Perlembagaan Persekutuan 1 Merged Merged Merged Pages 1 11 Merged Merged

gaan Persekutuan
UNDANG-UNDANG MALAYSIA
PERLEMBAGAAN PERSEKUTUAN
Mengandungi pindaan terkini - P.U.(A) 164/2009
Dipe rkenalka n pertama kali sebagai Pe rlembagaan Persekutuan Tanah Melayu pa da Hari Kemerdekaan : 31 Ogos 1957
Berikutnya diperkenalkan sebagai Perlembagaan Persekutuan Mala ys ia pada Hari Mala ys ia : 16 September 1963

SUSUNAN PERKARA
BAHAGIAN I
NEGERI-NEGERI, AGAMA DAN UNDANG-UNDANG BAGI
PERSEKUTUAN
Perkara
1. Nama, Negeri-negeri dan wilayah-wilayah Persekutuan
2. Penerimaan masuk wilayah-wilayah baru ke dalam Persekutuan
3. Agama bagi Persekutuan
4. Undang-undang utama Persekutuan
BAHAGIAN II
KEBEBASAN ASASI
5. Kebebasan diri
6. Keabdian dan kerja paksa dilarang
7. Perlindungan daripada undang-undang jenayah kuat kuasa ke belakang
dan perbicaraan berulang
8. Kesamarataan
9. Larangan buang negeri dan kebebasan bergerak
10. Kebebasan bercakap, berhimpun dan berpersatuan
11. Kebebasan beragama
12. Hak berkenaan dengan pendidikan
13. Hak terhadap harta
BAHAGIAN III
KEWARGANEGARAAN
Bab 1—Pemerolehan Kewarganegaraan
14. Kewarganegaraan melalui kuat kuasa undang-undang

20 Undang-Undang Malaysia
Agama bagi Persekutuan

3. (1) Islam ialah agama bagi Persekutuan; tetapi agama-agama
lain boleh diamalkan dengan aman dan damai di mana-mana Bahagian
Persekutuan.
(2) Di dalam tiap-tiap Negeri selain Negeri-Negeri yang tidak

mempunyai Raja, kedudukan Raja sebagai Ketua agama Islam di
Negerinya mengikut cara dan setakat yang diakui dan ditetapkan
oleh Perlembagaan Negeri itu, dan, tertakluk kepada Perlembagaan
itu, segala hak, keistimewaan, prerogatif dan kuasa yang dinikmati
olehnya sebagai Ketua agama Islam, tidaklah tersentuh dan tercacat;
tetapi dalam apa-apa perbuatan, amalan atau upacara yang berkenaan
dengannya Majlis Raja-Raja telah bersetuju bahawa perbuatan,
amalan atau upacara itu patut diperluas ke seluruh Persekutuan,
setiap Raja lain hendaklah atas sifatnya sebagai Ketua agama Islam
membenarkan Yang di-Pertuan Agong mewakilinya.
(3) Perlembagaan-Perlembagaan Negeri Melaka, Pulau Pinang,

Sabah dan Sarawak hendaklah masing-masing membuat peruntukan
bagi memberi Yang di-Pertuan Agong kedudukan sebagai Ketua
agama Islam di Negeri itu.
(4) Tiada apa-apa jua dalam ini mengurangkan mana-mana

peruntukan lain dalam Perlembagaan ini.
(5) Walau apa pun apa-apa jua dalam Perlembagaan ini, Yang
di-Pertuan Agong hendaklah menjadi Ketua Agama Islam di Wilayah-
Wilayah Persekutuan Kuala Lumpur, Labuan dan Putrajaya; dan
bagi maksud ini Parlimen boleh melalui undang-undang
membuat peruntukan-peruntukan bagi mengawal selia hal ehwal
agama Islam dan bagi menubuhkan suatu Majlis untuk menasihati
Yang di-Pertuan Agong mengenai perkara-perkara yang berhubungan
dengan agama Islam.
Undang-undang utama Persekutuan
4. (1) Perlembagaan ini ialah undang-undang utama Persekutuan

dan apa-apa undang-undang yang diluluskan selepas Hari Merdeka
yang tidak selaras dengan Perlembagaan ini adalah tidak sah setakat
ketidakselarasan itu.
Perlembagaan Persekutuan 21
(2) Kesahan mana-mana undang-undang tidak boleh dipersoalkan

atas alasan bahawa—
(a) undang-undang itu mengenakan sekatan-sekatan ke
atas hak yang disebut dalam Perkara 9(2) tetapi tidak
berhubungan dengan perkara-perkara yang disebut
dalam Perkara itu; atau
(b) undang-undang itu mengenakan mana-mana sekatan yang
disebut dalam Perkara 10(2) tetapi sekatan-sekatan itu
tidak disifatkan perlu atau suai manfaat oleh Parlimen
bagi maksud-maksud yang disebut dalam Perkara itu.
(3) Kesahan mana-mana undang-undang yang dibuat oleh

Parlimen atau Badan Perundangan mana-mana Negeri tidak boleh
dipersoalkan atas alasan bahawa undang-undang itu membuat
peruntukan berkenaan dengan apa-apa perkara yang berkenaan
dengannya Parlimen atau, mengikut mana-mana yang berkenaan,
Badan Perundangan Negeri itu tidak mempunyai kuasa untuk
membuat undang-undang, kecuali dalam prosiding untuk
mendapatkan suatu penetapan bahawa undang-undang itu adalah
tidak sah atas alasan itu atau—
(a) jika undang-undang itu telah dibuat oleh Parlimen, dalam
prosiding antara Persekutuan dengan satu atau beberapa
Negeri;
(b) jika undang-undang itu telah dibuat oleh Badan
Perundangan sesuatu Negeri, dalam prosiding antara
Persekutuan dengan Negeri itu.
(4) Prosiding untuk mendapatkan penetapan bahawa sesuatu

undang-undang adalah tidak sah atas alasan yang disebut dalam
Fasal (3) (iaitu prosiding yang tidak termasuk dalam perenggan (a)
atau (b) Fasal itu) tidak boleh dimulakan tanpa kebenaran hakim
Mahkamah Persekutuan; dan Persekutuan berhak menjadi satu pihak
dalam mana-mana prosiding itu, dan begitulah juga dengan mana-
mana Negeri yang akan atau mungkin menjadi satu pihak dalam
prosiding yang dibawa bagi maksud yang sama di bawah perenggan
(a) atau (b) Fasal itu.
dibicarakan semula kerana kesalahan yang sama kecuali jika sabitan

atau pembebasan itu telah dibatalkan dan perbicaraan semula
diperintahkan oleh suatu mahkamah yang lebih atas daripada
mahkamah yang telah membebaskan atau mensabitkannya itu.
Kesamarataan
8. (1) Semua orang adalah sama rata di sisi undang-undang dan

berhak mendapat perlindungan yang sama rata di sisi undang-
undang.
(2) Kecuali sebagaimana yang dibenarkan dengan nyata oleh

Perlembagaan ini tidak boleh ada diskriminasi terhadap warganegara
semata-mata atas alasan agama, ras, keturunan, tempat lahir atau
jantina dalam mana-mana undang-undang atau dalam pelantikan
kepada apa-apa jawatan atau pekerjaan di bawah sesuatu pihak
berkuasa awam atau dalam pentadbiran mana-mana undang-undang
yang berhubungan dengan pemerolehan, pemegangan atau pelupusan
harta atau berhubungan dengan penubuhan atau penjalanan apa-
apa pertukangan, perniagaan, profesion, kerjaya atau pekerjaan.
(3) Tidak boleh ada diskriminasi yang memihak kepada mana-

mana orang atas alasan bahawa dia seorang rakyat Raja bagi mana-
mana Negeri.
(4) Tiada pihak berkuasa awam boleh mendiskriminasikan mana-

mana orang atas alasan bahawa dia bermastautin atau menjalankan
perniagaan di mana-mana bahagian Persekutuan di luar bidang
kuasa pihak berkuasa itu.
(5) Perkara ini tidak menidaksahkan atau melarang—

(a) apa-apa peruntukan yang mengawal selia undang-undang
diri;
(b) apa-apa peruntukan atau amalan yang mengehadkan jawatan
atau pekerjaan yang berkaitan dengan hal ehwal mana-
mana agama, atau sesuatu institusi yang diuruskan oleh
sekumpulan orang yang menganuti mana-mana agama,
kepada orang yang menganuti agama itu;
(c) apa-apa peruntukan bagi perlindungan, kesentosaan atau
pemajuan orang asli Semenanjung Tanah Melayu
Perlembagaan Persekutuan 25
(termasuk perizaban tanah) atau perizaban bagi orang

asli suatu perkadaran yang munasabah daripada jawatan-
jawatan yang sesuai dalam perkhidmatan awam;
(d) apa-apa peruntukan yang menetapkan kemastautinan di
sesuatu Negeri atau di sebahagian sesuatu Negeri sebagai
suatu kelayakan bagi pemilihan atau pelantikan kepada
mana-mana pihak berkuasa yang mempunyai bidang kuasa
hanya di Negeri atau di bahagian itu sahaja, atau bagi
pengundian dalam pemilihan itu;
(e) apa-apa peruntukan Perlembagaan sesuatu Negeri, yang
adalah atau yang bersamaan dengan suatu peruntukan
yang berkuat kuasa sebaik sebelum Hari Merdeka;
(f) apa-apa peruntukan yang mengehadkan pengambilan masuk
tentera ke dalam Rejimen Askar Melayu kepada orang
Melayu.
Larangan buang negeri dan kebebasan bergerak
9. (1) Tiada seorang pun warganegara boleh dibuang negeri dari

atau ditahan masuk ke Persekutuan.
(2) Tertakluk kepada Fasal (3) dan kepada mana-mana undang-

undang yang berhubungan dengan keselamatan Persekutuan atau
mana-mana bahagiannya, ketenteraman awam, kesihatan awam,
atau penghukuman pesalah, tiap-tiap warganegara berhak bergerak
dengan bebas di seluruh Persekutuan dan bermastautin di mana-
mana bahagiannya.
(3) Selagi mana-mana Negeri lain berada dalam kedudukan

istimewa di bawah Perlembagan ini berbanding dengan Negeri-
Negeri Tanah Melayu, Parlimen boleh melalui undang-undang
mengenakan sekatan-sekatan, antara Negeri itu dengan Negeri-
Negeri yang lain, ke atas hak-hak yang diberikan oleh Fasal (2)
berkenaan dengan pergerakan dan kemastautinan.
Kebebasan bercakap, berhimpun dan berpersatuan
10. (1) Tertakluk kepada Fasal (2), (3) dan (4)—

(a) tiap-tiap warganegara berhak kepada kebebasan bercakap
dan bersuara;
(b) semua warganegara berhak untuk berhimpun secara

aman dan tanpa senjata;
(c) semua warganegara berhak untuk membentuk persatuan.
(2) Parlimen boleh melalui undang-undang mengenakan—

(a) ke atas hak yang diberikan oleh perenggan (a) Fasal (1),
apa-apa sekatan yang didapatinya perlu atau suai manfaat
demi kepentingan keselamatan Persekutuan atau mana-
mana bahagiannya, hubungan baik dengan negara-negara
lain, ketenteraman awam atau prinsip moral dan sekatan-
sekatan yang bertujuan untuk melindungi keistimewaan
Parlimen atau mana-mana Dewan Undangan atau untuk
membuat peruntukan menentang penghinaan mahkamah,
fitnah, atau pengapian apa-apa kesalahan;
(b) ke atas hak yang diberikan oleh perenggan (b) Fasal (1),
apa-apa sekatan yang didapatinya perlu atau suai
manfaat demi kepentingan keselamatan Persektuan
atau mana-mana bahagiannya atau ketenteraman awam;
(c) ke atas hak yang diberikan oleh perenggan (c) Fasal (1),
apa-apa sekatan yang didapatinya perlu atau suai
manfaat demi kepentingan keselamatan Persekutuan
atau mana-mana bahagiannya, ketenteraman awam atau
prinsip moral.
(3) Sekatan-sekatan ke atas hak untuk membentuk persatuan

yang diberikan oleh perenggan (c) Fasal (1) boleh juga dikenakan
oleh mana-mana undang-undang yang berhubungan dengan
perburuhan atau pendidikan.
(4) Pada mengenakan sekatan-sekatan demi kepentingan

keselamatan Persekutuan atau mana-mana bahagiannya atau
ketenteraman awam di bawah Fasal (2)(a), Parlimen boleh
meluluskan undang-undang melarang dipersoalkan apa-apa
perkara, hak, taraf, kedudukan, keistimewaan, kedaulatan atau
prerogatif yang ditetapkan atau dilindungi oleh peruntukan
Bahagian III, Perkara 152, 153 atau 181 melainkan yang
berhubungan dengan pelaksanaannya sebagaimana yang
dinyatakan dalam undang-undang itu.
UNDANG-UNDANG MALAYSIA
AKTA 588
AKTA KOMUNIKASI DAN MULTIMEDIA 1998
Mengandungi pindaan terkini - Akta A1220/2004
Tarikh Persetujuan Diraja: 23 September 1998

Tarikh diterbitkan dalam Warta: 15 Oktober 1998
Tarikh mula berkuatkuasa ditetapkan: [1 April 1999, P.U. (B) 128/1999—
kecuali ss. 157, 159-162, 164-171,
176, 178, 197 & 198; 1 April 2000,
P.U. (B) 106/2000—ss. 157, 159-
162, 164-171, 176 & 178; 1 Mac
2002, P.U. (B) 66/2002—ss. 197 &
198]
Cetakan semula: Pertama: 2006
_____________
SUSUNAN SEKSYEN
_____________
Tajuk Panjang & Mukadimah.
BAHAGIAN I - PERMULAAN
Seksyen 1. Tajuk ringkas.

Seksyen 2. Permulaan kuat kuasa.
Seksyen 3. Matlamat.
Seksyen 4. Pemakaian wilayah dan luar wilayah.
Seksyen 5. Kuasa Menteri untuk mengecualikan orang, kawasan geografi tertentu, dll.
Seksyen 6. Tafsiran.
BAHAGIAN II - KUASA DAN TATACARA MENTERI
Bab 1 - Arahan Menteri
Seksyen 7. Arahan oleh Menteri.

Seksyen 8. Perubahan arahan.
Seksyen 9. Daftar arahan.
Bab 2 - Penentuan Menteri
Seksyen 10. Penentuan oleh Menteri.

Seksyen 11. Perubahan penentuan.
230. Menteri boleh membuat peraturan-peraturan.
Menteri boleh, atas syor Suruhanjaya, membuat peraturan-peraturan berkenaan dengan cara bagi
melaksanakan peruntukan Bab ini.
Bab 2 - Kesalahan Dan Penalti Tambahan
231. Kesalahan jika menggunakan radas atau peranti tanpa kelulusan.
Seseorang yang menggunakan apa-apa radas atau peranti dengan niat untuk memperoleh maklumat
berkenaan dengan kandungan, penghantar atau orang yang kepadanya dialamatkan apa-apa
komunikasi tanpa kelulusan oleh agensi pemerakuan berdaftar di bawah Bab 3 Bahagian VII
melakukan suatu kesalahan dan apabila disabitkan boleh didenda tidak melebihi lima puluh ribu
ringgit atau dipenjarakan selama tempoh tidak melebihi satu tahun atau kedua-duanya.
232. Penggunaan secara fraud kemudahan rangkaian, perkhidmatan rangkaian, dll.
(1) Seseorang yang—
(a) secara tidak jujur menghantar atau membenarkan untuk dihantar mana-mana komunikasi
atau memperoleh suatu perkhidmatan yang diberikan oleh seorang pemberi kemudahan
rangkaian, pemberi perkhidmatan rangkaian, pemberi perkhidmatan aplikasi atau pemberi
perkhidmatan aplikasi kandungan berlesen; atau
(b) secara tidak jujur menerima perkhidmatan aplikasi kandungan dari suatu tempat di dalam
Malaysia yang tidak dimaksudkan untuk penerimaan umum,
dengan niat untuk mengelakkan pembayaran apa-apa kadar atau fi yang dikenakan bagi pemberian
kemudahan atau perkhidmatan itu melakukan suatu kesalahan.
(2) Seseorang yang memiliki, memperoleh atau mewujudkan suatu sistem yang direka bentuk untuk
menggunakan atau memperoleh secara fraud mana-mana kemudahan rangkaian, perkhidmatan
rangkaian, perkhidmatan aplikasi atau perkhidmatan aplikasi kandungan, melakukan suatu
kesalahan.
(3) Seseorang yang melakukan kesalahan di bawah subseksyen (1) atau (2) apabila disabitkan boleh
didenda tidak melebihi tiga ratus ribu ringgit atau dipenjarakan selama tempoh tidak melebihi tiga
tahun atau kedua-duanya.
233. Penggunaan tidak wajar kemudahan rangkaian atau perkhidmatan rangkaian, dll.
(1) Seseorang yang—
(a) dengan menggunakan mana-mana kemudahan rangkaian atau perkhidmatan rangkaian

atau perkhidmatan aplikasi secara sedar—
(i) membuat, mewujudkan atau meminta-minta; dan
(ii) memulakan penghantaran,

apa-apa komen, permintaan, cadanganatau komunikasi lain yang lucah, sumbang,
palsu, mengancam atau jelik sifatnya dengan niat untuk menyakitkan hati,
menganiayai, mengugut atau mengganggu orang lain; atau
(b) memulakan suatu komunikasi dengan menggunakan mana-mana perkhidmatan aplikasi,

sama ada secara berterusan, berulang kali atau selainnya, dan dalam masa itu komunikasi
mungkin atau tidak mungkin berlaku, dengan atau tanpa mendedahkan identitinya dan
dengan niat untuk menyakitkan hati, menganiayai, mengugut atau mengganggu mana-mana
orang di mana-mana nombor atau alamat elektronik,
melakukan suatu kesalahan.
(2) Seseorang yang secara sedar—
(a) dengan menggunakan suatu perkhidmatan rangkaian atau perkhidmatan aplikasi

memberikan apa-apa komunikasi lucah bagi maksud komersial kepada mana-mana orang;
atau
(b) membenarkan suatu perkhidmatan rangkaian atau perkhidmatan aplikasi di bawah

kawalan orang itu untuk digunakan bagi suatu aktiviti yang diperihalkan dalam perenggan (a),
(3) Seseorang yang melakukan suatu kesalahan di bawah seksyen ini apabila disabitkan boleh
didenda tidak melebihi lima puluh ribu ringgit atau dipenjarakan selama tempoh tidak melebihi satu
tahun atau kedua-duanya dan hendaklah juga boleh didenda selanjutnya satu ribu ringgit bagi setiap
hari kesalahan itu diteruskan selepas pensabitan.
234. Pemintasan dan pendedahan komunikasi dilarang.
(1) Seseorang yang tanpa kebenaran yang sah di bawah Akta ini atau mana-mana undang-undang
bertulis yang lain—
(a) memintas, cuba untuk memintas, atau mendapatkan mana-mana orang lain supaya
memintas, atau cuba untuk memintas, apa-apa komunikasi;
(b) mendedah, atau cuba untuk mendedahkan, kepada mana-mana orang lain kandungan
apa-apa komunikasi, sedangkan dia mengetahui atau mempunyai sebab untuk mempercayai
bahawa maklumat itu telah diperoleh melalui pemintasan mana-mana komunikasi dengan
melanggar seksyen ini; atau
(c) menggunakan, atau cuba untuk menggunakan, kandungan apa-apa komunikasi,

sedangkan dia mengetahui atau mempunyai sebab untuk mempercayai bahawa maklumat itu
telah diperoleh melalui pemintasan apa-apa komunikasi dengan melanggar seksyen ini,
(2) Seseorang yang dibenarkan di bawah Akta ini yang dengan sengaja mendedahkan, atau cuba
untuk mendedahkan, kepada mana-mana orang lain kandungan apa-apa komunikasi, yang dipintas
dengan cara yang dibenarkan oleh Akta ini—
(a) sedangkan dia mengetahui atau mempunyai sebab untuk mempercayai bahawa
maklumat itu telah diperoleh melalui pemintasan komunikasi itu berkaitan dengan suatu
penyiasatan jenayah;
THE INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY ACT, 2000
–––––––––
ARRANGEMENT OF SECTIONS
–––––––––
CHAPTER I
PRELIMINARY
SECTIONS
1. Short title, extent, commencement and application.
2. Definitions.
CHAPTER II
DIGITAL SIGNATURE AND ELECTRONIC SIGNATURE
3. Authentication of electronic records.
3A. Electronic signature.
CHAPTER III
ELECTRONIC GOVERNANCE
4. Legal recognition of electronic records.
5. Legal recognition of electronic signatures.
6. Use of electronic records and electronic signatures in Government and its agencies.
6A. Delivery of services by service provider.
7. Retention of electronic records.
7A. Audit of documents, etc., maintained in electronic form.
8. Publication of rule, regulation, etc., in Electronic Gazette.
9. Sections 6, 7 and 8 not to confer right to insist document should be accepted in electronic form.
10. Power to make rules by Central Government in respect of electronic signature.
10A. Validity of contracts formed through electronic means.
CHAPTER IV
ATTRIBUTION, ACKNOWLEDGEMENT AND DESPATCH OF ELECTRONIC RECORDS
11. Attribution of electronic records.
12. Acknowledgment of receipt.
13. Time and place of despatch and receipt of electronic record.
CHAPTER V
SECURE ELECTRONIC RECORDS AND SECURE ELECTRONIC SIGNATURE
14. Secure electronic record.
15. Secure electronic signature.
16. Security procedures and practices.
CHAPTER VI
REGULATION OF CERTIFYING AUTHORITIES
17. Appointment of Controller and other officers.
18. Functions of Controller.
19. Recognition of foreign Certifying Authorities.
20. [Omitted.]
21. Licence to issue electronic signature Certificates.
22. Application for licence.
23. Renewal of licence.
24. Procedure for grant or rejection of licence.
25. Suspension of licence.
26. Notice of suspension or revocation of licence.
1
Explanation.–For the purposes of this section,–
(a) the word “dishonestly” shall have the meaning assigned to it in section 24 of the Indian Penal
Code (45 of 1860);
(b) the word “fraudulently” shall have the meaning assigned to it in section 25 of the Indian Penal
Code (45 of 1860).
66A. Punishment for sending offensive messages through communication service, etc.–Any
person who sends, by means of a computer resource or a communication device,–
(a) any information that is grossly offensive or has menacing character; or
(b) any information which he knows to be false, but for the purpose of causing annoyance,
inconvenience, danger, obstruction, insult, injury, criminal intimidation, enmity, hatred or ill will,
persistently by making use of such computer resource or a communication device;
(c) any electronic mail or electronic mail message for the purpose of causing annoyance or
inconvenience or to deceive or to mislead the addressee or recipient about the origin of such
messages,
shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term which may extend to three years and with fine.
Explanation.–For the purposes of this section, terms “electronic mail” and “electronic mail message”
means a message or information created or transmitted or received on a computer, computer system,
computer resource or communication device including attachments in text, image, audio, video and any
other electronic record, which may be transmitted with the message.
66B. Punishment for dishonestly receiving stolen computer resource or communication
device.–Whoever dishonestly receive or retains any stolen computer resource or communication device
knowing or having reason to believe the same to be stolen computer resource or communication device,
shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to three years or
with fine which may extend to rupees one lakh or with both.
66C. Punishment for identity theft.–Whoever, fraudulently or dishonestly make use of the
electronic signature, password or any other unique identification feature of any other person, shall be
punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to three years and shall
also be liable to fine which may extend to rupees one lakh.
66D. Punishment for cheating by personation by using computer resource.–Whoever, by means of
any communication device or computer resource cheats by personation, shall be punished with
imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to three years and shall also be liable to
fine which may extend to one lakh rupees.
66E. Punishment for violation of privacy.–Whoever, intentionally or knowingly captures, publishes
or transmits the image of a private area of any person without his or her consent, under circumstances
violating the privacy of that person, shall be punished with imprisonment which may extend to three years
or with fine not exceeding two lakh rupees, or with both.
Explanation.–For the purposes of this section–
(a) “transmit” means to electronically send a visual image with the intent that it be viewed by a
person or persons;
(b) “capture”, with respect to an image, means to videotape, photograph, film or record by any
means;
(c) “private area” means the naked or undergarment clad genitals, public area, buttocks or female
breast:
(d) “publishes” means reproduction in the printed or electronic form and making it available for
public;
(e) “under circumstances violating privacy” means circumstances in which a person can have a
reasonable expectation that–
(i) he or she could disrobe in privacy, without being concerned that an image of his private
area was being captured; or
24
NOR HISHAM BIN OSMAN v PENDAKWA RAYA
CaseAnalysis
| [2010] MLJU 1249
Nor Hisham bin Osman v Pendakwa Raya [2010] MLJU 1249

Malayan Law Journal Unreported
HIGH COURT (SHAH ALAM)

Siti Khadijah Sheikh Hassan Badjenid, JC
PERMOHONAN JENAYAH NO 44-14-2010
26 August 2010
N/A
Siti Khadijah Sheikh Hassan Badjenid, JC

ALASAN PENGHAKIMAN
Nor Hisham bin Osman memohon kepada mahkamah supaya membatal dan atau mengenepikan pertuduhan dan
pendakwaan jenayah di Mahkamah Sesyen Jenayah Petaling Jaya Saman no 63-21-09 yang dikemukakan
terhadap beliau atas pertuduhan di bawah seksyen 233(1)(a) Akta Komunikasi dan Multimedia 1998 [Akta 588]
(akan dirujuk sebagai Akta 1998 selepas ini) atas alasan ianya adalah tidak sah kerana bercanggah dengan
Perlembagaan Persekutuan.
Pertuduhan terhadap pemohon adalah pada 11.12.09 beliau telah menghantar melalui internet komen yang jelek
sifatnya iaitu "DAULAT TUANKU, JILAT TAIK KIT terhadap DYMM Sultan Perak di
http://books.dreambook.com.webper/dul l.html yang mempunyai pautan kepada laman web pejabat DYMM Sultan
Perak iaitu www.sultan.perak.gov.my dengan niat untuk menyakitkan hati orang lain dan boleh dihukum di bawah
seksyen 233(3) Akta yang sama. Mengikut pemohon peruntukan ini bercanggah dengan haknya untuk mendapat
kebebasan asasi sepertimana yang dijamin oleh Perlembagaan.
Jika didapati bersalah pemohon boleh didenda tidak melebihi RM50,000.00 atau dipenjarakan selama tempoh tidak
melebihi 1 tahun atau kedua-duanya dan hendaklah juga boleh didenda selanjutnya RM1,000.00 bagi setiap hari
kesalahan itu diteruskan selepas pensabitan.
Tiga (3) isu yang perlu diputuskan adalah:-
A. Samadaseksyen 233(1)(a) Akta 1998 menyekat kebebasan bercakap dan ekspresi diri yang ditetapkan oleh
Perkara 10(1)(a) Perlembagaan Persekutuan?
Mengikut pemohon bahagian peruntukan bawahseksyen 233(1)(a) Akta 1998 yang menjadikan kesalahan untuk
"menyakitkan hati orang lain" merupakan sekatan kepada kebebasan untuk bercakap dan ekspresi diri yang
dimaksudkan oleh Perkara 10(1)(a) Perlembagaan Persekutuan.
Mengikut responden kebebasan yang diberi bukan merupakan pas untuk mengenepikan kewajipan bertindak
dengan penuh tanggungjawab.
Mahkamah mendapati sekatan atas kebebasan untuk bersuara dan ekspresi diri melalui seksyen seksyen
233(1)(a)) Akta 1998 adalah untuk memastikan kebebasan yang diberi oleh Perlembagaan dimunafaatkan dengan
penuh tanggungjawab.
Page 2 of 4
B. Samada sekatan ini dibenarkan oleh Perkara 10(2)(a) Perlembagaan tersebut?
Mengikut pemohon sekatan yang berbangkit melalui seksyen 233(1)(a)Akta 1998 tidak mematuhi Perkara 10(2)(a)
Perlembagaan Persekutuan (yang membenarkan undang-undang dibuat untuk menyekat kebebasan bersuara bagi
beberapa objektif tertentu sahaja).
Mengikut responden pula kebebasan yang diberi di bawah Perkara 10(1) Perlembagaan bukanlah hak yang diberi
secara mutlak (sepertimana di Amerika) sebaliknya mengikut peruntukan Perkara 10 Perlembagaan itu sendiri
kebebasan tersebut adalah tertakluk kepada sekatan yang digariskan dalam klausa-klausa (2) (3) & (4) Perkara
yang sama.
Merujuk kepada Perkara 10 Perlembagaan:-
Kebebasan bercakap, berhimpun dan menubuh persatuan. (1) Tertakluk kepada pasal (2), (3) dan (4)
(a)Tiap-tiap warganegara adalah berhak bebas bercakap dan mengeluarkan fikiran;
(b) (c)
(2) Parlimen boleh dengan undang-undang mengenakan-
(a) Ke atas hak-hak yang diberi oleh perenggan (a) Fasal (1), apa-apa sekatan yang didapatinya perlu atau
mustahak demi kepentingan keselamatan Persekutuan atau mana-mana bahagiannya, perhubungan
persahabatan dengan negeri-negeri lain, ketenteraman awam untuk melindungi keistimewaan-keistimewaan
Parlimen atau mana-mana Dewan Negeri atau untuk mengelakkan penghinaan terhadap mahkamah, fitnah, atau
perbuatan mengapi-api supaya dilakukan sesuatu kesalahan;
(b) .....
(c) ......
(3)........
(4)Pada mengenakan sekatan-sekatan demi kepentingan keselamatan Persekutuan atau mana-mana bahagiannya atau
ketenteraman awam di bawah Fasal (2)(a), Parlimen boleh meluluskan undang-undang melarang perbuatan
mempersoalkan apa-apa perkara, hak, taraf, kedudukan, keistimewaan, kedaulatan atau hak kedaulatan yang ditetapkan
atau diperlindung oleh Perutukan Bahagian 3, Perkara 152, 153 atau 181 berhubung dengan apa-apa jua melainkan
berhubung dengan pelaksanaannya sebagaimana yang dinyatakan dalam undang-undang itu.
Melalui kesSivarasa Rasiah v. Badan Peguam Malaysia & Anor [2010] 3 CU 507 Mahkamah Persekutuan memberi
panduan caranya untuk mentafsir peruntukan Perlembagaan. laitu tafsiran yang meluas (bermurah hati) tatkala mentafsir
berkenaan kebebasan asasi (fundamental liberties must be generously interpreted), dan secara terhad (restrictively)
apabila mentafsir peruntukan yang menyekat kebebasan yang dijamin oleh Perlembagaan itu.
Dalam kes ini mahkamah dikehendaki menentukan samada sekatan ke atas kebebasan melalui peruntukan
undang-undang bawahseksyen 233(1)(a)Akta 1998 -termasuk di bawah objektif yang terkandung dalam
peruntukan Perkara 10(2)(a) Perlembagaan. Seterusnya mahkamah perlu menentukan samada peruntukan
seksyen 233(1)(a) mencabuli hak pemohon untuk bercakap dan ekspres diri.
Sekali lagi merujuk kepada kes Sivarasa untuk menentukan samada sekatan yang dikenakan keatas kebebasan itu
sah mahkamah perlu menimbangkan samada sekatan melalui undang-undang itu munasabah dan berjustifikasi
bagi maksud Perkara seperti yang diperuntukkan itu.
Dalam kes ini dimana ekspresi diri melalui kata-kata jelek khususnya "DAULAT TUANKU, JILAT TAIK KU" yang di
tujukan kepada DYMM Sultan Perak yang merupakan seorang raja berperlembagaan, didapati bukan saja
menyakitkan hati sesiapapun ekspresi diri itu ditujukan bahkan tidak langsung menunjukkan kepada mahkamah
bagaimana dikatakan ianya mempunyai nilai yang memunafa'atkan kepentingan awam.
Page 3 of 4
Bukanlah sesuatu di luar dugaan, semata-mata agakan atau tidak masuk akal bahawa ekspresi diri melalui komen
sebegini jika dibiarkan tanpa sekatan, dalam keadaan tertentu lebih-lebih dalam keadaan masyarakat berbilang
kaum dengan pelbagai fahamannya, boleh secara munasabahnya mencetuskan sentimen di kalangan mereka
yang menjunjung tinggi kedaulatan raja berperlembagaan, menyemarakkan ketegangan perkauman dan
meretakkan ikatan perpaduan. Tentunya itu akan memudaratkan keselamatan Persekutuan atau mana-mana
bahagiannya.
Di samping itu mahkamah mengambil kira bahawa percakapan atau ekspresi diri tidak akan dikeluarkan tanpa ada
pihak yang mendengar atau yang menerimanya. Secara lumrahnya kedua-dua pihak saling memerlukan dan
sentiasa berjalan seiringan. Dengan itu tatkala Perlembagaan memberi hak kebebasan kepada yang bercakap dan
yang mengekspres diri, seksyen 233(1)(a)sekadar memelihara dan melindungi hak pihak yang mendengar dan
yang menerima ekspresi tersebut, sekali gus mengimbang hak kedua-duanya.
Mahkamah mendapati sekatan ini merupakan sesuatu yang munasabah dan berjustifikasi serta sampai kepada
objektif atau matlamat yang dimaksudkan oleh Perkara 10(2)(a). Perlembagaan Persekutuan, dengan jangkauan
kearifannya yang tidak terbatas bertujuan memelihara hak semua rakyat Malaysia yang bernaung di bawah
perlindungannya, tanpa mengira warna, agama, pangkat mahupun darjat.
C. Samada seksyen 233(1)(a)Akta 1998 konsisten dengan Perkara 10(l)(a) dan 10(2)(a) Perlembagaan
Persekutuan?
Mengikut pemohon memandangkan ianya bukan suatu sekatan yang munasabah bertujuan mencapai objektif
Perkara 10(2)(a) maka ianya tidak selaras dengan tujuan yang sah di sisi undang-undang untuk menyekat hak
asasi pemohon.
Sepertimana dihuraikan sebelum ini mahkamah memutuskan bahawa seksyen 233(1)(a)Akta 1998 merupakan
sekatan yang munasabah bertujuan mencapai objektif Perkara 10(2)(a) Perlembagaan maka ianya adalah selaras
dengan tujuan Perlembagaan Persekutuan, dan tidak mencabul hak pemohon di sisi Perlembagaan.
D. Samada pemohon terikat dengan Perkara 4(4) Perlembagaan Persekutuan?
Perkara 4(4) memperuntukkan:
Pembicaraan untuk mendapatkan sesuatu penetapan yang sesuatu undang-undang adalah tidak sah atas alasan
yang tersebut dalam fasal (3) (iaitu pembicaraan yang tidak termasuk di bawah (a) atau (b) Fasal itu) tidak boleh
dimulakan dengan tiada kebenaran seorang hakim Mahkamah Persekutuan;
Fasal 3 kepada perkara 4 memperuntukkan bahawa sahnya sesuatu undang undang yang dibuat oleh Parlimen
atau oleh Badan Perundangan Negeri tidak boleh dipersoalkan atas alasan bahawa undang-undang itu membuat
peruntukan mengenai apa-apa perkara yang Parlimen atau mana-mana badan perundangan berkenaan itu tidak
mempunyai kuasa membuatnya kecuali dalam pembicaraan untuk mendapatkan suatu penetapan yang undang-
undang itu adalah tidak sah atas alasan itu atau-
(a) Jika undang-undang itu telah dibuat oleh Parlimen, dalam pembicaraan antara Persekutuan dengan satu
atau beberapa Negeri;
(b) Jika undang-undang itu telah dibuat oleh Badan Perundangan Negeri, dalam pembicaraan antara
Persekutuan dengan Negeri itu.
Dalam permohonan di mahkamah ini adalah jelas pertikaian pemohon bukanlah terhadap kuasa Parlimen membuat
undang-undang Akta 1998, sebaliknya beliau mencabar peruntukan akta itu atas alasan ianya tidak sah kerana
bercanggah dengan Perlembagaan Persekutuan.
Dalam Ah Thian v. Government of Malaysia [1976]2 MLJ ms 112 di ms 113 yang membincangkan perkara yang
sama Sufian LP ( KH pada ketika itu) memutuskan-
"The applicant wants to attack the validity of the Firearms (Increased Penalties) Act not on the ground that it relates to a
matter with respect to which Parliament has no power to make law The applicant says that the Act is invalid because it is
inconsistent with the Constitution,.... Therefore clause (4) of article 4 and clause (1) of article 128 do not apply and the point
may be raised in the ordinary way in the course of submission, and determined in the High Court, without reference to the
Page 4 of 4
Federal Court, and there is no need for leave of a judge of the Federal Court."
Sehubungan dengan itu melihat kepada situasi dalam kes ini mahkamah memutuskan bahawa pemohon tidak
terikat dengan Perkara 4(4) Perlembagaan dan beliau tidak perlu untuk mendapatkan kebenaran seorang hakim
Mahkamah Persekutuan sebelum mengemukakan permohonannya di mahkamah ini.
Berhubung dengan permohonan dalam kes ini mahkamah menolak permohonan pemohon.
End of Document
Mohd Fahmi Reza bin Mohd Zarin lwn Pendakwa Raya
[2020] 7 MLJ (Mohd Radzi PK) 399
A Mohd Fahmi Reza bin Mohd Zarin lwn Pendakwa Raya
MAHKAMAH TINGGI (IPOH) — RAYUAN JENAYAH

NO AA-42S-3–02 TAHUN 2018
B
MOHD RADZI PK
7 JANUARI 2019
Undang-Undang Jenayah — Rayuan — Rayuan terhadap sabitan dan

C hukuman — Perayu memuat naik komunikasi di laman Facebook — Perayu
disabitkan dengan pertuduhan di bawah s 233(1)(a) Akta Komunikasi dan
Multimedia 1998 — Perayu dijatuhkan hukuman satu bulan penjara dan denda
RM30,000 — Sama ada perayu memuat naik suatu komunikasi — Sama ada
komunikasi tersebut palsu sifatnya — Sama ada komunikasi dimuat naik dengan
D
niat untuk menyakitkan hati orang lain — Akta Komunikasi dan Multimedia
1998 s 233(1)(a)
Ini adalah rayuan perayu yang tidak berpuas hati terhadap keputusan hakim
E mahkamah sesyen yang mensabitkan perayu dengan pertuduhan di bawah
s 233(1)(a) Akta Komunikasi dan Multimedia 1998 (‘Akta’) dan menjatuhkan
hukuman satu bulan penjara dan denda RM30,000. Perayu telah dihadapkan
dengan pertuduhan di bawah s 233(1)(a) Akta atas kesalahanya menggunakan
perkhidmatan aplikasi melalu laman profil Facebook miliknya dan
F menghantar komunikasi yang palsu sifatnya dengan niat menyakitkan hati
orang lain (‘komunikasi tersebut’). Perayu dan pihak pendakwaan berhujah
bahawa tiga elemen yang perlu dibuktikan oleh pihak pendakwaan bagi
pertuduhan di bawah s 233 Akta adalah: (a) perayu telah menggunakan
aplikasi laman profil Facebook miliknya untuk memuat naik suatu
G komunikasi; (b) komunikasi tersebut adalah palsu sifatnya; dan (c) komunikasi
tersebut dimuat naik dengan niat di pihak perayu untuk menyakitkan hati
orang lain.
Diputuskan, mengekalkan sabitan, membenarkan rayuan perayu terhadap

H hukuman, membatalkan hukuman hakim mahkamah sesyen dan
menggantikannya dengan hukuman denda RM10,000 jika tidak bayar satu
bulan penjara:
(1) Setelah meneliti semua rekod rayuan dan hujahan bertulis peguam
I perayu dan pendakwa raya, hakim Mahkamah Tinggi memutuskan
segala fakta dan undang-undang oleh hakim mahkamah sesyen adalah
betul (lihat perenggan 2).
(2) Elemen pertama diakui dan tidak dipertikaikan oleh perayu dan oleh itu,
mahkamah memutuskan bahawa tidak perlu untuk meneliti serta
400 Malayan Law Journal [2020] 7 MLJ
membuat kupasan undang-undang untuk elemen ini. Perkara ini A

dinyatakan dengan jelas dalam hujahan bertulis peguam perayu (lihat
perenggan 10).
(3) Perayu merumuskan bahawa komunikasi tersebut bersifat parodi dan
adalah suatu satira politik untuk mengkritik pihak berkuasa kerana B
menyekat kebebasan berekspresi dan internet. Mahkamah merumuskan
bahawa perayu tidak boleh dipaksa atau disekat dari berpandangan
sedemikian kerana berpandangan sedemikian bukan suatu jenayah.
Tetapi tatkala pandangan sedemikian dijelmakan dalam bentuk
komunikasi, maka pada saat itu perayu tidak boleh mengatakan C
komunikasi yang diciptanya tidak bercanggah dengan undang-undang.
Ini adalah alasan utama mahkamah menolak hujahan perayu bahawa
tidak wujud unsur atau elemen palsu sifatnya semata-mata kerana ia
dianggap oleh perayu sebagai suatu nukilan fakta (lihat
perenggan 22–23). D
(4) Setelah menilai keterangan saksi, mahkamah berpuas hati bahawa
walaupun komunikasi di Lampiran A kepada pertuduhan tersebut
merupakan kerja seni yang halus dan kreatif yang dicipta perayu untuk
mengkritik kerajaan dan pihak berkuasa, ia telah dihasilkan dengan niat
E
untuk menyakitkan hati orang lain. Komunikasi tersebut tidak boleh
dianggap sebagai satu parodi kerana ia gagal memenuhi erti kata ‘parodi’.
Komunikasi tersebut tidak berhak untuk ditampakkan oleh perayu
kepada khalayak tanpa saksi undang-undang dan ia tidak dilindungi oleh
peruntukan berkaitan dalam Perlembagaan Persekutuan. Ia adalah
F
komunikasi yang melanggar peruntukan s 233(1) Akta (lihat perenggan
27–28 & 40).
(5) Mengenai hukuman, mahkamah membuat ‘judicial notice’ bahawa pada
11 Oktober 2018, Mahkamah Sesyen Kuala Lumpur telah
membebaskan perayu setelah pihak pendakwaan menarik balik kes G
terhadap perayu yang dituduh bagi pertuduhan di bawah peruntukan
undang-undang yang sama bagi kesalahan melibatkan komunikasi yang
sama dengan pertuduhan di hadapan mahkamah ini sekarang.
Mahkamah juga mengambil maklum mengenai laporan media yang
menyebut tentang maklumat dari YB Menteri Komunikasi dan H
Multimedia mengenai pindaan yang sedang dibuat terhadap s 233 Akta
bagi memansuhkan unsur-unsur yang dikatakan oleh beliau sebagai
bersifat ‘draconian’. Setelah mengambil kira segala perkara tersebut,
mahkamah telah membenarkan rayuan perayu terhadap hukuman (lihat
perenggan 42–44). I
[English summary
This was an appeal of the appellant who was dissatisfied with the decision of a
session court judge convicting the appellant on the charge under s 233(1)(a) of
A the Communications and Multimedia Act 1998 (‘the Act’) for a one month jail
and a fine of RM30,000. The appellant was charged under s 233(1)(a) of the
Act for using an application through his Facebook profile page and sending
false communications of its nature with intent to injure others (‘the
communication’). The appellant and the prosecution argue that the three
B elements that the prosecution must fulfill for the charge under s 233 of the Act
are: (a) the appellant has used his Facebook page application to upload the
communication; (b) the communication is false in nature; and (c) the
communication was uploaded with intent on the appellant’s behalf to injure
the other person.
C
Held, upheld the conviction, allowed the appeal on sentencing, sessions court
sentencing revoked and replaced with a fine of RM10,000 fail to pay one
month imprisonment:
D (1) After reviewing all record of appeals and written submissions from the
defense and prosecution, the High Court judge has ruled that all facts
and the law by the session court judge are correct (see para 2).
(2) The first element was acknowledged and not disputed by the appellant
E and, therefore, the court ruled that it was not necessary to review and
establish legal remedies for this element. This is clearly stated in the
written argument of the appellant’s lawyer (see para 10).
(3) The appellant contended that the communication was a parody and that
it was a political satire to criticise the authorities for restricting freedom of
F expression and the internet. The court held that the appellant could not
be coerced or restricted from such a view because such a view was not a
crime. But when such views are expressed in the form of
communications, then the appellant cannot say that the communication
he creates does not conflict with the law. This is the main reason the court
G rejects the appellant’s argument that no element or false element exists
solely because it is regarded by the appellant as a factual statement (see
paras 22–23).
(4) After reviewing the evidence of the witness, the court is satisfied that
H although the communication in Appendix A to the charge was a fine and
creative work of art created by the appellant to criticise the government
and the authorities, it was produced with the intent to injure others. Such
communication cannot be considered a parody because it fails to fulfill
the meaning of the word ‘parody’. Such communication does not entitle
I the appellant to appear before the public without a legal witness and is
not protected by the provisions of the Federal Constitution. It is a
communication that violates the provisions of s 233(1)(1) of the Act (see
paras 27–28 & 40).
(5) On sentencing, the court made a judicial notice that on 11 October
2011, Kuala Lumpur Sessions Court acquitted the appellant after the A
prosecution withdrew the case against the appellant for the charge under
the same provision for an offence of communication similar to the charge
before this court today. The court also noted media reports citing the
information from the Minister of Communications and Multimedia on
amendments being made to s 233 of the Act to repeal elements he B
described as ‘draconian’. After considering all of these, the court allowed
appellant’s appeal against the sentence (see paras 42–44).]
Kes-kes yang dirujuk

C
Ong Eng Guan v PP [1956] 1 MLJ 44 (dirujuk)
PP v Rutinin Suhaimin [2013] 2 CLJ 427, MT (dirujuk)
Sepakat Efektif Sdn Bhd v Menteri Dalam Negeri & Anor and another suit
[2014] MLJU 1874; [2015] 2 CLJ 328, MR (dirujuk)
T Ponnamalam and 11 Others v PP [1948] 1 MLJ 76 (dirujuk) D
The People of the State of New York v Raphael Golb [2013] NY Slip Op 00436
[102 AD3d 601] (dirujuk)
Undang-undang yang dirujuk

Constitution of the United States [US] First Amendment E
Akta Komunikasi dan Multimedia 1998 s 233, 233(1), (1)(a), (1)(b)
Perlembagaan Persekutuan
Syahredzan Johan (Ramrais & Partners) bagi pihak perayu.
Mohd Sophian Zakaria (Timbalan Pendakwa Raya, Pejabat Timbalan F
Pendakwa Raya Negeri Perak) bagi pihak responden.
Mohd Radzi PK:
RAYUAN G
[1] Di hadapan saya adalah suatu rayuan oleh perayu yang tidak berpuas hati
terhadap keputusan hakim mahkamah sesyen yang bijaksana (‘HMS’) pada
20 Februari 2018 yang mensabitkan perayu dengan pertuduhan di bawah
s 233(1)(a) Akta Komunikasi dan Multimedia 1998 (Akta 588) (‘Akta KMM’), H
dan menjatuhkan hukuman satu bulan penjara dan denda RM30,000.
[2] Setelah meneliti fakta kes serta peruntukan undang-undang berkaitan,

serta setelah saya meneliti semua rekod rayuan dan juga hujahan bertulis
peguam perayu dan pihak pendakwa raya, saya memutuskan bahawa segala I
dapatan fakta dan undang-undang oleh HMS adalah betul. Maka saya
mengekalkan sabitan terhadap perayu bagi pertuduhan di bawah s 233(1)(a)
Akta KMM. Namun setelah mengambil kira pelbagai faktor, saya
membatalkan hukuman yang telah dijatuhkan oleh HMS dan
A menggantikannya dengan hukuman denda RM10,000, jika tidak bayar satu

bulan penjara.
[3] Perayu sekarang memfailkan rayuan ini kerana tidak berpuas hati
terhadap keputusan saya yang mengekalkan sabitan terhadapnya.
B
[4] Alasan penghakiman ini hanya memfokus kepada alasan-alasan yang
membawa kepada keputusan saya yang mengekalkan sabitan sahaja dan tidak
menyentuh secara mendalam alasan saya mengenai hukuman.
C
LATAR BELAKANG
[5] Perayu dihadapkan dengan pertuduhan di bawah s 233(1)(a) Akta

KMM atas kesalahannya pada 8 Februari 2016 jam lebih kurang 12.31 tengah
D hari menggunakan perkhidmatan aplikasi melalui laman profil Facebook milik
beliau dan menghantar komunikasi yang palsu sifatnya, seperti di Lampiran A
kepada pertuduhan, dengan niat menyakitkan hati orang lain.
[6] Lampiran A tersebut adalah dipaparkan di pautan:

E https://www.facebook.com/photo.php?fbid=957284987640269&set=a.1003
78253330951.605.100000763298189&type=3&theater dan salinan
komunikasi berkenaan adalah seperti saya tandakan sebagai ‘PAPARAN A’
berikut:
PAPARAN A
F
I
PERTUDUHAN A
[7] Perayu dihadapkan dengan pertuduhan seperti berikut:

Bahawa kamu pada 8 Februari 2016, jam lebih kurang 12.31 tengahari telah
didapati menggunakan perkhidmatan aplikasi melalui laman profil Facebook B
‘Fahmi Reza’ di pautan
https://www.facebook.com/photo.php?fbid=957284987640269&set
=a.100378253330951.605.100000763298189&type=3&theater secara sedar
membuat dan memulakan penghantaran komunikasi yang palsu sifatnya seperti
Lampiran A dengan niat untuk menyakitkan hati orang lain, yang telah dibaca pada C
8 Februari 2016 jam lebih kurang 2.40 petang di alamat Seraya Sdn Bhd, Batu 3,
Jalan Jelapang, di dalam daerah Ipoh dalam negeri Perak Darul Ridzuan. Oleh itu
kamu telah melakukan suatu kesalahan di bawah seksyen 233 (1) (a) Akta
Komunikasi dan Multimedia 1998 [Akta 588] dan boleh dihukum di bawah
seksyen 233(3) Akta yang sama.
D
ELEMEN PERTUDUHAN
[8] Untuk kemudahan rujukan, saya turunkan di bawah ini peruntukan s

233 Akta KMM secara penuh: E
233(1) Seseorang yang —
(a) dengan menggunakan mana-mana kemudahan rangkaian atau
perkhidmatan rangkaian atau perkhidmatan aplikasi secara sedar —
(i) membuat, mewujudkan atau meminta-minta; dan F
apa-apa komen, permintaan, cadangan atau komunikasi lain yang
lucah, sumbang, palsu, mengancam atau jelik sifatnya dengan niat
untuk menyakitkan hati, menganiayai, mengugut atau
mengganggu orang lain; atau G
(b) memulakan suatu komunikasi dengan menggunakan mana-mana
perkhidmatan aplikasi, sama ada secara berterusan, berulang kali atau
selainnya, dan dalam masa itu komunikasi mungkin atau tidak mungkin
berlaku, dengan atau tanpa mendedahkan identitinya dan dengan niat
untuk menyakitkan hati, menganiayai, mengugut atau mengganggu H
mana-mana orang di mana-mana nombor atau alamat elektronik,
(2) Seseorang yang secara sedar —
(a) dengan menggunakan suatu perkhidmatan rangkaian atau perkhidmatan I
aplikasi memberikan apa-apa komunikasi lucah bagi maksud komersial
kepada mana-mana orang; atau
(b) membenarkan suatu perkhidmatan rangkaian atau perkhidmatan aplikasi
di bawah kawalan orang itu untuk digunakan bagi suatu aktiviti yang
A diperihalkan dalam perenggan (a),

(3) Seseorang yang melakukan suatu kesalahan di bawah seksyen ini apabila
disabitkan boleh didenda tidak melebihi lima puluh ribu ringgit atau dipenjarakan
selama tempoh tidak melebihi satu tahun atau kedua-duanya dan hendaklah juga
B boleh didenda selanjutnya satu ribu ringgit bagi setiap hari kesalahan itu diteruskan
selepas pensabitan.
[9] Bagi maksud pertuduhan terhadap perayu, saya dapati HMS dalam
C alasan penghakimannya, begitu juga peguam perayu dan pihak pendakwaan
dalam hujahan bertulis mereka, dengan tepat menyatakan terdapat tiga elemen
yang perlu dibuktikan oleh pihak pendakwaan bagi pertuduhan di bawah s 233
Akta KMM, yakni:
(a) perayu telah menggunakan aplikasi laman profil Facebook miliknya
D untuk memuat naik suatu komunikasi (komunikasi adalah seperti di
Lampiran A kepada pertuduhan);
(b) komunikasi tersebut adalah palsu sifatnya; dan
(c) komunikasi tersebut dimuat naik dengan niat di pihak perayu untuk
E
menyakitkan hati orang lain.
ANALISA DAN DAPATAN MAHKAMAH
Elemen pertama: Perayu telah menggunakan aplikasi laman profil Facebook

F miliknya dan secara sedar telah membuat dan menghantar suatu komunikasi
seperti di Lampiran A kepada pertuduhan
[10] Mahkamah ini memutuskan bahawa tidak perlu untuk meneliti

G
keterangan serta membuat kupasan undang-undang bagi elemen pertama ini
memandangkan elemen ini diakui oleh perayu dan tidak dipertikaikan oleh
perayu. Perkara ini juga dinyatakan dengan jelas dalam hujahan bertulis
peguam perayu.
H [11] Memandangkan elemen pertama pertuduhan telah berjaya dibuktikan,

maka mahkamah ini hanya perlu memutuskan sama ada elemen kedua dan
ketiga pertuduhan telah berjaya dibuktikan oleh pihak pendakwaan.
Elemen kedua: Komunikasi tersebut adalah palsu sifatnya

I
Elemen ketiga: Komunikasi tersebut dengan niat di pihak perayu untuk
menyakitkan hati orang lain.
[12] Elemen kedua dan ketiga di bawah s 233(1)(a) Akta KMM ini adalah A
berkaitan. Oleh itu, saya akan membuat dapatan mengenai kedua-duanya
secara bersekali.
[13] Bagi maksud membuat dapatan mengenai perkara ini, saya telah
meneliti semula keterangan kesemua enam saksi pihak pendakwaan, dan secara B
khususnya kepada keterangan SP1 (pengadu), SP4 (pemantau ancaman
keselamatan sistem rangkaian), dan SP6 (pegawai penyiasat), serta keterangan
di pihak pembelaan, iaitu perayu sendiri. Saya juga telah meneliti hujahan
peguam perayu dan pihak pendakwaan serta dapatan HMS mengenai
kedua-dua elemen pertuduhan ini. C
[14] Pihak pendakwaan berhujah fakta bahawa perayu mengaku beliau

sendiri yang membuat dan memuat naik komunikasi tersebut, dan fakta
bahawa komunikasi itu tidak pernah dikeluarkan oleh Suruhanjaya
D
Komunikasi dan Multimedia (‘SKMM’) membuktikan ia adalah palsu
sifatnya.
[15] HMS memutuskan bahawa komunikasi itu palsu sifatnya berlandaskan

kepada keterangan SP1 bahawa SKMM tidak pernah mengeluarkannya. Juga E
keterangan SP6 bahawa komunikasi atau notis dalam bentuk sedemikian yang
dikeluarkan oleh SKMM tidak menggunakan perkataan ‘Amaran’ tetapi
‘Peringatan’ atau ‘Pengumuman’. Keterangan ini juga dipegang dan diterima
oleh HMS sebagai pembuktian tentang sifat palsu komunikasi berkenaan.
F
[16] Pihak perayu berhujah dapatan HMS yang bersetuju dengan hujahan
pihak pendakwaan bahawa memandangkan komunikasi di Lampiran A
kepada pertuduhan itu tidak dikeluarkan oleh SKMM, maka ia memenuhi
elemen komunikasi itu bersifat palsu, adalah terkhilaf dan terlalu simplistic.
G
[17] Mahkamah ini dapati hujahan pihak perayu mengenai isu ini adalah
dari suatu perspektif atau dimensi yang berbeza sama sekali dengan hujahan
pihak pendakwaan. Menurut peguam perayu, perkataan-perkataan yang
terkandung dalam komunikasi tersebut, seperti yang ditunjukkan di bawah,
adalah betul dan tidak palsu, walaupun ia tidak dikeluarkan oleh SKMM: H
LOGO SKMM’ AMARAN
I
A HENTI SEBAR GAMBAR MENGAIBKAN PEMIMPIN NEGARA

Orang ramai diberi amaran supaya berhenti menyebarkan gambar- gambar
pemimpin negara yang telah diubah suai menyerupai badut seperti dalam gambar
di atas menerusi laman sosial termasuk aplikasi ‘Whatsapp’.
Adalah menjadi satu kesalahan bila berkongsi atau menyebarkan kandungan
B
sedemikian kerana ia melanggar undang-undang negara khususnya Seksyen 233
Akta Komunikasi dan Multimedia 1998. Jika didapati bersalah, hukumannya
adalah denda tidak melebihi RM50,000 dan/atau tidak lebih satu tahun penjara.
C [18] Pihak perayu berhujah semua kenyataan dalam komunikasi seperti

ditunjukkan di atas itu sebenarnya pernah dan sering dikeluarkan sendiri oleh
pihak SKMM. Oleh itu, mana mungkin komunikasi itu dianggap sebagai
palsu sifatnya, walaupun ia dinukil oleh perayu. Menurut peguam perayu lagi,
memandangkan frasa ‘palsu sifatnya’ tidak ditafsirkan dalam Akta KMM,
D maka ia hendaklah diberi tafsiran atau definisi kamus, yang mana perkataan
‘palsu’ membawa makna sesuatu yang bertentangan dengan benar. Oleh itu,
hujah Peguam perayu, apa yang asasnya adalah benar, seperti terkandung
dalam komunikasi ini, bukanlah sesuatu yang ‘palsu sifatnya’, dan oleh itu
tiada apa-apa kesalahan yang dilakukan oleh perayu di bawah s 233 Akta
E KMM.
[19] Pihak perayu seterusnya berhujah bahawa bukan sahaja komunikasi itu
tidak memenuhi kehendak ‘palsu sifatnya’ seperti diperuntukkan di bawah
s 233 Akta KKM, malah dengan merujuk kepada kes Ong Eng Guan v Public
F Prosecutor [1956] 1 MLJ 44 dan T Ponnamalam and 11 Others v Public
Prosecutor [1948] 1 MLJ 76, pihak pendakwaan juga gagal membuktikan
elemen ketiga iaitu niat perayu untuk menyakitkan hati. Keterangan SP1, iaitu
pengadu dalam kes ini, yang sama sekali tidak menyatakan tentang siapa yang
sakit hati dengan komunikasi tersebut, hujah pihak perayu, menunjukkan
G elemen penting pertuduhan telah gagal dibuktikan oleh pihak pendakwaan.
Walaupun keterangan SP4 ada menyebut perihal beliau rasa marah dan sakit
hati dengan komunikasi tersebut, terutamanya kerana SKMM adalah seperti
keluarganya sendiri, keterangan ini dihujahkan oleh peguam perayu yang
bijaksana sebagai tidak relevan dalam membuktikan elemen pertuduhan ini.
H Ini disebabkan SP4 adalah bukan pengadu dalam kes ini dan beliau adalah
seorang saksi yang berkepentingan.
[20] Begitu juga keterangan SP6 yang membuat kesimpulan bahawa

komunikasi tersebut berniat untuk menyakitkan hati pihak polis dihujahkan
I oleh peguam perayu sebagai gagal membuktikan elemen ketiga pertuduhan.
[21] Mahkamah telah meneliti kembali keterangan perayu sendiri dalam hal
ini, sepertimana yang dititipkan dalam perenggan 94–97, 106 dan 112 dalam
hujahan bertulis perayu. Memandangkan keterangan ini amat mustahak dan
telah saya pertimbangkan dalam menentukan sama ada pihak pendakwaan A

telah membuktikan elemen kedua dan ketiga pertuduhan terhadap perayu,
maka saya perturunkan kesemua keterangan perayu dalam
perenggan-perenggan tersebut seperti berikut:
94. Menurut perayu, Perayu mereka Komunikasi tersebut sebagai satu kritikan.
B
Semasa pemeriksaan utama, Perayu mengatakan (seperti dalam video):
Saya reka notis amaran ini, yang mengambil bentuk parodi notis MCMC sebagai
satu kritikan terhadap pihak berkuasa yang cuba untuk menyekat penyebaran satu
lagi karya satira politik yang mengambil satu imej karikatur muka badut, yang pada
ketika itu sedang menular di media sosial, yang pada saya adalah satu percubaan C
untuk menyekat kebebasan berekspresi, dan percubaan sensorship internet yang
saya anggap bertentangan dengan komitmen kerajaan yang menjanjikan tiada
sensorship internet semasa kerajaan lancarkan Multimedia Super Corridor, 22
tahun dulu. Jadi notis amaran ini adalah satu karya berbentuk satira politik untuk
mengkritik tindakan ini.
D
95. Mengapa menggunakan medium grafik telah dijawab juga oleh Perayu:
Saya dah katakan tadi, seorang penulis mengekspresikan pandangan dia melalui
tulisan, jadi saya sebagai seorang pereka grafik, saya ekspresikan pandangan saya
melalui grafik, melalui visual. Tidak lebih dari itu.
96. Menurut Perayu, komunikasi itu adalah suatu bentuk ‘parodi’. Parodi, menurut E
Perayu, adalah:
Parodi adalah sesuatu karya yang meniru sesuatu karya lain untuk tujuan satira
politik, mengimitasi stail, design dan rupa bentuk sesuatu karya lain dengan
mengubah sesuatu elemen daripada karya yang asal, atau menokok- tambah sesuatu
elemen dari karya asal dengan suntikan humor dan juga ironi. Dan kebanyakan F
parodi adalah satu bentuk satira politik, memang bertujuan untuk menyampaikan
sesuatu mesej.
97. Perayu kemudian telah menerangkan mengapa Komunikasi tersebut menjadi
suatu parodi:
G
Kalau lihat grafik ini, sebagai satu parodi notis MCMC, grafik yang saya hasilkan
ini cuba untuk meniru stail notis yang pernah dikeluarkan oleh MCMC sebelum
ini. Dari aspek penggunaan warna biru, dari aspek meniru gaya bahasa yang
digunakan dalam notis MCMC sebelum ini. Termasuklah menggunakan logo yang
sama digunakan dalam notis yang pernah dikeluarkan MCMC sebelum ini. Tapi H
dengan elemen meletakkan imej yang cuba untuk disekat oleh notis ini. Jadi bila
imej yang cuba disekat itu, disertakan sekali dalam notis ini, ia memberi satu efek
ironi. Di mana percubaan untuk menyekat imej itu melalui notis amaran ini hanya
memberikan kesan membantu untuk menyebarkan lagi imej ini. Jadi humor
daripada karya satira ini datang daripada aspek ironi ini. Di mana matlamat asal
yang cuba dicapai, hasilnya ialah sesuatu yang bertentangan dengan matlamat asal. I
Dan dekat situ karya satira politik yang saya hasilkan ini sebenarnya mengandungi
mesej, seperti kebanyakan satira-satira politik yang ada di luar sana, mempunyai
mesej yang cuba untuk disampaikan.
…
A Seperti yang saya katakan tadi, dari satu aspek, sebagai seorang pereka grafik, saya
menggunakan medium grafik sebagai medium untuk menyampaikan mesej dan
menyampaikan pesan. Dan dari aspek ini saya pilih medium parodi yang berbentuk
grafik, yang berbentuk visual, yang bagi saya paling efektif, yang paling berkesan
untuk saya sampaikan mesej ini kepada audiens saya. Itu sebabnya saya memilih
B untuk hasilkan parodi ini. Dan sebagai karya parodi, seperti saya terangkan tadi
adalah satu karya yang meniru karya lain. Dari aspek ini hanya MCMC antara
agensi yang pernah mengeluarkan notis berbentuk visual seperti ini. Dan sebagai
karya parodi, saya pilih untuk memparodikan notis MCMC. Itu sebab saya
memiliih bentuk visual parodi seperti ini.
C 106. Semasa pemeriksaan oleh Pihak Pendakwa:
S: Setuju kalau saya katakan notis amaran tadi adalah kritikan En Fahmi
terhadap tindakan pihak polis?
J: Notis amaran yang bertarikh 8 Feb? Notis amaran ini saya anggap sebagai satu
D kritikan terhadap pihak berkuasa secara general termasuklah pihak polis, boleh
dikira pihak polis sebahagian dari pihak berkuasa tapi karya ini tidak secara
spesifik target ditujukan kepada pihak polis semata-mata tetapi kepada
mana-mana pihak berkuasa yang cuba untuk menyekat kebebasan berekspresi
dan kebebasan internet.
E S: Jadi setuju En. Fahmi rasakan, tindakan cuba sekat kebebasan berekspresi dan
internet ini adalah tindakan yang salah?
J: Tindakan yang saya tak setuju.
S: Tak bersetuju maksudnya rasa tindakan itu bersalah lah?
F J: Bukan, rasa tindakan itu perlu dikritik.
S: Setuju tak kamu rasa tindakan itu menyekat kebebasan berekspresi dan
internet ini tindakan yang salah?
J: Satu tindakan yang saya tak setuju dan perlu dikritik sebab saya anggap
G bertentangan dengan kebebasan berekspresi yang termaktub dalam
perlembagaan.
112. Seterusnya semasa pemeriksaan balas oleh pihak Pendakwaan:
S: En Fahmi setuju tak notis ni permain-mainkan MCMC?
H J: Saya tak setuju.
S: Tapi En Fahmi setuju notis ini sarkastik? Dia kata jangan sebarkan gambar,
tapi bila dia letakkan gambar tu, maka automatik notis ini sendiri pun
menyebarkan gambar tu.
I J: Ya, sebab itu sebahagian dari sifat karya seni berbentuk parodi, dan
karya-karya satira politik memang kadang kala mengambil sifat sarkastik dan
juga ironi. Dari aspek itu memang benar karya ini selari dengan sifat sebuah
karya parodi.
S: Jadi sifat karya ini, ia mempermainkan notis MCMC lah?
J: Saya tak akan pilih perkataan ‘mempermainkan’ sebab ianya sebuah karya A
parodi.
S: Kalau En Fahmi tak pilih perkataan ‘mempermainkan’, En. Fahmi guna
perkataan apa?
J: Mungkin boleh guna perkataan mempersendakan untuk tujuan kritikan dan B
komentar.
S: Setuju kalau saya katakan tujuan kita mempersendakan ini lebih kurang
macam bergurau lah kan?
J: Ya lebih kurang macam bergurau.
C
S: Maka orang-orang yang baca dan lihat notis parodi itu akan rasa terhibur?
J: Ya, mungkin. Tapi pada masa yang sama dalam mungkin rasa terhibur itu,
mereka akan dapat mesej yang cuba disampaikan melalui kritikan ini lah.
S: Setuju kalau saya katakan orang yang dipersendakan tu dia tak akan terhibur? D
J: Saya tak setuju. Sebab sebagai pihak berkuasa, mereka sudah biasa menerima
teguran, termasuk teguran-teguran yang dalam bentuk sebegini rupa,
lebih-lebih lagi yang datang daripada kartunis politik, atau pereka grafik seperti
saya yang banyak menggunakan medium-medium satira yang berbentuk
gurauan seperti ini sebagai medium kritikan. Jadi saya rasa, mana-mana pihak E
berkuasa sudah lali dan sudah biasa dengan bentuk teguran dan kritikan sebegini
rupa. Jadi saya tak setuju.
S: Tak setuju mereka tak terhibur, jadi En. Fahmi nak kata mereka terhiburlah
tengok?
J: Mungkin. F
S: Jadi En. Fahmi tak setujulah kalau saya katakan En. Fahmi buat notis itu
antara niatnya adalah untuk menyakitkan hati MCMC?
J: Memang saya sangat tak bersetuju. Sebab memang niat saya hasilkan dan
upload notis ini adalah sebagai satu bentuk kritikan yang saya katakan tadi, G
kritikan terhadap isu percubaan untuk menyekat kebebasan berekspresi,
kebebasan bersatira dan juga kebebasan berinternet, dan bukan dengan niat
untuk menyakitkan hati mana-mana pihak.
[22] Perayu jelas sekali merumuskan bahawa komunikasi di Lampiran A H

kepada pertuduhan tersebut bersifat parodi dan adalah suatu satira politik
untuk mengkritik pihak berkuasa kerana menyekat kebebasan berekspresi dan
internet. Mahkamah ini merumuskan perayu tidak boleh dipaksa atau disekat
dari berpandangan sedemikian. Malahan perayu tidak dihadapkan dengan
pertuduhan kerana berpandangan sedemikian bukan suatu jenayah. Tetapi I
tatkala pandangan sedemikian dijelmakan dalam bentuk komunikasi seperti di
Lampiran A kepada pertuduhan, maka pada saat itu perayu tidak boleh
mengatakan komunikasi yang diciptanya tidak bercanggah dengan
undang-undang.
A [23] Inilah alasan utama kenapa mahkamah ini menolak hujahan peguam
perayu bahawa, berdasarkan keterangan perayu seperti di dalam perenggan 21
di atas dan dengan mengambil kira segala faktor keadaan dan latar belakang
bagaimana komunikasi berkenan dinukilkan oleh perayu, tidak wujud unsur
atau elemen palsu sifatnya semata-mata kerana ia dianggap oleh perayu sebagai
B suatu nukilan fakta.
[24] Mahkamah ini memilih untuk bersetuju dengan hujahan pihak

pendakwaan bahawa dalam penentuan bahawa elemen ketiga di bawah
C
s 233(1)(a) Akta KMM itu dipenuhi, prinsip yang terpakai adalah
sebagaimana yang diputuskan dalam kes Ong Eng Guan v Public Prosecutor
[1956] 1 MLJ 44 , iaitu:
The point is not whether he annoyed the complainant, … but whether … he
intended to annoy him …
D
[25] Pada masa yang sama, mahkamah ini juga telah meneliti semula dan
menerima keterangan SP6 yang menyatakan bahawa hasil siasatannya
menunjukkan bahawa komunikasi perayu yang dipersoalkan (the appellant’s
impugned communication) dalam pertuduhan terhadap beliau dibuat oleh
E
perayu sebagai suatu bahan ejekan perayu atas tindakan pihak Polis Diraja
Malaysia (‘PDRM’) yang telah memberi pelbagai amaran kepada beliau hasil
siasatan pihak PDRM terhadap komunikasi perayu yang menggambarkan
Mantan Perdana Menteri sebagai badut. Mahkamah ini mendapati tanpa
F apa-apa keraguan munasabah bahawa komunikasi itu dibuat oleh perayu
sebagai suatu bentuk ejekan atau penghinaan kepada pihak berkuasa, terutama
PDRM dan SKMM.
[26] Mahkamah ini seterusnya telah meneliti segala aspek berkaitan

G komunikasi di Lampiran A kepada pertuduhan itu untuk membuat
pertimbangan sama ada komunikasi tersebut adalah benar seperti yang
dihujahkan oleh perayu telah dibuat oleh perayu semata-mata sebagai suatu
kerja halus seni, untuk mengkritik kerajaan dan pihak berkuasa tanpa niat
jahat atau apa-apa niat untuk menyakitkan hati mana-mana pihak, dengan
H bertanya dua soalan retorikal yang berikut:
(a) adakah komunikasi itu semata-mata suatu bentuk parodi dan dengan
melihat kepada latar belakang kerja seni perayu yang banyak
menghasilkan parodi menunjukkan perayu tidak berniat menyakitkan
I hati sesiapa? dan
(b) adakah komunikasi itu suatu karya ekspresi seni yang berhak untuk
ditampakkan oleh perayu kepada khalayak tanpa saksi undang-undang
kerana dilindungi oleh Perlembagaan Persekutuan?
[27] Setelah menilai semula semua keterangan saksi di hadapan HMS, A

termasuk keterangan perayu, dan setelah meneliti dengan terperinci
komunikasi seperti di paparan A di atas, serta setelah mahkamah ini
mengambil kira setiap hasil kerja kreatif yang dihasilkan oleh perayu dengan
merujuk kepada ekhs P6, D14, D15, D27, D28, D29, mahkamah ini berpuas
hati bahawa walaupun komunikasi di Lampiran A kepada pertuduhan tersebut B
merupakan suatu kerja seni yang halus dan kreatif yang dicipta oleh perayu
untuk mengkritik kerajaan dan pihak berkuasa, tetapi ia dihasilkan dengan
niat untuk menyakitkan hati orang lain. Mahkamah ini juga berpuas hati
bahawa komunikasi itu tidak boleh dianggap sebagai suatu bentuk parodi
kerana ia gagal memenuhi erti kata ‘parodi’ seperti diputuskan oleh Mahkamah C
Rayuan dalam kes Sepakat Efektif Sdn Bhd v Menteri Dalam Negeri & Anor and
another suit [2014] MLJU 1874; [2015] 2 CLJ 328:
The pithy observation by Justice Albie Sachs of the Constitutional Court of South
Africa in Laugh it Off Promotions CC v South African Breweries International
D
(Finance) Case (2005) 5 LRC 475, is quoted to indicate the proper approach courts
should take when assessing parodies and satires:
If parody does not prickle it does not work.
[28] Bersandarkan dapatan itu, mahkamah ini memutuskan komunikasi itu E

adalah suatu karya ekspresi seni tetapi disebabkan sifatnya yang menyakitkan
hati orang lain, maka ia tidak berhak untuk ditampakkan oleh perayu kepada
khalayak tanpa saksi undang-undang dan ia tidak dilindungi oleh peruntukan
berkaitan dalam Perlembagaan Persekutuan.
F
[29] Mahkamah ini telah meneliti kesemua kes-kes yang dirujuk oleh
peguam perayu dan timbalan pendakwa raya mengenai kedua-dua elemen ini.
Adalah didapati bahawa, hanya satu kes sahaja yang hampir sama, dari segi
fakta dan peruntukan undang-undangnya, dengan kes di hadapan saya ini,
terutamanya perihal tatacara pembuktian elemen kedua dan ketiga di bawah G
s 233(1)(a) Akta KMM ini, iaitu keputusan dalam kes Public Prosecutor v
Rutinin Suhaimin [2013] 2 CLJ 427. Walaupun dalam kes ini Yang Arif
Ravinthran Paramaguru PK (pada masa itu) memutuskan mengenai
s 233(1)(b) Akta KMM, namun mahkamah ini dapati peruntukan
perenggan (b) kepada s 233(1) Akta KMM yang dibincangkan beliau adalah H
hampir sama dengan perenggan (a) s 233(1) Akta KMM dalam kes di hadapan
saya ini. YA Ravinthran memutuskan sebegini:
As for evidence in respect of intention, it is always a matter of inference. From the
fact that an offensive remark pertaining to the HRH Sultan of Perak had been I
posted on the online visitor book, it can be inferred that the accused had intended
to cause annoyance. It is also unnecessary to call the victim of the annoying remark
to the witness stand. Section 233(1)(b) does not say that the victim of the offence
must actually feel annoyed or abused. The provision only says that the offender
must have intention to annoy or abuse. Therefore it is sufficient if the
A communication in question has the tendency to cause annoyance or abuse to any

person. The posting in question says that the HRH Sultan of Perak is ‘gila’ (mad).
Although, HRH was not called to testify, it is obvious that such a remark is intended
to cause annoyance. Lest it be forgotten, the remark was not posted in a private
internet chat session but on the online visitor book of the home page of HRH.
B Therefore, the prosecution had tendered sufficient inferential evidence to prove
intention.
[30] Secara ringkasnya, prinsip yang diputuskan dalam kes Public Prosecutor
v Rutinin Suhaimin itu, yang saya terima pakai bagi maksud kes perayu ini,
C adalah seperti berikut:
(a) elemen kedua dan ketiga dalam pertuduhan terhadap perayu ini hanya
perlu dibuktikan secara inferens;
(b) s 233(1)(a) tiada memperuntukkan kehendak atau keperluan
D memanggil orang yang menjadi mangsa kepada komunikasi yang
menyakitkan hati itu;
(c) s 233(1)(a) itu juga tidak menyebut bahawa orang yang mengatakan
komunikasi tersebut menimbulkan sakit hati atau marah kepadanya
mesti membuktikan keadaan marah atau sakit hatinya itu; dan
E
(d) adalah memadai jika dibuktikan kepada Mahkamah bahawa
komunikasi itu mempunyai kecenderungan untuk menyebabkan
kemarahan atau sakit hati kepada orang lain.
F [31] Mahkamah ini berpuas hati bahawa keterangan SP1, SP4 dan SP6 telah
berjaya tanpa apa-apa keraguan munasabah untuk mewujudkan dan membuat
suatu inferens bahawa komunikasi yang dibuat oleh perayu itu menyakitkan
hati dan mempunyai kecenderungan untuk menyebabkan kemarahan atau
sakit hati kepada orang lain.
G
RUMUSAN
[32] Mahkamah ini ingin membuat rumusan dengan merujuk kepada suatu
keputusan Mahkamah New York, Amerika Syarikat dalam kes The People of the
H State of New York v Raphael Golb [2013] NY Slip Op 00436 [102 AD3d 601],
atau lebih dikenali di Amerika Syarikat sebagai People v Golb. Walaupun People
v Golb tidak mengikat mahkamah di Malaysia dan keputusan kes ini lebih
relevan kepada suatu keadaan yang disebutkan sebagai ‘sockpuppetry’, iaitu
kesalahan penyalahgunaan penggunaan identiti atas talian dengan cara yang
I mengelirukan, namun demikian, prinsip undang-undang yang diputuskan
dalam kes ini agak relevan dengan kes perayu.
[33] Fakta dalam kes The People of the State of New York v Raphael Golb ini
agak menarik. Profesor Norman Golb dari University of Chicago dan Profesor
Lawrence Schiffman dari New York University merupakan pakar dalam kajian A
kitab purba. Kedua-dua profesor ini telah sekian lama bertelagah mengenai
asal-usul Skrol Laut Mati (Dead Sea Scrolls). Defendan, Raphael Golb, adalah
anak kepada Profesor Norman Golb. Tanpa pengetahuan bapanya, Raphael
telah mewujudkan lebih 50 entri dalam talian dengan paparan dan komunikasi
dalam talian yang menyatakan sokongan kepada pendapat Profesor Golb. B
Tindakan ini dibuat bagi mewujudkan suatu keadaan yang kononnya lebih
ramai orang yang menyokong pendapat Profesor Golb berbanding pendapat
Profesor Schiffman. Tindakan ini tidak menimbulkan sebarang masalah.
[34] Menggunakan nama samaran ‘Peter Kaufman’, Raphael telah menulis C

suatu artikel yang dipaparkan dalam laman web menuduh Profesor Schiffman
sebagai seorang yang berkali-kali menjiplak dan memplagiat kerja akademik
Profesor Golb. Pada masa yang sama Raphael menyamar sebagai Profesor
Schiffman, menggunakan alamat emel sebenar Profesor Schiffman, dan
membuat pengakuan bersalah dan memohon maaf kerana telah memplagiat D
kerja Profesor Golb. Emel yang kononnya digarap oleh Profesor Schiffman itu,
antara lain, menulis:
Someone is intent on exposing a minor failing of mine that dates back almost fifteen
years ago … It is true that I should have cited Dr. Golb’s articles when using his E
arguments, and it is true that I misrepresented his ideas. But this is simply the
politics of Dead Sea Scrolls studies.
[35] Emel tersebut dihantar kepada Provos New York University (‘NYU’),
yang telah membalas emel tersebut kepada ‘Profesor Schiffman’ tetapi F
sebenarnya diterima oleh Raphael. Provos NYU itu mengatakan perkara ini
telah ditugaskan kepada seorang dekan untuk disiasat. Raphael seterusnya
menghantar emel balasan Provos NYU itu bersama-sama emel awal yang
kononnya dihantar oleh Profesor Schiffman kepada Provos NYU itu kepada
lima surat khabar edaran New York University, dengan catatan untuk tidak G
menyebarkan perkara itu dan menandatanganinya sekali lagi sebagai
‘Lawrence Schiffman’.
[36] Raphael dihadapkan ke Supreme Court of New York dengan 51

pertuduhan pelbagai jenayah dan disabitkan dengan 30 pertuduhan. Beliau H
seterusnya merayu ke Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York yang
mengesahkan sabitan terhadap Raphael. Rayuan beliau yang seterusnya ke
mahkamah tertinggi di New York, the Court of Appeals, telah dibenarkan di
mana sepuluh dari sabitan tersebut telah dibatalkan tetapi 20 sabitan lain
termasuk identity theft, criminal impersonation, forgery, aggravated harassment I
dan unauthorised use of a computer dikekalkan.
[37] Carol Berkman, J yang membuat keputusan semasa kes ini dibicarakan
di Supreme Court of New York, dalam keputusannya mendapati hak asasi
A mengenai kebebasan bersuara yang dijamin oleh First Amendment kepada

Perlembagaan Amerika Syarikat melindungi kandungan emel Raphael Golb.
Namun demikian hak asasi itu tidak melindungi Raphael dalam tindakan
penyamarannya. Carol Berkman H ketika mensabitkan Raphael Golb untuk
jenayah identity theft, criminal impersonation, forgery, aggravated harassment dan
B unauthorised use of a computer, memutuskan:
Defendant was not prosecuted for the content of any of the emails, but only for
giving the false impression that his victims were the actual authors of the emails. The First
Amendment protects the right to criticize another person, but it does not permit anyone
C to give an intentionally false impression that the source of the message is that other person
(see SMJ Group, Inc. v 417 Lafayette Restaurant LLC, 439 F Supp 2d 281 (SD NY
2006]) …
Defendant’s principal defense was that these emails were only intended to be satiric
hoaxes or pranks. However, as it has been observed in the context of trademark law, ‘[a]
D parody must convey two simultaneous — and contradictory — messages: that it is the
original, but also that it is not the original and is instead a parody (Cliffs Notes, Inc v
Bantam Doubleday Dell Pub. Group, Inc, 886 F2d 490, 494 [2d Cir 1989] [emphasis
omitted]). Here, the evidence clearly established that defendant never intended any kind
of parody. Instead, he only intended to convey the first message to the readers of the emails,
E that is, that the purported authors were the actual authors. It was equally clear that
defendant intended that the recipients’ reliance on this deception would cause harm to the
purported authors and benefits to defendant or his father. (Penekanan ditambah.)
[38] Keputusan Carol Berkman H dalam isu tersebut di atas telah disahkan
F oleh Court of Appeal of New York apabila memutuskan bahawa penyamaran
Profesor Schiffman yang dbuat oleh Raphael Golb adalah:
more than a prank intended to cause temporary embarrassment or discomfiture,
and that he acted with intent to do real harm.
G
[39] Natijah keputusan mahkamah Amerika Syarikat dalam kes Raphael
Golb adalah sama dengan keputusan Mahkamah Rayuan dalam kes Sepakat
Efektif Sdn Bhd, yakni penentuan sama ada sesuatu kerja seni sebagai suatu
parodi atau sama ada ia menyakitkan hati orang lain atau tidak bukannya
H
untuk ditentukan oleh pengkarya karya seni itu, tetapi oleh orang lain, dan
tatkala ia di bawa ke mahkamah, ianya akan ditentukan oleh mahkamah
dengan mengambil kira prinsip bahawa:
a parody must convey two simultaneous — and contradictory — messages: that it
is the original, but also that it is not the original and is instead a parody and if parody
I does not prickle it does not work.
[40] Komunikasi yang dihasilkan perayu seperti di Lampiran A kepada

pertuduhan adalah komunikasi palsu dan berniat menyakitkan hati orang lain.
Ia bukan suatu parodi. Ia adalah komunikasi yang melanggar peruntukan
s 233(1)(a) Akta KMM. Atas alasan ini, sabitan terhadap perayu dikekalkan. A
[41] Mengenai hukuman, saya sekali lagi telah meneliti nota keterangan dan
ambil maklum rayuan mengurangkan hukuman yang dihujahkan oleh
peguambela perayu di hadapan HMS dan rayuan pemberatan hukuman oleh
pihak pendakwaan, serta hujahan peguam perayu dan pihak pendakwaan B
semasa perbicaraan dihadapan HMS.
[42] Selain itu saya juga membuat judicial notice bahawa pada 11 Oktober
2018 lalu Mahkamah Sesyen Kuala Lumpur telah membebaskan perayu
setelah pihak pendakwaan menarik balik kes terhadap perayu yang dituduh C
bagi pertuduhan di bawah peruntukan undang-undang yang sama bagi
kesalahan melibatkan komunikasi yang sama dengan pertuduhan di hadapan
mahkamah ini sekarang.
D
[43] Mahkamah juga mengambil maklum akan beberapa laporan media
yang menyebut tentang maklumat dari YB Menteri Komunikasi dan
Multimedia mengenai pindaan yang sedang dibuat terhadap s 233 Akta
Multimedia dan Komunikasi bagi memansuhkan unsur-unsur yang dikatakan
oleh beliau sebagai bersifat ‘draconian’. E
[44] Setelah mengambil kira segala perkara yang tersebut, maka saya
membenarkan rayuan perayu terhadap hukuman lalu membatalkan hukuman
satu bulan penjara dan denda RM30,000 yang dijatuhkan oleh HMS dan
digantikan dengan hukuman denda RM10,000 jika tidak bayar satu bulan F
penjara.
Sabitan dikekalkan, rayuan perayu terhadap hukuman dibenarkan; hukuman

hakim mahkamah sesyen dibatalkan dan digantikan dengan hukuman denda
RM10,000 jika tidak bayar satu bulan penjara. G
Dilaporkan oleh Fatin Mohd Ismail
I
Supreme Court of India
Romesh Thappar vs The State Of Madras on 26 May, 1950
Equivalent citations: 1950 AIR 124, 1950 SCR 594
Author: S Fazal Ali
Bench: Fazal Ali, Saiyid
PETITIONER:
ROMESH THAPPAR
Vs.
RESPONDENT:
THE STATE OF MADRAS
DATE OF JUDGMENT:
26/05/1950
BENCH:
FAZAL ALI, SAIYID
BENCH:
FAZAL ALI, SAIYID
KANIA, HIRALAL J. (CJ)
SASTRI, M. PATANJALI
MAHAJAN, MEHR CHAND
DAS, SUDHI RANJAN
MUKHERJEA, B.K.
CITATION:
1950 AIR 124 1950 SCR 594
CITATOR INFO :
F 1950 SC 129 (26)
R 1951 SC 270 (4)
E 1951 SC 318 (25)
D 1952 SC 75 (5,16)
E 1952 SC 329 (3,4,5)
R 1953 SC 252 (31)
RF 1953 SC 384 (5)
RF 1957 SC 620 (3,4,5,7)
RF 1957 SC 628 (12,16,20,21)
E&D 1957 SC 896 (14)
RF 1958 SC 578 (129)
F 1959 SC 395 (13,40)
R 1959 SC 725 (8)
R 1960 SC 633 (9,16)
RF 1961 SC1457 (8)
RF 1962 SC 171 (23)
R 1962 SC 305 (29)
R 1962 SC 955 (21)
R 1962 SC1621 (78,108,110,132)
R 1963 SC 996 (2,5)
MV 1966 SC 740 (48,69)
RF 1967 SC1110 (16)
RF 1967 SC1643 (165,227)
D 1969 SC 903 (23)
D 1970 SC1923 (12,13)
F 1971 SC2486 (8,13,14)
R 1973 SC 106 (16)
RF 1973 SC1461 (1705)
RF 1974 SC1389 (247)
RF 1977 SC 908 (23)
R 1978 SC 597 (77)
RF 1980 SC 494 (9)
RF 1986 SC 515 (24,33,34)
R 1986 SC 872 (74)
RF 1989 SC 190 (11)
ACT:
Constitution of India, Art. 19, cls. (1) (a) and (2), 32
Application under Art. 32--Preliminary objection--Fundamen-
tal right of freedom of speech and expression--Law imposing
restrictions for securing public order and maintenance of
public safety--Validity-Severability of Act--Madras Mainte-
nance of Public Order Act (XXIII of 1949), s. 9
(1-A)--Validity.
HEADNOTE:
Held, by the Full Court (i) (overruling a preliminary
objection) --Under the Constitution the Supreme Court is
constituted the protector and guarantor of fundamental
rights, and it cannot, consistently with the responsibility
so laid upon it, refuse to entertain applications seeking
protection against infringement of such rights, although
such applications are made to the Court in the first in-
stance without resort to a High Court having concurrent
jurisdiction in the matter.
Urquhart v. Brown (205 U.S. 179) and Hooney v. Kolohan
(294 U.S. 103) distinguished.
(ii) Freedom of speech and expression includes freedom
propagation of ideas and that freedom is ensured by the
freedom of circulation.
Ex parte Jackson (96 U.S. 727) and Lovell v. City of
Griffin (303 U.S. 444) referred to.
Held per KANIA C.J., PATANJALI SASTRI, MEHR CHAND
MAHAJAN, MUKHERJEA and DAS JJ.--(FAZL ALI J. dissenting):
(i) Apart from libel, slander etc. unless a law restricting
freedom of speech and expression is directed solely against
the undermining of the security of the State or the over-
throw of it, such law cannot fall within the reservation
under cl. (2) of art. 19 of the Constitution, although the
restrictions which it seeks to impose may have been con-
ceived generally in the interests of public order. Section 9
(1-A) of the Madras Maintenance of Public Order Act, XXXIII
of 1949, which authorises impositions of restrictions for
the wider purpose of securing public safety or the mainte-
nance of public order falls outside the scope of authorised
restrictions under cl. (2) and is therefore void and uncon-
stitutional; (ii) Where a law purports to authorise the
imposition of restrictions on a fundamental right in lan-
guage wide enough to cover restrictions both within and
without the limits of constitutionally permissible legisla-
tive action affecting such right, it is not possible to
uphold it even so far as it may be applied within the
constitutional limits, as it is not severable. So long as
the possibilitY of its being applied for purposes not sanc-
tioned by the Constitution cannot be ruled out
595
must be held to be wholly unconstitutional and void.
Section 9 (1-A) is therefore wholly unconstitutional and
void.
Per FAZL ALI J.--Restrictions which s. 9 (1-A) autho-
rised are within the provisions of cl. (2) of art. 19 of the
Constitution and s. 9 (1-A)is not therefore unconstitutional
or void.(1)
Brij Bhushan and Another v. The State [1950] S.C.R. 605
referred to.
JUDGMENT:
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION: Petition No. XVI of 1950. Appli- cation under article 32 of the
Constitution for a writ of prohibition and certiorari. The facts are set out in the judgment.
C.R.Pattabhi Raman, for the petitioner.
K. Rajah Ayyar, Advocate-General of MadraS, (Ganapathi Ayyar, with him) for the opposite
party.
1950. May 26. The Judgment of Kania C.J., Mehr Chand Mahajan, Mukherjea and Das JJ. was
delivered by Patanjali Sastri J. Fazl Ali J. delivered a separate judgment. PATANJALI SASTRI
J.--The petitioner is the printer, publisher and editor of a recently started weekly journal in
English called Cross Roads printed and published in Bombay. The Government of Madras, the
respondents herein, in exercise of their powers under section 9 (1-A) of the Madras
Maintenance of Public Order Act, 1949 (hereinafter referred to as the impugned Act) purported
to issue an order No. MS. 1333 dated 1st March, 1950, whereby they imposed a ban upon the
entry and circulation of the journal in that State. The order was published in the Fort St. George
Gazette and the notification ran as follows :--
"In exercise of the powers conferred by section 9 (I-A) of the Madras Maintenance of Public
Order, Act, 1949 (Madras Act XXIII of 1949) His Excellency the Governor of Madras, being
satisfied that for the purpose of securing the public safety and the maintenance of public order, it
is necessary so to do, hereby prohibits, with effect on and from the date of publication of this
order in the Fort St. George Gazette the entry into or the circulation, sale or distribution in the
State of Madras or any part thereof of the newspaper entitled Cross Roads an English weekly
published at Bombay."
The petitioner claims that the said order contravenes the fundamental right of the petitioner to
freedom of See the headnote to Brij Bhushan v. The State of Delhi, p. 605 infra.
speech and expression conferred on him by article 19 (1) (a) of the Constitution and he
challenges the validity of section 9 (1-A) of the impugned Act as being void under article 13 (1)
of the Constitution by reason of its being inconsistent with his fundamental right aforesaid. The
Advocate-General of Madras appearing on be half of the respondents raised a preliminary
objection, not indeed to the jurisdiction of this Court to entertain the application under article 32,
but to the petitioner resorting to this Court directly for such relief in the first instance. He
contended that, as a matter of orderly procedure, the petitioner should first resort to the High
Court at Madras which under article 226 of the Constitution has concurrent jurisdiction to deal
with the matter. He cited criminal revision petitions under section 435 of the Crimi- nal
Procedure Code, applications for bail and applications for transfer under section 24 of the Civil
Procedure Code as instances where, concurrent jurisdiction having been given in certain
matters to the High Court and the Court of a lower grade, a rule of practice has been
established that a party should proceed first to the latter Court for relief before resorting to the
High Court. He referred to Emperor v. Bisheswar Prasad Sinha (1) where such a rule of practice
was enforced in a criminal revision case, and called our attention also to certain American
decisions Urquhart v. Brown (2) and Hooney v. Kolohan (3) as showing that the Supreme Court
of the United States ordinarily required that whatever judicial remedies remained open to the
applicant in Federal and State Courts should be exhausted before the remedy in the Supreme
Court---be it habeas corpus or certiorari-- would be allowed. We are of opinion that neither the
instances mentioned by the learned Advocate General nor the American decisions referred to
by him are really analogous to the remedy afforded by article 32 of the Indian Constitution. That
article does not merely confer power on this Court, as article 226 does on the (1) I.L.R. 56 All.
158. (2) 205 U. S. 179. (3) 294 U.S. 103.
High Courts, to issue certain writs for the enforcement of the rights conferred by Part III or for
any other purpose, as part of its general jurisdiction. In that case it would have been more
appropriately placed among articles 131 to 139 which define that jurisdiction. Article 32 provides
a "guaranteed" remedy for the enforcement of those rights, and this remedial right is itself made
a fundamental right by being included in Part 1II. This Court is thus constituted the protector and
guarantor of fundamental rights, and it cannot, consistently with the responsibility so laid upon it,
refuse to entertain applications seeking protection against infringements of such rights. No
similar provision is to be found in the Constitution of the United States and we do not consider
that the American decisions are in point. Turning now to the merits, there can be no doubt that
freedom of speech and expression includes freedom of propagation of ideas, and that freedom
is ensured by the freedom of circulation. "Liberty of circulation is as essential to that freedom as
the liberty of publication. Indeed, without circulation the publication would be of little value ": Ex
parte Jackson(1). See also LoveIl v. City of Griffin(s). It is therefore perfectly clear that the order
of the Gov- ernment of Madras would be a violation of the petitioner's fundamental right under
article 19 (1) (a), unless section 9 (1-A) of the impugned Act under which it was made is saved
by the reservations mentioned in clause (2) of article 19 which (omitting immaterial words
regarding laws relating to libel, slander, etc., with which we are not concerned in this case)
saves the operation of any "existinglaw in so far as it relates to any matter which undermines
the security of, or tends to overthrow, the State." The question accordingly arises whether, the
impugned Act, in so far as it purports by section 9 (1-A) to authorise the Provincial Government
"for the purpose of securing the public safety or the maintenance of public order, to prohibit or
regulate the entry into (1) 96 U.S. 727. (2) 303 U.S, 444.
or the circulation, sale or distribution in the Province of Madras or any part thereof of any
document or class of documents" is a "law relating to any matter which undermines the security
of or tends to overthrow the State."
The impugned Act was passed by the Provincial Legisla- ture in exercise of the power conferred
upon it by section 100 of the Government of India Act 1935, read with Entry 1 of List II of the
Seventh Schedule to that Act, which com- prises among other matters, "public order." Now
"public order" is an expression of wide connotation and signifies that state of tranquillity which
prevails among the members of a political society as a result of the internal regulations
enforced by the government which they have established. Although section 9 (I-A) refers to
"securing the public safety" and "the maintenance of public order" as distinct purposes, it must
be taken that "public safety" is used as a part of the wider concept of public order, for, if public
safety were intended to signify any 'matter distinct from and outside the content of the
expression "public order," it would not have been competent for the Madras Legislature to enact
the provision so far as it relates to public safety. This indeed was not disputed on behalf of the
respondents. But it was urged that the expression "public safety" in the impugned Act, which is a
statute relating to law and order, means the security of the Province, and, therefore,' 'the
security of the State" with the meaning of article 19 (2)as "the State" has been defined in article
12 as including, among other things, the Government and the Legislature of each of the
erstwhile Provinces. Much reliance was placed in support of this view on Rex v. Wormwood
Scrubbs Prison(1) where it was held that the phrase "for securing the public safety and the'
defence of. the realm" in section 1 of the Defence of the Realm (Consolidation) Act, 1914, was
not limited to securing the country against a foreign foe but included also protection against
internal disorder such as a rebellion. The decision is not of much assistance to the respondents
as the context in (1) L.R. [1920] 2 K.B. 805.
which the words "public safety" occurred in that Act showed unmistakably that the security of the
State was the aim in view. Our attention has not been drawn to any definition of the expression
"public safety," nor does it appear that the words have acquired any technical signification as
words of art.
"Public safety" ordinarily means security of the public or their freedom from danger. In that
sense, anything which tends to prevent dangers to public health may also be regarded as
securing public safety. The meaning of the expression must, however, vary according to the
context. In the classification of offenCes in the Indian Penal Code, for instance, Chapter XIV
enumerates the "offences affecting the public health, safety, convenience, decency, and morals"
and it includes rash driving or riding on a public way (section 279) and rash navigation of a
vessel (section 280), among others, as offences against public safety, while Chapter VI lists
waging war against the Queen (section 121), sedition (section 124-A) etc. as "offences against
the State", because they are calculated to undermine or affect the security of the State, and
Chapter VIII defines "offences against the public tranquillity" which include unlawful assembly
(section 141) rioting (section 146), promoting enmity between classes (section 153-A), affray
(section 159) etc. Although in the context of a statute relating to law and order "securing
public safety" may not include the securing of public health, it may well mean securing the
public against rash driving on a public way and the like, and not necessarily the security of the
State. It was said that an enactment which provided for drastic remedies like preventive
detention and ban on newspapers must be taken to relate to matters affecting the security of the
State rather than trivial offences like rash driving, or an affray. But whatever ends the impugned
Act may have been intended to subserve, and whatever aims its framers may have had in view,
its application and scope cannot, in the absence of limiting words in the statute itself, be
restricted to those aggravated forms of prejudicial activity which are calculated to endanger the
security of the State. Nor is there any guarantee that those authorised to exercise the powers
under the Act will in using them discriminate between those who act prejudicially to the security
of the State and those who do not.
The Government of India Act, 1935, nowhere used the expression" security of the State" though
it made provision under section 57 for dealing with crimes of violence intended to overthrow
the Government. While the administration of law and order including the maintenance of public
order was placed in charge of a Minister elected by the people, the Governor was entrusted with
the responsibility of combating the operations of persons who "endangered the peace or
tranquillity of the Province" by committing or attempting to commit "crimes of violence intended
to overthrow the Govern- ment." Similarly, article 352 of the Constitution empowers the
President to make a Proclamation of Emergency when he is satisfied that the "security of India
or any part of the territory thereof is threatened by war or by external aggression or by internal
disturbance." These provisions recognise that disturbance of public peace or tranquillity may
assume such grave proportions as to threaten the security of the State.
As Stephen in his 'Criminal Law of England(1) observes:'' Unlawful assemblies, riots,

insurrections, rebellions, levying of war, are offences which run into each other and are not
capable of being marked off by perfectly defined boundaries. All of them have in common one
feature, namely, that the normal tranquillity of a civilised society is in each of the cases
mentioned disturbed either by actual force or at least by the show and threat of it." Though all
these offences thus involve disturbances of public tranquillity and are in theory offences
against public order, the difference between them being only a difference' of degree, yet for the
purpose of grading the punishment to be inflict- ed in respect of them they may be classified into
different minor categories as has been done by (1) Vol. II, p. 242.
the Indian Penal Code. Similarly, the Constitution, in formulating the varying criteria for
permissible legislation imposing restrictions on the fundamental rights enumerated in article 19
(1), has placed in a distinct category those offences against public order which aim at
undermining the security of the State or overthrowing it, and made their prevention the sole
justification for legislative abridgement of freedom of speech and expression, that is to say,
nothing less than endangering the foundations of the State or threatening its overthrow could
justify curtailment of the rights to freedom of speech and expression, while the right of
peaceable assembly "sub-clause (b)" and the right of association "sub-clause (c)" may be
restricted under clauses (3) and (4) of article 19 in the interests of" public order," which in those
clauses includes the security of the State. The differentiation is also noticeable in Entry 3 of List
III (Concurrent List) of the Seventh Sched- ule, which refers to the "security of a State" and
"maintenance of public order" as distinct subjects of.legislation. The Constitution thus requires
a line to be drawn in the field of public order or tranquillity marking off, may be, roughly, the
boundary between those serious and aggravated forms of public disorder which are calculated
to endanger the security of the State and the relatively minor breaches of the peace of a purely
local significance, treating for this purpose differences in degree as if they were differences in
kind.
It is also worthy of note that the word "sedition" which occurred in article 13 (2) of the Draft
Constitution pre- pared by the Drafting Committee was deleted before the article was finally.
passed as article 19 (2). In this connection it may be recalled that the Federal Court had, in
defining sedition in Niharendu Dutt Majumdar v. The King Emperor (1), held that "the acts or
words complained of must either incite to disorder or must be such as to satisfy reasonable men
that that is their intention or tendency", but the Privy Council overruled that [1942] F.C.R. 38.
decision and emphatically reaffirmed the view expressed in Tilak's case (1) to the effect that "the
offence "consisted in exciting or attempting to excite in others certain bad feelings towards the
Government and not in exciting or attempting to excite mutiny or rebellion, or any sort of actual
disturbance, great or small "-King Emperor v. Sada- shiv Narayan Bhalerao (2) Deletion of the
word "sedition" from the draft article 13 (2), therefore, shows that criticism of Government
exciting disaffection or bad feelings towards it is not to be regarded as a justifying ground for
restricting the freedom of expression and of the press, unless it is such as to undermine the
security of or tend to overthrow the State. It is also significant that the corresponding Irish
formula of "undermining the public order or the authority of the State" article 40 (6) (i) of the
Constitution of Eire, [1937] did not apparently find favour with the framers of the Indian
Constitution. Thus, very narrow and stringent limits have been set to permissible legislative
abridgement of the right of free speech and expression, and this was doubtless due to the
realisation that freedom of speech and of the press lay at the foundation of all democratic
organisations, for without free political discussion no public education, so essential for the
proper functioning of the processes of popular government, is possible. A freedom of such
amplitude might involve risks of abuse. But the framers of the Constitution may well have
reflected, with Madison who was "the leading spirit in the preparation of the First Amendment of
the Federal Constitution," that "it is better to leave a few of its noxious branches to their luxuriant
growth, than, by pruning them away, to injure the vigour of those yielding the proper fruits.":
[Quoted in Near v. Minnesotta (3)]. We are therefore of opinion 'that unless a law restricting
freedom of speech and expression is directed solely against the undermining of the security of
the State or the overthrow of it, such law cannot fall within the reservation under clause (2) of
article 19, although the (1) 22 Bom. 112. (21 L.R. 74, I A. 89. (8) 282U.S, 607, 717-8.
restrictions which it seeks to impose may have been con- ceived generally in the interests of
public order. It follows that section 9 (1-A) which authorises imposition of restrictions for the
wider purpose of securing public safety or the maintenance of public order falls outside the
scope of authorised restrictions under clause (2), and is therefore void and unconstitutional.
It was, however, argued that section 9 (1-A) could not be considered wholly void, as, under
article 13 (1), an existing law inconsistent with a fundamental right is void only to the extent of
the inconsistency and no more. In so far as the securing of the public safety or the maintenance
of public order would include the' security of the State, the impugned provision, as applied to the
latter purpose, was covered by clause (2) of article 19 and must, it was said, be held to be valid.
We are unable to accede to this contention. Where a law purports to authorise the imposition
of restrictions on a fundamental right in language wide enough to cover restrictions both within
and without the limits of constitutionally permissible legislative action affecting such right, it is
not possible to uphold it even so far as it may be applied within the constitutional limits, as it is
not severable. So long as the possibility of its being applied for purposes not sanctioned by the
Consti- tution cannot be ruled out, it must be held to be wholly unconstitutional and void. In
other words, clause (2) of article 19 having allowed the imposition of restrictions on the freedom
of speech and expression only in cases where danger to the State is involved, an enactment,
which is capable of being applied to cases where no such danger could arise, cannot be held to
be constitutional and valid to any extent.
The application is therefore allowed and the order of the respondents prohibiting the entry and
circulation of the petitioner's journal in the State of Madras is hereby quashed.
FAZL ALI J.--For the reasons given by me in Brij Bhushan and Another v. The State(1) , which
practically
605. involves the same question as is involved in this case, I hold that the reliefs sought by the
petitioner cannot be granted. In this view, I would dismiss this petition, but I should like to add a
few observations to supplement what I have said in the other case.
It appears to me that in the ultimate analysis the real question to be decided in this case is
whether "disorders involving menace to the peace and tranquillity of the Prov- ince" and
affecting "public safety" will be a matter which undermines the security of the State or not. I have
bor- rowed the words quoted within inverted commas from the preamble of the Act which shows
its scope and necessity and the question raised before us attacking the, validity of the Act must
be formulated in the manner I have suggested. If the answer to the question is in the affirmative,
as I think it must be, then the impugned law which prohibits entry into the State of Madras of
"any document or class of documents" for securing public safety and maintenance of public
order should satisfy the requirements laid down in article 19 (2)of the Constitution. From the
trend of the arguments addressed to us, it would appear that if a document is seditious, its
entry could be validly prohibited, because sedition is a matter which undermines the security of
the State; but if, on the other hand, the document is calculated to disturb public tranquillity and
affect public safety, its entry cannot be prohibited, because public disorder and disturbance of
public tranquillity are not matters which undermine the security of the State. Speaking for
myself, I cannot understand this argument. In Brij Bhushan and Another v. The State(1), I have
quoted good authority to show that sedition owes its gravity to its tendency to create disorders
and an authority on criminal law like Sir James Stephen has classed sedition as an offence
against public tranquillity. If so, how could sedition be a matter which would undermine the
security of the State and public disorders and disturbance of public safety will not be such a
matter? It was argued that a small riot or an affray will not (1) [1950] S.C R, 605.
undermine the security of the State, but to this line of argument there is a two-fold answer :--
(1) The Act, as its preamble shows, is not intended for petty disorders but for disorders involving
menace to the peace and tranquillity of the Province, (2) There are de- grees of gravity in the
offence of sedition also and an isolated piece of writing of mildly seditious character by one
insignificant individual may not also, from the layman's point of view, be a matter which
undermines the security of the State, but that would not affect the law which aims at checking
sedition. It was also said that the law as it stands may be misused by the State executive, but
misuse of the law is one thing and its being unconstitutional is another. We are here concerned
with the latter aspect only. I shall not pursue the matter further as I have said enough on the
subject in the connected case.
Petition allowed.
Agent for the petitioner:--K. J. Kale.
Agent for the opposite party :--P. A. Mehta.

Muhammad Hilman bin Idham & Ors v Kerajaan Malaysia &
[2011] 6 MLJ Ors 507
A Muhammad Hilman bin Idham & Ors v Kerajaan Malaysia &

Ors
COURT OF APPEAL (PUTRAJAYA) — CIVIL APPEAL NO

B
W-01(IM)-636 OF 2010
LOW HOP BING, MOHD HISHAMUDIN AND LINTON ALBERT
JJCA
31 OCTOBER 2011
C
Constitutional Law — Legislation — Validity of impugned legislation — Whether
s 15(5)(a) of the Universities and Universities Colleges Act 1971 unconstitutional
— Whether provisions of impugned provision reasonable and within ambit of art
10(1)(a) of the Federal Constitution read with art 10(2)(a) — Universities and
D University Colleges Act 1971 s 15(5)(a) — Federal Constitution art 10(1)
The appellants, who were at all material times political science undergraduate
students of the Universiti Kebangsaan Malaysia (the third respondent), were
present in the constituency of Hulu Selangor during the campaign period for
E the Parliamentary by-election of 24 April 2010. The appellants were found to
have in their possession paraphernalia supportive of, sympathetic with or
opposed to a contesting political party in the by-election. On 13 May 2010, the
appellants received notices from the third respondent requiring them to appear
before a disciplinary tribunal on 3 June 2010 to answer charges of alleged
F breaches and offences under s 15(5)(a) of the Universities and University
Colleges Act 1971 (‘the UUCA’). The appellants denied the allegations and at
the same time applied by way of an originating summons for a declaration that
s 15(5)(a) of the UUCA contravened art 10(1)(a) of the Federal Constitution
(‘the Constitution’) and was therefore invalid and that consequently, the
G disciplinary proceedings instituted by the third respondent against them were
also invalid. The appellants also applied by way of an interlocutory injunction
to restrain the third respondent from proceeding with the disciplinary
proceedings. The High Court judge found that s 15(5)(a) of the UUCA was
constitutional and valid and that the provisions of s 15(5)(a) of the UUCA
H were reasonable and within the ambit of art 10(1)(a) of the Constitution read
with art 10(2)(a). The High Court judge thus dismissed both the appellants’
OS application and the application for an interim injunction. This was the
appellants’ appeal against that decision on the grounds, inter alia, that the trial
judge had erred in law and fact in holding that the question of reasonableness
I did not arise when in fact it was an important consideration. The appellants
contended that the impugned provision was a restriction on the students’ right
to freedom of speech and that any restriction on the freedom of speech had to
be for one of the purposes as specified by cl 2(a) of art 10 of the Constitution
and it had to be reasonable. The respondents contended that the restriction on
freedom of speech was permitted by cl 2(a) of art 10 of the Constitution, in A

that, the restriction was necessary in the interest of ‘public order or morality’.
However, the appellants argued that there was nothing in the UUCA or in the
Minister’s speech, in moving the Bill in Parliament, as reported in the Hansard,
to suggest that s 15(5)(a) of the UUCA was meant to protect public interest or
public morality. Further, the appellants submitted that the restriction as B
imposed in s 15(5)(a) of the UUCA was unreasonable.
Held, allowing the appeal with costs:

(1) (per Low Hop Bing JCA, dissenting) The restrictions imposed under s C
15(5)(a) of the UUCA pertain essentially to the involvement of students
in politics. These restrictions were necessary and sought to prevent
infiltration of political ideologies including extremities amongst students
as this infiltration could adversely affect the primary purpose of the
universities ie the pursuit of education. The issue of ‘reasonableness’ had D
been extensively debated in Parliament as reported in Hansard. Further, it
was not for the court to state whether the law was ‘harsh and unjust’,
which was a matter of policy to be decided by Parliament. In conclusion
the restrictions contained in the impugned provision were within the
bounds of reasonableness and came within the scope of art 10(1)(a) read E
with art 10(2)(a) of the Constitution (see paras 26–27 & 30).
(2) (per Mohd Hishamudin JCA) It is settled law that any restriction
imposed on freedom of speech by Parliament had to be a reasonable
restriction, and that the court if called upon to rule, as in the present case, F
had the power to examine whether the restriction so imposed was
reasonable or otherwise, besides determining as to whether or not the
restriction fell within the exceptions as set out in cl 2(a) of art 10 of the
Constitution. Upon holding the restriction to be unreasonable, the court
also had the right to declare the impugned law imposing the restriction to G
be unconstitutional and accordingly null and void. In the present case,
the restrictions imposed by way of s 15(5)(a) of the UUCA were
unreasonable and it was difficult to see in what manner this section
related to public order or morality. There was no nexus between the
exercise of the right of a university student to express support for or H
opposition against a political party and public order or public morality
(see paras 43 & 47).
(3) (per Mohd Hishamudin JCA) The impugned provision was irrational.
Most university students were of the age of majority and therefore at
liberty to enter into contracts, sue and be sued, marry and undertake I
parental responsibilities and vote in general elections if they were over 21.
Thus, it was ironic that legally they could not say anything that could be
construed as supporting or opposing a political party. As such, a provision
like s 15(5)(a) of the UUCA, which impeded the healthy development of
[2011] 6 MLJ Ors 509
A the critical mind and original thoughts of students was not only counter
productive but also repressive in nature. Further, the Minister’s speech, in
moving the Bill in Parliament, as reported in the Hansard did not disclose
any link between prohibiting university students from expressing their
support for or opposition against a political party and the maintenance of
B public order or public morality. In fact what the Minister said in
Parliament about preserving the freedom of speech of students and what
the impugned provision provided were found to be contradictory (see
paras 48, 52 & 54).
C (4) (per Linton Albert JCA) In cases where the legislative enactment was self
explanatory in its manifest absurdity as s 15(5)(a) of the UUCA
undoubtedly was, it was not necessary to embark on a judicial scrutiny to
determine its reasonableness. There could be no better illustration of the
utter absurdity of s 15(5)(a) of the UUCA than the facts of the present
D case, where students of the university face disciplinary proceedings with
the grim prospect of expulsion simply because of their presence at a
Parliamentary by-election. Further, the respondents’ reliance on s 15(4)
of the UUCA to mitigate the effects of the impugned provision was
wholly misconceived (see paras 67 & 71).
E
[Bahasa Malaysia summary
Perayu-perayu, yang mana pada masa matan merupakan pelajar-pelajar
mahasiswa/mahasiswi sains politik Universiti Kebangsaan Malaysia
(‘responden ketiga’), berada untuk pilihan raya Hulu Selangor semasa tempoh
F kempen untuk pilihan raya kecil Parlimen pada 24 April 2010. Perayu-perayu
didapati dalam milikan mereka perlengkapan yang menyokong atau
menentang parti politik yang bertanding dalam pilihan raya kecil tersebut.
Pada 13 Mei 2010, perayu-perayu telah menerima notis daripada responden
ketiga memerlukan mereka untuk hadir di hadapan tribunal tatatertib pada 3
G Jun 2010 untuk menjawab tuduhan-tuduhan pelanggaran dan kesalahan yang
didakwa di bawah s 15(5)(a) Akta Universiti dan Kolej Universiti 1971
(‘AUKU’). Perayu-perayu menafikan dakwaan-dakwaan tersebut dan pada
masa yang sama telah memohon melalui saman pemula untuk deklarasi
bahawa s 15(5)(a) AUKU bercanggah dengan perkara 10(1)(a) Perlembagaan
H Persekutuan (‘Perlembagaan’) dan oleh itu tidak sah dan bahawa lanjutan itu,
prosiding-prosiding tatatertib yang dimulakan oleh responden ketiga terhadap
mereka adalah tidak sah. Perayu-perayu juga memohon melalui injunksi
interlokutori untuk menghalang responden ketiga daripada meneruskan
prosiding-prosiding interlokutori tersebut. Hakim Mahkamah Tinggi
I mendapati bahawa s 15(5)(a) AUKU adalah berpelembagaan dan sah dan
bahawa peruntukan-peruntukan s 15(5)(a) AUKU adalah munasabah dan
dalam lingkungan perkara 10(1)(a) Perlembagaan dibaca dengan perkara
10(2)(a). Hakim Mahkamah Tinggi justeru menolak kedua-dua permohonan
SP perayu-perayu dan permohonan untuk injunksi interim. Ini merupakan
rayuan perayu-perayu terhadap keputusan tersebut atas alasan-alasan, antara A

lain, bahawa hakim bicara telah terkhilaf dalam undang-undang dan fakta
dalam memutuskan bahawa persoalan tentang keberpatutan tidak wujud
apabila terdapat pertimbangan yang penting. Perayu-perayu berhujah bahawa
peruntukan yang dipersoalkan adalah sekatan terhadap hak kebebasan untuk
bersuara untuk pelajar-pelajar dan bahawa sebarang sekatan kebebasan untuk B
bersuara hendaklah untuk salah satu tujuan yang dispesifikasikan oleh klausa
2(a) perkara 10 Perlembagaan dan ia hendaklah berpatutan.
Responden-responden berhujah bahawa sekatan kebebasan untuk bersuara
adalah dibenarkan oleh klausa 2(a) perkara 10 PP, yakni, sekatan tersebut
adalah perlu untuk kepentingan ‘public order or morality’. Walau C
bagaimanapun, perayu-perayu membantah bahawa tidak terdapat apa-apa di
dalam AUKU atau dalam ucapan Menteri, dalam mencadangkan rang
undang-undang dalam Parlimen, seperti yang dilaporkan di dalam Hansard,
menunjukkan bahawa s 15(5)(a) AUKU adalah bertujuan untuk melindungi
kepentingan atau kelakuan akhlak awam. Selanjutnya, perayu-perayu berhujah D
bahawa sekatan yang dikenakan dalam s 15(5)(a) AUKU adalah tidak
berpatutan.
Diputuskan, membenarkan rayuan dengan kos:

E
(1) (oleh Low Hop Bing HMR, menentang) Sekatan-sekatan yang
dikenakan di bawah s 15(5)(a) AUKU pada asasnya berkenaan dengan
penglibatan pelajar-pelajar dalam politik. Sekatan-sekatan ini adalah
perlu dan bertujuan untuk menghalang penyerapan ideologi politik
termasuk keterlampauan di kalangan pelajar-pelajar memandangkan F
penyerapan ini secara bertentangan boleh menjejaskan tujuan utama
universiti-universiti iaitu untuk melanjutkan pelajaran. Isu
‘reasonableness’ telah didebatkan secara meluas dalam Parlimen seperti
yang dilaporkan di dalam Hansard. Selanjutnya, adalah bukan bagi
mahkamah untuk menyatakan sama ada undang-undang adalah ‘harsh G
and unjust’, yang mana merupakan perkara polisi yang harus diputuskan
oleh Parlimen. Secara kesimpulan, sekatan-sekatan yang terkandung
dalam peruntukan yang dipersoalkan adalah terangkum dalam batasan
keberpatutan dan termasuk dalam skop perkara 10(1)(a) dibaca dengan
perkara 10(2)(a) Perlembagaan (lihat perenggan 26–27 & 30). H
(2) (oleh Mohd Hishamudin HMR) Adalah menjadi undang-undang tetap
bahawa sebarang sekatan kebebasan untuk bersuara oleh Parlimen
seharusnya suatu sekatan yang berpatutan, dan bahawa sekiranya
mahkamah yang diarahkan untuk memutuskan, seperti dalam kes ini,
mempunyai kuasa untuk meneliti sama ada sekatan yang dikenakan I
adalah berpatutan atau sebaliknya, selain daripada menentukan sama ada
atau tidak sekatan tersebut tertakluk dalam pengecualian-pengecualian
yang dinyatakan dalam klausa 2(a) perkara 10 Perlembagaan. Setelah
memutuskan bahawa sekatan adalah tidak berpatutan, mahkamah juga
[2011] 6 MLJ Ors 511
A mempunyai hak untuk mengisytiharkan undang-undang yang

mengenakan sekatan tersebut sebagai tidak berpelembagaan dan
selanjutnya terbatal dan tidak sah. Dalam kes ini, sekatan-sekatan yang
dikenakan melalui s 15(5)(a) AUKU adalah tidak berpatutan dan adalah
sukar untuk melihat dalam bentuk apa seksyen ini berkaitan dengan
B ketenteraman dan kelakuan akhlak awam. Tidak terdapat hubung kait
antara pelaksanaan hak pelajar universiti untuk memberikan sokongan
untuk atau menentang parti politik dan ketenteraman atau kelakuan
akhlak awam (lihat perenggan 43 & 47).
C (3) (oleh Mohd Hishamudin HMR) Peruntukan yang dipersoalkan adalah
tidak munasabah. Kebanyakan pelajar-pelajar universiti adalah berusia
majoriti dan oleh itu bebas untuk memasuki kontrak, menyaman atau
disaman, berkahwin dan mengambil tanggungjawab sebagai ibu bapa
dan mengundi secara amnya dalam pilihan raya umum sekiranya mereka
D melebihi 21 tahun. Justeru, adalah ironik bahawa dari sisi
undang-undang mereka tidak boleh menyatakan apa-apa yang boleh
ditafsirkan sebagai menyokong atau menentang parti politik. Oleh itu,
peruntukan seperti s 15(5)(a) AUKU, yang mana menghalang
perkembangan untuk minda kritis yang sihat dan pemikiran asal
E pelajar-pelajar bukan hanya tidak produktif tetapi juga bersifat
menindas. Justeru, ucapan Menteri, dalam mencadangkan rang
undang-undang dalam Parlimen, seperti yang dilaporkan di dalam
Hansard tidak mengemukakan sebarang kaitan di antara mencegah
pelajar-pelajar universiti untuk memberikan sokongan untuk atau
F
menentang parti politik dan mengekalkan ketenteraman atau kelakuan
akhlak awam. Malahan apa yang dikatakan oleh Menteri dalam Parlimen
tentang memelihara kebebasan untuk bersuara pelajar-pelajar dan apa
yang diperuntukkan oleh peruntukan yang dipersoalkan didapati
bercanggah (lihat perenggan 48, 52 & 54).
G
(4) (oleh Linton Albert HMR) Dalam kes-kes di mana enakmen
perundangan adalah jelas dengan sendirinya dalam kebenaran yang tidak
munasabah seperti, yang tidak dapat disangsikan, s 15(5)(a), adalah tidak
perlu untuk memulakan penelitian dan pembetulan kehakiman untuk
H menentukan keberpatutannya. Tidak terdapat illustrasi yang lebih baik
tentang ketidakmunasabahan s 15(5)(a) AUKU daripada fakta-fakta kes
ini, di mana pelajar-pelajar universiti berdepan dengan
prosiding-prosiding tatatertib dengan prospek suram pengusiran
semata-mata kerana kehadiran mereka semasa pilihan raya kecil sidang
I Parlimen (lihat perenggan 67 & 71).]
Notes
For cases on validity of impugned legislation, see 3(1) Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed,
2011 Reissue) paras 2551–2556.
Cases referred to A
Adegbenro v Akintola [1963] 3 WLR 63; [1963] AC 614, PC (refd)
Badan Peguam Malaysia v Kerajaan Malaysia [2008] 2 MLJ 285; [2008] 1 CLJ
521, FC (refd)
Dalip Bhagwan Singh v PP [1998] 1 MLJ 1; [1997] 4 CLJ 645, FC (refd)
Educational Company of Ireland Ltd v Fitzpatrick (No 2) (1961) IR 345 (refd) B
Federal Steam Navigation Co Ltd and another v Department of Trade and Industy
[1974] 2 All ER 97, HL (refd)
Government of the State of Kelantan, The v The Government of the Federation of
Malaya and Tunku Abdul Rahman Putra Al-Haj [1963] MLJ 335 (refd)
Kesavananda Bharati v State of Kerala AIR 1973 SC 1461 (refd) C
Lee Kwan Woh v Public Prosecutor [2009] 5 MLJ 301; [2009] 5 CLJ 631, FC
(refd)
Loh Kooi Choon v Government of Malaysia [1977] 2 MLJ 187, FC (refd)
PP v Ooi Kee Saik & Ors [1971] 2 MLJ 108 (refd)
PP v Pung Chen Choon [1994] 1 MLJ 566; [1994] 1 LNS 208, SC (refd) D
Shamim Reza Abdul Samad v PP [2009] 6 CLJ 93, FC (refd)
Sivarasa Rasiah v Badan Peguam Malaysia & Anor [2010] 2 MLJ 333; [2010] 3
CLJ 607, FC (refd)
Sivarasa Rasiah v Badan Peguam Malaysia & Anor [2006] 1 MLJ 727, CA (refd)
Sweezy v New Hampshire 354 US 234 (1957) (refd) E
Vedprakash v The State AIR 1987 Gujerat 253 (refd)
Whitney v California 274 US 357 (1927) (refd)
Legislation referred to
Federal Constitution arts 4(1), 10(1), (1)(a), (1)(c), (2), (2)(a), (2)(c), Part II F
Legal Profession Act 1976 s 46A
Printing Presses and Publications Act 1984 s 8A(1)
Universities and University Colleges Act 1971 s 15(4), (5), (5)(a)
Appeal from: Originating Summons No R1-24-47 of 2010 (High Court, G
Kuala Lumpur)
Malik Imtiaz Sarwar (Jenine Gill with him) (Kandiah Partnership) for the
appellant.
Noor Hisham bin Ismail (Senior Federal Counsel, Attorney General’s Chambers)
for the first and second respondents. H
Muhammad Shafee Abdullah (Sarah Abishegam with him) (Shafee & Co) for the
third respondent.
Low Hop Bing JCA (dissenting):

I
APPEAL
[1] In the Kuala Lumpur High Court, the appellants’ (‘the plaintiffs’)
originating summons (encl 1) sought a declaration that s 15(5)(a) of the
[2011] 6 MLJ Ors (Low Hop Bing JCA) 513
A Universities and University Colleges Act 1971 (‘s 15(5)(a)’) is invalid, on the
ground that it contravenes art art 10(1)(a) of the Federal Constitution, and
consequentially the pending disciplinary proceedings instituted against the
plaintiffs by Universiti Kebangsaan Malaysia, the third respondent (‘the third
defendant’) are invalid (for brevity and convenience, a reference hereinafter to
B an article is a reference to that article in the Federal Constitution).
[2] The plaintiffs’ summons in chambers (encl 4) prayed for an interlocutory

injunction to restrain the third defendant from proceeding with the
C disciplinary proceedings.
[3] The High Court had dismissed the plaintiffs’ originating summons and
summons in chambers. Hence, this appeal by the plaintiffs.
D FACTUAL BACKGROUND
[4] The undisputed facts are simple and straightforward. The plaintiffs are
political science undergraduate students of the third defendant. They were
E present in the constituency of Hulu Selangor during the campaign period for
the Parliamentary by-election of 24 April 2010. They were having in their
possession paraphernalia supportive of, sympathetic with or opposed to a
contesting political party in the by-election.
F [5] On or about 13 May 2010, the plaintiffs received notices from the third’s
defendant Vice Chancellor, requiring them to appear before a disciplinary
tribunal on 3 June 2010, to answer charges of alleged breaches and offences
under s 15(5)(a), punishable under the disciplinary regulations of the third
defendant. In response thereto, the plaintiffs made written representations
G dated 26 May 2010 denying the allegations.
QUESTION FOR DETERMINATION
H [6] The plaintiffs’ learned counsel Mr Malik Imtiaz Sarwar (assisted by Miss
Jenine Gill) conceded that Parliament is permitted to enact laws that
contravene art 10(1)(a) if such laws fall within the ambit of art 10(2)(a).
However, they contended in essence that:
(a) the court ought to have regard to the nature of the fundamental rights
I
guaranteed under art 10(1)(a) which must be interpreted generously to
give its widest effect; and
(b) s 15(5)(a) violated the plaintiffs’ fundamental liberties to speech and
expression, and is unconstitutional as it lies outside the ambit of art
10(2)(a). They relied on, inter alia, the judgment of the Federal Court in A
Sivarasa Rasiah v Badan Peguam Malaysia & Anor [2010] 2 MLJ 333;
[2010] 3 CLJ 607 (FC).
[7] Learned senior federal counsel Noor Hisham bin Ismail derived support
from the judgment of the (then) Supreme Court in Public Prosecutor v Pung B
Chen Choon [1994] 1 MLJ 566 (SC) and argued for the first and second
respondents (the first and second defendants) that the learned High Court
judge is correct in arriving at the decision that s 15(5)(a) is constitutional and
valid. In any event, he added that the provisions of s 15(5)(a) are reasonable and
within the ambit of art 10(1)(a) read with art 10(2)(a). Likewise, Dato’ Sri Dr C
Muhammad Shafee Abdullah (Miss Sarah Abishegan with him) submitted for
the third defendant and supported the decision of the High Court as correct.
[8] A glimpse of the aforesaid submissions led me to the consideration of the

D
following question:
Upon a true construction of s.15(5)(a), and testing it against art 10(1)(a) read with
the restrictions under art 10(2)(a), can s.15(5)(a) be said to contravene art 10(1)(a)
and ultra vires the Federal Constitution, unconstitutional and invalid?
E
[9] In my view, consideration of the aforesaid question would necessarily

revolve around:
(a) an analysis of s 15(5)(a), art 10(1)(a) and art 10(2)(a);
F
(b) the methodology of constitutional interpretation;
(c) the ambit of art 10(1)(a) read with the restrictions under art 10(2)(a); and
(d) the reasonableness of those restrictions.
G
SECTION 15(5)(a), ART 10(1)(a) AND ART 10(2)(a)
[10] Section 15(5)(a) merits reproduction as follows:
15 Student or students’ organization, body or group associating with societies, etc H

(5) No student of the University and no organization, body or group of students of
the University which is established by, under or in accordance with the
Constitution, shall express or do anything which may reasonably be construed as
expressing support for or sympathy with or opposition to —
I
(a) any political party, whether in or outside Malaysia.
[11] Article 10(1)(a) provides for fundamental ‘Freedom of speech, assembly

and association’ in the following words:
A 10 Freedom of speech, assembly and association

(1) Subject to Clauses (2), —
(a) Every citizen has the right to freedom of speech and expression.
(Emphasis added.)
B
[12] Since art 10(1)(a) is ‘subject to’, inter alia, art 10(2)(a), art 10(1)(a) is
subservient while art 10(2)(a) is predominant. Where art 10(1)(a) is in conflict
with, repugnant to or inconsistent with art 10(2)(a), then art 10(1)(a) would
C give way and art 10(2)(a) would prevail. Article 10(2)(a) authorises Parliament
to enact laws imposing restrictions as follows:
(2) Parliament may by law impose —

(a) on the rights conferred by paragraph (a) of Clause (1), such restrictions as
D
it deems necessary or expedient in the interest of the security of the
Federation or any part thereof, friendly relations with other countries,
public order or morality and restrictions designed to protect the privileges
of Parliament or of any Legislative Assembly or to provide against
contempt of court, defamation, or incitement to any offence. (Emphasis
E added.)
METHODOLOGY OF CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION
F [13] In relation to art 10(1) and art 10(2), our apex court has apparently
developed two different methodologies of interpretation, as illustrated below.
[14] In Pung Chen Choon, the accused was prosecuted in the Magistrate’s
Court Kota Kinabalu. He faced a charge under s 8A(1) of the Printing Presses
G and Publications Act 1984 (‘s 8A(1)’) ie maliciously publishing false news in
‘The Borneo Mail’ dated 16 July 1990. At the close of the case for the
prosecution, the defence raised the question whether s 8A imposes restrictions
on the right to freedom of speech and expression in violation of art 10(1)(a)
and art 10(2)(a) and thereby void.
H
[15] The aforesaid question was eventually referred to the (then) Supreme
Court where four questions were formulated for consideration, out of which
the relevant questions are:
I
(a) Whether s 8A(1), read with s 8A(2), imposes restrictions on the right to
freedom of speech and expression conferred by art 10(1)(a)?
(b) If so, whether the restriction imposed is one permitted by or under art
10(2)(a)?
(c) Whether s 8A(1) read with s 8A(2) is consistent with art 10(1)(a) and art A
10(2)(a) and therefore valid?
[16] Article 10(1)(a) and art 10(2)(a) had been reproduced above.
B
[17] The provisions of s 8A(1) and (2) read as follows:
8A
(1) Where in any publication there is maliciously published any false news, the
printer, publisher, editor and the writer thereof shall be guilty of an offence and C
shall, on conviction, be liable to imprisonment for a term not exceeding three
years or to a fine not exceeding twenty thousand ringgit or to both.
(2) For the purposes of this section, malice shall be presumed in default of evidence
showing that, prior to publication, the accused took reasonable measures to
verify the truth of the news. D
[18] The (then) Supreme Court answered question (one) in the affirmative.
[19] Questions (two) and (three) were considered together. Edgar Joseph Jr E
SCJ (as he then was) held, inter alia, that:
(a) In Malaysia, when infringement of the right to freedom of speech and
expression is alleged, the scope of the court’s inquiry is limited to the
question whether the impugned law comes within the ambit of the
F
permitted restriction. So, for example, if the impugned law, in pith and
substance, is a law relating to the subject enumerated under the permitted
restrictions found in art 10(2)(a), the question whether it is reasonable does
not arise; the law would be valid (p 575H).
(b) The right to freedom of speech and expression as enshrined in art G
10(1)(a) is not absolute because the Constitution authorises Parliament
to impose certain restrictions, as it deems necessary (p 576E).
(c) The Constitution is primarily to be interpreted within its own four walls
and not in the light of analogies drawn from other countries such as Great H
Britain, the United States of America or Australia: per Thomson CJ in
The Government of the State of Kelantan v The Government of the
Federation of Malaya and Tunku Abdul Rahman Putra Al-Haj [1963] MLJ
335 at p 358 column 1J (FC). See also Loh Kooi Choon v Government of
Malaysia [1977] 2 MLJ 187 at p 189 column 1A (FC); Public Prosecutor I
v Ooi Kee Saik & Ors [1971] 2 MLJ 108 at p 113 column 2B–C; and
Adegbenro v Akintola [1963] 3 WLR 63; [1963] AC 614 (PC) per Lord
Radcliffe (p 576B–D).
(d) There is a presumption, perhaps even a strong presumption, of the
A constitutional validity of the impugned section and so the burden of

proof lies on the party seeking to establish the contrary (p 576H).
(e) It is impossible to lay down an abstract standard applicable to all cases. It
would be the duty of the court to consider each impugned law separately,
B
regard being had to the nature of the right alleged to have been infringed,
the underlying purpose of the restriction, the extent and the urgency of
the evil sought to be remedied, not forgetting the prevailing conditions of
the time (p 577B–C).
C [20] The (then) Supreme Court gave the answers to questions two and three
in the affirmative. In other words, the restriction imposed under s 8A(1) read
with s 8A(2) is one permitted under art 10(2)(a), and consistent therewith, and
therefore valid.
D [21] On the other hand, in Sivarasa Rasiah, the appellant raised three broad
grounds in support of his challenge to the constitutionality of s 46A of the
Legal Profession Act 1976 (‘s 46A’). Section 46A prohibits the appellant, an
advocate and solicitor, who is also an office bearer of a political party and a
Member of Parliament, from standing for and, if elected, serving on the Bar
E Council which is the governing body of the Malaysian Bar. The second ground,
which is relevant to the instant appeal, states that s 46A violates his right of
association guaranteed by art 10(1)(c) read with art 10(2)(c). The court
considered Part II of the Federal Constitution which houses, inter alia, art
10(1)(a) and art 10(2)(a), and guarantees fundamental liberties or rights. On
F the methodology of interpretation in relation to fundamental liberties or
rights, the Federal Court held, inter alia, that:
(a) these provisions must be generously interpreted in the sense that a
prismatic approach to interpretation must be adopted: per Gopal Sri
Ram FCJ (as he then was) speaking for the Federal Court at p 514,
G
applying Badan Peguam Malaysia v Kerajaan Malaysia [2008] 2 MLJ 285;
[2008] 1 CLJ 521 (FC); Lee Kwan Woh v Public Prosecutor [2009] 5 MLJ
301; [2009] 5 CLJ 631 (FC); and Shamim Reza Abdul Samad v Public
Prosecutor [2009] 6 CLJ 93 (FC);
H (b) the provisions of Part II contain concepts that house within them several
separate rights; and the duty of a court in interpreting these concepts is to
discover whether the particular right claimed as infringed by state action
is indeed a right submerged within a given concept;
I (c) provisions or restrictions that limit or derogate from a guaranteed right

must be read restrictively;
(d) in interpreting art 10(2)(c) (which says that ‘Parliament may by law
impose … (c) on the right conferred by para (c) of cl (1), such restrictions
as it deems necessary or expedient in the interest of the security of the
Federation or any part thereof, public order or morality’) the word A

‘reasonable’ should be read into the provision to qualify the width of the
proviso;
(e) when reliance is placed by the state to justify a statute under one or more
of the provisions of art 10(2), the question for determination is whether the B
restriction that the particular statute imposes is ‘reasonably’ necessary and
expedient for one or more of the purposes specified in that article; and
(f ) the disqualifications imposed under s 46A are reasonable restrictions
within art 10(2)(c), because they are justifiable on the ground of morality
ie in the nature of public morality as understood by the people as a whole. C
[22] His Lordship explained that part of public morality is the proper
conduct and regulation of professional bodies, and matters of discipline, and
that it is in the public interest that advocates and solicitors who serve on the
D
governing body behave professionally, act honestly and independent of any
political influence. He concluded that an independent Bar Council may act
morally in the proper and constitutional sense of that term, and that the
absence of political influence secures an independent Bar. Consequently, the
appellant’s challenge based on art 10(1)(c) failed.
E
[23] There are now two separate and conflicting judgments emanating from
the (then) Supreme Court and the present Federal Court respectively. These
courts bear different names for our apex court at different times. It is therefore
necessary to consider which judgment to follow. In Dalip Bhagwan Singh v F
Public Prosecutor [1998] 1 MLJ 1, (as he then was) delivered the judgment for
the Federal Court and held that where the Federal Court departs from its
previous decision when it is right to do so, then also by necessary implication its
decision represents the present state of the law. When two decisions of the
Federal Court conflict on a point of law, the later decision prevails over the G
earlier decision.
[24] Arising from the above judicial statement in Dalip Bhagwan Singh, for
the purposes of the instant appeal, I am bound to treat the judgment of the
Federal Court in Sivarasa Rasiah, as representing the present state of the law H
and prevails over the decision of the (then) Supreme Court in Pung Chen
Choon, on this point that the word ‘reasonable’ should be read into art 10(2).
[25] I therefore take the view that art 10(1)(a) and art 10(2)(a) must be
generously interpreted in the sense that a prismatic approach to interpretation I
must be adopted and that the word ‘reasonable’ should be read into the
provisions of art 10(2)(a) and to consider whether the restriction that art
10(2)(a) imposes is ‘reasonably’ necessary and expedient for one or more of the
purposes specified therein. In the circumstances, it is necessary for me to
A proceed to consider the reasonableness of the restrictions in the light of s

15(5)(a) and art 10(2)(a).
REASONABLENESS OF RESTRICTIONS
B [26] The reasonableness of the restrictions contained in s 15(5)(a) of the

Universities and University Colleges Act 1971 (‘UUCA’) may be traced to its
being enacted as a source of Federal law to regulate the affairs of students in
universities. The restrictions imposed under s 15(5)(a) pertain essentially to the
involvement of students in politics. It is necessary and seeks to prevent
C infiltration of political ideologies, including extremities, amongst students.
This infiltration may adversely affect the primary purpose of the universities ie
the pursuit of education. This is particularly significant as university students
could well be vulnerable youth capable of being subject to peer pressure and be
easily influenced. The issue of ‘reasonableness’ has been extensively debated in
Parliament as reported in Hansard dated 10 December 2008 at p 76. In essence,
D the restrictions were stated to protect the interest of the students and
institutions of higher learning, as a matter of policy.
[27] It is not for the court to say that the law is ‘harsh and unjust’. This was
succinctly stated by the Federal Court in Loh Kooi Choon v Government of
E Malaysia [1977] 2 MLJ 187, and the principles may be extracted as follows:
(a) The question whether the impugned Act is ‘harsh and unjust’ is a
question of policy to be debated and decided by Parliament, and
therefore not for judicial determination. To sustain it would cut very
F deeply into the very being of Parliament. Our courts ought not to enter
this political thicket, even in such a worthwhile cause as the fundamental
rights guaranteed by the Constitution.
(b) Some people may think the policy of the Act unwise and even dangerous
to the community. Some may think it at variance with principles which
G have long been held sacred. But a judicial tribunal has nothing to do with
the policy of any Act which it may be called upon to interpret. That may
be a matter for private judgment. The duty of the court, and its only duty,
is to expound the language of the Act in accordance with the settled rules
of construction. It is as unwise as it is unprofitable to cavil at the policy of
H an Act of Parliament, or to pass a covert censure on the Legislature.
(c) Those who find fault with the wisdom or expediency of the impugned
Act, and with vexatious interference of fundamental rights, normally
must address themselves to the Legislature, and not the courts; they have
their remedy at the ballot box.
I
CONCLUSION
[28] Based on the above judicial pronouncements I find that the provisions
contained in s 15(5)(a) are reasonable.
[29] By reason of the foregoing, I hold that the provisions contained in s A

15(5)(a) are reasonable. I answer the above question in the negative.
[30] The restrictions contained in s 15(5)(a), being within the bounds of

reasonableness, come within the scope of art 10(1)(a) read with art 10(2)(a). It
is therefore constitutional and valid. The instant appeal is dismissed. The B
decision of the High Court is affirmed. As agreed by the parties herein, there is
no order as to costs. Deposit to be refunded to the appellants.
[31] Strictly, by way of obiter, Parliament may wish to consider an

amendment to s 15(5) in particular and the whole Act in general so as to bring C
about a repeal or review thereof. This measure can only be brought about by
legislative acts. The making or unmaking of the law is a matter within the
exclusive domain of Parliament, while the courts are entrusted with the
responsibility for interpretation of the law.
D
Mohd Hishamudin JCA:
[32] This is the appellants’ appeal against the decision of the High Court
E
judge of Kuala Lumpur (of the Appellate and Special Powers Division) of 28
September 2010 dismissing their originating summons application.
[33] By an originating summons the appellants have sought a declaration

that s 15(5)(a) of the Universities and University Colleges Act 1971 (‘UUCA’) F
contravenes art 10(1)(a) of the Federal Constitution. The appellants have also
sought a consequential declaration that the pending disciplinary proceedings,
brought against them by the third respondent for alleged disciplinary breaches
connected with s 15(5)(a) of the UUCA, are not valid in law.
G
[34] The appellants’ appeal against the decision of the learned High Court
judge is on the following grounds:
(a) that the learned judge had erred in law and/or in fact in holding that the
question of reasonableness did not arise when in fact it was an important
H
consideration to be addressed; and
(b) that the learned judge had erred in law and/or in fact in concluding that
s 15(5)(a) of the UUCA was reasonably necessary and not
disproportionate.
I
[35] The facts of the case are not in dispute. The appellants are political
science undergraduate students of the third respondent, that is, Universiti
Kebangsaan Malaysia (‘the university’) (the third defendant in the originating
summons). They were present in the Parliamentary constituency of Hulu
[2011] 6 MLJ Ors (Mohd Hishamudin JCA) 521
A Selangor in the campaign period for the Parliamentary by-election of 24 April

2010 to observe a Parliamentary by-election.
[36] On or about 13 May 2010, each appellant received a notice from the
Vice Chancellor of the university requiring their attendance before a
B disciplinary tribunal on 3 June 2010. Before the disciplinary tribunal they were
charged for purported breaches of disciplinary offences under s 15(5)(a) of the
UUCA. The provision reads:
15 Student or students’ organization, body or group associating with societies, etc
C
D (a) any political party, whether in or outside Malaysia;
[37] The allegations in the charges include, amongst others, having in their
possession paraphernalia supportive of or sympathetic with or opposed to a
contesting political party in the said by-election.
E
THE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
[38] Clause (1)(a) of art 10 of the Federal Constitution provides:

F Freedom of speech, assembly and association
10
(1) Subject to Clauses (2), (3) and (4) —
(a) every citizen has the right to freedom of speech and expression;
G
(b) ...
(c) ...
H (a) On the rights conferred by paragraph (a) of Clause (1), such restrictions as
it deems necessary or expedient in the interest of the security of the
Federation or any part thereof, friendly relations with other countries,
public order or morality and restrictions designed to protect the privileges
of Parliament or of any Legislative Assembly or to provide against
I contempt of Court, defamation, or incitement to any offence.
THE ISSUE
[39] It is not disputed that the impugned provision of the UUCA is a

restriction on the students right to freedom of speech, and, therefore, prima A

facie, violates the constitutional guarantee of cl (1)(a) of art 10. It is also not
disputed that unless such a provision can be saved by the permissible
restrictions as provided for by cl (2)(a) of art 10, the provision is
unconstitutional.
B
[40] However, it is the contention of the counsel for the respondents that the
restriction on freedom of speech is permitted by cl (2)(a) of art 10 of the Federal
Constitution. It is submitted by the respondents that the restriction is
necessary or expedient in the interest of ‘public order or morality’. C
[41] The appellants, on the other hand, contend that any restriction on the
freedom of speech must be for one of the purposes as specified by cl (2)(a) of art
10. In addition, the restriction must also be reasonable. The appellants argue
that there is nothing in the UUCA or in the Minister’s speech, in moving the D
Bill in Parliament, as reported in the Hansard, to suggest or indicate that s
15(5)(a) of the UUCA was meant to protect public interest or public morality.
It is further contended by the appellants that the restriction as imposed by s
15(5)(a) of the UUCA is, in any case, unreasonable.
E
[42] I am allowing the appeal with costs.
MY GROUNDS
F
[43] It is now settled law that Parliament can no longer impose a restriction
on freedom of speech, in any manner it deems fit, for the purpose of protecting
the interests spelt out in cl 2(a) of art 10. Any restriction imposed on freedom
of speech by Parliament must be a reasonable restriction, and the court, if called
upon to rule (such as in the present case), has the power to examine whether the G
restriction so imposed is reasonable or otherwise (besides determining as to
whether or not the restriction falls within the permissible exceptions as spelt
out by cl (2)(a) of art 10); and — in the event it were to hold that the restriction
is unreasonable — to declare the impugned law imposing the restriction as
being unconstitutional and accordingly null and void. This is now the law as H
ruled by the Federal Court recently in Sivarasa Rasiah v Badan Peguam
Malaysia & Anor [2010] 2 MLJ 333. In this case, Gopal Sri Ram (FCJ), in
delivering the unanimous decision of the Federal Court (the other two
members of the panel being Richard Malanjum CJ (Sabah and Sarawak) and
Zulkifli Ahmad Makinudin FCJ (as he then was)), said (at p 340): I
Now although the article says ‘restrictions’, the word ‘reasonable’ should be read into
the provision to qualify the width of the proviso. … The correct position is that
when reliance is placed by the state to justify a statute under one or more of the
A provisions of art 10(2), the question for determination is whether the restriction that
the particular statute imposes is reasonably necessary and expedient for one or more
of the purposes specified in that article.
[44] In this regard I feel that I should add that the Federal Court also went
B further to hold that the fundamental rights guaranteed by Part II of the Federal
Constitution form part of the basic structure of the Federal Constitution,
thereby giving recognition for the first time, albeit in a limited fashion, to the
doctrine of basic structure of the Constitution as enunciated by the Supreme
Court of India almost 40 years ago in the landmark case of Kesavananda
C Bharati v State of Kerala AIR 1973 SC 1461. This is a remarkable departure
from the position taken by the Federal Court 33 years ago in Loh Kooi Choon
v Government of Malaysia [1977] 2 MLJ 187. In that case the Federal Court was
urged to adopt the doctrine, but the court then refused to do so.
D
[45] In so deciding the way it did in Sivarasa Rasiah, the Federal Court
reversed the decision of the Court of Appeal (the Court of Appeal judgment is
reported in Sivarasa Rasiah v Badan Peguam Malaysia & Anor [2006] 1 MLJ
727). The Court of Appeal had ruled that whether an impugned statutory
provision is reasonable or not in relation to the purpose in question is not a
E
matter for the court to decide but for Parliament. In so deciding, the Court of
Appeal had relied on the Supreme Court case of Public Prosecutor v Pung Chen
Choon [1994] 1 MLJ 566. Hence the Federal Court in Sivarasa Rasiah can be
said to have departed from the position that it held in Pung Chen Choon;
meaning that Pung Chen Choon is now no longer good law.
F
[46] On the principles of interpretation that should be adopted by the courts

in interpreting the Federal Constitution, in particular, those provisions
touching on fundamental liberties, the Federal Court ruled (at pp 349–350):
G In three recent decisions this court has held that the provisions of the Constitution,
in particular, the fundamental liberties under Part II, must be generously interpreted
and that a prismatic approach to interpretation must be adopted.
...
H Provisos or restrictions that limit or derogate from a guaranteed right must be read
restrictively.
[47] Now, reverting to the facts of the present case and the issue before this
court, in my judgment, I fail to see in what manner that s 15(5)(a) of the
I UUCA) relates to public order or public morality. I also do not find the
restriction to be reasonable. I am at a loss to understand in what manner a
student, who expresses support for, or opposition against, a political party,
could harm or bring about an adverse effect on public order or public morality?
Are not political parties legal entities carrying out legitimate political activities?
Are not political leaders, including Ministers and members of the Federal and A
State Legislatures, members of political parties? I read intensely the affidavits of
the respondents and the written submissions of learned counsel for the
respondents, searching for a clear explanation on the nexus between the
exercise of the right of a university student to express support for (or opposition
against) a political party and public order or public morality: but with respect, B
not surprisingly, I find none.
[48] The impugned provision is irrational. Most university students are of

the age of majority. They can enter into contracts. They can sue and be sued.
They can marry, becomes parents and undertake parental responsibilities. They C
can vote in general elections if they are 21 years old. They can become directors
of company. They can be office bearers of societies. Yet — and herein lies the
irony — they are told that legally they cannot say anything that can be
construed as supporting or opposing a political party.
D
[49] In my opinion such a provision as s 15(5)(a) of the UUCA impedes the
healthy development of the critical mind and original thoughts of students —
objectives that seats of higher learning should strive to achieve. Universities
should be the breeding ground of reformers and thinkers, and not institutions
to produce students trained as robots. Clearly the provision is not only counter E
productive but repressive in nature.
[50] In Sweezy v New Hampshire 354 US 234 (1957) Chief Justice Warren
Burger of the United States Supreme Court said (at p 250): F
Scholarship cannot flourish in an atmosphere of suspicion and distrust. Teachers
and students must always remain free to inquire, to study and to evaluate, to gain
new maturity and understanding; otherwise our civilisation will stagnate and die.
G
[51] In the present case it is the contention of the learned senior federal
counsel for the first and second respondents that the Minister’s speech in
Parliament in moving the Bill as reported in Hansard explains the rationale for
the provision. The relevant parts of the speech as reported in Hansard (DR 10
December 2008) are set out extensively in the written submission of learned H
senior federal counsel. I have examined the speech closely. Those parts are as
follow:
Pindaan kepada AUKU tidak akan lengkap tanpa perubahan kepada aspek
pengumsan kebajikan dan hak asasi pelajar. Perkara ini merupakan hasrat dan I
harapan setiap pelajar di universiti Negara ini. Pelajar merupakan stakeholder utama
kepada sesebuah universiti Mereka juga merupakan bakal pewaris kepada
kepimpinan negara. Justeru, kebajikan dan hak asasi pelajar hendaklah sentiasa
dipelihara dan mengikut Perlembagaan Persekutuan dan amalan terbaik (best
practices) antara bangsa.
A Justeru rang undang-undang ini akan memberi penekanan khusus kepada aspek
kebajikan dan hak asasi pelajar tersebut. Antara perkara yang akan dilihat semula
merangkumi:
(i) kebebasan berpersatuan;
(ii) kebebasan bersuara;
B
(iii) pemansuhan peruntukan berkaitan kesalahan dan hukuman jenayah;
(iv) pemansuhan peruntukan berkaitan penggantungan atau pembuangan secara
automatik;
(v) hak asasi pelajar kepada pendidikan;
C
(vi) tatacara pengendalian kes tatatertib;
(vii) penggantungan atau pembubaran pertubuhan pelajar;
(viii)hak pelajar pasca siswazah;
D (ix) perwakilan dalam jawatankuasa kebajikan pelajar; dan
(x) penglibatan pelajar dalam Senat.
Seperti yang dimaklumi AUKU sedia ada memperuntukkan bahawa mana-mana

pelajar yang hendak menganggotai mana-mana persatuan atau organisasi di luar
E universiti hendaklah mendapat kebenaran pihak universiti terlebih dahulu atau
dengan izin, prior permission. Peruntukan ini dilihat oleh sesetengah pihak sebagai
agak negatif dan tidak memberi kebaikan kepada pelajar dalam peningkatan ciri-ciri
kepimpinan dan sahsiah diri.
Justeru rang undang-undang yang dicadangkan ini akan membenarkan pelajar
F untuk bersekutu dengan atau menjadi ahli sesuatu pertubuhan, persatuan atau
organisasi sama ada di dalam atau luar negara.
Seperti yang dimaklumi AUKU sedia ada memperuntukkan bahawa mana-mana
pelajar yang hendak menganggotai mana-mana persatuan atau organisasi di luar
universiti hendaklah mendapat kebenaran pihak universiti terlebih dahulu.
Peruntukkan ini dilihat oleh setengah pihak sebagai agak negatif dan tidak memberi
G
kebaikan kepada pelajar dalam peningkatan ciri-ciri kepimpinan dan sahsiah diri.
Justeru rang undang-undang yang dicadangkan ini akan membenarkan pelajar
untuk bersekutu dengan, atau menjadi ahli sesuatu pertubuhan, persatuan atau
organisasi sama ada di dalam atau luar negara.
Walaubagaimanapun, pelajar adalah dilarang untuk terlibat dengan entiti-entiti
H berikut:
(i) parti politik sama ada di dalam atau luar negara;
(ii) pertubuhan yang menyalahi undang-undang sama ada di dalam atau luar
negara;
I (iii) pertubuhan, badan atau kumpulan yang dikenal pasti oleh Menteri sebagai
tidak sesuai demi kepentingan dan kesentosaan pelajar atau universiti.
Dalam menyediakan senarai pertubuhan yang tidak sesuai tersebut Menteri akan
berunding dengan Lembaga Pengarah Universiti terlebih dahulu dan senarai yang akan
disediakan adalah untuk kegunaan semua universiti. Meskipun terdapat larangan ke
atas pelajar untuk berpolitik, rang undang-undang ini masih memberikan sedikit A
pengecualian. Kuasa untuk memberi pengecualian ini akan dilaksanakan oleh Naib
Canselor. Dalam menjalankan kuasa tersebut Naib Canselor atas permohonan pelajar
boleh memberi kebenaran untuk terlibat dalam parti politik. Ini akan membolehkan
seseorang ahli politik yang bergiat dalam mana-mana parti politik mendaftar sebagai
pelajar di universiti tanpa perlu melepaskan kerjaya politiknya. Rang undang-undang B
yang dicadangkan ini juga akan memberi kebebasan kepada pelajar untuk bersuara
dalam hal yang berkaitan dengan perkara akademik yang diikuti dan dilakukannya.
Pelajar adalah dibenarkan untuk memberi pendapat dalam seminar, simposium dan
sebagainya dengan syarat seminar atau simposium tersebut tidak dianjur atau diberi
peruntukan kewangan oleh entiti-entiti berikut:
C
(i) parti politik sama ada di dalam atau luar negara;
(ii) pertubuhan yang menyalahi undang-undang sama ada di dalam atau luar
negara;
(iii) pertubuhan, badan atau kumpulan yang dikenal pasti oleh Menteri sebagai tidak D
sesuai demi kepentingan dan kesentosaan pelajar atau universiti.
Fasal 8 bertujuan untuk menggantikan Seksyen 15 Akta 30 untuk memberikan kepada
pelajar dan pertubuhan pelajar kebebasan berpersatuan tertakluk kepada sekatan
berhubung dengan parti politik, pertubuhan yang menyalahi undang-undang dan
pertubuhan, badan atau kumpulan orang yang dikenal pasti oleh menteri sebagai tidak E
sesuai demi kepentingan dan kesentosaan pelajar atau universiti itu. Sebagai tambahan,
Naib Canselor boleh atas permohonan seseorang pelajar mengecualikan pelajar itu
daripada sekatan yang disebut dalam perenggan 1(a) yang dicadangkan. Fasal 9
bertujuan meminda seksyen 15A Akta iaitu penalti jenayah dalam sub seksyen 2
digantikan dengan tindakan tatatertib. F
[52] Having read the above, I must say that I am unable to find any
explanation as to the link between prohibiting university students from
expressing support for or opposition against a political party and the
G
maintenance of public order or public morality. Indeed, in the speech, there is
not even any mention of public disorder as a result of students expressing their
view in support for or in opposition to political parties. On the contrary, the
Minister spoke about the preservation of the fundamental rights of the students
as provided for by the Federal Constitution and in accordance with
H
‘international best practices’; for he said:
Mereka juga merupakan bakal pewaris kepada kepimpinan negara. Justeru,

kebajikan dan hak asasi pelajar hendaklah sentiasa dipelihara dan mengikut
Perlembagaan Persekutuan dan amalan terbaik (best practices) antara bangsa.
I
[53] In fact the Minister even conceded that students are matured enough in
exercising their fundamental rights when he said (at p 76 DR 10 December
2008):
[2011] 6 MLJ Ors (Linton Albert JCA) 527
A Selain daripada itu, kementehan juga sedar bahawa masyarakat pelajar pada masa ini
lebih matang dalam menangani erti kebebasan dan kepelbagaian.
[54] With respect I find that what the Minister said in Parliament about
preserving the freedom of speech of students and what s 15(5)(a) provides to be
B
irreconcilable or contradictory.
CONCLUSION
C [55] I propose to conclude by saying this. Freedom of expression is one of the

most fundamental rights that individuals enjoy. It is fundamental to the
existence of democracy and the respect of human dignity. This basic right is
recognised in numerous human rights documents such as article 19 of the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights and article 19 of the International
D Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. Free speech is accorded pre-eminent
status in the constitutions of many countries.
[56] The words of wisdom of Brandeis J of the United States Supreme Court
in Whitney v California 274 US 357 (1927) (at p 375) is a salutary reminder:
E
Those who won our independence believed that the final end of the State was to
make men free to develop their faculties; and that in its government the deliberative
forces should prevail over the arbitrary... They believe that freedom to think as you
will and to speak as you think are means indispensible to the discovery and spread of
political truth,... that the greatest menace to freedom is an inert people; that public
F discussion is a political duty; and that this should be a fundamental principle of
American government.
[57] I, therefore, grant the declarations prayed for.

G
[58] Appeal allowed with costs.
Linton Albert JCA:
H
[59] I begin by setting out the facts which are brief and straightforward. The
appellants are undergraduates of University Kebangsaan Malaysia, the third
respondent. Their presence in the Parliamentary Constituency of Hulu
Selangor during the campaign period for the by-election in April 2010 brought
I about disastrous consequences to them because as a result of that, the third
respondent instituted disciplinary proceedings against them. For an ordinary
citizen similarly circumstanced, nothing would have come out of it, other than,
perhaps being lauded for expressing faith in our democracy which is the
bedrock of the Federal Constitution. As final year political science students the
prospect of expulsion was even more disastrous but they were in clear breach of A
an equally clear prohibition against expressing or doing anything which may
reasonably be construed as expressing support for, or sympathy with, or in
opposition to any political party under s 15(5)(a) of the Universities and
University Colleges Act 1971 (‘UUCA’). For completeness it is reproduced and
it is as follows: B

C
(a) any political party, whether in or outside Malaysia.
[60] Faced with the grim prospect of expulsion the appellants asked for a
declaration that s 15(5)(a) of the UUCA contravened art 10(1)(a) of the
D
Federal Constitution and was therefore invalid and consequently, the
disciplinary proceedings instituted by the third respondent against the
appellants was also invalid. The relevant part of the Federal Constitution relied
on by the appellants is as follows:
(10) Freedom of speech, assembly and association. E
(1) Subject to Clauses (2), (3) and (4) —
(a) every citizen has the right to freedom of speech and expression;
(b) ...
F
(c) ...
[61] The learned High Court judge disagreed with the appellants and
accordingly dismissed their application. Hence this appeal.
G
[62] It is universally accepted that freedom of expression is not and cannot be
absolute. The Federal Constitution recognises this and specifically sets out the
restrictions. The restrictions to the freedom of expression that are relevant to
the determination of this appeal are set out in art 10(2)(a) which reads in part
as follows: H

(a) on the rights conferred by paragraph (a) Clause (1), such restrictions as it deems
necessary or expedient in the interest of … public order or morality … I
[63] It was contended for the respondents and accepted by the learned High
Court judge that s 15(5)(a) of the UUCA falls squarely within the ambit of the
restrictions spelled out under art 10(2)(a) of the Federal Constitution and the
A appellants’ argument that s 15(5)(a) of the UUCA contravened art 10(1)(a) of

the Federal Constitution was therefore, misconceived. Hence the validity of the
disciplinary proceedings premised, as it was, on a valid legislative enactment,
could not be challenged. The approach taken by the learned High Court judge
was one that was unrestrictively literal giving unbridled effect to the plain
B meaning of the words used in art 10(2)(a) of the Federal Constitution and s
15(5)(a) of the UUCA and disregarding all notions of reasonableness or
proportionality. Based on this hypothesis there is no difficulty in concluding
that s 15(5)(a) of the UUCA relates to the purpose for which it was enacted,
C which was the establishment, maintenance and administration of universities
and university colleges because the discipline and conduct of the students affect
the maintenance and administration of universities and university colleges and
given their plain and literal meaning the discipline and conduct of the students
are also part of public morality. It was thus held by the learned High Court
D judge applying the plain and literal meaning of the words, that the prohibition
imposed under s 15(5)(a) of the UUCA comes within the restrictions
envisaged and set art 10(2)(a) of the Federal Constitution and hence there was
no violation of the appellants’ fundamental right to freedom of expression
guaranteed under art 10(1)(a). The learned High Court judge relied on the
E Supreme Court case of Public Prosecutor v Pung Chen Choon [1994] 1 LNS
208. It is useful to reproduce the relevant parts of the judgment of Edgar Joseph
Jr SCJ at pp 211–212 relied on by the learned High Court judge:
With regard to India, the Indian Constitution requires that the restrictions, even if
F
within the limits prescribed, must be ‘reasonable’... and so that court would be
under a duty to decide on its reasonableness. But, with regard to Malaysia, when
infringement of the right of freedom of speech and expression is alleged, the scope
of the court’s inquiry is limited to the question whether the impugned law comes
within the orbit of the permitted restrictions. So, for example, if the impugned law,
G in pith and substance, is a law relating to the subjects enumerated under the
permitted restrictions found in cl 10(2)(a), the question whether it is reasonable
does not arise; the law would be valid.
H [64] With the greatest of respect, in my judgment, the correct approach

would be that which was laid down in the Federal Court Case of Sivarasa
Rasiah v Badan Peguam Malaysia & Anor [2010] 2 MLJ 333, not least because
it was a decision of our apex court after Pung Chen Choon, in Dalip Bhagwan
Singh v Public Prosecutor [1998] 1 MLJ 1; [1997] 4 CLJ 645 the Federal Court
I held that where two decisions of the Federal Court conflict on a point of law
the later decision prevails over the earlier decision. There is no reason not to
apply that principle where, as here, the earlier decision is that of the Supreme
Court. Returning now to Sivarasa Rasiah Gopal Sri Ram FCJ, delivering the
judgment of the Federal Court set out the approach to be taken in determining
the constitutionality of a legislative enactment like s 15(5)(a) of the UUCA A

which purports to limit the freedom of expression under art 10(1)(a) of the
Federal Constitution at pp 340–342:
The other principle of constitutional interpretation that is relevant to the present
appeal is this. Provisos or restrictions that limit or derogate from a guaranteed right B
must be read restrictively. Take art 10(2)(c). It says that ‘Parliament may by law
impose … (c) on the right conferred by para (c) of cl (1), such restrictions as it deems
necessary or expedient in the interest of the security of the Federation or any part
thereof, public order or morality’. Now although the article says ‘restrictions’, the
word ‘reasonable’ should be read into the provision to qualify the width of the
proviso. The reasons for reading the derogation as ‘such reasonable restrictions’ C
appear in the judgment of the Court of Appeal in Dr Mohd Nasir bin Hashim v
Menteri Dalam Negeri Malaysia [2006] 6 MLJ 213; [2007] 1 CLJ 19 which reasons
are now adopted as part of this judgment. The contrary view expressed by the High
Court in Nordin bin Salleh & Anor v Dewan Undangan Negeri Kelantan & Ors
[1992] 1 CLJ 343; [1992] 1 CLJ 463 is clearly an error and is hereby disapproved. D
The correct position is that when reliance is placed by the state to justify a statute
under one or more of the provisions of art 10(2), the question for determination is
whether the restriction that the particular statute imposes is reasonably necessary
and expedient for one or more of the purposes specified in that article.
The second observation has to do with the test that should be applied in E
determining whether a constitutionally guaranteed right has been violated. The test
is that laid down by an unusually strong Supreme Court in the case of Dewan
Undangan Negeri Kelantan & Anor v Nordin bin Salleh & Anor [1992] 1 MLJ 697,
as per the following extract from the headnote to the report:
In testing the validity of the state action with regard to fundamental rights, what the F
court must consider is whether it directly affects the fundamental rights or its
inevitable effect or consequence on the fundamental rights is such that it makes their
exercise ineffective or illusory.
The third and final observation is in respect of the sustained submission made on the G
appellant’s behalf that the fundamental rights guaranteed under Part II is part of the
basic structure of the Constitution and that Parliament cannot enact laws (including
Acts amending the Constitution) that violate the basic structure …
It was submitted during argument that reliance on the Vacher’s case was misplaced
because the remarks were there made in the context of a country whose Parliament H
is supreme. The argument has merit. As Suffian LP said in Ah Thian v Government
of Malaysia [1976] 2 MLJ 112:
The doctrine of the supremacy of Parliament does not apply in Malaysia. Here we
have a written constitution. The power of Parliament and of State Legislatures in
I
Malaysia is limited by the Constitution, and they cannot make any law they please.
This earlier view was obviously overlooked by the former Federal Court when it
followed Vacher’s case. Indeed it is, for reasons that will become apparent from the
discussions later in this judgment, that the courts are very much concerned with
A issues of whether a law is fair and just when it is tested against art 8(10). Further, it
is clear from the way in which the Federal Constitution is constructed there are
certain features that constitute its basic fabric. Unless sanctioned by the
Constitution itself, any statute (including one amending the Constitution) that
offends the basic structure may be struck down as unconstitutional. Whether a
particular feature is part of the basic structure must be worked out on a case by case
B
basis. Suffice to say that the rights guaranteed by Part II which are enforceable in the
courts form part of the basic structure of the Federal Constitution. See
Keshavananda Bharati v State of Kerala AIR 1973 SC 1461.
C [65] The appropriate response to the pleas made by the appellants to assert
their fundamental right to freedom of expression must be the one stated by
Budd J in Educational Company of Ireland Ltd v Fitzpatrick (No 2) (1961) IR
345 at p 365:
The court will therefore assist and uphold a citizen’s constitutional rights.
D Obedience to the law is required of every citizen, and it follows that if one citizen has
a right under the Constitution there exists a correlative duty on the part of the other
citizens to respect that right and not to interfere with it.
E [66] The observations expressed by Gokulakrishnan CJ in Vedprakash v The

State AIR 1987 Gujerat 253 at para 24 reinforce the proposition that in
considering the constitutionality of legislative enactments restricting a
fundamental right those legislative enactments must measure up to the test of
reasonableness which include notions of proportionality:
F Our democratic Constitution inhibits blanket and arbitrary deprivation of a
person’s liberty by authority. It guarantees that no one shall be deprived of his
personal liberty except in accordance with procedure established by law. It further
permits the state, in the larger interests of the society to so restrict that fundamental
right in a reasonable but delicate balance is maintained on a legal fulcrum between
G individual liberty and social security. The slightest deviation from, or displacement
or infraction or violation of the legal procedure symbolised on that fulcrum upsets
the balance, introduces error and aberration and vitiates its working. The symbolic
balance, therefore, has to be worked out with utmost care and attention.
H [67] I do not think it is either necessary or useful to lay down inflexible

propositions to assess the reasonableness of legislative enactments which
purport to violate rights guaranteed by the Federal Constitution because each
must be determined on its own peculiar facts and circumstances. But where the
legislative enactment is self explanatory in its manifest absurdity as s 15(5)(a) of
I the UUCA undoubtedly is, it is not necessary to embark on a judicial scrutiny
to determine its reasonableness because it is in itself not reasonable. What
better illustration can there be of the utter absurdity of s 15(5)(a) than the facts
of this case where students of universities and university colleges face
disciplinary proceedings with the grim prospect of expulsion simply because of
their presence at a Parliamentary by-election. A legislative enactment that A

prohibits such participation in a vital aspect of democracy cannot by any
standard be said to be reasonable. In my judgment, therefore, because of its
unreasonableness, s 15(5)(a) of the UUCA does not come within the
restrictions permitted under art 10(2)(a) of the Federal Constitution and is
accordingly in violation of art 10(1)(a) and consequently void by virtue of art B
4(1) of the Federal Constitution which states:
4
(1) This Constitution is the supreme law of the Federation and any law passed after
Merdeka Day which is inconsistent with this Constitution shall, to the extent of C
the inconsistency, be void.
[68] Quite apart from what was laid down in Sivarasa Rasiah it is absolutely
necessary to read the word ‘reasonable’ into and before the word ‘restrictions’ in
D
art 10(2)(a) of the Federal Constitution to avoid the absurdity that it would
otherwise produce. A rigid application of the plain and literal meaning of the
words of art 10(2)(a) of the Federal Constitution would make nonsense of the
freedom of expression under art 10(1)(a) by rendering it nugatory because
every legislative enactment which takes away the freedom of expression under
E
art 10(1)(a) can conceivably be justified as being within the restrictions set out
under art 10(2)(a). Article 10(1)(a) would thus be subsumed under art
10(2)(a), a result that is manifestly absurd. In Federal Steam Navigation Co Ltd
and another v Department of Trade and Industy [1974] 2 All ER 97 Lord Salmon
made this observation in relation to statutory interpretation at p 114:
F
On the other hand, there are ample precedents of the highest authority for reading
the word ‘or’ for ‘and’ or substituting the word ‘and’ for ‘or’ when otherwise, as here,
the statute would be unintelligible and absurd.
G
[69] Similarly, reading the word ‘reasonable’ into art 10(2)(a) as aforesaid
would avoid the absurdily that it could otherwise produce.
[70] Finally, the respondents have also sought to rely on s 15(4) of the
UUCA to mitigate the effects of s 15(5)(a), s 15(4) of the UUCA states: H
The Vice-Chancellor may, on the application of a student of the University, exempt

the student from the provisions of paragraph (1)(a), subject to such terms and
conditions as he thinks fit.
I
[71] With respect, it is impossible not to suppose s 15(4) of the UUCA to be
anything other than a derisory appendage to s 15(5)(a) and therefore, patently
inconsequential. In my view, the respondents’ reliance on s 15(4) is wholly
misconceived.
A [72] Notwithstanding the presumption of constitutionality of a legislative

enactment and the rule that the court must endeavour to sustain its validity, in
the circumstances aforesaid, the validity of s 15(5)(a) of the UUCA is
nevertheless patently unsustainable.
B [73] For the reasons aforesaid, the appeal is allowed with no order as to costs.
The orders made by the High Court are set aside. The declarations prayed for
in the appellants’ originating summons dated 1 June 2010 are accordingly
allowed. Deposit to be refunded to the appellants.
C Appeal allowed with costs.
Reported by Kohila Nesan
I
SYARUL EMA RENA BINTI ABU SAMAH v PENDAKWA RAYA
CaseAnalysis
| [2018] MLJU 1128
Syarul Ema Rena binti Abu Samah lwn Pendakwa Raya

[2018] MLJU 1128
Malayan Law Journal Unreported
MAHKAMAH TINGGI (SHAH ALAM)

AB KARIM H
RAYUAN JENAYAH NO 41(ORS)-03-01 TAHUN 2017
25 June 2018
Latheefa Koya (Daim & Gamany) bagi pihak perayu.

Mohd Sophian Zakaria (Timbalan Pendakwa Raya, Jabatan Pendakwaan
Suruhanjaya Komunikasi dan Multimedia) bagi pihak responden.
Ab Karim H:
PENGHAKIMAN MAHKAMAH
[1]Perayu dalam kes ini membuat permohonan ke Mahkamah Seksyen di Sepang (Permohonan Jenayah No. 89-
209-12/2016) untuk merujuk beberapa kesan peruntukan perlembagaan ke Mahkamah Tinggi di bawah seksyen 30
Akta Mahkamah Kehakiman 1964 (Akta Tersebut) yang berbangkit dalam prosiding dalam kes Jenayah Mahkamah
Seksyen Selangor 63-5-02/2016 terhadap Perayu iaitu sama ada seksyen 233(1)(a) Akta Komunikasi dan
Multimedia 1998 adalah bercanggah dengan Perkara 8 dan Perkara 10 (2)(a) Perlembagaan Persekutuan. Tuan
Hakim Mahkamah Seksyen (HMS) telah menolak permohonan Perayu ini.
[2]Perayu telah dituduh atas pertuduhan:
“Bahawa kamu pada 6 Oktober 2015 jam lebih kurang 12.02 pagi telah didapati menggunakan perkhidmatan aplikasi
melalui laman profil Facebook “Ratu Naga” di pautan https://www.facebook.com/photo.php?fbid=75237680486667 3&set=p
752376804866673&type=3&permPage=1 secara sedar membuat dan memulakan penghantaran komen yang jelik sifatnya
iaitu “Kau memang pukimak Najib kalau benar ko sign TPPA Sialan anak haram kalau benar ko sign lah pukimak! Nak
lepaskan diri kau! Kau jual negara! Apa babinya kau ni? Kami rakyat Malaysia sumpah 7 keturunan kau! Kenapa tidak
dibentangkan di parlimen? 222 MP duduk dalam parlimen termasuk BN & PR BUTOH LAH! Sembang pasal rakyat!
Malaysia bakal di jajah kembali Malaysia ada 222 ahli parlimen tak bertanggungjawab!” dengan niat untuk menyakitkan hati
orang lain, yang telah dibaca pada 28 Januari 2016 jam lebih kurang 10.00 pagi di alamat Tingkat 8 MCMC Tower 1 Jalan
IMPACT Cyber 6 Cyberjaya Selangor Darul Ehsan. Oleh itu kamu telah melakukan suatu kesalahan di bawah seksyen
233(1)(a) Akta Komunikasi dan Multimedia 1998 [Akta 588] dan boleh dihukum di bawah seksyen 233(3) Akta yang sama.”
[3]Tuan HMS dalam menolak permohonan Perayu, memberi alasan bahawa perbicaraan dalam kes Perayu belum
lagi bermula, dengan itu permohonan tidak sewajarnya dibuat memandangkan tiada apa-apa dapatan dibuat.
Seterusnya Tuan HMS merujuk kepada kes Nor Hisham bin Osman v Pendakwa Raya [2010] MLJU 1249 yang
memutuskan seksyen 233(1)(a) Akta Komunikasi dan Multimedia 1998 adalah konsisten dengan Perkara 10(1)(a)
dan 10(2)(a) Perlembagaan Persekutuan. Dengan itu Tuan HMS memutuskan beliau terikat dengan keputusan kes
tersebut. Tuan HMS juga merujuk kes Pendakwa Raya v Adam Adli bin Abdul Halim dan 1 lagi [no. 06-5-
88/2016)W)] yang mana Mahkamah Persekutuan memutuskan Defendan diberi kebebasan untuk menfailkan
Page 2 of 7
....
rujukan selepas dapatan dibuat oleh Mahkamah bicara.
Isu-Isu
[4]Isu-isu yang ditimbulkan dan dihujahkan oleh peguambela adalah:

(a) Tuan HMS khilaf apabila mempertimbangkan kes Pendakwaraya Adam Adli bin Abdul Halim dan 1 lain
yang bukan merupakan satu keputusan atau nas yang mengikat bagi dalam semua permohonan kes di
bawah seksyen 30 Akta Tersebut. Kes tersebut hanya terbatas bagi fakta dalam kes tersebut sahaja
(b) Tuan HMS khilaf apabila memutuskan isu kesan peruntukan perlembagaan di bawah seksyen 233 Akta
Komunikasi dan Multimedia 1998 telah diputuskan oleh Mahkamah Tinggi dalam kes kes Nor Hisham
Osman v PR (Supra), sedangkan tiada ada apa-apa batasan di bawah sekysen 30 Akta Tersebut bagi
menghalang Mahkamah Seksyen untuk merujuk persoalan kesan peruntukan perlembagaan ke
Mahkamah Tinggi yang mana Mahkamah Seksyen hanya perlu mempertimbangkan sama ada “any
question arises as to the effect of any provision of the constitution”
[5]Bagi dua perkara ini Mahkamah ini berpendapat dan bersetuju bahawa tiada apa-apa halangan di bawah
seksyen 30 Akta Tersebut bagi HMS merujuk perkara kesan perlembagaan ke Mahkamah Tinggi walaupun telah
terdapat keputusan Mahkamah Tinggi mengenai perlembagaan berkaitan undang-undang atau peruntukan
undang-undang yang sama. Subseksyen 30(2) Akta Tersebut menetapkan bahawa Mahkamah Tinggi yang
seharusnya memikirkan sama ada kesan sesuatu peruntukan perlembagaan itu adalah perlu bagi memutuskan
prosiding di Mahkamah Rendah tersebut dan merujuk persoalan itu ke Mahkamah Persekutuan. Begitu juga tidak
menjadi keperluan di bawah subseksyen 30(1) Akta Tersebut satu persoalan undang-undang harus dirujuk ke
Mahkamah Tinggi selepas satu dapatan dibuat dalam prosiding di hadapan Mahkamah Rendah tersebut.
Mahkamah Rendah di bawah seksyen 30 Akta Tersebut hanya memutuskan sama ada terdapat apa-apa soal
berbangkit tentang kesan mana peruntukan perlembagaan dalam prosiding di hadapannya dan bukan untuk
memutuskan persoalan tersebut. Apa yang perlu adalah apa yang ada di hadapannya ketika itu, ia berpuas hati
bahawa wujud persoalan sedemikian yang bukan persoalan yang remeh dan tidak berasas. Seksyen 30(1) Akta
Tersebut memperuntukan dalam apa-apa prosiding di mana Mahkamah Rendah apa-apa soal berbangkit tentang
kesanan mana-mana perintah perlembagaan boleh menghantar rekod prosiding itu ke Mahkamah Tinggi. Dengan
itu persoalan berbangkit tentang kesan peruntukan perlembagaan boleh ditimbulkan dan dirujuk ke Mahkamah
Tinggi pada bila-bila masa dalam prosiding kes itu di hadapan Mahkamah Rendah tersebut sekiranya perkara itu
bermerit. Dalam kes PP v Syarikat Tekala Sdn Bhd [2007] 6 MLJ 500 Mahkamah menyatakan bahawa walaupun
peruntukan seksyen 30 AMK tidak berbentuk mandatori, maka Mahkamah Rendah haruslah sentiasa
menggunakan peruntukan ini sekiranya berbangkit apa-apa kesan perlembagaan di hadapannya dengan
menyatakan:
“(60)Although s. 30 does not seem to be a mandatory provision, we would think that this provision should always be
resorted to by subordinate court when faced with any question as to the effect of any provision of the Federal Constitution.”
[6]Sekiranya permohonan itu bermerit dan bukan satu yang tidak berasas serta bukan suatu yang remeh mengenai
kesan peruntukan perlembagaan dalam satu-satu prosiding di hadapannya, maka Mahkamah Rendah tersebut
sewajarnya mengemukakan ke Mahkamah Tinggi untuk memutuskan sama ada kesan peruntukan perlembagaan
itu adalah perlu bagi tujuan memutuskan prosiding di hadapannya. Sekiranya jawapannya secara affirmatif, maka
kesan peruntukan perlembagaan itu akan di rujuk ke Mahkamah Persekutuan untuk penentuan akan kesan
peruntukan perlembagaan itu. (Kes Gan Boon Aun v PP [2016] 6 CLJ 647 dirujuk). Tuan HMS dalam kes ini telah
menolak permohonan Perayu dengan berpendapat bahawa beliau terikat dengan keputusan Mahkamah Tinggi
dalam kes Nor Hisham Osman v PP [2010] MLJU 1249 yang memutuskan seksyen 233 Akta Tersebut adalah
berpelembagaan. Tuan HMS seharusnya tidak terjurus kepada persoalan sama ada seksyen 233 Akta Tersebut
berpelembagaan atau tidak. Tuan HMS di bawah seksyen 30 Akta Tersebut harus mempertimbangkan sama ada
persoalan yang dibangkitkan adalah tentang kesan mana-mana peruntukan perlembagaan telah timbul atau tidak.
Dalam kes ini, perkara yang ditimbulkan bahawa peruntukan seksyen 233 Akta Komunikasi dan Multimedia 1998
dan kesannya dengan peruntukan perlembagaan Perkara 8 dan Perkara 10(2)(a) dalam hubungan membataskan
kebebasan diri dan bersuara, peruntukan yang terlalu kabor dan luas serta tidak proportionate. Dari perkara yang
ditimbulkan jelas terdapat merit kesan peruntukan perlembagaan yang timbul dari persoalan yang bangkit dan perlu
dirujuk ke Mahkamah Tinggi sama ada persoalan mengenai kesan peruntukan perlembagaan itu perlu bagi
memutuskan prosiding dihadapan Mahkamah tersebut. Sekiranya persoalan perlembagaan itu diputuskan ia akan
menentukan sama ada pertuduhan itu boleh atau tidak diteruskan.
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[7]Setelah mengatakan demikian tugas Mahkamah ini untuk menentukan sama ada persoalan yang memberi
kesan kepada peruntukan perlembagaan itu mempunyai merit dan bagi memutuskan prosiding di hadapan
Mahkamah Seksyen tersebut. Dalam kes ini persoalan yang dibangkitkan seperti yang disebut terdahulu adalah
sama ada s. 233(1)(a) dan 233(3) Akta Komunikasi dan Multimedia 1998 adalah bercanggah dengan Perkara 8
dan Perkara 10(2)(a) Perlembagaan dan oleh itu terbatal, tidak sah dan tidak berpelembagaan.
[8]Seksyen 233(1)(a) Akta Tersebut memperuntukan:
“233.
(1) Seseorang yang __
Dengan menggunakan mana-mana kemudahan rangkaian atau perkhidmatan rangkaian atau perkhidmatan
aplikasi secara sedar -
(i) Membuat, mewujudkan atau meminta-minta; dan
(ii) Memulakan penghantaran,
Apa-apa komen, permintaan, cadangan atau komunikasi lain yang lucah, sumbang, palsu,
mengancam atau jelik sifatnya dengan niat untuk menyakitkan hati, menganiayai, mengugut atau
mengganggu orang lain; atau
(b) …
Melakukan suatu kesalahan
(2) …
(3) Seseorang yang melakukan suatu kesalahan di bawah seksyen ini apabila disabitkan boleh didenda tidak
melebihi lima puluh ribu ringgit atau dipenjarakan selama tempoh tidak melebihi satu tahun atau kedua-duanya
dan hendaklah juga boleh didenda selanjutnya satu ribu ringgit bagi setiap hari kesalahan itu diteruskan selepas
pensabitan”.
[9]Peguambela menghujahkan bahawa peruntukan seksyen 233(1) dan (3) khususnya subseksyen 233(1)(a) itu
bertujuan untuk meletakkan kesalahan kepada penggunaan internet yang menghantar komunikasi yang bersifat
lucah, sumbang, mengancam atau jelik dengan niat untuk menyakitkan hati, menghina, menggugut atau
mengganggu orang lain. Dengan itu keberpelembagaan peruntukan seksyen 233(1)(a) tersebut adalah
dipersoalkan atas asas lima perkara berikut:
(a) Ia membatasi kebebasan bercakap dan bertentangan dengan perkara yang dijamin di bawah Perkara
10(2)(a) dan 10(4) Perlembagaan Persekutuan;
(b) ia adalah kabur dan membenarkan pihak berkuasa bertindak secara abitarari atau sewenang-wenangnya;
(c) ia begitu luas;
(d) gagal melepasi ujian kekadaran (proportionality); dan
(e) bercanggah dengan hal kebebasan diri dan hak disisi undang-undang di bawah Perkara 5 dan 8
Perlembagaan Persekutuan.
[10]Peguambela menghujahkan sekatan kebebasan bercakap hanya terhad kepada perkara yang diperuntukan di
bawah Perkara 10(2)(a) dan 10(4) Perlembagaan Persekutuan yang menyentuh ketenteraman awam, prinsip
moral, pengaiban apa-apa kesalahan, fitnah, bahasa kebangsaan, quota bagi orang-orang Melayu dan anak negeri
serta kedaulatan Raja-Raja. Dengan itu dihujahkan bahawa seksyen 233(1)(a) Akta Komunikasi dan Multimedia
1998 telah mengenakan sekatan yang membataskan kebebasan bercakap yang tidak terjatuh atau yang boleh
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diselamatkan oleh mana-mana perkara yang membataskan kebebasan bercakap yang dikenakan di bawah
Perkara 10(2)(a) dan 10(4) Perlembagaan Persekutuan tersebut. Secara keseluruhan peguambela menghujahkan
peruntukan seksyen 233(1)(a) tidak memenuhi atau mencapai hasrat melindungi batasan 8 perkara yang
dinyatakan dalam Perkara 10(2) dan (4) perlembagaan tersebut. Bagi menyokong hujah beliau, peguambela
merujuk kepada nas dari keputusan kes Mahkamah Agong India dalam kes Shreya Singhal v Union of India AIR
[2015] 3 LRC 781 yang merujuk kepada peruntukan seksyen 66A Indian Information Technology Act 2000 yang
mempunyai peruntukan yang sama dengan seksyen 233(1)(a) Akta Komunikasi dan Multimedia 1998 yang
diputuskan sebagai tidak berpelembagaan atas alasan melanggar atau terkeluar daripada batasan kebebasan
bercakap dalam Perkara 10 Perlembagaan India yang pari materia dengan Perkara 10 Perlembagaan Persekutuan
Malaysia dan tidak berkaitan dalam hubungannya dengan ketenteraman awam.
[11]Seterusnya dihujahkan bahawa peruntukan seksyen 233(1)(a) Akta Komunikasi dan Multimedia 1998 terlalu
kabur dan luas. Peruntukan tersebut membenarkan tindakan sewenangnya oleh pihak berkuasa tanpa menjelaskan
atau memperuntukan apa yang boleh atau tidak yang terjumlah kepada satu kesalahan. Tidak ada garis panduan
yang jelas dalam menetapkan satu kesalahan itu sebagai panduan undang-undang kepada pihak berkuasa atau
Mahkamah. Ianya satu yang tidak mempunyai satu piawaian yang munasabah dan merupakan satu yang terlalu
kabur yang patut diketepikan. Peguambela menghujahkan bahawa sesuatu undang-undang berbentuk jenayah itu
tidak boleh dibuat atas landasan yang terlalu subjektif. Peruntukannya mestilah jelas atau sehingga boleh
menjelaskan perbuatan-perbuatan yang dikatakan terjatuh dalam ruang lingkup kesalahan yang dinyatakan itu,
lebih-lebih lagi apabila menyentuh ciri-ciri niat dalam melakukan kesalahan itu.
[12]Dalam mengatakan mengenai peruntukan akta itu yang terlalu kabur dan luas, peguambela menghujahkan
bahawa peruntukan berkaitan tidak boleh digunapakai untuk tujuan di luar 8 hal perkara yang dibenarkan oleh
perlembagaan itu dan dengan itu ianya tidak berpelembagaan [kes Shreya Singhal dirujuk].
[13]Bagi ujian perkadaran (proportionality test) pula, peguambela menghujahkan bahawa peruntukan seksyen
233(1)(a) tidak ‘propotionate’ kepada objektif ia digubal atau yang hendak dicapai. Dikatakan bahawa tujuan
seksyen 233 dengan meletak tanggungjawab jenayah dalam penghantaran maklumat tidak mempunyai hubung
kait yang rasional dengan objektif tujuan pembuatannya. Peruntukannya tidak meletakkan apa perbuatan yang
membolehkan dibanding dengan perkara yang dilarang yang menjadikan sesuatu perlakuan itu sebagai jenayah.
(Kes PP v Azmi Sharom [2015] CLJ 942 dirujuk).
[14]Peguam Kanan Persekutuan pula menghujahkan bahawa sekatan yang dikenakan dalam seksyen 233 Akta
Komunikasi dan Multimedia 1998 merupakan sekatan yang dibenarkan di bawah Perkara 10(2)(a) Perlembagaan
Persekutuan atas alasan ianya adalah perlu dan sesuai demi kepentingan ketenteraman awam dan moral.
Kesalahan yang digariskan di bawah seksyen 233(1) ini merupakan perbuatan untuk mengwujudkan kebencian
terhadap bangsa atau warganegara tertentu yang boleh menjejaskan ketenteraman dan menjejaskan hubungan
baik negara dan negara lain. Dengan itu ia tidak bercanggah dengan Perkara 8 dan 10 Perlembagaan
Persekutuan.
[15]Pihak pendakwaan juga menghujahkan bahawa peruntukan seksyen 233(1) Akta Komunikasi dan Multimedia
1998 itu adalah sangat spesifik dan dengan jelas menyatakan apakah kelakuan yang merupakan suatu kesalahan.
Malahan, pertuduhan terhadap Perayu di bawah seksyen 233(1)(b) Akta Komunikasi dan Multimedia 1998 juga
amat spesifik dan dengan jelas mengatakan apakah kelakuan Perayu yang Perayu dipertuduh dengan dan di
bawah cabang manakah seksyen 233(1) akta itu Perayu dituduh. Dengan itu menurut pihak pendakwaan bahawa
peruntukan seksyen 233 Akta Komunikasi dan Multimedia 1998 bukan tidak berpelembagaan.
[16]Menyentuh tentang peruntukan ini tidak melepasi ujian proportionality, pihak pendakwaan menghujahkan
bahawa seksyen 233(1)(a) memperuntukan tentang orang yang menggunakan kemudahan, perkhidmatan ataupun
aplikasi rangkaian telah membuat komunikasi yang lucah, sumbang, palsu, jelik dengan matlamat untuk menyakiti
hati orang yang boleh menggugat ketenteraman merupakan pengkelasifikasi yang munasabah dan bukan tidak
terjangkau (too remote) kepada objektif memelihara ketenteraman awam.
Keputusan Mahkamah
[17]Dalam menentukan keputusan bagi soal tentang kesan sesuatu peruntukan perlembagaan itu adalah perlu
bagi memutuskan prosiding Mahkamah Rendah itu, Mahkamah ini harus mempertimbangkan sama ada
permohonan itu bermerit (Gan Boon Aun v PP [2016] 6 CLJ 647).
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[18]Apa yang dibangkitkan oleh peguam menyentuh tentang merit permohonan mereka adalah berdasarkan
kepada kesan peruntukan seksyen 233(1)(a) Akta Komunikasi dan Multimedia 1998 kepada Perkara 10
Perlembagaan Persekutuan. Seksyen 233(1)(a) Akta Tersebut memperuntukan:
(1) Seseorang yang __
(a) dengan menggunakan mana-mana kemudahan rangkaian atau perkhidmatan rangkaian atau perkhidmatan
aplikasi secara sedar -
(i) membuat, mewujudkan atau meminta-minta;dan
apa-apa komen, permintaan, cadangan atau komunikasi lain yang lucah, sumbang,palsu,
mengancam atau jelik sifatnya dengan niat untuk menyakitkan hati, menganiayai, mengugut atau
mengganggu orang lain; atau
(b) …
(2) …
(3) Seseorang yang melakukan suatu kesalahan di bawah seksyen ini apabila disabitkan boleh didenda tidak
melebihi lima puluh ribu ringgit atau dipenjarakan selama tempoh tidak melebihi satu tahun atau kedua-duanya
dan hendaklah juga boleh didenda selanjutnya satu ribu ringgit bagi setiap hari kesalahan itu diteruskan selepas
pensabitan”.
[19]Perkara 10 Perlembagaan Persekutuan pula memperuntukan:

(1) Subject to Clauses (2), (3) and (4) _
(a) Every citizen has the right to freedom of speech and expression;
(b) All citizens have the right to assemble peaceable and without arms;
(c) All citizens have the right to form associations.
(2) Parliament may by law impose _
(a) on the rights conferred by paragraph (a) of Clause (1), such restrictions as it deems necessary or
expedient in the interest of the security of the Federation or any part thereof, friendly relations with
other countries,public order or morality and restrictions designed to protect the privileges or Parliament
of any Legislative Assembly or to provide against contempt of court, defamation, or incitement to any
offence;
(b) on the right conferred by paragraph (b) of Clause (1), such restrictions as it deems necessary or
expedient in the interest of the security of the Federation or any part thereof or public order;
(c) on the right conferred by paragraph (c) of Clause (1), such restrictions as it deems necessary or
expedient in the interest of the security of the Federation or any part thereof or public order or morality.
(3) Restrictions on the right to form associations conferred by paragraph (c) of Clause (1) may also be
imposed by any law relating to labour or education.
(4) In imposing restrictions in the interest of the security of the Federation or any part thereof or public order
under Clause (2)(a), Parliament may pass law prohibiting the questioning of any matter, right, status,
position, privilege, sovereignty or prerogative established or protected by the provisions of Part III, Article
152, 153 or 181 otherwise than in relation to the implementation thereof as may be specified in such law.
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[20]Perkara 10 Perlembagaan Persekutuan tidak memberi kebebasan itu secara mutlak di mana Parlimen boleh
melalui undang-undang mengenakan sekatan-sekatan seperti mana di bawah Fasal (2), (3) dan (4).
[21]Dalam hubungan seksyen 233 Akta Komunikasi dan Multimedia 1998, walaupun peruntukan tersebut menyekat
kebebasan bersuara dan berekpresi seperti yang dijamin di bawah Perkara 8 dan 10 Perlembagaan Persekutuan,
namun sekatan tersebut termasuk dalam lingkungan yang dibenarkan di bawah Perkara 10(2)(a) Perlembagaan
Persekutuan. Tujuan seksyen 233(1)(a) ini bagi menjadikan perbuatan menyalahgunakan kemudahan rangkaian,
perkhidmatan rangkaian dan perkhidmatan aplikasi, terutamanya bagi penyebaran komunikasi yang bersifat lucah,
tidak senonoh, palsu, mengancam atau jelik dengan niat untuk menyakiti hati, mendera, mengancam atau
mengganggu orang lain sebagai satu kesalahan. Dengan itu sekatan yang dikenakan di bawah peruntukan
tersebut sudah semestinya termasuk dalam sekatan yang dibenarkan di bawah perenggan 10(2)(a) Perlembagaan
Persekutuan. Sekatan-sekatan yang diperuntukan itu semata-mata bagi mengelakkan perbuatan-perbuatan yang
boleh menimbulkan kebencian terhadap individu-individu, kumpulan-kumpulan orang tertentu, bangsa dan juga
hubungan negara dengan sesebuah negara akibat dari perbuatan penyebaran komunikasi yang bersifat lucah,
tidak senonoh, palsu dan jelik tersebut. Perkara yang sama telah disentuh dalam kes Public Prosecutor v Pung
Chen Choon [1994] 1 MLJ 566 di muka surat 576 Mahkamah memutuskan:
“Instances of the application of this approach when interpreting our Federal Constitution are to be found in tafsiran
Perlembagaan Persekutuan dalam kes Loh Kooi Choon v Government Of Malaysia [1977] 2 MLJ 187 at p 189 col 1A and
PP v Ooi Kee Saik & Ors at p 113 col 2B-C. Indeed the same point was recognized and applied by the Privy Council (per
Lord Radcliffe) in Adegbenro v Akintola 14 at p 73.”
Seterusnya Mahkamah memutuskan:
“(3) In deciding whether a particular piece of legislation falls within the orbit of the permitted restrictions, consideration must
be given to the question whether such law is directed at a class of acts too remote in the chain of relation to the subjects
enumerated under art 10(2)(a). In other words, the objects of the impugned law must be sufficiently connected to the
subjects enumerated under art 10(2)(a). The connection contemplated must be real and proximate, not far-fetched or
problematical.”
[22]Dalam kes tersebut, Mahkamah memutuskan bahawa mesti pun seksyen 8A Printing Presses and Publication
Act 1984 yang menjadikan perbuatan menerbitkan berita palsu sebagai suatu kesalahan jenayah itu meletakkan
sekatan ke atas kebebasan bersuara dan ekpresi di bawah Perkara 8 dan 10 Perlembagaan Persekutuan, namun
sekatan tersebut termasuk dalam lingkungan sekatan yang dibenarkan di bawah Perkara 10(2)(a) Perlembagaan
Persekutuan kerana penerbitan berita palsu dengan niat jahat sedemikian boleh akan menggalakkan perbuatan
yang boleh menjejaskan keselamatan negara, melemahkan hubungan persahabatan Malaysia dan negara luar,
mengganggu ketenteraman awam dan menggalakkan perlakuan jenayah.
[23]Berasaskan kepada tujuan di sebalik peruntukan seksyen 233 Akta Komunikasi dan Multimedia 1998, jelas
sekatan yang dikenakan termasuk dalam sekatan yang dibenarkan di bawah Perkara 10(2)(a) Perlembagaan
Persekutuan sekali gus tidak menimbulkan apa-apa kesan kepada peruntukan perlembagaan yang perlu bagi
memutuskan prosiding di Mahkamah bawahan ini, bagi Mahkamah ini merujuk persoalan ketidak perlembagaan
peruntukan tersebut ke Mahkamah Persekutuan.
[24]Sekatan yang dibenarkan bagi kebebasan bersuara dan berekspresi dalam penggubalan sesuatu undang-
undang menurut kehendak Perkara 10(1)(a) Perlembagaan Persekutuan haruslah merupakan undang-undang
digubal demi menjamin bagi ketenteraman awam atau moral, termasuklah bagi tujuan menjaga kepentingan itu
sendiri. Kes Public Prosecutor v Param Cumaraswamy (No. 2) [1986] 1 MLJ 518:
“From the passage which I have just read, we can clearly see that the constitutional provisions allow the State to impose
restrictions in the interest of public order which has a wider ambit than for the maintenance of public order. This is because
a law may not have been designed to maintain public order and yet it may have been enacted in the interest of public order.
Similarly, a law may not have been designed to prevent incitement to violence and yet it may have been enacted in the
interest of security. Put in another way, a law would still be in the interest of security or public order without having to make
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it a law for the prevention of violence or public disorder.”
Apa yang terkandung dalam peruntukan seksyen 233 Akta Komunikasi dan Multimedia 1998 itu adalah semata-
mata bagi menjamin ketenteraman awam dan moral serta menjaga kepentingan itu yang konsisten dengan
perlembagaan.
[25]Pada hemat Mahkamah ini seterusnya bahawa seksyen 233(1)(a) Akta Komunikasi dan Multimedia 1998
adalah jelas, tidak terlalu luas dan peruntukan yang cukup memberi notis yang adil berkenaan perbuatan-
perbuatan yang dilarang. Bahkan melihat kepada peruntukannya, ia lebih spesifik dan jelas. Perbuatan membuat,
mewujudkan atau meminta-minta dan memulakan penghantaran apa-apa komunikasi adalah merupakan perbuatan
khusus yang dirujuk sebagai perbuatan atau kelakuan yang dilarang di bawah seksyen tersebut. Jenis komunikasi
itu secara khusus juga diperincikan iaitu komen, permintaan, cadangan atau komunikasi lain. Disamping itu jenis
komunikasi yang dilorong juga diperincikan sebagai komunikasi yang yang lucah, sumbang, palsu, mengancam
atau jelik sifatnya. Begitu juga tujuan komunikasi itu dibuat dan dihantar yang dilarang itu adalah dikhususnya
kepada perkara-perkara yang bagi maksud menyakitkan hati, menganiayai, mengugut atau mengganggu orang
lain. Malah, seksyen tersebut hanya terpakai kepada perbuatan yang dilarang di atas yang menggunakan
kemudahan rangkaian, perkhidmatan rangkaian atau perkhidmatan aplikasi sahaja. Kesemua perkara ini
terkandung dalam seksyen 233(1)(a) Akta Komunikasi dan Multimedia 1998 yang begitu khusus, jelas dan
seterusnya kepada yang terkesan dengan peruntukan itu mempunyai notis yang jelas dan adil berkenaan
perbuatan yang mereka dipertuduhkan.
[26]Mahkamah di India dalam kes Shreya Singhal v Union of Indian AIR 2015 SC 1123 yang menjadi rujukan
hujahan peguambela, yang memutuskan bahawa seksyen 66A Information Technology Act of 2000 adalah tidak
berperlembagaan dibuat berdasarkan kontek suasana tempatan di India. Ia tidak boleh disamakan dengan tafsiran
keatas seksyen 233 Akta Komunikasi dan Multimedia 1998 yang seharusnya mengambilkira suasana kontek
tempat di Malaysia berdasarkan objektif, hal keadaan sekeliling dan prinsip-prinsip seksyen 233 tersebut digubal.
[27]Seterusnya pada pendapat Mahkamah ini, peruntukan seksyen 233 Akta Komunikasi dan Multimedia 1998
melepasi ujian kekadaran (proportionality test). Peruntukan ini telah membuat klasifikasi yang munasabah dan
kelasifikasi itu adalah adil dan proportionate dengan objektif yang hendak dicapainya. Seksyen 233(1)(a) Akta
Komunikasi dan Multimedia 1998 telah mewujudkan satu klasifikasi orang yang menggunakan kemudahan,
perkhidmatan atau aplikasi rangkaian yang telah membuat komunikasi lucah, sumbang, palsu, mengancam atau
jelik sifatnya dengan niat untuk menyakitkan hati, menganiya, mengugut atau mengganggu orang lain. Ia satu yang
munasabah kepada objektif memelihara ketenteraman awam atau moral kerana kelasifikasi orang-orang
sedemikian sahaja yang dikatakan melakukan kesalahan. Ia juga bukan satu sekatan atau larangan yang
menyeluruh (total prohibition) bagi kesemua warganegara dan dalam semua perbuatan tetapi tertakluk kepada
batasan, sekatan dan had tertentu yang dinyatakan dalam peruntukan seksyen 233(1)(a) itu sendiri. Maka dengan
itu ia bukan satu sekatan yang mutlak ke atas kebebasan bersuara dan berekspresi melalui kemudahan,
perkhidmatan ataupun aplikasi rangkaian. Seksyen tersebut hanya bertujuan menghalang penyalahgunaan
kemudahan, perkhidmatan atau aplikasi rangkaian demi menjaga kepentingan ketenteraman awam dan moral yang
“proportionate” dengan objektif yang hendak dicapai.
Kesimpulan
[28]Dengan mengambil kira kesemua perkara yang Mahkamah ini nyatakan sebelum daripada ini adalah didapati
bahawa persoalan kesan peruntukan perlembagaan yang timbul di hadapan Tuan HMS itu adalah tidak mempunyai
merit dan tidak perlu dirujuk dan untuk keputusan Mahkamah Persekutuan bagi memutuskan prosiding di hadapan
Mahkamah Seksyen tersebut.
[29]Dari itu rayuan pihak Perayu ditolak dan prosiding di hadapan Mahkamah Seksyen diteruskan tanpa apa-apa
perintah penggantungan prosiding dibuat oleh Mahkamah ini.
End of Document
Supreme Court of India
Shreya Singhal vs U.O.I on 24 March, 2015
Bench: J. Chelameswar, Rohinton Fali Nariman
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL/CIVIL ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
WRIT PETITION (CRIMINAL) NO.167 OF 2012
SHREYA SINGHAL ... PETITIONER
VERSUS
UNION OF INDIA ... RESPONDENT
WITH
WRIT PETITION (CIVIL) NO.21 OF 2013
WRIT PETITION (CIVIL) NO. 97 OF 2013
WRIT PETITION (CIVIL) NO. 217 OF 2013
JUDGMENT
R.F. NARIMAN, J.
1. This batch of writ petitions filed under Article 32 of the Constitution of India raises very
important and far-reaching questions relatable primarily to the fundamental right of free speech
and expression guaranteed by Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution of India. The immediate cause
for concern in these petitions is Section 66A of the Information Technology Act of 2000. This
Section was not in the Act as originally enacted, but came into force by virtue of an Amendment
Act of 2009 with effect from 27.10.2009. Since all the arguments raised by several counsel for
the petitioners deal with the unconstitutionality of this Section it is set out hereinbelow:
"66-A. Punishment for sending offensive messages through communication service, etc.-Any
person who sends, by means of a computer resource or a communication device,-
(a) any information that is grossly offensive or has menacing character; or
(b) any information which he knows to be false, but for the purpose of causing annoyance,
inconvenience, danger, obstruction, insult, injury, criminal intimidation, enmity, hatred or ill will,
persistently by making use of such computer resource or a communication device; or
(c) any electronic mail or electronic mail message for the purpose of causing annoyance or
inconvenience or to deceive or to mislead the addressee or recipient about the origin of such
messages, shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term which may extend to three years
and with fine.
Explanation.- For the purposes of this section, terms "electronic mail" and "electronic mail
message" means a message or information created or transmitted or received on a computer,
computer system, computer resource or communication device including attachments in text,
image, audio, video and any other electronic record, which may be transmitted with the
message."[1]
2. A related challenge is also made to Section 69A introduced by the same amendment which
reads as follows:-
"69-A. Power to issue directions for blocking for public access of any information through any
computer resource.-(1) Where the Central Government or any of its officers specially authorised
by it in this behalf is satisfied that it is necessary or expedient so to do, in the interest of
sovereignty and integrity of India, defence of India, security of the State, friendly relations with
foreign States or public order or for preventing incitement to the commission of any cognizable
offence relating to above, it may subject to the provisions of sub-section (2), for reasons to be
recorded in writing, by order, direct any agency of the Government or intermediary to block for
access by the public or cause to be blocked for access by the public any information generated,
transmitted, received, stored or hosted in any computer resource.
(2) The procedure and safeguards subject to which such blocking for access by the public may
be carried out, shall be such as may be prescribed.
(3) The intermediary who fails to comply with the direction issued under sub-section (1) shall be
punished with an imprisonment for a term which may extend to seven years and shall also be
liable to fine."
3. The Statement of Objects and Reasons appended to the Bill which introduced the
Amendment Act stated in paragraph 3 that:
"3. A rapid increase in the use of computer and internet has given rise to new forms of crimes
like publishing sexually explicit materials in electronic form, video voyeurism and breach of
confidentiality and leakage of data by intermediary, e-commerce frauds like personation
commonly known as Phishing, identity theft and offensive messages through communication
services. So, penal provisions are required to be included in the Information Technology Act, the
Indian Penal code, the Indian Evidence Act and the code of Criminal Procedure to prevent such
crimes."
4. The petitioners contend that the very basis of Section 66A - that it has given rise to new forms
of crimes - is incorrect, and that Sections 66B to 67C and various Sections of the Indian Penal
Code (which will be referred to hereinafter) are good enough to deal with all these crimes.
5. The petitioners' various counsel raised a large number of points as to the constitutionality of
Section 66A. According to them, first and foremost Section 66A infringes the fundamental right
to free speech and expression and is not saved by any of the eight subjects covered in Article
19(2). According to them, the causing of annoyance, inconvenience, danger, obstruction, insult,
injury, criminal intimidation, enmity, hatred or ill- will are all outside the purview of Article 19(2).
Further, in creating an offence, Section 66A suffers from the vice of vagueness because unlike
the offence created by Section 66 of the same Act, none of the aforesaid terms are even
attempted to be defined and cannot be defined, the result being that innocent persons are roped
in as well as those who are not. Such persons are not told clearly on which side of the line they
fall; and it would be open to the authorities to be as arbitrary and whimsical as they like in
booking such persons under the said Section. In fact, a large number of innocent persons have
been booked and many instances have been given in the form of a note to the Court. The
enforcement of the said Section would really be an insidious form of censorship which impairs a
core value contained in Article 19(1)(a). In addition, the said Section has a chilling effect on the
freedom of speech and expression. Also, the right of viewers is infringed as such chilling effect
would not give them the benefit of many shades of grey in terms of various points of view that
could be viewed over the internet.
The petitioners also contend that their rights under Articles 14 and 21 are breached inasmuch
there is no intelligible differentia between those who use the internet and those who by words
spoken or written use other mediums of communication. To punish somebody because he uses
a particular medium of communication is itself a discriminatory object and would fall foul of
Article 14 in any case.
6. In reply, Mr. Tushar Mehta, learned Additional Solicitor General defended the constitutionality
of Section 66A. He argued that the legislature is in the best position to understand and
appreciate the needs of the people. The Court will, therefore, interfere with the legislative
process only when a statute is clearly violative of the rights conferred on the citizen under
Part-III of the Constitution. There is a presumption in favour of the constitutionality of an
enactment. Further, the Court would so construe a statute to make it workable and in doing so
can read into it or read down the provisions that are impugned. The Constitution does not
impose impossible standards of determining validity. Mere possibility of abuse of a provision
cannot be a ground to declare a provision invalid. Loose language may have been used in
Section 66A to deal with novel methods of disturbing other people's rights by using the internet
as a tool to do so. Further, vagueness is not a ground to declare a statute unconstitutional if the
statute is otherwise legislatively competent and non-arbitrary. He cited a large number of
judgments before us both from this Court and from overseas to buttress his submissions.
Freedom of Speech and Expression Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution of India states as
follows:
"Article 19. Protection of certain rights regarding freedom of speech, etc.- (1) All citizens shall
have the right-
(a) to freedom of speech and expression;"
7. Article 19(2) states:
"Article 19. Protection of certain rights regarding freedom of speech, etc.- (2) Nothing in
sub-clause (a) of clause (1) shall affect the operation of any existing law, or prevent the State
from making any law, in so far as such law imposes reasonable restrictions on the exercise of
the right conferred by the said sub-clause in the interests of the sovereignty and integrity of
India, the security of the State, friendly relations with foreign States, public order, decency or
morality or in relation to contempt of court, defamation or incitement to an offence."
8. The Preamble of the Constitution of India inter alia speaks of liberty of thought, expression,
belief, faith and worship. It also says that India is a sovereign democratic republic. It cannot be
over emphasized that when it comes to democracy, liberty of thought and expression is a
cardinal value that is of paramount significance under our constitutional scheme.
9. Various judgments of this Court have referred to the importance of freedom of speech and
expression both from the point of view of the liberty of the individual and from the point of view
of our democratic form of government. For example, in the early case of Romesh Thappar v.
State of Madras, [1950] S.C.R. 594 at 602, this Court stated that freedom of speech lay at the
foundation of all democratic organizations. In Sakal Papers (P) Ltd. & Ors. v. Union of India,
[1962] 3 S.C.R. 842 at 866, a Constitution Bench of this Court said freedom of speech and
expression of opinion is of paramount importance under a democratic constitution which
envisages changes in the composition of legislatures and governments and must be preserved.
In a separate concurring judgment Beg,J. said, in Bennett Coleman & Co. & Ors. v. Union of
India & Ors., [1973] 2 S.C.R. 757 at 829, that the freedom of speech and of the press is the Ark
of the Covenant of Democracy because public criticism is essential to the working of its
institutions.[2]
10. Equally, in S. Khushboo v. Kanniamal & Anr., (2010) 5 SCC 600 this Court stated, in
paragraph 45 that the importance of freedom of speech and expression though not absolute
was necessary as we need to tolerate unpopular views. This right requires the free flow of
opinions and ideas essential to sustain the collective life of the citizenry. While an informed
citizenry is a pre-condition for meaningful governance, the culture of open dialogue is generally
of great societal importance.
11. This last judgment is important in that it refers to the "market place of ideas" concept that
has permeated American Law. This was put in the felicitous words of Justice Holmes in his
famous dissent in Abrams v. United States, 250 US 616 (1919), thus:
"But when men have realized that time has upset many fighting faiths, they may come to believe
even more than they believe the very foundations of their own conduct that the ultimate good
desired is better reached by free trade in ideas-that the best test of truth is the power of thought
to get itself accepted in the competition of the market, and that truth is the only ground upon
which their wishes safely can be carried out. That at any rate is the theory of our Constitution."
12. Justice Brandeis in his famous concurring judgment in Whitney v. California, 71 L. Ed. 1095
said:
"Those who won our independence believed that the final end of the state was to make men
free to develop their faculties, and that in its government the deliberative forces should prevail
over the arbitrary. They valued liberty both as an end and as a means. They believed liberty to
be the secret of happiness and courage to be the secret of liberty. They believed that freedom to
think as you will and to speak as you think are means indispensable to the discovery and
spread of political truth; that without free speech and assembly discussion would be futile; that
with them, discussion affords ordinarily adequate protection against the dissemination of
noxious doctrine; that the greatest menace to freedom is an inert people; that public discussion
is a political duty; and that this should be a fundamental principle of the American government.
They recognized the risks to which all human institutions are subject. But they knew that order
cannot be secured merely through fear of punishment for its infraction; that it is hazardous to
discourage thought, hope and imagination; that fear breeds repression; that repression breeds
hate; that hate menaces stable government; that the path of safety lies in the opportunity to
discuss freely supposed grievances and proposed remedies; and that the fitting remedy for evil
counsels is good ones. Believing in the power of reason as applied through public discussion,
they eschewed silence coerced by law-the argument of force in its worst form. Recognizing the
occasional tyrannies of governing majorities, they amended the Constitution so that free speech
and assembly should be guaranteed.
Fear of serious injury cannot alone justify suppression of free speech and assembly. Men feared
witches and burnt women. It is the function of speech to free men from the bondage of irrational
fears. To justify suppression of free speech there must be reasonable ground to fear that serious
evil will result if free speech is practiced. There must be reasonable ground to believe that the
danger apprehended is imminent. There must be reasonable ground to believe that the evil to
be prevented is a serious one. Every denunciation of existing law tends in some measure to
increase the probability that there will be violation of it. Condonation of a breach enhances the
probability. Expressions of approval add to the probability. Propagation of the criminal state of
mind by teaching syndicalism increases it. Advocacy of lawbreaking heightens it still further. But
even advocacy of violation, however reprehensible morally, is not a justification for denying free
speech where the advocacy falls short of incitement and there is nothing to indicate that the
advocacy would be immediately acted on. The wide difference between advocacy and
incitement, between preparation and attempt, between assembling and conspiracy, must be
borne in mind. In order to support a finding of clear and present danger it must be shown either
that immediate serious violence was to be expected or was advocated, or that the past conduct
furnished reason to believe that such advocacy was then contemplated." (at page 1105, 1106)
13. This leads us to a discussion of what is the content of the expression "freedom of speech
and expression". There are three concepts which are fundamental in understanding the reach of
this most basic of human rights. The first is discussion, the second is advocacy, and the third is
incitement. Mere discussion or even advocacy of a particular cause howsoever unpopular is at
the heart of Article 19(1)(a). It is only when such discussion or advocacy reaches the level of
incitement that Article 19(2) kicks in.[3] It is at this stage that a law may be made curtailing the
speech or expression that leads inexorably to or tends to cause public disorder or tends to
cause or tends to affect the sovereignty & integrity of India, the security of the State, friendly
relations with foreign States, etc. Why it is important to have these three concepts in mind is
because most of the arguments of both petitioners and respondents tended to veer around the
expression "public order".
14. It is at this point that a word needs to be said about the use of American judgments in the
context of Article 19(1)(a). In virtually every significant judgment of this Court, reference has
been made to judgments from across the Atlantic. Is it safe to do so?
15. It is significant to notice first the differences between the US First Amendment and Article
19(1)(a) read with Article 19(2). The first important difference is the absoluteness of the U.S. first
Amendment - Congress shall make no law which abridges the freedom of speech. Second,
whereas the U.S. First Amendment speaks of freedom of speech and of the press, without any
reference to "expression", Article 19(1)(a) speaks of freedom of speech and expression without
any reference to "the press". Third, under the US Constitution, speech may be abridged,
whereas under our Constitution, reasonable restrictions may be imposed. Fourth, under our
Constitution such restrictions have to be in the interest of eight designated subject matters - that
is any law seeking to impose a restriction on the freedom of speech can only pass muster if it is
proximately related to any of the eight subject matters set out in Article 19(2).
16. Insofar as the first apparent difference is concerned, the U.S. Supreme Court has never
given literal effect to the declaration that Congress shall make no law abridging the freedom of
speech. The approach of the Court which is succinctly stated in one of the early U.S. Supreme
Court Judgments, continues even today. In Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 86 L. Ed. 1031,
Justice Murphy who delivered the opinion of the Court put it thus:-
"Allowing the broadest scope to the language and purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment, it is
well understood that the right of free speech is not absolute at all times and under all
circumstances. There are certain well- defined and narrowly limited classes of speech, the
prevention and punishment of which has never been thought to raise any Constitutional
problem. These include the lewd and obscene, the profane, the libelous, and the insulting or
'fighting' words-those which by their very utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate
breach of the peace. It has been well observed that such utterances are no essential part of any
exposition of ideas, and are of such slight social value as a step to truth that any benefit that
may be derived from them is clearly outweighed by the social interest in order and morality.
'Resort to epithets or personal abuse is not in any proper sense communication of information or
opinion safeguarded by the Constitution, and its punishment as a criminal act would raise no
question under that instrument.' Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 309, 310, 60 S.Ct. 900,
906, 84 L.Ed.1213, 128 A.L.R. 1352." (at page 1035)
17. So far as the second apparent difference is concerned, the American Supreme Court has
included "expression" as part of freedom of speech and this Court has included "the press" as
being covered under Article 19(1)(a), so that, as a matter of judicial interpretation, both the US
and India protect the freedom of speech and expression as well as press freedom. Insofar as
abridgement and reasonable restrictions are concerned, both the U.S. Supreme Court and this
Court have held that a restriction in order to be reasonable must be narrowly tailored or narrowly
interpreted so as to abridge or restrict only what is absolutely necessary. It is only when it comes
to the eight subject matters that there is a vast difference. In the U.S., if there is a compelling
necessity to achieve an important governmental or societal goal, a law abridging freedom of
speech may pass muster. But in India, such law cannot pass muster if it is in the interest of the
general public. Such law has to be covered by one of the eight subject matters set out under
Article 19(2). If it does not, and is outside the pale of 19(2), Indian courts will strike down such
law.
18. Viewed from the above perspective, American judgments have great persuasive value on
the content of freedom of speech and expression and the tests laid down for its infringement. It
is only when it comes to sub- serving the general public interest that there is the world of a
difference. This is perhaps why in Kameshwar Prasad & Ors. v. The State of Bihar & Anr., 1962
Supp. (3) S.C.R. 369, this Court held:
"As regards these decisions of the American Courts, it should be borne in mind that though the
First Amendment to the Constitution of the United State reading "Congress shall make no law....
abridging the freedom of speech..." appears to confer no power on the Congress to impose any
restriction on the exercise of the guaranteed right, still it has always been understood that the
freedom guaranteed is subject to the police power
- the scope of which however has not been defined with precision or uniformly. It is on the basis
of the police power to abridge that freedom that the constitutional validity of laws penalising
libels, and those relating to sedition, or to obscene publications etc., has been sustained. The
resultant flexibility of the restrictions that could be validly imposed renders the American
decisions inapplicable to and without much use for resolving the questions arising under Art.
19(1) (a) or (b) of our Constitution wherein the grounds on which limitations might be placed on
the guaranteed right are set out with definiteness and precision." ( At page 378)
19. But when it comes to understanding the impact and content of freedom of speech, in Indian
Express Newspapers (Bombay) Private Limited & Ors. v. Union of India & Ors., (1985) 2 SCR
287, Venkataramiah,J. stated:
"While examining the constitutionality of a law which is alleged to contravene Article 19 (1) (a) of
the Constitution, we cannot, no doubt, be solely guided by the decisions of the Supreme Court
of the United States of America. But in order to understand the basic principles of freedom of
speech and expression and the need for that freedom in a democratic country, we may take
them into consideration. The pattern of Article 19 (1)
(a) and of Article 19 (1) (g) of our constitution is different from the pattern of the First
Amendment to the American Constitution which is almost absolute in its terms. The rights
guaranteed under Article 19 (1) (a) and Article 19 (1) (g) of the Constitution are to be read along
with clauses (2) and (6) of Article 19 which carve out areas in respect of which valid legislation
can be made." (at page 324)
20. With these prefatory remarks, we will now go to the other aspects of the challenge made in
these writ petitions and argued before us.
A. Article 19(1)(a) -
Section 66A has been challenged on the ground that it casts the net very wide - "all information"
that is disseminated over the internet is included within its reach. It will be useful to note that
Section 2(v) of Information Technology Act, 2000 defines information as follows:
"2. Definitions.-(1) In this Act, unless the context otherwise requires,-
(v) "Information" includes data, message, text, images, sound, voice, codes, computer
programmes, software and databases or micro film or computer generated micro fiche."
Two things will be noticed. The first is that the definition is an inclusive one. Second, the
definition does not refer to what the content of information can be. In fact, it refers only to the
medium through which such information is disseminated. It is clear, therefore, that the
petitioners are correct in saying that the public's right to know is directly affected by Section
66A. Information of all kinds is roped in - such information may have scientific, literary or artistic
value, it may refer to current events, it may be obscene or seditious. That such information may
cause annoyance or inconvenience to some is how the offence is made out. It is clear that the
right of the people to know - the market place of ideas - which the internet provides to persons
of all kinds is what attracts Section 66A. That the information sent has to be annoying,
inconvenient, grossly offensive etc., also shows that no distinction is made between mere
discussion or advocacy of a particular point of view which may be annoying or inconvenient or
grossly offensive to some and incitement by which such words lead to an imminent causal
connection with public disorder, security of State etc. The petitioners are right in saying that
Section 66A in creating an offence against persons who use the internet and annoy or cause
inconvenience to others very clearly affects the freedom of speech and expression of the
citizenry of India at large in that such speech or expression is directly curbed by the creation of
the offence contained in Section 66A.
In this regard, the observations of Justice Jackson in American Communications Association v.

Douds, 94 L. Ed. 925 are apposite:
"Thought control is a copyright of totalitarianism, and we have no claim to it. It is not the function
of our Government to keep the citizen from falling into error; it is the function of the citizen to
keep the Government from falling into error. We could justify any censorship only when the
censors are better shielded against error than the censored."
Article 19(2) One challenge to Section 66A made by the petitioners' counsel is that the offence
created by the said Section has no proximate relation with any of the eight subject matters
contained in Article 19(2). We may incidentally mention that the State has claimed that the said
Section can be supported under the heads of public order, defamation, incitement to an offence
and decency or morality.
21. Under our constitutional scheme, as stated earlier, it is not open to the State to curtail
freedom of speech to promote the general public interest. In Sakal Papers (P) Ltd. & Ors. v.
Union of India, [1962] 3 S.C.R. 842, this Court said:
"It may well be within the power of the State to place, in the interest of the general public,
restrictions upon the right of a citizen to carry on business but it is not open to the State to
achieve this object by directly and immediately curtailing any other freedom of that citizen
guaranteed by the Constitution and which is not susceptible of abridgment on the same grounds
as are set out in clause (6) of Article 19. Therefore, the right of freedom of speech cannot be
taken away with the object of placing restrictions on the business activities of a citizen. Freedom
of speech can be restricted only in the interests of the security of the State, friendly relations
with foreign State, public order, decency or morality or in relation to contempt of court,
defamation or incitement to an offence. It cannot, like the freedom to carry on business, be
curtailed in the interest of the general public. If a law directly affecting it is challenged, it is no
answer that the restrictions enacted by it are justifiable under clauses (3) to (6). For, the scheme
of Article 19 is to enumerate different freedoms separately and then to specify the extent of
restrictions to which they may be subjected and the objects for securing which this could be
done. A citizen is entitled to enjoy each and every one of the freedoms together and clause (1)
does not prefer one freedom to another. That is the plain meaning of this clause. It follows from
this that the State cannot make a law which directly restricts one freedom even for securing the
better enjoyment of another freedom. All the greater reason, therefore for holding that the State
cannot directly restrict one freedom by placing an otherwise permissible restriction on another
freedom." (at page 863)
22. Before we come to each of these expressions, we must understand what is meant by the
expression "in the interests of". In The Superintendent, Central Prison, Fatehgarh v. Ram
Manohar Lohia, [1960] 2 S.C.R. 821, this Court laid down:
"We do not understand the observations of the Chief Justice to mean that any remote or fanciful
connection between the impugned Act and the public order would be sufficient to sustain its
validity. The learned Chief Justice was only making a distinction between an Act which
expressly and directly purported to maintain public order and one which did not expressly state
the said purpose but left it to be implied there from; and between an Act that directly maintained
public order and that indirectly brought about the same result. The distinction does not ignore
the necessity for intimate connection between the Act and the public order sought to be
maintained by the Act." (at pages 834, 835) "The restriction made "in the interests of public
order" must also have reasonable relation to the object to be achieved, i.e., the public order. If
the restriction has no proximate relationship to the achievement of public order, it cannot be said
that the restriction is a reasonable restriction within the meaning of the said clause." (at page
835) "The decision, in our view, lays down the correct test. The limitation imposed in the
interests of public order to be a reasonable restriction, should be one which has a proximate
connection or nexus with public order, but not one far-fetched, hypothetical or problematical or
too remote in the chain of its relation with the public order..........There is no proximate or even
foreseeable connection between such instigation and the public order sought to be protected
under section. We cannot accept the argument of the learned Advocate General that instigation
of a single individual not to pay tax or dues is a spark which may in the long run ignite a
revolutionary movement destroying public order" (at page 836).
Reasonable Restrictions:
23. This Court has laid down what "reasonable restrictions" means in several cases. In
Chintaman Rao v. The State of Madhya Pradesh, [1950] S.C.R. 759, this Court said:
"The phrase "reasonable restriction" connotes that the limitation imposed on a person in
enjoyment of the right should not be arbitrary or of an excessive nature, beyond what is required
in the interests of the public. The word "reasonable" implies intelligent care and deliberation, that
is, the choice of a course which reason dictates. Legislation which arbitrarily or excessively
invades the right cannot be said to contain the quality of reasonableness and unless it strikes a
proper balance between the freedom guaranteed in article 19(1)(g) and the social control
permitted by clause (6) of article 19, it must be held to be wanting in that quality." (at page 763)
24. In State of Madras v. V.G. Row, [1952] S.C.R. 597, this Court said:
"This Court had occasion in Dr. Khare's case (1950) S.C.R. 519 to define the scope of the
judicial review under clause (5) of Article19 where the phrase "imposing reasonable restriction
on the exercise of the right" also occurs and four out of the five Judges participating in the
decision expressed the view (the other Judge leaving the question open) that both the
substantive and the procedural aspects of the impugned restrictive law should be examined
from the point of view of reasonableness; that is to say, the Court should consider not only
factors such as the duration and the extent of the restrictions, but also the circumstances under
which and the manner in which their imposition has been authorised. It is important in this
context to bear in mind that the test of reasonableness, where ever prescribed, should be
applied to each, individual statute impugned and no abstract standard, or general pattern of
reasonableness can be laid down as applicable to all cases. The nature of the right alleged to
have been infringed, the underlying purpose of the restriction imposed, the extent and urgency
of the evil sought to be remedied thereby, the disproportion of the imposition, the prevailing
conditions at the time, should all enter into the judicial verdict. In evaluating such elusive factors
and forming their own conception of what is reasonable, in all the circumstances of a given
case, it is inevitable that the social philosophy and the scale of values of the judges participating
in the decision should play an important part, and the limit to their interference with legislative
judgment in such cases can only be dictated by their sense of responsibility and self- restraint
and the sobering reflection that the Constitution is meant not only for people of their way of
thinking but for all, and that the majority of the elected representatives of the people have, in
authorising the imposition of the restrictions, considered them to be reasonable." (at page
606-607)
25. Similarly, in Mohd. Faruk v. State of Madhya Pradesh & Ors., [1970] 1 S.C.R. 156, this Court
said:
"The Court must in considering the validity of the impugned law imposing a prohibition on the
carrying on of a business or profession, attempt an evaluation of its direct and immediate impact
upon the fundamental rights of the citizens affected thereby and the larger public interest sought
to be ensured in the light of the object sought to be achieved, the necessity to restrict the
citizen's freedom, the inherent pernicious nature of the act prohibited or its capacity or tendency
to be harmful to the general public, the possibility of achieving the object by imposing a less
drastic restraint, and in the absence of exceptional situations such as the prevalence of a state
of emergency-national or local-or the necessity to maintain essential supplies, or the necessity
to stop activities inherently dangerous, the existence of a machinery to satisfy the administrative
authority that no case for imposing the restriction is made out or that a less drastic restriction
may ensure the object intended to be achieved." (at page 161)
26. In Dr. N. B. Khare v. State of Delhi, [1950] S.C.R. 519, a Constitution Bench also spoke of
reasonable restrictions when it comes to procedure. It said:
"While the reasonableness of the restrictions has to be considered with regard to the exercise of
the right, it does not necessarily exclude from the consideration of the Court the question of
reasonableness of the procedural part of the law. It is obvious that if the law prescribes five
years externment or ten years externment, the question whether such period of externment is
reasonable, being the substantive part, is necessarily for the consideration of the court under
clause (5). Similarly, if the law provides the procedure under which the exercise of the right may
be restricted, the same is also for the consideration of the Court, as it has to determine if the
exercise of the right has been reasonably restricted." (at page 524)
27. It was argued by the learned Additional Solicitor General that a relaxed standard of
reasonableness of restriction should apply regard being had to the fact that the medium of
speech being the internet differs from other mediums on several grounds. To appreciate the
width and scope of his submissions, we are setting out his written submission verbatim:
"(i) the reach of print media is restricted to one state or at the most one country while internet
has no boundaries and its reach is global;
(ii) the recipient of the free speech and expression used in a print media can only be literate
persons while internet can be accessed by literate and illiterate both since one click is needed to
download an objectionable post or a video;
(iii) In case of televisions serials [except live shows] and movies, there is a permitted pre-
censorship' which ensures right of viewers not to receive any information which is dangerous to
or not in conformity with the social interest. While in the case of an internet, no such
pre-censorship is possible and each individual is publisher, printer, producer, director and
broadcaster of the content without any statutory regulation;
In case of print media or medium of television and films whatever is truly recorded can only be
published or broadcasted I televised I viewed. While in case of an internet, morphing of images,
change of voices and many other technologically advance methods to create serious potential
social disorder can be applied.
By the medium of internet, rumors having a serious potential of creating a serious social
disorder can be spread to trillions of people without any check which is not possible in case of
other mediums.
In case of mediums like print media, television and films, it is broadly not possible to invade
privacy of unwilling persons. While in case of an internet, it is very easy to invade upon the
privacy of any individual and thereby violating his right under Article 21 of the Constitution of
India.
By its very nature, in the mediums like newspaper, magazine, television or a movie, it is not
possible to sexually harass someone, outrage the modesty of anyone, use unacceptable filthy
language and evoke communal frenzy which would lead to serious social disorder. While in the
case of an internet, it is easily possible to do so by a mere click of a button without any
geographical limitations and almost in all cases while ensuring anonymity of the offender.
By the very nature of the medium, the width and reach of internet is manifold as against
newspaper and films. The said mediums have inbuilt limitations i.e. a person will have to buy /
borrow a newspaper and / or will have to go to a theater to watch a movie. For television also
one needs at least a room where a television is placed and can only watch those channels
which he has subscribed and that too only at a time where it is being telecast. While in case of
an internet a person abusing the internet, can commit an offence at any place at the time of his
choice and maintaining his anonymity in almost all cases.
(ix) In case of other mediums, it is impossible to maintain anonymity as a result of which speech
ideal opinions films having serious potential of creating a social disorder never gets generated
since its origin is bound to be known. While in case of an internet mostly its abuse takes place
under the garb of anonymity which can be unveiled only after thorough investigation.
(x) In case of other mediums like newspapers, television or films, the approach is always
institutionalized approach governed by industry specific ethical norms of self conduct. Each
newspaper / magazine / movie production house / TV Channel will have their own
institutionalized policies in house which would generally obviate any possibility of the medium
being abused. As against that use of internet is solely based upon individualistic approach of
each individual without any check, balance or regulatory ethical norms for exercising freedom of
speech and expression under Article 19[ 1] [a].
(xi) In the era limited to print media and cinematograph; or even in case of publication through
airwaves, the chances of abuse of freedom of expression was less due to inherent
infrastructural and logistical constrains. In the case of said mediums, it was almost impossible
for an individual to create and publish an abusive content and make it available to trillions of
people. Whereas, in the present internet age the said infrastructural and logistical constrains
have disappeared as any individual using even a smart mobile phone or a portable computer
device can create and publish abusive material on its own, without seeking help of anyone else
and make it available to trillions of people by just one click."
28. As stated, all the above factors may make a distinction between the print and other media
as opposed to the internet and the legislature may well, therefore, provide for separate offences
so far as free speech over the internet is concerned. There is, therefore, an intelligible differentia
having a rational relation to the object sought to be achieved
- that there can be creation of offences which are applied to free speech over the internet alone
as opposed to other mediums of communication. Thus, an Article 14 challenge has been
repelled by us on this ground later in this judgment. But we do not find anything in the features
outlined by the learned Additional Solicitor General to relax the Court's scrutiny of the curbing of
the content of free speech over the internet. While it may be possible to narrowly draw a Section
creating a new offence, such as Section 69A for instance, relatable only to speech over the
internet, yet the validity of such a law will have to be tested on the touchstone of the tests
already indicated above.
29. In fact, this aspect was considered in Secretary Ministry of Information & Broadcasting,
Government of India v. Cricket Association of Bengal, (1995) 2 SCC 161 in para 37, where the
following question was posed:
"The next question which is required to be answered is whether there is any distinction between
the freedom of the print media and that of the electronic media such as radio and television, and
if so, whether it necessitates more restrictions on the latter media."
This question was answered in para 78 thus:
"There is no doubt that since the airwaves/frequencies are a public property and are also
limited, they have to be used in the best interest of the society and this can be done either by a
central authority by establishing its own broadcasting network or regulating the grant of licences
to other agencies, including the private agencies. What is further, the electronic media is the
most powerful media both because of its audio-visual impact and its widest reach covering the
section of the society where the print media does not reach. The right to use the airwaves and
the content of the programmes, therefore, needs regulation for balancing it and as well as to
prevent monopoly of information and views relayed, which is a potential danger flowing from the
concentration of the right to broadcast/telecast in the hands either of a central agency or of few
private affluent broadcasters. That is why the need to have a central agency representative of all
sections of the society free from control both of the Government and the dominant influential
sections of the society. This is not disputed. But to contend that on that account the restrictions
to be imposed on the right under Article 19(1)(a) should be in addition to those permissible
under Article 19(2) and dictated by the use of public resources in the best interests of the
society at large, is to misconceive both the content of the freedom of speech and expression
and the problems posed by the element of public property in, and the alleged scarcity of, the
frequencies as well as by the wider reach of the media. If the right to freedom of speech and
expression includes the right to disseminate information to as wide a section of the population
as is possible, the access which enables the right to be so exercised is also an integral part of
the said right. The wider range of circulation of information or its greater impact cannot restrict
the content of the right nor can it justify its denial. The virtues of the electronic media cannot
become its enemies. It may warrant a greater regulation over licensing and control and vigilance
on the content of the programme telecast. However, this control can only be exercised within the
framework of Article 19(2) and the dictates of public interests. To plead for other grounds is to
plead for unconstitutional measures. It is further difficult to appreciate such contention on the
part of the Government in this country when they have a complete control over the frequencies
and the content of the programme to be telecast. They control the sole agency of telecasting.
They are also armed with the provisions of Article 19(2) and the powers of pre-censorship under
the Cinematograph Act and Rules. The only limitation on the said right is, therefore, the
limitation of resources and the need to use them for the benefit of all. When, however, there are
surplus or unlimited resources and the public interests so demand or in any case do not prevent
telecasting, the validity of the argument based on limitation of resources disappears. It is true
that to own a frequency for the purposes of broadcasting is a costly affair and even when there
are surplus or unlimited frequencies, only the affluent few will own them and will be in a position
to use it to subserve their own interest by manipulating news and views. That also poses a
danger to the freedom of speech and expression of the have-nots by denying them the truthful
information on all sides of an issue which is so necessary to form a sound view on any subject.
That is why the doctrine of fairness has been evolved in the US in the context of the private
broadcasters licensed to share the limited frequencies with the central agency like the FCC to
regulate the programming. But this phenomenon occurs even in the case of the print media of
all the countries. Hence the body like the Press Council of India which is empowered to enforce,
however imperfectly, the right to reply. The print media further enjoys as in our country, freedom
from pre-censorship unlike the electronic media."
Public Order
30. In Article 19(2) (as it originally stood) this sub-head was conspicuously absent. Because of
its absence, challenges made to an order made under Section 7 of the Punjab Maintenance of
Public Order Act and to an order made under Section 9 (1)(a) of the Madras Maintenance of
Public Order Act were allowed in two early judgments by this Court. Thus in Romesh Thappar v.
State of Madras, [1950] S.C.R. 594, this Court held that an order made under Section 9(1)(a) of
the Madras Maintenance of Public Order Act (XXIII of 1949) was unconstitutional and void in
that it could not be justified as a measure connected with security of the State. While dealing
with the expression "public order", this Court held that "public order" is an expression which
signifies a state of tranquility which prevails amongst the members of a political society as a
result of the internal regulations enforced by the Government which they have established.
31. Similarly, in Brij Bhushan & Anr. v. State of Delhi, [1950] S.C.R. 605, an order made under
Section 7 of the East Punjab Public Safety Act, 1949, was held to be unconstitutional and void
for the self-same reason.
32. As an aftermath of these judgments, the Constitution First Amendment added the words
"public order" to Article 19(2).
33. In Superintendent, Central Prison, Fatehgarh v. Ram Manohar Lohia, [1960] 2 S.C.R. 821,
this Court held that public order is synonymous with public safety and tranquility; it is the
absence of disorder involving breaches of local significance in contradistinction to national
upheavals, such as revolution, civil strife, war, affecting the security of the State. This definition
was further refined in Dr. Ram Manohar Lohia v. State of Bihar & Ors., [1966] 1 S.C.R. 709,
where this Court held:
"It will thus appear that just as "public order" in the rulings of this Court (earlier cited) was said to
comprehend disorders of less gravity than those affecting "security of State", "law and order"
also comprehends disorders of less gravity than those affecting "public order". One has to
imagine three concentric circles. Law and order represents the largest circle within which is the
next circle representing public order and the smallest circle represents security of State. It is
then easy to see that an act may affect law and order but not public order just as an act may
affect public order but not security of the State." (at page 746)
34. In Arun Ghosh v. State of West Bengal, [1970] 3 S.C.R. 288, Ram Manohar Lohia's case
was referred to with approval in the following terms:
"In Dr. Ram Manohar Lohia's case this Court pointed out the difference between maintenance of
law and order and its disturbance and the maintenance of public order and its disturbance.
Public order was said to embrace more of the community than law and order. Public order is the
even tempo of the life of the community taking the country as a whole or even a specified
locality. Disturbance of public order is to be distinguished, from acts directed against individuals
which do not disturb the society to the extent of causing a general disturbance of public
tranquility. It is the degree of disturbance and its effect upon the life of the community in a
locality which determines whether the disturbance amounts only to a breach of law and order.
Take for instance, a man stabs another. People may be shocked and even disturbed, but the life
of the community keeps moving at an even tempo, however much one may dislike the act. Take
another case of a town where there is communal tension. A man stabs a member of the other
community. This is an act of a very different sort. Its implications are deeper and it affects the
even tempo of life and public order is jeopardized because the repercussions of the act
embrace large Sections of the community and incite them to make further breaches of the law
and order and to subvert the public order. An act by itself is not determinant of its own gravity. In
its quality it may not differ from another but in its potentiality it may be very different. Take the
case of assault on girls. A guest at a hotel may kiss or make advances to half a dozen chamber
maids. He may annoy them and also the management but he does not cause disturbance of
public order. He may even have a fracas with the friends of one of the girls but even then it
would be a case of breach of law and order only. Take another case of a man who molests
women in lonely places. As a result of his activities girls going to colleges and schools are in
constant danger and fear. Women going for their ordinary business are afraid of being waylaid
and assaulted. The activity of this man in its essential quality is not different from the act of the
other man but in its potentiality and in its effect upon the public tranquility there is a vast
difference. The act of the man who molests the girls in lonely places causes a disturbance in the
even tempo of living which is the first requirement of public order. He disturbs the society and
the community. His act makes all the women apprehensive of their honour and he can be said to
be causing disturbance of public order and not merely committing individual actions which may
be taken note of by the criminal prosecution agencies. It means therefore that the question
whether a man has only committed a breach of law and order or has acted in a manner likely to
cause a disturbance of the public order is a question of degree and the extent of the reach of
the act upon the society. The French distinguish law and order and public order by designating
the latter as order publique. The latter expression has been recognised as meaning something
more than ordinary maintenance of law and order. Justice Ramaswami in Writ Petition No. 179
of 1968 drew a line of demarcation between the serious and aggravated forms of breaches of
public order which affect the community or endanger the public interest at large from minor
breaches of peace which do not affect the public at large. He drew an analogy between public
and private crimes. The analogy is useful but not to be pushed too far. A large number of acts
directed against persons or individuals may total up into a breach of public order. In Dr. Ram
Manohar Lohia's case examples were given by Sarkar, and Hidayatullah, JJ. They show how
similar acts in different contexts affect differently law and order on the one hand and public order
on the other. It is always a question of degree of the harm and its effect upon the community.
The question to ask is: Does it lead to disturbance of the current of life of the community so as
to amount to a disturbance of the public order or does it affect merely an individual leaving the
tranquility of the society undisturbed? This question has to be faced in every case on facts.
There is no formula by which one case can be distinguished from another." (at pages 290 and
291).
35. This decision lays down the test that has to be formulated in all these cases. We have to ask
ourselves the question: does a particular act lead to disturbance of the current life of the
community or does it merely affect an individual leaving the tranquility of society undisturbed?
Going by this test, it is clear that Section 66A is intended to punish any person who uses the
internet to disseminate any information that falls within the sub-clauses of Section 66A. It will be
immediately noticed that the recipient of the written word that is sent by the person who is
accused of the offence is not of any importance so far as this Section is concerned. (Save and
except where under sub-clause (c) the addressee or recipient is deceived or misled about the
origin of a particular message.) It is clear, therefore, that the information that is disseminated
may be to one individual or several individuals. The Section makes no distinction between mass
dissemination and dissemination to one person. Further, the Section does not require that such
message should have a clear tendency to disrupt public order. Such message need not have
any potential which could disturb the community at large. The nexus between the message and
action that may be taken based on the message is conspicuously absent - there is no ingredient
in this offence of inciting anybody to do anything which a reasonable man would then say would
have the tendency of being an immediate threat to public safety or tranquility. On all these
counts, it is clear that the Section has no proximate relationship to public order whatsoever. The
example of a guest at a hotel `annoying' girls is telling - this Court has held that mere
`annoyance' need not cause disturbance of public order. Under Section 66A, the offence is
complete by sending a message for the purpose of causing annoyance, either `persistently' or
otherwise without in any manner impacting public order.
Clear and present danger - tendency to affect.
36. It will be remembered that Justice Holmes in Schenck v. United States, 63 L. Ed. 470
enunciated the clear and present danger test as follows:
"...The most stringent protection of free speech would not protect a man in falsely shouting fire
in a theatre and causing a panic. It does not even protect a man from an injunction against
uttering words that may have all the effect of force. Gompers v. Buck's Stove & Range Co., 221
U. S. 418, 439, 31 Sup. Ct. 492, 55 L. ed. 797, 34 L. R. A. (N. S.) 874. The question in every
case is whether the words used are used in such circumstances and are of such a nature as to
create a clear and present danger that they will bring about the substantive evils that Congress
has a right to prevent. It is a question of proximity and degree." (At page 473, 474)
37. This was further refined in Abrams v. Unites States 250 U.S. 616 (1919), this time in a
Holmesian dissent, to be clear and imminent danger. However, in most of the subsequent
judgments of the U.S. Supreme Court, the test has been understood to mean to be "clear and
present danger". The test of "clear and present danger" has been used by the U.S. Supreme
Court in many varying situations and has been adjusted according to varying fact situations. It
appears to have been repeatedly applied, see- Terminiello v. City of Chicago 93 L. Ed. 1131
(1949) at page 1134-1135, Brandenburg v. Ohio 23 L. Ed. 2d 430 (1969) at 434-435 & 436,
Virginia v. Black 155 L. Ed. 2d 535 (2003) at page 551, 552 and 553[4].
38. We have echoes of it in our law as well S. Rangarajan v. P. Jagjivan & Ors., (1989) 2 SCC
574 at paragraph 45:
"45. The problem of defining the area of freedom of expression when it appears to conflict with
the various social interests enumerated under Article 19(2) may briefly be touched upon here.
There does indeed have to be a compromise between the interest of freedom of expression and
special interests. But we cannot simply balance the two interests as if they are of equal weight.
Our commitment of freedom of expression demands that it cannot be suppressed unless the
situations created by allowing the freedom are pressing and the community interest is
endangered. The anticipated danger should not be remote, conjectural or far-fetched. It should
have proximate and direct nexus with the expression. The expression of thought should be
intrinsically dangerous to the public interest. In other words, the expression should be
inseparably locked up with the action contemplated like the equivalent of a "spark in a powder
keg".
39. This Court has used the expression "tendency" to a particular act. Thus, in State of Bihar v.
Shailabala Devi, [1952] S.C.R. 654, an early decision of this Court said that an article, in order
to be banned must have a tendency to excite persons to acts of violence (at page 662-663). The
test laid down in the said decision was that the article should be considered as a whole in a fair
free liberal spirit and then it must be decided what effect it would have on the mind of a
reasonable reader. (at pages 664-665)
40. In Ramji Lal Modi v. The State of U.P., [1957] S.C.R. 860 at page 867, this court upheld
Section 295A of the Indian Penal Code only because it was read down to mean that aggravated
forms of insults to religion must have a tendency to disrupt public order. Similarly, in Kedar Nath
Singh v. State of Bihar, 1962 Supp. (2) S.C.R. 769, Section 124A of the Indian Penal Code was
upheld by construing it narrowly and stating that the offence would only be complete if the words
complained of have a tendency of creating public disorder by violence. It was added that merely
creating disaffection or creating feelings of enmity in certain people was not good enough or
else it would violate the fundamental right of free speech under Article 19(1)(a). Again, in Dr.
Ramesh Yeshwant Prabhoo v. Prabhakar Kashinath Kunte & Ors., 1996 (1) SCC 130, Section
123 (3A) of the Representation of People Act was upheld only if the enmity or hatred that was
spoken about in the Section would tend to create immediate public disorder and not otherwise.
41. Viewed at either by the standpoint of the clear and present danger test or the tendency to
create public disorder, Section 66A would not pass muster as it has no element of any tendency
to create public disorder which ought to be an essential ingredient of the offence which it
creates.
Defamation
42. Defamation is defined in Section 499 of the Penal Code as follows:
"499. Defamation.-Whoever, by words either spoken or intended to be read, or by signs or by

visible representations, makes or publishes any imputation concerning any person intending to
harm, or knowing or having reason to believe that such imputation will harm, the reputation of
such person, is said, except in the cases hereinafter excepted, to defame that person.
Explanation 1.-It may amount to defamation to impute anything to a deceased person, if the
imputation would harm the reputation of that person if living, and is intended to be hurtful to the
feelings of his family or other near relatives.
Explanation 2.-It may amount to defamation to make an imputation concerning a company or an

association or collection of persons as such.
Explanation 3.-An imputation in the form of an alternative or expressed ironically, may amount to
defamation.
Explanation 4.-No imputation is said to harm a person's reputation, unless that imputation
directly or indirectly, in the estimation of others, lowers the moral or intellectual character of that
person, or lowers the character of that person in respect of his caste or of his calling, or lowers
the credit of that person, or causes it to be believed that the body of that person is in a
loathsome state, or in a state generally considered as disgraceful."
43. It will be noticed that for something to be defamatory, injury to reputation is a basic
ingredient. Section 66A does not concern itself with injury to reputation. Something may be
grossly offensive and may annoy or be inconvenient to somebody without at all affecting his
reputation. It is clear therefore that the Section is not aimed at defamatory statements at all.
Incitement to an offence:
44. Equally, Section 66A has no proximate connection with incitement to commit an offence.
Firstly, the information disseminated over the internet need not be information which "incites"
anybody at all. Written words may be sent that may be purely in the realm of "discussion" or
"advocacy" of a "particular point of view". Further, the mere causing of annoyance,
inconvenience, danger etc., or being grossly offensive or having a menacing character are not
offences under the Penal Code at all. They may be ingredients of certain offences under the
Penal Code but are not offences in themselves. For these reasons, Section 66A has nothing to
do with "incitement to an offence". As Section 66A severely curtails information that may be sent
on the internet based on whether it is grossly offensive, annoying, inconvenient, etc. and being
unrelated to any of the eight subject matters under Article 19(2) must, therefore, fall foul of
Article 19(1)(a), and not being saved under Article 19(2), is declared as unconstitutional.
Decency or Morality
45. This Court in Ranjit Udeshi v. State of Maharashtra [1965] 1 S.C.R. 65 took a rather
restrictive view of what would pass muster as not being obscene. The Court followed the test
laid down in the old English judgment in Hicklin's case which was whether the tendency of the
matter charged as obscene is to deprave and corrupt those whose minds are open to such
immoral influences and into whose hands a publication of this sort may fall. Great strides have
been made since this decision in the UK, United States as well as in our country. Thus, in
Director General, Directorate General of Doordarshan v. Anand Patwardhan, 2006 (8) SCC 433,
this Court noticed the law in the United States and said that a material may be regarded as
obscene if the average person applying contemporary community standards would find that the
subject matter taken as a whole appeals to the prurient interest and that taken as a whole it
otherwise lacks serious literary artistic, political, educational or scientific value (see Para
31).
46. In a recent judgment of this Court, Aveek Sarkar v. State of West Bengal, 2014 (4) SCC 257,
this Court referred to English, U.S. and Canadian judgments and moved away from the Hicklin
test and applied the contemporary community standards test.
47. What has been said with regard to public order and incitement to an offence equally applies
here. Section 66A cannot possibly be said to create an offence which falls within the expression
'decency' or 'morality' in that what may be grossly offensive or annoying under the Section need
not be obscene at all - in fact the word 'obscene' is conspicuous by its absence in Section 66A.
48. However, the learned Additional Solicitor General asked us to read into Section 66A each of
the subject matters contained in Article 19(2) in order to save the constitutionality of the
provision. We are afraid that such an exercise is not possible for the simple reason that when
the legislature intended to do so, it provided for some of the subject matters contained in Article
19(2) in Section 69A. We would be doing complete violence to the language of Section 66A if
we were to read into it something that was never intended to be read into it. Further, he argued
that the statute should be made workable, and the following should be read into Section 66A:
"(i) Information which would appear highly abusive, insulting, pejorative, offensive by reasonable
person in general, judged by the standards of an open and just multi-caste, multi-religious, multi
racial society;
Director of Public Prosecutions v. Collins - (2006) 1 WLR 2223 @ para 9 and Connolly v.
Director of Public Prosecutions reported in [2008] 1 W.L.R. 276/2007 [1] All ER 1012 House of
Lords Select Committee 1st Report of Session 2014-2015 on Communications titled as "Social
Media And Criminal Offences" @ pg 260 of compilation of judgments Vol I Part B
(ii) Information which is directed to incite or can produce imminent lawless action Brandenburg
v. Ohio 395 U.S. 444 (1969);
(iii) Information which may constitute credible threats of violence to the person or damage;
(iv) Information which stirs the public to anger, invites violent disputes brings about condition of
violent unrest and disturbances;
Terminiello v. Chicago 337 US 1 (1949)
(v) Information which advocates or teaches the duty, necessity or proprietary of violence as a
means of accomplishing political, social or religious reform and/or justifies commissioning of
violent acts with an intent to exemplify glorify such violent means to accomplish political, social,
economical or religious reforms [Whitney vs. California 274 US 357];
(vi) Information which contains fighting or abusive material;
Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942)
(vii) Information which promotes hate speech i.e. Information which propagates hatred towards
individual or a groups, on the basis of race, religion, religion, casteism, ethnicity, Information
which is intended to show the supremacy of one particular religion/race/caste by making
disparaging, abusive and/or highly inflammatory remarks against religion/race/caste.
Information depicting religious deities, holy persons, holy symbols, holy books which are created
to insult or to show contempt or lack of reverence for such religious deities, holy persons, holy
symbols, holy books or towards something which is considered sacred or inviolable.
(viii) Satirical or iconoclastic cartoon and caricature which fails the test laid down in Hustler
Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell 485 U.S. 46 (1988)
(ix) Information which glorifies terrorism and use of drugs;
(x) Information which infringes right of privacy of the others and includes acts of cyber bullying,
harassment or stalking.
(xi) Information which is obscene and has the tendency to arouse feeling or revealing an overt
sexual desire and should be suggestive of deprave mind and designed to excite sexual passion
in persons who are likely to see it.
Aveek Sarkar and Anr. vs. State of West Bengal and Ors. (2014) 4 SCC 257.
(xii) Context and background test of obscenity. Information which is posted in such a context or
background which has a consequential effect of outraging the modesty of the pictured individual.
Aveek Sarkar and Anr. vs. State of West Bengal and Ors. (2014) 4 SCC 257."
49. What the learned Additional Solicitor General is asking us to do is not to read down Section
66A - he is asking for a wholesale substitution of the provision which is obviously not possible.
Vagueness
50. Counsel for the petitioners argued that the language used in Section 66A is so vague that
neither would an accused person be put on notice as to what exactly is the offence which has
been committed nor would the authorities administering the Section be clear as to on which side
of a clearly drawn line a particular communication will fall.
51. We were given Collin's dictionary, which defined most of the terms used in Section 66A, as
follows:
"Offensive:-
Unpleasant or disgusting, as to the senses Causing anger or annoyance; insulting For the
purpose of attack rather than defence.
Menace:-
To threaten with violence, danger, etc. A threat of the act of threatening Something menacing; a
source of danger A nuisance Annoy:-
To irritate or displease To harass with repeated attacks Annoyance The feeling of being
annoyed The act of annoying.
Inconvenience The state of quality of being inconvenient Something inconvenient; a hindrance,

trouble, or difficulty Danger:-
The state of being vulnerable to injury, loss, or evil risk A person or a thing that may cause injury
pain etc. Obstruct:-
To block (a road a passageway, etc.) with an obstacle To make (progress or activity) difficult.
To impede or block a clear view of.
Obstruction:- a person or a thing that obstructs.
Insult:-
To treat, mention, or speak to rudely; offend; affront To assault; attack An offensive or

contemptuous remark or action; affront; slight A person or thing producing the effect of an
affront = some television is an insult to intelligence An injury or trauma."
52. The U.S. Supreme Court has repeatedly held in a series of judgments that where no
reasonable standards are laid down to define guilt in a Section which creates an offence, and
where no clear guidance is given to either law abiding citizens or to authorities and courts, a
Section which creates an offence and which is vague must be struck down as being arbitrary
and unreasonable. Thus, in Musser v. Utah, 92 L. Ed. 562, a Utah statute which outlawed
conspiracy to commit acts injurious to public morals was struck down.
53. In Winters v. People of State of New York, 92 L. Ed. 840, a New York Penal Law read as
follows:-
"1141. Obscene prints and articles
1. A person......who,
2. Prints, utters, publishes, sells, lends, gives away, distributes or shows, or has in his
possession with intent to sell, lend, give away, distribute or show, or otherwise offers for sale,
loan, gift or distribution, any book, pamphlet, magazine, newspaper or other printed paper
devoted to the publication, and principally made up of criminal news, police reports, or accounts
of criminal deeds, or pictures, or stories of deeds of bloodshed, lust or
crime;.....................................................
'Is guilty of a misdemeanor, .....'" (at page 846) The court in striking down the said statute held:
"The impossibility of defining the precise line between permissible uncertainty in statutes caused
by describing crimes by words well understood through long use in the criminal law - obscene,
lewd, lascivious, filthy, indecent or disgusting-and the unconstitutional vagueness that leaves a
person uncertain as to the kind of prohibited conduct-massing stories to incite crime-has
resulted in three arguments of this case in this Court. The legislative bodies in draftsmanship
obviously have the same difficulty as do the judicial in interpretation. Nevertheless despite the
difficulties, courts must do their best to determine whether or not the vagueness is of such a
character 'that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning.' Connally v.
General Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391, 46 S.Ct. 126, 127, 70 L.Ed. 322. The entire text of the
statute or the subjects dealt with may furnish an adequate standard. The present case as to a
vague statute abridging free speech involves the circulation of only vulgar magazines. The next
may call for decision as to free expression of political views in the light of a statute intended to
punish subversive activities.
The subsection of the New York Penal Law, as now interpreted by the Court of Appeals prohibits
distribution of a magazine principally made up of criminal news or stories of deeds of bloodshed,
or lust, so massed as to become vehicles for inciting violent and depraved crimes against the
person. But even considering the gloss put upon the literal meaning by the Court of Appeals'
restriction of the statute to collections of stories 'so massed as to become vehicles for inciting
violent and depraved crimes against the person * * * not necessarily * * * sexual passion,' we
find the specification of publications, prohibited from distribution, too uncertain and indefinite to
justify the conviction of this petitioner. Even though all detective tales and treatises on
criminology are not forbidden, and though publications made up of criminal deeds not
characterized by bloodshed or lust are omitted from the interpretation of the Court of Appeals,
we think fair use of collections of pictures and stories would be interdicted because of the utter
impossibility of the actor or the trier to know where this new standard of guilt would draw the line
between the allowable and the forbidden publications. No intent or purpose is required- no
indecency or obscenity in any sense heretofore known to the law. 'So massed as to incite to
crime' can become meaningful only by concrete instances. This one example is not enough.
The clause proposes to punish the printing and circulation of publications that courts or juries
may think influence generally persons to commit crime of violence against the person. No
conspiracy to commit a crime is required. See Musser v. State of Utah, 68 S.Ct. 397, this Term.
It is not an effective notice of new crime. The clause has no technical or common law meaning.
Nor can light as to the meaning be gained from the section as a whole or the Article of the Penal
Law under which it appears. As said in the Cohen Grocery Co. case, supra, 255 U.S. at page
89, 41 S.Ct. at page 300, 65 L.Ed. 516, 14 A.L.R. 1045:
'It leaves open, therefore, the widest conceivable inquiry, the scope of which no one can foresee
and the result of which no one can foreshadow or adequately guard against.' The statute as
construed by the Court of Appeals does not limit punishment to the indecent and obscene, as
formerly understood. When stories of deeds of bloodshed, such as many in the accused
magazines, are massed so as to incite to violent crimes, the statute is violated. it does not seem
to us that an honest distributor of publications could know when he might be held to have
ignored such a prohibition. Collections of tales of war horrors, otherwise unexceptionable, might
well be found to be 'massed' so as to become 'vehicles for inciting violent and depraved crimes.'
Where a statute is so vague as to make criminal an innocent act, a conviction under it cannot be
sustained. Herndon v. Lowry, 301 U.S. 242, 259, 57 S.Ct. 732, 739, 81 L.Ed. 1066." (at page
851-852)
54. In Burstyn v. Wilson, 96 L. Ed. 1098, sacrilegious writings and utterances were outlawed.
Here again, the U.S. Supreme Court stepped in to strike down the offending Section stating:
"It is not a sufficient answer to say that 'sacrilegious' is definite, because all subjects that in any
way might be interpreted as offending the religious beliefs of any one of the 300 sects of the
United States are banned in New York. To allow such vague, undefinable powers of censorship
to be exercised is bound to have stultifying consequences on the creative process of literature
and art-for the films are derived largely from literature. History does not encourage reliance on
the wisdom and moderation of the censor as a safeguard in the exercise of such drastic power
over the minds of men. We not only do not know but cannot know what is condemnable by
'sacrilegious.' And if we cannot tell, how are those to be governed by the statute to tell? (at page
1121)
55. In City of Chicago v. Morales et al, 527 U.S. 41 (1999), a Chicago Gang Congregation
Ordinance prohibited criminal street gang members from loitering with one another or with other
persons in any public place for no apparent purpose. The Court referred to an earlier judgment
in United States v. Reese 92 U.S. 214 (1875) at 221 in which it was stated that the Constitution
does not permit a legislature to set a net large enough to catch all possible offenders and leave
it to the Court to step in and say who could be rightfully detained and who should be set at
liberty. It was held that the broad sweep of the Ordinance violated the requirement that a
legislature needs to meet: to establish minimum guidelines to govern law enforcement. As the
impugned Ordinance did not have any such guidelines, a substantial amount of innocent
conduct would also be brought within its net, leading to its unconstitutionality.
56. It was further held that a penal law is void for vagueness if it fails to define the criminal
offence with sufficient definiteness. Ordinary people should be able to understand what conduct
is prohibited and what is permitted. Also, those who administer the law must know what offence
has been committed so that arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement of the law does not take
place.
57. Similarly, in Grayned v. City of Rockford, 33 L.Ed. 2d. 222, the State of Illinois provided in an
anti noise ordinance as follows:
"'(N)o person, while on public or private grounds adjacent to any building in which a school or
any class thereof is in session, shall willfully make or assist in the making of any noise or
diversion which disturbs or tends to disturb the peace or good order of such school session or
class thereof. . . .' Code of Ordinances, c. 28, 19.2(a)."
The law on the subject of vagueness was clearly stated thus:
"It is a basic principle of due process that an enactment is void for vagueness if its prohibitions
are not clearly defined. Vague laws offend several important values. First, because we assume
that man is free to steer between lawful and unlawful conduct, we insist that laws give the
person of ordinary intelligence a reasonable opportunity to know what is prohibited, so that he
may act accordingly. Vague laws may trap the innocent by not providing fair warning. Second, if
arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement is to be prevented, laws must provide explicit
standards for those who apply them. A vague law impermissibly delegates basic policy matters
to policemen, judges, and juries for resolution on an ad hoc and subjective basis, with the
attendant dangers of arbitrary and discriminatory application. Third, but related, where a vague
statute 'abut(s) upon sensitive areas of basic First Amendment freedoms, it 'operates to inhibit
the exercise of (those) freedoms.' Uncertain meanings inevitably lead citizens to "steer far wider
of the unlawful zone' . . . than if the boundaries of the forbidden areas were clearly marked.'"(at
page 227-228)
58. The anti noise ordinance was upheld on facts in that case because it fixed the time at which
noise disrupts school activity - while the school is in session - and at a fixed place - 'adjacent' to
the school.
59. Secondly, there had to be demonstrated a causality between disturbance that occurs and
the noise or diversion. Thirdly, acts have to be willfully done. It is important to notice that the
Supreme Court specifically held that "undesirables" or their "annoying conduct" may not be
punished. It is only on these limited grounds that the said Ordinance was considered not to be
impermissibly vague.
60. In Reno, Attorney General of the United States, et al. v. American Civil Liberties Union et al.,
521 U.S. 844 (1997), two provisions of the Communications Decency Act of 1996 which sought
to protect minors from harmful material on the internet were adjudged unconstitutional. This
judgment is a little important for two basic reasons - that it deals with a penal offence created for
persons who use the internet as also for the reason that the statute which was adjudged
unconstitutional uses the expression "patently offensive" which comes extremely close to the
expression "grossly offensive" used by the impugned Section 66A. Section 223(d), which was
adjudged unconstitutional, is set out hereinbelow:-
"223 (d) Whoever-
"(1) in interstate or foreign communications knowingly-
(A) uses an interactive computer service to send to a specific person or persons under 18 years
of age, or (B) uses any interactive computer service to display in a manner available to a person
under 18 years of age, "any comment, request, suggestion, proposal, image, or other
communication that, in context, depicts or describes, in terms patently offensive as measured by
contemporary community standards, sexual or excretory activities or organs, regardless of
whether the user of such service placed the call or initiated the communication; or (2) knowingly
permits any telecommunications facility under such person's control to be used for an activity
prohibited by paragraph (1) with the intent that it be used for such activity, shall be fined under
Title 18, or imprisoned not more than two years, or both." (at page 860) Interestingly, the District
Court Judge writing of the internet said:
"[i]t is no exaggeration to conclude that the Internet has achieved, and continues to achieve, the
most participatory marketplace of mass speech that this country - and indeed the world - as yet
seen. The plaintiffs in these actions correctly describe the 'democratizing' effects of Internet
communication: individual citizens of limited means can speak to a worldwide audience on
issues of concern to them. Federalists and Anti- federalists may debate the structure of their
government nightly, but these debates occur in newsgroups or chat rooms rather than in
pamphlets. Modern- day Luthers still post their theses, but to electronic bulletins boards rather
than the door of the Wittenberg Schlosskirche. More mundane (but from a constitutional
perspective, equally important) dialogue occurs between aspiring artists, or French cooks, or
dog lovers, or fly fishermen." 929 F. Supp. At 881. (at page 425)
61. The Supreme Court held that the impugned statute lacked the precision that the first
amendment required when a statute regulates the content of speech. In order to deny minors
access to potentially harmful speech, the impugned Act effectively suppresses a large amount
of speech that adults have a constitutional right to receive and to address to one another.
62. Such a burden on adult speech is unacceptable if less restrictive alternatives would be as
effective in achieving the legitimate purpose that the statute was enacted to serve. It was held
that the general undefined term "patently offensive" covers large amounts of non-pornographic
material with serious educational or other value and was both vague and over broad.
It was, thus, held that the impugned statute was not narrowly tailored and would fall foul of the
first amendment.
63. In Federal Communications Commission v. Fox Television Stations, 132 S.Ct. 2307, it was
held:
"A fundamental principle in our legal system is that laws which regulate persons or entities must
give fair notice of conduct that is forbidden or required. See Connally v. General Constr. Co.,
269 U. S. 385, 391 (1926) ("[A] statute which either forbids or requires the doing of an act in
terms so vague that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and
differ as to its application, violates the first essential of due process of law"); Papachristou v.
Jacksonville, 405 U. S. 156, 162 (1972) ("Living under a rule of law entails various suppositions,
one of which is that '[all persons] are entitled to be informed as to what the State commands or
forbids'" (quoting Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U. S. 451, 453 (1939) (alteration in original))).
This requirement of clarity in regulation is essential to the protections provided by the Due
Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. See United States v. Williams, 553 U. S. 285, 304
(2008). It requires the invalidation of laws that are impermissibly vague. A conviction or
punishment fails to comply with due process if the statute or regulation under which it is
obtained "fails to provide a person of ordinary intelligence fair notice of what is prohibited, or is
so standardless that it authorizes or encourages seriously discriminatory enforcement." Ibid. As
this Court has explained, a regulation is not vague because it may at times be difficult to prove
an incriminating fact but rather because it is unclear as to what fact must be proved. See id., at
306.
Even when speech is not at issue, the void for vagueness doctrine addresses at least two
connected but discrete due process concerns: first, that regulated parties should know what is
required of them so they may act accordingly; second, precision and guidance are necessary so
that those enforcing the law do not act in an arbitrary or discriminatory way. See Grayned v. City
of Rockford, 408 U. S. 104, 108-109 (1972). When speech is involved, rigorous adherence to
those requirements is necessary to ensure that ambiguity does not chill protected speech."(at
page 2317)
64. Coming to this Court's judgments, in State of Madhya Pradesh v. Baldeo Prasad, [1961] 1
S.C.R. 970 an inclusive definition of the word "goonda" was held to be vague and the offence
created by Section 4A of the Goondas Act was, therefore, violative of Article 19(1)(d) and (e) of
the Constitution. It was stated:
"Incidentally it would also be relevant to point out that the definition of the word "goonda" affords
no assistance in deciding which citizen can be put under that category. It is an inclusive
definition and it does not indicate which tests have to be applied in deciding whether a person
falls in the first part of the definition. Recourse to the dictionary meaning of the word would
hardly be of any assistance in this matter. After all it must be borne in mind that the Act
authorises the District Magistrate to deprive a citizen of his fundamental right under Art. 19(1)(d)
and (e), and though the object of the Act and its purpose would undoubtedly attract the
provisions of Art. 19(5) care must always be taken in passing such acts that they provide
sufficient safeguards against casual, capricious or even malicious exercise of the powers
conferred by them. It is well known that the relevant provisions of the Act are initially put in
motion against a person at a lower level than the District magistrate, and so it is always
necessary that sufficient safeguards should be provided by the Act to protect the fundamental
rights of innocent citizens and to save them from unnecessary harassment. That is why we think
the definition of the word "goonda" should have given necessary assistance to the District
Magistrate in deciding whether a particular citizen falls under the category of goonda or not; that
is another infirmity in the Act. As we have already pointed out s. 4-A suffers from the same
infirmities as s. 4.
Having regard to the two infirmities in Sections 4, 4-A respectively we do not think it would be
possible to accede to the argument of the Learned Advocate-General that the operative portion
of the Act can fall under Art. 19(5) of the Constitution. The person against whom action can be
taken under the Act is not entitled to know the source of the information received by the District
Magistrate; he is only told about his prejudicial activities on which the satisfaction of the District
Magistrate is based that action should be taken against him under s.4 or s. 4-A. In such a case
it is absolutely essential that the Act must clearly indicate by a proper definition or otherwise
when and under what circumstances a person can be called a goonda, and it must impose an
obligation on the District Magistrate to apply his mind to the question as to whether the person
against whom complaints are received is such a goonda or not. It has been urged before us that
such an obligation is implicit in Sections 4 and 4-A. We are, however, not impressed by this
argument. Where a statute empowers the specified authorities to take preventive action against
the citizens it is essential that it should expressly make it a part of the duty of the said authorities
to satisfy themselves about the existence of what the statute regards as conditions precedent to
the exercise of the said authority. If the statute is silent in respect of one of such conditions
precedent it undoubtedly constitutes a serious infirmity which would inevitably take it out of the
provisions of Art. 19(5). The result of this infirmity is that it has left to the unguided and
unfettered discretion of the authority concerned to treat any citizen as a goonda. In other words,
the restrictions which it allows to be imposed on the exercise of the fundamental right of a
citizen guaranteed by Art. 19(1)(d) and (e) must in the circumstances be held to be
unreasonable. That is the view taken by the High court and we see no reason to differ from it."
(at pages 979, 980)
65. At one time this Court seemed to suggest that the doctrine of vagueness was no part of the
Constitutional Law of India. That was dispelled in no uncertain terms in K.A. Abbas v. The Union
of India & Another, [1971] 2 S.C.R. 446:
"This brings us to the manner of the exercise of control and restriction by the directions. Here
the argument is that most of the regulations are vague and further that they leave no scope for
the exercise of creative genius in the field of art. This poses the first question before us whether
the 'void for vagueness' doctrine is applicable. Reliance in this connection is placed on
Municipal Committee Amritsar and Anr. v. The State of Rajasthan . In that case a Division Bench
of this Court lays down that an Indian Act cannot be declared invalid on the ground that it
violates the due process clause or that it is vague......" (at page 469) "These observations which
are clearly obiter are apt to be too generally applied and need to be explained. While it is true
that the principles evolved by the Supreme Court of the United States of America in the
application of the Fourteenth Amendment were eschewed in our Constitution and instead the
limits of restrictions on each fundamental right were indicated in the clauses that follow the first
clause of the nineteenth article, it cannot be said as an absolute principle that no law will be
considered bad for sheer vagueness. There is ample authority for the proposition that a law
affecting fundamental rights may be so considered. A very pertinent example is to be found in
State of Madhya Pradesh and Anr. v. Baldeo Prasad, 1961 (1) SCR 970 where the Central
Provinces and Berar Goondas Act 1946 was declared void for uncertainty. The condition for the
application of Sections 4 and 4A was that the person sought to be proceeded against must be a
goonda but the definition of goonda in the Act indicated no tests for deciding which person fell
within the definition. The provisions were therefore held to be uncertain and vague.
The real rule is that if a law is vague or appears to be so, the court must try to construe it, as far
as may be, and language permitting, the construction sought to be placed on it, must be in
accordance with the intention of the legislature. Thus if the law is open to diverse construction,
that construction which accords best with the intention of the legislature and advances the
purpose of legislation, is to be preferred. Where however the law admits of no such construction
and the persons applying it are in a boundless sea of uncertainty and the law prima facie takes
away a guaranteed freedom, the law must be held to offend the Constitution as was done in the
case of the Goonda Act. This is not application of the doctrine of due process. The invalidity
arises from the probability of the misuse of the law to the detriment of the individual. If possible,
the Court instead of striking down the law may itself draw the line of demarcation where
possible but this effort should be sparingly made and only in the clearest of cases." (at pages
470, 471)
66. Similarly, in Harakchand Ratanchand Banthia & Ors. v. Union of India & Ors., 1969 (2) SCC
166, Section 27 of the Gold Control Act was struck down on the ground that the conditions
imposed by it for the grant of renewal of licences are uncertain, vague and unintelligible. The
Court held:
"21. We now come to Section 27 of the Act which relates to licensing of dealers. It was stated
on behalf of the petitioners that the conditions imposed by sub-section (6) of Section 27 for the
grant or renewal of licences are uncertain, vague and unintelligible and consequently wide and
unfettered power was conferred upon the statutory authorities in the matter of grant or renewal
of licence. In our opinion this contention is well founded and must be accepted as correct.
Section 27(6)(a) states that in the matter of issue or renewal of licences the Administrator shall
have regard to "the number of dealers existing in the region in which the applicant intends to
carry on business as a dealer". But the word "region" is nowhere defined in the Act. Similarly
Section 27(6)(b) requires the Administrator to have regard to "the anticipated demand, as
estimated by him, for ornaments in that region." The expression "anticipated demand" is a
vague expression which is not capable of objective assessment and is bound to lead to a great
deal of uncertainty. Similarly the expression "suitability of the applicant" in Section 27(6)(e) and
"public interest" in Section 27(6)(g) do not provide any objective standard or norm or guidance.
For these reasons it must be held that clauses (a),(d),(e) and (g) of Section 27(6) impose
unreasonable restrictions on the fundamental right of the petitioner to carry on business and are
constitutionally invalid. It was also contended that there was no reason why the conditions for
renewal of licence should be as rigorous as the conditions for initial grant of licence. The
requirement of strict conditions for the renewal of licence renders the entire future of the
business of the dealer uncertain and subjects it to the caprice and arbitrary will of the
administrative authorities. There is justification for this argument and the requirement of Section
26 of the Act imposing the same conditions for the renewal of the licence as for the initial grant
appears to be unreasonable. In our opinion clauses (a), (b), (e) and (g) are inextricably bound
up with the other clauses of Section 27(6) and form part of a single scheme. The result is that
clauses (a), (b), (c), (e) and (g) are not severable and the entire Section 27(6) of the Act must be
held invalid. Section 27(2)(d) of the Act states that a valid licence issued by the Administrator
"may contain such conditions, limitations and restrictions as the Administrator may think fit to
impose and different conditions, limitations and restrictions may be imposed for different classes
of dealers". On the face of it, this sub- section confers such wide and vague power upon the
Administrator that it is difficult to limit its scope. In our opinion Section 27(2)(d) of the Act must
be struck down as an unreasonable restriction on the fundamental right of the petitioners to
carry on business. It appears, however, to us that if Section 27(2)(d) and Section 27(6) of the
Act are invalid the licensing scheme contemplated by the rest of Section 27 of the Act cannot be
worked in practice. It is, therefore, necessary for Parliament to enact fresh legislation imposing
appropriate conditions and restrictions for the grant and renewal of licences to dealers. In the
alternative the Central Government may make appropriate rules for the same purpose in
exercise of its rule-making power under Section 114 of the Act."
67. In A.K. Roy & Ors. v. Union of India & Ors., [1982] 2 S.C.R. 272, a part of Section 3 of the
National Security Ordinance was read down on the ground that "acting in any manner prejudicial
to the maintenance of supplies and services essential to the community" is an expression so
vague that it is capable of wanton abuse. The Court held:
"What we have said above in regard to the expressions 'defence of India', 'security of India',
'security of the State' and 'relations of India with foreign powers' cannot apply to the expression
"acting in any manner prejudicial to the maintenance of supplies and services essential to the
community" which occurs in Section 3(2) of the Act. Which supplies and services are essential
to the community can easily be defined by the legislature and indeed, legislations which
regulate the prices and possession of essential commodities either enumerate those
commodities or confer upon the appropriate Government the power to do so. In the absence of
a definition of 'supplies and services essential to the community', the detaining authority will be
free to extend the application of this clause of sub-section (2) to any commodities or services
the maintenance of supply of which, according to him, is essential to the community.
But that is not all. The Explanation to sub-section (2) gives to the particular phrase in that
sub-section a meaning which is not only uncertain but which, at any given point of time, will be
difficult to ascertain or fasten upon. According to the Explanation, no order of detention can be
made under the National Security Act on any ground on which an order of detention may be
made under the Prevention of Blackmarketing and Maintenance of Supplies of Essential
Commodities Act, 1980. The reason for this, which is stated in the Explanation itself, is that for
the purposes of sub-section (2), "acting in any manner prejudicial to the maintenance of
supplies essential to the community" does not include "acting in any manner prejudicial to the
maintenance of supplies of commodities essential to the community" as defined in the
Explanation to sub-section (1) of Section 3 of the Act of 1980. Clauses (a) and (b) of the
Explanation to Section 3(1) of the Act of 1980 exhaust almost the entire range of essential
commodities. Clause (a) relates to committing or instigating any person to commit any offence
punishable under the Essential Commodities Act, 10 of 1955, or under any other law for the
time being in force relating to the control of the production, supply or distribution of, or trade and
commerce in, any commodity essential to the community. Clause (b) of the Explanation to
Section 3(1) of the Act of 1980 relates to dealing in any commodity which is an essential
commodity as defined in the Essential Commodities Act, 1955, or with respect to which
provisions have been made in any such other law as is referred to in clause (a). We find it quite
difficult to understand as to which are the remaining commodities outside the scope of the Act of
1980, in respect of which it can be said that the maintenance of their supplies is essential to the
community. The particular clause in sub- section (2) of Section 3 of the National Security Act is,
therefore, capable of wanton abuse in that, the detaining authority can place under detention
any person for possession of any commodity on the basis that the authority is of the opinion that
the maintenance of supply of that commodity is essential to the community. We consider the
particular clause not only vague and uncertain but, in the context of the Explanation, capable of
being extended cavalierly to supplies, the maintenance of which is not essential to the
community. To allow the personal liberty of the people to be taken away by the application of
that clause would be a flagrant violation of the fairness and justness of procedure which is
implicit in the provisions of Article 21." (at page 325-326)
68. Similarly, in Kartar Singh v. State of Punjab, (1994) 3 SCC 569 at para 130-131, it was held:
"130. It is the basic principle of legal jurisprudence that an enactment is void for vagueness if its
prohibitions are not clearly defined. Vague laws offend several important values. It is insisted or
emphasized that laws should give the person of ordinary intelligence a reasonable opportunity
to know what is prohibited, so that he may act accordingly. Vague laws may trap the innocent by
not providing fair warning. Such a law impermissibly delegates basic policy matters to policemen
and also judges for resolution on an ad hoc and subjective basis, with the attendant dangers of
arbitrary and discriminatory application. More so uncertain and undefined words deployed
inevitably lead citizens to "steer far wider of the unlawful zone ... than if the boundaries of the
forbidden areas were clearly marked.
131. Let us examine clause (i) of Section 2(1)(a). This section is shown to be blissfully and
impermissibly vague and imprecise. As rightly pointed out by the learned counsel, even an
innocent person who ingenuously and undefiledly communicates or associates without any
knowledge or having no reason to believe or suspect that the person or class of persons with
whom he has communicated or associated is engaged in assisting in any manner terrorists or
disruptionists, can be arrested and prosecuted by abusing or misusing or misapplying this
definition. In ultimate consummation of the proceedings, perhaps that guiltless and innoxious
innocent person may also be convicted."
69. Judged by the standards laid down in the aforesaid judgments, it is quite clear that the
expressions used in 66A are completely open-ended and undefined. Section 66 in stark contrast
to Section 66A states:
"66. Computer related offences.-If any person, dishonestly or fraudulently, does any act referred
to in Section 43, he shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term which may extend to three
years or with fine which may extend to five lakh rupees or with both.
Explanation.-For the purposes of this section,-
(a) the word "dishonestly" shall have the meaning assigned to it in Section 24 of the Indian
Penal Code (45 of 1860);
(b) the word "fraudulently" shall have the meaning assigned to it in Section 25 of the Indian
Penal Code (45 of 1860)."
70. It will be clear that in all computer related offences that are spoken of by Section 66, mens
rea is an ingredient and the expression "dishonestly" and "fraudulently" are defined with some
degree of specificity, unlike the expressions used in Section 66A.
71. The provisions contained in Sections 66B up to Section 67B also provide for various
punishments for offences that are clearly made out. For example, under Section 66B, whoever
dishonestly receives or retains any stolen computer resource or communication device is
punished with imprisonment. Under Section 66C, whoever fraudulently or dishonestly makes
use of any identification feature of another person is liable to punishment with imprisonment.
Under Section 66D, whoever cheats by personating becomes liable to punishment with
imprisonment. Section 66F again is a narrowly drawn section which inflicts punishment which
may extend to imprisonment for life for persons who threaten the unity, integrity, security or
sovereignty of India. Sections 67 to 67B deal with punishment for offences for publishing or
transmitting obscene material including depicting children in sexually explicit acts in electronic
form.
72. In the Indian Penal Code, a number of the expressions that occur in Section 66A occur in
Section 268.
"268. Public nuisance.-A person is guilty of a public nuisance who does any act or is guilty of an
illegal omission, which causes any common injury, danger or annoyance to the public or to the
people in general who dwell or occupy property in the vicinity, or which must necessarily cause
injury, obstruction, danger or annoyance to persons who may have occasion to use any public
right.
A common nuisance is not excused on the ground that it causes some convenience or
advantage."
73. It is important to notice the distinction between the Sections 268 and 66A. Whereas, in
Section 268 the various expressions used are ingredients for the offence of a public nuisance,
these ingredients now become offences in themselves when it comes to Section 66A. Further,
under Section 268, the person should be guilty of an act or omission which is illegal in nature -
legal acts are not within its net. A further ingredient is that injury, danger or annoyance must be
to the public in general. Injury, danger or annoyance are not offences by themselves howsoever
made and to whomsoever made. The expression "annoyance" appears also in Sections 294
and 510 of the IPC:
"294. Obscene acts and songs.-Whoever, to the annoyance of others,
(a) does any obscene act in any public place, or
(b) sings, recites or utters any obscene songs, ballad or words, in or near any public place, shall
be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to three
months, or with fine, or with both.
510. Misconduct in public by a drunken person.-Whoever, in a state of intoxication, appears in

any public place, or in any place which it is a trespass in him to enter, and there conducts
himself in such a manner as to cause annoyance to any person, shall be punished with simple
imprisonment for a term which may extend to twenty-four hours, or with fine which may extend
to ten rupees, or with both."
74. If one looks at Section 294, the annoyance that is spoken of is clearly defined - that is, it has
to be caused by obscene utterances or acts. Equally, under Section 510, the annoyance that is
caused to a person must only be by another person who is in a state of intoxication and who
annoys such person only in a public place or in a place for which it is a trespass for him to enter.
Such narrowly and closely defined contours of offences made out under the Penal Code are
conspicuous by their absence in Section 66A which in stark contrast uses completely open
ended, undefined and vague language.
75. Incidentally, none of the expressions used in Section 66A are defined. Even "criminal
intimidation" is not defined - and the definition clause of the Information Technology Act, Section
2 does not say that words and expressions that are defined in the Penal Code will apply to this
Act.
76. Quite apart from this, as has been pointed out above, every expression used is nebulous in
meaning. What may be offensive to one may not be offensive to another. What may cause
annoyance or inconvenience to one may not cause annoyance or inconvenience to another.
Even the expression "persistently" is completely imprecise - suppose a message is sent thrice,
can it be said that it was sent "persistently"? Does a message have to be sent (say) at least
eight times, before it can be said that such message is "persistently" sent? There is no
demarcating line conveyed by any of these expressions - and that is what renders the Section
unconstitutionally vague.
77. However, the learned Additional Solicitor General argued before us that expressions that are
used in Section 66A may be incapable of any precise definition but for that reason they are not
constitutionally vulnerable. He cited a large number of judgments in support of this submission.
None of the cited judgments dealt with a Section creating an offence which is saved despite its
being vague and in capable of any precise definition. In fact, most of the judgments cited before
us did not deal with criminal law at all. The few that did are dealt with hereinbelow. For instance,
Madan Singh v. State of Bihar, (2004) 4 SCC 622 was cited before us. The passage cited from
the aforesaid judgment is contained in para 19 of the judgment. The cited passage is not in the
context of an argument that the word "terrorism" not being separately defined would, therefore,
be struck down on the ground of vagueness. The cited passage was only in the context of
upholding the conviction of the accused in that case. Similarly, in Zameer Ahmed Latifur
Rehman Sheikh v. State of Maharashtra & Ors., (2010) 5 SCC 246, the expression "insurgency"
was said to be undefined and would defy a precise definition, yet it could be understood to
mean break down of peace and tranquility as also a grave disturbance of public order so as to
endanger the security of the State and its sovereignty. This again was said in the context of a
challenge on the ground of legislative competence. The provisions of the Maharashtra Control
of Organised Crime Act were challenged on the ground that they were outside the expression
"public order" contained in Entry 1 of List I of the 7th Schedule of the Constitution of India. This
contention was repelled by saying that the expression "public order" was wide enough to
encompass cases of "insurgency". This case again had nothing to do with a challenge raised on
the ground of vagueness.
78. Similarly, in State of M.P. v. Kedia Leather & Liquor Limited, (2003) 7 SCC 389, paragraph 8
was cited to show that the expression "nuisance" appearing in Section 133 of the Code of
Criminal Procedure was also not capable of precise definition. This again was said in the
context of an argument that Section 133 of the Code of Criminal Procedure was impliedly
repealed by the Water (Prevention and Control of Pollution) Act, 1974. This contention was
repelled by saying that the areas of operation of the two provisions were completely different
and they existed side by side being mutually exclusive. This case again did not contain any
argument that the provision contained in Section 133 was vague and, therefore,
unconstitutional. Similarly, in State of Karnataka v. Appa Balu Ingale, 1995 Supp. (4) SCC 469,
the word "untouchability" was said not to be capable of precise definition. Here again, there was
no constitutional challenge on the ground of vagueness.
79. In fact, two English judgments cited by the learned Additional Solicitor General would
demonstrate how vague the words used in Section 66A are. In Director of Public Prosecutions v.
Collins, (2006) 1 WLR 2223, the very expression "grossly offensive" is contained in Section
127(1)(1) of the U.K. Communications Act, 2003. A 61 year old man made a number of
telephone calls over two years to the office of a Member of Parliament. In these telephone calls
and recorded messages Mr. Collins who held strong views on immigration made a reference to
"Wogs", "Pakis", "Black bastards" and "Niggers". Mr. Collins was charged with sending
messages which were grossly offensive. The Leicestershire Justices dismissed the case against
Mr. Collins on the ground that the telephone calls were offensive but not grossly offensive. A
reasonable person would not so find the calls to be grossly offensive. The Queen's Bench
agreed and dismissed the appeal filed by the Director of Public Prosecutions. The House of
Lords reversed the Queen's Bench stating:
"9. The parties agreed with the rulings of the Divisional Court that it is for the Justices to
determine as a question of fact whether a message is grossly offensive, that in making this
determination the Justices must apply the standards of an open and just multi-racial society, and
that the words must be judged taking account of their context and all relevant circumstances. I
would agree also. Usages and sensitivities may change over time. Language otherwise insulting
may be used in an unpejorative, even affectionate, way, or may be adopted as a badge of
honour ("Old Contemptibles"). There can be no yardstick of gross offensiveness otherwise than
by the application of reasonably enlightened, but not perfectionist, contemporary standards to
the particular message sent in its particular context. The test is whether a message is couched
in terms liable to cause gross offence to those to whom it relates.
10. In contrast with section 127(2)(a) and its predecessor subsections, which require proof of an
unlawful purpose and a degree of knowledge, section 127(1)(a) provides no explicit guidance on
the state of mind which must be proved against a defendant to establish an offence against the
subsection."
80. Similarly in Chambers v. Director of Public Prosecutions, [2013] 1 W.L.R. 1833, the Queen's
Bench was faced with the following facts:
"Following an alert on the Internet social network, Twitter, the defendant became aware that,
due to adverse weather conditions, an airport from which he was due to travel nine days later
was closed. He responded by posting several "tweets" on Twitter in his own name, including the
following: "Crap1 Robin Hood Airport is closed. You've got a week and a bit to get your shit
together otherwise I am blowing the airport sky high1" None of the defendant's "followers" who
read the posting was alarmed by it at the time. Some five days after its posting the defendant's
tweet was read by the duty manager responsible for security at the airport on a general Internet
search for tweets relating to the airport. Though not believed to be a credible threat the matter
was reported to the police. In interview the defendant asserted that the tweet was a joke and not
intended to be menacing. The defendant was charged with sending by a public electronic
communications network a message of a menacing character contrary to section 127(1)(a) of
the Communications Act 2003. He was convicted in a magistrates' court and, on appeal, the
Crown Court upheld the conviction, being satisfied that the message was "menacing per se" and
that the defendant was, at the very least, aware that his message was of a menacing character."
81. The Crown Court was satisfied that the message in question was "menacing" stating that an
ordinary person seeing the tweet would be alarmed and, therefore, such message would be
"menacing". The Queen's Bench Division reversed the Crown Court stating:
"31. Before concluding that a message is criminal on the basis that it represents a menace, its
precise terms, and any inferences to be drawn from its precise terms, need to be examined in
the context in and the means by which the message was sent. The Crown Court was
understandably concerned that this message was sent at a time when, as we all know, there is
public concern about acts of terrorism and the continuing threat to the security of the country
from possible further terrorist attacks. That is plainly relevant to context, but the offence is not
directed to the inconvenience which may be caused by the message. In any event, the more
one reflects on it, the clearer it becomes that this message did not represent a terrorist threat, or
indeed any other form of threat. It was posted on "Twitter" for widespread reading, a
conversation piece for the defendant's followers, drawing attention to himself and his
predicament. Much more significantly, although it purports to address "you", meaning those
responsible for the airport, it was not sent to anyone at the airport or anyone responsible for
airport security, or indeed any form of public security. The grievance addressed by the message
is that the airport is closed when the writer wants it to be open. The language and punctuation
are inconsistent with the writer intending it to be or it to be taken as a serious warning.
Moreover, as Mr. Armson noted, it is unusual for a threat of a terrorist nature to invite the person
making it to be readily identified, as this message did. Finally, although we are accustomed to
very brief messages by terrorists to indicate that a bomb or explosive device has been put in
place and will detonate shortly, it is difficult to imagine a serious threat in which warning of it is
given to a large number of tweet "followers" in ample time for the threat to be reported and
extinguished."
82. These two cases illustrate how judicially trained minds would find a person guilty or not
guilty depending upon the Judge's notion of what is "grossly offensive" or "menacing". In Collins'
case, both the Leicestershire Justices and two Judges of the Queen's Bench would have
acquitted Collins whereas the House of Lords convicted him. Similarly, in the Chambers case,
the Crown Court would have convicted Chambers whereas the Queen's Bench acquitted him. If
judicially trained minds can come to diametrically opposite conclusions on the same set of facts
it is obvious that expressions such as "grossly offensive" or "menacing" are so vague that there
is no manageable standard by which a person can be said to have committed an offence or not
to have committed an offence. Quite obviously, a prospective offender of Section 66A and the
authorities who are to enforce Section 66A have absolutely no manageable standard by which
to book a person for an offence under Section 66A. This being the case, having regard also to
the two English precedents cited by the learned Additional Solicitor General, it is clear that
Section 66A is unconstitutionally vague.
Ultimately, applying the tests referred to in Chintaman Rao and V.G. Row's case, referred to
earlier in the judgment, it is clear that Section 66A arbitrarily, excessively and disproportionately
invades the right of free speech and upsets the balance between such right and the reasonable
restrictions that may be imposed on such right.
Chilling Effect And Overbreadth
83. Information that may be grossly offensive or which causes annoyance or inconvenience are
undefined terms which take into the net a very large amount of protected and innocent speech.
A person may discuss or even advocate by means of writing disseminated over the internet
information that may be a view or point of view pertaining to governmental, literary, scientific or
other matters which may be unpalatable to certain sections of society. It is obvious that an
expression of a view on any matter may cause annoyance, inconvenience or may be grossly
offensive to some. A few examples will suffice. A certain section of a particular community may
be grossly offended or annoyed by communications over the internet by "liberal views" - such as
the emancipation of women or the abolition of the caste system or whether certain members of
a non proselytizing religion should be allowed to bring persons within their fold who are
otherwise outside the fold. Each one of these things may be grossly offensive, annoying,
inconvenient, insulting or injurious to large sections of particular communities and would fall
within the net cast by Section 66A. In point of fact, Section 66A is cast so widely that virtually
any opinion on any subject would be covered by it, as any serious opinion dissenting with the
mores of the day would be caught within its net. Such is the reach of the Section and if it is to
withstand the test of constitutionality, the chilling effect on free speech would be total.
84. Incidentally, some of our judgments have recognized this chilling effect of free speech. In R.
Rajagopal v. State of T.N., (1994) 6 SCC 632, this Court held:
"19. The principle of Sullivan [376 US 254 : 11 L Ed 2d 686 (1964)] was carried forward - and
this is relevant to the second question arising in this case - in Derbyshire County Council v.
Times Newspapers Ltd. [(1993) 2 WLR 449 : (1993) 1 All ER 1011, HL] , a decision rendered by
the House of Lords. The plaintiff, a local authority brought an action for damages for libel against
the defendants in respect of two articles published in Sunday Times questioning the propriety of
investments made for its superannuation fund. The articles were headed "Revealed: Socialist
tycoon deals with Labour Chief" and "Bizarre deals of a council leader and the media tycoon". A
preliminary issue was raised whether the plaintiff has a cause of action against the defendant.
The trial Judge held that such an action was maintainable but on appeal the Court of Appeal
held to the contrary. When the matter reached the House of Lords, it affirmed the decision of the
Court of Appeal but on a different ground. Lord Keith delivered the judgment agreed to by all
other learned Law Lords. In his opinion, Lord Keith recalled that in Attorney General v. Guardian
Newspapers Ltd. (No. 2)[(1990) 1 AC 109 : (1988) 3 All ER 545 : (1988) 3 WLR 776, HL]
popularly known as "Spycatcher case", the House of Lords had opined that "there are rights
available to private citizens which institutions of... Government are not in a position to exercise
unless they can show that it is in the public interest to do so". It was also held therein that not
only was there no public interest in allowing governmental institutions to sue for libel, it was
"contrary to the public interest because to admit such actions would place an undesirable fetter
on freedom of speech" and further that action for defamation or threat of such action "inevitably
have an inhibiting effect on freedom of speech". The learned Law Lord referred to the decision
of the United States Supreme Court in New York Times v. Sullivan [376 US 254 : 11 L Ed 2d 686
(1964)] and certain other decisions of American Courts and observed - and this is significant for
our purposes-
"while these decisions were related most directly to the provisions of the American Constitution
concerned with securing freedom of speech, the public interest considerations which underlaid
them are no less valid in this country. What has been described as 'the chilling effect' induced by
the threat of civil actions for libel is very important. Quite often the facts which would justify a
defamatory publication are known to be true, but admissible evidence capable of proving those
facts is not available." Accordingly, it was held that the action was not maintainable in law."
85. Also in S. Khushboo v. Kanniammal, (2010) 5 SCC 600, this Court said:
"47. In the present case, the substance of the controversy does not really touch on whether
premarital sex is socially acceptable. Instead, the real issue of concern is the disproportionate
response to the appellant's remarks. If the complainants vehemently disagreed with the
appellant's views, then they should have contested her views through the news media or any
other public platform. The law should not be used in a manner that has chilling effects on the
"freedom of speech and expression".
86. That the content of the right under Article 19(1)(a) remains the same whatever the means of
communication including internet communication is clearly established by Reno's case (supra)
and by The Secretary, Ministry of Information & Broadcasting v. Cricket Association of Bengal &
Anr., (1995) SCC 2 161 at Para 78 already referred to. It is thus clear that not only are the
expressions used in Section 66A expressions of inexactitude but they are also over broad and
would fall foul of the repeated injunctions of this Court that restrictions on the freedom of speech
must be couched in the narrowest possible terms. For example, see, Kedar Nath Singh v. State
of Bihar, [1962] Supp. 2 S.C.R. 769 at 808 -809. In point of fact, judgments of the Constitution
Bench of this Court have struck down sections which are similar in nature. A prime example is
the section struck down in the first Ram Manohar Lohia case, namely, Section 3 of the U.P.
Special Powers Act, where the persons who "instigated" expressly or by implication any person
or class of persons not to pay or to defer payment of any liability were punishable. This Court
specifically held that under the Section a wide net was cast to catch a variety of acts of
instigation ranging from friendly advice to systematic propaganda. It was held that in its wide
amplitude, the Section takes in the innocent as well as the guilty, bonafide and malafide advice
and whether the person be a legal adviser, a friend or a well wisher of the person instigated, he
cannot escape the tentacles of the Section. The Court held that it was not possible to predicate
with some kind of precision the different categories of instigation falling within or without the field
of constitutional prohibitions. It further held that the Section must be declared unconstitutional as
the offence made out would depend upon factors which are uncertain.
87. In Kameshwar Prasad & Ors. v. The State of Bihar & Anr., [1962] Supp. 3 S.C.R. 369, Rule
4-A of the Bihar Government Servants Conduct Rules, 1956 was challenged. The rule states
"No government servant shall participate in any demonstration or resort to any form of strike in
connection with any matter pertaining to his conditions of service."
88. The aforesaid rule was challenged under Articles 19 (1)(a) and (b) of the Constitution. The
Court followed the law laid down in Ram Manohar Lohia's case [1960] 2 S.C.R. 821 and
accepted the challenge. It first held that demonstrations are a form of speech and then held:
"The approach to the question regarding the constitutionality of the rule should be whether the
ban that it imposes on demonstrations would be covered by the limitation of the guaranteed
rights contained in Art. 19 (2) and 19(3). In regard to both these clauses the only relevant
criteria which has been suggested by the respondent-State is that the rule is framed "in the
interest of public order". A demonstration may be defined as "an expression of one's feelings by
outward signs." A demonstration such as is prohibited by, the rule may be of the most innocent
type - peaceful orderly such as the mere wearing of a badge by a Government servant or even
by a silent assembly say outside office hours - demonstrations which could in no sense be
suggested to involve any breach of tranquility, or of a type involving incitement to or capable of
leading to disorder. If the rule had confined itself to demonstrations of type which would lead to
disorder then the validity of that rule could have been sustained but what the rule does is the
imposition of a blanket-ban on all demonstrations of whatever type - innocent as well as
otherwise - and in consequence its validity cannot be upheld." (at page 374)
89. The Court further went on to hold that remote disturbances of public order by demonstration
would fall outside Article 19(2). The connection with public order has to be intimate, real and
rational and should arise directly from the demonstration that is sought to be prohibited. Finally,
the Court held:
"The vice of the rule, in our opinion, consists in this that it lays a ban on every type of
demonstration - be the same however innocent and however incapable of causing a breach of
public tranquility and does not confine itself to those forms of demonstrations which might lead
to that result." (at page 384)
90. These two Constitution Bench decisions bind us and would apply directly on Section 66A.
We, therefore, hold that the Section is unconstitutional also on the ground that it takes within its
sweep protected speech and speech that is innocent in nature and is liable therefore to be used
in such a way as to have a chilling effect on free speech and would, therefore, have to be struck
down on the ground of overbreadth.
Possibility of an act being abused is not a ground to test its validity:
91. The learned Additional Solicitor General cited a large number of judgments on the
proposition that the fact that Section 66A is capable of being abused by the persons who
administered it is not a ground to test its validity if it is otherwise valid. He further assured us that
this Government was committed to free speech and that Section 66A would not be used to curb
free speech, but would be used only when excesses are perpetrated by persons on the rights of
others. In The Collector of Customs, Madras v. Nathella Sampathu Chetty & Anr., [1962] 3
S.C.R. 786, this Court observed:
"....This Court has held in numerous rulings, to which it is unnecessary to refer, that the
possibility of the abuse of the powers under the provisions contained in any statute is no ground
for declaring the provision to be unreasonable or void. Commenting on a passage in the
judgment of the Court of Appeal of Northern Ireland which stated:
"If such powers are capable of being exercised reasonably it is impossible to say that they may
not also be exercised unreasonably"
and treating this as a ground for holding the statute invalid Viscount Simonds observed in
Belfast Corporation v. O.D. Commission [ 1960 AC 490 at pp. 520-521] :
"It appears to me that the short answer to this contention (and I hope its shortness will not be
regarded as disrespect) is that the validity of a measure is not to be determined by its
application to particular cases.... If it is not so exercised (i.e. if the powers are abused) it is open
to challenge and there is no need for express provision for its challenge in the statute."
The possibility of abuse of a statute otherwise valid does not impart to it any element of
invalidity. The converse must also follow that a statute which is otherwise invalid as being
unreasonable cannot be saved by its being administered in a reasonable manner. The
constitutional validity of the statute would have to be determined on the basis of its provisions
and on the ambit of its operation as reasonably construed. If so judged it passes the test of
reasonableness, possibility of the powers conferred being improperly used is no ground for
pronouncing the law itself invalid and similarly if the law properly interpreted and tested in the
light of the requirements set out in Part III of the Constitution does not pass the test it cannot be
pronounced valid merely because it is administered in a manner which might not conflict with
the constitutional requirements." (at page 825)
92. In this case, it is the converse proposition which would really apply if the learned Additional
Solicitor General's argument is to be accepted. If Section 66A is otherwise invalid, it cannot be
saved by an assurance from the learned Additional Solicitor General that it will be administered
in a reasonable manner. Governments may come and Governments may go but Section 66A
goes on forever. An assurance from the present Government even if carried out faithfully would
not bind any successor Government. It must, therefore, be held that Section 66A must be
judged on its own merits without any reference to how well it may be administered.
Severability:
93. The argument of the learned Additional Solicitor General on this score is reproduced by us
verbatim from one of his written submissions:
"Furthermore it is respectfully submitted that in the event of Hon'ble Court not being satisfied
about the constitutional validity of either any expression or a part of the provision, the Doctrine
of Severability as enshrined under Article 13 may be resorted to."
94. The submission is vague: the learned Additional Solicitor General does not indicate which
part or parts of Section 66A can possibly be saved. This Court in Romesh Thappar v. The State
of Madras, [1950] S.C.R. 594 repelled a contention of severability when it came to the courts
enforcing the fundamental right under Article 19(1)(a) in the following terms:
"It was, however, argued that Section 9(1-A) could not be considered wholly void, as, under
Article 13(1), an existing law inconsistent with a fundamental right is void only to the extent of
the inconsistency and no more. Insofar as the securing of the public safety or the maintenance
of public order would include the security of the State, the impugned provision, as applied to the
latter purpose, was covered by clause (2) of Article 19 and must, it was said, be held to be valid.
We are unable to accede to this contention. Where a law purports to authorise the imposition of
restrictions on a fundamental right in language wide enough to cover restrictions both within and
without the limits of constitutionally permissible legislative action affecting such right, it is not
possible to uphold it even so far as it may be applied within the constitutional limits, as it is not
severable. So long as the possibility of its being applied for purposes not sanctioned by the
Constitution cannot be ruled out, it must be held to be wholly unconstitutional and void. In other
words, clause (2) of Article 19 having allowed the imposition of restrictions on the freedom of
speech and expression only in cases where danger to the State is involved, an enactment,
which is capable of being applied to cases where no such danger could arise, cannot be held to
be constitutional and valid to any extent." (At page 603)
95. It has been held by us that Section 66A purports to authorize the imposition of restrictions
on the fundamental right contained in Article 19(1)(a) in language wide enough to cover
restrictions both within and without the limits of constitutionally permissible legislative action. We
have held following K.A. Abbas' case (Supra) that the possibility of Section 66A being applied
for purposes not sanctioned by the Constitution cannot be ruled out. It must, therefore, be held
to be wholly unconstitutional and void. Romesh Thappar's Case was distinguished in R.M.D.
Chamarbaugwalla v. The Union of India, [1957] S.C.R. 930 in the context of a right under Article
19(1)(g) as follows:
"20. In Romesh Thappar v. State of Madras [ (1950) SCR 594] , the question was as to the
validity of Section 9(1-A) of the Madras Maintenance of Public Order Act, 23 of 1949. That
section authorised the Provincial Government to prohibit the entry and circulation within the
State of a newspaper "for the purpose of securing the public safety or the maintenance of public
order." Subsequent to the enactment of this statute, the Constitution came into force, and the
validity of the impugned provision depended on whether it was protected by Article 19(2), which
saved "existing law insofar as it relates to any matter which undermines the security of or tends
to overthrow the State." It was held by this Court that as the purposes mentioned in Section
9(1-A) of the Madras Act were wider in amplitude than those specified in Article 19(2), and as it
was not possible to split up Section 9(1-A) into what was within and what was without the
protection of Article 19(2), the provision must fail in its entirety. That is really a decision that the
impugned provision was on its own contents inseverable. It is not an authority for the position
that even when a provision is severable, it must be struck down on the ground that the principle
of severability is inadmissible when the invalidity of a statute arises by reason of its
contravening constitutional prohibitions. It should be mentioned that the decision in Romesh
Thappar v. State of Madras [ (1950) SCR 594] was referred to in State of Bombay v. F.N.
Balsara [ (1951) SCR 682] and State of Bombay v. United Motors (India) Ltd. [ (1953) SCR 1069
at 1098-99] and distinguished."[pic]
96. The present being a case of an Article 19(1)(a) violation, Romesh Thappar's judgment would
apply on all fours. In an Article 19(1)(g) challenge, there is no question of a law being applied for
purposes not sanctioned by the Constitution for the simple reason that the eight subject matters
of Article 19(2) are conspicuous by their absence in Article 19(6) which only speaks of
reasonable restrictions in the interests of the general public. The present is a case where, as
has been held above, Section 66A does not fall within any of the subject matters contained in
Article 19(2) and the possibility of its being applied for purposes outside those subject matters is
clear. We therefore hold that no part of Section 66A is severable and the provision as a whole
must be declared unconstitutional.
Article 14
97. Counsel for the petitioners have argued that Article 14 is also infringed in that an offence
whose ingredients are vague in nature is arbitrary and unreasonable and would result in
arbitrary and discriminatory application of the criminal law. Further, there is no intelligible
differentia between the medium of print, broadcast, and real live speech as opposed to speech
on the internet and, therefore, new categories of criminal offences cannot be made on this
ground. Similar offences which are committed on the internet have a three year maximum
sentence under Section 66A as opposed to defamation which has a two year maximum
sentence. Also, defamation is a non-cognizable offence whereas under Section 66A the offence
is cognizable.
98. We have already held that Section 66A creates an offence which is vague and overbroad,
and, therefore, unconstitutional under Article 19(1)(a) and not saved by Article 19(2). We have
also held that the wider range of circulation over the internet cannot restrict the content of the
right under Article 19(1)(a) nor can it justify its denial. However, when we come to discrimination
under Article 14, we are unable to agree with counsel for the petitioners that there is no
intelligible differentia between the medium of print, broadcast and real live speech as opposed
to speech on the internet. The intelligible differentia is clear - the internet gives any individual a
platform which requires very little or no payment through which to air his views. The learned
Additional Solicitor General has correctly said that something posted on a site or website travels
like lightning and can reach millions of persons all over the world. If the petitioners were right,
this Article 14 argument would apply equally to all other offences created by the Information
Technology Act which are not the subject matter of challenge in these petitions. We make it
clear that there is an intelligible differentia between speech on the internet and other mediums of
communication for which separate offences can certainly be created by legislation. We find,
therefore, that the challenge on the ground of Article 14 must fail.
Procedural Unreasonableness
99. One other argument must now be considered. According to the petitioners, Section 66A also
suffers from the vice of procedural unreasonableness. In that, if, for example, criminal
defamation is alleged, the safeguards available under Section 199 Cr.P.C. would not be
available for a like offence committed under Section 66A. Such safeguards are that no court
shall take cognizance of such an offence except upon a complaint made by some person
aggrieved by the offence and that such complaint will have to be made within six months from
the date on which the offence is alleged to have been committed. Further, safeguards that are to
be found in Sections 95 and 96 of the Cr.P.C. are also absent when it comes to Section 66A. For
example, where any newspaper book or document wherever printed appears to contain matter
which is obscene, hurts the religious feelings of some community, is seditious in nature, causes
enmity or hatred to a certain section of the public, or is against national integration, such book,
newspaper or document may be seized but under Section 96 any person having any interest in
such newspaper, book or document may within two months from the date of a publication
seizing such documents, books or newspapers apply to the High court to set aside such
declaration. Such matter is to be heard by a Bench consisting of at least three Judges or in High
Courts which consist of less than three Judges, such special Bench as may be composed of all
the Judges of that High Court.
100. It is clear that Sections 95 and 96 of the Criminal Procedure Code reveal a certain degree
of sensitivity to the fundamental right to free speech and expression. If matter is to be seized on
specific grounds which are relatable to the subject matters contained in Article 19(2), it would be
open for persons affected by such seizure to get a declaration from a High Court consisting of at
least three Judges that in fact publication of the so-called offensive matter does not in fact relate
to any of the specified subjects contained in Article 19(2).
Further, Section 196 of the Cr.P.C. states:
"196. Prosecution for offences against the State and for criminal conspiracy to commit such
offence.- (1) No Court shall take cognizance of-
(a) any offence punishable under Chapter VI or under Section 153-A, [Section 295-A or
sub-section (1) of Section 505] of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), or
(b) a criminal conspiracy to commit such offence, or
(c) any such abetment, as is described in Section 108-A of the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860),
except with the previous sanction of the Central Government or of the State Government.
[(1-A) No Court shall take cognizance of-
(a) any offence punishable under Section 153-B or sub-section (2) or sub- section (3) of Section
505 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), or
(b) a criminal conspiracy to commit such offence, except with the previous sanction of the
Central Government or of the State Government or of the District Magistrate.] (2) No court shall
take cognizance of the offence of any criminal conspiracy punishable under Section 120-B of
the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860), other than a criminal conspiracy to commit [an offence]
punishable with death, imprisonment for life or rigorous imprisonment for a term of two years or
upwards, unless the State Government or the District Magistrate has consented in writing to the
initiation of the proceedings:
Provided that where the criminal conspiracy is one to which the provisions of Section 195 apply,
no such consent shall be necessary.
(3) The Central Government or the State Government may, before according sanction [under
sub-section (1) or sub-section (1-A) and the District Magistrate may, before according sanction
under sub-section (1-A)] and the State Government or the District Magistrate may, before giving
consent under sub-section (2), order a preliminary investigation by a police officer not being
below the rank of Inspector, in which case such police officer shall have the powers referred to
in sub-section (3) of Section
155."
101. Again, for offences in the nature of promoting enmity between different groups on grounds
of religion etc. or offences relatable to deliberate and malicious acts intending to outrage
religious feelings or statements that create or promote enmity, hatred or ill-will between classes
can only be taken cognizance of by courts with the previous sanction of the Central Government
or the State Government. This procedural safeguard does not apply even when a similar offence
may be committed over the internet where a person is booked under Section 66A instead of the
aforesaid Sections.
Having struck down Section 66A on substantive grounds, we need not decide the procedural
unreasonableness aspect of the Section.
Section 118 of the Kerala Police Act.
102. Learned counsel for the Petitioner in Writ Petition No. 196 of 2014 assailed sub-section (d)
of Section 118 which is set out hereinbelow:
"118. Penalty for causing grave violation of public order or danger.- Any person who,-
(d) Causes annoyance to any person in an indecent manner by statements or verbal or

comments or telephone calls or calls of any type or by chasing or sending messages or mails by
any means; shall, on conviction be punishable with imprisonment for a term which may extend
to three years or with fine not exceeding ten thousand rupees or with both."
103. Learned counsel first assailed the Section on the ground of legislative competence stating
that this being a Kerala Act, it would fall outside Entries1 and 2 of List II and fall within Entry 31
of List I. In order to appreciate the argument we set out the relevant entries: "List - I
31. Posts and telegraphs; telephones, wireless, broadcasting and other like forms of
communication.
List - II
1. Public order (but not including the use of any naval, military or air force or any other armed
force of the Union or of any other force subject to the control of the Union or of any contingent or
unit thereof in aid of the civil power).
2. Police (including railway and village police) subject to the provisions of entry 2A of List I."
The Kerala Police Act as a whole would necessarily fall under Entry 2 of List II. In addition,
Section 118 would also fall within Entry 1 of List II in that as its marginal note tells us it deals
with penalties for causing grave violation of public order or danger.
104. It is well settled that a statute cannot be dissected and then examined as to under what
field of legislation each part would separately fall. In A.S. Krishna v. State of Madras, [1957]
S.C.R. 399, the law is stated thus:
"The position, then, might thus be summed up : When a law is impugned on the ground that it is
ultra vires the powers of the legislature which enacted it, what has to be ascertained is the true
character of the legislation. To do that, one must have regard to the enactment as a whole, to its
objects and to the scope and effect of its provisions. If on such examination it is found that the
legislation is in substance one on a matter assigned to the legislature, then it must be held to be
valid in its entirety, even though it might incidentally trench on matters which are beyond its
competence. It would be quite an erroneous approach to the question to view such a statute not
as an organic whole, but as a mere collection of sections, then disintegrate it into parts, examine
under what heads of legislation those parts would severally fall, and by that process determine
what portions thereof are intra vires, and what are not." (at page 410)
105. It is, therefore, clear that the Kerala Police Act as a whole and Section 118 as part thereof
falls in pith and substance within Entry 2 List II, notwithstanding any incidental encroachment
that it may have made on any other Entry in List I. Even otherwise, the penalty created for
causing annoyance in an indecent manner in pith and substance would fall within Entry 1 List III
which speaks of criminal law and would thus be within the competence of the State Legislature
in any case.
106. However, what has been said about Section 66A would apply directly to Section 118(d) of
the Kerala Police Act, as causing annoyance in an indecent manner suffers from the same type
of vagueness and over breadth, that led to the invalidity of Section 66A, and for the reasons
given for striking down Section 66A, Section 118(d) also violates Article 19(1)(a) and not being a
reasonable restriction on the said right and not being saved under any of the subject matters
contained in Article 19(2) is hereby declared to be unconstitutional.
Section 69A and the Information Technology (Procedure and Safeguards for Blocking for
Access of Information by Public) Rules, 2009.
107. Section 69A of the Information Technology Act has already been set out in paragraph 2 of
the judgment. Under sub-section (2) thereof, the 2009 Rules have been framed. Under Rule 3,
the Central Government shall designate by notification in the official gazette an officer of the
Central Government not below the rank of a Joint Secretary as the Designated Officer for the
purpose of issuing direction for blocking for access by the public any information referable to
Section 69A of the Act. Under Rule 4, every organization as defined under Rule 2(g), (which
refers to the Government of India, State Governments, Union Territories and agencies of the
Central Government as may be notified in the Official Gazette by the Central Government)- is to
designate one of its officers as the "Nodal Officer". Under Rule 6, any person may send their
complaint to the "Nodal Officer" of the concerned Organization for blocking, which complaint will
then have to be examined by the concerned Organization regard being had to the parameters
laid down in Section 69A(1) and after being so satisfied, shall transmit such complaint through
its Nodal Officer to the Designated Officer in a format specified by the Rules. The Designated
Officer is not to entertain any complaint or request for blocking directly from any person. Under
Rule 5, the Designated Officer may on receiving any such request or complaint from the Nodal
Officer of an Organization or from a competent court, by order direct any intermediary or agency
of the Government to block any information or part thereof for the reasons specified in 69A(1).
Under Rule 7 thereof, the request/complaint shall then be examined by a Committee of
Government Personnel who under Rule 8 are first to make all reasonable efforts to identify the
originator or intermediary who has hosted the information. If so identified, a notice shall issue to
appear and submit their reply at a specified date and time which shall not be less than 48 hours
from the date and time of receipt of notice by such person or intermediary. The Committee then
examines the request and is to consider whether the request is covered by 69A(1) and is then to
give a specific recommendation in writing to the Nodal Officer of the concerned Organization. It
is only thereafter that the Designated Officer is to submit the Committee's recommendation to
the Secretary, Department of Information Technology who is to approve such requests or
complaints. Upon such approval, the Designated Officer shall then direct any agency of
Government or intermediary to block the offending information. Rule 9 provides for blocking of
information in cases of emergency where delay caused would be fatal in which case the
blocking may take place without any opportunity of hearing. The Designated Officer shall then,
not later than 48 hours of the issue of the interim direction, bring the request before the
Committee referred to earlier, and only on the recommendation of the Committee, is the
Secretary Department of Information Technology to pass the final order. Under Rule 10, in the
case of an order of a competent court in India, the Designated Officer shall, on receipt of a
certified copy of a court order, submit it to the Secretary, Department of Information Technology
and then initiate action as directed by the Court. In addition to the above safeguards, under Rule
14 a Review Committee shall meet at least once in two months and record its findings as to
whether directions issued are in accordance with Section 69A(1) and if it is of the contrary
opinion, the Review Committee may set aside such directions and issue orders to unblock the
said information. Under Rule 16, strict confidentiality shall be maintained regarding all the
requests and complaints received and actions taken thereof.
108. Learned counsel for the petitioners assailed the constitutional validity of Section 69A, and
assailed the validity of the 2009 Rules. According to learned counsel, there is no pre-decisional
hearing afforded by the Rules particularly to the "originator" of information, which is defined
under Section 2(za) of the Act to mean a person who sends, generates, stores or transmits any
electronic message; or causes any electronic message to be sent, generated, stored or
transmitted to any other person. Further, procedural safeguards such as which are provided
under Section 95 and 96 of the Code of Criminal Procedure are not available here. Also, the
confidentiality provision was assailed stating that it affects the fundamental rights of the
petitioners.
109. It will be noticed that Section 69A unlike Section 66A is a narrowly drawn provision with
several safeguards. First and foremost, blocking can only be resorted to where the Central
Government is satisfied that it is necessary so to do. Secondly, such necessity is relatable only
to some of the subjects set out in Article 19(2). Thirdly, reasons have to be recorded in writing in
such blocking order so that they may be assailed in a writ petition under Article 226 of the
Constitution.
110. The Rules further provide for a hearing before the Committee set up - which Committee
then looks into whether or not it is necessary to block such information. It is only when the
Committee finds that there is such a necessity that a blocking order is made. It is also clear from
an examination of Rule 8 that it is not merely the intermediary who may be heard. If the "person"
i.e. the originator is identified he is also to be heard before a blocking order is passed. Above all,
it is only after these procedural safeguards are met that blocking orders are made and in case
there is a certified copy of a court order, only then can such blocking order also be made. It is
only an intermediary who finally fails to comply with the directions issued who is punishable
under sub-section (3) of Section 69A.
111. Merely because certain additional safeguards such as those found in Section 95 and 96
CrPC are not available does not make the Rules constitutionally infirm. We are of the view that
the Rules are not constitutionally infirm in any manner.
Section 79 and the Information Technology (Intermediary Guidelines) Rules, 2011.
112. Section 79 belongs to Chapter XII of the Act in which intermediaries are exempt from
liability if they fulfill the conditions of the Section. Section 79 states:
"79. Exemption from liability of intermediary in certain cases.-(1) Notwithstanding anything

contained in any law for the time being in force but subject to the provisions of sub-sections (2)
and (3), an intermediary shall not be liable for any third party information, data, or
communication link made available or hosted by him.
(2) The provisions of sub-section (1) shall apply if-
(a) the function of the intermediary is limited to providing access to a communication system
over which information made available by third parties is transmitted or temporarily stored or
hosted; or
(b) the intermediary does not-
(i) initiate the transmission,
(ii) select the receiver of the transmission, and
(iii) select or modify the information contained in the transmission;
(c) the intermediary observes due diligence while discharging his duties under this Act and also
observes such other guidelines as the Central Government may prescribe in this behalf.
(3) The provisions of sub-section (1) shall not apply if-

(a) the intermediary has conspired or abetted or aided or induced, whether by threats or
promise or otherwise in the commission of the unlawful act;
(b) upon receiving actual knowledge, or on being notified by the appropriate Government or its
agency that any information, data or communication link residing in or connected to a computer
resource controlled by the intermediary is being used to commit the unlawful act, the
intermediary fails to expeditiously remove or disable access to that material on that resource
without vitiating the evidence in any manner. Explanation.-For the purposes of this section, the
expression "third party information" means any information dealt with by an intermediary in his
capacity as an intermediary.]"
113. Under the 2011 Rules, by Rule 3 an intermediary has not only to publish the rules and
regulations, privacy policy and user agreement for access or usage of the intermediary's
computer resource but he has also to inform all users of the various matters set out in Rule 3(2).
Since Rule 3(2) and 3(4) are important, they are set out hereinbelow:- "3. Due diligence to be
observed by intermediary.-The intermediary shall observe following due diligence while
discharging his duties, namely:-
(2) Such rules and regulations, terms and conditions or user agreement shall inform the users of
computer resource not to host, display, upload, modify, publish, transmit, update or share any
information that-
(a) belongs to another person and to which the user does not have any right to;
(b) is grossly harmful, harassing, blasphemous defamatory, obscene, pornographic, paedophilic,

libellous, invasive of another's privacy, hateful, or racially, ethnically objectionable, disparaging,
relating or encouraging money laundering or gambling, or otherwise unlawful in any manner
whatever;
(c) harm minors in any way;
(d) infringes any patent, trademark, copyright or other proprietary rights;
(e) violates any law for the time being in force;
(f) deceives or misleads the addressee about the origin of such messages or communicates any
information which is grossly offensive or menacing in nature;
(g) impersonate another person;
(h) contains software viruses or any other computer code, files or programs designed to
interrupt, destroy or limit the functionality of any computer resource;
(i) threatens the unity, integrity, defence, security or sovereignty of India, friendly relations with
foreign states, or public order or causes incitement to the commission of any cognisable offence
or prevents investigation of any offence or is insulting any other nation.
(4) The intermediary, on whose computer system the information is stored or hosted or
published, upon obtaining knowledge by itself or been brought to actual knowledge by an
affected person in writing or through e-mail signed with electronic signature about any such
information as mentioned in sub- rule (2) above, shall act within thirty-six hours and where
applicable, work with user or owner of such information to disable such information that is in
contravention of sub-rule (2). Further the intermediary shall preserve such information and
associated records for at least ninety days for investigation purposes."
114. Learned counsel for the petitioners assailed Rules 3(2) and 3(4) on two basic grounds.
Firstly, the intermediary is called upon to exercise its own judgment under sub-rule (4) and then
disable information that is in contravention of sub-rule (2), when intermediaries by their very
definition are only persons who offer a neutral platform through which persons may interact with
each other over the internet. Further, no safeguards are provided as in the 2009 Rules made
under Section 69A. Also, for the very reasons that Section 66A is bad, the petitioners assailed
sub-rule (2) of Rule 3 saying that it is vague and over broad and has no relation with the
subjects specified under Article 19(2).
115. One of the petitioners' counsel also assailed Section 79(3)(b) to the extent that it makes the
intermediary exercise its own judgment upon receiving actual knowledge that any information is
being used to commit unlawful acts. Further, the expression "unlawful acts" also goes way
beyond the specified subjects delineated in Article 19(2).
116. It must first be appreciated that Section 79 is an exemption provision. Being an exemption
provision, it is closely related to provisions which provide for offences including Section 69A. We
have seen how under Section 69A blocking can take place only by a reasoned order after
complying with several procedural safeguards including a hearing to the originator and
intermediary. We have also seen how there are only two ways in which a blocking order can be
passed - one by the Designated Officer after complying with the 2009 Rules and the other by
the Designated Officer when he has to follow an order passed by a competent court. The
intermediary applying its own mind to whether information should or should not be blocked is
noticeably absent in Section 69A read with 2009 Rules.
117. Section 79(3)(b) has to be read down to mean that the intermediary upon receiving actual
knowledge that a court order has been passed asking it to expeditiously remove or disable
access to certain material must then fail to expeditiously remove or disable access to that
material. This is for the reason that otherwise it would be very difficult for intermediaries like
Google, Facebook etc. to act when millions of requests are made and the intermediary is then to
judge as to which of such requests are legitimate and which are not. We have been informed
that in other countries worldwide this view has gained acceptance, Argentina being in the
forefront. Also, the Court order and/or the notification by the appropriate Government or its
agency must strictly conform to the subject matters laid down in Article 19(2). Unlawful acts
beyond what is laid down in Article 19(2) obviously cannot form any part of Section 79. With
these two caveats, we refrain from striking down Section 79(3)(b).
118. The learned Additional Solicitor General informed us that it is a common practice worldwide
for intermediaries to have user agreements containing what is stated in Rule 3(2). However,
Rule 3(4) needs to be read down in the same manner as Section 79(3)(b). The knowledge
spoken of in the said sub-rule must only be through the medium of a court order. Subject to this,
the Information Technology (Intermediaries Guidelines) Rules, 2011 are valid.
119. In conclusion, we may summarise what has been held by us above:
Section 66A of the Information Technology Act, 2000 is struck down in its entirety being violative
of Article 19(1)(a) and not saved under Article 19(2).
Section 69A and the Information Technology (Procedure & Safeguards for Blocking for Access
of Information by Public) Rules 2009 are constitutionally valid.
Section 79 is valid subject to Section 79(3)(b) being read down to mean that an intermediary
upon receiving actual knowledge from a court order or on being notified by the appropriate
government or its agency that unlawful acts relatable to Article 19(2) are going to be committed
then fails to expeditiously remove or disable access to such material. Similarly, the Information
Technology "Intermediary Guidelines" Rules, 2011 are valid subject to Rule 3 sub-rule (4) being
read down in the same manner as indicated in the judgment.
Section 118(d) of the Kerala Police Act is struck down being violative of Article 19(1)(a) and not
saved by Article 19(2).
All the writ petitions are disposed in the above terms.
............................................J.
(J. Chelameswar) ............................................J.
(R.F. Nariman) New Delhi, March 24, 2015.
-----------------------
[1] [2]The genealogy of this Section may be traced back to Section 10(2)(a) of the U.K. Post
Office (Amendment) Act, 1935, which made it an offence to send any message by telephone
which is grossly offensive or of an indecent, obscene, or menacing character. This Section was
substantially reproduced by Section 66 of the UK Post Office Act, 1953 as follows:
66. Prohibition of sending offensive or false telephone messages or false telegrams, etc. If any
person-
(a)sends any message by telephone which is grossly offensive or of an indecent, obscene or

menacing character ;
(b)sends any message by telephone, or any telegram, which he knows to be false, for the
purpose of causing annoyance, inconvenience or needless anxiety to any other person ; or
(c)persistently makes telephone calls without reasonable cause and for any such purpose as
aforesaid, he shall be liable on summary conviction to a fine not exceeding ten pounds, or to
imprisonment for a term not exceeding one month, or to both.
This Section in turn was replaced by Section 49 of the British Telecommunication Act, 1981 and
Section 43 of the British Telecommunication Act, 1984. In its present form in the UK, it is Section
127 of the Telecommunication Act, 2003 which is relevant and which is as follows:-
127. Improper use of public electronic communications network A person is guilty of an offence
if he -
sends by means of a public electronic communications network a message or other matter that
is grossly offensive or of an indecent, obscene or menacing character; or cause any such
message or matter to be so sent.
A person is guilty of an offence if, for the purpose of causing annoyance, inconvenience or
needless anxiety to another, he-
sends by means of a public electronic communications network, a message that he knows to be

false, causes such a message to be sent; or persistently makes use of a public electronic
communications network.
A person guilty of an offence under this section shall be liable, on summary conviction, to
imprisonment for a term not exceeding six months or to a fine not exceeding level 5 on the
standard scale, or to both.
Subsections (1) and (2) do not apply to anything done in the course of providing a programme
service (within the meaning of the Broadcasting Act 1990 (c.42)).
[3] [4] Incidentally, the Ark of the Covenant is perhaps the single most important focal point in
Judaism. The original ten commandments which the Lord himself gave to Moses was housed in
a wooden chest which was gold plated and called the Ark of the Covenant and carried by the
Jews from place to place until it found its final repose in the first temple - that is the temple built
by Solomon.
[5] [6] A good example of the difference between advocacy and incitement is Mark Antony's
speech in Shakespeare's immortal classic Julius Caesar. Mark Antony begins cautiously. Brutus
is chastised for calling Julius Caesar ambitious and is repeatedly said to be an "honourable
man". He then shows the crowd Caesar's mantle and describes who struck Caesar where. It is
at this point, after the interjection of two citizens from the crowd, that Antony says-
"ANTONY- Good friends, sweet friends, let me not stir you up To such a sudden flood of mutiny.
They that have done this deed are honourable: What private griefs they have, alas, I know not,
That made them do it: they are wise and honourable, And will, no doubt, with reasons answer
you. I come not, friends, to steal away your hearts: I am no orator, as Brutus is;
But, as you know me all, a plain blunt man, That love my friend; and that they know full well
That gave me public leave to speak of him: For I have neither wit, nor words, nor worth, Action,
nor utterance, nor the power of speech, To stir men's blood: I only speak right on; I tell you that
which you yourselves do know; Show you sweet Caesar's wounds, poor poor dumb mouths,
And bid them speak for me: but were I Brutus, And Brutus Antony, there were an Antony Would
ruffle up your spirits and put a tongue In every wound of Caesar that should move The stones of
Rome to rise and mutiny. ALL- We'll mutiny."
[7] [8] In its present form the clear and present danger test has been reformulated to say that:
"The constitutional guarantees of free speech and free press do not permit a State to forbid or
proscribe advocacy of the use of force or of law violation except where such advocacy is
directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such
action."
Interestingly, the US Courts have gone on to make a further refinement. The State may ban
what is called a "true threat".
"'True threats' encompass those statements where the speaker means to communicate a
serious expression of an intent to commit an act of unlawful violence to a particular individual or
group of individuals."
"The speaker need not actually intend to carry out the threat. Rather, a prohibition on true
threats protects individuals from the fear of violence and from the disruption that fear
engenders, in addition to protecting people from the possibility that the threatened violence will
occur. Intimidation in the constitutionally proscribable sense of the word is a type of true threat,
where a speaker directs a threat to a person or group of persons with the intent of placing the
victim in fear of bodily harm or death."
See Virginia v. Black (Supra) and Watts v. United States 22 L. Ed. 2d. 664 at 667
JEYARETNAM, JB v PUBLIC PROSECUTOR AND ANOTHER APPEAL
CaseAnalysis | [1990] 1 MLJ 129
JB JEYARETNAM v PUBLIC PROSECUTOR AND ANOTHER APPEAL [1990]

1 MLJ 129
Malayan Law Journal Reports · 7 pages
HIGH COURT (SINGAPORE)

CHAN SEK KEONG J
MAGISTRATE'S APPEAL NOS 205 OF 1988, AND 215 OF 1988
10 October 1989
Case Summary
Criminal Law — Public entertainment without a licence — Speech at opening of political party's premises —
Whether speeches 'public entertainment' — Public Entertainments Act (Cap 257, 1985 Ed), ss 2, 13(2) 14 &
18(1)(a) — Public Entertainments Rules 1969 — Police Act 1967 [Mal], s 27 — House To House and Street
Collections Act (Cap 128, 1985 Ed), s 3(2)
Criminal Procedure — Sentencing — $3,500 fine for offence of providing public entertainment without
licence — Whether excessive — Appellants had deliberately broken the law — No breach of the peace —
Fine reduced to $1,500 — Public Entertainments Act (Cap 257, 1985 Ed), s 18(1)(a) — Public Entertainments
Rules 1969
Constitutional Law — Freedom of speech — Whether violated by laws regulating licensing of public
entertainment — Public Entertainments Act (Cap 257, 1985 Ed), ss 13(1) & 14 — Constitution of the
Republic of Singapore, art 14(2) — Federal Constitution [Mal], art 10(2) — Constitution of India, art 19 —
Public Meetings and Processions Act 1969 [St Christopher, Nevis and Anguilla], s 5 — Constitution of St
Christopher, Nevis and Anguilla, s 10
Words and Phrases — 'Supply' — Public Entertainments Act (Cap 257, 1985 Ed), s 18(2)
The first appellant, JB Jeyaretnam, was convicted on the charge of providing public entertainment without a licence
issued under the Public Entertainments Act (Cap 257, 1985 Ed)('the Act'), s 18(1)(a). The second appellant, Wong
Hong Toy, who was tried together with the first appellant, was also convicted on a similar charge. The appellants
were each sentenced to a fine of $3,500 and in default two weeks' imprisonment. The appellants have appealed
against conviction and sentence.
The first appellant, who was the secretary-general of the Workers' Party ('WP'), a duly registered political society
under the Societies Act (Cap 311, 1985 Ed), submitted an application, in the prescribed form, for a licence under
the Public Entertainments Rules 1969 to hold the opening ceremony of the WP's premises. The application was
rejected. Both the appellants submitted they had no case to answer. The first appellant has in this appeal
contended that his conviction was wrong on the following grounds. His speech was not per se public entertainment
under the Act, and therefore no licence was required. If the speech was public entertainment under the Act, there
was no evidence to show that he had provided it. The decision of the licensing officer in rejecting his application
was contrary to law and null and void and was an unjustifiable interference with his right to freedom of speech and
expression conferred by art 14(1) of the Constitution of the Republic of Singapore. The second appellant associated
himself with all these arguments. Notwithstanding the extended meaning of 'public entertainment', the first appellant
contended, first, that the Act could not have been intended to and did not apply to the making of speeches in a
public place on the ground that, prior to the proceedings against him, no one else had been prosecuted for making
speeches in public without a licence. He referred to speeches made at the openings of factories and offices and at
Page 2 of 11
JB JEYARETNAM v PUBLIC PROSECUTOR AND ANOTHER APPEAL
wedding dinners in restaurants. The first appellant contended, secondly, that an address was not entertainment if its
dominant purpose was not entertainment.
The second appellant submitted that his speech was a welcoming speech and not an address, without explaining
the difference between the two. He submitted that the evidence showed that he had merely participated in the
public entertainment that was provided. The first appellant also claimed that the decision of the licensing officer in
refusing his application was not made in relation to any of the matters in respect of which the Constitution has
permitted Parliament to restrict the right to freedom of speech and expression. The decision was thus bad in law
and therefore since he was just exercising his constitutional right, no offence had been committed.
Held, dismissing the appeals as regards the convictions but allowing the appeals as regards sentence:
(1) The first appellant's argument had no substance for the following reasons: first, the first appellant has
produced no evidence to show that in the instances cited by him, the persons involved were not
prosecuted on the ground or grounds stated by him. Absence of a prosecution does not mean absence of
an offence.
(2) Secondly, there is also no basis for assuming that restaurants, factories and offices are places to which the
public or any class of the public has access.
(3) Thirdly, by reason of the statutory definition, whether an activity is 'public entertainment' is not determined
by its purpose or its nature and/or effect but simply by its form. The ordinary meaning of the word 'address'
is a speech made to a group of people, usually on a formal occasion. Here, it was the opening of the WP's
branch premises.
(4) There is no reason to suggest that the same word in s 2(1) does not bear its ordinary meaning. The second
appellant submitted that the speech of the second appellant was a welcoming speech and not an address,
without explaining the difference between the two.
(5) The next submission that he had merely participated in the public entertainment that was provided had no
substance. The word 'provide' in the context of s 18(2) means 'supply'. A person may supply the
entertainment by performing it himself or by engaging someone else to perform it. Whatever the precise
effect of s 18(2) may be, it does not provide a defence to the appellants as they were not mere participants
but were the organizers of the event. The second appellant, as chairman of the WP, could not say that he
had nothing to do with the organization of the event.
(6) Since the trial judge had refused to allow the licensing officer to explain his reasons for rejecting the first
appellant's application for a public entertainment licence, the correct position must be that as the matter
now stood neither the first appellant nor the court knew the reasons for the rejection of his application. The
purpose of s 13(2) is not to enable a person charged for an offence under the Act to ask for the reasons at
the trial. The purpose is to enable an aggrieved applicant to appeal to the Minister under s 14 of the Act.
(7) In the court's view, the only available defence to the charges, in the context of this case, would be that the
Act is [*130]
unconstitutional as being in contravention of art 14(2) of the Constitution. However, neither appellant made
any submission to that effect.
(8) The test of constitutionality, ie that the power given to restrict the freedom of speech must not be arbitrary
and untramelled, and that there need not be any express guidelines for the exercise of power to restrain
freedom of speech, are relevant to determine whether the Act contravened art 14. The Act was not
unconstitutional and thus the appellants were properly convicted on the charges faced by them.
(9) The district judge, in imposing the fine of $3,500 each, took into account the following factors: (1) the
previous convictions of the appellants (five in respect of the first appellant and four in respect of the second
appellant); (2) their deliberate intention to commit the offence; and (3) their mitigation speeches. The Privy
Council in another decision concerning the appellant, had, however, declared that the appellants had been
wrongly convicted of the four offences which the district judge took into account. The deputy public
prosecutor submitted that those four convictions were in any case irrelevant to the present conviction. On
this basis, the first appellant had one previous conviction for an unrelated offence and the second appellant
had no previous convictions. The only other negative factor against the appellants was that they had
deliberately broken the law. That is not an exceptional factor. There was no evidence that any disorderly
conduct or breach of the peace had occurred at or in connection with the addresses made by the
appellants or that any member of the public or any of the residents of the neighbouring premises had been
Page 3 of 11
unduly inconvenienced. Taking into account all the circumstances of this case, including the nature of the
offence and conduct of the appellants, the court was of the view that a fine of $1,500 would be the
appropriate sentence. The appeals against conviction were dismissed and the appeals against sentence
allowed to the extent that the fines were reduced to $1,500 in respect of both appellants.
Cases referred to
Madhavan Nair & Anor v PP [1975] 2 MLJ 264 (distd)
Lau Dak Kee v PP [1976] 2 MLJ 229 (distd)
Indulal v State of Gujarat AIR 1963 G 259 (folld)
Arthur Francis v Chief of Police [1973] AC 761 (folld)
JB Jeyaretnam v Law Society of Singapore [1988] 3 MLJ 425 (refd)
Legislation referred to
Constitution of the Republic of Singapore art 14(1)
House To House And Street Collections Act (Cap 128, 1985 Ed) s 3(2)
Public Entertainments Act (Cap 257, 1985 Ed) ss 2, 13(2), 14,18(1)(a)
Public Entertainments Rules 1969
Federal Constitution [Mal] art 10(2)
Police Act 1967 [Mal) s 27
Constitution of St Christopher, Nevis and Anguilla s 10
Public Meetings and Processions Act 1969 s 5
Constitution of India art 19
First appellant in person.
Ling How Doong for the second appellant.
Sowaran Singh (Jennifer Marie (Ms) with him) for the Public Prosecutor.
CHAN SEK KEONG J
The first appellant, JB Jeyaretnam, was on 15 June 1988 convicted on the following charge:
… that you, on or about January 1987, at about 1.10pm at the five foot way of house No 80 Boat Quay, Singapore, did
provide public entertainment without a licence issued under the Public Entertainments Act (Cap 257), to wit, by addressing
a public gathering and you have thereby committed an offence punishable under section 18(1)(a) of the Public
Entertainments Act (Cap 257, 1985 Ed).
The second appellant, Wong Hong Toy, who was tried together with the first appellant, was also convicted on a
similar charge, save that his address was made at about 1.05pm. The appellants were each sentenced to pay a fine
of $3,500 and in default two weeks' imprisonment. The fines have been paid. The appellants have appealed against
conviction and sentence.
Page 4 of 11
The relevant facts were as follows. On 5 January 1987, the first appellant, who was the secretary-general of the
Workers' Party ('WP'), a duly registered political society under the Societies Act (Cap 311, 1985 Ed), submitted an
application, in the prescribed form, for a licence under the Public Entertainments Rules 1969 to hold the opening
ceremony of the WP's premises at No 80-A Boat Quay on 10 January 1987 from 12 noon to 4pm. The application,
which was signed by the first appellant, listed both the appellants as speakers and the following entertainment to be
provided: (1) lion dance, (2) Indian drums, and (3) Malay kompang. The form also stated that a 'PA system would
be used'.
The application and the covering letter were received at about 2.45pm on the same day by the licensing officer
appointed under the Public Entertainments Act (Cap 257, 1985 Ed)('the Act'). The covering letter requested that the
licence be issued by 9 January 1987. The application was rejected on 9 January 1987 and the letter of rejection
was despatched to the first appellant's office on 10 January 1987 between 8.30am and 9.00am and was received
by the office attendant.
On 10 January 1987 at about 1pm, the police received information that a crowd of about 150 people had gathered
along the frontage of No 80, Boat Quay to hear the first appellant speak. There was also a lion dance in the vicinity.
PW1, a police superintendent, went to investigate. He saw a crowd of people along the frontage of No 80, Boat
Quay and the first appellant standing behind a rostrum addressing them. PW1 went up to the rostrum and asked
the first appellant whether he had a permit. The first appellant's reply was:
No, I don't have a permit. Yes you can. You can have my name and address. Alright. Yes, you can take action. I have just
been informed by the police officer that we do not have a permit for this. (Jeerings)
The short answer to this, my friend, is that we applied for a permit and were told that it was not granted. So we decided to
carry on. (Pause)
The second appellant was also present at the scene. He was seen by PW2, another police officer, who saw a
crowd of [*131]
about 100-200 persons with some 60-80 sitting on chairs in front of the pavement of No 80, Boat Quay. PW2 went
there to ensure that there was no breach of the peace. He found an orderly crowd. He saw and heard the second
appellant addressing the crowd in Mandarin after the master of ceremonies had addressed the gathering. After the
second appellant had spoken, the first appellant spoke. Another police officer, PW3, who was also at the scene,
testified that he had made a tape-recording of the speeches and that there were microphones on the rostrum from
where the speeches were made.
That, in brief, was the evidence adduced by the prosecution. Both the appellants submitted they had no case to
answer. Their submissions were rejected by the district judge who held that the evidence, if unrebutted, would
warrant their conviction on the charges faced by the appellants. Accordingly, he called for their defence and, upon
the appellants electing not to enter their defence, convicted both of them.
The first appellant has in this appeal contended that his conviction was wrong on the following grounds:
(a) his speech made at No 80 Boat Quay was not per se public entertainment under the Act, and therefore no
licence was required;
(b) if the speech was public entertainment under the Act, there was no evidence to show that he had provided
it;
(c) the decision of the licensing officer in rejecting his application was contrary to law and null and void and
was an unjustifiable interference with his right to freedom of speech and expression conferred by art 14(1)
of the Constitution of Singapore.
Counsel for the second appellant associated himself with all these arguments, which I will now consider.
Section 18 of the Act provides as follows:
(1) Any person who provides or assists in providing any public entertainment not being a public entertainment
exempted under section 15
Page 5 of 11
(a) without a licence issued under this Act;
(b) while the licence is suspended;
(c) in contravention of any condition of a licence; or
(d) in contravention of this Act or any rules made thereunder;
shall be guilty of an offence and shall be liable on conviction to a fine not exceeding $5,000.
(2) For the purposes of this section no person shall be deemed to have provided or assisted in providing public
entertainment merely by reason of his having taken part in the public entertainment provided.
The expression 'public entertainment' as used in the Act has a wider meaning than its ordinary meaning. Section 2
defines the expression toinclude the activities specified in paras (a) to (o) 'in any place to which the public or any
class of the public has access whether gratuitously or otherwise, but does not include' the activities specified in
paras (i) to (iv)(viz public entertainment at state functions, religious ceremonies or rites, and meetings of public
companies, trade unions, political associations or societies from which non-members are excluded). Most of the
activities included in the definition would qualify as entertainment in its ordinary sense of amusements and
diversions, eg plays, operas, fireworks displays, circuses, parades, exhibitions of films, models, etc. Others such as
'play-readings, recitals, lectures, talks, addresses, debates and discussions' in parA(1) may be performed for more
serious purposes than entertainment in its ordinary sense. Some of the specifically excluded activities, eg religious
rites and ceremonies, are not entertainment or meant to be entertaining.
Notwithstanding the extended meaning of 'public entertainment', the first appellant contended, first, that the Act
could not have been intended to and did not apply to the making of speeches in a public place on the ground that,
prior to the proceedings against him, no one else had been prosecuted for making speeches in public without a
licence. He referred to speeches made at the openings of factories and offices and at wedding dinners in
restaurants, which events were regularly reported by the media. He also referred to a recent literary event, viz the
launching of a book at Raffles Place when speeches were made, without a licence under the Act, and no one had
been prosecuted in connection with the event. This attitude on the part of the authorities, he submitted, was an
indication as to the intention of the Act.
The first appellant contended, secondly, that an address was no entertainment if its dominant purpose was not
entertainment, and that would explain why there were no prosecutions in connection with speeches 'at wedding
dinners in restaurants (which were to celebrate the nuptials) and at openings of factories and offices (which were to
celebrate the openings)'. Similarly, it was argued that the speeches made at No 80 Boat Quay were to celebrate the
opening of the WP's branch premises and not to entertain the guests.
In my view, neither argument has any substance for the following reasons: first, the first appellant has produced no
evidence to show that in the instances cited by him, the persons involved were not prosecuted on the ground or
grounds stated by him. Absence of a prosecution does not mean absence of an offence. Secondly, there is also no
basis for assuming that restaurants, factories and offices are places to which the public or any class of the public
has access. No person has access to a restaurant if his patronage is rejected by the restaurant, and even if he is
accepted as a customer, he cannot be said to have access to another part of the restaurant where another function
is being held, except by an invitation to that function. Thirdly, by reason of the statutory definition, whether an
activity is 'public entertainment' is not determined by its purpose or its nature and/or effect but simply by its
form. [*132]
In the present case, there was no dispute that the appellants had addressed a crowd of people at a public place.
The only issue is whether their speeches were public entertainment. The ordinary meaning of the word 'address' is
a speech made to a group of people, usually on a formal occasion. Here, it was the opening of the WP's branch
premises. There is no reason to suggest that the same word in s 2(1) does not bear its ordinary meaning. This was
precisely what had occurred on this occasion. The first appellant had never contended that his speech was not an
address in its ordinary meaning.
Page 6 of 11
However, the second appellant contended otherwise. His counsel submitted that the speech of the second
appellant was a welcoming speech and not an address, without explaining the difference between the two. If the
second appellant had merely said: 'I welcome you to this official opening of the Workers' Party branch office. I now
call upon [Mr X] to address you', it might be arguable that he had not made an address in terms of the Act. But, the
second appellant said more than that; he extolled the fortitude of the supporters of the WP for being present on a
rainy day and in showing 'them' that as citizens they were not cowards. It was a short but defiant speech to lift the
spirits of the WP members who were present. Accordingly, I reject his counsel's submission.
The next contention of the first appellant was that there was no evidence that he had provided public entertainment
in terms of s 18(2) of the Act. He submitted that the evidence showed that he had merely participated in the public
entertainment that was provided. In my view, there is again no substance in this argument. The word 'provide' in the
context of s 18(2) means 'supply'. A person may supply the entertainment by performing it himself or by engaging
someone else to perform it. Thus, any person who gives an address also, literally, provides the address, and if he
does it in a public place without a licence, he commits an offence under the Act. As innocent guest speakers or
entertainers may unwittingly commit offences under the Act, s 18(2) is designed to provide a defence to such
participants. Whatever the precise effect of s 18(2) may be, it does not provide a defence to the appellants. They
were not mere participants at the function. They were the organizers of the event. The application for the licence
was made by the first appellant and the application form was signed by him. Both the first and second appellants
were named as the speakers. They were respectively the secretary-general and chairman of the WP. The occasion
was the opening of the WP's branch premises. It was clearly an important occasion for the WP as was evident from
the contents of the first appellant's speech. In my view, this evidence was sufficient to prove, in the absence of
rebutting evidence, that the event, including the speeches, was planned and arranged by the appellants as the two
principal office bearers of the WP. They were not guest speakers who merely took part in the event. I have no doubt
that the first appellant provided the public entertainment, if not in the form of his own speech, then in the form of the
speech made by the second appellant. The position of the second appellant was exactly the same, save that he did
not sign the application form. But, as chairman of the WP, he could not, and he did not, say he had nothing to do
with the organization of the event. In his case, I have no reasonable doubt that he had also provided public
entertainment by his own speech or if not, by the first appellant's speech.
I turn now to the constitutional argument advanced by the first appellant, which is that he was wrongfully denied his
constitutional right to freedom of speech and expression given to him as a citizen by art 14 of the Constitution. I set
out below the material parts of this article.
(1) Subject to clauses (2) and (3)
(a) every citizen of Singapore has the right to freedom of speech and expression;
(b) all citizens of Singapore have the right to assemble peaceably and without arms; and
(c) all citizens of Singapore have the right to form associations.
(2) Parliament may by law impose
(a) on the rights conferred by clause (1)(a), such restrictions as it considers necessary or expedient in the interest
of the security of Singapore or any part thereof, friendly relations with other countries, public order or morality and
restrictions designed to protect the privileges of Parliament or to provide against contempt of court, defamation or
incitement to any offence;
It is not disputed by the first appellant that the constitutional right to freedom of speech and expression is not an
absolute right exercisable by any citizen without any restraint in all circumstances, but one which is subject to the
power of Parliament to enact any law to impose on such right such restrictions it considers necessary or expedient
in the interest of any of the matters enumerated in art 14(2) of the Constitution. The first appellant has also not
contended that the Act is not such a law within the scope of art 14(2) of the Constitution. His case is that the
decision of the licensing officer in refusing his application was not made in relation to any of the matters in respect
of which the Constitution has permitted Parliament to restrict the right to freedom of speech and expression, that is
Page 7 of 11
to say, in the interest of public order or public morality or the security of the state. Specifically, he contended that
the licensing officer rejected the application because he was told to do so by an official in the Ministry of Home
Affairs, and had therefore failed to exercise his power at all or properly, or if that were not the reason for the
rejection, the licensing officer had no other reason for rejecting the application; in either case, the decision was bad
in law as there was no nexus between the decision and the objects of the Act. That being the case, it was then
contended that no [*133]
offence had been committed as he was exercising his constitutional right.
Leaving aside for the moment the validity of the legal conclusion that he had committed no offence if the decision of
the licensing officer were wrong, what was the evidence relied upon by the first appellant to show that it was wrong?
The relevant part of the licensing officer's testimony was as follows:
On receipt of P26(the application for the licence) I checked through the application to see whether the necessary columns
were completed and I proceeded to check my records to see whether there have been similar applications from political
parties in the past. I found that there were none. I then proceeded to refer the application to my immediate supervisor in the
Criminal Investigation Department for his transmission to the Ministry of Home Affairs for instructions. All this is necessary
in the normal screening of the applications. I also informed the Deputy Commissioner of Police Operations Command of
this application; Director CID and other command officers. They were informed clearance was also sought from Area
Commanders and 'A' Division in which area 80 Boat Quay is. Prior to application I did not check for exemption order
because there was no such application seeking exemption from the applicant. By 9 January 1987, the decision was arrived
in the evening of 9 January 1987. The application was rejected.
Under cross-examination, the licensing officer (PW4) made the following admissions: that the application, being
from a political party, was referred to the Ministry of Home Affairs in compliance with normal administrative
procedure; that in point of time the application was rejected on the evening of 9 January 1987 immediately after he
had spoken with one Lim Siam Kim, then deputy secretary of Home Affairs. When the first appellant questioned
PW4 as to whether Lim had told him to refuse the application, the trial judge disallowed the question on the ground
that it was not relevant. When PW4 was questioned on his reasons for refusing the application, the trial judge again
disallowed the question on the ground that the issue before the court was whether public entertainment had been
provided, the absence of a licence not being disputed. When the first appellant put to PW4 for his answer an
assertion of fact and law that PW4 had refused the application on the direction of the Minister or the permanent
secretary and that the decision was contrary to the Constitution and invalid under the Act, the suggestion was also
disallowed by the trial judge.
That, briefly, was the evidence upon which the first appellant contended that the licensing officer failed to exercise
his power and/or had no reason to refuse the application. The contention is plainly untenable for lack of a factual
foundation. The licensing officer did not give his reasons because he was prevented from doing so. No inference
could be drawn from this that he had no reasons to give, or that those reasons would be bad reasons. This is not a
case where the court may draw an adverse inference against a witness for refusing or failing to give evidence of
facts especially within his own knowledge. The correct position must be that as the matter now stands neither the
first appellant nor the court knows the reasons for the rejection.
It seems to me that the real thrust of the first appellant's submission was that if the licensing officer had been
allowed to answer his questions, the answers might have been such as to have enabled him to satisfy the court that
the refusal was wrong or unconstitutional. If this were the correct legal position, I would agree that the first appellant
was entitled to cross-examine PW4 on the reasons for his decision. It is a basic rule in a criminal trial that the
accused is entitled to put any relevant questions to any prosecution witness in order to elicit evidence to support his
defence. A denial of that right could lead to a miscarriage of justice.
In support of the argument that he had committed no offence under the Act if the licence had been wrongfully
refused, the first appellant referred to two decisions, vizMadhavan Nair & Anor v PP [1975] 2 MLJ 264 andLau Dak
Kee v PP [1976] 2 MLJ 229 (which authorities were made available to the court through the industry of the DPP). In
my view, these decisions are distinguishable. Both cases arose out of the issue by the OCPD under s 27 of the
Police Act 1967 of a licence to Madhavan Nair to hold a public meeting subject to the condition that no speaker
should touch on matters relating to the MCE results and the status of Bahasa Malaysia as the national language.
The appellants committed a breach of the condition and were charged accordingly. By way of defence, the
appellants argued that the condition was unconstitutional as being in breach of art 10(2) of the Malaysian
Constitution (which corresponds in all material respects to art 14(2) of the Constitution). It was held in both cases
that the condition was valid. If, in those cases, the condition had been declared invalid on the ground of
Page 8 of 11
unconstitutionality, the appellants would have committed no offence as the licence granted to them would have
become an unconditional licence. In the present case, the appellants had no licence at all.
The soundness of the first appellant's submission may be tested by assuming that the licensing officer wrongfully
refused the licence. What were his legal rights? The court would have quashed the decision if the appellants had
commenced proceedings for judicial review. [*134]
The licensing officer would then have to consider the application afresh. If he refused, the court would have the
power to direct him to do so. But, the court would not have been able to grant a licence to the first appellant or
direct the licensing officer to do so, as the power of court is exercisable by way of supervisory jurisdiction in these
matters. Therefore, the invalidity of the decision of the licensing officer would result in nothing more than the
appellants' status quo ante the application. They would still have had no licence when they provided the public
entertainment. The law was that no public entertainment might be provided without a licence under the Act and
except in accordance with the terms of the licence. The law was not that public entertainment might be provided
subject to such restrictions as might be imposed under the Act. It must follow that the answers of the licensing
officer, whatever they might have been, could not have provided any defence to the appellants on the charges
against them.
In my view, the only available defence to the charges, in the context of this case, would be that the Act (or, what is
the same thing, the scheme of licensing established by the Act) is unconstitutional as being in contravention of art
14(2) of the Constitution to the extent that it affects the right to freedom of speech and expression. But neither
appellant made any submission to such effect. Indeed, when the court inquired of the first appellant whether he was
making this submission, he replied that he was not. He went on to submit that even though s 13(1) of the Act
provided that the licensing officer might in his discretion refuse any application for a licence, that discretion could
not be exercised arbitrarily in view of s 14 which was, as he put it, a guide as to how the discretion should be
exercised. As s 14 provides for the cancellation at any time of a licence under the Act for any reason connected
with, inter alia, public order, public morality or the security of the state, which are interests in respect of which
Parliament may legislate to impose restrictions on the constitutional right to freedom of speech and expression, this
was in effect a submission or a concession that the Act, even to that extent, was within the scope of art 14(2) of the
Constitution. If the discretion vested in the licensing officer under the Act were absolute and untrammelled, there
might be a case for arguing that the licensing scheme is unconstitutional, as then the licensing officer would have
been vested with arbitrary power to deprive a citizen of his constitutional right to freedom of speech and expression
contrary to the objects of art 14(2): seeIndulal v State of Gujarat AIR 1963 G 259 andArthur Francis v Chief of
Police [1973] AC 761.
InIndulal v State of Gujarat AIR 1963 G 259, Miabhoy J, after a full review of the US and Indian authorities on the
right to freedom of speech and expression under the constitutions of those countries, upheld a statutory scheme of
licensing the use of loudspeakers at public meetings which vested the power to grant or withhold such licences in
the Police Commissioner of Ahmedebad on the ground that under the statute in question such power was not
arbitrary and untrammelled. Miabhoy J, at p 270 para 28, said:
That the licence cannot be arbitrarily refused is also quite clear from the fact that, in the licensing rules, the use of as
loudspeaker is prohibited only in order to prevent obstruction, inconvenience, annoyance, risk, danger or damage to the
residents or the passengers in the vicinity. Thus the extreme power of prohibiting the user of loudspeakers is also not a
naked and arbitrary power, but, it is hedged in by a few conditions which indicate the policy governing the exercise of that
power. The objects which are to be achieved by making such a rule are clearly mentioned. As we have already pointed out
these objects can best be achieved by the Legislature by leaving the powers in the hands of those on whom the duty of
preservation of the public order is imposed from day to day.
In another part of his long judgment when dealing with the possibility that the power of licensing might be abused,
Miabhoy J, at p 269 para 26, said:
Moreover, a study of the various provisions of the Bombay Police Act reveals the policy of the Legislature and the purpose
for which the Act is enacted and, as we have already pointed out, there is authority of the Supreme Court which has clearly
laid down that if a power is given to an executive officer, the power has necessarily to be exercised by the officer in
enforcement of that particular policy. It is conceivable that a partial or a corrupt official may in a particular case ignore the
policy of the Act and may so use his power that, on a particular occasion, he may, on extraneous considerations, deprive
the citizen of the right of the use of a loudspeaker. But, as has been pointed out in AIR 1954 SC 465, a restriction cannot be
held to be unreasonable on the ground that the power may be exercised by an officer mala fides. As pointed out in the
Page 9 of 11
same case, in such a case, the arms of the court are strong enough to deal with such a refractory officer.
InArthur Francis v Chief of Police [1973] AC 761, the Privy Council, after reviewing decisions from the United
States, India, Pakistan, the West Indies and Canada and identifying the principles to be applied to determine the
extent to which the constitutional right of free speech and expression under the constitutions of those countries
could be validly restricted by ordinary legislation, held that s 5 of the Public Meetings and Processions Act 1969 did
not constrain s 10 of the Constitution of St Christopher, Nevis and Anguilla. Section 10 provided for the enjoyment
of freedom of expression subject however to the power of the legislature to enact laws that are reasonably required
in the interest of defence, public safety public order, public morality or public health and other matters. Section 5 of
the said Act provided that no person might use any noisy instrument at any public meeting without the permission of
the Chief of Police who might, in his discretion, grant permission upon such terms and conditions and subject to
such restrictions as he might think fit. Lord Pearson, in delivering the opinion of the Privy Council, at pp 772-773,
said:
Whatever may be the exact construction of s 10, it must be clear that (1) a wrongful refusal of permission to use a
loudspeaker [*135]
at a public meeting (for instance if the refusal is inspired by political partiality) would be an unjustified and therefore
unconstitutional interference with freedom of communication, because it would restrict the range of communication, and (2)
some regulation of the use of loudspeakers is required in order that citizens who do not wish to hear what is said may be
protected against 'aural aggression' if that might reach unbearable intensity.
As some regulation of 'noisy instruments' is required, and a system of licensing is the natural method, there must be some
licensing authority to grant or refuse the permission. The legislature of the state concerned has decided that the Chief of
Police is the suitable officer to be given this power and duty. There is convenience in that choice, as he is concerned with
the preservation of public order and knows the prevailing conditions affecting it and therefore is able to give a quick
decision. There is no evidence, and no reason to infer, that he has abused the power or would be likely to abuse it in any
way. It is reasonable to assume that the legislature, knowing the local conditions, made a suitable choice of licensing
authority.
The final question is whether s 5 of the Act is so defective as to be unconstitutional because it does not expressly lay down
guidelines for the exercise by the Chief of Police of his licensing power. Whether or not it might have been better to have
some express provision as to the way in which his discretion should be exercised, he is not without guidance. It is plain
from the preamble to the Act and from its provisions as a whole that its object is to facilitate the preservation of public order.
That being the object of the Act, he must exercise his powers bona fide for the achievement of that object. Roncarelli v
Duplessis (1959) 16 DLR (2d) 689, per Rand J (with whom Judson J concurred), at p 705, per Martland J (with whom
Kerwin CJ and Locke J concurred) at p 742 and per Abbott J at p 729. Section 5 is not defective, or at any rate not
seriously defective, in this respect. It does not contravene the Constitution.
Article 14 of the Constitution does not contain the same language as that in s 10 of the Constitution of St
Christopher, Nevis and Anguilla or as that in art 19 of the Indian Constitution; (the latter constitutions permit only
'reasonable' restrictions on constitutional rights). However, I am of the view that the test of constitutionality applied
in bothIndulal AIR 1963 G 259 andArthur Francis [1973] AC 761 is relevant to determine whether the Act
contravenes art 14(2).
InArthur Francis v Chief of Police [1973] AC 761 the Privy Council said that a wrongful refusal of permission to use
a loudspeaker at a public meeting would be an unjustified and therefore unconstitutional interference with freedom
of communication. The Privy Council however did not say what the consequence of such a breach was. As their
Lordships had specifically held that s 5 was not in breach of the Constitution, the consequence could not possibly
be the invalidity of s 5 but rather the invalidity of the decision itself. A decision which is invalid for unconstitutionality
does not, by itself, make the law under which the decision is made invalid. A law which is invalid for
unconstitutionality makes all decisions made under it invalid.
Accordingly, as the Act is not unconstitutional, it follows that the appellants were properly convicted on the charges
faced by them.
Before I consider the submission in relation to the appeals on sentence, I should like to refer to a material fact in
these appeals which appeared to have escaped the attention of counsel and the DPP. It should be recalled that the
charges on which the appellants were convicted were that they had provided public entertainment at No 80, Boat
Quay. The evidence proved conclusively, and the first appellant has admitted in the course of the argument before
Page 10 of 11
me, that the speeches were made on the five-foot way of No 80 Boat Quay which was in law a public thoroughfare
for pedestrians, and therefore a place to which the public had access. It should also be recalled that the application
made by the first appellant for the licence was for public entertainment to be provided at 'the opening ceremony of
Workers' Party premises at No 80-A Boat Quay'. In P26, the same address was given in the column bearing the
caption 'Address or locality at which event will take place'. These premises, as admitted by the first appellant, was
the second level of the two-storey building, whereas No 80-A occupied the first level of the building. No 80 Boat
Quay was not the same place as No 80-A Boat Quay. The first appellant had never applied for a licence to provide
public entertainment at No 80 Boat Quay. It must follow that whatever the fate of the application was in this case,
the appellants had no defence to the charges against them.
I turn now to the appeals on sentence. The appellants were both fined $3,500. The district judge in imposing the
fine of $3,500 each took into account the following factors: (1) the previous convictions of the appellants (five in
respect of the first appellant and four in respect of the second appellant); (2) their deliberate intention to commit the
offence in the knowledge that they had no licence under the Act; and (3) their mitigation speeches. The first
appellant contended that the fines of $3,500 was manifestly excessive having regard to the nature of the offence,
the maximum penalty for the offence (a fine not exceeding $5,000), and the judgment of the Privy Council
inJeyaretnam v Law Society of Singapore [1988] 3 MLJ 425. In that case, the Privy Council declared that the first
appellant had been wrongly convicted of the four Penal Code offences which the district judge had taken into
account.
He therefore submitted that the sentence was manifestly excessive and wrong to the extent that it had taken into
account these convictions. Further, he submitted that although the district judge had also taken into account one
other previous conviction for which he was fined $1,500, that conviction was for a different and unrelated offence
under s 3(2) of the House To House And Street Collections Act (Cap 128, 1985 Ed) and in respect of which the
maximum penalty was a fine of $5,000 or [*136]
imprisonment for a term not exceeding two years or to both. He also contended that he had complied with the law
by applying for a licence and that the rejection came too late for him to cancel the function as he had invited foreign
dignitaries to attend it.
The second appellant also had four previous convictions, having been convicted jointly with the first appellant in
respect of the Penal Code Offences. His counsel accordingly submitted that the fine of $3,500 was manifestly
excessive and wrong on the same ground relied upon by the first appellant. Counsel also claimed that his client did
not know that a licence was required or that the licence had not been obtained when he addressed the gathering,
and that the second appellant had merely made a welcoming speech of about one to two minutes, and that, unlike
the first appellant, the second appellant was not told by the police to refrain from speaking.
The deputy public prosecutor's submission was that the sentence was not manifestly excessive for the following
reasons: (a) that the appellants showed a brazen disregard of the law and had committed the offence knowing full
well that they did not have a licence; (b) that the police had been inconvenienced in that they had to perform crowd
control duty; and (c) that the appellants in committing the offences had failed to pay the licence fees. The deputy
public prosecutor declined to make a submission on whether this court should, for the purpose of determining the
appropriateness of the sentences, have regard to the decision of the Privy Council inJeyaretnam v Law Society of
Singapore [1988] 3 MLJ 425. Instead, he submitted that the said convictions were irrelevant to the present
conviction and that he did not wish to rely on them for the purpose of these appeals on sentence. In view of the
stand taken by the deputy public prosecutor and the fact that he has not addressed me on the status of these
convictions, I do not propose to say more about them. I shall disregard them as irrelevant for the purpose of
determining the appropriateness of the sentence under appeal.
On this basis, the first appellant had one previous conviction for an unrelated offence and the second appellant had
no previous conviction. The only other negative factor against the appellants was that they had deliberately broken
the law. That, of course, is not an exceptional factor as it is normally present in most convictions. It is a factor which
is more important when imposing sentences for subsequent offences of a similar nature. There were no other
adverse factors that could be put on the scale against the appellants. There was no evidence that any disorderly
conduct or breach of the peace had occurred at or in connection with the addresses made by the appellants or that
any member of the public or any of the residents of the neighbouring premises had been unduly inconvenienced, or
that their peace of mind or tranquility unduly disturbed by this infraction of the law. Taking into account all the
circumstances of this case, including the nature of the offence and conduct of the appellants, I am of the view that a
fine of $1,500 would be the appropriate sentence to be imposed on each of them.
The appeals against conviction are dismissed and the appeals against sentence are allowed to the extent that the
Page 11 of 11
fines are reduced to $1,500 in respect of both appellants.
Order accordingly.
Solicitors:Ling & Co
Reported by Terence Tan Bian Chye
End of Document
The European Proceedings of
Social & Behavioural Sciences
EpSBS
Future Academy ISSN: 2357-1330
https://dx.doi.org/10.15405/epsbs.2018.12.03.85
UUMILC 2017
9TH UUM INTERNATIONAL LEGAL CONFERENCE
RESTRICTIVE PROVISIONS OF THE COMMUNICATIONS AND

MULTIMEDIA ACT 1998: A DISCUSSION
Rusniah Ahmad (a)*, Ahmad Shamsul Abd Aziz (b), Nor Azlina Mohd Noor (c)
*Corresponding author
(a) School of Law, College of Law, Government & International Studies, Universiti Utara Malaysia, Sintok Kedah
Malaysia, rusniah@uum.edu.my
(b) School of Law, College of Law, Government & International Studies, Universiti Utara Malaysia, Sintok Kedah
Malaysia, sham@uum.edu.my
(c) School of Law, College of Law, Government & International Studies, Universiti Utara Malaysia, Sintok Kedah
Malaysia, norazlyna@uum.edu.my
Abstract
The right to freedom of expression in Malaysia enjoys a constitutional protection under Article
10(1) (a) of the Federal Constitution and has been arguably well-guarded by an independent judiciary.
The existence of countless legal restrictions to this right has never deterred the courts from its noble duty
of scrutinizing executive and ministerial action which has impacted the fundamental rights of the people.
The emergence of new technology inevitably demands more attention from the judiciary. The legislature
has enacted Communications and Multimedia Act of 1998 (CMA) to give power to the authorities to
monitor and control activities in the social media. Hence, this article will discuss the effects of two
important provisions of the CMA that is Sections 211 and 233 and its ramifications upon netizens of the
social media. For this purpose, the discussion adopts the doctrinal analysis by examining the existing
primary and secondary materials gathered from multiple sources including statutory provisions such as
Federal Constitution and Communications and Multimedia Act of 1998, case law and other legal and non-
legal literatures. This article concludes that the CMA is clearly a modern legislation that acknowledges
the existence of new technologies and that such technology must regarded as an asset to the country and
its people. It is also a recognition to the industry of communications and multimedia. Furthermore, the
cases revealed an indication that both sections 211 and 233 of the CMA 1998 appears to show that such
law is used to silence the critics and comments against the ruling establishment.
© 2018 Published by Future Academy www.FutureAcademy.org.UK
Keywords: Freedom of Speech and Expression, Media Social Law, Communication and Multimedia, Malaysia.
This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial 4.0
Unported License, permitting all non-commercial use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is
properly cited.
Corresponding Author: Rusniah Ahmad
Selection and peer-review under responsibility of the Organizing Committee of the conference
eISSN: 2357-1330
1. Introduction
The right to freedom of expression in Malaysia enjoys a constitutional protection and has been
arguably well-guarded by an independent judiciary. Article 10(1) (a) of the Federal Constitution provides
for the right to freedom of speech and expression not in absolute terms. The presence of many legal
restrictions to this right has never deterred the courts from its noble duty of scrutinizing executive and
ministerial action which has impacted the fundamental rights of the people (Aziz, Ahmad & Manap,
2015). The emergence of new technology inevitably demands more attention from the judiciary as the
right to freedom of expression widens and comfortably give access to more information and expands the
freedom of expression of Malaysian netizens to new frontiers that has never before been experienced by
Malaysians generally. The social media is facilitated by various service providers namely Facebook,
Twitter, Youtube, Flickr, Tumbler, Linkedin, Skype, Instagram, Pinterest and many more. As faced by
the conventional rights to freedom of expression, this new popular sensation is not isolated from the
common restrictions to deter acts of abuse and indiscretions. Legally the Communications and
Multimedia Act of 1998 (CMA) has been enacted to give power to the authorities to monitor and control
activities in the social media with the intention of deterring netizens from engaging in the social media in
an abusive manner and to avoid irresponsible circulation of information. This article will discuss the
effects of two important provisions of the CMA that is Sections 211 and 233 and its ramifications upon
netizens of the social media. Such an unpopular move to curb such a popular activity for all walks of
Malaysian life poses a challenge to the authorities concerned in the implementation and enforcement of
the law.
2. Problem Statement
The presence of many legal restrictions to this right has never deterred the courts from its noble
duty of scrutinizing executive and ministerial action which has impacted the fundamental rights of the
people. (Bari & Shuib, 2004) The emergence of new technology inevitably demands more attention from
the judiciary as the right to freedom of expression widens and comfortably give access to more
information and expands the freedom of expression of Malaysian netizens to new frontiers that has never
been experienced by Malaysians generally. The social media is facilitated by various service providers
namely Facebook, Twitter, Youtube, Flickr, Tumbler, Linkedin, Skype, Instagram, Pinterest and many
more. As faced by the conventional rights to freedom of expression, this new popular sensation is not
isolated from the common restrictions to deter acts of abuse and indiscretions (Barendt, 2005).
3. Research Questions
This article will discuss the effects of two important provisions of the CMA that is Sections 211
and 233 and its ramifications upon netizens of the social media.
4. Purpose of the Study

This article is intended to discuss the effects of two important provisions of the CMA that is
Sections 211 and 233 and its ramifications upon netizens of the social media. Such an unpopular move to
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curb such a popular activity for all walks of Malaysian life poses a challenge to the authorities concerned
in the implementation and enforcement of the law
5. Research Methods
This article employed a qualitative doctrinal legal research as the article intends to discuss in-depth
and detailed on the particular matters. By using qualitative methods many new aspects of problem can be
identified and thus once they are identified, suggestion would follows resulting in the research result and
findings being more beneficial and practical. For this purpose, the discussion adopts the doctrinal analysis
by examining the existing primary and secondary materials gathered from multiple sources including
statutory provisions such as Federal Constitution and Communications and Multimedia Act of 1998, case
law and other legal and non-legal literatures.
6. Findings
6.1.The Concept of Freedom of Speech and Expression
Major human rights international instruments the likes of The Universal Declaration of Human
Rights (UDHR) and International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) both provide for the
right to freedom of speech and expression and recognize it as a universal right. Across the globe many
national constitutions of countries such as the United States of America guarantees this right in its First
Amendment. The Constitution of the Republic of Korea provides for such protection in Article 21 and in
Germany it is enshrined in Article 5 of the Basic Law for the Federal Republic of Germany. Malaysia
followed suit by the provision of Article 10 of the Federal Constitution. The United Nations Human
Rights Committee further stated that freedom of expression is “a necessary condition for the realization of
the principles of transparency and accountability that are, in turn, essential for the promotion and
protection of human rights”, for whose enjoyment it form an essential basis.
Essentially the right to freedom of speech and expression ensures that individuals are entitled to
the right of imparting, seeking and receiving information, opinions and ideas without unjustifiable
unnecessary and excessive restrictions imposed by the States. This notion is applicable to the exercise of
the right to freedom of expression both in the “real world” and cyberspace (Ismail, 2012).
A prominent constitutional law jurist has conceptualized that the constitution of free democratic
states organize and control power, ensure human rights, balance competing claims of social and
individual interests, mirror the culture and experience of the country and operate as vehicles of national
progress and unity (Wheare,1960:2-8). It is only correct to say that when the Reid Constitutional
Commission recommended the provisions of protection of freedom of speech and expression amongst
others is to echo this notion of a free people and country and forgo these enduring values in the
generations to come. Worthy of its achievement the human being should be ready to commit themselves
in ensuring justice and fairness for all through just principles and just outcomes (Bhat, 2004).
John Stuart Mill, an English philosopher viewed that freedom of expression allows different
opinions and ideas in free competition of each other in open discussions. All for the goodness of seeking
the truth. Although States may not be eye to eye with this discovery and may try to censor opinions and
ideas (Mills, 2003). John Stuart Mill may have spoken this opinion in a world when such technology of
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the social media was non-existent, but the relevance of his argument is still applicable and real.
Ultimately freedom of expression would allow the individual access to various information, opinions and
ideas which will assist him to make an informed decision and an autonomous judgement. For the young it
would tremendously be of value for him/her to extend his critical thinking and develop his mental ability
to greater heights. The social media in this regard could act to facilitate this vision and be of use to the
authorities and the people both in positively turning technology as a tool for progress.
Such simple method of access to information is critical for transparency as it allows the citizens
right from the grass roots to participate in governance no matter how minute it is. However, transparency
measures must be to a large extent set rules on what information, under what form and measured in what-
way and who it ought to be reported to.
6.2.CMA 1998: The Two Sections

As discussed above, the social media could be used as a medium for progress of the human race
where access to ideas and opinion has no boundaries and information would be unlimited. However,
could over-access and unlimited data be abused and misused by the users i.e. netizens? There had been
instances where the access to unlimited data will lead to uncontrollable use since the user does not have
any clue on how to make use of such data. Or could such unlimited data access lead to unnecessary access
to unwanted data such as pornography? This is where restrictions to the use of the social media come into
the picture.
There is no doubt that many would find the implementation of such legal restrictions as negative
and hostile to progressive thoughts and social development. However compelling public interest such as
national security, public order, public morality and public security or in the context of Malaysia “acts
prejudicial to the security of the Federation of Malaysia or parts of the Federation”, will take precedence
over such sacred fundamental rights.
Section 211 of the CMA 1998 inter alia provides that content which is indecent, obscene, false,
menacing, or offensive in character with intent to annoy, abuse, threaten or harass any person, shall not be
provided by content applications service provider, or other person using a content application service. For
any commission of offence under section 211, the offender may be punished by a fine up to RM50, 000 or
imprisonment not exceeding one year and further fine of RM1000 for each day of the continuance of that
offence after the offender had been convicted by the court. Furthermore, section 233 (1) (a) CMA
provides the act of improper use of network facilities or network service by a person who is by means of
any network facilities or network service or applications service knowingly makes, creates or solicits;
initiates the transmission of, any comment, request, suggestion or other communication which is obscene,
indecent, false, menacing or offensive in character with intent to annoy, abuse, threaten or harass another
person; or initiates a communication using any applications service, whether continuously, repeatedly or
otherwise, during which communication may or may not ensue, with or without disclosing his identity
and with intent to annoy, abuse, threaten or harass any person at any number or electronic address,
commits an offence. It also includes a person who knowingly by means of a network service or
applications service provides any obscene communication for commercial purposes to any person; or
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permits a network service or applications service under the person’s control to be used for an activity
described in paragraph (a), commits an offence.
This provision prohibits anyone from posting any negative remarks/photos/sign against anyone on
the internet. However, it requires the prohibited remarks/photos/sign need to be obscene, indecent, or not
true. Protection is accorded to anyone who has been hurt by any posting in the internet and would be able
to seek protection under these sections. These provisions serve as a warning to those with intention to
abuse the ubiquitous effect of the internet to share and spread derogatory materials against another.
Deterrent measures are pertinent as once such materials have been published on the internet, it will be
accessible to all and will cause irreparable damage to one’s reputation even if what has been published is
false. The false materials will affect the lives of others as the damage caused may not easily be erased.
(Loh & Basir, 2012)
These sections of the CMA 1998 should be able to encourage mature, responsible and accountable
conduct among netizens. There is a need for them to check their facts before producing or posting
anything and to use the internet in a positive manner. The purpose of such legislation is to deter
irresponsible people from abusing and misusing the internet.
However, the challenge lies in the interpretation and the usage of the dual provisions. Basically,
the question arise as to what constitutes the act of indecent, false, obscene, menacing or offensive in
character with intent to annoy, abuse, threaten or harass” as provided by Section 211 of the CMA. Clearly
materials that are indecent, obscene, false could be understood by many but what are considered as
“menacing” or “offensive” are ambiguous and must be cautiously applied by the authorities. Although the
judiciary shall have the ultimate final interpretation of such terms, it also lies in their hands to strike a
balance between the right of netizens to enjoy freedom of speech and expression and the applicable
restrictions that is attached to that enjoyment. As usual vigorous scrutiny must be exercised where judicial
review of any encroachment of a fundamental right is engaged by the executive authorities. For this to
take place, what constitutes “menacing” and “offensive” should not be given a wide interpretation.
Examples of cases could be cited to show how the application of the two provisions so far. In
Rutinin Suhaimin v PP [2015] 3 CLJ 838, the appellant was convicted for an offence under Section 233 of
CMA and was sentenced to a fine of RM15,000 in default eight months imprisonment. The appellant was
alleged to have entered a comment against the Sultan of Perak (the impugned entry). On appeal the
appellant has argued that he did not make or initiate the transmission of the impugned entry despite the
fact that his internet account has been used. The appellant argued that his computer and internet account
were accessible by other persons and any user could have simply clicked the mouse and the computer
would have been ready for used including his internet account. The appeal was allowed since the
prosecution failed to establish beyond reasonable doubt that it was the appellant who made and initiated
the transmission of the impugned entry.
As opposed to the above case, in Ahmad Abdul Jalil v PP [2015] 5 CLJ 822, appellant was
charged for entering a comment against the Sultan of Johor and was fined RM20, 000 on his Face
account. On appeal the appellant used similar argument in Rutinin (See also Public Prosecutor v Pung
Chen Choon [1994] 1 MLJ 566, Madhavan Nair v Public Prosecutor [1975] 2 MLJ 264, Mark Koding v
Public Prosecutor [1982] 2 MLJ 120 and Public Prosecutor v Lim Kit Siang [1979] 23 MLJ 37) that is
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the account belonging to his name could have been accessible to others and that the post could have been
clicked by others. However, the witness who came from the enforcement department of the Commission
of Communications and multimedia who testified that the source of the comment came from the
Appellant’s workplace. His appeal against the decision of the judge of 1st instance was rejected.
In the case of PP v Muslim Ahmad [2013] 5 MLJ 823, the respondent was charged at the Sessions
Court for three offences under Section 233(1) (a) of the Communications and Multimedia Act 1998 for
posting offensive comments against the Perak State government’s official portal on 7th February 2009
and 8th February 2009 but was discharged and acquitted of all the charges. His defence was that he had
not posted the said offensive comments and denied using the computer to send the comments. His alibi
was that he was at his factory on the said dates. On appeal the decision of the Sessions Court was
overturned and that his alibi was rejected and witnesses that he brought to corroborate his defence were
not accepted as they were defective for non-compliance with Section 402A(1) of the Criminal Procedure
Code. The High Court contended that the Sessions Court judge had erred in her decision and accepted the
prosecution’s contention that the particulars of the place where the accused claimed to be at the time of
the commission of the offence and the names and addresses of the witnesses called to establish his
defence were not provided.
The Malaysian Communications and Multimedia Commission (MCMC) initially imposed a
blanket block on websites that published content related to Malaysia’s 1MDB scandal in February 2016.
The Malaysian Insider, a popular online news portal was blocked including other news sites like Sarawak
Report and Asia Sentinel. These measures are seen as very hostile to media freedom.
The spirit and aspirations of the CMA 1998 among others is for Malaysian netizens to be able to
enjoy this new technology and to be given the opportunity to impart healthy opinions and use available
forum for discussion. This should not in any way discourage them from expressing their view, or
comments based on facts just because it is a menace or offensive to the other person. In fact netizens must
be encouraged to check their facts and tell the truth. (Ali, 2013)
Any comments and opinions given by anyone based on facts, tantamount to freedom of speech and
expression which are protected by article 10 of the Federal Constitutions. Right of freedom of speech and
expression is a right of every citizen and this right can only be restricted if it involved the interest of
security of the Federation, public order, and morality.
Prosecuting a person merely for giving opinions and fair comments is a suppression of these rights
curtailing the basic fundamental rights of Malaysian netizens which is against the spirit of our Federal
Constitution. It is only logical that fair comments and opinions is not a threat to the security of the
Federation, public order, and morality. Within this premise, section 3 (2) (a) and (b) of the CMA 1998
asserted to promote a civil society where information-based services will provide the basis of continuing
enhancements to quality of work and life and to grow and nurture local information resources and cultural
representation that facilitate the national identity and global diversity;
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7. Conclusion
This article concludes that the CMA is clearly a modern legislation that acknowledges the
existence of new technologies and that such technology must regarded as an asset to the country and its
people. It is also a recognition to the industry of communications and multimedia. Furthermore, the cases
mentioned expressed that Sections 211 and 233 of the CMA 1998 seems to show that such law is used to
silence the critics and remarks against the ruling establishment. This if true, is a dangerous precedent. The
society must be open minded to acknowledge criticism, the same goes to the government. We need to
promote and polish a society that cherish honesty, open to criticism and comments, and celebrate
differences. (Manique, 2015) Think with open mind, give opportunity to ask questions, query the obvious
which should be healthy for society within any generations. If the subject matter that has been posted is
indecent, obscene, and false, it is only right that we should go against these menaces. However, as far as
we do not want people to abuse the internet, all parties must ensure that the regulative framework will not
be abused and used as a tool of oppression. Fair comments and criticisms that are constructive and
intended for discussion are not a threat to the security of the Federation, public order, and morality.
However, in this context despotic, bigotry, irrational behaviour/thinking should be ceased from
continuing. Such restrictions must be formulated with sufficient precision to enable an individual/netizens
to regulate his or her conduct accordingly. If sufficient guidance is available to enable them to determine
what kind of expression is restricted and those that are allowed, any allegations of legal breach will be
addressed efficiently and further breach could be prevented.
Acknowledgments
This research work is sponsored by Ministry of Education under Fundamental Research Grant
Scheme 2006-1 (Ke Arah Pengukuhan Model Undang-undang Berkaitan Penyalahgunaan Media Sosial di
Malaysia), FRGS/1/2016/SSI10/UUM/02/3, and research s/o code: 13587
References
Aziz, A.S.A, Ahmad, R. & Manap, N.A. (2015). Sekatan kepada tanggungan ISP menurut Akta Hak
Cipta 1987, Malayan Law Journal, 5.
Ali, S. H. (2013). The Malay Rulers: Regression or Reform? Strategic Information and Research
Development Centre: Petaling Jaya.
Barendt, E. (2005). Freedom of speech. Oxford University Press: Oxford.
Bari, A.A. & Shuaib, F.S. (2004). Constitution of Malaysia: Text and commentary. Pearson: Selangor.
Bhat, P. I. (2004). Fundamental rights: A study of their interrelationships. Eastern Law House: Kolkata.
Ismail, N. (2012). Bloggers as amateur journalist and their position under the regulatory system of the
press in the UK. Malaysian Journal of Law and Society, 16, 69-78.
Loh, I.H. & Basir, S.M. (2012). Penggumpulan dan pengagihan data remote sensing: Kajian ke atas isu
keselamatan nasional. Malaysian Journal of Law and Society. 16, 19-28.
Manique, C. (2015). The law relating to ISPs liability in Malaysia and policy strategies that service
providers could adopt to avoid third party liability. Malayan Law Journal, 2, cxlii-cxxii.
Mill, J. S. (2003). On Liberty. Edited by D. Bromwich and G. Kateb. Yale University Press: New Haven.
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gaan Persekutuan

Bab 1—Pemerolehan Kewarganegaraan

14. Kewarganegaraan melalui kuat kuasa undang-undang

Agama bagi Persekutuan

(2) Di dalam tiap-tiap Negeri selain Negeri-Negeri yang tidak

(3) Perlembagaan-Perlembagaan Negeri Melaka, Pulau Pinang,

(4) Tiada apa-apa jua dalam ini mengurangkan mana-mana

Undang-undang utama Persekutuan

4. (1) Perlembagaan ini ialah undang-undang utama Persekutuan

(2) Kesahan mana-mana undang-undang tidak boleh dipersoalkan

(3) Kesahan mana-mana undang-undang yang dibuat oleh

(4) Prosiding untuk mendapatkan penetapan bahawa sesuatu

dibicarakan semula kerana kesalahan yang sama kecuali jika sabitan

8. (1) Semua orang adalah sama rata di sisi undang-undang dan

(2) Kecuali sebagaimana yang dibenarkan dengan nyata oleh

(3) Tidak boleh ada diskriminasi yang memihak kepada mana-

(4) Tiada pihak berkuasa awam boleh mendiskriminasikan mana-

(5) Perkara ini tidak menidaksahkan atau melarang—

(termasuk perizaban tanah) atau perizaban bagi orang

Larangan buang negeri dan kebebasan bergerak

9. (1) Tiada seorang pun warganegara boleh dibuang negeri dari

(2) Tertakluk kepada Fasal (3) dan kepada mana-mana undang-

(3) Selagi mana-mana Negeri lain berada dalam kedudukan

Kebebasan bercakap, berhimpun dan berpersatuan

10. (1) Tertakluk kepada Fasal (2), (3) dan (4)—

(b) semua warganegara berhak untuk berhimpun secara

(2) Parlimen boleh melalui undang-undang mengenakan—

(3) Sekatan-sekatan ke atas hak untuk membentuk persatuan

(4) Pada mengenakan sekatan-sekatan demi kepentingan

Tarikh Persetujuan Diraja: 23 September 1998

Tajuk Panjang & Mukadimah.

Seksyen 1. Tajuk ringkas.

BAHAGIAN II - KUASA DAN TATACARA MENTERI

Bab 1 - Arahan Menteri

Seksyen 7. Arahan oleh Menteri.

Bab 2 - Penentuan Menteri

Seksyen 10. Penentuan oleh Menteri.

Bab 2 - Kesalahan Dan Penalti Tambahan

231. Kesalahan jika menggunakan radas atau peranti tanpa kelulusan.

232. Penggunaan secara fraud kemudahan rangkaian, perkhidmatan rangkaian, dll.

(1) Seseorang yang—

(1) Seseorang yang—

(a) dengan menggunakan mana-mana kemudahan rangkaian atau perkhidmatan rangkaian

(i) membuat, mewujudkan atau meminta-minta; dan

(ii) memulakan penghantaran,

(b) memulakan suatu komunikasi dengan menggunakan mana-mana perkhidmatan aplikasi,

melakukan suatu kesalahan.

(2) Seseorang yang secara sedar—

(a) dengan menggunakan suatu perkhidmatan rangkaian atau perkhidmatan aplikasi

(b) membenarkan suatu perkhidmatan rangkaian atau perkhidmatan aplikasi di bawah

melakukan suatu kesalahan.

234. Pemintasan dan pendedahan komunikasi dilarang.

(c) menggunakan, atau cuba untuk menggunakan, kandungan apa-apa komunikasi,

melakukan suatu kesalahan.

Nor Hisham bin Osman v Pendakwa Raya [2010] MLJU 1249

HIGH COURT (SHAH ALAM)

Siti Khadijah Sheikh Hassan Badjenid, JC

Tiga (3) isu yang perlu diputuskan adalah:-

B. Samada sekatan ini dibenarkan oleh Perkara 10(2)(a) Perlembagaan tersebut?

Merujuk kepada Perkara 10 Perlembagaan:-

(a)Tiap-tiap warganegara adalah berhak bebas bercakap dan mengeluarkan fikiran;

(2) Parlimen boleh dengan undang-undang mengenakan-

D. Samada pemohon terikat dengan Perkara 4(4) Perlembagaan Persekutuan?