crafts it in
their own way. Nevertheless, the dialogic methodology allows each one to come
to an agreement with the others on several aspects. These aspects are highlighted
by the person who is acting as the relational guide, and go towards constituting
the We-relation. The observation leads to a diagnosis (D of ODG), or assessment,
also centred on the relational contexts in which each participant’s problems
emerge. The relational guidance (G of ODG) consists in the fact that the person
acting as coordinator/facilitator/supervisor helps the participants succeed, in a spon-
taneous manner, in identifying courses of action that can solve their problems by
applying what has emerged in the relational climate (We-relation) created in the
group. In this way, practical solutions are based on reflexive change in the people
through the working of their group (relational) reflexivity.
This kind of welfare intervention is called ‘relational work’ (Folgheraiter 2004).
This model provides ‘relational services’ (Donati and Martignani 2015) because it
achieves each person’s well-being through the relational good created by the
network, which has truly operated as a reflexive social subject.
Generalizing, we can say that public institutions (local authorities, statutory
welfare services, municipalities, socio-sanitary districts, churches, etc.) are moral
persons, not because they act as a totality (in a holistic manner), but because they
act through a We-relation as ‘relational subjects’. They do not do it by their own
nature, and never so in an unmediated way: it is necessary for them to be mediated
by subjects acting in the life worlds. Public institutions become relational subjects if
and only if institutional roles open themselves to external conversation with infor-
mal (not institutional) roles, that is, when they operate together with the latter by
building a network of relations which leads to the creation or regeneration of the
common good as a good constituted by their relations, namely, the common good
as relational good.
Summarizing relational reflexivity

In all the cases considered, from the micro level (couple, family), to the meso level
(voluntary associations), to the macro level (public institutions), social subjects
can be relational and, therefore, fully ‘moral persons’ if we can attribute relational
reflexivity to them, which is to say, a reflexivity that proceeds by means of internal
and external conversation on the relations between the agents/actors that take part
in the decisions and practical initiatives as a source of a potential reciprocal good. A
couple, a family, a company, a union, an institutional welfare service, all become
relational social subjects if and only if the persons involved share a We-relation
that arises from their reflexive interactions. Of course degenerative processes are
not excluded; on the contrary they are commonplace.
At this point, it may be useful to summarize the necessary conditions for relational
reflexivity to exist. Their core consists in the various agents and actors: (a) believing
that the social relation that connects them is desirable and attractive; (b) aspiring to
create a relational effect among themselves that is an emergent good and not purely
aggregative; (c) expecting that this effect (inherent in the We-relation) will be good
for them (a relational good); (d) being aware that they will exist as a relational social
subject only as long as and in so far as their relational processes continue to have the
above characteristics.
In order to create and/or continue to regenerate the relational social subject that
engenders their relational good, the agents/actors can avail themselves of different
models of action. Scholars generally catalogue these models in three types:
(i) utilitarian exchange models; the actors adopt decisions and courses of action
that are based on a calculation of the advantages/disadvantages or costs/
benefits of the exchanges that they realize in their participation in the relational
social subject (this component cannot be excluded, but cannot be the most
important explanatory factor, as asserted by the rational choice approach,
followed for example by Uhlaner 1989);
(ii) equity models, which motivate the agents/actors to participate with the goal of
rendering justice to all participants, where equity is generally considered to be a
value in itself and not purely instrumental (that is, as Wertrationalität: see Kel-
lerhals et al. 1988); the motivation of equity (giving to each his due) has the
function of opening a credit of trust with respect to others, which must be
accepted by the others in order to be efficacious; this may be another com-
ponent, but not decisive.
(iii) gift (free-giving) models, according to which the essential motivation for consti-
tuting a relational social subject lies in renouncing the pursuit of one’s own and
immediate interest in order to seek the common good by making a gift to others
(see for example Caillé 1994; Godbout 1992); it is well known that the gift also
requires acceptance and some form of acknowledgement in order to be effica-
cious; so, even this component can play an important role, but not one that can
explain the emergence of the relational subject fully.
On the level of sociological analysis, all three of these types of motivation play their
role when the emergence of relational social subjects is observed, the third one in
particular. Nevertheless, I believe that these three types are in and of themselves
insufficient for generating a relational subject, which has need of another dimension
without which the three types of motivations mentioned above risk not creating the
relational social subject, or they configure it in a distorted manner, so to produce
relational evils.
(iv) This dimension is the ‘normative dimension’ of the social relationality, in the
sense that the relation established by the agents/actors must be realized and con-
tinually regenerated in accordance with its own sense of itself (it must realize
itself, not another kind of social relation with different qualities and properties).
The normativity is not extrinsic, but intrinsic to the We-relation. If the
We-relation is friendship, being friends implies a set of social norms.26 The nor-
mative model states that the relation that constitutes the relational subject (the
We-relation) has an idem (it must be capable of regenerating the same kind of
relationship) and an ipse (it should be that specific relation) (Donati 2015a).
Conclusions: putting the relational analysis on the right track

The creation of relational social subjects cannot be the work of individuals, either
singly or as an aggregate among themselves, or of structures (systems) that
operate as impersonal institutions. The relational social subject exists only when
social and cultural structures are enacted reflexively by agents/actors through the
temporal phases of the morphostatic/morphogenetic sequence [conditioning struc-
ture → interactions → structural elaboration], in which personal and social reflexive
processes must be included. In this framework, the crucially important players in the
pivotal phase of ‘interaction’ are relational social subjects in their We-relationship,
exercising their collective reflexivity through their orientation to relational goods.
Relational subjects emerge from relations between agents/actors in a structural
context and acquire different characteristics depending on the type and degree of
constraints and enablements that the social structures exert on them and between
them, as mediated through their reflexive deliberations.
Different social structures can be more formal or informal, more direct (in a
network of interpersonal relationships) or indirect (impersonal), and so on, depend-
ing on the type (quality and strengths) of the relations that over time become ‘fixed’
(morphostatic) as structures.
In all cases, however, the social structures that mediate relations among agents/
actors operate as specific constraints and opportunities of a context in which the
relations among the agents/actors are activity-dependent, and the interactions
create relations that alter the structures themselves in that they are systems of con-
straints and opportunities. They can simply reproduce the initial systems, reiterate
them, or free up new relations instead. I think of examples such as the structure
of a firm, a family, a corporation, a voluntary association or a public welfare
service, in their temporal vicissitudes.
In this conceptual framework, social structures have their own reality. Social
structures are not only patterns of transactions with no power of their own, as Emir-
bayer and his followers (Dépelteau 2008; Dépelteau and Powell 2013; Emirbayer
1997; Powell and Dépelteau 2013) believe, but have causal powers and their own
effects on the actions of single agents and on their interactions in that they condition
their relations, and are, in turn, re-elaborated by the emergent relations among
agents.
There are two substantial differences between relational sociology, based on criti-
cal realism, and transactional sociology, based on the pragmatics of communication
and interaction. The first difference resides in the fact that, from the critical realist
point of view, structures have some power (as Archer and Donati believe), while
in the latter, they are merely empirical patterns with no power of their own (as Emir-
bayer, Dépelteau and Powell believe). The second distinction goes in parallel.
According to critical realism, to say that the subject is relationally constituted
does not mean that it has no ‘nature’ in itself (just the contrary is true27), while
from the viewpoint of transactional sociology, ‘there are, so to speak, relations all
the way down, all the way up, and all the way out in every direction; you never
reach something which is not just one more nexus of relations’ (Rorty 1999, 54).
For relational sociology these nexuses are structures, while for the relationists
they are nothing more than relations of relations ad infinitum.
In any case, I hope that this article has made clear that the emergence of relational
subjectivities does not require the introduction of any new holistic entity of the type
of ‘collective mind’ or ‘collective intentionality’ because the We of relational subjec-
tivity is a relation. It is certainly true that many versions of relational sociology
exist.28 However, not all versions are truly ‘relational’.
For instance, Bajoit (1992) at first writes a book entitled, Pour une sociologie rela-
tionelle, but later states that, ‘la sociologie ne peut comprendre la vie sociale d’au-
jourd’hui qu’en plaçant le sujet individuel au coeur de son approche’ [‘sociology
can understand today’s social life only by placing the individual subject at the
heart of its approach’] (Bajoit 2000, 72). This example demonstrates that Bajoit
has not understood almost anything about the social relation. The same can be
said of many other authors cited by Bagaoui and Vautier (Bagaoui 2007; Vautier
2008), who use the term relation without having a proper relational vision, and
often fall into relationalism, i.e. into a completely circular vision of the social
relation as a co-determination between agent and social structure. Rorty’s ‘nexus
of relations’ is a form of an endless central conflation between agency and structure
where relationships (reciprocal actions) do not generate an emergent effect. This is
what we lose or hide from view if we adopt the relationist approach. When Marx
claims that ‘the essence of man’ is ‘the ensemble (aggregate) of social relations’, he
does not mean that the individual can be dissolved into an indeterminate flow of
transactions. He is talking about a human essence that possesses an emergent rela-
tional structure, which can be alienated or flourishing, as Porpora (1987) has well
elucidated by referring to the ontological status of subjectivity as a non-eliminable
link between agency and structure.
In this contribution I have tried to clarify that, in order to understand and explain
what the relational subject is and how it operates, it is necessary to adopt a critical
realist relational sociology. If one adopts other social ontologies and/or epistem-
ology, one does not succeed in apprehending the relational subject, which remains
at the mercy of individuals or systems.
Notes
1 Smith (2010) has well illustrated the processes through which the human person
‘emerges’. Here we wish to make more explicit the ‘relational’ character of these pro-
cesses and to expand the picture to those collective relational subjects that are ‘moral
persons’.
2 I agree with Farrugia (2013) when he criticizes the theory of reflexive modernization for
its empty and homogeneous view of reflexivity stemming ultimately from the absence of a
theory of the subject. But I wholly disagree with him when he criticizes critical realism
‘for its view of reflexivity as a disembodied rationality and its hostility to any connection
between reflexivity and pre-reflexive foundations for identity’. He suggests ‘a new theory
of reflexivity which overturns theoretical orthodoxies viewing reflexivity and social prac-
tice as opposed concepts’ (283), based on insights from Bourdieu and other practice the-
orists. For the relational approach, reflexivity and social practice do interact with one
another, and that is why Farrugia’s theory of reflexivity as actualizing a practical intellig-
ibility shaped by the dispositions of the habitus is untenable.

3 By integrating Simmel’s late theory of the relational self into the formal analysis of social
relations, Silver and Lee (2012) propose a framework for theorizing forms of association
among self-relating individuals. On this model, every ‘node’ in an interaction has
relations not only to others but also to itself, specifically between its ideality and its actu-
ality. They go on to integrate this self-relation into a formal model of social relations. This
model provides a way to describe configurations of social interactions defined by the
forms according to which social relations realize participants’ ideal selves. In respect to
this framework, I maintain that, while Simmel’s notion of relational ‘self’ refers to the
individual (in her internal reflexivity) and can reveal the troubles faced by the Self in
making reflexive her external relationships, the notion of ‘relational social subject’,
which can be collective, refers to what emerges from the connections between the internal
reflexivity of individuals and the relationality between them. These connections are
mediated by what I call ‘relational reflexivity’, which refers to the reflexivity emerging
from the network interactions (Donati 2011b, 137–41).
4 The sequence discernment → deliberation → dedication is illustrated by Archer (2003).
5 As claimed by Donati and Archer (2015).
6 This extension is necessary for many reasons. One of them is that the definition of per-
sonal reflexivity is more and more used for ‘humanoids’ (robots), while relational reflex-
ivity pertains only to human beings, as individuals or as members of social groups.
7 Let me recall that personal identity is the answer to the question, ‘Who am I for Myself?’
while social identity is the answer to the question, ‘Who am I for Others?’ (the Others are
differentiated as family members, relatives, friends, neighbours, work colleagues, associ-
ation members, fellow citizens, etc.).
8 This inner relationality of the social relation is an enigma, a puzzle that must be treated as
such.
9 This is the way Uhlaner (1989) conceives of ‘relational goods’ as an outcome of a mul-
titude of individual ‘rational choices’, whereas the term ‘relational good’ is used without
any reference to the relations among the people involved. A better understanding of what
we lose by reducing social relations to aggregations (instead of emergent effects) is given
with reference to the family by Edwards et al. (2012).
10 On the differences between the ‘interaction order’ as theorized by Goffman (1983) and
the theory of the ‘relational order’ see Donati (2011a, 2015a).
11 In this way, they lose the relational character of social structures so aptly articulated by
Porpora (1987, 1989).
12 Crossley (2010) argues that social worlds ‘comprise’ networks of interaction and
relations. He asserts that relations are lived trajectories of iterated interaction, built up
through a history of interaction, but also entailing anticipation of future interaction. To

him, social networks comprise multiple dyadic relations which are mutually transformed
through their combination. On this conceptual basis he builds a relational sociology
which aims at overcoming three central sociological dichotomies — individualism/
holism, structure/agency and micro/macro — that are utilized as a foil against which
to construct the case for his relational sociology. Crossley argues that neither individuals
nor ‘wholes’ — in the traditional sociological sense — should take precedence in soci-
ology. Rather, sociologists should focus upon evolving dynamic networks of interaction
and relations conceived as transactions.
13 The micro, meso and macro levels can be defined on the analytical level or the empirical
level. In this treatise, for reasons of space, we will address them only on an empirical level.
14 Obviously, there can also exist other classifications of social relations. For example,
Bagaoui (2007) proposes a typology that differentiates between: (i) the level of inter-
actions between actors (three types: effects of the interaction = Elias; play between
actors = Crozier; stakes between actors = Touraine and the Marxists); (ii) the level of
relations between agents and structures (three types: non-separability between agents
and structures, that is, the relation as co-determination between agent and structure =
Giddens; relation covered in the media = Bourdieu; relation as separability = Archer);
(iii) the systemic level (three types: system/environment relations = Luhmann; totality-
parts relations = Morin; exchange relations = Laflamme). However, it seems to me that
this typology groups together many things that are very different from one another,
and above all, that it confuses relations in a logical sense (entities of reason) and social
relations (empirical). Some of these types are not properly social relations (for
example, Luhmann’s system/environment relations entail a binary distinction; see
Donati 1991, ch. 4). Bagaoui, in effect, does not consider social relations as such, but
rather as ways in which various scholars have used the linguistic term of relation. The
defect of Bagaoui’s proposal is that it does not enter into the social relation, it does
not analyse it in terms of its structure and dynamic, but remains outside, so to speak, lim-
iting itself to cataloguing the different uses of the word.
15 What makes the constitution and apprehension of the Other possible at all? Husserl
writes: ‘A certain mediacy of intentionality must be present here, going out from the sub-
stratum, “primordial world” (which, in any case, is the incessantly underlying basis) and
making present to the consciousness a “there too,” which nevertheless is not itself there
and can never become an “itself there.” We have here, accordingly, a kind of “making
co-present,” a kind of “appresentation”’ (Husserl 1973, 139).
16 Searle (1983, 1995) distinguishes between ‘brute’ physical facts and mental facts. Brute
physical facts include such things as rivers, trees and mountains. Mental facts include
such things as perceptions, feelings and judgements. Mental facts are ultimately caused
by physical facts, in that mental facts depend on physical and biological functions
which are required for consciousness. The physical and biological processes which are
necessary for consciousness enable conscious individuals to recognize physical and
mental facts. Thus, mental facts are based on physical facts, and both physical and
mental facts are required for the construction of social reality. According to Searle,
mental facts may be intentional or non-intentional, depending on whether or not they
are directed at something. Intentionality is a quality of representations whereby they
are about, or directed at, something. Intentional mental facts may be recognized by a
single individual, or may be recognized by multiple individuals. Thus, intentional
mental facts may become social facts when they are recognized by many individuals.
Social facts are facts which are generally agreed upon, and which have collective inten-
tionality (Searle 1995, 7). Our critique lies in the fact that ‘the social’, according to Searle,
is a collective reality (meaning ‘identical’, as in the Durkheimian ‘collective conscience’),
not a relational one.
17 It could be noticed that the words ‘we’ and ‘them’ can have a double meaning, i.e. as an
interpersonal entity or as an object (or reified entity). Such difference can be well under-
stood if we make reference to Martin Buber’s distinction between the I-You and I-It
relationships (see Ich und Du, Berlin: Shocken Verlag, 1923; first translated into
English in 1937). The Ich-Es (‘I-It’) relationship is nearly the opposite of Ich-Du.
Whereas in Ich-Du the two beings encounter one another, in an Ich-Es relationship
the beings do not actually meet. Instead, the ‘I’ confronts and qualifies an idea, or con-
ceptualization, of the being in its presence and treats that being as an object. All such
objects are considered merely mental representations, created and sustained by the indi-
vidual mind. This is based partly on Kant’s theory of phenomenon, in that these objects
reside in the cognitive agent’s mind, existing only as thoughts. Therefore, the Ich-Es
relationship is in fact a relationship with oneself; it is not a dialogue, but a monologue.
In the Ich-Es relationship, an individual treats other things, people, etc., as objects to be
used and experienced. Essentially, this form of objectivity relates to the world in terms of
the self — how an object can serve the individual’s interest. Buber argued that human life
consists of an oscillation between Ich-Du and Ich-Es, and that in fact Ich-Du experiences
are rather few and far between. In diagnosing the various perceived ills of modernity (e.g.
isolation, dehumanization, etc.), Buber believed that the expansion of a purely analytic,
material view of existence was at heart an advocation of Ich-Es relations — even between
human beings. Buber argued that this paradigm devalued not only existents, but the
meaning of all existence.
18 For a more extensive explanation, see Donati (2012) and the additions suggested by
Archer in Figure 2.1 of Donati and Archer (2015, 70–71).
19 With respect to the earlier example of the orchestra, we could ask where the ‘orchestra
conductor’ is, if it exists at all, in the couple. The question is intriguing. In our opinion, in
the case of the couple, the ‘orchestra conductor’ is represented by the social institution of
marriage that ‘orients’ the couple as a cultural and structural model. The We of the
couple does not coincide with the tasks assigned by the institution, because the couple
has its own relational constitution. The We of the couple and the institution of marriage
are two different orders of reality, which, of course, influence each other.
20 ‘The pure relationship refers to a situation where a social relation is entered into for its
own sake, for what can be derived by each person from a sustained association with
another; and which is continued only in so far as it is thought by both parties to
deliver enough satisfaction for each individual to stay within it’ (Giddens 1992, 58).
21 The example is taken from Weaver (2012), and developed in Weaver and McNeill
(2015).
22 To say that there are similarities to be found between massive collective movements and
love relationships in a couple, as Alberoni (Falling in Love, 1983) maintains, is under-
standable if social relations are reduced to ‘psychological processes’ of destructuration-
reorganization of previous relations due to new emergent emotions and feelings. But it
seems quite clear that, in these cases, the individual becomes capable of merging with
other persons and creating a new collectivity with a seemingly very high degree of soli-
darity since, in such a nascent state, both personal and relational reflexivity do not work
properly.
23 On the notion of persona moralis, see Hittinger 2002.
24 See, for instance, the dialogical methodology through which some social and health ser-
vices are reorganized in Finland (Seikkula and Arnkil 2006).
25 Called ODG systems; see Donati 1991, 346–56.
26 Porpora (1993) has rightly argued that material social relations arise from the constitu-
tive rules that constitute a group’s way of life. Although such relationships are derivative
from the conscious rule-following behaviour of actors, nevertheless they have an objec-
tive existence independent of actors’ specific awareness. In short, such material relations
are an important mechanism beyond the cultural rules through which our behaviour is
constrained, enabled and motivated.
27 According to Fromm (1961, 25–6): ‘Marx does not say that ‘there is no human nature
inherent in each separate individual’, but something quite different, namely, that ‘the
essence of man is no abstraction inherent in each individual’. It is the essential point
of Marx’s ‘materialism’ against Hegel’s idealism. Marx never gave up his concept of
man’s nature … but this nature is not a purely biological one, and not an abstraction;
it is one which can be understood only historically, because it unfolds in history. The
nature (essence) of man can be inferred from its many manifestations (and distortions)
in history; it cannot be seen as such, as a statistically existing entity ‘behind’ or
‘above’ each separate man, but as that in man which exists as a potentiality and
unfolds and changes in the historical process.’
28 Vautier (2008) has tried to draw a classification of relational sociologies that is very ques-
tionable since it does not distinguish between what is relational and what is relationist.
Acknowledgement
I would like to thank Margaret Archer for her generous help in producing our
common book as a relational good. When in this article I speak of a ‘we think’ or
‘we believe’, this we is constituted by Maggie and myself as relational subjects.
ORCiD
Pierpaolo Donati http://orcid.org/0000-0002-9794-132X
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Notes on contributor
Pierpaolo Donati is full professor of sociology at the University of Bologna, Italy.
Correspondence to: Pierpaolo Donati, Dept. SDE, Strada Maggiore 45, 40125
Bologna, Italy. Email: pierpaolo.donati@unibo.it
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The ‘Relational Subject’ According to a

The article aims at clarifying the viewpoint of a critical realist relational

keywords relational goods, relational realism, relational sociology, relational

The concept of relational subject

relationship emerging from the dynamics of a social network.

What is ‘social’ in the relational subject?

reflexive consciousness of the Self,7 is not a substance in and of itself lacking

(i) as resulting from individual actions, psychological projections or exchanges

Examples of relational subjects

At the micro level: the couple and informal relations.

exists, in fact, a radical difference between relational sociology based on critical

At the meso level: voluntary associations

figure 3. The relational social subject at a meso level.

At the macro level: public institutions

Their characteristic is that of being constituted by relations that:

Relational subjectivities within social policies

methodologies that function to stimulate the participants’ personal and social

Summarizing relational reflexivity

Conclusions: putting the relational analysis on the right track

ibility shaped by the dispositions of the habitus is untenable.

through a history of interaction, but also entailing anticipation of future interaction. To

Revue Internationale de Sociologie 25 (1): 86–109.

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