Republic of the Philippines

Court of Appeals
Manila

SPECIAL FORMER NINTH DIVISION

MA. TINA BRIN-ROGERO, CA-G.R. SP No. 158635

Petitioner-Appellant,
Members:
- versus - *
YBAÑEZ, Ch.,
GALAPATE-LAGUILLES and
ONG, JJ.

Promulgated:
MYRNA S. LEONIDA, BIR-OIC-
REGIONAL DIRECTOR, RR5,
CALOOCAN CITY, AND MARIA 17 June 2021
ZORAHAIDA S. DELA CRUZ, BIR-
OIC CHIEF COLLECTION DIVISION,
RR5, CALOOCAN CITY,
Respondents-Appellees.

RESOLUTION

ONG, J.:

Before this Court is a Motion for Reconsideration1 dated 22

December 2019 filed by appellant Ma. Tina Brin-Rogero (“Rogero”)
assailing the Decision2 dated 22 November 2019 which held:

Here, Rogero imputes grave abuse of

discretion unto appellees for issuing the subject
Warrant of Distraint and/or Levy since, under the
National Internal Revenue Code (“NIRC”), only the
Commissioner of Internal Revenue or his duly
authorized representative may issue a warrant of
*
Vice J. Rosario, per raffle dated 11 March 2021.
1
Rollo, pp. 64-75.
2
Id., at 53-62.
CA-G.R. SP No. 158635 Page 2 of 6
Resolution

distraint if the amount involved exceeds One Million

Pesos. However, a perusal of Rogero's Petition for
Certiorari and Prohibition shows that appellees
merely acted in their representative capacities as
officers-in-charge of Revenue Region 5 in issuing the
assailed Warrant of Distraint and/or Levy, an act
which is consistent with their authority granted under
Section 205 of the NIRC. Meanwhile, the record does
not support any finding that appellees acted in a
capricious, whimsical, arbitrary or despotic manner
in the exercise of their authority in issuing the
Warrant of Distraint and/or Levy as to be the
equivalent to lack of jurisdiction.

Thus, there is no basis to reverse the dismissal

of the Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition.

xxx

Contrary to Rogero's assertion that she no

longer has any other remedy to assail the issuance of
the Warrant of Distraint and/or Levy, the CTA has
jurisdiction to determine whether the issuance of a
warrant of distraint and levy is proper. As explained
in Philippine Journalists, Inc. v. Commissioner of
Internal Revenue:

Section 7(1) of Republic Act No.

1125, the Act Creating the Court of Tax
Appeals, provides for the jurisdiction of
that special court:

SEC. 7. Jurisdiction. – The Court

of Tax Appeals shall exercise exclusive
appellate jurisdiction to review by appeal,
as herein provided –

(1) Decisions of the

Commissioner of Internal Revenue in cases
involving disputed assessments, refunds of
internal revenue taxes, fees or other charges,
penalties imposed in relation thereto, or
other matters arising under the National
Internal Revenue Code or other laws or part
of law administered by the Bureau of
Internal Revenue;

The appellate jurisdiction of the

CTA is not limited to cases which involve
decisions of the Commissioner of Internal
CA-G.R. SP No. 158635 Page 3 of 6
Resolution

Revenue on matters relating to

assessments or refunds. The second part
of the provision covers other cases that
arise out of the NIRC or related laws
administered by the Bureau of Internal
Revenue. The wording of the provision is
clear and simple. It gives the CTA the
jurisdiction to determine if the warrant
of distraint and levy issued by the BIR
is valid and to rule if the Waiver of
Statute of Limitations was validly
effected. (Emphasis supplied)

The rule is that, for the CTA to acquire

jurisdiction, an assessment must first be disputed by
the taxpayer and ruled upon by the Commissioner of
Internal Revenue to warrant a decision from which a
petition for review may be taken to the CTA. Where
an adverse ruling has been rendered by the
Commissioner of Internal Revenue with reference to
a disputed assessment or a claim for refund or credit,
including the issuance of a Warrant of Distraint
and/or Levy, the taxpayer may appeal the same
within thirty days after receipt thereof. In this case,
Rogero already received an adverse ruling with
respect to the Warrant of Distraint and/or Levy.
Consequently, she had thirty days from receipt to
appeal the same and file a petition for review before
the CTA. Clearly, the remedy of appeal to the CTA
was available to Rogero in the ordinary course of
law, which prevents the issuance of a writ of
certiorari and prohibition.

Accordingly, the Court finds that the trial

court did not err in dismissing the Petition for
Certiorari and Prohibition.

DISPOSITION

The appeal is DENIED for lack of merit. The

Decision dated 12 February 2018 rendered by Branch
125 of the Regional Trial Court, National Capital
Judicial Region, Caloocan City in SCA Case No. C-
1250 is AFFIRMED.3 (Formatting in the original;
citations omitted)

3
Decision dated 22 November 2019, pp. 7-11; Id., at 59-62.
CA-G.R. SP No. 158635 Page 4 of 6
Resolution

Considering that appellees failed to file their comment on

Rogero's Motion for Reconsideration despite notice,4 they are deemed
to have waived their right to do so.

Rogero seeks reconsideration of the Decision dated 22 November

2019 by arguing that: (i) since she never received her Preliminary
Assessment Notice (“PAN”) and a formal demand letter, she was
deprived of due process which warranted her exception from the rule
on exhaustion of administrative remedies;5 (ii) appellees had no
jurisdiction to issue a warrant of distraint and/or levy against her and
were not designated by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue to levy
on Rogero's property;6 and (iii) the Court of Tax Appeals only has
jurisdiction over a final decision of the Commissioner of Internal
Revenue, unlike in the present case where no PAN was issued against
her.7

An examination of the issues raised in the Motion for

Reconsideration reveals that the same are mere rehashed arguments
that have already been exhaustively passed upon, duly considered, and
resolved in the Decision dated 22 November 2019. This warrants the
denial of Rogero's Motion for Reconsideration. As held by the Supreme
Court in Social Justice Society, Officers v. Lim:8

The grounds relied on being mere

reiterations of the issues already passed upon by
the Court, there is no need to “cut and paste”
pertinent portions of the Decision or re-write the
ponencia in accordance with the outline of the
instant motion.

As succinctly put by then Chief Justice

Andres R. Narvasa in Ortigas and Co. Ltd.
Partnership v. Judge Velasco on the effect and
disposition of a motion for reconsideration:

4
Resolution dated 03 March 2020 (Id., at 77) and per CMIS Verification dated 26 May 2021 (Id.,
at dorsal portion of p. 80).
5
Pars. 8-10 and 23-29 of Motion for Reconsideration, pp. 3 and 7-8 (Id., at 66 and 70-71) vis-a-
vis Memorandum, p. 6 (Id., at 27).
6
Pars. 12-21, 30-33 of Motion for Reconsideration, pp. 5-6, 8-9 (Id., at 68-69, 71-72) vis-a-vis
Memorandum, pp. 7-8 (Id. at 28-29)
7
Pars. 34-40 of Motion for Reconsideration, pp. 9-11 (Id., at 72-74) vis-a-vis Memorandum, pp.
11-14 (Id., at 32-35).
8
G.R. No. 187836, 10 March 2015.
CA-G.R. SP No. 158635 Page 5 of 6
Resolution

The filing of a motion for

reconsideration, authorized by Rule 52 of
the Rules of Court, does not impose on
the Court the obligation to deal
individually and specifically with the
grounds relied upon therefor, in much the
same way that the Court does in its
judgment or final order as regards the
issues raised and submitted for decision.
This would be a useless formality or ritual
invariably involving merely a reiteration
of the reasons already set forth in the
judgment or final order for rejecting the
arguments advanced by the movant; and it
would be a needless act, too, with respect
to issues raised for the first time, these
being, as above stated, deemed waived
because not asserted at the first
opportunity. It suffices for the Court to
deal generally and summarily with the
motion for reconsideration, and merely
state a legal ground for its denial (Sec. 14,
Art. VIII, Constitution); i.e., the motion
contains merely a reiteration or rehash of
arguments already submitted to and
pronounced without merit by the Court in
its judgment, or the basic issues have
already been passed upon, or the motion
discloses no substantial argument or
cogent reason to warrant reconsideration
or modification of the judgment or final
order; or the arguments in the motion are
too unsubstantial to require consideration,
etc.

As for Rogero's argument that an exception to the rule on

exhaustion of administrative remedies applies since her right to due
process was violated because she did not receive a PAN or a formal
demand letter, this presupposes that she took the proper course of
action and brought her case before the proper forum and within the
reglementary period. However, Rogero immediately resorted to filing
the instant petition without bringing the matter before the proper forum
and simply stated that the warrant of distraint and/or levy was
tantamount to a final and executory decision. Hence, Rogero's assertion
is without merit.
CA-G.R. SP No. 158635 Page 6 of 6
Resolution

Considering that Rogero failed to raise any meritorious argument

for the Court's consideration, there is no cogent reason to reverse the
ruling in the Decision dated 22 November 2019. Accordingly, the
Motion for Reconsideration dated 22 December 2019 is DENIED for
lack of merit.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

WALTER S. ONG
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

ELIHU A. YBAÑEZ ZENAIDA T. GALAPATE-LAGUILLES

Associate Justice Associate Justice