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The coronavirus pandemic, as this is being written, is still on the upswing in the number of
reported cases, but has quickly caused a financial and economic crisis. And while the housing
finance system is not a central cause of today’s crisis, as it was in 2008, it is rapidly becoming
clear that many longstanding stress points in the country’s mortgage system are nevertheless
becoming highly problematic, even on a systemic-risk scale.
Here, in rough chronological order of when they may appear, is my list of ten stress points to
watch in the mortgage system, some of which the government has already begun to face (with
new announcements every day), and some of which are just beginning to emerge. If these
stresses are not adequately addressed, the impact on the mortgage markets could be severe,
making housing finance more expensive and more scarce, and making the mortgage system a
continuing source of financial instability.
It is unclear, however, what can be done in the longer run. MBS mREITs play a major role in the
agency MBS markets, and allowing too large a share to be so highly leveraged with such high
liquidity exposure is probably not consistent with being crisis-resistant and resilient.
There is a risk, hopefully small, of a repeat in today’s stressed markets for the FHLBs. If this
happens, it will show up quickly. In the long run, there should be no implicit (and, as such, unpaid
for) guarantee – it should be made explicit and paid for, just as is being designed into the GSE
system for when the companies exit conservatorship.
The industry and government are on top of this issue, but it needs resolution quickly because the
impact will hit servicers hard in a matter of weeks, and will grow quickly in the coming months.
Without help, the non-bank servicers are likely to fail in large numbers, disrupting the MBS
marketplace.
Longer term, this system of “advances” is unsustainable, and has been a known market stability
problem for some time. It needs to be fixed, likely with MBS investors (especially Ginnie Mae-
related ones) absorbing some of the risk related to late principal and interest cashflows, while
ultimately being protected from credit losses.
It is unclear what the government can do in the short run to alleviate the impact of this net worth
issue. The most obvious solution is to move the riskiest servicing from standalone (usually non-
bank) servicers to bank-affiliated ones (which are usually part of larger, broadly-diversified
companies), although this takes time and can only be done in modest size in the immediate future.
Longer term, changing the system of compensation for servicers – getting rid of the simple 0.25
percent fee and replacing it with a schedule of price per functional activity done – will eliminate the
MSR asset and, therefore, its problematic accounting. This has been discussed for years, but
never acted upon. It should be.
The PMI firms going into this crisis were rated from the middle of investment grade down to the
top of below-investment grade. But downgrades inevitably will follow. Because the GSEs are
unsecured creditors of the PMIs in large size, with no collateral to back up PMI promises to
reimburse the GSEs for credit losses on insured mortgages, the two companies need the PMIs to
be strong enough to back up their promises to pay. At some point, however, it is likely that one or
more PMI firms may become ineligible to do new GSE business (the rules to be eligible were set
by FHFA during conservatorship), because they will have deteriorated so much in
creditworthiness. Because GSE business accounts for virtually 100 percent of PMI revenues, this
would lead to an immediate collapse of such a company, which would then be placed by its state-
level insurance regulator into run-off (i.e. orderly liquidation).
The question then is how much high LTV lending is going to be crimped, and what losses might
be passed onto the GSEs themselves? In the 2008 financial crisis, when three PMI firms failed, the
government engineered a covert rescue of the four other firms by eliminating the requirement that
they have a strong (specifically, AA) credit rating. This kept high LTV lending going in the interest
of countering a major recession. In the short run, then, watch the credit ratings of the PMI firms,
and watch whether FHFA engineers another covert rescue by materially loosening the criteria
under which they can still insure new loans sold to the GSEs and, if so, on what terms? In the long
run, the structure of PMI needs to be revamped so that the GSEs are no longer unsecured
creditors of companies without the very strongest credit ratings, such as the AA rating that was
required prior to 2008.
Will completed CRT transactions already on the books of the GSEs perform as expected?
This will take time to work through, as loans impaired by the economic downturn can take
years to be fully resolved and their losses known. And this might get beyond economics if
perhaps CRT investors sue, claiming fraud perhaps, or otherwise maneuver to get out of
their obligation, and would such a suit prove successful?
What damage does the disrupted credit market cause the GSEs? While CRT transactions
were being done through mid-March, the overall fixed income market is now in enough
distress that no such transactions could be issued today. Watch to see if this causes any
permanent damage to the GSEs or the mortgage market. Will the GSEs stop purchasing
more mortgages? Or raise g-fees? It may not do any overt damage at all, except for the
GSEs needing to fully carry the credit risk of new mortgage purchases until the markets
open up again. Since they previously kept 100 percent of the credit risk for the full 30-year
life of mortgages, this should be an easy lift for them, especially while in conservatorship.
8. GSE LOSSES
The GSEs between them have about a $5 trillion book of credit guarantees, mostly in single-family
mortgage, as well as securities investments. They lost large amounts on both in the 2008 financial
crisis, but claim to have since eliminated most of the major sources of those losses: (1) the
investment portfolios are much reduced, with almost no high-risk mortgage securities; (2) they
claim to have laid off significant credit risk via CRT; (3) they claim to have a well-balanced “credit
box” (i.e. credit risk appetite) that is neither too tight nor too loose and which avoids riskier
mortgage products (as defined by the Qualified Mortgage rule); and (4) they even claim their
affordable lending is done prudently. We shall see how this all works out in the coming quarters,
as higher credit loss reserves are generated by the current economic downturn. Ideally, their
credit reserves should rise – they are, after all, supposed to take appropriate credit risk – but not
anything like in the last crisis. The manner in which GAAP accounting works, however, means that
this will only be substantively revealed, with all the disclosed analysis of what caused it, through
the second half of 2020, as second and third quarter earnings are released, and perhaps into
2021. (Some investment-related and interest rate hedging-related losses could occur very much
up-front, by comparison. We will find out about that when first quarter earnings are released
during the second quarter.)
In addition, the forbearance programs being offered to people in distress will cause a spike in
delinquencies. And while delinquencies will apparently not be reported to consumer credit
agencies, they will definitely impact the GAAP-compliant credit reserves required – perhaps not as
much as a straight delinquency would, but certainly by a material amount.
Finally, if credit losses are far higher than believed to be consistent with a properly underwritten
credit box, the ongoing market for CRT will be impacted, either becoming noticeably more
expensive (in which case it won’t be used a lot) or much smaller as investors exit after feeling they
have been “burned.” Watch for CRT volume and pricing when the credit markets open up again –
are they reasonable or not for market conditions at that time?
We’ll now find out if this is true. If so, because both FHA and VA are just part of the federal
government and its budget, there will not be immediate overt signs of distress – like credit rating
downgrades or liquidity problems. The FHA does not need to adhere to GAAP accounting, and so
it may take an extended time for the credit performance of its book to become clear. But watch
for it – and if it does lose large amounts, will Congress take a hand in revising the business model
of the two organizations, especially FHA, to avoid a repeat?
10. GSE CAPITAL PROPOSAL – A HELPFUL STRESS TEST?
FHFA has outstanding a capital rule proposal to apply to the GSEs when they exit
conservatorship. Such a rule is the very core of financial institutions being safe and sound, and
able to resist collapse in the next market crisis. It was put out for comment under the previous
FHFA director and the current director, Mark Calabria, withdrew it for revision, with the latest date
for its re-publication (which begins a minimum 60-day comment period) being in the back half of
the second quarter of this year. Observers believe the revision will be targeted at certain items
only (such as its procyclical nature) but otherwise take the basic approach of the withdrawn
proposal. However, we’re going through just the kind of stressed markets where such capital
requirements either stand up to that stress, or prove defective in some manner. To that end, FHFA
and the industry more broadly should watch how the proposed capital rule would work in the
current stress environment to understand its dynamics and see if it passes muster or not. FHFA,
while being in a rush related to its desire to keep the exit from conservatorship moving along,
should seriously consider holding the finalization up until the current distressed market works itself
out. As that will take a while to play out (the last one started in roughly 2006-07 and did not really
end until 2011-12), it makes sense for FHFA to wait until at least early 2021 to reach a conclusion.
And while there have been hit or miss efforts to fix these sources of systemic weakness and stress
amplification, hit or miss is proving not good enough right now. No single regulator is in charge,
and lobbying has proven effective at blocking or watering down many proposed changes
because they hurt someone’s bottom line or might make mortgage credit a bit more expensive.
One industry observer recently referenced “our Frankenstein’s monster of a mortgage finance
system.” In many ways it is, and has the longstanding weaknesses now bedeviling it to prove its
monster nature. After the crisis subsides, it will be time for a proper, comprehensive review of
housing finance to improve its liquidity, capitalization, and the many operational mechanisms that
do not do well in a stressed environment. There should be no exceptions to this
comprehensiveness – no exclusion of the PMIs because they are state-regulated, no exclusion of
the non-bank mortgage servicers because they are not banks, and so on. In fact, one could argue
a major conclusion of such a comprehensive review would be to put a single regulatory agency in
charge of the safety and soundness of the entire housing finance system. Such an agency could
be responsible and accountable for making the housing finance system stronger, more resilient,
and a source of strength to the financial system rather than one of the first components to seize up
and amplify problems.