GR No.

L-5101
SANTOS vs AQUINO

Facts of the Case:

The petitioner is the manager of a theater known as "Cine Concepcion," and avers that Ordinance No.
61, adopted by the Municipal Council of Malabon, imposes a license tax of P1,000 per annum on the
said theater in addition to a license tax pursuant to the Ordinance No. 58. Prior to Ordinance No. 61, the
municipal license tax paid by the petitioner on was P180, pursuant to the Ordinance No. 9. The
Municipal Council of Malabon adopted Ordinance No. 10, imposing a graduated municipal license tax on
theaters and cinematographs and submitted the same for approval to the Department of Finance, which
reduced the rate of taxes provided therein, and the ordinance with the reduced rate of taxes was
approved. A notice thereof was served on the petitioner. Petitioner avers that Ordinance No. 61, is ultra
vires  and repugnant to the provisions of the Constitution on taxation; that its approval was not in
accordance with law; that Ordinance No. 10, is all null and void, and is unjust, and oppressive.
Procedural History:
Petitioner seeks to have Ordinance No. 61 and 10 declared null and void. A motion to dismiss was filed
by the Assistant Provincial Fiscal of Rizal, but upon suggestion of the Court at the hearing thereof, the
respondents were prevailed upon to file their answer. In their answer the respondents allege that both
ordinances adopted by the Council are not ultra vires. Respondents allege the Court has no jurisdiction
over the subject matter of the petition for declaratory relief; that this being an action for declaratory
relief, the Provincial Fiscal of Rizal should have been notified thereof but the petitioner failed to do so.
The Court dismissed the petition upholding the ordinances’ constitutionality. Petitioner appealed.
Statement of the Issue:
WON the acts of the Municipal Council in adopting the questioned ordinances are ultro vires
Holding:
No. Under CA No. 472 the Council is authorized and empowered to adopt the ordinances in question,
and the evidence does not show, that the rate of the municipal taxes therein provided is excessive,
unjust, oppressive and confiscatory, their validity must be upheld. This is not an action for declaratory
relief, because the terms of the ordinances assailed are not ambiguous or of doubtful meaning which
require a construction thereof by the Court. And granting that the validity or legality of an ordinance
may be drawn in question in an action for declaratory relief, such relief must be asked before a violation
of the ordinance be committed.  When this action was brought, payment of the municipal license taxes
imposed by both ordinances, the tax rate of the last having been reduced by the Department of Finance,
and the petition shows that it was due and petitioner had not paid them. In those circumstances the
petitioner cannot bring an action for declaratory relief. Petitioner doesnt testify that he is the owner or
part-owner of "Cine-Concepcion." He alleges that he is only the manager thereof. For that reason he is
not an interested party. He has no interest in the theater known as "Cine Concepcion" which may be
affected by the municipal ordinances in question and for that reason he is not entitled to bring this
action either for declaratory relief or for prohibition, which apparently is the purpose of the action as
may be gleaned from the prayer of the petition. The rule that actions must be brought in the name of
the real party in interest applies to actions brought under Rule 66 for declaratory relief. 
GR. No. L-23645
GOMEZ vs PALOMAR

Facts of the Case:

RA 1635, as amended by RA 2631 was passed providing for the printing and issue of semi-postal stamps
of different denominations with face value showing the regular postage charge plus the additional
amount of five centavos for the said purpose to help raise funds for the Philippine Tuberculosis Society.
The respondent Postmaster General thereafter issued four Administrative Orders. Pursuant to A.O. No.
3, mails post from August 19 to September 30 of each year starting in 1958, without the required semi-
postal stamp, shall be returned to the sender, On September l5, 1963 the petitioner Benjamin P. Gomez
mailed a letter at the post office in San Fernando, Pampanga. Because this letter did not bear the special
anti-TB stamp required by the statute, it was returned to the petitioner.
Procedural History:
Petitioner brought suit for declaratory relief to test the constitutionality of the statute, as well as the
implementing AOs issued, contending that it violates the equal protection clause of the Constitution as
well as the rule of uniformity and equality of taxation. The lower court declared the statute and the
orders unconstitutional; hence this appeal by the respondent postal authorities.
Statement of the Issue:
WON RA 2631 is constitutional
Holding:
Yes. As to respondents' contention that declaratory relief is unavailing, the prime specification of an
action for declaratory relief is that it must be brought "before breach or violation" of the statute has
been committed. Rule 64, section 1 so provides. Section 6 of the same rule, which allows the court to
treat an action for declaratory relief as an ordinary action, applies only if the breach or violation occurs
after the filing of the action but before the termination thereof. Hence, if, as the trial court itself
admitted, there had been a breach of the statute before the firing of this action, then indeed the
remedy of declaratory relief cannot be availed of, much less can the suit be converted into an ordinary
action. Nor is there merit in the petitioner's argument that the mailing of the letter in question did not
constitute a breach of the statute because the statute appears to be addressed only to postal
authorities. The statute, it is true, in terms provides that "no mail matter shall be accepted in the mails
unless it bears such semi-postal stamps." It does not follow, however, that only postal authorities can be
guilty of violating it by accepting mails without the payment of the anti-TB stamp. It is obvious that they
can be guilty of violating the statute only if there are people who use the mails without paying for the
additional anti-TB stamp. Nevertheless, the Court holds that the petitioner's choice of remedy is correct
because this suit was filed not only with respect to the letter which he mailed on September 15, but also
with regard to any other mail that he might send in the future. Thus, in his complaint, the petitioner
prayed that due course be given to "other mails without the semi-postal stamps which he may deliver
for mailing ... if any, during the period covered by RA 1635, as amended, as well as other mails hereafter
to be sent by or to other mailers which bear the required postage, without collection of additional
charge of five centavos prescribed by the same Republic Act." As one whose mail was returned, the
petitioner is certainly interested in a ruling on the validity of the statute requiring the use of additional
stamps.