Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Inquiry, Knowledge,
and Understanding
CHRISTOPH KELP
1
3
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For Mona
Preface
This book has benefited from discussions with and feedback from many
colleagues and friends. First and foremost, I’d like to offer special thanks
to Mona Simion with whom I have thought through the issues in this
book more than with anyone else.
In addition, I’d like to express my gratitude for helpful feedback to my
colleagues at COGITO Epistemology Research Centre, Kristoffer
Ahlstrom-Vij, Heather Battaly, Christoph Baumberger, Bob Beddor,
Claus Beisbart, Sven Bernecker, Alexander Bird, Michael Blome-
Tillman, Cameron Boult, Elke Brendel, Fernando Broncano-Berrocal,
Jessica Brown, Georg Brun, Herman Cappelen, Adam Carter, Matthew
Chrisman, Annalisa Coliva, Juan Comesaña, Marian David, Henk
DeRegt, Ezio DiNucci, Philip Ebert, Anna-Maria Eder, Miguel Egler,
Catherine Elgin, Markus Eronen, Jeremy Fantl, Claire Field, Giada
Fratantonio, Lizzie Fricker, Miranda Fricker, Jane Friedman, Mikkel
Gerken, Sandy Goldberg, Alvin Goldman, Emma Gordon, Peter
Graham, Patrick Greenough, John Greco, Stephen Grimm, Thomas
Grundmann, Katherine Hawley, John Heil, Jaakko Hirvelä, Frank
Hofmann, Joachim Horvath, Jonathan Jenkins Ichikawa, Matt Jope,
Jepser Kallestrup, Klemens Kappel, Kareem Khalifa, Dirk Kindermann,
Peter Klein, Stephan Krämer, Jennifer Lackey, Maria Lasonen-Aarnio,
Clayton Littlejohn, Fed Luzzi, Jack Lyons, Aidan McGlynn, Matt
McGrath, Conor McHugh, Robin McKenna, Alan Millar, Lisa
Miracchi, Anne Meylan, Luca Moretti, Jennifer Nagel, Ram Neta,
Nikolaj Nottelman, Erik Olsson, Carlotta Pavese, Nikolaj Jang Lee
Linding Pederson, Andy Peet, Tommaso Piazza, Duncan Pritchard, Jim
Pryor, Agustin Rayo, Wayne Riggs, Blake Roeber, Sven Rosenkranz,
Felipe Santos, Susanna Schellenberg, Pedro Schmechtig, Susanna Siegel,
Waldomiro Silva-Filho, Gerhard Schönrich, Martin Smith, Roy
Sorensen, Matthias Steup, Ernest Sosa, Kurt Sylvan, Alessandra
Tanesini, Raphael van Riel, Jonathan Vogel, Daniel Whiting, Tim
vii
Let’s start with the central methodological idea of this book, which is to
take inquiry (or finding out about things) as the starting point for epis-
temological theorizing. What this means in practice is that, in this book,
I will be thinking a good deal about inquiry, and I will argue that thinking
about inquiry allows us to develop an attractive way of doing epistemol-
ogy. In a nutshell, the reason for this is that thinking about inquiry gives
us a systematic way of developing answers to a range of central epistemo-
logical questions that are not only novel but also promising.
Some of the most fundamental questions in epistemology concern (i) the
nature of core epistemic phenomena as well as (ii) their value and (iii) the
extent to which we possess them. My ambition here is to use the central
methodological idea to develop new answers to all three of the above
questions in a systematic way. The core epistemic phenomena that will
take centre stage here are knowledge and understanding. However, my
investigation will broach a variety of further relevant epistemic phenomena,
most notably epistemic abilities, and epistemic sources such as deduction. In
the remainder of this Introduction, I will sketch the view with a very broad
brush. The ensuing chapters will then do the job of filling in the details.¹
One interesting property of inquiry is that it is a type of activity with
an aim. When we are inquiring, we are trying to find out something, to
settle something, to understand something, etc. A distinction that is of
¹ Recent years have witnessed a surge of interest in the debate between traditionalist and
experimental philosophers. Since this book falls in the traditionalist camp, it is only fair to
acknowledge the fact that a lot of work in experimental philosophy has been done that raises
important concerns for traditionalism (e.g. Buckwalter and Stich 2014, Machery et al. 2004,
Petrinovich and O’Neill 1996, Schwitzgebel and Cushman 2015, Swain et al. 2008, Weinberg
2016, Weinberg et al. 2001, Wright 2010). With this disclaimer in play, I hasten to add that I will
leave discussion of experimental philosophy for another occasion.
Inquiry, Knowledge, and Understanding. Christoph Kelp, Oxford University Press (2021). © Christoph Kelp.
DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780192896094.003.0001
2 , ,
some importance for present purposes is that there are two different
types of inquiry.
First, one can inquire into specific questions such as the question of
whether Boris Johnson will be prime minister of the UK in 2019, whether
the Rolling Stones have ever played a gig in Ruanda, when the Battle of
Hastings took place, who won the Wimbledon mixed doubles competi-
tion in 2018, and so on. One claim that I expect to enjoy widespread
agreement is that an inquiry into a specific question aims at settling the
question inquired into:
Question-Settling Aim
One’s inquiry into Q aims at settling Q; alternatively: inquiry into
Q aims at properly closing Q for oneself in the affirmative/negative.
For instance, an inquiry into who won the Wimbledon mixed doubles
competition in 2018 aims at settling who won the Wimbledon mixed
doubles competition in 2018, an inquiry into when the Battle of Hastings
took place aims at settling when the Battle of Hastings took place, and
so on.
Second, one can inquire into general phenomena such as the UK’s exit
from the European Union, the rise of the Roman Empire, the origins of
species, the death of JFK, and so on. Another claim that I expect to enjoy
widespread agreement is that an inquiry into a general phenomenon
aims at understanding the phenomenon inquired into:
Understanding Aim
One’s inquiry into phenomenon P aims at understanding P.
For instance, inquiry into the rise of the Roman Empire aims at under-
standing the rise of the Roman Empire, inquiry into the death of JFK
aims at understanding the death of JFK, and so on.
While I expect that some consensus on the aims of the two forms of
inquiry is easy to generate, more substantive epistemological questions
about them remain. In particular, there are a number of substantive
accounts of both the aim of inquiry into specific questions and under-
standing on the market. For instance, some have unpacked the aim of
3
Transmission
If one knows that p, competently deduces q from p, thereupon comes
to believe that q, then one knows that q.
Let’s first recall the lightweight characterization of the aim of inquiry into
specific questions in terms of question-settling. For present purposes,
I will focus on inquiry into specific whether questions, i.e. questions of
the form whether p. Accordingly, here is the lightweight characterization
of the aim of inquiry that I will be working with in what follows:
Question-Settling Aim
One’s inquiry into whether p aims at settling the question whether p;
alternatively: inquiry into whether p aims at properly closing for oneself
the question whether p in the affirmative/negative.
And now I’d like to turn to the main views that are held in the epis-
temological literature on the aim of inquiry:
Knowledge Aim
One’s inquiry into whether p aims at coming to know that p/not-p.¹
Inquiry, Knowledge, and Understanding. Christoph Kelp, Oxford University Press (2021). © Christoph Kelp.
DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780192896094.003.0002
11
² True Belief Aim has been defended, for instance, by Jonathan Kvanvig (2003) and Michael
Lynch (2005).
³ Donald Davidson (2005), Richard Feldman (2002), Richard Rorty (1995), and Jay
Rosenberg (2002) are among the most prominent advocates of Justified Belief Aim.
12 , ,
may have the aim of running the marathon. You do so when you have
the intention of running it.
In addition, one may be committed to attaining successes in AAs. The
nature of the commitment depends on how it arises (or how it is
sustained). The perhaps most familiar case is one in which one desires
to attain success. For instance, you may desire to run the marathon in
question. In this case, I will say that you have a practical commitment to
running it. You may also have promised someone to run it. In this case,
you have a moral commitment to running the marathon. Or you may
have been contracted to run it, in which case your commitment will be
contractual. Other forms of commitment are conceivable. What’s more,
one may simultaneously have various different kinds of commitment
towards attaining success in an AA. Besides desiring to run the mara-
thon, you may have promised and signed a contract that you would do
so. In this case, you are practically, morally, and contractually committed
to running the marathon.
In the standard case, one has the aim of attaining the success of an AA
because of some set of commitments one has towards attaining it. For
instance, in the standard case, you desire to run the marathon in question
and thereupon form (and subsequently sustain) the intention to do so.⁴
Note, however, that being committed to attaining the success of an AA is
one thing and having the aim of attaining it is another. Most importantly
for present purposes, one can be committed to attaining the success of an
AA even though one does not have the aim of attaining it.⁵ Suppose you
once desired to run the marathon and thereupon formed the intention to
⁴ Note that while this is how things go in the standard case, it is not how they must go. You
may promise someone to do something that you have no desire to do and form an intention to
do that thing based on your promise. Here you have the aim of doing what you promised to do,
but your aim is neither generated nor sustained by a desire to do it. Likewise, what sustains your
aim may change. While initially you acquired an aim based on a desire, you later promised that
you would do what you desire to do. Subsequently you lose the desire but keep the intention and
hence the aim because of your promise.
⁵ One may wonder whether it is also possible to have an aim that one has no commitment
towards. In my view, the answer is likely to be yes. It is conceivable that one forms an intention
to do something based on a desire and subsequently loses the desire but keeps the intention. If
the commitment generated by the desire is the only commitment one has towards attaining the
relevant aim, one is now in a position in which one has the aim but no commitment towards
attaining it. That said, for present purposes, this possibility is of little interest, which is why I am
happy to set it aside here.
13
do so. Since then you have also promised that you would run it and have
signed a contract that you would do so. As a result, you now have a
practical, moral, and contractual commitment towards running it.
Recently, however, you have lost any intention to do so, perhaps because
your desire to run the marathon was replaced by an even greater desire
not to run it. In this case, you no longer have the aim of running a
marathon. However, it does not follow that you are no longer committed
to running it. While, when you lost the desire, you also lost your practical
commitment towards running the marathon, the promise you made and
the contract you signed are still binding and so continue to commit you
to running it. And if you end up not running the marathon, you do not
live up to your commitments. In this way, you may be committed
towards attaining success in an AA even though you don’t have the
aim of doing so.
There are a number of ways in which you may be released from your
commitments towards attaining success in an AA. As I already indicated,
you may lose interest and as a result lose your desire to run the mara-
thon. This will release you from your practical commitment. And while
the mere loss of desire will typically not release you from your moral and
contractual commitments, the cooperation of the person you made the
promise to and the other party to the contract might.⁶ That said, and
most importantly for present purposes, one way in which one can be
released from all commitments one may have towards attaining the aim
of an AA is by actually pulling off the feat, i.e. by scoring the relevant
success. This gives us the following first crucial thesis about AAs:
Commitment Release
If, at t, one attains the aim of a given AA, then, at t, one is released from
all commitments towards attaining this aim.
⁶ In addition, one may have a moral commitment to fulfil other commitments, such as
contractual ones, that one has taken on. In that case, one won’t be released from one’s moral
commitment unless one has been released from one’s contractual commitment. The same may
hold for other types of commitments.
14 , ,
For instance, when you have covered the distance, you will be released
from your practical, moral, and contractual commitments to running the
marathon.
With these points in play, consider the following case:
The Hire
You are a geologist. I have hired you for two weeks to find out whether
(D =) a certain mine that I am considering buying still has diamonds in
it. Since I need to be in a remote location with no means of commu-
nication for the next two weeks, we agree to meet at the mine two
weeks from now. You send your team of workers to the mine. After a
day’s work, they bring you a sample of a deposit of stones they found.
You run all available tests on the sample of the stones, all of which
suggest that the stones are indeed diamonds. On the basis of this
evidence, you come to believe that D. Since there is still a considerable
amount of time before our meeting, you and your team pack your bags
and get on the next flight home to spend time with your families.
Meanwhile, I return unexpectedly early from my trip to the breaking
news that the seller has placed a deposit of fake stones in the mine that
are so cleverly crafted as to be indistinguishable from real ones by
currently available tests. What’s more, I also learn that the fake stones
were placed exactly where you found the deposit and that you have
since left to see your family. You are currently back home with your
family and entirely unaware of the news. The final twist in the story is
that, unbeknownst to everyone, there actually is a deposit of real
diamonds in a hidden corner of the mine.
Notice that your belief that there are diamonds in the mine was formed
on the basis of excellent evidence, evidence that is strong enough to
ensure that your belief that D is justified. In addition, your belief that D is
true: there are diamonds in the mine, albeit in a hidden corner. That
means that you have a justified true belief that D. According to two out of
the three of the main contenders in the debate on the aim of inquiry—to
wit, True Belief Aim and Justified Belief Aim—you have attained the aim
of your inquiry into whether D. In conjunction with Commitment
15
Release, these views predict that you are released from all commitments
towards settling the question whether D.
Now here is the key question: is this prediction correct? In particular,
are you released from your contractual commitment to settle the ques-
tion whether D? No. As far as your contract is concerned, what you
ought to be doing is to inspect the mine rather than taking time off to see
your family. To see this, put yourself in my shoes (i.e. in the shoes of your
employer). I know that what you found wasn’t a deposit of diamonds.
While I might concede that you have an excuse for no longer working in
the mine, I could rightly insist that you go back to work and fulfil your
contract. Crucially, there is no need to negotiate a new contract with you.
The old contract is still binding. None of this would make any sense if
you had been released from your contractual commitment. Thus, the
prediction that you are released from all commitments towards settling
the question whether D, which both True Belief Aim and Justified Belief
Aim generate in conjunction with Commitment Release, is mistaken.⁷
In contrast, Knowledge Aim does not make a mistaken prediction
here. After all, the case is a standard Gettier case and so your belief falls
short of knowledge. According to Knowledge Aim, then, you do not
attain the aim of your inquiry into whether D. Knowledge Aim, there-
fore, does not predict that you are released from your contractual
commitment to settling the question you were employed to settle.
Knowledge Aim is thus preferable to the competition on this count.
Argument 2: Progress. Let’s move on to the second argument. Often
AAs admit of varying degrees of progress towards attaining their aims.
Progress here is a function of times and distances from attaining the
aims. One has made progress on a given AA between t1 and t2 if and
only if, at t2, one is closer to attaining the aim of this AA than at t1.
Suppose you are about to cross the finishing line of the marathon you are
⁷ Compare also: You have contracted a moving company to move all your furniture from
your old address to the new one. So long as the company has moved only part of your furniture,
they have not fulfilled the contract. As far as the contract is concerned, they ought to continue
working on moving your furniture rather than call it a day early, say. You may also rightly take
steps to get them back to work, without first having to negotiate a new contract. This is so even if
they have an excellent excuse for having called it a day, say, because they justifiably believe that
they have already moved all your furniture.
16 , ,
Progress
If, at t2, one has not attained the aim of a given AA and if one makes
progress towards attaining its aim between t1 and t2, then one has not
attained its aim at t1 either.
The Insight
The local prison at which you are a warder has received a tip that an
inmate is in possession of illegal drugs (henceforth ‘is holding’ for
short). You are charged with finding out whether this is correct. The
first inmate you investigate has a history of drug dealing and abuse.
You find a little bag of white powder under their bed. Moreover, upon
questioning, the inmate credibly admits to being in possession of
drugs. On the basis of this evidence, at t1, you come to believe that
some inmate is indeed holding. At t2, however, you discover that the
bag does actually not contain drugs and that the confession was false.
Perhaps the inmate himself thought that someone else had planted
drugs on him and was confessing to minimize the impending punish-
ment. So, you go back and resume your inquiry. At the same time,
some inmate is indeed holding. It is just that it isn’t the one you
investigated.
the target proposition is misleading. Second, at t2, you can tick one
person off the list of suspects you were not able to tick off at t1.
The second reason why Knowledge Aim is preferable to the competi-
tion is that only Knowledge Aim is compatible with the crucial claim.
Here is why: according to the crucial claim, you made progress on the
inquiry into whether some inmate is holding between t1 and t2. By
Progress, it follows that at t1 you did not attain the aim of your inquiry
into this question. However, at t1 you have a justified true belief that M.
According to both True Belief Aim and Justified Belief Aim, then, you
did attain the aim of your inquiry into whether some inmate is holding at
t1. The competition is thus unable to accommodate the crucial claim. In
contrast, Knowledge Aim encounters no difficulties here. After all, at t1,
your belief that some inmate is holding is gettiered and so does not
qualify as knowledge. According to Knowledge Aim, you do not attain
the aim of your inquiry into whether some inmate is holding at t1. As a
result, Knowledge Aim is entirely compatible with the crucial claim.
Generalization. I take these arguments to make a pretty compelling
case that Knowledge Aim is preferable to the rival views that have been
defended in the literature. While this constitutes considerable progress
towards establishing that the aim of inquiry does indeed require know-
ledge, it might be thought that it doesn’t quite do the trick. After all,
couldn’t there be further rivals that escape these arguments? Arguably,
the answer to this question is no. For any rival to Knowledge Aim, R, that
imposes a weaker requirement than knowledge, there will be some
Gettier case in which the weaker requirement is satisfied but the agent
doesn’t know the target proposition (P). What’s more, in any such case,
there will be a fact (F) in virtue of which the agent fails to know. For
instance, in the Hire, P = D = there are diamonds in the mine and F = the
stones in the deposit you discovered are fakes. It is now easy to see how
the above argument can be recovered for any R that imposes a weaker
requirement on the aim of inquiry than knowledge. All that needs to be
done is to construct the relevant Gettier case and update P and F in the
above cases accordingly. The resulting cases will favour Knowledge Aim
over any weaker R. And the same goes, mutatis mutandis, for the Insight.
18 , ,
By the same token, there is reason to think that the aim of inquiry
requires knowledge.
Belief
One has a belief on whether p if and only if inquiry into the question
whether p is closed for one in the affirmative/negative.
Does Belief offer an account of the nature of belief? Some have argued
that the answer is yes.⁸ While I will get back to this issue in due course,
note that for now it’s not necessary to embrace so strong a claim. All
I need is that it is a truth about belief, whether or not it also captures its
essence. This much, however, I will assume without further argument, at
least for now.
Since the aim of inquiry into whether p is to properly close inquiry
into whether p for oneself, one will attain the aim of inquiry into whether
p if and only if one does indeed properly close inquiry into whether p for
oneself. In conjunction with Belief, we get the result that one attains the
aim of inquiry into whether p if and only if one has a proper belief on
whether p.⁹ By the same token, any belief on whether p whatsoever will
⁸ See Pamela Hieronymi’s (2009) insightful paper, which also makes a convincing case for
this claim (cf. Friedman 2019, Harman 1986).
⁹ Note that the idea that the conditions for success in inquiry into whether p are the
conditions for proper belief that p, in conjunction with the fact that the leading candidates in
the debate on the aim of inquiry are knowledge, true belief, and justified belief, gives us reason to
expect that there are three main candidates for proper belief, i.e. knowledge, truth, and
justification. Note that this, in turn, tallies nicely with the fact that the leading candidates in
19
ipso facto be improper if and only if it does not attain the aim of inquiry
into whether p. Crucially, it is implausible that there should be a require-
ment stronger than knowledge such that any belief that doesn’t satisfy it
will ipso facto be improper. By way of evidence, let’s look at the perhaps
most obvious candidates for stronger requirements. These are higher-
order knowledge, understanding why, and certainty. There is excellent
reason to think that it is not the case that any belief whatsoever that
doesn’t satisfy these requirements will ipso facto be improper. To see this,
consider a small child who believes that there is a dummy over there.
Suppose this child has not acquired the concept of knowledge yet and so
isn’t even in the ballpark for higher-order knowledge. Does it follow that
her belief is ipso facto improper? Clearly not. Or consider your belief that
Razorlight are playing in Manchester later this year. Suppose you don’t
have a belief about why they are playing and so haven’t attained under-
standing why they are playing and suppose you are not certain that they
are playing. Does it follow that your belief is ipso facto improper? Again,
that doesn’t seem right. But, then, by the same token, there is reason to
think that proper belief does not require higher-order knowledge, under-
standing why, or certainty.
What about less obvious candidates? For instance, what about an
account of proper belief that requires what we may call knowledge+,
where one knows+ that p if and only if (i) one knows that p and (ii) one’s
degree of justification for p is ever so slightly higher than what’s required
for knowing that p? To assess the prospects of a knowledge+ account,
note that there will be cases in which one knows that p but doesn’t know
+ that p. The key question now is whether, in such cases, one’s belief that
p is ipso facto improper? It seems to me that the answer here is no. But
even if you don’t share this intuition, note that knowledge+ is not a
property that we use in our evaluation of beliefs, nor one that we might
easily come to so use. The vast majority of us don’t even have the concept
of knowledge+. As a result, the vast majority of us don’t even have
the related debate over the norm of belief are knowledge and truth. Moreover, it provides
evidence that construing the aim of inquiry in terms of properly closing questions does not beg
the question in favour of Knowledge Aim. After all, truth and justification remain live candi-
dates for what it takes for a belief to be proper.
20 , ,
While I think that there is strong reason to accept Knowledge Aim, the
literature also contains a number of arguments against it. In what
follows, I will look at the most popular candidates. My aim is to show
that all of them remain ultimately unsuccessful.
Before getting down to the nitty-gritty, I’d like to point out that there
is at least one important argument that I will not discuss in any detail. In
a nutshell, the idea here is that knowledge cannot be the aim of inquiry
because knowledge has no role to play in conducting inquiry (e.g. Kaplan
1985). Now, I take it that the best that champions of this argument can
hope for is to pose a challenge for champions of Knowledge Aim: they
need to explain what the role of knowledge in inquiry might be. And
since the arguments for Knowledge Aim I just offered do precisely that,
I will not address this argument in detail. With this disclaimer in play,
let’s get down to business.
21
The first two objections I would like to consider are due to an anonym-
ous referee. They aim to show that the arguments in Section 1 above for
Knowledge Aim do not provide support for Knowledge Aim after all.
Well-Conducted Inquiry. The key thought of the first objection is that
champions of rival views might hold that, in the Hire and the Insight,
you do attain success in inquiry but that your inquiry falls short in a
different way. To see why one might think this, note first that, in both
cases, the inquiries are complex activities that feature further nested
inquiries. For instance, in the Hire, your inquiry into whether D is true
proceeds by the nested inquiry of inspecting some diamonds, coming to
believe that (R=) the diamonds you inspected are real, and inferring that
D is true. Second, and crucially, the thought is that while the complex
inquiry is ultimately successful, the inquiry is not well conducted because
it relies on the results of unsuccessful nested inquiries. For instance, in the
Hire, the inquiry proceeds via a sub-inquiry that delivers the false belief
that R. In this way, it may be possible to resist the above argument, at
least for champions of True Belief Aim.
In response, it’s not so clear exactly how this is supposed to help
mitigate the force of the arguments. Consider the Insight first. Here, you
do indeed make a mistake. You acquire a false belief that the first inmate
you investigated was holding. However, you find out about it and correct
it. As a result, your overall complex inquiry may yet be not only
successful but also well conducted in that it does not rely on the results
of unsuccessful nested inquiries. What’s more, the key claim in this
argument is that when you realize your mistake you make progress in
your inquiry. Whether your complex inquiry is ultimately successful
and/or well conducted in the relevant sense is orthogonal to this claim
and hence to the success of the argument.
While it will do for my purposes if one of my arguments is successful,
it may be worth considering whether this objection can get traction
against the first argument. Let’s return, then, to the Hire once more. At
first glance, things may look promising here. After all, as we have already
seen, your inquiry is once again a complex one. More importantly yet, it
does rely on the results of an unsuccessful nested inquiry.
22 , ,
¹⁰ Suppose my stomach is currently digesting the breakfast I ate earlier today. It is engaged in
an activity with an aim, to wit, the digestion of the breakfast. Can this activity be brought to a
rational close? If the answer is yes, then even the above account of the terminus of activities with
aims in terms of rational belief is too strong. After all, neither I nor my stomach has beliefs on
the matter. That said, this further development won’t be of much help for champions of the
present strategy. After all, whatever it is that does feature in the correct account of the terminus
of activities with aims cannot be success-entailing, for the reasons outlined above.
It may also be worth noting that these considerations also help with a looming over-
intellectualization worry for champions of Knowledge Aim. In conjunction with the account
of the terminus of activities with aims in terms of rational belief, Knowledge Aim entails that the
24 , ,
Second, once it is clear that rational belief rather than knowledge is the
terminus of activities with aims, there is little reason to think that the
data that I took to support Knowledge Aim can be explained in terms of
the terminus of inquiry. The reason for this is that, to explain the trouble
that champions of True Belief Aim encounter as a result of allowing that
success in inquiry has been attained in cases like the Hire and the Insight,
it had better be the case that the terminus of inquiry is not attained in
these cases. Or to be more precise, it had better be the case that the
terminus of inquiry is not attained at the crucial junctures at which,
according to True Belief Aim, success is attained and which cause trouble
for its champions. The problem is that rational beliefs are present at these
junctures. As a result, there is excellent reason to think that the data that
I took to support Knowledge Aim cannot be explained in terms of the
terminus of inquiry.
It may be useful to look at how this plays out in a particular case. To
this end, let’s return to the Hire once more. Recall that what needs to be
explained is the datum that you are not released from your contractual
commitment to inquire into whether D. Since you have a true belief that
D, champions of True Belief Aim cannot do so by holding that you didn’t
succeed in inquiry. The question is whether they can do so by appealing
to the distinction between success in inquiry and the terminus of inquiry.
Now, the only way this distinction might do the trick is as follows:
although you did attain success, you didn’t attain the terminus of your
inquiry. Since your true belief falls short of knowledge, it is also easy to
see that if the terminus is knowledge, then you haven’t attained the
terminus of your inquiry into whether D and the envisaged strategy
may work in the way intended. But once we are clear that the terminus
of activities with aims is rational belief (rather than knowledge), it is also
clear that you have attained the terminus of your inquiry into whether
D. After all, your belief that D is rational. As a result, the prospects for
terminus of inquiry is rational belief that one knows. If we want to acknowledge that unsophis-
ticated agents who don’t have the concept of knowledge can reach the terminus of inquiry, we
may legitimately worry that the present account is too demanding. My strategy for dealing with
this is as follows: if we want an account of the terminus of activities with aims that applies to
agents who don’t have the relevant beliefs or concepts, there is independent reason for thinking
that it will have to be something weaker, as the case of my stomach digesting my breakfast
clearly indicates.
25
The first two objections took issue with my arguments for Knowledge
Aim. They aimed to show that the arguments do not support Knowledge
Aim. The remaining objections switch gear and opt for a more robust
approach. They all aim to show that Knowledge Aim is false for one
reason or another.
The first objection I will consider ventures to show that the aim of
inquiry cannot be thought to involve truth. It will come as no surprise
that this line has been pursued mainly by champions of Justified Belief
Aim. And while versions of it have been given by a number of different
champions of this view, it is particularly clearly stated in the following
passage by Davidson:
[T]ruths do not come with a ‘mark’, like the date in the corner of some
photograph, which distinguishes them from falsehoods. The best we
can do is test, experiment, compare and keep an open mind. But no
matter how long and well we and coming generations keep at it, we and
they will be left with fallible beliefs. We know many things, and will
learn more; what we will never know for certain is which of the things
we believe are true. Since it is neither visible as a target nor recognizable
when achieved, there is no point in calling truth a goal.
(Davidson 2005, 6)
There are actually two arguments in this short passage. Both lay down a
condition on aims. The first argument holds that aims must be visible as
targets. The second, in contrast, claims that aims must be recognizable as
having been achieved when they have been achieved. Crucially, the
argument continues, truth doesn’t have either property and so cannot
be an aim. A fortiori, it cannot be the aim of inquiry.
While I could discuss the arguments individually, I won’t. One reason
for this is that if I manage to successfully argue that these arguments fail,
26 , ,
This argument fails. The reason for this is that there no is way of
unpacking the epistemic accessibility requirement that makes both (1)
and (2) true.
Let’s return to Davidson once more: the above passage suggests that he
takes it that in order to satisfy the epistemic accessibility requirement,
you must know for certain that you have attained the relevant success.
This promises to make (2) true, at least on the plausible assumption that
there is fairly little in general that can be known for certain.
At the same time, (1) comes out clearly false. Completing a marathon
can clearly be an aim. At the same time, it’s not possible to know for
certain that you have done so when you have done so. After all, despite
your best efforts to ensure otherwise, it may always be the case that
something went wrong with the equipment used to measure the distance
with the result that you stopped running prematurely and so failed to
cover the distance. Note also that this doesn’t even start mentioning the
more extravagant types of error possibility (Cartesian demons, etc.) that
are standardly taken to show that it is very hard to know anything for
certain.
On the other hand, we can opt for a weaker account of the epistemic
accessibility requirement in order to give (1) a better chance of coming
out true. For instance, we might unpack the epistemic accessibility
27
requirement in terms of knowledge that you have attained the aim. To see
why this promises to make (1) true, note that, in the marathon case, you
can plausibly know that you have run the distance, for instance in virtue
of knowing that if you have crossed the finishing line, you have run the
distance and coming to know that you have crossed the finishing line. (I
hasten to add that you will not come to know that you have run a
marathon if your epistemic environment is not hospitable in that the
equipment used to measure the distance was malfunctioning, Cartesian
demons were meddling, etc. Crucially, however, the fact that you may fail
to know (e.g. when the environment is not hospitable) does not entail
that you don’t frequently come to know (e.g. when it is not).) In this way,
the weaker account of the epistemic accessibility requirement gives us a
better chance of making (1) come out true.
Unfortunately, now there is excellent reason to think that (2) is false.
After all, it is hard to deny that we can come to know the truth. Suppose
I wonder whether Fermat’s last theorem is true. It is hard to deny that
I can come to know that it is true, for instance, by asking my mathem-
atics teacher. Again, this is not to say that I might also fail to acquire this
knowledge, for instance, if I am in an epistemically unsuitable environ-
ment. But now that I am not, there is no in principle obstacle for me to
come to know what I want to find out. As a result, the weaker account of
the epistemic accessibility relation will make (2) come out false.
In general, the trouble with the Inaccessibility Argument is that it is
just not clear why it should be any harder to satisfy any given accessibility
requirement for truth than for any other aim. That’s why ways of
unpacking what it takes to recognize something that makes (1) true
will make (2) false and vice versa.¹¹
¹¹ It might be thought that this is not entirely fair to champions of the inaccessibility
argument. After all, when offering this argument, they typically have a specific account of
truth in mind, to wit, one according to which truth is objective and mind-independent and may
fail to be present even when we have all agreed on the answer to the questions, have the best
possible justification for our answer, etc. But then again, many things are objective and mind-
independent and may fail to be present even when we have agreement, the best possible
justification, etc. Rocks, lakes, and trees are among the many points in case. Crucially, most
of us do not have difficulties in recognizing a rock, a lake, or a tree when we see one. Or, to be
more precise, we do not have any such difficulties unless the requirements for what it takes to do
28 , ,
so are unduly stringent. Objectivity and mind-independence are not the kinds of property that
make recognition hard either.
But perhaps even this isn’t the full story. Perhaps what champions of the inaccessibility
argument have in mind is the following: if truth is objective and mind-independent, then, in
order to recognize that it is present, we’d have to step outside our skin and compare the naked facts
with the contents of our beliefs. It’s not possible to recognize that the truth is present when it is
because it is not possible to do that. I do not mean to deny that if that were indeed required for
recognizing a truth to be present, it would be impossible to do so. The trouble is, of course, that
there is precious little reason to think that, in order to recognize truths, we’d have to do anything as
fancy as that. Compare: in order to recognize that Sandy Goldberg is American, I do not need to
see his certificate of citizenship. I can recognize that he is American from the way he sounds. No
fancy methods are required here. Similarly, it is just not clear why recognizing truths requires
fancy methods. For instance, it’s not clear that in order to recognize that it is true that there is milk
in the fridge I need to do much over and above exercising my ability to recognize milk.
Champions of the inaccessibility argument might concede the point but worry that I have
moved away from an objective account of truth to a minimal one and that their argument was
never meant to work on minimal accounts of truth in the first place. On reflection, this objection
does not stand up to scrutiny. The above point was that you may be able to recognize Fs even
though you don’t have the opportunity and perhaps are unable to get into direct cognitive
contact with the features in virtue of which Fs are Fs. For instance, you might be able to
recognize Sandy Goldberg as being American even though you don’t have the opportunity to get
into direct cognitive contact the relevant properties in virtue of which he is American. If so,
there is little reason to think that the fact that you are unable to get into direct cognitive contact
with the naked facts will prevent you from recognizing truths.
29
the possibility that . . . one can engage in inquiry absent even the
concept of truth. Even so, such inquiry . . . is teleological, directed at
some goal. The aim of such inquiry, from within the intentional
states of the cognizer, is not to find the claims that are true, for such
a characterization requires possession of the concept of truth by the
cognizer. From the perspective of the cognizer with respect to a
particular proposition p, the goal in question is to ascertain whether
p or not-p, not to ascertain whether or not p is true.
Once we see the teleological nature of inquiry . . . in this way, the most
accurate way to describe it from the outside is in terms of . . . truth, for
the concept of truth allows us to generalize across all the particular
instances of attempting to ascertain whether p or not-p, which is the
accurate portrayal from the inside of the nature of inquiry. . . . It is in
this way that the goal of inquiry . . . [is] to be identified with finding the
truth.
(Kvanvig 2003, 145–6)
One obvious difficulty with this argument lies with premise 1. To see this,
note that agents who do not have the concepts of truth and knowledge
will not (or at any rate need not) have the concept of ascertaining either.
As a result, from the perspective of unsophisticated inquirers, the aim of
inquiry cannot plausibly be characterized as involving ascertaining. The
only way in which the aim of inquiry can be thus characterized is from
the outside.
Note that even if this problem can be fixed and a more suitable
characterization of the aim of inquiry from the point of view of a UC
can be found, there is reason to think that the argument will not go
through because premise 2 is no less problematic. To see why, note that
the aim of inquiry can in any case not only involve the concept of truth.
After all, to attain the aim of inquiry, it’s not enough that a certain
proposition be true; the inquiring agent must also be related in the right
way to this truth; more specifically, they must also believe it. But now
note that unsophisticated inquirers may not have the concept of belief
either. If so, there is excellent reason to think that the accurate portrayal
of the aim of inquiry from the first person perspective of an unsophis-
ticated agent, whatever it may be, is simply not a good guide to the
correct characterization of the aim of inquiry from the third person
perspective.
Finally, we can of course agree with Kvanvig that the aim of inquiry is
to ascertain whether p/not-p, from the third person perspective, that is.
But, of course, that simply leaves open the question as to what it takes to
ascertain whether p/not-p, i.e. whether that involves acquiring know-
ledge that p/not-p, a true belief that p/not-p, etc. Section 1 above has
made a case that it involves coming to know. And, as we have now seen,
the First Person Argument provides no compelling reason for thinking
otherwise.
Kvanvig’s first argument fails. But perhaps the second does better.
Here is Kvanvig once more:
been sated by some found answer, but who does not know that answer
to be correct, we could ask what such an inquirer would do if he or she
was informed that the answer was not known to be correct. It is
plausible to assume that inquiry would resume under such conditions,
and this fact may be thought to lend credence to the view that know-
ledge is the goal of inquiry.
(Kvanvig 2003, 47)
The first is that we would get the same result if the person in question
had not found the truth and were informed of such. So this argument
for a connection between [the aim of inquiry]¹² and knowledge is no
better than a similar argument connecting [the aim of inquiry] with
discovered truth.
(Kvanvig 2003, 147)
To see just why this response fails, let’s first consider two games involv-
ing basketball: in the first (call it three-pointer), the aim is to take shots
until one sinks a three-pointer; in the second (call it mid-court), the aim
is to take shots until one sinks a shot from the far side of the mid-court
line. Note that the aim of mid-court is logically stronger than the aim of
three-pointer. After all, making a mid-court shot entails making a three-
pointer but not vice versa.
¹² Kvanvig himself talks about curiosity here. Since my main interest here lies with the aim of
inquiry, I have reformulated the argument accordingly. I don’t think that this does Kvanvig an
injustice. After all, he takes himself to be arguing that the above argument that knowledge is the
aim of inquiry fails.
32 , ,
With these points in play, suppose you are playing a game of mid-
court. Of course, we would expect you to resume taking shots if someone
informed you that were not on the far side of the mid-court line. At the
same time, we’d also expect you to resume taking shots if someone
informed you were not beyond the three-point line. After all, if you are
not beyond the three-point line, you are not beyond the mid-court line
either. Informing you that you weren’t beyond the former is effectively
informing you that weren’t on the far side of the latter. No surprise, then,
that you would resume taking shots. Suppose, next, that you are playing a
game of three-pointer. Here, we’d, of course, also expect you to resume
taking shots if you are informed that you are not beyond the three-point
line. But now suppose that, in a game of three-pointer, you are informed
that you are not beyond the mid-court line. Would you resume taking
shots? Presumably not. Rather what you’d do is ask for clarification as to
how this piece of information is relevant.
Finally, suppose that some people are playing a game involving shoot-
ing basketball. You know that it’s either mid-court or three-pointer but
you don’t know which. You are trying to arrive at an answer by looking
at how players would behave if they are given various pieces of informa-
tion. Suppose you discover that they resume taking shots upon being
informed that they are not on the far side the mid-court line (rather than
asking why this is relevant, say). In this case, you have reason for
thinking that they are playing mid-court rather three-pointer.
Crucially, the fact that they would equally resume taking shots were
they informed that they were not beyond the three-point line does
precious little to change this. After all, since not being beyond the
three-point line entails not being beyond the mid-court line, that’s also
entirely as it should be. The argument that they are playing mid-court
rather than three-pointer stands.
It should now be easy to see why Kvanvig’s first response to the
argument he considers fails. Just as the aim of mid-court is logically
stronger than the aim of three-pointer, what champions of Knowledge
Aim take the aim of inquiry to be is logically stronger what champions of
True Belief Aim take it to be. After all, knowledge entails true belief but
not vice versa. Note next that what Kvanvig proposes on behalf of
champions of Knowledge Aim is basically to arrive at an answer as to
33
[I]f we are to compare these two proposals [i.e. Knowledge Aim and
True Belief Aim], we should inform our inquirers fully of their precise
condition. Upon having their appetite for information sated, they are
in one of three conditions: (i) they have not found the truth but think
they have; (ii) they have found the truth but not in such a way that they
have knowledge; and (iii) they have found the truth and know the
information in question to be true. I submit that the only one of these
three situations in which inquiry would resume would be condition (i).
To inform someone that she had found the truth but had fallen short of
knowledge would be met, I submit, with relative indifference.
(Kvanvig 2003, 147–8)
In fact, it’s clear that Kvanvig takes the above considerations not only to
indicate that the argument for Knowledge Aim he considers is unsuc-
cessful but also to provide reason to think Knowledge Aim is false. After
all, as we fill in the blanks for inquirers even further, in the sense that we
provide information not only about whether their beliefs qualify as
knowledge but also about whether they are true, it becomes clear that
what really matters to whether inquirers would resume inquiry is not
whether they know but whether they have the truth. Since, upon fuller
34 , ,
information, resumption goes with truth, at the end of the day, there is
reason for thinking that True Belief Aim is correct.
Here is one way in which champions of Knowledge Aim may respond
to Kvanvig’s argument. If one is informed that p is true, one will typically
come to know that p. As a result, even though one may not have known
before, one knows now, in which case it’s entirely in line with Knowledge
Aim that inquiry would not resume in this case.¹³ Kvanvig grants this
point but insists that there is a kind of case that will do the job for him,
which I will henceforth refer to as the Mixed Track Record case. Here it is:
It’s not hard to see how Mixed Track Record cases may be thought to get
Knowledge Aim into trouble. In these cases, you have a belief that p. You
are also fully informed about your situation in the sense that you have
been given not only the information that you don’t know that p but also
that p is true. Finally, the case is set up such that you do not thereby come
to know that p. Since here you would still not resume inquiry, there is
¹³ In fact, I am not convinced that this is the right account of what’s going on here, for
reasons I’ll explain in due course.
35
reason to think that the aim of inquiry requires only true belief, not
knowledge.
Unsurprisingly, I think the Mixed Track Record cases do not serve to
make a convincing case against Knowledge Aim. To drive this point
home, I’d like to start by asking why, according to champions of True
Belief Aim, it is appropriate to respond to the assertion that your belief is
true but falls short of knowledge by saying ‘Yeah, yeah, who cares?’ or
‘Whatever’ (henceforth also the ‘Whatever’ response for short). The
obvious answer is that the ‘Whatever’ response is appropriate because
the assertion is simply irrelevant to you. You are interested in whether
you have attained the aim of inquiry. According to True Belief Aim, you
have done so when you have a formed true belief. But, then, when
someone points out to you that your belief is true but falls short of
knowledge, that’s irrelevant. And, of course, irrelevant assertions can
appropriately be dismissed by the ‘Whatever’ response.
In what follows, I will argue that this explanation of the ‘Whatever’
response is not best one on the market. Crucially, a better explanation
enables champions of Knowledge Aim to accept Kvanvig’s key claim
that, in Mixed Track Record cases, there is no cause for inquiry to
resume. As a result, at the end of the day, the argument does not serve
to make a compelling case against Knowledge Aim.
First, consider a variation of the Mixed Track Record case in which
two things happen: an agent with a mixed track record (henceforth M)
first tells you that p is true and a little later a highly reliable agent
(henceforth R) tells you that you don’t know that p. Is it appropriate
for you to dismiss either R or M by a ‘Whatever’ response? Clearly, the
answer here is no. And the same goes for another variation of the case in
which you are talking sequentially to two agents with mixed track
records, M1 and M2, such that M1 first tells you that p is true and a
little later M2 tells you that you don’t know that p.
Of course, if, in the original version of the Mixed Track Record case,
the reason why it is appropriate for you to dismiss M’s assertion by a
‘Whatever’ response is that the assertion is simply irrelevant to you, then
the same should go for at least one of the two assertions in these
variations of the case. In particular, the assertions telling you that you
don’t know should be also irrelevant to you and so should be equally
36 , ,
¹⁴ In fact, my own view is that the function of assertion is to generate knowledge. See (Kelp
2018a) for a defence.
¹⁵ This is a point that is often made by and associated with champions of knowledge-based
accounts of justified belief. However, it turns out that it is independently defensible. For a
compelling argument (that’s available even to internalists), see Douven (2009).
37
¹⁶ Again, in case of a highly reliable testifier such as R we may owe it to them to figure out
what the point may be. As a result, we may not be able to dismiss their assertion by a ‘Whatever’
response straight away. But it’s not clear that we have the same obligation towards an agent with
a mixed track record such as M. Given that we don’t, the ‘Whatever’ response will be
appropriate straight away.
38 , ,
¹⁷ Note that teleological analyses typically are thought to proceed from for-its-own-sake
value. That’s why the claim that knowledge (rather than truth) is a for-its-own-sake value in the
epistemic domain will do to get the argument off the ground.
39
the epistemic aim. Crucially, however, no one, David included, has ever
provided a single argument that knowledge admits of reductive analysis
in terms of justified true belief. All we have ever done on this front is to
hope for the best.¹⁹ But, of course, in the absence of a viable argument
that knowledge admits of reductive analysis in terms of justified true
belief, the Anti-Justification Argument fails to make a compelling case
against the claim that knowledge is the epistemic aim. As a result, the
threat to Knowledge Aim that is posed by the Anti-Justification
Argument can also be defused. Even if it establishes the conditional
that if knowledge is the epistemic goal, then knowledge does not admit
of reductive analysis in terms of epistemically justified belief, it simply
provides no reason for detaching in the intended way.
In fact, there is reason to think that the argument can now be turned
on its head. Section 1 has developed a series of arguments that knowledge
is the aim of inquiry. If, in addition, the epistemic domain is constituted
by inquiry (as I will argue in Chapter 5), these arguments now provide
excellent reason to believe that knowledge is the epistemic aim.²⁰ By the
same token, there is reason to think that the way forward with the
conditional that the Anti-Justification argument establishes is not by
applying modus tollens, as David would have it, but rather modus ponens.
If so, what the Anti-Justification Argument in conjunction with the
arguments for Knowledge Aim really amounts to is an argument
that knowledge does not admit of reductive analysis in terms of justified
true belief.
3. Conclusion
¹⁹ In fact, what has become clear in the wake of the Gettier literature is that we are holding
out hope in the face of continued failure.
²⁰ Or, to be more precise, there is reason to believe that knowledge is the relevant epistemic
aim, the one that justification is to be analysed as derivative from and the one for which true
belief is a competitor.
42 , ,
Chapter 1 took a closer look at the aim of inquiry into specific questions.
In this chapter, I will turn to the question of what knowledge is. My aim
is to use the result of my discussion in Chapter 1—in particular, the claim
that knowledge is the aim of inquiry into specific questions—in order to
shed light on this question.
1. A Network Analysis
Priority
The simpler elements in the analysans enjoy explanatory priority over
the complex structure in the analysandum.
Inquiry, Knowledge, and Understanding. Christoph Kelp, Oxford University Press (2021). © Christoph Kelp.
DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780192896094.003.0003
44 , ,
JTB
One knows that p if and only if one justifiably and truly believes that p.
¹ JTB might not count as a fully successful instance of the dismantling model of philosophical
analysis as Strawson would have it. In fact, it won’t be, unless one is prepared to hold that
justification, truth, and belief are not themselves in need of dismantling.
² For some overviews of the Gettier literature, see Lycan (2006), Slaght (1977), and Shope
(1983).
45
One important difference between the network model and the dismant-
ling model is that successful network analyses do not require Priority to
be satisfied. In particular, elements in the network need not enjoy
explanatory priority over the phenomenon to be analysed, or, at the
very least, not all of them do. And, unsurprisingly, network analyses are
also compatible with circularity.
Once we have abandoned the dismantling model for our analysis of
knowledge, we may still hope to offer an analysis that fits the network
model. In what follows, I will develop just such a network analysis.
We do many things and pursue many aims. Often the relation between
what we do and the aim we pursue is contingent. For instance, suppose
you aim to get a new passport. To this end, you go to the embassy of your
country, because you are an expat. country. In this case, going to the
embassy is aimed at getting a new passport. The relation between
46 , ,
³ Note that to say that an activity has a certain constitutive aim is not to say that an agent
engaging in that activity has this aim too. For instance, you can play a game of chess and aim to
lose. In this case, the aim of the game of chess, which is to checkmate your opponent, does not
coincide with your aim, which is to be checkmated by your opponent. By the same token, to
engage in an ACAN cannot require you to adopt the ACAN’s aim. What, then, does it take to
engage in an ACAN? This is a hard question that I won’t be able to address here. For some
proposed answers, see, e.g., Kelp and Simion (2018), Maitra (2011), and Williamson (2000).
47
With the examples in play, what does it mean to say that the norms
and aims of a given ACAN are constitutive? The answer is that these
norms and aims are essential to the ACAN. Anything that does not have
these norms and aims will not be this ACAN. For instance, anything that
does not have checkmating one’s opponent as its aim and is not governed
by a norm that one must move the bishop diagonally will not be chess.
Likewise, anything that does not have scoring more runs than the other
team as its aim and is not governed by a norm requiring play with teams
of nine will not be baseball, and so on.
Before moving on, I’d like to look at a couple important properties
of ACANs that set them apart from activities with contingent aims.
First, every token of a given ACAN can be assessed in terms of these
aims and norms. It is always prima facie appropriate to ask whether
the ACAN’s constitutive aim was attained and whether its constitu-
tive norms were respected. For instance, it is always prima facie
appropriate to ask whether a certain chess player checkmated their
opponent or whether they moved the bishop diagonally. Likewise, it is
always prima facie appropriate to ask whether a certain baseball team
scored more runs than the other team and whether they played with a
team of nine players. Note that, in this way, ACANs differ from
activities that have their aims contingently. It is not always prima
facie appropriate to ask whether a certain aim was attained when this
aim is contingent. For instance, suppose your spouse knows full well
that you work at the embassy and that you just received a new
passport. When you return home from a long day of work at the
embassy, it will not be prima facie appropriate to ask whether you got
a new passport.
Second, when one doesn’t attain the constitutive aim of an ACAN
one engages in, one must always remain unsuccessful in at least some
way. If you take a shot in target archery that doesn’t hit the target, you
must remain unsuccessful in some way. If you play a game of whist and
do not score five points, you are bound to remain unsuccessful in some
way. Again, ACANs differ from activities that have their aims contin-
gently in this way. If one doesn’t attain an aim that an activity may
have as a contingent matter of fact, one is not bound to remain
unsuccessful in any way. For instance, if you return home from a
48 , ,
long day of work at the embassy, you may not remain unsuccessful in
any way if you didn’t get a new passport.
What I want to argue is that there are ACANs that do not admit of
dismantling analysis. In a nutshell, the reason for this is that any attempt
at dismantling for these ACANs is spoiled by circularity. Even so, I will
argue that a network analysis is still very much on the cards for these
ACANs. In what follows, I will provide a few relevant examples. My aim
here is to provide evidence not only that ACANs with this profile exist
but also that they are not at all uncommon. In this way, this subsection
lays important groundwork for the next subsection, which argues that
inquiry is an ACAN with just this profile and develops a network analysis
of knowledge in terms of its place in inquiry.
Let’s move on to the examples then. My first case of an ACAN that
lends itself to network but not dismantling analysis is chess. At first
glance, this might seem surprising. After all, it might be thought that the
prospects for a dismantling analysis of chess are quite bright, really. To
see why, note first that we can offer necessary and sufficient conditions
for attaining the constitutive aim of chess: one attains the constitutive
aim of chess if and only if one checkmates one’s opponent. What’s even
better is that we can also give necessary and sufficient conditions for the
right-hand side of this biconditional: one checkmates one’s opponent if
and only if one places one’s opponent’s king under inescapable threat of
capture.
Granted, it may initially appear as though the prospects for a success-
ful dismantling analysis are looking up. On reflection, however, there is
reason to think that this can’t be quite right. To see why not, note that the
right-hand side of the last biconditional itself contains elements that are
complex and so require dismantling. For instance, we might ask what a
king is or what capturing amounts to. Of course, there are interesting
things to be said here. For instance, to answer the question what a king is
we might specify its starting point and the ways in which it moves.
Crucially, however, the project of attempting to understand what a
49
project, we need to say what exactly it takes for a card to have the
designated property. And this cannot be done without making reference
to the game of whist.⁴ In this way, our project of offering a dismantling
analysis of the constitutive aim of whist leads us back to the game of
whist. Once again, we have gone around in a circle. Priority is once more
violated. Again, the prospects for a dismantling analysis are dim.
My last example is baseball. Recall that a team attains the constitutive
aim of baseball if and only if it scores more runs than the other team. If
we wanted to embark on a dismantling project, we will have to further
analyse the right-hand side of this biconditional. For instance, we will
have to say what it is to score a run. Here goes: a player scores a run if and
only if they return safely to the home plate via the first, second, and third
bases, touching the first base first, the second base second, the third base
third, and the home plate last, before three outs are recorded and no
obligations to reach bases safely on batted balls are violated. Now, there
are plenty of questions to answer, including what a base is, what an out is,
what the relevant obligations are, what it is to reach bases safely, and so
on. The trouble is that it is again impossible to provide these answers
without referring to the game of baseball. To take just one example,
consider the question of what a base is. If you ask this question, the
standard answer you will get is that bases are the most important
elements in a baseball field, each one of which a player must touch to
score a run in baseball.
What comes to light is that it is not at all uncommon that ACANs do
not admit of dismantling analysis because of a circularity issue. On the
upside, there is little reason for thinking that we must now abandon the
attempt to understand the activities, their norms, and aims altogether.
After all, a network analysis is not committed to avoiding circularity and
so might still be made to work. In fact, a network analysis seems
particularly well suited here. To properly understand chess, whist, and
⁴ Perhaps this difficulty can be circumvented. It could be held, for instance, that the
designated relation is always analysed in terms of the highest card. Even so, we are bound to
run into the same kind of trouble once we try to understand what it takes for something to be
the highest value card. The reason for this is that this turns on card ranking, which again differs
from one game to the next. To understand what the highest card is we need to invoke the
ranking rule of whist.
51
We have seen that there is a diverse range of ACANs which do not lend
themselves to dismantling analysis. In all of these cases, the reason for
this is that our dismantling endeavour ultimately leads us around in a
circle. As a result, a key requirement for dismantling analyses is not met,
to wit, Priority. Even so, I also argued that a network analysis is still very
much on the cards.
In what follows, I will develop a network analysis for knowledge. The
key idea is that knowledge is defined in terms of its place in an ACAN
that joins the ranks of ACANs which lend themselves to network but not
dismantling analysis. What’s more, the reason why a dismantling ana-
lysis won’t work is that any dismantling endeavour is bound to lead us
around in a circle, with the result that a key requirement on dismantling
analyses, Priority, is not met.
52 , ,
⁵ It’s worth keeping in mind here that activity aim and agent aim can come apart (see n.3).
Accordingly, it is entirely compatible with the claim that inquiry constitutively aims at question-
settling that a given inquirer does not have question-settling as her aim.
⁶ I will return to epistemic abilities in Chapter 3. For detailed discussion, see Kelp (2016,
2017, 2018). While I think this is roughly right, alternatives are conceivable. Evidentialists, for
instance, might say that inquiry essentially involves gathering evidence (and that’s why making
use of the brainwashing service doesn’t qualify as inquiring).
⁷ While I will describe enough of the network for my purpose of illuminating the nature of
knowledge in terms of its place in it, I will not describe it in its entirety. Most importantly,
suspension of judgement will have a place in the network (as the result of another type of move).
However, since suspension of judgement is of little relevance for understanding the nature of
knowledge, I will set it (as well as any other phenomena that may belong in the network)
aside here.
53
With the rough idea in play, let’s look at some of the details. Recall that
I said that inquiry into whether p aims at settling the question whether p;
or, alternatively, it aims at properly closing the question whether p for
oneself in the affirmative/negative. The way in which knowledge enters
the picture, I suggest, is that it specifies what it takes to attain the
constitutive aim of inquiry. In particular, I want to suggest the following
necessary and sufficient conditions for the question-settling aim of
inquiry:
Question-Settling
Inquiry into the question whether p is properly closed for one in the
affirmative/negative if and only if one knows that p/not-p.
I said that belief is the result of a kind of move in inquiry and, more
specifically, that it is the result of the type of move that one makes when
one closes inquiry into whether p in the affirmative or negative. More
specifically, I want to suggest that belief is the state in which inquiry is
closed for one either in the affirmative or in the negative:
Belief
One believes that p/not-p if and only if inquiry into whether p is closed
for one in the affirmative/negative.
With these points in play, the network is up and running. Note that, just
as in the chess case earlier, we find necessary and sufficient conditions for
some of the relevant phenomena. And, again, this raises the question
whether we might not hope for relevant dismantling analyses after all.
Crucially, just as in the cases of chess, whist, and baseball, the answer is
no. To see this, note that the right-hand side of Question-Settling is itself
complex and would therefore require further dismantling. Moreover, we
can say interesting things about it too, including that knowledge requires
some epistemic condition(s) (e.g. justification or reliability) and belief.
However, first, we have already seen in the discussion of the Anti-
Justification Argument from Chapter 1 that if (i) knowledge is the aim of
inquiry and (ii) there is an epistemic condition that is analysed teleo-
logically, then the epistemic condition will have to be analysed in terms
54 , ,
of knowledge.⁸ Since there is excellent reason to think that both (i) and (ii)
hold, the prospects for a dismantling analysis of knowledge are dim. After
all, a dismantling analysis will lead us from knowledge to the teleological
epistemic condition on knowledge and from there back to knowledge. As a
result, the analysis is going to be circular and so bound to violate Priority.
Moreover, second, by Belief, the necessary and sufficient conditions
for belief feature inquiry. But, of course, inquiry is again not a simple
phenomenon, and our dismantling analysis cannot stop here. We’ll need
to offer an analysis of inquiry. The trouble is that there is no chance of
offering a successful dismantling analysis of inquiry without including
the claim that its constitutive aim is to settle the question at hand. As a
result, we are once again tied up in a circle. Our analysis is thus bound to
violate Priority on yet another count, and so the prospects for a success-
ful dismantling analysis are dim.
Of course, what this suggests in the first instance is that we should not
expect a dismantling analysis of what it is to settle a question. Note,
however, that the reason why settling questions doesn’t admit of dis-
mantling analysis will also serve to show that we should not expect a
dismantling analysis of knowledge either. This is very obvious in the case
of the epistemic condition. If knowledge features an epistemic condition
and the epistemic condition is to be analysed in terms of knowledge,
there will be no successful dismantling of knowledge in terms of the
epistemic condition. Regarding the belief condition, any further dis-
mantling of belief will feature inquiry, and any further dismantling of
inquiry will lead us back to knowledge. The attempt at dismantling
knowledge will at this point be circular and so violate Priority as well.
Just as in the cases of chess, whist, and baseball, then, there is reason to
think that a dismantling analysis is not forthcoming.
Yet, again, there is an upside. There is little reason for thinking that we
must now abandon the attempt to understand the nature of knowledge
altogether. After all, a network analysis is not committed to Priority and
so might still be made to work. In fact, a network analysis seems
particularly well suited here. To properly understand inquiry, we must
understand its constitutive norms and aims, including that the constitu-
tive aim of inquiry is to settle the question at hand, a constitutive norm is
that closing questions in the affirmative/negative is a kind of move in
inquiry, etc. To properly understand these constitutive norms and aims,
we must at the very least understand that they are constitutive of inquiry.
For instance, there is no way to properly understand what settling a
question amounts to unless we understand that it has something to do
with inquiry. To properly understand the activity of inquiry and its
constitutive aims and norms, we are thus bound to move around in a
circle here. But, again, this is entirely compatible with a network analysis.
And, more importantly, the resulting analysis is no less illuminating for
all that.
At this stage, the network analysis should have come into view with
sufficient clarity. Even so, I have said fairly little about why one should
buy it in the first place. That’s the task I’ll take up next.
For the vast majority of work on the nature of knowledge in the litera-
ture, the part on why we should accept it focuses mainly (if not entirely)
on Gettier cases. This is no surprise, given that the project of fixing JTB is
effectively the project to coming to grips with Gettier cases. For those
who expect me to explain how my account handles various Gettier cases,
I have bad news: you’ll have to wait until Chapter 3. In fact, I will not
look into any predictions about cases here. What I want to focus on
instead is a number of theoretical benefits that the network analysis
brings in its train, both for the theory of knowledge and for the theory
of belief. Here goes.
First, the network analysis allows us to understand the nature of
knowledge even once we agree that a dismantling analysis is not forth-
coming. This means that we will be able to reap the benefits of a non-
reductive epistemology like the one this book develops whilst not being
at a complete loss when it comes to the important task of understanding
the nature of knowledge.
56 , ,
Second, the network analysis places the ACAN of inquiry and hence
the phenomena of inquiry, knowledge, and belief which it connects into a
broader class of ACANs (alongside chess, whist, and baseball) that does
not admit of dismantling analysis because of a circularity issue. In this
way, the proposal promises to deliver an important diagnostic insight as
to why we shouldn’t expect knowledge to admit of dismantling analysis
in the first place.
Third, the following highly attractive thesis about belief drops right
out of the network analysis, to wit, that belief is constitutively governed
by a knowledge norm.⁹ Here is how. Recall first that, by Question-
Settling and Belief, knowledge that p (not-p) is proper belief that p
(not-p). As a result, belief is governed by a knowledge norm. And
since, on the present network analysis, the relations between inquiry,
knowledge, and belief hold as a matter of constitutive fact, this know-
ledge norm is a constitutive norm of belief.¹⁰
Fourth, the network analysis allows us to avoid some important
downsides that the thesis that belief is constitutively governed by a
knowledge norm might be thought to have. For instance, it might be
thought that it forecloses a dismantling analysis of knowledge in terms of
belief. While this is, of course, true, it is no longer worrying. After all, the
network analysis also explains why we shouldn’t expect a dismantling
analysis of knowledge to be viable in the first place. It might also be
thought that the thesis about belief commits us to the implausible claim
that belief can be fully analysed in terms of knowledge or, at the very
least, that knowledge enjoys explanatory priority over belief. Again, given
the network analysis, this is incorrect. This is because both are analysed
by their place in the network. Since the network places them on an
explanatory par, knowledge does not enjoy priority over belief on this
front. Since the network also features inquiry, belief cannot be fully
analysed in terms of knowledge.
⁹ While I do take this to be a particularly neat consequence of the account, I won’t stop to
defend it here. Fortunately, this won’t be necessary either since what I take to be a compelling
case for this claim has already been made in the literature (e.g. Adler 2002, Huemer 2007,
McHugh 2011, Simion, Kelp, and Ghijsen 2016, Williamson 2000).
¹⁰ See Simion, Kelp, and Ghijsen (2016) for a more detailed account of what it means to say
that belief is governed by a knowledge norm (in terms of Geach-style attributive goodness
Geach 1956).
57
Suppose you walk down the street and enter a red house. In this case, you
may form a belief that the house you entered is red and you may come to
know this. At the same time, it may well be that you form your belief
automatically. In that case, however, you form your belief without ever
inquiring. But how can this be if beliefs are supposed to be the result of
moves in inquiry?
I’d like to sketch two responses to this worry. The first maintains that
cases of automatic belief formation are cases of inquiry. To see why this
might be plausible, suppose that, a little later, someone asks the question
whether the house you have entered is red. Given that you still believe
that it is red, you return a positive answer straight away, i.e. without
inquiring further (Case 1). Now contrast Case 1 with a case in which you
never formed a belief about the colour of the house in the first place.
When asked whether the house you have entered is red, you will not
return a positive answer straight away. Rather, you inquire further (Case 2).
Why is it that, in Case 1 you don’t inquire further, while in Case 2 you
do? An attractive answer to this question is that in Case 1, but not in Case
2, you made a move in inquiry. But since making a move in inquiry
requires inquiry, there is reason to believe that you did inquire in our toy
case of automatic belief formation, i.e. Case 1.
Second, even those who still want to resist counting cases of automatic
belief formation as cases of inquiry will be hard pressed to deny that the
problematic cases of automatic belief formation and cases of what they
would count as genuine inquiry are species of a broader genus of activity
which we may call ‘finding things out’.¹¹ In the above case, for instance,
¹¹ Couldn’t we just say that the activity is belief formation or acquiring knowledge? No. To
think of the activity as acquiring knowledge trivializes Knowledge Aim. After all, True Belief
Aim and Justified Belief Aim are no longer serious competitors. To see that we can’t construe
the activity as belief formation, note that not every belief-forming process has settling questions
as its aim. Some are aimed at making us feel better about ourselves, some at producing false
beliefs that increase the probability of survival, etc. Since ACANs have their constitutive aims
essentially, it is hard to see how belief formation could still be an ACAN that has the constitutive
aim of settling questions.
58 , ,
even if you don’t count it as inquiring, you are still engaged in the activity
of finding out whether the colour of the house is red.
Crucially, inquiry and finding things out share their constitutive aim
and a range of key constitutive norms. Just like inquiry, finding things
out has properly closing questions as a constitutive aim. If what you are
doing does not aim at properly closing questions, then what you are
doing is not finding things out. The two activities have the same
constitutive aim.
What’s more, finding things out and inquiry share key constitutive
norms. Recall that an important constitutive norm of inquiry is that in
inquiry one must form or work toward positioning oneself to form
beliefs via epistemic abilities.¹² That’s why going to the local brainwash-
ing service and having a certain belief installed will not count as inquir-
ing into the corresponding question. Note that the same goes, once again,
for finding things out. This is evidenced by the fact that being brain-
washed into a certain belief counts no more as engaging in the activity of
finding things out than it counts as inquiring.
Another way of responding to the above worry, then, is to grant that
the problematic cases of automatic belief formation do not count as cases
of inquiry but to insist that they do still count as cases of a broader type
of activity. This type of activity, finding things out, can accommodate the
problematic cases of automatic belief formation. At the same time,
finding things out shares the constitutive aim and key constitutive
norms with inquiry. As a result, just like inquiry, the broader type of
activity is an ACAN which has knowledge as its constitutive aim and
closing questions in the affirmative/negative as a central kind of move
which results in belief. This will allow me to get the network analysis off
the ground, even if it turns out that I was wrong to think that it is inquiry.
While it is possible to respond to the worry by retreating to a different
ACAN such as ‘finding things out’, my own preference is for the broad
account of inquiry, which allows that cases of automatic belief formation
are cases of inquiry. Unsurprisingly, then, this is the view I will continue
to be working with in what follows.
¹² I will return to epistemic abilities in Chapter 3. For detailed discussion, see Kelp (2016,
2017, 2018).
59
According to the proposed view, belief closes inquiry. Given that this is
so, doesn’t it follow that once one has formed a belief, one must stop
inquiring, and if one continues to inquire, one cannot believe? And isn’t
that implausible? Isn’t it entirely possible to inquire into what one
already believes?
While a positive answer to the last two of these questions may look
plausible at first glance, things are not entirely straightforward on reflec-
tion. This is because when one has a belief and continues to inquire, one
will often inquire into questions that are subtly different from the one
about which one holds a belief already. Suppose, for instance, that you
have a belief that a certain defendant is guilty and continue to inquire. How
plausible is it that you are still trying to find out whether the defendant is
guilty? Not very plausible. After all, you already believe that they did it. In
keeping with that, there are questions in the vicinity that you may still
pursue, for instance, whether there is further evidence that they are
guilty. Accordingly, one response to the above worry is that what’s really
going on when one continues to inquire when one already has a belief is
that one inquires into a (perhaps subtly) different question from the one
about which one holds a belief already (Friedman 2019).
Still, there is a lingering worry that this response isn’t fully satisfactory
at the end of the day. To see why not, suppose you have formed a belief
that p and are offered a handsome sum for continuing to inquire into
whether p. Isn’t that something you could still do to collect the money?
But, of course, if you can, it can’t be that belief closes inquiry.
Let’s suppose this is right, then. If so, the claim that belief closes
inquiry needs to be qualified. To see how, compare: you are playing a
game of chess. You have captured all your opponent’s pieces except for
the king. At the same time, you still have two bishops and a king left.
Since your opponent knows you to be a skilled player, they resign and
you win the game. Now suppose that someone offers you a handsome
sum to continue to play until the bitter end. While you do continue to
play after your opponent has resigned in this case, there is a clear sense in
which the game is over once your opponent has resigned. Here is one way
of saying more about this sense: the aim of winning the game can no
60 , ,
longer generate reason for you to continue playing. Rather, any reason to
continue playing will now need to be game-external (e.g. here, to get the
money).
Unsurprisingly, I want to suggest that the same goes, mutatis mutan-
dis, for inquiry and belief. Even if we want to allow that you can continue
to inquire into whether p after you have formed a belief that p/not-p,
there is a clear sense in which inquiry into whether p is closed for you once
you form a belief that p, say. One way of saying more about this sense is
that the aim of settling the question whether p can no longer generate
reason for you to continue inquiring into whether p: to do so, you will
now need an external reason, such as the prospects of a reward or an
interest in a (perhaps subtly) different question.
Note that these two responses will also work for seemingly more
difficult cases. Suppose that you believe that the hob is off. Now you
are seeking to confirm that it is. Isn’t this a case in which you believe that
the hob is off and yet continue to inquire into the question whether it is
off?¹³ No, for the reason just given. Once you have a belief that the hob is
off, the aim of settling the corresponding question can no longer give you
a reason to inquire into this question. What you need is an external
reason such as the reward of the additional confidence (perhaps given the
stakes). What’s more, it’s plausible that what you are really inquiring into
is a subtly different question, e.g. whether you can confirm that the hob is
off or whether you can be sure that the hob is off.
All right, one might say, inquiry into whether p is an ACAN and it
constitutively aims at settling the question whether p. But even so, it’s not
very plausible that inquiry constitutively aims at knowledge. To see why
not, note that there could be communities of inquiring agents whose
belief-forming processes are insufficiently reliable to generate knowledge
in them. Members of these communities surely engage in inquiry. And
even if their inquiries may be thought to aim at settling questions, they
¹⁴ Thanks to Mona Simion for bringing this to my attention. Essentially the same worry
could be raised with inquiry in different domains. For instance, it might be thought that the
aims of scientific and legal inquiry are more stringent that the aim of ordinary inquiry. It is easy
to see that the responses I offer below work just as well here. Thanks to Miguel Egler for raising
this issue.
62 , ,
fixed by its function. Now, Craig takes it that the function of the concept
of knowledge is to flag good informants. However, there is an alternative
proposal, which I (e.g. Kelp 2011) and others (e.g. Kappel 2010, Rysiew
2012) have defended elsewhere, according to which the function of the
concept of knowledge is to flag when a question is properly closed for
one. What this proposal effectively amounts to is that the function of the
concept of knowledge is to flag when the aim of inquiry has been
reached. Given that, according to this view, the function of the concept
determines its content, if the requirements for reaching the aim of
inquiry vary, the requirements for knowledge will vary as well. On this
view, then, we’d expect the requirements for knowledge to vary between
the three communities in just the way the response to the above objection
would have it.
Here is another way of responding to the objection. The key idea here
is to explain the objection in terms of the distinction between activity
aims and agent aims. To see how it works, let’s return to chess: suppose a
grandmaster is playing a schoolchild. No time control rules are operative.
At the same time, it is a longstanding grandmaster ethos that school-
children must be defeated within forty-five seconds; otherwise playing
them is just too boring. On the other hand, it is schoolchildren’s ethos to
last for at least one minute when playing grandmasters. This is not to say
that winning wouldn’t be nice, but rather to have some aim that is more
realistically attainable. Finally, suppose our grandmaster checkmates the
schoolchild as expected but needs ninety seconds to do so. While she has
attained success in chess, she has failed to honour grandmaster ethos. On
the other hand, our schoolchild has not attained success in chess but has
done well when it comes to schoolchildren’s ethos.
Note that what is happening here is that there are certain normative
practices built around the game of chess; or, to be more precise, around a
certain type of match. Crucially, these practices are extrinsic to the game
in that they do not affect its constitutive norms and aims. Note also that
it makes sense to have the extrinsic normative practices. After all, it
makes sense to have aims that are both challenging and attainable.
Unsurprisingly, the key idea of the second response is that the same is
going on, mutatis mutandis, in the different communities. Inquiry con-
stitutively aims at knowledge. And the agents in all three communities
63
engage in inquiry. However, agents in the less and more reliable com-
munities also have some additional normative practices built around the
activity of inquiry. In the case of the less reliable community, positive
normative status is assigned to certain failures in inquiry. Since it makes
sense to have aims that are both challenging and attainable and since
they cannot attain the aim of inquiry, this makes sense. In the case of the
more reliable community, negative normative status is assigned to some
successes in inquiry. Again, since it makes sense to have aims that are
both challenging and attainable and since attaining the aim of inquiry is
not challenging at all, this makes sense also.
The last response I will consider here takes seriously the idea that the
aim of the activity of inquiry changes. To see how it works, let’s return to
chess once more. Note first that ‘chess’ does not pick out a single game.
Rather it picks out a family of games.¹⁵ For some of these family
members we have names. Blitz chess is one example, Chess960 another.
For many others, we don’t. Some of them we do play; others we don’t
(though we might have played at least some of them). Crucially, each
family member has its own constitutive aims and norms, which distin-
guish it from the others. For instance, one key rule of Blitz chess which
distinguishes it from more familiar members of the chess family is a time
control rule. Roughly, one has only ten minutes to win the game. The
time control rule also affects the aim of Blitz chess, which is not only to
checkmate the opponent but to do so within the allocated time. Note that
the specific time control rule also distinguishes Blitz chess from other
members of the chess family with different time control rules, such as
Bullet chess or Lightning chess. Finally, note that whichever member of
the game in the chess family one is playing, one can correctly be said to
be playing chess.
With these points in play, let’s return to inquiry. The nub of the
present response is, again, that the same is going on, mutatis mutandis,
in the case of inquiry. ‘Inquiry’ does not pick out a single activity but a
family of activities.¹⁶ Each family member has its own constitutive aims
and norms, which distinguish it from the others. According to this
¹⁵ How this range is fixed is a tricky question that I do not attempt to settle here.
¹⁶ Again, I won’t offer a detailed account of how the range is fixed.
64 , ,
One very fundamental objection one might have is that activities simply
aren’t the kinds of thing that can have aims. Only agents have aims;
activities don’t. Or, at the very least, talk of aims is at best metaphorical
when it comes to activities. Given how central the idea that activities
have aims is for the present view, doesn’t that undermine the entire
project?¹⁸
One might wonder just how damaging this objection is. In particular,
one might wonder whether we can’t analyse talk of aims of activities in
terms of talk of aims of agents? A straightforward proposal would be that
to say that an activity has an aim means that there is an agent who has
adopted this aim and intends to bring it about by engaging in the activity.
For instance, to say that the aim of chess is to checkmate one’s opponent
means that there is some player who has adopted the aim of checkmating
their opponent and intends to bring it about by playing chess.
Unfortunately, there is excellent reason to think that this won’t work.
Consider chess. It is possible to play chess without adopting the aim of
¹⁷ Note that this response leaves open the possibility that true belief is the aim of inquiry of
some members of the family of inquiry, or at least minimally reliable true belief. (Thanks to an
anonymous referee for pointing this out.) One advantage of this consequence is that it serves to
make even clearer how the present view differs from knowledge first epistemological alterna-
tives. After all, it allows that true belief is the constitutive aim of at least some members of the
family of inquiry. At the same time, it’s important to be clear that this is not much of a
concession to champions of True Belief Aim. After all, even if there are such members of the
family of inquiry, they are not members we engage in, nor might we easily have done so.
¹⁸ Thanks to an anonymous referee for pressing me on this.
65
¹⁹ To keep things simple, I will bracket the phenomena of forfeiting and resigning here.
²⁰ One may wonder just how much is gained by replacing aim talk with success talk.
Shouldn’t anyone who was uneasy with the thought that activities have aims also be uneasy
with the thought that activities have success conditions? Might we not say that just as aim talk
only applies to agents, the same goes for success talk?
No, in the case of success talk it is clear that it applies beyond agents. Consider my digestive
system. We may be uneasy about saying that my digestive system aims to digest my breakfast.
But it would be odd to be uneasy about saying that my digestive system successfully digested my
breakfast.
66 , ,
Another worry one might press against my view is whether it isn’t best
understood as a kind of dismantling analysis after all. In particular, the
idea is that the best way of interpreting what the account amounts to is as
a functional analysis à la Ramsey (1990) and Lewis (1970). Once we have
delineated the network, we go on to replace the key terms we are
interested in—in the present case, knowledge, belief, and inquiry—by
variables and then quantify over these variables. What we end up with is
a so-called Ramsey-sentence, which offers a reductive analysis of know-
ledge, belief, and inquiry all at the same time, as it were. And isn’t that
tantamount to a form of dismantling of these phenomena?²¹
Perhaps. But if it is, I want to suggest that what the worry highlights is
that Strawson’s way of putting things simply isn’t maximally perspicu-
ous. In particular, I think that there are actually two important distinc-
tions between philosophical analyses that Strawson’s distinction between
the dismantling and network model by itself doesn’t take into account, at
least not explicitly. The first is between atomistic and holistic analyses.
Atomistic analyses aim to illuminate complex phenomena by breaking
them down into simpler ones. Holistic analyses, in contrast, aim to shed
light on phenomena by tracing relations to other phenomena. The
second distinction is between reductive and non-reductive analyses. On
the standard view, reductive analyses allow us to transform any state-
ment about the thing to be reduced into a statement about the things it is
reduced to (Carnap 1967). For instance, JTB qualifies as a reductive
analysis in this sense. It allows us to transform any statement about
knowledge into a statement about justified true belief. Of course, to count
as genuinely reductive, the analysis must satisfy Priority and thus be non-
circular. That’s why JTB qualifies as reductive, whereas an analysis of
knowledge according to which one knows that p if and only if one knows
What’s more success talk also does explanatory work when it comes to activities. Suppose
I had the aim of running a marathon by running 10 miles. My aim is unattainable. What
explains this unattainability is the fact that running a marathon has a success condition that
cannot be attained by running 10 miles. Here success conditions that apply to activities do
crucial explanatory work.
knowledge. At the same time, I think that there is some reason for
caution. To begin with, Ramsey-Lewis functional analyses are always
threatened by the so-called permutation problem, i.e. that the relevant
Ramsey-sentence is realized in ever so many different ways (e.g. Smith
1994). Note that the present account is particularly likely to succumb to
the permutation problem, at least in its present shape. The reason for this
is that the number of statements at issue in the account to be ‘ramsified’
is so very small. As a result, the chance of there being a large number of
things that realize it seems particularly high.
Here is another problem with opting for the Ramsey-Lewis route.
Recall that what we are trying to do is understand the nature of know-
ledge. The trouble is that the Ramsey-Lewis route isn’t particularly well
suited for this purpose. To see why not, consider the following: you are at
the luggage carousel at the local airport. Someone took your suitcase.
You ask who. ‘The person with the pink and green underwear’ is not a
particularly illuminating answer to this question (even if true), at least
not unless you have some idea of who the person with the pink and green
underwear is. Likewise, ‘Knowledge is the denotation of x in there is an x,
there is a y, there is a z . . . such that . . . ’ is not a particularly illuminating
answer to the question as to what knowledge is, at least not unless you
have some idea of what y, z . . . are. But, of course, to answer the questions
as to what y is, you need to have some idea of what x, z . . . are, to answer
the question of what z is, you need to have some idea of what x, y . . . are,
and so on. Not only are we moving around in a circle, but we also appear
to be doing so blindly. In this way, a second important downside of the
Ramsey-Lewis route is that it just doesn’t deliver the kind of illumination
that would allow us to make progress on understanding the nature of
knowledge.
3. The Competition
I have argued that certain ACANs afford network analyses in that they
cannot be properly understood without understanding their constitutive
norms and aims, and the constitutive norms and aims cannot be properly
understood without understanding the activity they are constitutive
69
norms and aims of. I have also made a case that inquiry is an ACAN. Since
knowledge is the aim of inquiry, this means that we should not hope for a
dismantling analysis of knowledge but opt for a network analysis instead.
In keeping with this, it may be possible to specify necessary and sufficient
conditions for knowledge. Crucially, we must not expect these to be non-
circular. What we get, then, is a non-reductive account of knowledge.
Of course, the above is not the only non-reductive account of know-
ledge on the market. Arguably the most prominent alternative is due to
Timothy Williamson. He claims that knowledge is a mental state, or, to
be more precise, that it is the most general factive mental state, and that
this sheds some light on the nature of knowledge (Williamson 2000; cf.
Nagel 2013, Miracchi 2015). At this stage, one might wonder which of
the two accounts is preferable.
As a first observation, note that the two accounts are in principle
compatible. It could be that knowledge is the constitutive aim of inquiry
(henceforth the inquiry view) and that it is the most general factive
mental state (henceforth the mental state view). Perhaps, like quantic
entities which have both a particle and a wave nature, knowledge has
both a normative and a psychological nature.
That said, anyone who accepts at least one of the two views will have to
make a choice between the following three incompatible views: the first is
to accept both the inquiry view and the mental state view; the second is to
accept only the mental state view; and the third is to accept only the
inquiry view. In what follows I will provide reason to believe that the last
option is the one to go for. In a nutshell, this is because the mental state
view cannot be correct because, pace Williamson, knowledge simply is
not a mental state. Note also that, as a result, Williamson is genuine
competition. After all, he endorses the mental state view and so is firmly
committed to either the first or the second option.
3.1 Preliminaries
Let’s first take a look at what exactly Williamson means when he says
that knowledge is a mental state. It might be thought that this thesis is
not particularly controversial. After all, it is widely agreed that
70 , ,
Mental State
There is a mental state such that being in it is necessary and sufficient
for knowing that p.
This puts knowledge on a par with other paradigmatic mental states such
as belief, desire, hope, fear, and intention. It is also what gets Williamson
in the ballpark of a non-reductive account of knowledge. And, of course,
it is also much more controversial.
Before I get down to the nitty-gritty, I’d like to briefly say a few words
about my general strategy. In order to mount a case against Williamson,
I will offer an alternative to the thesis that knowledge is a mental state,
which I’ll argue is better than what Williamson has to offer.
In a nutshell, here is my alternative: knowledge is an epistemic state
only. And here is a more careful statement of what it amounts to. One
key thesis is that knowledge is an epistemic state. The thought is that
knowledge is an epistemic state in the same sense in which, according to
Williamson, knowledge is a mental state:
Epistemic State
There is an epistemic state such that being in it is both necessary and
sufficient for knowing that p.
This puts knowledge on a par with other paradigm epistemic states such
as justified belief and irrational belief. I take it that Williamson does not
deny Epistemic State. Rather, what I’d expect him to maintain is that
both Mental State and Epistemic State are true—that is, that knowledge
is both an epistemic state and a mental state. This is where the second key
71
²² In this respect, my argument differs from the (perhaps seemingly similar) ones in Magnus
and Cohen (2003) and Molyneux (2007) both of which attempt to show that explanations of
actions in terms of broad conditions—and, in particular, knowledge—aren’t better than in terms
of narrow conditions—and, in particular, some form of belief. Unlike them, I do not mean to
take a stance on whether explanations of actions in terms of broad conditions such as knowledge
are ever better than explanations of actions in terms of narrow conditions here. Rather, my
point specifically concerns the debate over Mental State. In particular, what I aim to show is that
73
As a first observation, note that not only mental states can contribute
to the explanation of action. Properties of mental states may do so as
well. To return to Williamson’s case of the burglar, his ransacking of the
house all night in search of a diamond will be better explained by a
dogmatic or by an appropriate desire to find the diamond than by a desire
to find it. Similarly, his action will be better explained by a dogmatic or a
well-evidenced belief that the diamond is in the house than by a belief.
The reason for this is in essence the same as the reason why explanations
in terms of knowledge are better than explanations in terms of belief.
Dogmatic and appropriate desires and dogmatic and well-evidenced
beliefs are more robust (in the sense that they are less likely to be lost)
than desires and beliefs. As a result, the probability of continued action
conditional on dogmatic or well-evidenced belief is higher than the
probability of continued action conditional on belief (and similarly for
desire). However, dogmatic or well-evidenced beliefs are not mental
states in their own right. Rather, dogmaticity and well-evidencedness
are properties of such mental states as belief and desire.
With these points in play, let’s suppose we are trying to decide whether
to augment Epistemic State by Mental State. To this end, let’s ask the
following question: what is more plausible? That knowledge better
explains action than belief because knowledge is a mental state in its
own right or that knowledge better explains action than belief because
qualifying as knowledge is a property of belief that better explains action.
Before answering this question, let us broaden our perspective a bit.
More specifically, let’s consider a series of explanations of actions such as
Williamson’s burglar ransacking the house all night in search of a
diamond: (i) in terms of knowledge; (ii) in terms of justified true belief;
(iii) in terms of true belief; (iv) in terms of belief; (v) in terms of absence
of belief. Note that Williamson’s argument serves to show that (i) is
better than (ii), (ii) is better than (iii), (iii) is better than (iv), and (iv) is
better than (v). After all, thanks to differences in robustness, the prob-
ability of action conditional on knowledge is higher than that conditional
on justified true belief, which, in turn, is higher than the probability of
even if Williamson is right about broad conditions and causal explanations of action, there is
still reason not to adopt Mental State in addition to Epistemic State.
74 , ,
and (iii) as well as (iii) and (iv)) that, whilst not being mental differences,
affect the quality of explanation of action. The picture we get is one in
which we have a significant difference in the quality of explanation
between (iv) and (v) and then a more or less gradual increase in the
quality of explanation between (i) and (iv).
With this picture in play, let’s return to our initial scenario in which
we are trying to decide whether or not to add Mental State to Epistemic
State, and to our question as to what is more plausible: that knowledge
better explains action than belief because knowledge is a mental state in
its own right or that knowledge better explains action than belief because
qualifying as knowledge is a property of belief that better explains action.
In view of the available evidence, it is hard to deny that the answer is that
it is the latter. It is hard to deny that the more or less gradual increase in
quality of explanation we find here fits much more nicely with an
explanation in terms of properties of belief that add to the robustness
of the belief all the way from (i) to (iv) than with an explanation in terms
of such properties between (ii) and (iv) and an explanation in terms of a
different kind of mental state between (i) and (ii).²³ However, this answer
is, of course, not available to champions of Mental State, who are firmly
committed to the former answer.
In contrast, those who accept that knowledge is an epistemic state only
can easily give the more plausible answer. According to them, know-
ledge, justified true belief, and true belief are all epistemic states, that is,
instantiations of epistemic properties by mental states. Since they reject
Mental State, they may hold that there is no difference in the kind of
mental state invoked in explanations (i) and (ii). At the same time, their
view is entirely compatible with the orthodox view in the philosophy of
mind, which entails that there is a difference in kind of mental state at
issue in explanations (iv) and (v). They can, of course, also allow that
²³ But is it really correct that there is a more or less gradual increase in the quality of
explanation between (i) and (iv)? Isn’t it more plausible that there is another significant
difference between an explanation in terms of belief and true belief? I must confess that I am
not convinced about this. That said, there is reason to think that I could in principle grant
Williamson as much. After all, given just how rare Gettier cases are, it is quite plausible that the
difference in quality of explanation is higher between (ii) and (iii) as well as (iii) and (iv) than
between (i) and (ii). If so, it remains hard to see why exactly there should be a difference in kind
just where Williamson needs it, i.e. between (i) and (ii).
76 , ,
Rejecting Mental State will also allow us to secure at least two theoretical
virtues in our theories of mental and epistemic states. First, our theory of
mental states will be more parsimonious if it does not countenance
knowledge as a mental state in its own right, alongside other mental
states such as belief and desire. Second, knowledge would be somewhat
queer among epistemic states. After all, for other epistemic states (with
the possible exception of seeing that), there has never been much doubt
that they are not mental states in their own right, that is, not even
according to Williamson. Rather, they are instantiations of epistemic
properties by mental states. As a result, steering clear of Mental State will
allow us to attain a more uniform theory of epistemic states according to
which all epistemic states are instantiations of epistemic properties by
mental states. Resisting Mental State promises to deliver a theory of
mental and epistemic states that is more parsimonious and uniform
77
than one that embraces Mental State. There is thus further reason to
favour the thesis that knowledge is an epistemic state only.
4. Conclusion
Inquiry, Knowledge, and Understanding. Christoph Kelp, Oxford University Press (2021). © Christoph Kelp.
DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780192896094.003.0004
79
Practitioners of ACANs may have the ability to attain the aim of a given
ACAN. Consider, for instance, a simple version of archery—call it
ARCH—in which shots are taken at a disc-shaped target with no further
81
¹ Properties (i), (ii), and (iv) above are among what Jennifer McKitrick (2003, 157) calls
‘markers of dispositionality’, that is, properties of dispositions that are widely agreed upon
among contributors to the debate on dispositions. For what I take to be convincing motivations
of property (iii), see, e.g., Mumford (1998) and Sosa (2015). Finally, it might be better to
construe dispositions as being associated with a probability of manifestation conditional on
triggering in suitable conditions, rather than with the counterfactual conditionals at issue in (iv)
above. One advantage that this kind of account of dispositions has for the application to abilities
is that it can easily make sense of the fallibility of abilities, even in favourable conditions. After
all, the relevant probability of manifestation may but need not be 1, even when the triggering
conditions obtain in favourable conditions. See, e.g., Healey (1991) and Suarez (2007) for more
on probabilistic approaches to dispositions.
83
ACAN Ability
One has an ability to attain the aim for a range, R, of ACANs and
relative to conditions, C, if and only if one has a way of move produc-
tion, W, such that, for any S∈R, using W in C disposes one to attain the
aim of S.²
ACAN Exercise
One exercises an ability, A, to attain the aim for a range, R, of ACANs
and relative to conditions, C, if and only if one has A and produces a
move via the way of move production at issue in A.
² See Kelp (2016, 2018) for a more detailed account of ACAN Abilities (as well as ACAN
Exercise and Competent ACAN Move below). Note also that the full account of ACAN abilities
additionally features what I call a groundedness condition on abilities, which is a generalization
of Millikan’s (2000, ch. 4) idea that genuine abilities are distinguished from mere behavioural
dispositions by being relative to conditions in which they were acquired via learning or natural
selection. That said, the grounding condition does no substantive theoretical work here.
Accordingly, for present purposes at least, it can safely be set aside.
84 , ,
³ Note that, as a result, unsuitable SH may and often do explain incompetent performance in
an indirect way. What directly explains incompetence is that no way of move production that
qualifies as an ability was used. For instance, suppose you are given a drug with the result that
you are not in suitable SH for any ability to hit the target in ARCH you may have. That you are
drugged explains why you don’t shoot in a way that qualifies as an ability to hit the target
(perhaps you mess up your aim), which in turns explains why your shot is not competent.
Similarly, suppose a certain official aiming to marry a couple is too drunk, with the result that
they are not in suitable SH for their ability to marry couples. That the official is too drunk
explains why they don’t perform the ceremony in a way that qualifies as an ability to marry
couples (perhaps they mess up the words), which indirectly explains why their performance was
not competent. Finally, suppose that I just received a letter about my application to do graduate
studies and want to find out whether I was admitted into my favourite programme. If I am too
nervous, this may explain why I read in a way that does not qualify as an ability to know
(perhaps I am reading the words wrong), which indirectly explains why the formation of my
belief was not competent.
85
Recall that we saw that there is reason to think that there are substantive
constraints on both the means and the environment for attaining the aim
of inquiry. And given that knowledge is the aim of inquiry, there is also
reason to think that there are substantive constraints on the means and
the environment for attaining knowledge. The good news was that this is
independently plausible, since knowledge is widely believed to feature
both a justification condition and a condition requiring a suitable envir-
onment. However, the question remained as to whether more can be said
about these constraints.
With the accounts of ACAN abilities, their exercises, and competent
ACAN moves in play, I am now in a position to answer this question.
I want to unpack both substantive constraints in terms of the notion of
an ACAN ability. In this way, then, there is a relation between these two
conditions. More specifically, I want to suggest that the constraint on the
means for attaining the aim of inquiry/knowledge is unpacked in terms
of a competence condition and the constraint on the environment in
terms of the satisfaction of the EN of the abilities that produce the belief.
In other words:
Conditions on Knowledge
One knows that p only if (Constraint on Means =) one’s belief that p is
competently produced and (Constraint on Environment =) the EN of
the ability by means of which one’s belief that p is produced are satisfied.
Ability to Know
One has an ability to know propositions in a range, R, and relative to
conditions, C, if and only if one has a way of belief formation, W, such
that, for any p∈R, using W in C disposes one to form knowledgeable
beliefs that p.
Competent Belief
One competently believes that p if and only if one’s belief that p is
produced by an exercise of an ability to know propositions in range R
and relative to conditions C such that p∈R.
Conditions on Knowledge
One knows that p only if (K1 =) one’s belief that p is produced by an
exercise of an ability to know propositions in range R and relative to
conditions C such that p∈R, and (K2 =) the EN of the ability to know
that produced one’s belief that p are satisfied.
Now, even if we are willing to go along with the idea that for ACANs
with constitutive aims that feature normative properties there may be
88 , ,
substantive constraints on both the means of attaining these aims and the
environment, and even if we are willing to grant that inquiry is an ACAN
with a constitutive aim featuring a normative property, why should we
think that this specific way of precisifying these constraints is correct?
While I don’t have anything conclusive to offer in response to this
question, there are some considerations that provide relevant evidence.
The first is that the above precisification accommodates the motivations
for the substantive constraints on the means and environment for
attaining the aim of inquiry. For instance, we can now explain why you
cannot properly close a question via mere guesswork. Mere guesswork
simply couldn’t be an ability to know. This, in turn, is because mere
guesswork simply doesn’t dispose one to come to know propositions in
any range. But, of course, if mere guesswork couldn’t be an ability to
know, beliefs acquired by mere guesswork simply couldn’t be competent.
Given C1 of Proper Question Closing, it follows that it’s impossible to
properly close a question via mere guesswork. Similarly, we can explain
why it’s impossible to properly close certain questions when one is
radically deceived. Even if the beliefs one forms are competent, the EN
of the ability to know that produced these beliefs could not be satisfied.
This, in turn, is because the disposition to know at issue in this ability
simply could not extend to the EN of radical deception. By C2 of
Conditions on Proper Question Closing, it follows that it’s impossible
to properly close certain questions when one is radically deceived.
The second reason for thinking that the precisification is correct is that
it serves to address one of the central problems in the literature on the
nature of knowledge, i.e. the Gettier problem. To see how, consider first
the following two famous Gettier cases:
Stopped Clock
Having come down the stairs, you look at the grandfather clock in the
hallway, see that it reads 8.22 and on that basis comes to believe that it
is 8.22. The clock has an outstanding track record of functioning
properly and you have no reason to think that it is currently not
accurate. Your belief is true. It is in fact 8.22. Unbeknownst to you,
however, the clock has stopped exactly twelve hours ago.
89
Fake Barns
You are driving through the countryside and are currently looking out
of the window of your car. You see what appears to be a barn in the
field and form a perceptual belief that there is a barn in the field.
Unbeknownst to you, you are looking at one of the few real barns in an
area peppered with barn façades that are so cleverly constructed as to
be indistinguishable from real barns from your position on the road.
In Stopped Clock, you don’t know that it is 8.22 and in Fake Barns, you
don’t know that there is a barn in the field. One of the central difficulties
for traditional reductive analyses of knowledge is to explain the absence
of knowledge in these cases.
Fortunately, the present proposal can succeed where traditional reduc-
tive analyses have failed. It allows us explain the absence of knowledge in
Gettier cases in terms of the violation of some substantive conditions on
knowledge. More specifically, the reason why agents in Gettier cases lack
knowledge is that the EN for the ability to know that produces the
relevant beliefs in Gettier cases are not satisfied. To see in more detail
why this is so, let’s return to our two toy cases and look at how things
play out here.
In Stopped Clock, the clock you are taking a reading from is stopped.
As a result, you are not in conditions C relative to which you have the
ability to acquire knowledge about the time. After all, your way of belief
formation does not dispose you to form knowledgeable beliefs about the
time in conditions in which the clock you are taking a reading from is
stopped. At the same time, the conditions you find yourself in do not
prevent you from forming your belief in the way that constitutes an
ability to know relative to some (but different) conditions. This means
that you are in unsuitable EN for the ability that produced your belief
about the time. By K2 of Conditions on Knowledge, your belief that it’s
8.22 falls short of knowledge.
Similarly, in Fake Barns, the fact that you are in a part of the country in
which fake barns predominate means that you are not in conditions C
relative to which you have the ability to recognize barns. At the same
time, the conditions you find yourself in do not prevent you from
90 , ,
forming your belief in the way that constitutes an ability to know relative
to some (but different) conditions. This means that you are in unsuitable
EN for your ability to recognize barns. By K2 of Conditions on
Knowledge, your belief that there is a barn in the field falls short of
knowledge.
Let’s move on to the third reason, then. To see this one, recall that we
found it only natural to identify the constraint on the means with the
independently plausible justification condition on knowledge. What the
above precisification of the constraint on means does, then, is to deliver
the following precise account of the justification condition on knowledge:
Justified Belief
One’s belief that p is justified if and only if it is formed by an exercise of
an ability to know propositions in range R and relative to conditions C
such that p∈R.⁴
In a nutshell, the third reason for thinking that the above precisification
of the constraints on the aim of inquiry is correct is that (modulo the
natural identification of the constraint on means with the justification
condition on knowledge) it delivers Justified Belief, which is independ-
ently attractive. In fact, I have defended Justified Belief at length in a
recent book (Kelp 2018). There I argue that the account offers promising
solutions to a wide range of central problems in the theory of justifica-
tion, including the new evil demon problem, the clairvoyant problem, the
generality problem, the new Gettier problem and the lottery paradox.
Now, I could not hope to even begin to rehearse my case for Justified
Belief, not least because it spans the entirety of the earlier book. That’s
why I will have to content myself with (i) observing that the proposed
precisification effectively allows me to incorporate the relevant material
into the present project and (ii) referring the interested reader to the
book for more detailed arguments.
⁴ For other accounts of justified belief in terms of abilities to know, see Miracchi (2015),
Schellenberg (2018), Silva (2017). For other accounts of justified belief in terms of knowledge,
see, e.g., Bird (2007a), Jenkins Ichikawa (2014), Littlejohn (2013), Millar (2010), Reynolds
(2013), Simion (2019), Sutton (2007), and Williamson (2010).
91
2. Objections
2.1 Redundancy
with indistinguishable fakes, it’s impossible for you to come to know that
there is a barn in the field by looking, even if your belief is perfectly
competent.
Given that this is so, a proper treatment of Gettier cases must not only
explain why knowledge happens to be absent in Gettier cases but also
account for why knowledge couldn’t be present in Gettier cases. And, of
course, this strongly suggests that the absence of knowledge in Gettier
cases must be explained in terms of the violation of some substantive
condition on knowledge.
2.2 Queerness
One can attain the aim of an ACAN via a move that is not competent.
Consider a case in which you take a shot in ARCH. Suppose you are
completely drunk when taking the shot. As a result, your shot is not
competent. But now suppose that, by an incredible stroke of luck, your
shot finds the target anyway. Your shot attains the aim of ARCH without
being competent. Moreover, attaining the aim of a given ACAN does not
require suitable conditions for one’s ability either, as the two gusts of
wind case we looked at earlier clearly indicates.
Why think that these observations cause trouble for the proposed
view? To answer this question, note that on the present view inquiry
differs from other familiar ACANs in just this respect. To attain the aim
of inquiry, your belief must be competent and the environment must be
suitable. As a result, one may now worry that the present view turns
inquiry into an oddball amongst ACANs.
Now, it might be thought that all we need by way of response is to
recall that, for ACANs with aims that feature normative properties, there
may be substantive constraints on both means and environments for
attaining the aim. This was clearly shown by the case of fairly winning an
archery competition. While I think this line of thought goes a long way
towards a viable response here, there is a residual worry that may be
worth addressing. To see this, note that while the fair winning case
demonstrates the existence of some substantive constraints, it does not
demonstrate the existence of competence constraints in particular. After
94 , ,
all, it’s easy to see that you can win an archery competition fairly without
competence. Despite the fact that you are drunk beyond comprehension,
all of your shots find the target by complete luck and none of your
opponent’s does. You win the competition fairly but not by means of
competence. Perhaps, then, inquiry is an oddball among ACANs after all
just because it imposes an unheard-of competence requirement on the
attainment of its aim.
To repeat, I do believe that the fact that there are substantive con-
straints on means and environment for attaining the aims of some
ACANs with aims featuring normative properties goes a long way
towards addressing the issue we are facing here. After all, once we see
that there are some such substantive constraints, it’s a short way to
acknowledging that there may also be different ways in which these
substantive constraints manifest themselves. But once we have granted
this, the worry that the competence requirement on attaining the aim of
inquiry makes inquiry into a problematic oddball amongst ACANs is
deprived of much, if not all of its force.
Even so, to eliminate any residual worry that may remain, it will be
useful to show that inquiry isn’t the only ACAN featuring the sort of
competence constraint we find in Conditions on Knowledge. One of my
favourite examples is the activity of joining consenting adults in lawful
marriage (henceforth LM). LM is an ACAN, the aim of which is to effect
the lawful marriage of the target couple. Moves are tokens of ceremonies
of a certain type—call it c. The aim of LM is a token of c that effects the
lawful marriage of the target couple. (The definitions of LM ability,
exercise thereof, and competent move as expected.)
Crucially, there is reason to believe that one joins partners in lawful
marriage only if one competently conducts a token of c. To see this,
suppose you, the person performing the ceremony, fail to competently
conduct a token of c. This may be for two reasons. You may fail to
conduct a token of c altogether, say because you are too drunk and so do
not manage to say enough of the relevant words. Or else the ACAN may
not be in the range of c, say because one of the partners is underage and
so a different kind of ceremony is needed. In either case, the couple will
not end up lawfully married. Since joining the couple in lawful marriage
is the success condition of LM, this means that the aim of LM will not be
95
⁵ In a recent paper, Jaakko Hirvelä (2019) argues that success and competence can always
come apart. He directly addresses the above lawful marriage case, which he claims is a case in
point. Hirvelä gives three reasons for this. First, he takes it that having a disposition to fail to
conduct tokens of c excludes the competence to join couples in marriage. Second, he considers
the rejoinder that the disposition at issue in the competence is to effect lawful marriage when
producing a token of c. In response, he claims that this commits me to an unduly fine-grained
way of individuating ways of move production that isn’t in line with how I characterize ways of
move production for other ACANs, such as archery, where I appeal to something more coarse-
grained such as shooting with one’s left or right hand. Third, he considers a case in which the
law is about to be changed and has already changed in many nearby worlds. In this case, he
claims, an unwitting official doesn’t have the disposition to lawfully marry a couple by
conducting c any longer. At the same time, given that the old law remains in force until the
end of the ceremony, the couple ends up lawfully married.
None of these reasons is convincing. The first claim is simply false. Having a disposition to
fail to produce moves in a given ACAN by means of ability does not exclude the ability to attain
the aim in that ACAN. Suppose I have vowed never to produce moves in a given ACAN via my
only ability. Instead I either refrain from practising altogether or have taken up practising in a
way that falls short of an ability. Does this mean that I lost my ability or that if I were to break
my vow once and produced a move via this ability, the move would no longer be competent?
Clearly not.
The second reason doesn’t fare much better. Contrary to what Hirvelä says, I think that the
ways of move production at issue in ACAN abilities will turn out to be quite fine-grained. In the
archery case, for instance, the way of shooting at issue in an ability to hit the target in archery
must be much more fine-grained than what I laxly labelled ‘shooting with one’s right hand’.
There are many ways of shooting with one’s right hand that do not qualify as an ability, and
anything that does must be quite fine-grained.
Finally, the third claim rests on an implausible modal condition on dispositions/abilities, one
on which the failure in nearby worlds in different conditions bears on the presence of the
disposition/ability in the actual world. However, it is widely agreed that abilities may be fragile
and that if there is a modal condition on dispositions/abilities at all, then the modal condition
needs to hold the conditions of the actual world fixed. Once we are clear on these points, it is
easy to see that Hirvelä’s variation of the marriage case is not one of success without competence
either.
96 , ,
Try-outs for team sports are another example. The constitutive aim of
try-outs is to make the team. Whether you make the team will depend on
how you perform on a variety of relevant tasks. To take a simple
example, consider a try-out for a team that will compete in basketball
free-throw competitions. Suppose you are the team coach. Suppose (i)
you are trying out a player who is drunk and takes shots, many of which
find the hoop, by bouncing them randomly off the floor. Or suppose (ii)
the player you are trying out refuses to take shots from the free-throw
line and will only take shots, many of which go in, from right under the
basket. Finally, suppose (iii) one of the players produces many shots that
go in but only because they have a helper with a wind machine in the
wings. You will not select any of them. By the same token, there is reason
to believe that only shots that are both competent and taken in suitable
environmental conditions are successes in your try-out (only those count
towards a prospective draft). We thus have another ACAN featuring the
sort of competence constraint we find in Conditions on Knowledge.
3. Conclusion
⁶ Note also that this is just another way of putting one of the key insights from the Anti-
Justification Arguments from Chapter 1.
98 , ,
Understanding Aim
One’s inquiry into general phenomenon P aims at understanding P.
First things first, inquiry into general phenomena is an ACAN, just like
inquiry into specific questions. The aim of understanding is a constitu-
tive aim of inquiry into general phenomena.
Second, recall that in the parallel debate about the aim of inquiry into
specific questions, we found a number of substantive epistemological
theses about the aim of inquiry. These substantive theses could be viewed
as unpacking a lightweight characterization of the aim of inquiry into
specific questions in terms of question-settling. Now, it is arguable that
less ink has been spilled on substantive epistemological theses about the
aim of inquiry into general phenomena. That said, there is a lively debate
on the nature of understanding. And, of course, given Understanding
Inquiry, Knowledge, and Understanding. Christoph Kelp, Oxford University Press (2021). © Christoph Kelp.
DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780192896094.003.0005
100 , ,
1.1 Phenomena
planet of our solar system are not real, and neither are Creatio ex nihilo, the
rise of the Finnish Empire in the twentieth century, and the dependence of
mass and acceleration. That’s why they do not count as phenomena.
Second, phenomena come with structure. More specifically, they have
internal structure or they are essentially part of a broader structure. Planet
Earth has internal structure: it consists of an inner core, an outer core, a
mantle, and so on. The number 1 may not have internal structure.
However, it is essentially part of a broader structure, i.e. the natural
number structure.
Doesn’t the metaphysical heterogeneity of phenomena render a uni-
form account of the aim of inquiry into them problematic? Shouldn’t we
offer separate accounts for different kinds of phenomena? Fortunately,
there is reason to think that this won’t be necessary. After all, for every
phenomenon, no matter what its metaphysical nature might be, there is a
set of true propositions that describes it. Structures help regiment the set
of true propositions describing a phenomenon. It is true propositions
about the structural relations between its elements and true propositions
about intrinsic properties of the structure of the phenomenon that
matter. Let’s call the totality of true propositions describing a phenom-
enon its ‘full account’. It is the full account of a general phenomenon that
is the target of an inquiry into it. While phenomena are metaphysically
heterogeneous, each phenomenon has a full account. As a result, a
uniform account of the aim of inquiry into general phenomena is still
very much a live option.¹
people don’t believe in it, that I was thinking about it on Easter Monday 2019, as well as
disjunctions with infinitely many disjuncts, including one of the propositions just mentioned.
But it would be a stretch to say that those propositions are part of our ordinary understanding of
the phenomenon of the Big Bang. Given that this is so, there is reason to think that we need
further restrictions on what counts as a phenomenon. The claim about structure provides just
such a restriction, and a promising one at that. Perhaps one can get the right restriction out of
the relevant ‘What the whole truth about . . . ?’ questions. If so, my account is compatible with an
analysis of phenomena in terms of questions (though if the correct restriction differs from my
proposal about structure, that proposal will have to be revised accordingly). If not, there is
reason to think that the attempt to analyse phenomena in terms of questions is in trouble.
103
and launch an inquiry into this phenomenon. How are you going to
proceed? You might buy a relevant history book or find an expert on the
topic. What happens as you read through the book or as the expert tells
you more about the rise of the Roman Empire? The answer is that you
close more and more questions about the phenomenon and, if all goes
well, properly so. In this way, that inquiry into a general phenomenon
can be understood as the activity of settling a series of questions about it
with the ultimate aim of properly closing all of them fits the way in which
inquiry into general phenomena typically proceeds.
I do not mean to deny that the simple account has considerable
attractions. At the same time, the truth of the simple account threatens
to be disastrous through and through, at least for present purposes. To
see this, recall that my aim is to offer a network analysis which connects
inquiry into general phenomena and understanding general phenomena
in the same non-reductive way as the network analysis in Chapter 2
connected inquiry into specific questions and knowledge. The reason
the simple account threatens to be disastrous is that it is most naturally
understood as offering a reductive analysis of inquiry into general phe-
nomena in terms inquiry into specific questions and, as a result, a
reductive analysis of understanding in terms of knowledge.² How, if at
all, can this disaster be averted?
In a nutshell, the answer is that, perhaps somewhat surprisingly, there
is reason to think that the simple account is mistaken. To be clear, I do
not mean to say that the aim of inquiry into general phenomena doesn’t
feature knowledge of its full account. On the contrary, I take the above
considerations in favour of the simple account to show that it does.³
Rather, the thought is that the simple account is too weak. The aim of
inquiry into a general phenomenon features more than just knowledge of
its full account. To see why, consider the following case:
² Note that this is a view that knowledge firsters might be sympathetic to.
³ In addition, the claim that the aim of inquiry into general a phenomenon requires
knowledge of its full account is independently plausible. In fact, this claim can be established
by arguments parallel to the ones that show that the aim of inquiry into specific is knowledge
(see Appendix 1 for details).
104 , ,
The Scatterbrain
You want to find out about phenomenon P. To achieve this, you offer a
reward for anyone who gives you information about P. You subsequently
receive all the information about P and come to know the full account of
P. However, each proposition you know you know on the basis of
testimony from a different person. Many of the pieces of information
you receive are in different languages (all of which you speak).
Have you attained the aim of your inquiry into P? If all that’s required of
you is that you know the full account of P, then the answer is yes.
Crucially, however, there is reason to think that this cannot be quite
right. To see why, note that you believe each proposition of the full
account of P separately, as it were, on the basis of the testimony of a
different testifier. As a result, you can, of course, answer any question
about P. Crucially, many of your answers are bound to remain unsatis-
factory in an important respect. Suppose that I ask you whether q is true,
and you offer the correct answer. Suppose, next, that I ask you why you
would think that. In your current predicament, the only answer you can
give is that a certain testifier told you so. Somewhat irked by this, you go
on to consider a number of further things that you know about P and ask
yourself why you would think that they are true. Unfortunately, again
and again, the only thing you can come up with is that some person or
other told you so.
Recall that you wanted to find out about P. In other words, you had a
desire to find out about P. Now, here is the crucial question: in your
predicament, is your desire satisfied? Note that if knowledge of the full
account of P is the aim of inquiry into P, then the answer to this question
has to be yes. After all, you do know the full account of P. At the same
time, it seems plausible that the answer does not have to be yes. The very
fact that you are unable to justify your various beliefs about P beyond
pointing to the fact that you were told so by some testifier may rightly
leave you dissatisfied. You may rightly feel that the job is not done yet. If
so, of course, knowledge of the full account cannot be all there is to the
aim of inquiry into general phenomena. Something is missing. But what?
Here is a promising thought: although you are in possession of all the
information about P, you haven’t connected the dots yet. That is to say,
105
This is how inquiry into a given general phenomenon requires more than
knowledge of the full account of that phenomenon: one’s knowledge
must also be connected in the right way.⁴
⁴ Note that this view of the aim of inquiry is compatible with the idea that phenomena can be
analysed in terms of questions (see n.1). After all, it may be that the phenomenon is nothing but
a set of questions, but to attain the aim of inquiry into it we must do more than simply know all
the answers (i.e. connect the dots in the right way).
106 , ,
2. A Network Analysis
Understanding Aim*
One’s inquiry into general phenomenon P ultimately aims at maximal
understanding of P.
Maximal Understanding
One has maximal understanding of a phenomenon, P, if and only if
one has maximally systematic knowledge of P.
practice such that some of these attributions can come out true. How can
this be done?
The answer I’d like to propose combines an account of degrees of
understanding with a contextualist semantics for outright attributions of
understanding. Given that Maximal Understanding gives us the max-
imum degree of understanding, it will come as no surprise that my
account of degrees of understanding measures degrees of understanding
in terms of approximations to the maximum degree:
Degrees of Understanding
Degree of understanding of P is a function of distance from maximally
systematic knowledge of P: the closer one approximates
maximally systematic knowledge of P, the higher one’s degree of
understanding of P.
have to have a look at what I will call one’s view of P. One way of homing
in on the property of a view of P is that one’s view of P stands to
understanding of P as one’s belief on whether p stands to knowledge
whether p. Belief is the result of a kind of move in inquiry into the
specific questions. Similarly, a view is the result of a kind of move in
inquiry into the general phenomena. More specifically, one’s view of P is
a function of the set questions about P that are closed for one and the
connections one has effected between them. To assess how closely one
approximates maximally systematic knowledge of P, we must look at
one’s view of P and ask how closely it approximates maximally system-
atic knowledge of P. The answer to this question will give us one’s degree
of understanding.
With this point in play, it is easy to see why the prospects for a
dismantling analysis of understanding of general phenomena are no
brighter than in the case of knowledge. Recall that, in the case of
knowledge, a dismantling analysis is out of the question because it
would have to proceed from inquiry to question-settling to knowledge
to belief and back to inquiry. Likewise, what is becoming clear now is that
the same goes, mutatis mutandis, for understanding. Here a dismantling
analysis would have to proceed from inquiry to understanding to sys-
tematic knowledge to views and back to inquiry. In both cases, any
attempt at a dismantling analysis will be spoiled by a violation of
Priority due to circularity.
phenomenon is a function only of what one knows about P and how well
one’s knowledge is connected; or whether parts of one’s view that fall
short of knowledge can make a difference also. More specifically, one
may wonder whether false or unjustified beliefs about P can negatively
affect one’s degree of understanding of P. And one may also ask whether
justified beliefs or at least justified true beliefs that fall short of knowledge
can positively affect one’s degree of understanding of P.
While all of the above are fascinating questions, I will not stop to
address them here. Rather, I will content myself with one further clari-
ficatory remark: to keep things simple, I will work on the assumption
that one’s degree of understanding of P is a function only of what one
knows about P and how well one’s knowledge is connected. This simpli-
fying assumption should not raise too many eyebrows. After all, a lot of
criticism that knowledge-based accounts of understanding encounter is
that they are too strong: understanding doesn’t require knowledge. I will
address the most prominent objections in this camp in due course. For
the present, note that, if anything, I am making my life harder by
adopting the simplifying assumption. If the simplifying assumption is
dropped and we allow that justified true beliefs or perhaps even justified
false beliefs can get one closer to maximally systematic knowledge, we
gain additional resources for dealing with some of the relevant objec-
tions. I don’t believe that I need those resources here. However, it is
worth keeping in mind that they are in store if needed.
Here is another question one may ask about Degrees of
Understanding. It is widely agreed that degrees of understanding can
themselves be measured along at least two dimensions, i.e. breadth and
depth. How can Degrees of Understanding make sense of this? In
response, it may be tempting to identify degree of breadth of under-
standing with degree of comprehensiveness of knowledge and degree of
depth with degree of well-connectedness. However, it is likely that things
are more complicated, especially when it comes to depth. Here things
like knowledge of detail will matter as well, which means that it is likely
that degree depth of understanding is going to be a function of degree of
both comprehensiveness and well-connectedness of knowledge.
Regarding Outright Understanding, the perhaps most obvious ques-
tion that remains is how exactly the threshold is fixed at a given context.
111
⁵ It might be thought that the subjunctive conditional here is problematic. After all, as Robert
Shope (1978) has argued at length, biconditionals featuring a subjunctive are prone to
what he calls ‘the conditional fallacy’. In the simplest case, the biconditional is of the form
‘p (q □! r)’. In one version of the fallacy (V1), p is true and q is not, but if q were true, q’s
being true (and/or r’s being true) would lead to p’s no longer being true. In another version of
the fallacy (V2), p is true and q is not, but if q were to be true, this would lead to r’s no longer
being true. Fortunately, there is reason to think that Outright Understanding, Specific does not
fall prey to the conditional fallacy. Concerning V1, note that we can add further conditions to
the antecedent of the subjunctive such that they entail that the left-hand side of the bicondi-
tional is true. A biconditional of the form ‘p ((p & q) □! r)’ will evidently be safe from V1. In
the case of Outright Understanding, Specific, we can require that the context remains the same
and S approximates maximally systematic knowledge to the same degree and in the same way.
Since whether or not an agent surpasses the threshold depends only on the context and the
degree and way of approximation to maximally systematic knowledge, adding the above
conditions to the antecedent guarantees that if the antecedent of the subjunctive is true, the
left-hand side of Outright Understanding, Specific is true also. Concerning V2, note that if the
corresponding conditional is necessarily true, again there is no need to worry: ‘p ((p & q) □!
r)’ will evidently be safe from V2 when ‘p □((p & q) ! r)’ is true also. In Outright
Understanding, Specific, the addition of the proviso that conditions be suitably favourable
arguably ensures that the corresponding conditional is necessarily true. That said, it is in
principle possible to avoid stating Outright Understanding, Specific in terms of a subjunctive
conditional. One alternative strategy appeals to the notion of an epistemic duplicate and claims
that ‘S understands P’ is true in a context just in case some epistemic duplicate of S would
successfully perform the tasks determined by context. (Thanks to Catherine Elgin for pointing
this out to me.) I decided to opt for the subjunctive version because it strikes me as most
intuitive and more elegant certainly than the ‘epistemic duplicate’ version.
112 , ,
3. Objections
Comanche
Consider, say, someone’s historical understanding of the Comanche
dominance of the southern plains of North America from the late
seventeenth until the late nineteenth centuries. Suppose that if you
asked this person any question about this matter, she would answer
correctly. Assume further that the person is answering from stored
information; she is not guessing or making up answers, but is honestly
averring what she confidently believes the truth to be. Such an ability is
surely constitutive of understanding, and the experience of query and
answer, if sustained for a long enough period of time, would generate
convincing evidence that the person in question understood the phe-
nomenon of Comanche dominance of the southern plains.
(Kvanvig 2003, 197–8)
113
Crucially, Kvanvig points out that while the history aficionado’s beliefs
will normally also qualify as knowledge, they need not. The case can be
set up as a Gettier case and so the history aficionado’s beliefs are only
luckily true. Here’s how Kvanvig ventures to achieve this:
For example, most history books might have been mistaken, with only
the correct ones being the sources of the understanding in question and
with no basis in the subject for preferring the sources consulted over
those ignored.
(Kvanvig 2003, 198)
The thought here is that the case is relevantly analogous to Fake Barns.
(Recall that, in Fake Barns, the agent acquires a true belief that they are
facing a barn whilst driving alongside a field that otherwise contains only
cleverly constructed fakes.) For that reason, the history aficionado under-
stands Comanche dominance, even though the beliefs that constitute
their understanding are gettiered and hence do not qualify as knowledge.
One problem I have with this case is that it is actually not clear that
Fake Barns is the correct model for it. After all, in Fake Barns, the agent
(i) comes to truly believe one proposition, to wit, that they are looking at a
barn. Moreover, (ii) they might easily have believed the same proposition,
but (iii) that belief would have been false. In contrast, in the Comanche
case, the history aficionado (i) acquires a body of interconnected true
beliefs about Comanche dominance. What might easily have happened is
(ii) that they might have come by a different body of interconnected
beliefs. Finally, (iii) while some members of the body of interconnected
beliefs the history aficionado might have arrived at, including some
central ones, would have been false, it is far from clear that all of them
would have been false (or even unknown).⁶
Here is a more adequate model for the Comanche case: someone
selects a particular school for their daughter on the ground that it is
housed in a nicer building than all the other schools in the neighbour-
hood. Suppose, furthermore, the school selected happens to be the only
⁶ In fact, I am not the only one who has this concern. See Khalifa (2013b) for a similar
complaint.
114 , ,
The ideal gas law, for example, accounts for the behaviour of gases by
characterizing the behaviour of a gas composed of dimensionless,
⁷ We might have to add that this person is not aware of any alternative theories that they
believe to be equally or almost equally plausible. Otherwise, they might not be prepared to
answer in accordance with what the theory says. Notice, however, that the history aficionado
also satisfies this additional requirement.
116 , ,
The last objection I will discuss here is due to Zagzebski, who argues that
incompatible theories can give their champions understanding of some
phenomena. Here is Zagzebski:
More than one alternative theory may give understanding of the same
subject matter. This makes sense if we think of a theory as a represen-
tation of reality, where alternative representations can be better or
worse, more or less accurate. But more than one may be equally
good, equally accurate. This form of understanding does not presup-
pose knowledge or even true belief, and if we assume that two com-
peting representations of the same part of reality cannot both
constitute knowledge, it cannot be a form of knowledge.
(Zagzebski 2001, 244)
⁸ It may be worth noting that, in an insightful paper, Alexander Bird (2007b) forcefully
argues that scientific progress must be understood in terms of accumulation of knowledge. If
successful, Bird’s argument turns the tables on those who think that knowledge-based accounts
of understanding have difficulties in explaining progress in science.
119
committed to this kind of claim. In fact, it is not hard to see that the
present view can allow that more than one alternative theory can deliver
an equal degree of understanding. After all, it is possible for adherents of
two (or more) distinct theories to be equidistant from maximally sys-
tematic knowledge of a certain phenomenon.⁹ In that case, the present
view predicts that they have the same degree of understanding of the
phenomenon.
4. The Competition
Obviously, the Received View is quite different from the view I have
outlined above. In fact, it might be thought that it is so different as to not
be a competitor at all. To see why one might think this, consider a widely
recognized distinction between two types of understanding: objectual
understanding and explanatory understanding. The two kinds of under-
standing differ in that they have different objects. Objectual understand-
ing takes objects (or phenomena) as objects. Explanatory understanding
takes propositions as objects. More specifically, propositions that qualify
as correct answers to why questions. In other words, explanatory under-
standing is understanding why.
With these two types of understanding in play, it is easy to see why one
might think that the Received View isn’t a competitor for my preferred
Explanationism
Nothing of philosophical importance is lost if all instances of objectual
understanding are treated as instances of explanatory understanding.
(Khalifa 2017, 85)
Let us call the view that combines the Received View and Explanationism
‘Classical Explanationism’. It is easy to see that Classical
Explanationism is in competition with my own view. According to
Classical Explanationism, knowledge of explanations is all that matters
philosophically for objectual understanding. The same does not hold for
my own view.
There are a number of straightforward problems with both compo-
nents of Classical Explanationism. In what follows, I will look at some of
these as well as at a more sophisticated development of them, due to
Khalifa, which is a more serious competitor for my own view.
¹¹ Though see Khalifa (2017, ch. 5) for a competing account according to which Galileo’s
thought experiment establishes not the independence of mass and acceleration but the inde-
pendence of our concepts of mass and acceleration.
¹² Lipton (2009, 47). I take it that Lipton’s theses (i) that explanations must offer direct
answers to the relevant why questions and (ii) that explanations by showing necessity require
constructive arguments constitute constraints that any satisfactory account of explanation (by
showing necessity) will have to satisfy. As a result, his argument will go through on any viable
account of explanation.
122 , ,
absurdum of the proposition that mass and acceleration are not inde-
pendent, it does not serve to explain why they are independent.¹³
The upshot of Lipton’s argument for the Received View is obvious.
Given that one can have understanding why without knowing an explan-
ation of what one understands, the Received View is too demanding.
More specifically, it seems plausible that the problem the view faces here
is one of over-intellectualization. The intellectual demands placed on
understanding—knowledge of an explanation—are unrealistically high.
Less sophisticated cognitive achievements can qualify as understanding.
It is worth noting that my own account promises to avoid this
problem. According to Degrees of Understanding, as one acquires
more systematic knowledge about a phenomenon, one advances one’s
understanding of it. Crucially, that is just what happens when one learns
about Galileo’s thought experiment. One acquires systematic knowledge
about the relation between gravitational acceleration and mass, thereby
advancing one’s understanding of this phenomenon. So, my account
predicts correctly that one’s understanding increases even in cases like
Lipton’s Galileo case.
What about attributions of outright understanding? Again, there is
excellent reason to think that Outright Understanding can steer clear of
the over-intellectualisation problem. Recall that here the thought is that
whether outright understanding can truly be attributed to one depends
on whether one knows enough to be able to successfully complete a
contextually determined task. Crucially, the contextually determined
tasks may be very easy. In certain contexts, for instance, when talking
about small children, knowing enough to be able to answer a set of fairly
easy multiple-choice questions may do the trick. That’s why there is
every reason to think that Outright Understanding can deliver right
results when it comes to attributions of outright understanding in
Lipton’s cases also.
¹³ Lipton (2009, 47–8). Note, first, that Lipton argues that the situation is analogous in the
case of mathematical proofs, which also allows for a distinction between explanatory and non-
explanatory proofs. Here, too, Lipton is attracted by the idea that proofs by reductio are not
explanatory. Second, those who are not convinced by this particular case may recall that Lipton
offers three other cases of understanding without explanation. To those who remain unmoved
by all of them, I’d say that the onus is on them to show why.
123
EKS1
S1 understands why p better than S2 if and only if
(A) Ceteris paribus, S1 grasps p’s explanatory nexus more com-
pletely than S2; or
(B) Ceteris paribus, S1’s grasp of p’s explanatory nexus bears
greater resemblance to scientific knowledge than S2’s.
EKS2
S has minimal understanding of why p if and only if for some q,
S believes that q explains why p, and q explains why p is
approximately true.
(Khalifa 2017, 14)
This already looks quite close to the account I sketched above (in Section
2) and defended in earlier work (e.g. Kelp 2015, 2017), especially once we
are clear what Khalifa means by ‘explanatory nexus’.
Now that we are clear on the similarities, let’s take a closer look at the
differences between Khalifa and me. Here is Khalifa once more:
4.2 Explanationism
Quasi-Explanationism
Nothing of philosophical importance is lost if all instances of
objectual understanding are treated as instances of:
(a) explanatory understanding, or
(b) being on the right track to having explanatory understanding.
(Khalifa 2017, 85)
¹⁴ Isn’t this case unfair to Khalifa? After all, Khalifa is quite clear that he takes understanding
of word meanings, concepts, and the like to be something quite different from understanding of
empirical phenomena and that his account is an account of understanding of empirical
phenomena only.
Three points by way of response: first, even if successful, this move doesn’t allow Khalifa to
sidestep the problem raised by the case of the layout of my house. And that’s all that I really need
to cause trouble for Khalifa is one case. Second, Khalifa says that his view ‘should be compatible
with whatever turns out to be the best account of these kinds of non-explanatory understand-
ing.’ (2017, 3) I take the ‘should’ here to express a desideratum for his account of understanding.
As I will argue below in more detail, there is reason to think that Khalifa’s account doesn’t satisfy
this desideratum. Here is the key idea: there is a view (mine), which may very well be the best,
that accounts for at least a certain kind of non-explanatory understanding in terms of objectual
understanding. However, this is incompatible with the part of Khalifa’s view that nothing of
philosophical interest is lost if we eliminate objectual understanding. Third, suppose Khalifa can
offer a convincing motivation for bracketing understanding of word meanings, concepts, and
the like. Even so, the fact remains that my account does not have to. In fact, it can offer a unified
account of understanding of word meanings, concepts, and the like, on the one hand, and
empirical phenomena, on the other. As a result, my account compares favourably with Khalifa’s
in any case.
128 , ,
¹⁵ Here is yet another difference between Khalifa and me. Khalifa’s project seems to qualify as
a dismantling analysis which ventures to unpack understanding in terms of knowledge and
knowledge in terms of safe because competent belief. In contrast, abandoning the dismantling
approach in favour of a network alternative is at the very heart of my own project. At the same
time, Khalifa could embed his view in the kind of non-reductive framework that I favour. That’s
why I will set these differences aside here.
¹⁶ Thanks to an anonymous referee for pressing me on this. The remainder of this subsection
engages with their very helpful comments.
129
than the postman’ comes out true. Moreover, ‘Chris understands the
meaning of “drake”’ comes out true in the vast majority of contexts. In
contrast, on Khalifa’s view, while ‘My daughter knows the layout of my
house better than the postman’ and ‘Chris knows the meaning of
“drake”’ come out true, ‘My daughter understands the layout of my
house better than the postman’ and ‘Chris understands the meaning of
“drake”’ don’t. And one might wonder whether these differences don’t
favour my view over Khalifa’s. After all, isn’t it intuitive that ‘My
daughter understands the layout of my house better than the postman’
and ‘Chris understands the meaning of “drake”’ come out true, at least in
the right contexts?
I expect that Khalifa would deny that these differences are of genuine
philosophical significance. At best, the above considerations indicate that
Khalifa’s view doesn’t respect how competent speakers of English use the
word ‘understanding’. However, what Khalifa is offering is an account of
understanding, not a semantics for ‘understanding’. Moreover, there is
little reason to think that having a view that respects how competent
English speakers use the word ‘understand’ is of philosophical import-
ance. So, the above considerations aren’t all that damning for Khalifa.
I agree. In fact, as a stand-alone argument, they don’t carry much
weight at all against Khalifa. It is worth keeping in mind, however, that
I am not seeking to give a stand-alone argument, nor do I need to. This is
because what we are looking at is a comparison between two rival
accounts of understanding, Khalifa’s and my own. And in this particular
setting, the above considerations can still do some work. After all, given
that the two accounts perform equally well on all other fronts and this is
the only point of difference, they do provide reason to favour my
account.
More importantly yet, there are further and more substantive differ-
ences. To get them into sharp relief, note first that we may inquire into
phenomena with non-explanatory structure. For instance, a potential
buyer may inquire into the layout of my house and a non-native speaker
may inquire into the meaning of ‘drake’. What’s more, we may make
progress and eventually succeed in our inquiries into phenomena with
non-explanatory structure. For instance, upon seeing a floor plan of my
house, the potential buyer may make progress in their inquiry into its
130 , ,
layout, and when the non-native speaker finds out that ‘drake’ means
male duck, they may well have succeeded in their inquiry into the
meaning of ‘drake’.
Now, here is the key question I want to ask: what is the aim of inquiry
into phenomena with non-explanatory structure such as the layout of my
house and the meaning of ‘drake’? It will not come as much of a surprise
that my answer is: understanding of the target phenomena. On my view,
then, inquiry into phenomena with non-explanatory structure has the
same aim as inquiry into any other general phenomenon. In this way, my
account offers an attractively unified answer to this question. Note also
that my view can easily accommodate the possibility of progress and
success in inquiries into phenomena with non-explanatory structure.
Having had a look at the floor plan, the potential buyer approximates
maximally systematic knowledge about the layout of my house more
closely than before. As a result, they understand the layout better than
before, thus making progress in their inquiry. Similarly, upon learning
that ‘drake’ means male duck, the non-native speaker approximates
maximally systematic knowledge about the meaning of ‘drake’ more
closely than before. In fact, they approximate it closely enough that
outright attributions of understanding of the meaning of ‘drake’ come
out true in the vast majority of contexts, including the one they found
themselves in when embarking on their inquiry. If so, their inquiry is
successful.
In contrast, the question about the aim of inquiry into general phe-
nomena with non-explanatory structure causes trouble for Khalifa. Since
the target phenomena of these inquiries don’t have explanatory struc-
ture, according to Quasi-Explanationism, they simply cannot be under-
stood. As a result, Khalifa is faced with the following trilemma: (i) He
agrees that inquiry into phenomena with non-explanatory structure aims
at understanding these phenomena. In that case, Khalifa cannot accom-
modate the possibility of attaining the aim of inquiry into these phe-
nomena, nor of making progress, which is a considerable cost for his
view. (ii) Inquiry into general phenomena never aims at understanding
and always only aims at knowledge (or else true belief, justified belief,
etc.) In that case, he will run into trouble with cases like the Scatterbrain
(Section 1.2), which suggest otherwise. (iii) Inquiry into phenomena with
131
5. Conclusion
1. A Normative Framework
Inquiry, Knowledge, and Understanding. Christoph Kelp, Oxford University Press (2021). © Christoph Kelp.
DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780192896094.003.0006
134 , ,
there more, as pluralists would have us believe? (iii) What exactly are the
unmoved movers in the domain? Different moral/aesthetic theories
provide different answers to these questions.
By way of illustration, consider classical utilitarianism and classical
Kantianism in moral philosophy. Classical utilitarianism takes happi-
ness to be the only central moral value. Its central norm holds,
roughly, that an action is morally permissible if and only if it causes
the greatest happiness for the greatest number. It is easy to see that
classical utilitarianism takes values to be the unmoved movers and so
is teleological (re i). After all, the central norm is analysed in in terms
of the central moral value. In this way, values enjoy explanatory
priority over norms. What’s more, classical utilitarianism counten-
ances only one central moral value, to wit, happiness. As a result, it is
monistic (re ii). Finally, it identifies happiness as the only central
moral value (re iii).
Classical Kantianism takes the Kantian Moral Law to be the only
central moral norm and the good will as its central value. In contrast
with classical utilitarianism, classical Kantianism, at least on a standard
reading, assigns explanatory priority to the norm, i.e. the Kantian Moral
Law. The central value is understood in terms of the norm as follows: ‘a
good will is a will whose decisions are wholly determined by . . . the Moral
Law’ (Johnson and Cureton 2019, §2). Here the central moral value is
analysed in terms of the central moral norm. On classical Kantianism,
then, norms are the unmoved movers. The view is deontological (re i).
Like classical utilitarianism, there is only one central moral norm, the
Kantian Moral Law, which means that the view is monistic (re ii). Finally,
it identifies the Kantian Moral Law as the only central moral norm
(re iii).
Epistemology is a normative discipline, just like moral philosophy and
aesthetics. Epistemology is concerned with the epistemic domain, which
is also a normative domain. Accordingly, when doing epistemology, we
need to answer a number of questions about the epistemic domain,
including (i) whether the unmoved movers in the epistemic domain
are values or whether they are norms; (ii) whether there is only one
kind of unmoved mover in the epistemic domain or whether there is a
plurality; and (iii) what exactly the unmoved movers in the epistemic
135
To get there I need to first introduce the idea of critical domains (Sosa
2007). Critical domains are normative domains that are associated with
goods or values for that domain. Any critical domain has at least one
central value. Central values are fundamental to the domain in the sense
that it cannot be explained fully in terms of other values in that domain.
Another way of putting this point is that central values are valuable for
their own sake, relative to the domain. The qualification is important,
because values in critical domains may not enjoy any of the more
familiar kinds of value, such as moral, prudential, or aesthetic value.
Crucially, central values organize the evaluations in that domain in the
sense that all other domain-specific values and norms can be explained
fully in terms of the central values. Critical domains are thus teleologic-
ally structured.
One example Sosa uses to illustrate these rather abstract ideas is the
domain of coffee. The thought here is that in this domain, a central value
is ‘liquid coffee that is delicious and aromatic’ (2007: 73, henceforth good
coffee for short). From the point of view of the domain of coffee, this
value cannot be explained fully in terms of other values. (In keeping with
that, it may be possible to explain it in terms of other values external to
the domain, e.g. the value of pleasant experiences.) Crucially, this value
organizes our evaluations in that domain in the sense that the values of
other relevant entities, as well as norms in the domain, are explained in
terms of it. For instance, we may ask questions about good beans,
baristas, and so on. What it takes for a bean to be a good bean and for
a barista to be a good barista will be explained in terms of the central
137
value of good coffee. In the present case, the value is instrumental value.
Good beans and good baristas are good insofar as they are conducive to
(i.e. effective means to) good coffee. And the same goes, mutatis mutan-
dis, for norms in the domain of coffee. How one ought to roast beans,
brew coffee, and so on is explained in terms of the central value of good
coffee, too.
The reason I am mentioning all this is that I want to suggest that
ACANs constitute critical domains. More specifically, I want to put
forward the following eminently plausible idea: ACANs’ constitutive
aims correspond to central values in the domains they constitute.
Consider, for instance, chess. The constitutive aim of chess is to check-
mate one’s opponent. As a result, checkmating one’s opponent is a
central value in the domain constituted by chess.
Given that this is so, we can ask our three questions about domains
constituted by ACANs: (i) Are the unmoved movers values or norms?
(ii) Is there only one value or are there more? (iii) What exactly are the
unmoved movers? Since the domains constituted by ACANs are critical
domains and since critical domains are teleologically structured, (i)
receives a straightforward answer. The unmoved movers are values; in
other words, the domains constituted by ACANs are teleologically struc-
tured. As I will argue in due course, there is reason to think that this is
independently plausible.
A more interesting question is (ii). If constitutive aims of ACANs
correspond to central values in the domains they constitute, does this
mean that domains constituted by ACANs are monistic? There is reason
to think that at least some such domains are indeed monistic. Chess is a
plausible example. Checkmating is not only a central value in the domain
of chess, but, in fact, it is the only one. That said, it is possible for the
domains constituted by ACANs to feature more than one central value.
A noteworthy example is snooker. The constitutive aim of snooker is to
score more points than one’s opponent. This gives us one central value of
snooker. However, the central value corresponding to the constitutive
aim cannot be the only central value of snooker. To see why, note that to
understand what the constitutive aim of snooker amounts to, we require
further information on how points are scored. We need to know, for
instance, that potting a red ball is worth one point, that potting a black
138 , ,
ball is worth seven points, and so on. Crucially, the value attaching to
potting balls of various colours cannot be explained fully in terms of the
value of scoring more points than one’s opponent. And, conversely, the
value attaching to scoring more points than one’s opponent cannot be
explained fully in terms of the value of potting balls of various colours.
This means that snooker must have more than one central value.
Here is what’s going on in snooker, on a more theoretical level. To
begin with, note that snooker is an ACAN that nests further ACANs.
Consider potting, safety, and snookering. These activities are nested in
snooker in that, to play snooker, you may at least sometimes engage in
any of them and you have to engage in at least some of them. Crucially,
potting, safety, and snookering are all ACANs themselves. That is to say,
they have their own constitutive aims and norms. For instance, potting
constitutively aims at legally pocketing an object ball.
Now, the key reason why snooker has more than one central value is
that it is an ACAN such that the constitutive aim is defined in terms of a
set of (perhaps suitably related) successes of nested ACANs. In other
words, it is an ACAN that computes progress towards and attainment of
its constitutive aims at least partly by scoring successes in nested ACANs.
In what follows, I will also refer to ACANs that fit this bill as score-based
ACANs. Score-based ACANs have more than one central value: one is
given by the ACAN’s constitutive aim, another by any of the constitutive
aims of nested ACANs, successes in which are used for scoring. It is easy
enough to see why score-based ACANs must have more than one central
value. It is not possible to fully explain the value that is given by its
constitutive aim in terms of the value of the successes used for scoring.
After all, even after we have agreed on the latter values, the question of
what it takes to attain the value given by the ACAN’s constitutive aim
remains open. And, vice versa, it’s also not possible to fully explain the
value given by the successes used for scoring in terms of the value of the
constitutive aim. Even if we agreed on these latter values, the question of
how the former are scored remains open also.²
² It may be worth noting that not all ACANs are score-based ACANs in this sense. Chess, for
example, isn’t. Even though there may be nested ACANs such as various openings and gambits,
success in chess is not scored in terms of whether or not a certain opening, gambit, etc. was
successful.
139
What comes to light, then, is that the question of whether the domains
constituted by ACANs are monistic or pluralistic remains open. Some of
them, such as chess, plausibly are monistic, whilst others, score-based
ACANs, are pluralistic. Which way our answer to question (ii) will go,
then, may vary from one ACAN to the next. And, of course, the same
holds for question (iii).
2. Value Problems
2.1 Knowledge
Some have claimed that simply meeting the Primary Value Problem
won’t be enough to give a satisfactory account of the value of knowledge.
Jonathan Kvanvig, for one, argues that more is needed: suppose that
there is some logically weaker property than knowledge, P, which may
but need not be truth, such that knowledge is not more valuable than
belief that has P. In that case, it would be wrong to think that knowledge
is distinctively valuable. After all, we have no reason to care about
knowledge rather than belief that has P. In view of these considerations,
Kvanvig favours the following constraint:
Duncan Pritchard (Pritchard, Millar, and Haddock 2010) ups the stakes
even further; according to him, in order to account for the distinctive
value of knowledge, one must explain why knowledge is more valuable
than the corresponding belief that falls short of knowledge not just as a
matter of degree, but also as a matter of kind. This gives us:
2.2 Understanding
With this account of the epistemic value of knowledge in play, I’d now
like to move on to understanding. Of course, one key task in epistemol-
ogy is to explain the distinctive value of knowledge. It is hard to deny,
however, that another no less significant task is to explain the distinctive
value of understanding. And it might be thought that, just as in the case
of knowledge, in order to achieve this, we will have to solve some set of
value problems.
Recall that, in the case of knowledge, this approach was initially
motivated by the intuition that knowledge is more valuable than mere
true belief. Likewise, I am confident that many would agree that under-
standing a phenomenon is more valuable than merely having some
knowledge about it. Accordingly, there is reason to think that any
satisfactory account of the distinctive value of understanding must
explain why this is so. In other words, it must solve the following value
problem:
Again, solving the Third Value Problem is the hardest challenge and will
suffice to solve the other two. Unfortunately, unlike in the case of the
Tertiary Value Problem, it is difficult to see how the present account
could do so. After all, on my view, understanding is a central epistemic
value, i.e. something that has final value relative to the epistemic domain.
The trouble is that knowledge is also a central epistemic value, even if it
falls short of understanding. As a result, it is hard to see how the present
view could have the resources to solve the Third Value Problem.
Recall that I shelved the question of whether the Tertiary Value
Problem really places an adequate demand on accounts of the distinctive
value of knowledge. I would now like to return to this question. Or, to be
more precise, the question I am really interested in is whether the Third
Value Problem places an adequate demand on accounts of the distinctive
value of understanding. As I am about to argue, the answer to this
question is no.
To begin with, let’s consider Pritchard’s original motivations for the
Tertiary Value Problem. Here goes:
[I]f one regards knowledge as being more valuable than that which falls
short of knowledge merely as a matter of degree rather than kind, then
this has the effect of putting knowledge on a kind of continuum of
value with regard to the epistemic, albeit further up the continuum
than anything that falls short of knowledge. The problem with this
‘continuum’ account of the value of knowledge, however, is that it fails
to explain why the long history of epistemological discussion has
focused specifically on the stage in this continuum of value that
146 , ,
knowledge marks rather than some other stage (such as a stage just
before the one marked out by knowledge, or just after). Accordingly, it
seems that accounting for our intuitions about the value of knowledge
requires us to offer an explanation of why knowledge has not just a
greater degree but also a different kind of value than whatever falls
short of knowledge.
(Pritchard, Millar, and Haddock 2010, 7–8).
3. Objections
One might worry that my proposed solution to the Tertiary Value Problem
doesn’t really work because there is no such thing as domain-relative
148 , ,
⁴ It may also be worth repeating that, even if there is no such thing as domain-relative for-
its-own-sake value, the account preserves the original motivations for the Tertiary Value
149
But even if this is right, reservations about whether this solution to the
Tertiary Value Problem actually works may remain. To see why, note
that Pritchard himself countenances something in the vicinity of what
I call a central value. He calls it a fundamental good in that domain.
A fundamental good in a domain here is something that at least some-
times has domain-relative value for its own sake (Pritchard, Millar, and
Haddock 2010, 11–12). Now, it might be thought that what I call a
central value just is what Pritchard calls a fundamental good. But if
that’s right, then there is excellent reason to think that showing that
knowledge is a central value in this sense is not enough to solve the
Tertiary Value Problem. After all, on the standard interpretation of all of
the above versions of the value problem, what needs to be done in order
to solve any one of them is to show that knowledge always has the
required form of excess value. But if all we show is that knowledge is a
central value, where that is taken to be tantamount to what Pritchard
calls a fundamental good, all we have shown is that knowledge at least
sometimes enjoys a different kind of value from that of beliefs that fall
short of knowledge. In that case, however, we won’t have solved the
Tertiary Value Problem.
The key to my response to this worry is that there is an important
difference between what I call a central value and what Pritchard calls a
fundamental good after all. Pritchard’s fundamental goods at least some-
times enjoy domain-relative for-its-own-sake value. Of course, to make
the point that my account doesn’t solve the Tertiary Value Problem stick,
Pritchard will need the additional claim that fundamental goods do not
(and more specifically that knowledge does not) always enjoy this form
of value. So, suppose they don’t. The trouble is that it now gets pretty
hard to see how they could still play the role that central values are
supposed to play, i.e. organize the evaluations in the domains to which
they are central. This is easiest to see for domains with only one central
Problem, i.e. taking knowledge off a value continuum with belief that falls short of knowledge.
What’s more, it also vindicates the special attention that knowledge has received among
epistemologists. After all, it makes perfect sense for epistemologists to pay special attention to
central values in the epistemic domain.
150 , ,
token of a fundamental good is valuable for its own sake relative to the
domain at hand turns on facts about some domain-external type of value
such as moral or prudential value. In that case, it now appears that what
organizes the evaluations in the domain is really the relevant domain-
external type of value, not the fundamental goods in that domain. If this
isn’t immediately obvious, consider the case of chess once more. If what
determines whether a token checkmating is valuable for its own sake in
the domain of chess is, say, facts about moral value, then the question
whether a move is a good move is ultimately determined by these very
facts, as is the question whether a player is a good player. After all, it is
the moral facts that ultimately determine whether the move is good
rather than having no value at all. And it is the moral facts that determine
whether the match at hand contributes to the player being a good player.
What I take these considerations to suggest is that we will do well to
construe the values that organize the evaluations in a given domain as
always enjoying for-its-own sake value, relative to that domain. This will
allow us to avoid not only the undesirable consequence we are otherwise
settled with but also the complications that we are bound to encounter.
Perhaps most importantly, it will enable us to retain our straightforward
understanding of what makes for, for example, a good move in chess and
a good chess player. Given the role that central values are meant to play,
then, there is excellent reason for thinking that they differ from what
Pritchard calls fundamental goods in a domain. In particular, there is
reason to think that central values are always valuable for their own sake,
relative to their proper domains. What this means for the case of
knowledge is that knowledge is always valuable for its own sake, relative
to the epistemic domain, whereas belief that falls short of knowledge is
not. By the same token, the worry that the proposed account does not
solve the Tertiary Value Problem because it establishes the relevant
excess value only for some items of knowledge can be laid to rest.
One might worry that even if the present account solves the value
problem, it doesn’t do so in anything but a superficial sense. On the
present account, knowledge is a central epistemic value because it is the
152 , ,
aim of inquiry into specific questions. But even if that solves the value
problem, one might think that it misses what’s at its very heart, to wit, the
question why this should be. Why should it be knowledge that we pursue
in inquiry rather than, say, true belief or something else?⁵
By way of response, let’s first consider chess. Suppose that there are
(perhaps alien) theorists of chess who have discovered that checkmating
has distinctive value in chess and have wondered why this might be.
Suppose, further, that they recently agreed that the distinctive value of
checkmating is explained by the fact that checkmating is the constitutive
aim of chess and, as a result, checkmating is a central value in the domain
constituted by chess. Suppose, finally, that a sceptic raises the worry that
this doesn’t get to the heart of the issue: the important question, they
suggest, is why it is checkmating that we pursue when playing chess
rather than, say, perpetual chess or something else.
The answer to this worry is that we pursue checkmating in chess
rather than perpetual chess or something else because checkmating is
the constitutive aim of chess. That is to say, if the question that is at the
heart of the value problem for chess is why we pursue checkmating in
chess rather than perpetual chess or something else, the fact that check-
mating is the constitutive aim of chess provides the answer. By the same
token, the worry that the account of the value of checkmating under
consideration does not get to the heart of the value problem can be laid to
rest. And the same goes, mutatis mutandis, for the worry that my
account of the value of knowledge does not get to the heart of the
value problem.
But perhaps the question was meant to be slightly different. Perhaps
the question at the heart of the value problem was not why we pursue
knowledge in inquiry rather than true belief or something else but rather
why knowledge is the aim of inquiry rather than true belief or
something else.
In response, let’s turn to chess once more. In particular, I’d like to first
consider the question why checkmating is the aim of chess rather than
perpetual chess or something else. This question simply doesn’t have a
very satisfactory answer, not beyond the observation that if it had a
different aim, it would have been a different game. And, again, the same
holds, mutatis mutandis, for inquiry.
This leaves the question why we are playing chess rather than some
other game. I think it is impossible to answer this question fully. This is
because there is no good answer to why we are playing chess rather than
a game that is just like chess except that its constitutive aim is to capture
the king. At the same time, I don’t mean to deny that it is possible to
answer this question partially. Chess is enjoyable to play, much more so
than many alternatives we might have played instead but don’t. And that
explains why we are playing chess rather than these alternatives. But note
that in giving this answer we have now left the domain of chess. What
explains why we play chess rather than some alternative turns on chess-
external, practical factors, to wit, enjoyability.
Of course, there is much more to be said about what exactly makes
chess enjoyable to play, and more so than some alternatives we don’t play
but might have played instead. My best guess is that part of the story
about what makes chess enjoyable to play is that it achieves a good
balance between a variety of factors, including some that pull in opposite
directions such as playability and challengingness. And what makes
chess more enjoyable to play than some alternatives is that it achieves a
better such balance. Crucially, since we have now left the domain of
chess, these details are not for chess theorists to work out and so can
safely be set aside by chess theorists.
Unsurprisingly, once again, I want to say that the same goes, mutatis
mutandis, for inquiry. The question why we engage in inquiry rather
than in a similar activity with a slightly different constitutive aim is
impossible to answer fully. For instance, it’s impossible to answer the
question why we engage in inquiry rather than an activity that is just like
inquiry except that it aims at knowledge+.⁶ At the same time, I don’t
mean to deny that it is possible to answer this question partially. Inquiry
is useful to engage in, much more so than many alternatives we might
have engaged in instead but don’t. And that explains why we are
⁶ Knowledge+ made an appearance in Chapter 1. Recall that one knows+ that p if and only if
(i) one knows that p and (ii) one’s degree of justification for p is ever so slightly higher than
what’s required for knowing that p.
154 , ,
Let’s suppose that this story works in the way envisaged. If so, we have a
solution to the value problem, including in its difficult tertiary incarna-
tion, and, by the same token, a promising account of the distinctive value
of knowledge. While this would, of course, constitute a significant
achievement, it cannot be the whole story about epistemic value. After
all, while no one would deny that knowledge has epistemic value, it is
also immensely plausible that justified and true belief have epistemic
value also. At the very least, it is plausible that justified and true belief are
epistemically better than, respectively, unjustified and false belief. And
here is where another difficulty for the present account arises. How can it
be that justified and true belief are epistemically better than, respectively,
unjustified and false belief? Note that traditionalists have little trouble in
answering this question. After all, they take true belief but not false belief
to be the relevant central value in the epistemic domain. If, in addition,
they go for a teleological account of justification according to which,
roughly, justification is essentially truth-conducive, they also have an
attractive account of why justified belief is better than unjustified belief
ready to hand. After all, justified belief is a good means to the central
155
question we need to ask is what’s good about your belief from a distinct-
ively epistemic point of view. If you are already convinced that true belief
is a central epistemic value, the answer is obvious. What’s good about
your belief is that it enjoys for-its-own-sake epistemic value. But once
you have given up the idea that true belief is a central epistemic value, it is
just not clear why we should think that what you arrived at enjoys value
that’s distinctively epistemic at all. What’s more, the impression of
craziness mentioned above may very well be the result of (what we are
assuming to be) an erroneous theory of epistemic value according to
which true belief is a central epistemic value. But since mistaken views
frequently give rise to mistaken impressions, we need not attach much
evidential weight to the impression of craziness either.
Even if, on reflection, this response is better than it may initially have
appeared, I wouldn’t be surprised if many considered adopting it a cost
for the present view. After all, at the very least, the view is revisionist in a
way that many may find objectionable. The question, then, is whether
there is a story to be told that accords positive epistemic value to true
belief over and above false belief without taking this value to be for-
its-own-sake value, relative to the epistemic domain. Fortunately, the
answer to this question is yes. This leads me to my second response.
Let’s start by asking whether true belief could be a good means to
knowledge. It may be thought that the answer has to be no. After all, a
true belief either already is knowledge or it isn’t. As a result, true belief
cannot be instrumental to knowledge. There surely is an important sense in
which this thought is correct. More specifically, I agree that a true belief at a
given time cannot be a good means to knowledge at that time. However, in
keeping with that it may well be that present true belief is a good means
to future knowledge in a way in which false belief isn’t an equally good
means to future knowledge. If so, true belief does have instrumental
epistemic value over and above false belief. To see what I am getting at
here, let’s return once more to Williamson’s burglar case from Chapter 2.
More specifically, consider the following variation of it: two burglars have
entered our two houses to steal our diamonds. Both have beliefs about
where the diamonds are: in the safes under our beds, say. Crucially, only
the belief of the burglar at your house is true. While my diamonds are
usually in the safe, this very night, I took them out to wear them at a
157
party. At present, the burglars open the safes. Shortly after that, the one
at your house comes to know where the diamonds are. In contrast, the
one at my house is still in the dark. In fact, he may never discover the
location of the diamonds. What this case forcefully illustrates, then, is
that present true belief makes future knowledge more likely than present
false belief. In this way, present true belief is a better means to future
knowledge than present false belief. On this line, it turns out that true
belief does enjoy instrumental epistemic value over and above false belief
because present true belief is a better means to future knowledge than
present false belief.⁷
4. Conclusion
This chapter has used the framework developed in the previous chapters
to offer a novel account of the epistemic domain as a domain that is
constituted by inquiry. What’s more, the account delivers new solutions
to various value problems in epistemology, including (the plausible
motivations of) the relevant versions of the controversial Tertiary
Value Problem.
More specifically, I have argued that ACANs constitute critical
domains, which have their constitutive aims as central values, i.e. things
that are valuable for their own sake, relative to the domains they consti-
tute. Since both inquiry into specific questions and inquiry into general
phenomena are ACANs and since they have, respectively, knowledge
and understanding as their constitutive aims, we get the result that
knowledge and understanding are valuable for their own sake, relative
to the domains constituted by these ACANs. The epistemic domain is
identified with the domain constituted by inquiry into general phenom-
ena in which both knowledge and understanding are final values. As
such, they have a kind of value that anything falling short of knowledge/
understanding does not have.
⁷ Note also that true belief may have other kinds of extrinsic epistemic value as well. Since
knowledge entails true belief, perhaps they inherit value from knowledge in a way in which false
beliefs don’t. Thanks to Mona Simion for drawing my attention to this option.
158 , ,
One thing that may be worth noting is that, while I did respond to a
number of objections to my view, unlike in earlier chapters I did not
consider how this view compares with the competition. The reason for
this is that I am not convinced that there is much in the way of
competition to consider. After all, it is entirely compatible with the
present account of the value of knowledge and understanding that the
two are valuable in many other ways as well. In fact, I’d be happy to
countenance a vast variety of ways in which knowledge and understand-
ing are valuable. If any of them works, that’s great. It means that
knowledge and/or understanding are even more valuable/valuable in
other respects than I have outlined here. (In fact, I believe that they are
and have explored the prospects of some relevant avenues concerning
the value of knowledge elsewhere; see Kelp and Simion 2017, Simion and
Kelp 2016). For that reason, there is no need to try to establish that my
view compares favourably with alternative accounts of the value of
knowledge and/or understanding.
6
Scepticism
Both premises of the Argument from Ignorance are highly plausible. AI1
is intuitively compelling. You don’t know that you are not a handless
BIV. How could you? After all, everything would seem to you exactly as it
would, were you to be a normal handed person. AI2 is motivated by the
following attractive principle:
Inquiry, Knowledge, and Understanding. Christoph Kelp, Oxford University Press (2021). © Christoph Kelp.
DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780192896094.003.0007
160 , ,
Transmission of Knowledge
If one knows that p, one competently deduces q from p, and one comes
to believe that q based on one’s deduction, then one thereby comes to
know that q.¹
Zebra
You are at the zoo. Currently you are standing in front of the zebra
enclosure and see a black-and-white striped equine creature inside.
Since you can tell a zebra from the way it looks, you come to know the
¹ Williamson (2000), Hawthorne (2004). This principle also sometimes goes by the name of
Closure. In contrast with the debate on knowledge, the literature on warrant distinguishes
sharply between closure principles and transmission principles. Since the above would clearly be
categorized as a transmission principle there, I decided to go with the label Transmission of
Knowledge.
161
Question-Settling Aim
One’s inquiry into whether p aims at settling the question whether p.
No Settling
If one’s inquiry into whether p proceeds via a question-begging argu-
ment (henceforth is question-begging for short), then it doesn’t settle
the question whether p.
Now consider the following two cases involving inquiry into whether
~CDM:
Inquiry 1
You are at the zoo. Currently you are standing in front of the zebra
enclosure and see a black-and-white striped equine creature inside.
Since you can tell a zebra from the way it looks, you come to know that
Z. You now want to find out whether ~CDM. To settle this question,
you take a hair sample from the animal and perform a DNA analysis.
The result of the analysis is that the animal is indeed a zebra. From this,
you competently deduce and thereupon come to believe that ~CDM.
Inquiry 2
You are at the zoo. Currently you are standing in front of the zebra
enclosure and see a black-and-white striped equine creature inside.
Since you can tell a zebra from the way it looks, you come to know that
Z. You now want to find out whether ~CDM. To settle this question,
163
Question-Begging
In Inquiry 2, your inquiry into whether ~CDM is question-begging.²
Now, one might wonder what all of these rather unexceptional points
have to do with Transmission of Knowledge. To see the answer, recall
that there is a more substantive characterization of the aim of inquiry in
terms of knowledge:
Knowledge Aim
Inquiry into whether p aims at knowledge that p/not-p.³
² It may be worth noting that even champions of Transmission of Knowledge and the related
transmission of warrant principle (see also Section 2.2 below) acknowledge this point (Pryor
2000, Markie 2005, Pritchard 2007).
³ It may be worth noting that, for the purposes of this argument, all that I need is the
sufficiency direction of Knowledge Aim. Since the competition in the literature advocates
weaker aims of inquiry, they would all agree on the sufficiency direction of Knowledge Aim.
By the same token, the relevant premise of my argument should not raise too many eyebrows.
164 , ,
2.2 Diagnosis
Transmission of Warrant
If one has warrant for p and one competently deduces q from p, then
one thereby has warrant for q.
One interesting fact that this debate has unearthed is that the division on
Transmission of Warrant is driven by a disagreement about the structure
of warrant (Pryor 2004). In particular, we can distinguish between three
Before moving on, I’d like to point out that we also have what it takes to
specify a certain type of case in which Transmission of Knowledge fails
due to question-begging. To see this, note that the reason why, in Inquiry
2, your inquiry into whether ~CDM begs the question generalizes. If
I-Moderatism is true, settling the question whether p in way Wp will
typically (if not invariably) require that a certain set of facts ΔWp is
already in place. More specifically, I want to suggest that ΔWp is the set of
facts that obtains if and only if what we may call the ‘false positive
conditions’ of Wp do not obtain. By the ‘false positive conditions’
I mean the conditions under which W produces a belief on whether p
that falls short of knowledge. Anyone who then ventures to settle any
further question whether q by deducing, say, q from p, where q corres-
ponds to some i ∈ ΔWp, will fall foul of question-begging. If, in addition,
one knows that p by having settled the question whether p in Wp and has
come to believe q by competent deduction from p, we will have a case of
Transmission of Knowledge failure due to question-begging. We thus
have a type of case in which Transmission of Knowledge fails due to
question-begging. It is this type of case (henceforth ‘the Case’) that I will
focus on in the remainder of this chapter.⁵
With the argument against Transmission of Knowledge in play, I will
now return to my preferred account of knowledge. My aim here is to
show that this account has the resources to accommodate not only that
Transmission of Knowledge fails in the relevant type of case, but also
that all remaining instances of Transmission of Knowledge continue to
hold. In order to achieve this, I will first argue that, given certain
assumptions, my account of knowledge validates an unrestricted
version of Transmission of Knowledge. This establishes that the account
can license instances of Transmission of Knowledge, including the
⁵ There may be other kinds of case in which Transmission of Knowledge fails, perhaps even
due to question-begging. While this may mean that the account of Transmission of Knowledge
failure is not complete, it does not diminish its significance. After all, understanding only one
such kind of case means important progress on the issue.
168 , ,
target ones. Then I will show how the assumptions that commit me
to Transmission of Knowledge can be replaced in such a way that
Transmission of Knowledge fails just in the Case. In this way, my
account of knowledge supports just the kind of restricted version of
Transmission of Knowledge we are after.
First things first, recall the transmission principle as well as the substan-
tive conditions on knowledge that I developed in Chapter 3:
Transmission of Knowledge
If (C1 =) one knows that p, (C2 =) one competently deduces q from p,
and (C3 =) one comes to believe that q based on one’s deduction, then
(C4 =) one thereby comes to know that q.
Conditions on Knowledge
One knows that p only if (K1 =) one’s belief that p competent, and (K2 =)
the EN of the ability to know that produced one’s belief that p are satisfied.
Competent Belief
One’s belief that p is competent if and only if it is formed by an exercise
of an ability to know propositions in range R and relative to conditions
C such that p∈R.
Bridge 1
(C2) and (C3) hold if and only if one believes that q via the exercise
of a deductive epistemic ability (DEAq).
Bridge 2
(C1) identifies a member of CDEAq.
Assumption 1
The disposition at issue in DEAq is a sure-fire disposition.
Assumption 2.
There are no other members of CDEAq besides (C1).
Assumption 3.
The range of DEAq includes all propositions q one may compe-
tently deduce from p.
Abomination
I know that I have hands, but I don’t know that I am not a
handless BIV.
(DeRose 1995, 28)
Abomination*
I have settled the question whether I have hands but the question
whether I am not a handless BIV remains entirely open.
174 , ,
that you could possibly know that you are not a BIV. The explanation
will need to invoke an ability to know. Unfortunately, it does not help
with discharging this task. We cannot hope to explain how you could
possibly know that you are not a handless BIV by simply pointing out
that you do so via an ability to know. What we need, at the very least, is to
identify a specific ability to know that can deliver knowledge that you are
not a handless BIV and to offer an account of how this ability does the
job. It is this task that I will take on in the remainder of this subsection.
There is a popular account available on the market. According to this
view, championed most prominently by G. E. Moore (e.g. 1939), you
know that you are not a handless BIV on the basis of competent
deduction from your knowledge that you have hands. On Moore’s
view, then, the relevant ability to know is a deductive epistemic ability
and the way in which this ability delivers knowledge that you are not a
handless BIV is just the normal way in which exercise of this ability
delivers knowledge. The trouble with the Moorean account is, of course,
that it requires (relevant instances of) Transmission of Knowledge and so
is unavailable to those who want to adopt the above way of denying
Transmission of Knowledge. So, it looks as though foes of Transmission
of Knowledge face a particularly difficult challenge here.
To get my own preferred account of how you can know that you are
not a handless BIV in view, I’d first like to focus on a slightly different
type of case, which does not involve sceptical hypotheses. Suppose, for
instance, someone were to put to us the hypothesis (TOS =) that there is
a teapot orbiting the Sun somewhere between the Earth and Mars or
(SM =) that the universe was created by a supernatural creator closely
resembling a serving of spaghetti with meatballs. As a first observation,
I want to insist that we know that these hypotheses are false. At the same
time, it doesn’t look as though we will be able to produce a conclusive
argument against these hypotheses. At the very least, many of us won’t be
able to do this. So then, how can we know these facts?
To arrive at what I take to be a promising answer to this question, I’d
like to ask how a sane person might react to being presented with such a
hypothesis. Here is what I take to be the sane response: ‘Get real! That’s
just crazy!’ What’s going on here? My suggestion is that we have an
epistemic ability that enables us to recognize that certain possibilities could
176 , ,
not easily enough obtain. It is via an exercise of this ability that we come
to know that the possibilities described in TOS and SM could not easily
enough obtain (and hence that ~TOS and that ~SM are both true). This
suggestion offers an attractive explanation of the sane response. Upon
consideration of the possibility described in TOS and SM, you come to
know that these possibilities could not easily enough obtain by an
exercise of your epistemic ability to recognize possibilities that could
not easily enough obtain. ‘Get real! That’s just crazy!’ is an expression of
this very knowledge. The fact that my suggestion offers an attractive
explanation of the sane response provides some evidence that it is on the
right track.
There is further support for my suggestion. Consider the following
two important properties of beliefs produced by recognitional abilities
(henceforth recognitional beliefs). First, recognitional beliefs are cogni-
tively spontaneous; they do not appear to be based on further evidence.
For instance, when you form a perceptual recognitional belief that there
is a chair before you, you do not appear to base this belief on further
evidence such as the appearance as of a chair. Second, in case of
recognitional beliefs, we are often unable to articulate how the recogni-
tional ability works in any detail. For instance, someone may have the
ability to recognize pieces by Beethoven without being able to articulate
how they do so (other than by making the rather uninformative obser-
vation that it sounds like Beethoven) (Millar 2010). But now note that,
our beliefs that the possibilities described in TOS and SM could not easily
enough obtain plausibly satisfy these two key properties of recognitional
beliefs. First, when we acquire these beliefs, we do not appear to base
them on further evidence. Rather, they are cognitively spontaneous.
Second, we may not be able to articulate how we recognize the relevant
possibilities as such (other than by making the rather uninformative
observation that they just look crazy). The fact that our beliefs fit the
profile of recognitional beliefs further confirms my suggestion.⁶
⁶ Just how this ability might operate is a fascinating question. It may not be the job for
philosophers to answer it, at least not fully, and I will not attempt to do so here. Instead, I will
content myself with the observation that, even if we do not have an account of how the ability
operates, the above still provides some evidence that we do indeed have this ability.
177
⁷ Note also that the sane response is not, for instance ‘Well, I have siblings, so the BIV
possibility doesn’t obtain.’ As a result, Moorean responses to the sceptical argument do not fit
well with the common-sense reaction here.
⁸ It is also easy to see that our beliefs here fit the profile of recognitional beliefs just as well as
in the TOS and SM cases, with the result that my proposal is further confirmed.
⁹ It may also be worth noting that invoking this ability in my response to the sceptic is not ad
hoc. After all, the evidence for the existence of the ability is already provided by the TOS and SM
cases. As far as the response to scepticism is concerned, then, the argument invokes an ability
that there is independent reason to think exists.
178 , ,
3.3 Diagnosis
Finally, I want to iron out a last wrinkle in the proposed treatment of the
sceptical problem. While it is hard to deny that there are indeed many
situations in which nearly everyone would offer some version or other of
the sane response when presented with sceptical possibilities, there are
also situations in which most of us wouldn’t. The clearest examples are
certain academic and educational settings. Here, many of us will not only
fail to give the sane response, but we will even be very much taken by the
sceptical possibilities and may be tempted to agree that we cannot know
the denials of various sceptical hypotheses. Accordingly, any treatment
of the sceptical problem according to which we can know the denials of
sceptical hypotheses will not be fully adequate until it has explained why
we tend to be so taken by AI1, at least in the relevant settings. And that’s
what I want to do now.
To begin with, note that many recognitional abilities have what I will
call illusion conditions, that is, conditions under which exercises of these
abilities make things seem to us in a way in which they are not. One
classical example is the bent stick illusion. Here exercises of relevant
perceptual recognitional abilities make it seem to us that a stick partly
immersed in water is bent, whereas in fact it is straight. Note that this
illusion only occurs in special settings, i.e. when the stick is immersed in
water. In the vast majority of situations, we are not prone to this kind of
illusion. Rather, we have no problem recognizing whether a certain stick
is straight. Likewise, I want to suggest that, when considering the prob-
lem of scepticism in certain settings, most notably academic and educa-
tional ones, our ability to recognize whether certain possibilities could
easily enough obtain falls prey to an illusion: it makes it seem to us as
though sceptical possibilities could indeed easily enough obtain even
though, in fact, they could not. And, of course, that’s what explains
why we are so taken by them.
What do we need to do in order to see through a given illusion? This
varies from one case to the next. In case of the bent stick illusion, the
answer is particularly easy: we just take the stick out of the water to verify
that it is not bent. What about the sceptical illusion? My suggestion is
that what will help reveal that the sceptical possibilities such as the BIV
179
4. Objections
¹⁰ I assume that not everyone will agree that they can now see that sceptical possibilities
could not easily enough obtain. It may even be that they see the above ‘crazy’ possibilities as ones
that could easily enough obtain. But even this can be explained. Some illusions are harder to see
through, and some ways of revealing them won’t work equally well for everyone. Thus, consider
the grey strawberries illusion. Here we have a picture of some strawberries, which look red even
though they are not: the picture does not contain any red colour. One way of revealing this
illusion is by adding a grey strip at the bottom of the picture and another grey strip that comes
up from that strip to the depicted strawberries. However, this way of revealing the illusion
doesn’t work for everyone, just as may be the case with the sceptical illusion. In fact, just as in
the sceptical illusion, it may be that some see the above ‘crazy’ possibilities as ones that could
easily obtain, in the grey strawberries illusion, some subjects will simply see the grey strip as red
as well.
180 , ,
Transmission of Knowledge after all. The key idea here is to not only
place the aforementioned restrictions on the range of DEAq, but also to
abandon Bridge 1 in favour of the following:
Bridge 1*
(C2) and (C3) hold if and only if one believes that q via the exercise
of a DEAq such that q is in the range of this ability.
The result that we get is that, in the Case, the agent simply does not
competently deduce the conclusion from the premise. In this way, we
can have an unrestricted version of Transmission of Knowledge,
whilst also securing the result that, in the Case, the deductive infer-
ence does not transmit knowledge. And isn’t that the best of all
worlds?
I agree that this would be a very nice outcome. But now note that it is
very plausible that whether you satisfy (C2) and (C3), i.e. whether you
competently deduce one proposition from another, is a formal issue in
the sense that it doesn’t (or at least needn’t) depend on what the semantic
contents of your deduction are. For instance, suppose that you replace
the propositions you want to employ in a deduction by variables and ask
me to do the deduction for you. I should still be able to do so compe-
tently. But Bridge 1* threatens to violate the formality of competent
deduction and clearly does so when combined with the further restric-
tions on the range of DEAq mentioned earlier. To see this, just suppose
that Z has been replaced by A and ~CDM by B. On the present proposal,
I cannot competently deduce B from A and A ! B simply because of
how A and B have been introduced. That’s why I think that, on reflec-
tion, we will do well not to replace Bridge 1 by Bridge 1* and stick to the
restriction strategy developed above.
The second objection also aims to show that there is a viable transmis-
sion principle for knowledge after all. To begin with, recall that
I assumed the following version of the principle:
181
Transmission of Knowledge
If one knows that p, one competently deduces q from p, and one comes
to believe that q based on one’s deduction, then one thereby comes to
know that q.
Now, while this principle comes close enough to the right principle for
many purposes, in the final analysis, it arguably affords the following
refinement:
Transmission of Knowledge*
If one knows that p, one competently deduces q from p, one comes to
believe that q based on one’s deduction, and one retains one’s know-
ledge that p throughout, then one thereby comes to know that q.
¹¹ See, e.g., DeRose (2002), Fantl and McGrath (2009), Hawthorne (2005), Hawthorne and
Stanley (2008), Kelp (2018a), Simion (2016), Turri (2016a), Unger (1975), and Williamson
(2000). I hasten to add that I do not subscribe to the knowledge norm of action.
182 , ,
4.3 Question-Begging
¹² It is not hard to imagine similar cases in which Z is used as a premise in practical reasoning
or acted upon.
183
Inquiry 1*
You and I are at the zoo. Currently we are standing in front of the zebra
enclosure and see a black-and-white striped equine creature inside.
Since we can tell a zebra from the way it looks, we both come to know
that Z. We now want to find out whether ~CDM. You take the lead. To
settle this question, you take a hair sample from the animal and
perform a DNA analysis. The result of the analysis is that the animal
is indeed a zebra. From this, you competently deduce and thereupon
come to believe that ~CDM and present the corresponding argument
to me.
Inquiry 2*
You and I are at the zoo. Currently we are standing in front of the zebra
enclosure and see a black-and-white striped equine creature inside.
Since we can tell a zebra from the way it looks, we both come to know
184 , ,
that Z. We now want to find out whether ~CDM. You take the lead. To
settle this question, you exploit the entailment from Z to ~CDM to
competently deduce and thereupon come to believe that ~CDM and
present the corresponding argument to me.
5. The Competition
5.1 Sensitivity
1981). And, again very roughly, one’s belief that p is sensitive if and only
if at the closest worlds at which p false, one does not believe p.
It’s easy to see that Transmission of Knowledge will fail on sensitivity
accounts. Just consider Zebra once more. Your belief that Z is sensitive:
at the closest worlds at which Z is false, the enclosure is empty or you are
standing in front of a different enclosure in which case you are looking at
some other kind of animal instead. In that case, you do not believe that
Z. Since your belief that Z is sensitive, sensitivity accounts will predict
that you know Z. Now suppose you competently deduce and thereupon
come to believe that ~CDM. Is that belief sensitive as well? No. After all,
at the closest worlds at which ~CDM false, you are looking at a cleverly
disguised mule, in which case you still believe ~CDM (based on your
competent deduction from Z). Since your belief that ~CDM isn’t sensi-
tive, sensitivity accounts will predict that you don’t know ~CDM.
Transmission of Knowledge fails.¹³
¹³ Not all versions of sensitivity accounts are committed to the failure of Transmission of
Knowledge (e.g. Roush 2005). However, since my aim here is to compare my account of
transmission failure with its most prominent rival, these views can safely be set aside, at least
for present purposes.
186 , ,
wouldn’t believe that you have hands. Therefore, you know that you have
hands. AI3 comes out false. In fact, on sensitivity-based approaches to
transmission failure, it is precisely the fact that claims like AI1 come out
true and claims like AI3 come out false that explains why Transmission
of Knowledge fails to begin with. As a result, the truth of AI1 and the
falsity of AI3 are not accidental features of sensitivity-based approaches
to transmission failure but rather lie at their very heart.
But given that claims like AI1 will come out true and claims like AI3
false on sensitivity-based approaches to transmission failure, it is easy to
see that sensitivity-based approaches will be committed to abominable
conjunctions and problematic conversational patterns. For instance,
they will be committed to Abomination, i.e. ‘I know that I have hands,
but I don’t know that I am not a handless BIV.’ And given the
knowledge norm of assertion, they will also require you to say something
like ‘I can’t say’ when asked whether you are a handless BIV after having
affirmed that you have hands and that this entails that you are not a
handless BIV.
The Crazy Argument from Ignorance. To bring out yet another down-
side of sensitivity’s treatment of scepticism, consider next the
following case:
Milk
You have just put a half-full carton of milk back in the fridge. Since you
have been looking at the fridge ever since and nobody has opened the
fridge in the meantime, you know that there is milk in the fridge.
It is easy to see that advocates of sensitivity will have to treat the Crazy
Argument from Ignorance in the same way as the Argument from
Ignorance. That is to say, just as they maintain that AI2 is false and
AI1 and 3 are true, here too they will have to hold that CAI2 is false,
while CAI1 and 3 are true. After all, your belief that there is milk in the
fridge is sensitive, but your belief that the milk hasn’t been drunk by
invisible milk fairies isn’t.¹⁴ Crucially, however, there is an important
intuitive difference between the two cases. While AI1 is indeed intuitively
plausible, the same does not go for CAI1. On the contrary, it is intuitively
highly plausible that you know that ~IMF is false.
Inquiry 3
You are at the zoo. Currently you are standing in front of the zebra
enclosure and see a black-and-white striped equine creature inside.
Since you can tell a zebra from the way it looks, you come to know that
Z. You now want to find out whether ~CDM. In order to achieve this,
you first exploit the equivalence between Z and Z & ~CDM to com-
petently deduce Z & ~CDM and then apply conjunction elimination to
arrive at the belief that ~CDM.
It’s easy to see that the above argument that knowledge fails to transmit
across competent deduction in Inquiry 2 serves to establish the same
result for Inquiry 3.¹⁵ It’s also easy to see that sensitivity-based accounts
of knowledge can secure this result. After all, your belief that ~CDM is no
more sensitive here than in the earlier Inquiry 2. Hence, you don’t know
~CDM here either. So far, so good.
¹⁴ If this isn’t immediately obvious, consider: were there to be no milk in the fridge, say,
because you have not yet put it back, you wouldn’t believe there is. In contrast, had the milk
been drunk by invisible milk fairies, you’d still believe that it hadn’t.
¹⁵ This is unsurprising once it is noted that the only difference between Inquiry 2 and Inquiry
3 is that the competent deduction of ~CDM from Z proceeds via a different route and the above
argument simply doesn’t depend on the specific route of deduction.
188 , ,
Transmission Failure
If knowledge fails to transmit across a competent deduction that
exploits a certain logical relationship between the members of a certain
set of propositions, then it also fails to transmit across any competent
190 , ,
6. Conclusion
In Chapter 4, I explored the claim that the aim of inquiry into general phenomena is
understanding and developed a knowledge-based account of understanding. While
we saw some reason for thinking that the aim of inquiry into general phenomena
requires knowledge, I mentioned that more detailed arguments for this claim can be
given. More specifically, I indicated that the arguments that inquiry into specific
questions requires knowledge from Chapter 1 can be adapted to bring home the
point about general phenomena also. In what follows, I show how this can be done.
1. Commitment Release
It’s easy enough to see that one can run a similar argument via Commitment Release
for understanding. Recall:
Commitment Release
If, at t, one attains the aim of a given activity with an aim, then, at t, one is
released from all commitments towards attaining this aim.
And now consider:
The Hire 2
You are a geologist. I have hired you for two weeks to find out about (P =) the
value of a certain mine I am considering buying. Since I need to be in a remote
location with no means of communication for the next two weeks, we agree to
meet at the mine two weeks from now. Thanks to a contact in the government
you are able to access a classified and full report on the value of the mine, which
includes detailed information about the fake diamonds, the real diamonds, and
so on. On the basis of this report, you come to believe the full account of P. Since
there is still a considerable amount of time before our meeting, you and your
team pack your bags and get on the next flight home to spend time with your
families. Meanwhile, I return unexpectedly early from my trip to the breaking
news that the report is a fabrication of a corrupt government official who
wanted to climb the career ladder. You are currently back home with your
family and entirely unaware of the news. The final twist in the story is that,
unbeknownst to everyone, despite being a fabrication, the full account of P the
report gives is entirely true.
To see how the argument will go, note first that you justifiably and truly believe in
the full account of P. If we analyse the aim of inquiry into general phenomena
in terms of true belief or justified belief, Commitment Release entails that
you are released from your contractual commitment to find out about P.
However, again, that’s the wrong result. Your contractual commitment is still
binding, as is evidenced by the fact that I can take steps to get you back to work
194
without negotiating a new contract. In contrast, if we analyse the aim of inquiry into
general phenomena in terms of knowledge, we will do better. Since your beliefs
about P are all gettiered, they fall short of knowledge. According to a knowledge-
based account of the aim of inquiry into general phenomena, it does not follow that
you are released from your contractual commitment. In this way, there is further
reason to favour it.
2. Progress
Finally, let’s look at the argument from Progress. Recall:
Progress
If, at t2, one has not attained the aim of a given activity with an aim and if one
makes progress towards attaining its aim between t1 and t2, then one has not
attained its aim at t1 either.
And now consider:
The Insight 2
You are a geologist. I have hired you for two weeks to find out about (P =) the
value of a certain mine I am considering buying. Since I need to be in a remote
location with no means of communication for the next two weeks, we agree to
meet at the mine two weeks from now. Thanks to a contact in the government,
at t1, you are able to access a classified and full report on the value of the mine,
which includes detailed information about the fake diamonds, the real dia-
monds, and so on. On the basis of this report, you come to believe the full
account of P. At t2, however, you discover that the report is a fabrication of a
corrupt agent who wanted to climb the career ladder. So, you start again. At t3,
you have discovered the fake diamonds and the real diamonds in the mine.
Now here is what I take to be an overwhelmingly plausible claim about the Insight 2:
you make progress on your inquiry into P between t2 and t3 (henceforth also ‘the
crucial claim 2’). By way of support for the crucial claim 2 notice, first, that, at t2, you
have discovered that a certain account of P, at t1, is a mere fabrication and so you
have to start from scratch. But that also means that, at t3, once you have discovered
the fake diamonds and the real ones, you have made progress.
The second reason why it is better to analyse the aim of inquiry into general
phenomena in terms of knowledge than in terms of true belief or justified belief is that
only the knowledge-based account is compatible with the crucial claim 2. Here is why:
according to the crucial claim 2, you made progress on the inquiry into P between t2
and t3. By Progress, it follows that at t1 you did not attain success in your inquiry into
P. However, again, we may think of the case as one in which you justifiably and
truly believed the full account of P. According to any account of the aim of inquiry
into general phenomena that analyses it in terms of true belief or justified belief,
then, you did attain the aim of inquiry into P at t1. As a result, these accounts
are unable to accommodate the crucial claim 2. In contrast, a knowledge-based
195
account encounters no difficulties here. After all, at t1, your beliefs about P are
gettiered and so do not qualify as knowledge. According to a knowledge-based
account of the aim of inquiry into general phenomena, you do not attain the aim of
your inquiry into P at t1. As a result, a knowledge-based account is entirely compat-
ible with the crucial claim. Given the plausibility of this claim, this means that there is
yet further reason to think that the aim of inquiry into general phenomena requires
knowledge.
APPENDIX 2
1. Virtue Epistemology
Key to virtue epistemology are (i) a theory of the normativity of performances; (ii)
the claim that beliefs are performances with an epistemic aim; and (iii) the identifi-
cation of key epistemological properties with normative properties of beliefs as
performances. In what follows, I will briefly explain all three elements, starting
with the theory of performance normativity.
According to this theory, we can always ask whether a performance is successful,
i.e. whether it attains its aim; whether it is competent, i.e. whether it is produced by an
ability to attain its aim; and whether it is apt, i.e. whether it is successful because
competent. Accordingly, performances can be assessed along three key dimensions:
success, competence, and aptness.
When virtue epistemologists say that beliefs are performances with an epistemic
aim, they typically hold that the aim of belief is truth. Given that this is so, beliefs can
be assessed along the aforementioned three dimensions, as successful (true), compe-
tent (produced by an ability to form true beliefs), and apt (true, because competent).
Finally, virtue epistemologists typically identify key epistemological properties
with normative properties of beliefs as performances. In particular, they typically
identify justified belief with competent belief and knowledge with apt belief.
The distinctively knowledge first version of virtue epistemology I developed in
earlier work (e.g. Kelp 2016, 2017, 2018b) took all of (i)–(iii) on board. The most
¹ For recent virtue epistemologies, see, e.g., Broncano-Berrocal (2017), Carter (2016), Greco
(2010), Kelp (2018b), Miracchi (2015), Pritchard, Millar, and Haddock (2010), Riggs (2002),
Sosa (2015), Turri (2016b), and Zagzebski (1996). Recent collections on virtue epistemology
include Battaly (2018), Fernandez Vargas (2016), Greco and Turri (2012), and Kelp and Greco
(2020).
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important difference from standard virtue epistemology is that knowledge takes the
place of truth as the aim of belief. This difference may appear puzzling. After all, if
knowledge is the relevant kind of epistemic success, how can knowledge be identified
with apt belief, as (iii) would have it?
To get the answer into clearer view, let’s first consider my preferred account of
aptness:
Apt ACAN Move
An ACAN move is apt if and only if it is (i) successful, (ii) competent, and (iii)
the EN of the ability exercised are satisfied.
Next, recall the conditions on knowledge from Chapter 3 that I also defended in the
earlier work:
Conditions on Knowledge
One knows that p only if (K1 =) one’s belief that p is produced by an exercise of
an ability to know propositions in range R and relative to conditions C such that
p∈R, and (K2 =) the EN of the ability to know that produced one’s belief that p
are satisfied.
It is easy to see that, given Apt ACAN Move and Conditions on Knowledge, a belief is
successful if and only if it is apt. In this way, the virtue-epistemological identification
of knowledge with apt belief turns out to be entirely compatible with the knowledge
first claim that belief is a kind of performance that aims not at truth but at knowledge.
It may also be worth noting that, as a result, the views of knowledge and justified
belief developed in Chapters 2 and 3 can be understood along virtue-epistemological
lines. More specifically the substantive constraints on means and environment on the
aim of inquiry from Chapter 3 are tantamount to a virtue-epistemological aptness
constraint on the aim of inquiry.
Now, a couple of potential hiccups remain. First, one might still wonder whether
the identification of knowledge and apt belief isn’t incompatible with my claim that
belief is a state from Chapter 2. After all, isn’t this claim incompatible with something
that the identification entails, i.e. that belief is a performance? By way of response,
recall the possibility of dual natures which we already encountered in Chapter 2. This
possibility may be realized here too. Like quantic entities which have both a particle
and a wave nature, belief may have both a stative and a performative nature. As a
result, although it is part of my view that belief is a state, the view remains compatible
with virtue epistemology.
Second, one may also wonder whether the identification of knowledge and apt
belief doesn’t lead us back to the kind of dismantling analysis that I claimed to have
abandoned. Fortunately, the answer to this question is no. The claim that apt belief is
knowledge cannot be developed into a dismantling analysis of knowledge. This is
because aptness is unpacked in terms of knowledge and so any attempt at a
dismantling analysis is bound to fall foul of the non-circularity requirement on
dismantling analyses. In this way, the identification of apt belief and knowledge
that the present account delivers leaves the question about the nature of knowledge
wide open. The network analysis can still provide the answer.
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2. Back-Pedalling
There is reason to think that the views of justified belief and knowledge from
Chapters 2 and 3 are entirely compatible with my earlier work on knowledge first
virtue epistemology. Even so, I am now less convinced that interpreting the present
view as a virtue epistemology, never mind a knowledge first virtue epistemology, is
the right thing to do. Let me explain.
Knowledge First. Recall that I already mentioned that there are important differ-
ences between my account and knowledge first epistemology. Most importantly,
knowledge first epistemology takes the distinction between knowledge and ignorance
as the starting point for epistemological theorizing. As a result, that knowledge is of
key significance in epistemology is not optional on a knowledge first approach. In
contrast, my account takes inquiry as the starting point for epistemological theoriz-
ing. That knowledge is of central importance is a function of the methodological idea
in conjunction with a set of arguments. Knowledge must earn its keep as something
of key significance. That it does so is by no means a foregone conclusion in the
present framework.
While I do not mean to deny that, on the present interpretation, my view has a
number of features that are congenial to knowledge first epistemology, in view of
these differences, I think that it would be a mistake to think of the view as knowledge
first epistemological proper. And this goes for the view I defend here, as well as the
view I defended in earlier work (e.g. Kelp 2016, 2017, 2018b).
Beliefs as Performances. What’s more, there is reason for thinking that the view is
not best understood as a version of virtue epistemology either. This is because there is
reason not to take at least two of the three key elements of virtue epistemology—i.e.
(i) the theory of the normativity of performances and (ii) the claim that beliefs are
performances with an epistemic aim—on board. Let’s look at (ii) first.
I said that my view is compatible with the virtue-epistemological idea that belief is
a kind of performance. After all, while on my view belief is a state, it might be that
belief has both a state and a performance nature. The question remains, however,
whether it is a good idea to embrace the view that belief has a dual nature. One reason
against is that it is less simple than the alternative view according to which belief is a
state only.
That said, the view that belief is a performance has met with considerable
resistance on independent grounds. More specifically, it has been argued that belief
is a kind of state and not kind of a performance.² And, of course, if this objection is on
target, there is reason for thinking that we will do well not to take the key virtue-
epistemological claim that belief is a kind of performance with an aim on board.³
² The most prominent version of this objection is due to Matthew Chrisman (2012, 2017). In
a nutshell, Chrisman uses a typology of English verb phrases from Kenny (1963), Mourelatos
(1978), and Vendler (1957) to argue that knowledge attributions are statives and that, as a result,
knowledge attributions are about states and not performances.
³ One might wonder whether it is really optional on my view that belief is a kind of
performance. After all, I do take justified belief to be competent belief. And doesn’t that commit
me to the claim that beliefs are performances? No. Consider sitting. Sitting is a state. In keeping
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with that, one may or may not have the ability to sit and one may or may not have the ability to
sit straight, for hours on end, and so on. These abilities are relative to conditions of shape and
environment, and so on. Moreover, states can feature in ACANs. You may compete in a
competition to see who can sit longest. Now certain abilities to sit, i.e. abilities to sit for
prolonged periods of time, become relevant. We can ask whether you won the competition,
whether you sat competently (i.e. as a result of the exercise of an ability to sit rather than, say,
paralysis), and so on. Finally, states can feature in ACANs with normative success conditions.
You may compete in a try-out for the sitting competition team. Now successes require you not
only to sit still but to do so competently in suitable conditions (see Chapter 3). Abilities have
become essential to success. None of this changes the fact that sitting is a state. Likewise, the fact
that one may believe a proposition because of the exercise of a certain ability, that we can ask
whether one’s belief is successful (i.e. qualifies as knowledge) or whether it was competent, and
that success in inquiry requires competent belief in suitable environmental conditions are
entirely compatible with the claim that belief is a state, as is, of course, the proposed identifi-
cation of competent belief with justified belief.
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It makes sense for us to feel that you have fallen short, and perhaps even that you
don’t really deserve to be on the team. These considerations suggest that aptness has
a normative significance that goes beyond that of success. By the same token, aptness
seems to deserve its place as a (and perhaps the) central normative category in the
theory of the normativity of performances.
The reason I have started to harbour doubts about the centrality of aptness is that
there are cases in which aptness does not seem to have additional normative
significance. Consider the case of a frog which has the reliable ability to catch flies
with its tongue. Crucially, we must take this ability to be triggered automatically
rather than by intention. Luckily, this seems plausible enough anyway. Unfortunately
for the frog, the environment has recently been taken over by a new species of fly that
is considerably faster than the kind of fly that used inhabit it. In fact, at its current
speed, the frog’s tongue won’t be fast enough to catch enough flies of the new fast
kind. Luckily, there also is an unusual kind of gas in the environment which slows the
flies down. Just now, the frog rolls out its tongue to catch a fly. Even if our frog
succeeds, as we may, of course, assume it does, it will not succeed aptly. After all,
unsuitable environmental conditions will prevent this from happening.
Now here is the key question. Does this matter? Does it make sense for us to feel
that the frog has fallen short and that he does not deserve, say, to no longer go
hungry, etc.? In my view, the answer to these questions is a clear no. But if so, we may
start to wonder whether the property of aptness captures anything of distinctive
normative significance and, as a result, whether it really deserves its place as a central
normative category in the theory of the normativity of performances. After all, there
are cases in which whether or not a performance is apt simply does not matter/does
not correspond to a shortcoming of the agent.
It might be thought that so far all we have is evidence that leaves it open whether
aptness is a central normative category. Some cases suggest that it is; others don’t.
Crucially, however, there is an alternative account of the cases that seem to support
the centrality of aptness, which appeals only to success and not to aptness. To see
this, recall first that the standard motivation for the centrality of aptness comes from
standard cases of human performance. Of course, standard cases of human perform-
ance are cases of intentional performance. For instance, in the above archery case,
you intentionally produce a shot that turns out to be successful. But now note that
you cannot perform without performing in a certain way. What’s more, when it
comes to intentional performances, you cannot perform intentionally without per-
forming intentionally in a certain way. For instance, you cannot intentionally take a
shot in ARCH without intentionally doing so in a certain way (e.g. releasing the
arrow thus). As a result, when intentional performances have an aim, their aim
consists not only in bringing about the success of the relevant performance type, but
also in doing so in the intended way. For intentional performances with an aim, then,
we have two dimensions of success: the first is whether the performance attains its
aim and the second is whether the performance attains its aim in the intended way.
This gives us the resources to offer an alternative account of the kinds of cases that
are typically adduced to motivate the centrality of aptness, such as the above archery
case in which your shot is off target but successful anyway because of the intervention
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of a helper in the wings. The performance attains its first aim: your shot finds the
target. However, it does not attain its second aim: it does not find the target in
the intended way. In this way, we have an attractive alternative explanation of the
shortcomings of agents in cases of successful but inapt intentional performance.
Crucially, this alternative explanation invokes only success and does not appeal to
aptness at all.⁴
Where does this leave us? At first glance, standard cases of intentional human
performances appear to suggest that there is a genuine normative difference between
merely successful and apt performances which would justify the centrality of aptness.
On reflection, however, there is reason to think that appearances are misleading.
Once we move away from intentional performances and focus on automatic ones, it
becomes hard to deny that aptness is not of central normative significance. What’s
more, there is an attractive alternative account of cases motivating the centrality of
aptness that doesn’t appeal to aptness.
But, of course, if the centrality of aptness is false, virtue epistemology runs into
even more trouble. After all, it now looks as though it is based on a flawed normative
framework. And that, I take is a serious drawback for the view.
In contrast, my own view is in no way committed to the centrality of aptness. On
my view, knowledge is first and foremost the aim of inquiry. If there is any normative
property of belief as performance that explains the normative significance of know-
ledge, it is success. And since the normative significance of success is not in question,
the problem that virtue epistemologists encounter by endorsing a theory of perform-
ance normativity featuring the centrality of aptness can be laid to rest as well.
3. Conclusion
In sum, the view of knowledge and justified belief I developed in Chapters 2 and 3
can be seen as a version of virtue epistemology, perhaps even the distinctively
knowledge first variety thereof that I defended in earlier work (e.g. Kelp 2016,
2017, 2018b). That said, it transpires that there is reason not to do so. There are
significant differences between my own view and both knowledge first epistemology
and virtue epistemology. My view differs from knowledge first epistemology in that it
doesn’t take the distinction between knowledge and ignorance as a starting point for
epistemological theorizing, with the result that knowledge must earn its keep as
⁴ Note that it is compatible with this that there are cases in which aptness matters. In
particular, the cases I have in mind are cases in which a performance is successful if and only
if it is apt. Two things are worth bearing in mind here. First, aptness plausibly matters here only
because success matters: it is not as if aptness has normative significance over and above success.
Second, it’s not clear that standard virtue epistemology can allow this way in which aptness
matters. After all, standard virtue epistemology typically doesn’t countenance the possibility of a
performance that is successful if and only if apt. In fact, as we have seen earlier, some standard
virtue epistemologists resist the thought vehemently.
202
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For the benefit of digital users, indexed terms that span two pages (e.g., 52–53) may,
on occasion, appear on only one of those pages.
abilities 1, 7–9, 27, 52, 58, 78, 80–90, Anti-Justification Argument 38–41, 53
93–98, 112, 168–172, 174–178, 180, Argument from Ignorance 159–160,
189, 191, 196–198, 200 172–173, 184, 187, 190
abominable conjunctions 173–174,
185–186, 189 belief 3–5, 14–15, 17–25, 30–36, 38–41,
activities with constitutive aims and 44, 51–60, 64, 66, 70–78, 84, 86–93,
norms (ACANs) 46–48, 51–52, 105, 109, 113, 117, 123, 125, 128,
56–58, 60, 69, 79–86, 88, 91, 93–99, 135, 141, 142–143, 146, 148,
136, 138–140, 197 151–152, 154–157, 161, 167–169,
ACAN Ability, see Principles, ACAN 171–172, 176, 181, 185, 187–188,
Ability 193–194, 196–199, 201–202
ACAN Exercise, see Principles, Competent Belief, see Principles,
ACAN Exercise Competent Belief
Apt ACAN Move, see Principles, Apt true 3–4, 7, 9, 14, 17–18, 22–24, 28,
ACAN Move 30, 32–33, 35, 38–42, 44, 64, 66,
Competent ACAN Moves, see 71–77, 113, 118, 130, 141, 144, 152,
Principles, Competent ACAN Moves 154–157, 193–194
score-based 138–140 True Belief Aim, see Principles, True
aims 1–33, 35, 37–43, 45–55, 57–66, 69, Belief Aim
72, 79, 80–86, 88, 90–91, 93–107,
130–132, 135–138, 140, 152–153, Carnap 66
159, 161–164, 167, 183, 185, Carter 154, 196
193–198, 200–201 Cases
constitutive 4–5, 8–9, 46, 48, 51–52, Fake Barns 89, 92, 113
55, 57–58, 61, 63–65, 87, 99, Inquiry 1 162–164, 183–184
136–140, 152, 157 Inquiry 1* 183–184
analysis Inquiry 2 162–164, 166–167, 171,
atomistic 66–67 183–184, 187–190
dismantling 43–46, 48–56, 66–67, 69, Inquiry 2* 183–184
77, 96–97, 107, 109, 128, 197 Inquiry 3 187–189
functional 66–67 Mixed Track Record 34–37
holistic 66–67 Stopped Clock 88, 89, 92
network 5, 8, 45, 48, 50–51, 54–56, 58, the burglar case 71, 72, 73, 74, 156
69, 77, 98–100, 103, 108, 131–132, 197 The Case 160, 167–168, 170–172,
non-reductive 5, 8, 66–67, 69–70 180–182
reductive 5, 6, 8, 39–42, 55, 66–67, 69, the Comanche case 113, 114
89, 97, 99–100, 103, 128, 132–133 The Hire 14, 17, 21–24
210