EDMUND HUSSERL AND LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN 1 1. The regeneration of philosophical tradition by tackling old problems in a way entirely different from the usual is exemplified in two philoso- phers, different from each other and cheracteristie of the Continental and Anglo-Saxon traditions respectively, at the same time, however, having something in common in their approach, viz., Edmund Husserl (1859-1988) and Ludwig Wittgenstein (1889-1951). Each of them founded a philosophical school, phenomenology and anelysis respectively, which have a spocial feature in common, ~ the combination of very conerete clements with a very striet methodology. Each engaged on methodological problems, especially those which had already been raised by David Hume, while each, too, derived much inspiration from G. Frege, and indeed oceupiod himself thoroughly with problems of mathematical logie. It may be useful briefly, and without trying to bo quite exhaustive, to indicate somothing of tho common theme of both thinkers, while in so doing the differences will also become apparent. Tho most conspicuous foature in all this is the charaetoristic, already hinted at, of ronowal, which clearly comes to tho foro in thoir philosophy. 1.11. A central point with Hussorl is the phonomonological reduction or epoché, especially after 1913. This roduction or Einklammorung is a brackoting of reality, and is not intondod to restrict reality, but procisoly to unfold its structure, What is involved hero is a “rovaluation,” which ig not coneorned to deny, nor to affirm, reality, but to consider its being or not being real as irrelevant. ‘This goes beyond tho denial of the world by the solipsist, or the scepticist’s doubts, and is indoed entirely differont from these attitudes, since such negations or doubts somehow presuppose a natural world. Every consideration of the phenomena or the world in #0 far as they are real is withheld (Id., 1, 68-69). Human Imowledge and 1 Husserl's works referred to in this article are: Logische Untersuchungen, 1, 1 (1013): LU; Porleeungen zur Phiinomenologie des inneren Zeitberwusstecins (1928): V2; Formale und Tranazendentale Logik (1929): FTL; Brjahrung wnd Urteil (1939): BU; Die Ido der PRinomenologie (1060): IPs Cartsioniache Meditationen (1060): CMs Tdeen zu einer reinen Phiinomenologie ‘und phiinomenologische Philosophie, 1, TI, TIL (1960-1962): 1d.; Die Krieis der ewropdiechen Wissenschaften und die transeendentale Pheinomenclogie (1054): Wx. Brate Philosophie, I (1958): EPh. Wittgenstein's sre: Trastatus Logico-Philosophicus (1922): ‘Tr.; Philosophical In- vestigations (1953): PhI; The Blue and Brown Books (1958): BBB, The first numbers (1, 2, ete.) of the decimal figures indicate the themes; the second number indicates the treatment of the theme in question by Husserl (n. 1), or by Wittgenstein (n. 2); while the third number with each indicates the parallel parts. 181182 Pamosoray AnD PHENomENozocioaL ReszaRrcn consciousness in the ordinary sense, also in the exact sciences, is character- ined by @ latent prejudice: the accoptance, as a matter of course, of the phenomenon in question being somehow real (including the pertinent modalities as its being probable, doubtfal, or even not real), whether this phenomenon be given in perception, memory, theoretical model, ete. The phenomenological reduction considers the reality-as-such as irrelevant, reveals, in so doing, its latent presence, and unfolds in this manner a “uni- verse of absolute freedom of prejudice” (OM, 72-74). 1.12. Ib is in connection with this that we must interpret the adage of phenomenclogy, which has become so well-known and has so often been misunderstood: “Zu den Sachen.” This involves no empiricist epistemo- logy, for reality as naturally given has in its factual character been bracketed, and the natural or “mundane” position of the epistemological subject has been fundamentally changed and widened. Things, therefore, are structures, which unfold themselves within the scope of transcendental reduction. And there we are concerned with the description of phenomena, thet is to say, with the structure of the judgments in whieh these de- scriptions come to the fore (Id., I, 43). Thus already in his earlier works Husserl could speak of “the idea of pure grammar,” which aims at investi- gating the objective and aprioristic possibilities, not by empirical investi- gations, but by looking for laws of meaningfulness on the basis of whieh meaningful language becomes distinguishable from meaningless language (LU, TI, 1, 884). Now when the investigator's attention, by-passing per- ception, remembrance, ete., is directed to the judgments, the objective clement which is, as it were, the terminal point of judgments is called by Husserl the “Sachverhalt” (atomic fact: translation of the same term in Tr) (LU, HL, 1, 445). Husserl, aftor all, wants to investigate the phenomena. This word should be understood properly. It does not denote the phenomena in the everyday sonse, but that which is most fundamentally given, and whieh is not unfolded until it is investigated in the light of transcendental re- duction. The question of whother or not what is investigated roally oxiste is no longor asked, so that wo aro only concerned with “moanings” whieh aro given absolutely, ic., which, indepondont of all psychological and philosophical explanation, can only bo noted according to what they “protend,” what thoy mean. How, in conoreto, doos Husserl sot about doing this? Lot us give one of the numerous oxamplos deseribod by bir (1a., ILI, 100): whet, ultimately, does the phenomenon “material thing” come to? Purely phenomenologically, therefore, irrospectively of any explenations about things, and also of any factual modalities (like reality, probability, irroality) — it is only in this way that we ean look for the meaning of “thing” at all. In order to attain this ond we stort from ox- amples: bricks, housos, etc. We find exemples which hardly merit theEpunp Hussuat anp Lupwic Wrrragnsrnin 183 namo of “thing” any more. In this way, instoad of inductively finding common traits, the aim is to see, what, in tho poreoptually given, is con- voyod by tho coneopt, what is “intendod” and what is not, what essontial foaturos, thoroforo, aro eonvayed by tho word. 1.18. All this is characteristic of an ontirely new approach in philosophy. ‘Tho Cartosian doubt is mothodieally olaborated and rendered radical by tho phenomenological reduction. This enables the philosopher to doseribe “things” without projudice, that is to say the phenomena in so far as they obtain structurally. ‘The connection with the antimotaphysical tendency is clear. Husserl, it is true, is prepared to speak of a metaphysios, but only as a “prima philosophia,” not in the sense of a “historically degenerated metaphysics.” Every metaphysical adventure and speculative approach is precisely destined to be cut off by this method. It is meaningless to speak, as traditional metaphysics doos, of a world-in-itself, which is destitute of the meaning, unfolding itself in knowledge. ‘There is no “being behind the phenomena,” for the “‘in-itself” is itself a meaning, which, ontside of language and outside of consciousness (not indeed as a psychological, “zeal” given, but always phenomenologically reduced) would be devoid of any sense (EPh., 285, 248). 1.21. Wittgenstein considers philosophy as the analysis of philosophical problems, an analysis which aims to counteract an urge to misumderstand them. He, too, favors a different approach, therefore, foregoing expla~ nations and endeavoring to unfold structures which are at first invisible. He states, consequently, that problems are solved, not by giving new information, but by arranging what: we have always known: philosophy is a battle against the bewitchment of our intellect by means of language (PRI, § 109). 1.22, Sueh an investigation implies that a fact, i.e., that which ex- presses a sense, is to be taken into consideration even though it is concealed by the ordinary form of expression that the propositional sign is a fact (Tr., 8.142, 8.148). These facts are reducible to atomic tacts (“Sachver- halt”) and these are combinations of entities (“Sachen”). Wittgenstein wants, by logical investigation, to go into the structures of a thing, which means that he wants to find out if a thing can occur in an atomic fact, and this has already to be projudged in the thing (‘Tr., 2 - 2.0121). At first Wittgenstein evolves this investigation within the scope of a theory of picturing, which means that logical language “pictures” atomic facts as real facts, oxisting in tho natural world; the proposition is in so doing a picture of roality (Tr., 4.01 ff,). This constitutes the so-called logical atomism. In a subsoquont phaso philosophy is given the task of putting everything simply before us, neither explaining nor deducing anything. Philosophy becomes a kind of “prima philosophia” in the process, since Wittgenstoin ascribes tho torm philosophy to what is possi-184, PxiosopHy AND PHENOMENOLOGICAL REsKARCH ble before all new discoveries and inventions (PhI, §126). It is not for philosophy, therefore, to interfere with the actual use of language; it, can in the end only deseribe it. It leaves everything as it is (PhI, § 124). We are concerned, therefore, with what reveals itself ab this new level of investigation, where neither scientific explanation, nor a philosophic doctrine of picturing can be permitted to interfere with the deseription of what lies open to view. ‘What we have to discover is all that pertains to structures and meanings, or, us Wittgenstein formulates it himself in the German text: we have to consider facts (““Tatsachen”) as the most fundamental phenomena: We ought to look at what happens as a “‘proto-phenomenon.” The question is not one of explaining a languago-game by means of our experiences, but of noting a language-game (PhI, § 654, 655). How doos Wittgenstein set about doing this in concreto? In order to know how a word functions one has to look at its use and lear from that (PI, § 340). This docs not involvo dismissing 3 irrelevant the concrete casos, which alone ean help to undorstand the usage of a torm. We shall have to abandon our craving for gonerality. “If we study the grammar, soy, of the words ‘wishing,’ ‘thinking,’ ‘undorstanding,’ ‘meaning,’ wo chall not bo dissatisfied when wo havo dosoribed various casos of wishing, thinking, ote. If someono seid, “surely this is not all that ono calls ‘wishing,’” we should answer, “cortainly not, but you can build up more complicated casos if you like,” (BBB, 18, 19). 1.28 In this method a new approach in philosophy is given by Wittgen- stein, a vory antimotaphysical one too. So much so, indeed, that at first it scems as if the whole of philosophy is annihilated, at least judging by a cursory glance at often quoted fragments of the Tractatus, for example, that the right mothod of philosophiaing is to sey nothing oxeopt what con be said, i.c., the propositions of natural science, something that has nothing to do with philosophy (6. 68). It is only leter that it becomes evident that the central problems of philosophy have not beon dismissed in the philosophical analysis of Wittgenstein. In view of this, however, it ‘will be necessary to explain what precisely is the antimetaphysical tenden- cy. Most questions and positions of philosophers result from the fact that we do not understand the logie of our language; they are nob false but senseless, and it is one of the characteristics of metaphysics to give no meaning to certain signs in the propositions (Tr., 4. 008; cf. 6. 58). A well-known example is thai we try to find a substance for a substantive: one of the great sources of philosophical bewilderment (BBB, 1). There- fore, when investigating words like “knowledge,” “being,” “object,” “1,” we have to bring these words back from their metaphysical to their everyday usage (PhI, § 116). 2. Husset!’s approach to philosophy in the various forms of reductionEpmunp Husserv anp Lupwic Wrrresnsrsin 185 ~ the eidetic reduction, which unfolds the essence of some particular object, and the transcendental or phenomenological reduction, which is condueted in various phases and is constantly renewed by Husserl ~ is more dynamic than Wittgenstein’s, and is able to do without any theory of picturing. Ultimately, however, 8 common accent with both thinkers is on the phenomena in their meaningful structures. The point is not to ask what something is (the explanation), but how something shows itself. Hussorl conducts this investigation within the seope of the (transeen- dental, not psychologically given) consciousness; Witigenstein carries on his within the seope of logical language. In this way a certain coherence of the phenomena becomes apparent, and their structural ordor within the horizon of the world. At the same time, while with Husserl the empha- sis is rather on the lived reality of the world (“Lebenswelt”), with Witt- gonstein the logic of everyday language is placed in the foreground. 2.11 In describing the phenomena within the view as it is transeen- dentally determined it appears that a poresived or romombered thing, known or willed object, a spatial or temporal distanes, ete., ete., mani- fests itself in over varying modes of judgmonts and states of consciousness (not. psychologically but structurally, og., as intended toward past or present, otc). Consciousness, therefore, is nothing in itself, but always connocted with an objects it is always consciousnoss of (i.a., CM, 77-79; LU, I, 1, 866-870). Tho moaning of an object (a houso which I soo, an ovent which I romember, ote.) which is discovered in tho descriptions of tho significant strueturo, and in tho brackoting of ontological validity (tho quostion whether or not something roally oxists is in so doing climinatod irom tho philosophical investigation), this moaning is the object con- siderod according to the manner in which it shows itsolf: “Gegonstand im Wie.” Consciousness (invariably in the above mentioned structural sonso) and the object of consciousness are inoxtrieably interwoven in any form of appoarance whatsoever. The object always belongs to consciousnoss: it is always “how” (Id., I, 822; EPh., 249). ‘Thus structures and logical possibilities are also apprehended by consciousness in the sense that they are necessary, and could not be other- wise apart from thinking, eg., that a thing is thought os indepondent, that a quality cannot be so considered — this impossibility is not psycho- logically factual, but necessary in itself. In these modes of appearance object and thinking turn out to be necessarily interrelated, so that Huser] infers: what we cannot think, cannot be, and what cannot be, we cannot think (LU, II, 1, 295-289). Afterwards the same idea returns in Husser!'s philosophy, though in a somewhat altered form, when he points out that to speak about an unknowable world behind the phenomena, as well as to speak about another conerete world in a differant solar system, for ex- ample, in the sense thal such a world ean de jure never come into contact186 Putnosopry anv Pumnomunotoeican Researce with our world and perceptions (which is not the same as: de facto not yet), must be devoid of all meaning (Id., I, 110-114) 2.12 The foregoing is more concretely exemplified by the investigation of rules. Perceived or remembered things, value-objects, perception of timo, ete., all this manifests itself in definite rules. 'The thing is, to mention an example, such a series of rules, under which we perceive it as this particular thing: of a cube we perceive the front part, the back is con- cealed from view, but the fact that I perceive the front part as the front part involves that somehow T know something of the back part as well: L anticipate it, as it wore. Tt is further already certain that tho back surface will, like the front, have the form of a quadrangle, not, however, that because the front is green, the back must be green as well; although, again, I do know that the back surface must be of some color, ete. Thus there ae rules tending toward the completion of this thing-perception, although this completion can never be altogether reached, rales, therefore, under which that thing manifests itsolt within the perspective of view, while, too, the infinity of such a progression becomes evident (Id., 866- 367). Going by these rules it will again be geen that the “thing” is corre- late with the “consciousness.” Husserl speaks of the correlation of “noerna’ and “noosis” — for the rule shows the thing by manifosting how speaking about, and conseiousness of, the thing evolves itsolf. For this reason Husserl speaks of “thing” instead of thing, in which, again, his mothod of transcendental reduction is reflected (Id., IIL, 84-85). In such rales there is an infinite progression, which is also oxprossod by Husserl saying that the “and so on” pertains to the ossenee of the “thing” (o.g., Id., I, 368). Another conspicuous element in those rules is tho structure of fringo and horizon. Everything really givon appears to bo given within a cortain field of relations: the thing on the tablo with tho tablo, with tho cireum- ambient space of the room, with the house, place, ote. Every actual por- ception extends itself in this manner and is surrounded by a fringo of tho non-aetual (compare tho example of tho poreoived front part of the cube). Thus thoro is no isolated object, but in the progrossive explication of what the perception of this object involves, a totality becomes manifest, tho horizon, sometimes also called the “world” by Husserl (BU, 112-171). Thus everything is located in cortain surroundings. Without those the object would have no significance. 'Theso rules exhibit expectation, cach of them is embedded in a tomporal situation. Just as an object has a front part and a back part within the total spatial world, in an analogical way cach moment has the surroundings of before and after and, ultimately, its structurally ordered place in the temporal world (V4, 46). Experience is, when considered phenomenologically, characterized by the rules of expectation and the progressing, never perfected fulfillment as horizon (EPh., 274-975).Epmunp Husseru anp Lupwie Wirraenstein 187 2.18 The world is a central theme with Husser] and truth is with him, more and more, characterized by practical rather than logical features. In his Logische Untersuchungen (1900) he still speaks of absolute truths in his opposition to a psychological explanation of knowledge; in his Formale und Transzendentale Logik (1929) he speaks of truth within the horizons. Truth bolongs to tho infinitely progressive feature of explication within the world-horizon, and therefore, the truth of tho scieneos should find recognition as well as the truth of the market (FTL, § 105). In this way Husserl mora and more approaches the standpoint that the “doxa,” i.e, proscientifie experience, so ofton held in contempt by traditional philoso- phy, should bo rohabilitatod. Sciontific knowledge ariscs as a consoquenco of process of objoctivation which loavos everyday oxporienee, the lived reality, behind itself. This lived world is the subjeotive world rolated to man in all his doings, in his communication, too, with fellowmen, trying to realize his aims in this form of lifo. Thus logical and sciontifie thoorios aro viowod within the scope, a dynamic ono, of the system of behavior of mankind, or, as Husser] himself puts it, within tho horizon of “tho practical existence of mankind”; and this practical existence becomes, in a practico (“Praxis”) which loads to definite results, tho horizon of philosophy itself (¢.g., Kr., 182-188, 466-467). 2.21 Wittgenstein says: “A proposition oan only say how a thing ia, not what a thing is” (Tr., 8. 291). By strossing this “how” he omphasizes the analytical, of the non-metaphysical cloment of his thought. To this word “analysis” ho gives further clarity by pointing out that it is not for philosophy to penetrate phenomena, but to diroct itself toward the “possibilities” of phenomena. The point is to see what kind of statement we are to make about phenomena. We only clarify by clearing misunder- standings away (PhI § 90). It will be seon how intimately the way in which the human subject formulates in his language is interrelated with the description of tho objects. Logical language explicates the a priori order of the world, “the order of possibilities, which must be common to both world and thought.” It is here of special importance to see that we are not concerned with a superorder between superconcepts, but with ordinary, everyday usage of language (PhI, §97). Ib will afterwards become apparent that there is a certain tension here between the clarity of logie and everyday language. Thus language never apprehends what falls outside the scope of logical possibilities, and, as we have seen, this also means: outside the scope of tho world. “Logie fills the world: the limits of the world are also its limits,” and “what we cannot think, that we cannot think; we cannot therefore say what we cannot think” (Tr., 5.6; 5. 61). It is therefore meaning- less to speak about another world, in the sense that it would not have the logical possibilities, the form, in common with our world (Tr, 2.022).188 Puiuosopny and PHENoMENoLOGICAL RESEARCH 2,92 Wittgenstoin’s systematic analysis is concerned to investigate the things within the logical space. ‘This investigation leads to certain rulos, called by him “structures of the atomic fact.” Thus it is clear that a speok in visual field need not be red, but it must have a color, a tone must have a pitch, ote. (‘Ir., 1.18, 2.081-2, 2.0181). The infinity of the visual field as an image and that of life itself is already posited by Wittgenstein at an early date (‘Tr., 6.4811), but only subsequently does it acquire a methodological significance with him, when he discusses tho rules of ordinary language and points out that we are then giving examples as part of an infinite sequence. It is here that the “and so on” acquires more than the meaning of an abbreviated notation. For here it means “and so on ad int.,” that is, we evolve a teaching which points beyond tho ex- amples (PhI, § 208). The rules are comparable to signposts. These may sometimes leave room for doubt and sometimes not, provided they meet their purpose under normal conditions (PhI, § 85, 87). Language is the contact of an expectation and its fulfillment. This means that the elements must not be isolated, but have to be considered in connection with other elements and within certain surroundings. Every expectation is embedded in a situation, says Wittgenstein, and, as he points out, that which takes place now has significance in these sur- roundings only. Thus no one can have a feeling of hope for a second: the word “hope” refers to a phenomenon of human life (PhI, § 445, 581, 588). 2.98 A ceniral theme with Wittgenstein is “the systom of signs” and “the use of signs,” which one might call a horizon. It is only within this horizon that the rules can function properly; this horizon is the field of reference that lends significance to every single phenomenon. Thus a word cannot have meaning unless as a part of a sentence. A thing has not even a name except in the language-game; every sign (sentence) gets its significance from the syatem of signs, the language. What gives the sentence life is not something occult accompanying the sentence. Every sign is dead by itself but alivo in uso; the use is ite life (PhI, § 49; BBB, 5; PhI, § 482). Tt is as if in such descriptions somothing like tho Hussorlian intentionality comes to the foro, ospocially when Wittgonstcin indicates tho human subject as tho ono that, in the uso of sings, moves, as it wero, towards tho phonomonon. A sign, say an arrow, points, ho says, only in tho application that a living being makes of it. To mean something is like going up to someone; wo go up to tho thing wo moan, one is rushing ahoad when one thinks something (PhI, § 464~466). This emphasis on use is, in Wittgenstoin’s thought, accompanied by a move from logical language to everyday language. At first Wittgenstoin thinks he can avoid tho errors by omploying a symbolism which obeys the rales of logical grammar, von though ho alroady ostablishes a connoction between tho genuine, the living and colloquial language in all its compli-Epaunp Husszen ap Lupwie WirtaenstEIn 189 cations: “colloquial language is a part of the human organism and ia not less complicated than it” (Tr., 8.825 and 4.002 regp.). Afterwards he in- elines to compare language to an old town: a maze of little stroots, of old and new houses, surrounded by new boroughs with straight, regular streets (PhI, § 18). His interest is then rather directed toward the older part of the town. It is true, we construct ideal languages, like logic, but tho word “ideal” does not mean that these languages wore better than our everyday language. At an earlier stage of his philosophical develop- ment Wittgenstein had thought, unjustly so, that if anyone utters a sentonco and understands it ho is oporating « calculus to definite rulos (PhI, § 81), Logical language, thorofore, does not prove to bo a result of invostigation but a requirement; thoro appoars to be a tension between it and actual languago. Logie is like slippery ico without friction: idoal conditions, but “becauso of that we are unablo to walk: so wo nocd friction. Baek to tho rough ground!” (PAI, § 107). This tension, which in the carlior works of Wittgenstein was still too little conspiouous, leads one to the intersubjective, living human world of language. Tho practical character of philosophy, doseribed before (Tr., 4.112:.... Philosophy is not a theory but an activity), gets more ompha- sis. Obeying the rules is a practice (“cine Praxis”); it is not possible to obey a rule “privately.” ‘The common behavior of mankind is, therefor, the system of reference for the interpretation of a language. Human beings agree in the language they. use. This is not an agreement in theo- retical torms, but in “form of life” (PhI, § 202, 206, 241). 8. Besides the points of agreement between Husserl and Wittgenstein the differences also become gradually clearer. Hach thinker looks for rules constituting the object in the ways in which it presents itself. Hach works them out by giving concrete examples (cube, remembering, feeling pain, the color red), which are forever subjected to new investigations. As the coherence of modes of consciousness and modes of appearance is with Huser] a very close one ("‘noosis” and “noema”), these rules are investi- gated much more systematically, the horizon has a much more funda- mental significance, and the consideration of the practice (“Praxis”) and the lived reality of the world goes much deeper. In the case of Witigen- stein, on the other hand, philosophizing becomes much more aphoristic according as it moves from logical to everyday categories, and thus ib is a number of sketehy orientations that he gives, rather than a systemati- cally elaborated fundamental plan. Again, with Husserl the speculative clement, which at times verges on, and even becomes, idealistic, proves greater than, with Wittgenstein. It is therefore for Wittgenstein « more obvious tendency to make intersubjectivity a system of reference, since language is his point of departure, than is the case with Huser], for whom this point is consciousness itself, albeit in the nonpsychological, structural