BILDERBERG GROUP BUXTON CONFERENCE 19-15 September 1958 PRELIMINARY REPORTBILDERBERG _GROUR BRON _CONRERENGR SURVEY OF EVENTS SINCE THE LAST BILDERBERG CONFERENCE TN EuIGG tthe Seventh Bilderberg Conference, presided over by B.R-H. the Frinoe of tho Netheriends, oponed with a survey Of dovelopents since the provious oie feronee held netziy 2 year ogo im Italy» The digcussions ranged over events” of major significance to the Western Alliance and were introdueed in turn by @ Guropsen ang an imerzosn speaker, each giving an agsesenen’ of the world scene as it was soen on hig side cf the Atlantice the discussion concentrated on those issues At the Chaimmanta reguee wiee Inter itons in the Conference Agente. which did nob arise for debate ¥ there vere few rongons for satiocaction, In the previous twelve months fusetn nal Rencstbmied her boclrioal wogrsds in the Yield of missiles by being the figot 2p lama an cart satelite, the United States had experienced a roression, hich had ¢ prigury projicsr countwies herd elthouga’t+ now Seemed to be ending, Im Terope, Fzence went through taternal ‘upheavals; and although sue locks iike solving the yreblon of her overseas Se iterios, the Fahne tct Aigesta romaine os worsen as eves, The solution of Sie Hpntt Question 1g no nearer, ‘The negottetions oad annocurering abou & summit cone Seer aad not nine ang peoul+ one Woy oF another, and In the as le East Re ieee haa cepenioncod setbacks. Hicw the West ves likely lo suffer further reverses in the Far Fast. there wore, howeves, sone ereas of progress, es in the field of Buropean Eoonvnis Toeestation, here the Connon Market had been set ap and the Free Toade vee nsgotiations wore more Lisely to suoceets Deoueston emeentzated om the two mont topical problenss the Bar Bast and tha lildéle Eact, toth of watch bad en inmedic#s npact on relations be~ tween Europe and America. A Buropean participant zenerod on the differen’ histories oirourstances hich oti tisteh theapattuies of Europeans and Americens tovards Ching» Thaceae ten Barereana, China was The most roncte country in the worlds for ceerioimg dt mesre neigmeous arose the coca, Buropeans Lesleed upon’ Tot Easivm problors in practice) terns of political or econonte interest, with eee ein. cvccntiment of troiition, Americats thinking on Ching wae Jinted sigh stemg mosal feoling, Unlike Barope or-Africa, China carried for Tutisah bon ioclonaané oonnemisions and eteracted, theretome, much of their sympathy cad attention, This ued been expressed an the very powerful missionary~2- ‘effort through which large parte of America were made aware of Chinese prom ploms. Mary Aneriouns regarded thc Chinese as their spiritual ohildren, yuring the Civil Wer the bed Chineso had defeated the good ones, who retreated to Fornose. It vas now hard to leave these friends in the luxch. another erful factor was the Korean War, which, in terms of casualties was the second largest Amerion hod ever experienced, and left a residue of hoatility towards the Foking Government. Again, Formosa was the bese from which the Japanese attacked Poarl Harbour and it therefore had to remein in friendly hands, For all these reseone a strong emotion! stresk wae injected into American thinking on the eubject. One of the Ancrican spenkers rertarked that all nations develop on some point or another an emotional attitude, a "sticking point" on which they find it difficult to yields China hed become such a point for the anerican opinion, All this influenced Anericate attitude concerning the admission of China to the United Nations, Most Auecican perticinents felt that China should not be admitted tecause it had failed to prove ite willingness to abide by the United Notions Charter, On ths other hand, while some Europoane shared their jew, the majority Gd not attach mich inportance to this argument, considers ing thot ations alzeady included governments with equally bad records. leat of the European perideiganis were yropered to consider tae caso on its political merits, Jmony the argunants mit forsard was the position of China as a mejor power, and also the necessity of creating conditions in which peaceful chonees and adjustments could take place, Sone Suropean speakers considered that the crisis over Quomoy and lstau was typical of mony situations fn which Chinese menberehip of tha United Nations could prove helpful. Above all, however, there wos the problen of Chinats relations with Russia, It should be our principal aim to break this @llianco end China's entry into the United Nations might ease our tack in this resyect. ‘The exnct relationship between these two powers was en enigne. It was notel, hovever, that differences existed between their respective attitudes, ae was shor at the tine of the Futgarien Revolution ané, later on, over the second break with Tito, We should not, hovever, put too mich hope in major divergencies arising betreen Russia and China in the near future, Por a long time these tro countries vould stand together, Quenoy and Matsa naturally ocoupied a prominent place in the discussion, Tt was generally felt that the question of the off-shore islands was creating serious differences between Europe and fimerica and that therefore it vas partioulerly eppromiate tint it showld be fully examined at the Bilderberg Conference. Turopean speakers pointed out that 1% appeared as if the United States was trying to apply a right principle, that of opposing the uae of force, to among cause, The majority felt that the islands should be treated as pert of the mainland, ani that the conflict over then was in reality a further episode the Ghonese Civil Wer. For this reason, the ergunent against the use of force in egvessicn across frontiers dig not soc convincing, Moreover, the islands~3- were important to the Nationalists, not as a tastion for the defence of Formoss, but as a forward base for posaible invasion of the mainland, Though such an invasion was today both unpractical and improbable, as one of the participants pointed out, it served to support a myth which she Chiang KainChok regime needed to maintain its hold on its eupporters, Public opinion in Burope end algo in Canada, was therefore unwilling to support a defence of the islends, and this attitude was further strengthened by 2 lack of sympathy with the Nationalist regime. A repid and incouplete poll taken during the Conference evidently reflected this public opinion. The survival of the Nationalist regime was generally considered as of little importance, and only fow Europeans thought it could be of serious significance for the Chineso colonies in South Bast Asia, Accordingly, the trensformation of the Nationalist regimo into an independent stete of Formosa, following some kind of popular consultation ot plebiscite, mes suggested. In expressing their viens on Maten, Quemoy and Fornosa the European participants distinguished clearly botwoon the last and the off-shore islands, and no European dissent was heard frou the view expressed by Americans that whatever the fate of the off-shore islends, Formosa should not be allowed to fall to the Conmmnists. The main argunent for present American policy was that we were faced with another manifestation @ the general’ policy of the Soviet Bloc to provoke the Yost at distant points of the globe, to test ite determination and will to resist. A line should be dra somewhere, and considering that the Test vas in @ weak position in many places around the gorld - for instance in Berlin ~ it ms better to tako a fira stend from the start. Ono of tho snoricon spookers said, however, the hited States opinion wes avare of the dravbacks of taking a stand in Quenoy and Matsa, but 2t wos believed that firmess was tho best wey of securing a reapite which would permit the U.S.4, to extricate ttscif from this wpleasant situation, The difficulty of the present position was generally oppreciated on all sides, ‘The arguneuts, therefore, were mainly directed at the pelicy which haa led the West into on untenable position. It was pointed out that the United States had lost a good opportunity during the period of peace which followed the previous attack on Quemoy, to come to a reasonable assessment of the situation and avoid getting into the prosent difficulties, Por this reason, as one of the American participants pointed out at the end of this debate, it would help to rally public opinion, in any cage in Europe; if it was understood that the United States in its present prodicament ained, not at maintaining the status quo, but at oxtricating itself from an unfortmate position,a~4- During the last eleven months, the West had experienced severe set-backs in tho Middle Hast, Sone of the speskers felt, ‘however, that Western action had succesded in averting still greater dangers, and that by stepping in in ‘tine we had prevented a revolution spreading tsroughout the ares. Whether wo succeeded or not vas open to question, for the prasence of american and Eritish troops in the lebanon and Jordan was onky a temporary measure, and their withdrawal might woll restart the chain of events which was intorrupted ty their landings. As it vas, the situation was not wholly bad, The Baghiad Pact, though it-could no longer hope to become e rallying point for the Iiadle Eastas a whole, remained a5’2 shield in the north, Although with the fall of the Nuri Said rogine in Iraq, Cairo remained the sole pole of attraction for the dwabs, some participants thought’ that in time the emergence of other nationalist vegies, such as that in Roghdad, might nrove to be beneficicl. Arab national- isn vas dengerous in so fer as it fell under Soviet influence or Nasserts domination, “but vecause it stood for independance and produced apparently ropes Jar vegines, it might yet ve'veluable and useful. Its three characteriatics, one of the Speakers observed, were jaccbinisn, xenophobiz and enti-Israclisn, Apart from these nebulous ani mainly negative attitules it had yet to define itself end find its expression in a more positive programme, Nationalist revolutions could well yield positive results; as was tho case in Turkey undex Koms1 Ataturk, It wae objectioneble, however, when it reached beyond its cm borders hurting the interests of others, In such cases we hei the right to protect ourselves, and should be firm abort it, 4s it was, some participants felt thet, in a sense, we had acted in the Isiddle Hast io stop the Arab Tevelution, It was a natural process that hed to run its cycle, and our best policy wes to try instead to come to terms with it. Otherwise whoever in the Arab world carries 1¢ through and energes as its leader, will do so as our eneny, This was, moreover, an inevitable process which will continne, if for no other reason, to got rid of Western influence in the area. ‘Thet and its anti-Israeli cheracter were'the tro negative sources of its strength, Tt need not be accessarily true, hovever, that a victorious Avab nationalism would be a grester danger to Istacl, So far, unstable governments, for reasons of demagozy, vied with each other in asserting their hostility to the Jewish state, ‘The temptation to do that would be lessened for @ unified arab atete or for populer governaente. In the Mlddle East we wore witnessing not only a nationaltet revolution, put also e social revolution, The Arebs were noving from a medieval-vorld into a modern one, and this rapid change was not, and indeed could not be, accomplished by way of peaceful political evolution. They were following a revolutionary path ied by small elites recruited froa tho nowly energing'clesecs. As always in iustory, the armed forces led ty the younger officers, were playing a prominent pert, and their outlook was in Line with the Cartesian formia of the dismantling of tho past ond attaupting 2 logicel reconstitution of the prosent, What happened in the Middle Bast indicated a social transformation, a transition toverds in dustrial society and nationel emanicipation, but it sbould not be confused with-5e communion, Ib was accompanied ty coercioa and violence, but often no other way was possible. Interual violence was promoted and supported, however, by indirect external aggression, the use of pressure, thraats, infiltration and subversion, This could hardly be tolerated in view of our commitments and interests, and ve bad to act to prevent force from suceseding, ‘There was a fforence between one successful coup dtetot and on epidenic of revolutions sna vielence sponsored from the outsid If the use of force was to become @ common occurrence the transition would prove a hazardous process which could lead to unpredictable results, rt promoted an imperialistic state of mind which could occur in small netions as well as lerge, leading to equally dangerous and mwelcome results, These olrounstances, cous participanta felt, considerably detracted from whatever eympathy one might feel with the cause of Arab emancipation. ‘his concept of resisting external, indirect aggression should not be cervied too far, however, for it might involve us in resisting national evolution. In spite of the United Nations! resolution, some speakers folt that the Weet stood on weak ground in defending present frontiers, as the frontiers of the Middle East vere impased by the West and had little significe ance for the Arabs, xtarnally sponsored indirect aggression only suceeded wish tho internal ground for it was favourable. Again it was in the Western ‘iberal tradition so supyort forces opposing unposalar regimes, Bad as our {Elemis was, it wee further aggravated by Communist se%ion end influence, Shey hed the techniques, the meats, and above ell the determination to exploit such situations, thezeas the West was practically unprepared to deal with thom cals vas @ problen to which attention vos drawn on several occzsion2. It was } particularly urgent problem, oc similar situations were Likely to arise in sther parts of the world, and maybe even in South America. At present, as a European speaker emphasised, the Middle Rast with ite woven mixture of bad and hopeful points, confronted the West with a croblem which was lergely ona of tactics, As was often pointed out, we found our- yelves associated with regimes on their way out. Jo try, however, to identify, jet alone support, the right forces of the future vas 9 dengorous gaite and “ae Likelihood of error ves great. There was no simple end magical formule. s vealistie approach was recommended. Too often we seened to fell in for generalisation and slogans. Nasser for instance was sozetimes mae to appear ie an ogre, sometines as a martyr. Again, the principles underlying our solicy should be sdapted to the facts ofthe situntion and the mentality of the seople concerned, If ve need to be firm, if in extremis we have to intervene, let ua at least do it openly, The more explicit the threat the less the chance af needing to carry it ou. Heononie mena could be used. Whoever cane to power in the Widdle Hast, as one of the American participants said, would have to boar in mind his-6- countrys necd for oil revenues, and he did not doubt the ability of the oii companies to strike a bargain, Besides, the West could do more than anybody 9 prouote the econonic development of this region, and the most promising course vas to oncourege the Arabs to pursue the same lines of economic co-operation as were developing in Western Europe. Our search for new institutional formulas wos of great significance to the new netions trying to find thir propar place in the world. larger economic entities could weld irresistible political aspirations with the necessities of modern civilisation based on the free market econcwy, The movement towards economic unification in Burope was an attempt to reconoile national sovereignty with econcnic necessity and social progresa. It embodied three principles - the large market, the price mechanien cotrected and controlled to.eliminate excesses, and common institutions evolved to meet administrat~ ive needs, The new nations might well benefit fron our example and try to follow this path. Te EUIURY OF W, In the course of a special sitting devoted to this subject one of the perticipants outlined the strategy of N.A,7,0. and some of the problema it hed to face, The task of the military plamers, that of defining « minimum strategy to achieve moxinum eecurity, largely turned on an assessment of strategy over the next five year's; 69 did the programming of military procurements. in view of the rapid technological advance in weanons, what was appropriate five yoars ego was wilikely to be suitable five years hence. However, the military planners were satisfied that their policy wae as sound tolay as it proved to be in the past. .A.7.0, strategy wes based on the dual concopt ‘of the shield and the sword, he task of the shield is to Hold an initial attack, and it must be of sufficient strength to meet snd hold an aggreseor, fo theb the onus of deciding to extend the conflict would rest with the enemy. This sitution was naturally a delicate one to plan for, and for instance 4% was considered doubtful whether on atteck could remain limited if the Soviet forcea were directly involved. The shield force had thus three functions 1. To complete the deterrent. 2, %o give military and political flexibility to our reactions. 3. o defend the European members of N.A,7.0, if attacked, ‘ts strength had to be plenned in accordance with the estimated power of the enemy's limited or goneral attack, It was believed that the integration of our forces and the maximum use of science and teotmology would compensate for our manpowor inferiority and would onable us to hold the balance. However, our actual strength was constantly below requirements, In spite of the steady reduction in the manpower demands of 8,H.A.P., the gap persisted, It was