G.R. No.

85044 June 3, 1992
MACARIO TAMARGO, CELSO TAMARGO and AURELIA
TAMARGO, petitioners,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, THE HON. ARISTON L.
RUBIO, RTC Judge, Branch 20, Vigan, Ilocos Sur; VICTOR
BUNDOC; and CLARA BUNDOC, respondents.
appeal, this time ruling that the notice had been filed beyond
the 15-day reglementary period ending 22 December 1987.
Petitioners went to the Court of Appeals on a petition
for mandamus and certiorari questioning the trial court's
Decision dated 3 December 1987 and the Orders dated 18
April 1988 and 6 June 1988, The Court of Appeals dismissed
the petition, ruling that petitioners had lost their right to appeal.

In the present Petition for Review, petitioners once again

FELICIANO, J.:
On 20 October 1982, Adelberto Bundoc, then a minor of 10
years of age, shot Jennifer Tamargo with an air rifle causing
injuries which resulted in her death. Accordingly, a civil
complaint for damages was filed with the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 20, Vigan, Ilocos Sur, docketed as Civil Case No.
3457-V, by petitioner Macario Tamargo, Jennifer's adopting
parent, and petitioner spouses Celso and Aurelia Tamargo,
Jennifer's natural parents against respondent spouses Victor
and Clara Bundoc, Adelberto's natural parents with whom he
was living at the time of the tragic incident. In addition to this
case for damages, a criminal information or Homicide through
Reckless Imprudence was filed [Criminal Case No. 1722-V]
against Adelberto Bundoc. Adelberto, however, was acquitted
and exempted from criminal liability on the ground that he bad
acted without discernment.
Prior to the incident, or on 10 December 1981, the spouses
Sabas and Felisa Rapisura had filed a petition to adopt the
minor Adelberto Bundoc in Special Proceedings No. 0373-T
before the then Court of First Instance of Ilocos Sur. This
petition for adoption was grunted on, 18 November 1982, that
is, after Adelberto had shot and killed Jennifer.
In their Answer, respondent spouses Bundoc, Adelberto's
natural parents, reciting the result of the foregoing petition for
adoption, claimed that not they, but rather the adopting
parents, namely the spouses Sabas and Felisa Rapisura, were
indispensable parties to the action since parental authority had
shifted to the adopting parents from the moment the successful
petition for adoption was filed.
Petitioners in their Reply contended that since Adelberto
Bundoc was then actually living with his natural parents,
parental authority had not ceased nor been relinquished by the
mere filing and granting of a petition for adoption.
The trial court on 3 December 1987 dismissed petitioners'
complaint, ruling that respondent natural parents of Adelberto
indeed were not indispensable parties to the action.
Petitioners received a copy of the trial court's Decision on 7
December 1987. Within the 15-day reglementary period, or on
14 December 1987, petitioners filed a motion for
reconsideration followed by a supplemental motion for
reconsideration on 15 January 1988. It appearing, however,
that the motions failed to comply with Sections 4 and 5 of Rule
15 of the Revised Rules of Court — that notice of the motion
shall be given to all parties concerned at least three (3) days
before the hearing of said motion; and that said notice shall
state the time and place of hearing — both motions were
denied by the trial court in an Order dated 18 April 1988. On 28
April 1988, petitioners filed a notice of appeal. In its Order
dated 6 June 1988, the trial court dismissed the notice at
contend that respondent spouses Bundoc are the
indispensable parties to the action for damages caused by the
acts of their minor child, Adelberto Bundoc. Resolution of this
Petition hinges on the following issues: (1) whether or not
petitioners, notwithstanding loss of their right to appeal, may
still file the instant Petition; conversely, whether the Court may
still take cognizance of the case even through petitioners'
appeal had been filed out of time; and (2) whether or not the
effects of adoption, insofar as parental authority is concerned
may be given retroactive effect so as to make the adopting
parents the indispensable parties in a damage case filed
against their adopted child, for acts committed by the latter,
when actual custody was yet lodged with the biological
parents.
1. It will be recalled that, petitioners' motion (and supplemental
motion) for reconsideration filed before the trial court, not
having complied with the requirements of Section 13, Rule 41,
and Section 4, Rule 15, of the Revised Rules of Court, were
considered pro forma and hence did not interrupt and suspend
the reglementary period to appeal: the trial court held that the
motions, not having contained a notice of time and place of
hearing, had become useless pieces of paper which did not
interrupt the reglementary period. 1 As in fact repeatedly held
by this Court, what is mandatory is the service of the motion on
the opposing counsel indicating the time and place of
hearing. 2
In view, however, of the nature of the issue raised in the
instant. Petition, and in order that substantial justice may be
served, the Court, invoking its right to suspend the application
of technical rules to prevent manifest injustice, elects to treat
the notice of appeal as having been seasonably filed before
the trial court, and the motion (and supplemental motion) for
reconsideration filed by petitioner in the trial court as having
interrupted the reglementary period for appeal. As the Court
held in Gregorio v. Court of Appeals: 3
Dismissal of appeal; purely on technical
grounds is frowned upon where the policy of
the courts is to encourage hearings of
appeal on their merits. The rules of
procedure ought not be applied in a very
rigid technical sense, rules of procedure are
used only to help secure not override,
substantial justice. if d technical and rigid
enforcement of the rules is made their aim
would be defeated. 4
2. It is not disputed that Adelberto Bundoc's voluntary act of
shooting Jennifer Tamargo with an air rifle gave rise to a cause
of action on quasi-delict against him. As Article 2176 of the
Civil Code provides:
Whoever by act or omission causes damage
to another, there being fault or negligence, is
obliged to pay for the damage done. Such
 fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing
contractual relation between the parties, is
called a quasi-delict . . .
Upon the other hand, the law imposes civil liability upon the
father and, in case of his death or incapacity, the mother, for
any damages that may be caused by a minor child who lives
with them. Article 2180 of the Civil Code reads:
The obligation imposed by article 2176 is
demandable not only for one's own acts or
omissions, but also for those of persons for
whom one is responsible.
The father and, in case of his death or
incapacity, the mother, are responsible for
the damages caused by the minor children
who live in their company.
xxx xxx xxx
The responsibility treated of in this Article
shall cease when the person herein
mentioned prove that they observed all the
diligence of a good father of a family to
prevent damage. (Emphasis supplied)
This principle of parental liability is a species of what is
frequently designated as vicarious liability, or the doctrine of
"imputed negligence" under Anglo-American tort law, where a
person is not only liable for torts committed by himself, but also
for torts committed by others with whom he has a certain
relationship and for whom he is responsible. Thus, parental
liability is made a natural or logical consequence of the duties
and responsibilities of parents — their parental authority —
which includes the instructing, controlling and disciplining of
the child. 5 The basis for the doctrine of vicarious liability was
explained by the Court in Cangco v. Manila Railroad Co. 6 in
the following terms:
With respect to extra-contractual obligation
arising from negligence, whether of act or
omission, it is competent for the legislature
to elect — and our Legislature has so
elected — to limit such liability to cases in
which the person upon whom such an
obligation is imposed is morally culpable or,
on the contrary, for reasons of public policy.
to extend that liability, without regard to the
lack of moral culpability, so as to
include responsibility for the negligence of
those persons whose acts or omissions are
imputable, by a legal fiction, to others who
are in a position to exercise an absolute or
limited control over them. The legislature
which adopted our Civil Code has elected
to limit extra-contractual liability — with
certain well-defined exceptions — to cases
in which moral culpability can be directly
imputed to the persons to be charged. This
moral responsibility may consist in having
failed to exercise due care in one's own acts,
or in having failed to exercise due care in the
selection and control of one's agent or
servants, or in the control of persons who, by
reasons of their status, occupy a position of
dependency with respect to the person made
liable for their conduct. 7 (Emphasis
Supplied)
The civil liability imposed upon parents for the torts of
their minor children living with them, may be seen to
be based upon the parental authority vested by the
Civil Code upon such parents. The civil law assumes
that when an unemancipated child living with its
parents commits a tortious acts, the parents were
negligent in the performance of their legal and natural
duty closely to supervise the child who is in their
custody and control. Parental liability is, in other
words, anchored upon parental authority coupled with
presumed parental dereliction in the discharge of the
duties accompanying such authority. The parental
dereliction is, of course, only presumed and the
presumption can be overtuned under Article 2180 of
the Civil Code by proof that the parents had exercised
all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent
the damage.
In the instant case, the shooting of Jennifer by Adelberto with
an air rifle occured when parental authority was still lodged in
respondent Bundoc spouses, the natural parents of the minor
Adelberto. It would thus follow that the natural parents who had
then actual custody of the minor Adelberto, are the
indispensable parties to the suit for damages.
The natural parents of Adelberto, however, stoutly maintain
that because a decree of adoption was issued by the adoption
court in favor of the Rapisura spouses, parental authority was
vested in the latter as adopting parents as of the time of the
filing of the petition for adoption that is, before Adelberto had
shot Jennifer which an air rifle. The Bundoc spouses contend
that they were therefore free of any parental responsibility for
Adelberto's allegedly tortious conduct.
Respondent Bundoc spouses rely on Article 36 of the Child
and Youth Welfare Code 8 which reads as follows:
Art. 36. Decree of Adoption. — If, after
considering the report of the Department of
Social Welfare or duly licensed child
placement agency and the evidence
submitted before it, the court is satisfied that
the petitioner is qualified to maintain, care
for, and educate the child, that the trial
custody period has been completed, and that
the best interests of the child will be
promoted by the adoption, a decree of
adoption shall be entered, which shall be
effective he date the original petition was
filed. The decree shall state the name by
which the child is thenceforth to be known.
(Emphasis supplied)
The Bundoc spouses further argue that the above
Article 36 should be read in relation to Article 39 of
the same Code:
Art. 39. Effect of Adoption. — The adoption
shall:
xxx xxx xxx
 (2) Dissolve the authority vested in the
natural parents, except where the adopter is
the spouse of the surviving natural parent;
xxx xxx xxx
(Emphasis supplied)
and urge that their Parental authority must be deemed to have
been dissolved as of the time the Petition for adoption was
filed.
The Court is not persuaded. As earlier noted, under the Civil
Code, the basis of parental liability for the torts of a minor child
is the relationship existing between the parents and the minor
child living with them and over whom, the law presumes, the
parents exercise supervision and control. Article 58 of the Child
and Youth Welfare Code, re-enacted this rule:
Art. 35. Trial Custody. — No petition for
adoption shall be finally granted unless and
until the adopting parents are given by the
courts a supervised trial custody period of at
least six months to assess their adjustment
and emotional readiness for the legal
union. During the period of trial custody,
parental authority shall be vested in the
adopting parents. (Emphasis supplied)
Under the above Article 35, parental authority is provisionally
vested in the adopting parents during the period of trial
custody, i.e., before the issuance of a decree of
adoption, precisely because the adopting parents are given
actual custody of the child during such trial period. In the
instant case, the trial custody period either had not yet begun
or bad already been completed at the time of the air rifle
shooting; in any case, actual custody of Adelberto was then
with his natural parents, not the adopting parents.

Article 58 Torts — Parents and guardians
are responsible for the damage caused by
the child under their parental authority in
accordance with the civil Code. (Emphasis
supplied)
Article 221 of the Family Code of the Philippines 9 has similarly
insisted upon the requisite that the child, doer of the tortious
act, shall have beer in the actual custody of the parents sought
to be held liable for the ensuing damage:
Art. 221. Parents and other persons
exercising parental authority shall be civilly
liable for the injuries and damages caused
by the acts or omissions of their
unemancipated children living in their
companyand under their parental authority
subject to the appropriate defenses provided
by law. (Emphasis supplied)
Accordingly, we conclude that respondent Bundoc spouses,
Adelberto's natural parents, were indispensable parties to the
suit for damages brought by petitioners, and that the dismissal
by the trial court of petitioners' complaint, the indispensable
parties being already before the court, constituted grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition for Review is
hereby GRANTED DUE COURSE and the Decision of the
Court of Appeals dated 6 September 1988, in C.A.-G.R. No.
SP-15016 is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Petitioners'
complaint filed before the trial court is hereby REINSTATED
and this case is REMANDED to that court for further
proceedings consistent with this Decision. Costs against
respondent Bundoc spouses. This Decision is immediately
executory.
SO ORDERED.

We do not believe that parental authority is properly regarded

as having been retroactively transferred to and vested in the
adopting parents, the Rapisura spouses, at the time the air rifle
shooting happened. We do not consider that retroactive effect
may be giver to the decree of adoption so as to impose a
liability upon the adopting parents accruing at a time when
adopting parents had no actual or physically custody over the
adopted child. Retroactive affect may perhaps be given to the
granting of the petition for adoption where such is essential to
permit the accrual of some benefit or advantage in favor of the
adopted child. In the instant case, however, to hold that
parental authority had been retroactively lodged in the
Rapisura spouses so as to burden them with liability for a
tortious act that they could not have foreseen and which they
could not have prevented (since they were at the time in the
United States and had no physical custody over the child
Adelberto) would be unfair and unconscionable. Such a result,
moreover, would be inconsistent with the philosophical and
policy basis underlying the doctrine of vicarious liability. Put a
little differently, no presumption of parental dereliction on the
part of the adopting parents, the Rapisura spouses, could have
arisen since Adelberto was not in fact subject to their control at
the time the tort was committed.

Article 35 of the Child and Youth Welfare Code fortifies the

conclusion reached above. Article 35 provides as follows:
 G. R. No. 143989 - July 14, 2003
ISABELITA S. LAHOM, Petitioner, vs. JOSE MELVIN
SIBULO (previously referred to as "DR. MELVIN S.
LAHOM"), Respondent.
VITUG, J.:
The bliss of marriage and family would be to most less than
complete without children. The realization could have likely
prodded the spouses Dr. Diosdado Lahom and Isabelita
Lahom to take into their care Isabelita's nephew Jose Melvin
Sibulo and to bring him up as their own. At the tender age of
two, Jose Melvin enjoyed the warmth, love and support of the
couple who treated the child like their own. Indeed, for years,
Dr. and Mrs. Lahom fancied on legally adopting Jose Melvin.
Finally, in 1971, the couple decided to file a petition for
adoption. On 05 May 1972, an order granting the petition was
issued that made all the more intense than before the feeling of
affection of the spouses for Melvin. In keeping with the court
order, the Civil Registrar of Naga City changed the name "Jose
Melvin Sibulo" to "Jose Melvin Lahom."
A sad turn of events came many years later. Eventually, in
December of 1999, Mrs. Lahom commenced a petition to
rescind the decree of adoption before the Regional Trial Court
(RTC), Branch 22, of Naga City. In her petition, she averred
"7. That x x x despite the proddings and pleadings of said
spouses, respondent refused to change his surname from
Sibulo to Lahom, to the frustrations of petitioner particularly her
husband until the latter died, and even before his death he had
made known his desire to revoke respondent's adoption, but
was prevented by petitioner's supplication, however with his
further request upon petitioner to give to charity whatever
properties or interest may pertain to respondent in the future.
xxx - xxx - xxx
"10. That respondent continued using his surname Sibulo to
the utter disregard of the feelings of herein petitioner, and his
records with the Professional Regulation Commission showed
his name as Jose Melvin M. Sibulo originally issued in 1978
until the present, and in all his dealings and activities in
connection with his practice of his profession, he is Jose
Melvin M. Sibulo.
xxx - xxx - xxx
"13. That herein petitioner being a widow, and living alone in
this city with only her household helps to attend to her, has
yearned for the care and show of concern from a son, but
respondent remained indifferent and would only come to Naga
to see her once a year.
"14. That for the last three or four years, the medical check-up
of petitioner in Manila became more frequent in view of a leg
ailment, and those were the times when petitioner would need
most the care and support from a love one, but respondent all
the more remained callous and utterly indifferent towards
petitioner which is not expected of a son.
"15. That herein respondent has recently been jealous of
petitioner's nephews and nieces whenever they would find time
to visit her, respondent alleging that they were only motivated
by their desire for some material benefits from petitioner.
"16. That in view of respondent's insensible attitude resulting in
a strained and uncomfortable relationship between him and
petitioner, the latter has suffered wounded feelings, knowing
that after all respondent's only motive to his adoption is his
expectancy of his alleged rights over the properties of herein
petitioner and her late husband, clearly shown by his recent
filing of Civil Case No. 99-4463 for partition against petitioner,
thereby totally eroding her love and affection towards
respondent, rendering the decree of adoption, considering
respondent to be the child of petitioner, for all legal purposes,
has been negated for which reason there is no more basis for
its existence, hence this petition for revocation," 1
Prior to the institution of the case, specifically on 22 March
1998, Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8552, also known as the
Domestic Adoption Act, went into effect. The new statute
deleted from the law the right of adopters to rescind a decree
of adoption.
Section 19 of Article VI of R.A. No. 8552 now reads:
"SEC. 19. Grounds for Rescission of Adoption. Upon petition of
the adoptee, with the assistance of the Department if a minor
or if over eighteen (18) years of age but is incapacitated, as
guardian/counsel, the adoption may be rescinded on any of the
following grounds committed by the adopter(s): (a) repeated
physical and verbal maltreatment by the adopter(s) despite
having undergone counseling; (b) attempt on the life of the
adoptee; (c) sexual assault or violence; or (d) abandonment
and failure to comply with parental obligations.
"Adoption, being in the best interest of the child, shall not be
subject to rescission by the adopter(s). However, the
adopter(s) may disinherit the adoptee for causes provided in
Article 919 of the Civil Code." (emphasis supplied)
Jose Melvin moved for the dismissal of the petition, contending
principally (a) that the trial court had no jurisdiction over the
case and (b) that the petitioner had no cause of action in view
of the aforequoted provisions of R.A. No. 8552. Petitioner
asseverated, by way of opposition, that the proscription in R.A.
No. 8552 should not retroactively apply, i.e., to cases where
the ground for rescission of the adoption vested under the
regime of then Article 3482 of the Civil Code and Article 1923 of
the Family Code.
In an order, dated 28 April 2000, the trial court held thusly:
"On the issue of jurisdiction over the subject matter of the suit,
Section 5(c) of R.A. No. 8369 confers jurisdiction to this Court,
having been designated Family Court in A.M. No. 99-11-07
SC.
"On the matter of no cause of action, the test on the sufficiency
of the facts alleged in the complaint, is whether or not,
admitting the facts alleged, the Court could render a valid
judgment in accordance with the prayer of said complaint (De
Jesus, et al. vs. Belarmino, et al., 95 Phil. 365).
"Admittedly, Section 19, Article VI of R.A. No. 8552 deleted the
right of an adopter to rescind an adoption earlier granted under
the Family Code. Conformably, on the face of the petition,
indeed there is lack of cause of action.
"Petitioner however, insists that her right to rescind long
acquired under the provisions of the Family Code should be
respected. Assuming for the sake of argument, that petitioner
is entitled to rescind the adoption of respondent granted on
May 5, 1972, said right should have been exercised within the
period allowed by the Rules. From the averments in the
petition, it appears clear that the legal grounds for the petition
have been discovered and known to petitioner for more than
five (5) years, prior to the filing of the instant petition on
December 1, 1999, hence, the action if any, had already
prescribed. (Sec. 5, Rule 100 Revised Rules of Court)
"WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing consideration, the
petition is ordered dismissed."4
Via a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997
Rules of Court, petitioner raises the following questions; viz:
1. May the subject adoption, decreed on 05 May 1972, still be
revoked or rescinded by an adopter after the effectivity of R.A.
No. 8552?
2. In the affirmative, has the adopter's action prescribed?
A brief background on the law and its origins could provide
some insights on the subject. In ancient times, the Romans
undertook adoption to assure male heirs in the family.5 The
continuity of the adopter's family was the primary purpose of
adoption and all matters relating to it basically focused on the
rights of the adopter. There was hardly any mention about the
rights of the adopted.6 Countries, like Greece, France, Spain
and England, in an effort to preserve inheritance within the
family, neither allowed nor recognized adoption.7 It was only
much later when adoption was given an impetus in law and still
later when the welfare of the child became a paramount
concern.8 Spain itself which previously disfavored adoption
ultimately relented and accepted the Roman law concept of
adoption which, subsequently, was to find its way to the
archipelago. The Americans came and introduced their own
ideas on adoption which, unlike most countries in Europe,
made the interests of the child an overriding consideration.9 In
the early part of the century just passed, the rights of children
invited universal attention; the Geneva Declaration of Rights of
the Child of 1924 and the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights of 1948,10 followed by the United Nations Declarations
of the Rights of the Child,11 were written instruments that would
also protect and safeguard the rights of adopted children. The
Civil Code of the Philippines12 of 1950 on adoption, later
modified by the Child and Youth Welfare Code13 and then by
the Family Code of the Philippines,14 gave immediate statutory
acknowledgment to the rights of the adopted. In 1989, the
United Nations initiated the Convention of the Rights of the
Child. The Philippines, a State Party to the Convention,
accepted the principle that adoption was impressed with social
and moral responsibility, and that its underlying intent was
geared to favor the adopted child. R.A. No. 8552 secured
these rights and privileges for the adopted. Most importantly, it
affirmed the legitimate status of the adopted child, not only in
his new family but also in the society as well. The new law
withdrew the right of an adopter to rescind the adoption decree
and gave to the adopted child the sole right to sever the legal
ties created by adoption.
Petitioner, however, would insist that R.A. No. 8552 should not
adversely affect her right to annul the adoption decree, nor
deprive the trial court of its jurisdiction to hear the case, both
being vested under the Civil Code and the Family Code, the
laws then in force.
The concept of "vested right" is a consequence of the
constitutional guaranty of due process15 that expresses
a present fixed interest which in right reason and natural justice
is protected against arbitrary state action;16 it includes not only
legal or equitable title to the enforcement of a demand but also
exemptions from new obligations created after the right has
become vested.17 Rights are considered vested when the right
to enjoyment is a present interest,18 absolute, unconditional,
and perfect19 or fixed and irrefutable.
In Republic vs. Court of Appeals,20 a petition to adopt Jason
Condat was filed by Zenaida C. Bobiles on 02 February 1988
when the Child and Youth Welfare Code (Presidential Decree
No. 603) allowed an adoption to be sought by either spouse
or both of them. After the trial court had rendered its decision
and while the case was still pending on appeal, the Family
Code of the Philippines (Executive Order No. 209), mandating
joint adoption by the husband and wife, took effect. Petitioner
Republic argued that the case should be dismissed for having
been filed by Mrs. Bobiles alone and without being joined by
the husband. The Court concluded that the jurisdiction of the
court is determined by the statute in force at the time of the
commencement of the action. The petition to adopt Jason,
having been filed with the court at the time when P.D. No. 603
was still in effect, the right of Mrs. Bobiles to file the petition,
without being joined by her husband, according to the Court
had become vested. In Republic vs. Miller,21 spouses Claude
and Jumrus Miller, both aliens, sought to adopt Michael
Madayag. On 29 July 1988, the couple filed a petition to
formalize Michael's adoption having theretofore been taken
into their care. At the time the action was commenced, P.D.
No. 603 allowed aliens to adopt. After the decree of adoption
and while on appeal before the Court of Appeals, the Family
Code was enacted into law on 08 August 1988 disqualifying
aliens from adopting Filipino children. The Republic then
prayed for the withdrawal of the adoption decree. In discarding
the argument posed by the Republic, the Supreme Court ruled
that the controversy should be resolved in the light of the law
governing at the time the petition was filed.
It was months after the effectivity of R.A. No. 8552 that herein
petitioner filed an action to revoke the decree of adoption
granted in 1975. By then, the new law,22 had already
abrogated and repealed the right of an adopter under the Civil
Code and the Family Code to rescind a decree of adoption.
Consistently with its earlier pronouncements, the Court should
now hold that the action for rescission of the adoption decree,
having been initiated by petitioner after R.A. No. 8552 had
come into force, no longer could be pursued.
Interestingly, even before the passage of the statute, an action
to set aside the adoption is subject to the five-year bar rule
under Rule 10023 of the Rules of Court and that the adopter
would lose the right to revoke the adoption decree after the
lapse of that period. The exercise of the right within a
prescriptive period is a condition that could not fulfill the
requirements of a vested right entitled to protection. It must
also be acknowledged that a person has no vested right in
statutory privileges.24 While adoption has often been referred
to in the context of a "right," the privilege to adopt is itself not
naturally innate or fundamental but rather a right merely
created by statute.25 It is a privilege that is governed by the
state's determination on what it may deem to be for the best
interest and welfare of the child.26 Matters relating to adoption,
including the withdrawal of the right of an adopter to nullify the
adoption decree, are subject to regulation by the
State.27Concomitantly, a right of action given by statute may be
taken away at anytime before it has been exercised. 28

While R.A. No. 8552 has unqualifiedly withdrawn from an

adopter a consequential right to rescind the adoption decree
even in cases where the adoption might clearly turn out to be
undesirable, it remains, nevertheless, the bounden duty of the
Court to apply the law. Dura lex sed lex would be the
hackneyed truism that those caught in the law have to live with.
It is still noteworthy, however, that an adopter, while barred
from severing the legal ties of adoption, can always for valid
reasons cause the forfeiture of certain benefits otherwise
accruing to an undeserving child. For instance, upon the
grounds recognized by law, an adopter may deny to an
adopted child his legitime and, by a will and testament, may
freely exclude him from having a share in the disposable
portion of his estate.

WHEREFORE, the assailed judgment of the court a quo is

AFFIRMED. No costs.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 164948 June 27, 2006
DIWATA RAMOS LANDINGIN Petitioner,
vs.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45
of the Rules of Court is the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. CV No. 77826 which reversed the Decision 2 of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Tarlac City, Branch 63 in Civil
Case No. 2733 granting the Petition for Adoption of the
petitioner herein.
The Antecedents
On February 4, 2002, Diwata Ramos Landingin, a citizen of the
United States of America (USA), of Filipino parentage and a
resident of Guam, USA, filed a petition3 for the adoption of
minors Elaine Dizon Ramos who was born on August 31,
1986;4 Elma Dizon Ramos, who was born on September 7,
1987;5 and Eugene Dizon Ramos who was born on August 5,
1989.6 The minors are the natural children of Manuel Ramos,
petitioner’s brother, and Amelia Ramos.
Landingin, as petitioner, alleged in her petition that when
Manuel died on May 19, 1990,7 the children were left to their
paternal grandmother, Maria Taruc Ramos; their biological
mother, Amelia, went to Italy, re-married there and now has
two children by her second marriage and no longer
communicated with her children by Manuel Ramos nor with her
in-laws from the time she left up to the institution of the
adoption; the minors are being financially supported by the
petitioner and her children, and relatives abroad; as Maria
passed away on November 23, 2000, petitioner desires to
adopt the children; the minors have given their written
consent8 to the adoption; she is qualified to adopt as shown by
the fact that she is a 57-year-old widow, has children of her
own who are already married, gainfully employed and have
their respective families; she lives alone in her own home in
Guam, USA, where she acquired citizenship, and works as a
restaurant server. She came back to the Philippines to spend
time with the minors; her children gave their written consent 9 to
the adoption of the minors. Petitioner’s brother, Mariano
Ramos, who earns substantial income, signified his willingness
and commitment to support the minors while in petitioner’s
custody.
Petitioner prayed that, after due hearing, judgment be rendered
in her favor, as follows:
WHEREFORE, it is most respectfully prayed to this Honorable
Court that after publication and hearing, judgment be rendered
allowing the adoption of the minor children Elaine Dizon
Ramos, Elma Dizon Ramos, and Eugene Dizon Ramos by the
petitioner, and ordering that the minor children’s name follow
the family name of petitioner.
Petitioner prays for such other reliefs, just and equitable under
the premises.10
On March 5, 2002, the court ordered the Department of Social
Welfare and Development (DSWD) to conduct a case study as
mandated by Article 34 of Presidential Decree No. 603, as
amended, and to submit a report thereon not later than April 4,
2002, the date set for the initial hearing of the petition. 11 The
Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) entered its
appearance12 but deputized the City Prosecutor of Tarlac to
appear in its behalf.13 Since her petition was unopposed,
petitioner was allowed to present her evidence ex parte. 14
The petitioner testified in her behalf. She also presented Elaine
Ramos, the eldest of the adoptees, to testify on the written
consent executed by her and her siblings.15 The petitioner
marked in evidence the Affidavit of Consent purportedly
executed by her children Ann, Errol, Dennis and Ricfel
Branitley, all surnamed Landingin, and notarized by a notary
public in Guam, USA, as proof of said consent.16
On May 24, 2002, Elizabeth Pagbilao, Social Welfare Officer II
of the DSWD, Field Office III, Tarlac, submitted a Child Study
Report, with the following recommendation:
In view of the foregoing, undersigned finds minors Elaine, Elma
& Eugene all surnamed Ramos, eligible for adoption because
of the following reasons:
1. Minors’ surviving parent, the mother has voluntarily
consented to their adoption by the paternal aunt,
Diwata Landingin this is in view of her inability to
provide the parental care, guidance and support they
need. An Affidavit of Consent was executed by the
mother which is hereto attached.
2. The three minors subject for adoption have also
expressed their willingness to be adopted and joins
the petitioners in Guam, USA in the future. A joint
Affidavit of consent is hereto attached. The minors
developed close attachment to the petitioners and
they regarded her as second parent.
3. The minors are present under the care of a
temporary guardian who has also family to look after.
As young adolescents they really need parental love,
care, guidance and support to ensure their protection
and well being.
In view of the foregoing, it is hereby respectfully recommended
that minors Elaine D. Ramos, Elma D. Ramos and Eugene D.
Ramos be adopted by their maternal aunt Diwata Landingin.
Trial custody is hereby further recommended to be dispensed
with considering that they are close relatives and that close
attachments was already developed between the petitioner
and the 3 minors.17
Pagbilao narrated what transpired during her interview, as
follows:
The mother of minors came home together with her son John
Mario, this May 2002 for 3 weeks vacation. This is to enable
her appear for the personal interview concerning the adoption
of her children.
The plan for the adoption of minors by their paternal aunt
Diwata Landingin was conceived after the death of their
paternal grandmother and guardian. The paternal relatives
including the petitioner who attended the wake of their mother
were very much concerned about the well-being of the three
minors. While preparing for their adoption, they have asked a
cousin who has a family to stay with minors and act as their
temporary guardian.
The mother of minors was consulted about the adoption plan
and after weighing the benefits of adoption to her children, she
voluntarily consented. She realized that her children need
parental love, guidance and support which she could not
provide as she already has a second family & residing in Italy.
Knowing also that the petitioners & her children have been
supporting her children up to the present and truly care for
them, she believes her children will be in good hands. She also
finds petitioners in a better position to provide a secured and
bright future to her children.18
However, petitioner failed to present Pagbilao as witness and
offer in evidence the voluntary consent of Amelia Ramos to the
adoption; petitioner, likewise, failed to present any
documentary evidence to prove that Amelia assents to the
adoption.
On November 23, 2002, the court, finding merit in the petition
for adoption, rendered a decision granting said petition. The
dispositive portion reads:
WHEREFORE, it is hereby ordered that henceforth, minors
Elaine Dizon Ramos, Elma Dizon Ramos, Eugene Dizon
Ramos be freed from all legal obligations obedience and
maintenance from their natural parents and that they be
declared for all legal intents and purposes the children of
Diwata Ramos Landingin. Trial custody is dispensed with
considering that parent-children relationship has long been
established between the children and the adoptive parents. Let
the surnames of the children be changed from "Dizon-Ramos"
to "Ramos-Landingin."
Let a copy of this decision be furnished the Local Civil
Registrar of Tarlac, Tarlac for him to effect the corresponding
changes/amendment in the birth certificates of the above-
mentioned minors.
SO ORDERED.19
The OSG appealed20 the decision to the Court of Appeals on
December 2, 2002. In its brief21 for the oppositor-appellant, the
OSG raised the following arguments:
I sufficiently complies with the law; and (c) whether or not
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING THE PETITION
FOR ADOPTION DESPITE THE LACK OF CONSENT OF
THE PROPOSED ADOPTEES’ BIOLOGICAL MOTHER.
II
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING THE PETITION
FOR ADOPTION DESPITE THE LACK OF THE WRITTEN
CONSENT OF THE PETITIONER’S CHILDREN AS
REQUIRED BY LAW.
III
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING THE PETITION
FOR ADOPTION DESPITE PETITIONER’S FAILURE TO
ESTABLISH THAT SHE IS IN A POSITION TO SUPPORT
THE PROPOSED ADOPTEES.
On April 29, 2004, the CA rendered a decision22 reversing the
ruling of the RTC. It held that petitioner failed to adduce in
evidence the voluntary consent of Amelia Ramos, the
children’s natural mother. Moreover, the affidavit of consent of
the petitioner’s children could not also be admitted in evidence
as the same was executed in Guam, USA and was not
authenticated or acknowledged before a Philippine consular
office, and although petitioner has a job, she was not stable
enough to support the children. The dispositive portion of the
CA decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appealed decision
dated November 25, 2002 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch
63, Tarlac City in Spec. Proc. No. 2733 is hereby REVERSED
and SET ASIDE.
SO ORDERED.23
Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration 24 on May 21,
2004, which the CA denied in its Resolution dated August 12,
2004.25
Petitioner, thus, filed the instant petition for review on
certiorari26 on September 7, 2004, assigning the following
errors:
1. THAT THE HONORABLE LOWER COURT HAS
OVERLOOKED AND MISAPPLIED SOME FACTS
AND CIRCUMSTANCES WHICH ARE OF WEIGHT
AND IMPORTANCE AND WHICH IF CONSIDERED
WOULD HAVE AFFECTED THE RESULT OF THE
CASE.
2. THAT THE HONORABLE LOWER COURT
ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT THE PETITIONER-
APPELLEE IS NOT FINANCIALLY CAPABLE TO
SUPPORT THE THREE CHILDREN.27
The issues raised by the parties in their pleadings are the
following: (a) whether the petitioner is entitled to adopt the
minors without the written consent of their biological mother,
Amelia Ramos; (b) whether or not the affidavit of consent
purportedly executed by the petitioner-adopter’s children
petitioner is financially capable of supporting the adoptees.
The Court’s Ruling
The petition is denied for lack of merit.
It has been the policy of the Court to adhere to the liberal
concept, as stated in Malkinson v. Agrava,28 that adoption
statutes, being humane and salutary, hold the interest and
welfare of the child to be of paramount consideration and are
designed to provide homes, parental care and education for
unfortunate, needy or orphaned children and give them the
protection of society and family in the person of the adopter as
well as to allow childless couples or persons to experience the
joys of parenthood and give them legally a child in the person
of the adopted for the manifestation of their natural parental
instincts. Every reasonable intendment should thus be
sustained to promote and fulfill these noble and compassionate
objectives of the law.29
However, in Cang v. Court of Appeals,30 the Court also ruled
that the liberality with which this Court treats matters leading to
adoption insofar as it carries out the beneficent purposes of the
law to ensure the rights and privileges of the adopted child
arising therefrom, ever mindful that the paramount
consideration is the overall benefit and interest of the adopted
child, should be understood in its proper context and
perspective. The Court’s position should not be misconstrued
or misinterpreted as to extend to inferences beyond the
contemplation of law and jurisprudence. Thus, the discretion to
approve adoption proceedings is not to be anchored solely on
best interests of the child but likewise, with due regard to the
natural rights of the parents over the child.31
Section 9 of Republic Act No. 8552, otherwise known as the
Domestic Adoption Act of 1998, provides:
Sec. 9. Whose Consent is Necessary to the Adoption. - After
being properly counseled and informed of his/her right to give
or withhold his/her approval of the adoption, the written
consent of the following to the adoption is hereby required:
(a) The adoptee, if ten (10) years of age or over;
(b) The biological parent(s) of the child, if known, or
the legal guardian, or the proper government
instrumentality which has legal custody of the child;
(c) The legitimate and adopted sons/daughters, ten
(10) years of age or over, of the adopter(s) and
adoptee, if any;
(d) The illegitimate sons/daughters, ten (10) years of
age or over, of the adopter, if living with said adopter
and the latter’s souse, if any;
(e) The spouse, if any, of the person adopting or to be
adopted.
The general requirement of consent and notice to the natural
parents is intended to protect the natural parental relationship
from unwarranted interference by interlopers, and to insure the
opportunity to safeguard the best interests of the child in the
manner of the proposed adoption.32
Clearly, the written consent of the biological parents is
indispensable for the validity of a decree of adoption. Indeed,
the natural right of a parent to his child requires that his
consent must be obtained before his parental rights and duties
may be terminated and re-established in adoptive parents. In
this case, petitioner failed to submit the written consent of
Amelia Ramos to the adoption.
We note that in her Report, Pagbilao declared that she was
able to interview Amelia Ramos who arrived in the Philippines
with her son, John Mario in May 2002. If said Amelia Ramos
was in the Philippines and Pagbilao was able to interview her,
it is incredible that the latter would not require Amelia Ramos
to execute a Written Consent to the adoption of her minor
children. Neither did the petitioner bother to present Amelia
Ramos as witness in support of the petition.
Petitioner, nonetheless, argues that the written consent of the
biological mother is no longer necessary because when
Amelia’s husband died in 1990, she left for Italy and never
came back. The children were then left to the guidance and
care of their paternal grandmother. It is the paternal relatives,
including petitioner, who provided for the children’s financial
needs. Hence, Amelia, the biological mother, had effectively
abandoned the children. Petitioner further contends that it was
by twist of fate that after 12 years, when the petition for
adoption was pending with the RTC that Amelia and her child
by her second marriage were on vacation in the Philippines.
Pagbilao, the DSWD social worker, was able to meet her, and
during the meeting, Amelia intimated to the social worker that
she conformed to the adoption of her three children by the
petitioner.
Petitioner’s contention must be rejected. When she filed her
petition with the trial court, Rep. Act No. 8552 was already in
effect. Section 9 thereof provides that if the written consent of
the biological parents cannot be obtained, the written consent
of the legal guardian of the minors will suffice. If, as claimed by
petitioner, that the biological mother of the minors had indeed
abandoned them, she should, thus have adduced the written
consent of their legal guardian.
Ordinarily, abandonment by a parent to justify the adoption of
his child without his consent, is a conduct which evinces a
settled purpose to forego all parental duties.33 The term means
neglect and refusal to perform the filial and legal obligations of
love and support. If a parent withholds presence, love, care,
the opportunity to display filial affection, and neglects to lend
support and maintenance, the parent, in effect, abandons the
child.34
Merely permitting the child to remain for a time undisturbed in
the care of others is not such an abandonment.35 To dispense
with the requirement of consent, the abandonment must be
shown to have existed at the time of adoption. 36
In this case, petitioner relied solely on her testimony and that of
Elaine Ramos to prove her claim that Amelia Ramos had
abandoned her children. Petitioner’s testimony on that matter
follows:
Q Where is the mother of these three children now?
A She left for Italy on November 20, 1990, sir.
Q At the time when Amelia Ramos left for Italy, was there an
instance where she communicated with the family?
A None, sir.
Q How about with her children?
A None, sir.
Q Do you know what place in Italy did she reside?
A I do not know, sir.
Q Did you receive any news about Amelia Ramos?
A What I know, sir, was that she was already married with
another man.
Q From whom did you learn that?
A From others who came from Italy, sir.
Q Did you come to know whether she has children by her
second marriage?
A Yes, sir, she got two kids.37
Elaine, the eldest of the minors, testified, thus:
Q Where is your mother now?
A In Italy, sir.
Q When did your mother left for Italy?
A After my father died, sir.
Q How old were you when your mother left for Italy in 1990?
A Two years old, sir.
Q At the time when your mother left for Italy, did your mother
communicate with you?
A No, sir.38
However, the Home Study Report of the DSWD Social Worker
also stated the following:
IV. Background of the Case:
xxxx
Since the mother left for Italy, minors siblings had been under
the care and custody of their maternal grandmother. However,
she died in Nov. 2001 and an uncle, cousin of their deceased
father now serves as their guardian. The petitioner, together
with her children and other relatives abroad have been
supporting the minor children financially, even during the time
that they were still living with their natural parents. Their
mother also sends financial support but very minimal.39
xxxx
V. Background Information about the Minors Being Sought for
Adoption:
xxxx
As the eldest she tries her best to be a role model to her
younger siblings. She helps them in their lessons, works and
has fun with them. She also encourages openness on their
problems and concerns and provides petty counseling. In
serious problems she already consult (sic) her mother and
petitioner-aunt.40
xxxx
In their 5 years of married life, they begot 3 children, herein
minors, Amelia recalled that they had a happy and comfortable
life. After the death of her husband, her in-laws which include
the petitioner had continued providing support for them.
However being ashamed of just depending on the support of
her husband’s relatives, she decided to work abroad. Her
parents are also in need of financial help as they are
undergoing maintenance medication. Her parents mortgaged
their farm land which she used in going to Italy and worked as
domestic helper.
When she left for Italy in November 1990, she entrusted her 3
children to the care & custody of her mother-in-law who
returned home for good, however she died on November 2000.
While working in Italy, she met Jun Tayag, a married man from
Tarlac. They became live-in partners since 1995 and have a
son John Mario who is now 2 years old. The three of them are
considered Italian residents. Amelia claimed that Mr. Tayag is
planning to file an annulment of his marriage and his wife is
amenable to it. He is providing his legitimate family regular
support.
Amelia also sends financial support ranging from P10,000-
P15,000 a month through her parents who share minimal
amount of P3,000-P5,000 a month to his (sic) children. The
petitioner and other paternal relatives are continuously
providing support for most of the needs & education of minors
up to present.41
Thus, when Amelia left for Italy, she had not intended to
abandon her children, or to permanently sever their mother-
child relationship. She was merely impelled to leave the
country by financial constraints. Yet, even while abroad, she
did not surrender or relinquish entirely her motherly obligations
of rearing the children to her now deceased mother-in-law, for,
as claimed by Elaine herself, she consulted her mother,
Amelia, for serious personal problems. Likewise, Amelia
continues to send financial support to the children, though in
minimal amounts as compared to what her affluent in-laws
provide.
Let it be emphasized, nevertheless, that the adoption of the
minors herein will have the effect of severing all legal ties
between the biological mother, Amelia, and the adoptees, and
that the same shall then be vested on the adopter.42 It would
thus be against the spirit of the law if financial consideration
were to be the paramount consideration in deciding whether to
deprive a person of parental authority over his/her children.
More proof has to be adduced that Amelia has emotionally
abandoned the children, and that the latter will not miss her
guidance and counsel if they are given to an adopting
parent.43 Again, it is the best interest of the child that takes
precedence in adoption.
Section 34, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court provides that the
Court shall consider no evidence which has not been formally
offered. The purpose for which the evidence is offered must be
specified. The offer of evidence is necessary because it is the
duty of the Court to rest its findings of fact and its judgment
only and strictly upon the evidence offered by the parties.
Unless and until admitted by the court in evidence for the
purpose or purposes for which such document is offered, the
same is merely a scrap of paper barren of probative weight.
Mere identification of documents and the markings thereof as
exhibits do not confer any evidentiary weight on documents
unless formally offered.44
Petitioner failed to offer in evidence Pagbilao’s Report and of
the Joint Affidavit of Consent purportedly executed by her
children; the authenticity of which she, likewise, failed to prove.
The joint written consent of petitioner’s children45 was
notarized on January 16, 2002 in Guam, USA; for it to be
treated by the Rules of Court in the same way as a document
notarized in this country it needs to comply with Section 2 of
Act No. 2103,46 which states:
Section 2. An instrument or document acknowledged and
authenticated in a foreign country shall be considered
authentic if the acknowledgment and authentication are made
in accordance with the following requirements:
(a) The acknowledgment shall be made before (1) an
ambassador, minister, secretary of legation, chargé d
affaires, consul, vice-consul, or consular agent of the
Republic of the Philippines, acting within the country
or place to which he is accredited, or (2) a notary
public or officer duly authorized by law of the country
to take acknowledgments of instruments or
documents in the place where the act is done.
(b) The person taking the acknowledgment shall
certify that the person acknowledging the instrument
or document is known to him, and that he is the same
person who executed it, and acknowledged that the
same is his free act and deed. The certificate shall be
under his official seal, if he is by law required to keep
a seal, and if not, his certificate shall so state. In case
the acknowledgment is made before a notary public
or an officer mentioned in subdivision (2) of the
preceding paragraph, the certificate of the notary
public or the officer taking the acknowledgment shall
be authenticated by an ambassador, minister,
secretary of legation, chargé de affaires, consul, vice-
consul, or consular agent of the Republic of the
Philippines, acting within the country or place to which
he is accredited. The officer making the authentication
shall certify under his official seal that the person who
took the acknowledgment was at the time duly
authorized to act as notary public or that he was duly
exercising the functions of the office by virtue of which
he assumed to act, and that as such he had authority
under the law to take acknowledgment of instruments
or documents in the place where the acknowledgment
was taken, and that his signature and seal, if any, are
genuine.
As the alleged written consent of petitioner’s legitimate children
did not comply with the afore-cited law, the same can at best
be treated by the Rules as a private document whose
authenticity must be proved either by anyone who saw the
document executed or written; or by evidence of the
genuineness of the signature or handwriting of the makers.47
Since, in the instant case, no further proof was introduced by
petitioner to authenticate the written consent of her legitimate
children, the same is inadmissible in evidence.
In reversing the ruling of the RTC, the CA ruled that petitioner
was not stable enough to support the children and is only
relying on the financial backing, support and commitment of
her children and her siblings.48 Petitioner contradicts this by
claiming that she is financially capable as she has worked in
Guam for 14 years, has savings, a house, and currently earns
$5.15 an hour with tips of not less than $1,000.00 a month. Her
children and siblings have likewise committed themselves to
provide financial backing should the need arise. The OSG,
again in its comment, banks on the statement in the Home
Study Report that "petitioner has limited income." Accordingly,
it appears that she will rely on the financial backing of her
children and siblings in order to support the minor adoptees.
The law, however, states that it is the adopter who should be in
a position to provide support in keeping with the means of the
family.
Since the primary consideration in adoption is the best interest
of the child, it follows that the financial capacity of prospective
parents should also
be carefully evaluated and considered. Certainly, the adopter
should be in a position to support the would-be adopted child
or children, in keeping with the means of the family.
According to the Adoption Home Study Report49 forwarded by
the Department of Public Health & Social Services of the
Government of Guam to the DSWD, petitioner is no longer
supporting her legitimate children, as the latter are already
adults, have individual lives and families. At the time of the
filing of the petition, petitioner was 57 years old, employed on a
part-time basis as a waitress, earning $5.15 an hour and tips of
around $1,000 a month. Petitioner’s main intention in adopting
the children is to bring the latter to Guam, USA. She has a
house at Quitugua Subdivision in Yigo, Guam, but the same is
still being amortized. Petitioner likewise knows that the limited
income might be a hindrance to the adoption proceedings.
Given these limited facts, it is indeed doubtful whether
petitioner will be able to sufficiently handle the financial aspect
of rearing the three children in the US. She only has a part-
time job, and she is rather of age. While petitioner claims that
she has the financial support and backing of her children and
siblings, the OSG is correct in stating that the ability to support
the adoptees is personal to the adopter, as adoption only
creates a legal relation between the former and the latter.
Moreover, the records do not prove nor support petitioner’s
allegation that her siblings and her children are financially able
and that they are willing to support the minors herein. The
Court, therefore, again sustains the ruling of the CA on this
issue.
While the Court recognizes that petitioner has only the best of
intentions for her nieces and nephew, there are legal infirmities
that militate against reversing the ruling of the CA. In any case,
petitioner is not prevented from filing a new petition for
adoption of the herein minors.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby
DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
 [G.R. NOS. 168992-93 : May 21, 2009]
IN RE: PETITION FOR ADOPTION OF MICHELLE P. LIM,
MONINA P. LIM, Petitioner.
IN RE: PETITION FOR ADOPTION OF MICHAEL JUDE P.
LIM, MONINA P. LIM, Petitioner.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari filed by Monina P.
Lim (petitioner) seeking to set aside the Decision 1 dated 15
September 2004 of the Regional Trial Court, General Santos
City, Branch 22 (trial court), in SPL. PROC. Case Nos. 1258
and 1259, which dismissed without prejudice the consolidated
petitions for adoption of Michelle P. Lim and Michael Jude P.
Lim.
The Facts
The following facts are undisputed. Petitioner is an optometrist
by profession. On 23 June 1974, she married Primo Lim (Lim).
They were childless. Minor children, whose parents were
unknown, were entrusted to them by a certain Lucia Ayuban
(Ayuban). Being so eager to have a child of their own,
petitioner and Lim registered the children to make it appear
that they were the children's parents. The children 2 were
named Michelle P. Lim (Michelle) and Michael Jude P. Lim
(Michael). Michelle was barely eleven days old when brought
to the clinic of petitioner. She was born on 15 March
1977.3 Michael was 11 days old when Ayuban brought him to
petitioner's clinic. His date of birth is 1 August 1983.4
The spouses reared and cared for the children as if they were
their own. They sent the children to exclusive schools. They
used the surname "Lim" in all their school records and
documents. Unfortunately, on 28 November 1998, Lim died.
On 27 December 2000, petitioner married Angel Olario
(Olario), an American citizen.
Thereafter, petitioner decided to adopt the children by availing
of the amnesty5 given under Republic Act No. 85526 (RA 8552)
to those individuals who simulated the birth of a child. Thus, on
24 April 2002, petitioner filed separate petitions for the
adoption of Michelle and Michael before the trial court
docketed as SPL PROC. Case Nos. 1258 and 1259,
respectively. At the time of the filing of the petitions for
adoption, Michelle was 25 years old and already married, while
Michael was 18 years and seven months old.
Michelle and her husband gave their consent to the adoption
as evidenced by their Affidavits of Consent.7 Michael also gave
his consent to his adoption as shown in his Affidavit of
Consent.8 Petitioner's husband Olario likewise executed an
Affidavit of Consent9 for the adoption of Michelle and Michael.
In the Certification issued by the Department of Social Welfare
and Development (DSWD), Michelle was considered as an
abandoned child and the whereabouts of her natural parents
were unknown.10 The DSWD issued a similar Certification for
Michael.11
The Ruling of the Trial Court
On 15 September 2004, the trial court rendered judgment
dismissing the petitions. The trial court ruled that since
petitioner had remarried, petitioner should have filed the
petition jointly with her new husband. The trial court ruled that
joint adoption by the husband and the wife is mandatory citing
Section 7(c), Article III of RA 8552 and Article 185 of the
Family Code.
Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the decision but
the motion was denied in the Order dated 16 June 2005. In
denying the motion, the trial court ruled that petitioner did not
fall under any of the exceptions under Section 7(c), Article III of
RA 8552. Petitioner's argument that mere consent of her
husband would suffice was untenable because, under the law,
there are additional requirements, such as residency and
certification of his qualification, which the husband, who was
not even made a party in this case, must comply.
As to the argument that the adoptees are already emancipated
and joint adoption is merely for the joint exercise of parental
authority, the trial court ruled that joint adoption is not only for
the purpose of exercising parental authority because an
emancipated child acquires certain rights from his parents and
assumes certain obligations and responsibilities.
Hence, the present petition.
Issue
Petitioner appealed directly to this Court raising the sole issue
of whether or not petitioner, who has remarried, can singly
adopt.
The Court's Ruling
Petitioner contends that the rule on joint adoption must be
relaxed because it is the duty of the court and the State to
protect the paramount interest and welfare of the child to be
adopted. Petitioner argues that the legal maxim "dura lex sed
lex" is not applicable to adoption cases. She argues that joint
parental authority is not necessary in this case since, at the
time the petitions were filed, Michelle was 25 years old and
already married, while Michael was already 18 years of age.
Parental authority is not anymore necessary since they have
been emancipated having attained the age of majority.
We deny the petition.
Joint Adoption by Husband and Wife
It is undisputed that, at the time the petitions for adoption were
filed, petitioner had already remarried. She filed the petitions
by herself, without being joined by her husband Olario. We
have no other recourse but to affirm the trial court's decision
denying the petitions for adoption. Dura lex sed lex. The law is
explicit. Section 7, Article III of RA 8552 reads:
SEC. 7. Who May Adopt. - The following may adopt:
(a) Any Filipino citizen of legal age, in possession of full civil
capacity and legal rights, of good moral character, has not
been convicted of any crime involving moral turpitude,
emotionally and psychologically capable of caring for children,
at least sixteen (16) years older than the adoptee, and who is
in a position to support and care for his/her children in keeping
with the means of the family. The requirement of sixteen (16)
year difference between the age of the adopter and adoptee
may be waived when the adopter is the biological parent of the
adoptee, or is the spouse of the adoptee's parent;
(b) Any alien possessing the same qualifications as above
stated for Filipino nationals: Provided, That his/her country has
diplomatic relations with the Republic of the Philippines, that
he/she has been living in the Philippines for at least three (3)
continuous years prior to the filing of the application for
adoption and maintains such residence until the adoption
decree is entered, that he/she has been certified by his/her
diplomatic or consular office or any appropriate government
agency that he/she has the legal capacity to adopt in his/her
country, and that his/her government allows the adoptee to
enter his/her country as his/her adopted
son/daughter: Provided, further, That the requirements on
residency and certification of the alien's qualification to adopt in
his/her country may be waived for the following:
(i) a former Filipino citizen who seeks to adopt a relative within
the fourth (4th) degree of consanguinity or affinity; or
(ii) one who seeks to adopt the legitimate son/daughter of
his/her Filipino spouse; or
(iii) one who is married to a Filipino citizen and seeks to adopt
jointly with his/her spouse a relative within the fourth (4th)
degree of consanguinity or affinity of the Filipino spouses; or
(c) The guardian with respect to the ward after the termination
of the guardianship and clearance of his/her financial
accountabilities.
Husband and wife shall jointly adopt, except in the following
cases:
(i) if one spouse seeks to adopt the legitimate son/daughter of
the other; or
(ii) if one spouse seeks to adopt his/her own illegitimate
son/daughter: Provided, however, That the other spouse has
signified his/her consent thereto; or
(iii) if the spouses are legally separated from each other.
In case husband and wife jointly adopt, or one spouse adopts
the illegitimate son/daughter of the other, joint parental
authority shall be exercised by the spouses. (Emphasis
supplied)cralawlibrary
The use of the word "shall" in the above-quoted provision
means that joint adoption by the husband and the wife is
mandatory. This is in consonance with the concept of joint
parental authority over the child which is the ideal situation. As
the child to be adopted is elevated to the level of a legitimate
child, it is but natural to require the spouses to adopt jointly.
The rule also insures harmony between the spouses.12
The law is clear. There is no room for ambiguity. Petitioner,
having remarried at the time the petitions for adoption were
filed, must jointly adopt. Since the petitions for adoption were
filed only by petitioner herself, without joining her husband,
Olario, the trial court was correct in denying the petitions for
adoption on this ground.
Neither does petitioner fall under any of the three exceptions
enumerated in Section 7. First, the children to be adopted are
not the legitimate children of petitioner or of her husband
Olario. Second, the children are not the illegitimate children of
petitioner. And third, petitioner and Olario are not legally
separated from each other.
The fact that Olario gave his consent to the adoption as shown
in his Affidavit of Consent does not suffice. There are certain
requirements that Olario must comply being an American
citizen. He must meet the qualifications set forth in Section 7 of
RA 8552 such as: (1) he must prove that his country has
diplomatic relations with the Republic of the Philippines; (2) he
must have been living in the Philippines for at least three
continuous years prior to the filing of the application for
adoption; (3) he must maintain such residency until the
adoption decree is entered; (4) he has legal capacity to adopt
in his own country; and (5) the adoptee is allowed to enter the
adopter's country as the latter's adopted child. None of these
qualifications were shown and proved during the trial.
These requirements on residency and certification of the alien's
qualification to adopt cannot likewise be waived pursuant to
Section 7. The children or adoptees are not relatives within the
fourth degree of consanguinity or affinity of petitioner or of
Olario. Neither are the adoptees the legitimate children of
petitioner.
Effects of Adoption
Petitioner contends that joint parental authority is not anymore
necessary since the children have been emancipated having
reached the age of majority. This is untenable.
Parental authority includes caring for and rearing the children
for civic consciousness and efficiency and the development of
their moral, mental and physical character and well-
being.13 The father and the mother shall jointly exercise
parental authority over the persons of their common
children.14 Even the remarriage of the surviving parent shall not
affect the parental authority over the children, unless the court
appoints another person to be the guardian of the person or
property of the children.15
It is true that when the child reaches the age of emancipation -
that is, when he attains the age of majority or 18 years of
age16 - emancipation terminates parental authority over the
person and property of the child, who shall then be qualified
and responsible for all acts of civil life.17However, parental
authority is merely just one of the effects of legal adoption.
Article V of RA 8552 enumerates the effects of adoption, thus:
ARTICLE V
EFFECTS OF ADOPTION
SEC. 16. Parental Authority. - Except in cases where the
biological parent is the spouse of the adopter, all legal ties
between the biological parent(s) and the adoptee shall be
severed and the same shall then be vested on the adopter(s).
SEC. 17. Legitimacy. - The adoptee shall be considered the
legitimate son/daughter of the adopter(s) for all intents and
purposes and as such is entitled to all the rights and because Olario has filed a case for dissolution of his marriage
obligations provided by law to legitimate sons/daughters born to petitioner in the Los Angeles Superior Court.
to them without discrimination of any kind. To this end, the
adoptee is entitled to love, guidance, and support in keeping We disagree. The filing of a case for dissolution of the
with the means of the family. marriage between petitioner and Olario is of no moment. It is
not equivalent to a decree of dissolution of marriage. Until and
SEC. 18. Succession. - In legal and intestate succession, the unless there is a judicial decree for the dissolution of the
adopter(s) and the adoptee shall have reciprocal rights of marriage between petitioner and Olario, the marriage still
succession without distinction from legitimate filiation. subsists. That being the case, joint adoption by the husband
However, if the adoptee and his/her biological parent(s) had and the wife is required. We reiterate our ruling above that
left a will, the law on testamentary succession shall govern. since, at the time the petitions for adoption were filed,
petitioner was married to Olario, joint adoption is mandatory.
Adoption has, thus, the following effects: (1) sever all legal ties
between the biological parent(s) and the adoptee, except when WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition. We AFFIRM the
the biological parent is the spouse of the adopter; (2) deem the Decision dated 15 September 2004 of the Regional Trial Court,
adoptee as a legitimate child of the adopter; and (3) give General Santos City, Branch 22 in SPL. PROC. Case Nos.
adopter and adoptee reciprocal rights and obligations arising 1258 and 1259. Costs against petitioner.
from the relationship of parent and child, including but not
limited to: (i) the right of the adopter to choose the name the SO ORDERED.
child is to be known; and (ii) the right of the adopter and
adoptee to be legal and compulsory heirs of each
other.18 Therefore, even if emancipation terminates parental
authority, the adoptee is still considered a legitimate child of
the adopter with all the rights19 of a legitimate child such as: (1)
to bear the surname of the father and the mother; (2) to receive
support from their parents; and (3) to be entitled to the legitime
and other successional rights. Conversely, the adoptive
parents shall, with respect to the adopted child, enjoy all the
benefits to which biological parents are entitled20 such as
support21 and successional rights.22

We are mindful of the fact that adoption statutes, being

humane and salutary, hold the interests and welfare of the
child to be of paramount consideration. They are designed to
provide homes, parental care and education for unfortunate,
needy or orphaned children and give them the protection of
society and family, as well as to allow childless couples or
persons to experience the joys of parenthood and give them
legally a child in the person of the adopted for the
manifestation of their natural parental instincts. Every
reasonable intendment should be sustained to promote and
fulfill these noble and compassionate objectives of the
law.23But, as we have ruled in Republic v. Vergara:24

We are not unmindful of the main purpose of adoption statutes,

which is the promotion of the welfare of the children.
Accordingly, the law should be construed liberally, in a manner
that will sustain rather than defeat said purpose. The law must
also be applied with compassion, understanding and less
severity in view of the fact that it is intended to provide homes,
love, care and education for less fortunate children.
Regrettably, the Court is not in a position to affirm the trial
court's decision favoring adoption in the case at bar, for the
law is clear and it cannot be modified without violating the
proscription against judicial legislation. Until such time
however, that the law on the matter is amended, we cannot
sustain the respondent-spouses' petition for adoption.
(Emphasis supplied)ςηαñrοblεš νιr†υαl lαω lιbrαrÿ

Petitioner, being married at the time the petitions for adoption

were filed, should have jointly filed the petitions with her
husband. We cannot make our own legislation to suit
petitioner.

Petitioner, in her Memorandum, insists that subsequent events

would show that joint adoption could no longer be possible
 G.R. No. 188801, October 15, 2014
ROSARIO MATA CASTRO AND JOANNE BENEDICTA
CHARISSIMA M. CASTRO, A.K.A. "MARIA SOCORRO M.
CASTRO" AND "JAYROSE M. CASTRO," Petitioners,
v. JOSE MARIA JED LEMUEL GREGORIO AND ANA
MARIA REGINA GREGORIO, Respondents.
DECISION
LEONEN, J.:
The policy of the law is clear. In order to maintain harmony,
there must be a showing of notice and consent. This cannot be
defeated by mere procedural devices. In all instances where it
appears that a spouse attempts to adopt a child out of
wedlock, the other spouse and other legitimate children must
be personally notified through personal service of summons. It
is not enough that they be deemed notified through
constructive service.
This is a petition for review on certiorari1 assailing the
decision2 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 101021,
which denied the petition for annulment of judgment filed by
petitioners. The petition before the appellate court sought to
annul the judgment of the trial court that granted respondents'
decree of adoption.3chanrobleslaw
The case originally stemmed from the adoption of Jose Maria
Jed Lemuel Gregorio (Jéd) and Ana Maria Regina Gregorio
(Regina) by Atty. Jose G. Castro (Jose). Jose is the estranged
husband of Rosario Mata Castro (Rosario) and the father of
Joanne Benedicta Charissima M. Castro (Joanne), also known
by her baptismal name, "Maria Socorro M. Castro" and her
nickname, "Jayrose."
Rosario alleged that she and Jose were married on August 5,
1962 in Laoag City. Their marriage had allegedly been
troubled. They had a child, Rose Marie, who was born in 1963,
but succumbed to congenital heart disease and only lived for
nine days. Rosario allegedly left Jose after a couple of months
because of the incompatibilities between them.4chanrobleslaw
Rosario and Jose, however, briefly reconciled in 1969. Rosario
gave birth to Joanne a year later. She and Jose allegedly lived
as husband and wife for about a year even if she lived in
Manila and Jose stayed in Laoag City. Jose would visit her in
Manila during weekends. Afterwards, they separated
permanently because Rosario alleged that Jose had
homosexual tendencies.5 She insisted, however, that they
"remained friends for fifteen (15) years despite their
separation(.)"6chanrobleslaw
On August 1, 2000, Jose filed a petition7 for adoption before
the Regional Trial Court of Batac, Ilocos Norte. In the petition,
he alleged that Jed and Regina were his illegitimate children
with Lilibeth Fernandez Gregorio (Lilibeth),8 whom Rosario
alleged was his erstwhile housekeeper.9 At the time of the filing
of the petition, Jose was 70 years old.10chanrobleslaw
According to the Home Study Report11 conducted by the Social
Welfare Officer of the trial court, Jose belongs to a prominent
and respected family, being one of the three children of former
Governor Mauricio Castro.
He was also a well-known lawyer in Manila and Ilocos
Norte.12 The report mentioned that he was once married to
Rosario, but the marriage did not produce any children. 13 It
also stated that he met and fell in love with Lilibeth in 1985,
and Lilibeth was able to bear him two children, Jed on August
1987, and Regina on March 1989.14 Under "Motivation for
Adoption," the social welfare officer
noted:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Since, he has no child with his marriaged [sic] to Rosario Mata,
he was not able to fulfill his dreams to parent a child. However,
with the presence of his 2 illegitimate children will fulfill his
dreams [sic] and it is his intention to legalize their relationship
and surname. . . .15
At the time of the report, Jose was said to be living with Jed
and Regina temporarily in Batac, Ilocos Norte.16 The children
have allegedly been in his custody since Lilibeth's death in July
1995.17chanrobleslaw
On October 16, 2000, the trial court approved the
adoption,18 having ruled that "[n]o opposition had been
received by this Court from any person including the
government which was represented by the Office of the
Solicitor General."19 A certificate of finality20 was issued on
February 9, 2006.
Meanwhile, on July 3, 2006, Rosario, through her lawyer, Atty.
Rene V. Saguisag, filed a complaint for disbarment against
Jose with the Integrated Bar of the Philippines.21 In her
complaint, she alleged that Jose had been remiss in providing
support for their daughter, Joanne, for the past 36 years. 22 She
alleged that she single-handedly raised and provided financial
support to Joanne while Jose had been showering gifts to his
driver and alleged lover, Larry R. Rentegrado (Larry), and even
went to the extent of adopting Larry's two children, Jed and
Regina, without her and Joanne's knowledge and
consent.23She also alleged that Jose made blatant lies to the
trial court by alleging that Jed and Regina were his illegitimate
children with Larry's wife, Lilibeth, to cover up for his
homosexual relationship with Larry.24chanrobleslaw
In his answer before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, Jose
denies being remiss in his fatherly duties to Joanne during her
minority. He alleged that he always offered help, but it was
often declined.25 He also alleged that he adopted Jed and
Regina because they are his illegitimate children. He denied
having committed any of the falsification alluded to by Rosario.
He also stated that he had suffered a stroke in 1998 that left
him paralyzed. He alleged that his income had been
diminished because several properties had to be sold to pay
for medical treatments.26 He then implored the Integrated Bar
of the Philippines to weigh on the case with "justice and
equity."27chanrobleslaw
On October 8, 2006, Jose died in Laoag City, Ilocos
Norte.28chanrobleslaw
On October 18, 2007, Rosario and Joanne filed a petition for
annulment of judgment under Rule 47 of the Rules of Civil
Procedure with the Court of Appeals, seeking to annul the
October 16, 2000 decision of the trial court approving Jed and
Regina's adoption.29chanrobleslaw
In their petition, Rosario and Joanne allege that they learned of
the adoption sometime in 2005.30 They allege that Rosario's
affidavit of consent, marked by the trial court as "Exh. K,"31 was
fraudulent.32 They also allege that Jed and Regina's birth
certificates showed different sets of information, such as the
age of their mother, Lilibeth, at the time she gave birth. They
argue that one set of birth certificates states the father to be
Jose and in another set of National Statistic Office certificates
shows the father to be Larry, Jose's driver and alleged
lover.33 It was further alleged that Jed and Regina are not
actually Jose's illegitimate children but the legitimate children
of Lilibeth and Larry who were married at the time of their
birth.34chanrobleslaw
On May 26, 2009, the Court of Appeals denied the petition.
While admittedly, no notice was given by the trial court to
Rosario and Joanne of the adoption, the appellate court ruled
that there is "no explicit provision in the rules that the spouse
and legitimate child of the adopter . . . should be personally
notified of the hearing."35chanrobleslaw
The appellate court "abhor[red] the mind baffling scheme
employed by [Jose] in obtaining an adoption decree in favor of
[his illegitimate children] to the prejudice of the interests of his
legitimate heirs"36 but stated that its hands were bound by the
trial court decision that had already attained "finality and
immutability."37chanrobleslaw
The appellate court also ruled that the alleged fraudulent
information contained in the different sets of birth certificates
required the determination of the identities of the persons
stated therein and was, therefore, beyond the scope of the
action for annulment of judgment. The alleged fraud was also
perpetrated during the trial and could not be classified as
extrinsic fraud, which is required in an action for annulment of
judgment.38chanrobleslaw
When Rosario and Joanne's motion for reconsideration was
denied on July 10, 2009,39 they filed this petition.
The issue before this court is whether the Court of Appeals
erred in denying the petition for annulment for failure of
petitioners to (1) show that the trial court lacked jurisdiction and
(2) show the existence of extrinsic fraud.
In their petition, petitioners argue that the appellate court erred
in its application of the law on extrinsic fraud as ground to
annul a judgment.40 They argue that because of the fabricated
consent obtained by Jose and the alleged false information
shown in the birth certificates presented as evidence before
the trial court,41 they were not given the opportunity to oppose
the petition since the entire proceedings were concealed from
them.42chanrobleslaw
Petitioners also argue that the appellate court misunderstood
and misapplied the law on jurisdiction despite the denial of due
process, notice, and non-inclusion of indispensable
parties.43 They argue that the adoption of illegitimate children
requires the consent, not only of the spouse, but also the
legitimate children 10 years or over of the adopter, and such
consent was never secured from Joanne.44chanrobleslaw
Respondents, however, argue in their comment that petitioners
could not have been deprived of their day in court since their
interest was "amply protected by the participation and
representation of the Solicitor General through the deputized
public prosecutor."45chanrobleslaw
Respondents also argue that there was constructive notice
through publication for three consecutive weeks in a
newspaper of general circulation, which constitutes not only
notice to them but also notice to the world of the adoption
proceedings.46 They argue that since the alleged fraud was
perpetrated during the trial, it cannot be said to be extrinsic
fraud but intrinsic fraud, which is not a ground for annulment of
judgment.47 They also argue that petitioners were not
indispensable parties because adoption is an action in
rem and, as such, the only indispensable party is the
state.48chanrobleslaw
The petition is granted.
Annulment of judgment under Rule 47
of the Rules of Civil Procedure
Under Rule 47, Section 1 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, a
party may file an action with the Court of Appeals to annul
judgments or final orders and resolutions in civil actions of
Regional Trial Courts. This remedy will only be available if "the
ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief or
other appropriate remedies are no longer available through no
fault of the petitioner."49chanrobleslaw
In Dare Adventure Farm Corporation v. Court of
Appeals:50chanrobleslaw
A petition for annulment of judgment is a remedy in equity so
exceptional in nature that it may be availed of only when other
remedies are wanting, and only if the judgment, final order or
final resolution sought, to be annulled was rendered by a court
lacking jurisdiction or through extrinsic fraud. Yet, the remedy,
being exceptional in character, is not allowed to be so easily
and readily abused by parties aggrieved by the final
judgments, orders or resolutions. The Court has thus instituted
safeguards by limiting the grounds for the annulment to lack of
jurisdiction and extrinsic fraud, and by prescribing in Section 1
of Rule 47 of the Rules of Court that the petitioner should show
that the ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief
or other appropriate remedies are no longer available through
no fault of the petitioner. A petition for annulment that ignores
or disregards any of the safeguards cannot prosper.
The attitude of judicial reluctance towards the annulment of a
judgment, final order or final resolution is understandable, for
the remedy disregards the time-honored doctrine of
immutability and unalterability of final judgments, a solid corner
stone in the dispensation of justice by the courts. The doctrine
of immutability and unalterability serves a two-fold purpose,
namely: (a) to avoid delay in the administration of justice and
thus, procedurally, to make orderly the discharge of judicial
business; and (b) to put an end to judicial controversies, at the
risk of occasional errors, which is precisely why the courts
exist. As to the first, a judgment that has acquired finality
becomes immutable and unalterable and is no longer to be
modified in any respect even if the modification is meant to
correct an erroneous conclusion of fact or of law, and whether
the modification is made by the court that rendered the
decision or by the highest court of the land. As to the latter,
controversies cannot drag on indefinitely because fundamental
considerations of public policy and sound practice demand that
the rights and obligations of every litigant must not hang in
suspense for an indefinite period of time.51 (Emphasis
supplied)
Because of the exceptional nature of the remedy, there are
only two grounds by which annulment of judgment may be
availed of: extrinsic fraud, which must be brought four years
from discovery, and lack of jurisdiction, which must be brought
before it is barred by estoppel or laches.52chanrobleslaw
Lack of jurisdiction under this rule means lack of jurisdiction
over the nature of the action or subject matter, or lack of
jurisdiction over the parties.53 Extrinsic fraud, on the other
hand, is "[that which] prevents a party from having a trial or
from presenting his entire case to the court, or [that which]
operates upon matters pertaining not to the judgment itself but
to the manner in which it is procured."54chanrobleslaw
The grant of adoption over respondents should be annulled as
the trial court did not validly acquire jurisdiction over the
proceedings, and the favorable decision was obtained through
extrinsic fraud.
Jurisdiction over adoption proceedings
vis-a-vis the law on adoption
Petitioners argue that they should have been given notice by
the trial court of the adoption, as adoption laws require their
consent as a requisite in the proceedings.
Petitioners are correct.
It is settled that "the jurisdiction of the court is determined by
the statute in force at the time of the commencement of the
action."55 As Jose filed the petition for adoption on August 1,
2000, it is Republic Act No. 855256 which applies over the
proceedings. The law on adoption requires that the adoption by
the father of a child born out of wedlock obtain not only the
consent of his wife but also the consent of his legitimate
children.
Under Article III, Section 7 of Republic Act No. 8552, the
husband must first obtain the consent of his wife if he seeks to
adopt his own children born out of
wedlock:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
ARTICLE III
ELIGIBILITY
SEC. 7. Who May Adopt. — The following may
adopt:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Husband and wife shall jointly adopt, except in the following
cases:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
(i) if one spouse seeks to adopt the legitimate son/daughter of
the other; or
(ii) if one spouse seeks to adopt his/her own illegitimate
son/daughter: Provided, however, That the other spouse has
signified, his/her consent thereto; or
(iii) if the spouses are legally separated from each other. . .
(Emphasis supplied)
The provision is mandatory. As a general rule, the husband
and wife must file a joint petition for adoption. The rationale for
this is stated in In Re: Petition for Adoption of Michelle P.
Lim:57chanrobleslaw
The use of the word "shall" in the above-quoted provision
means that joint adoption by the husband and the wife is
mandatory. This is in consonance with the concept of joint
parental authority over the child which is the ideal situation. As
the child to be adopted is elevated to the level of a legitimate
child, it is but natural to require the spouses to adopt jointly.
The rule also insures harmony between the spouses.58
The law provides for several exceptions to the general rule, as
in a situation where a spouse seeks to adopt his or her own
children born out of wedlock. In this instance, joint adoption is
not necessary. However, the spouse seeking to adopt must
first obtain the consent of his or her spouse.
In the absence of any decree of legal separation or annulment,
Jose and Rosario remained legally married despite their de
facto separation. For Jose to be eligible to adopt Jed and
Regina, Rosario must first signify her consent to the adoption.
Jose, however, did not validly obtain Rosario's consent. His
submission of a fraudulent affidavit of consent in her name
cannot be considered compliance of the requisites of the law.
Had Rosario been given notice by the trial court of the
proceedings, she would have had a reasonable opportunity to
contest the validity of the affidavit. Since her consent was not
obtained, Jose was ineligible to adopt.
The law also requires the written consent of the adopter's
children if they are 10 years old or older. In Article III, Section 9
of Republic Act No. 8552:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
SEC. 9. Whose Consent is Necessary to the Adoption. — After
being properly counseled and informed of his/her right to give
or withhold his/her approval of the adoption, the written
consent of the following to the adoption is hereby
required:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
(c) The legitimate and adopted sons/daughters, ten (10) years
of age or over, of the adopter(s) and adoptee, if any;
(Emphasis supplied)
The consent of the adopter's other children is necessary as it
ensures harmony among the prospective siblings. It also
sufficiently puts the other children on notice that they will have
to share their parent's love and care, as well as their future
legitimes, with another person.
It is undisputed that Joanne was Jose and Rosario's legitimate
child and that she was over 10 years old at the time of the
adoption proceedings. Her written consent, therefore, was
necessary for the adoption to be valid.
To circumvent this requirement, however, Jose manifested to
the trial court that he and Rosario were childless, thereby
preventing Joanne from being notified of the proceedings. As
her written consent was never obtained, the adoption was not
valid.
For the adoption to be valid, petitioners' consent was required
by Republic Act No. 8552. Personal service of summons
should have been effected on the spouse and all legitimate
children to ensure that their substantive rights are protected. It
is not enough to rely on constructive notice as in this case.
Surreptitious use of procedural technicalities cannot be
privileged over substantive statutory rights.
Since the trial court failed to personally serve notice on Rosario
and Joanne of the proceedings, it never validly acquired
jurisdiction.
There was extrinsic fraud
The appellate court, in denying the petition, ruled that while
fraud may have been committed in this case, it was only
intrinsic fraud, rather than extrinsic fraud. This is erroneous.
In People v. Court of Appeals and Socorro
Florece:59chanrobleslaw
Extrinsic fraud refers to any fraudulent act of the prevailing
party in litigation committed outside of the trial of the
case, whereby the defeated party is prevented from fully
exhibiting his side of the case by fraud or deception
practiced on him by his opponent, such as by keeping him
away from court, by giving him a false promise of a
compromise, or where the defendant never had the knowledge
of the suit, being kept in ignorance by the acts of the plaintiff,
or where an attorney fraudulently or without authority connives
at his defeat.60 (Emphasis supplied)
An action for annulment based on extrinsic fraud must be
brought within four years from discovery.61Petitioners alleged
that they were made aware of the adoption only in 2005. The
filing of this petition on October 18, 2007 is within the period
allowed by the rules.
The badges of fraud are present in this case.
First, the petition for adoption was filed in a place that had no
relation to any of the parties. Jose was a resident of Laoag
City, llocos Norte.62 Larry and Lilibeth were residents of
Barangay 6, Laoag City.63 Jed and Regina were born in San
Nicolas, Ilocos Norte.64 Rosario and Joanne were residents of
Parañaque City, Manila.65 The petition for adoption, however,
was filed in the Regional Trial Court of Batac, Ilocos
Norte.66 The trial court gave due course to the petition on
Jose's bare allegation in his petition that he was a resident of
Batac,67 even though it is admitted in the Home Study Report
that he was a practicing lawyer in Laoag City.68chanrobleslaw
Second, using the process of delayed registration,69 Jose was
able to secure birth certificates for Jed and Regina showing
him to be the father and Larry as merely the
informant.70 Worse still is that two different sets of fraudulent
certificates were procured: one showing that Jose and Lilibeth
were married on December 4, 1986 in Manila,71 and another
wherein the portion for the mother's name was not filled in at
all.72 The birth certificates of Jed and Regina from the National
Statistics Office, however, show that their father was Larry R.
Rentegrado.73 These certificates are in clear contradiction to
the birth certificates submitted by Jose to the trial court in
support of his petition for adoption.
Third, Jose blatantly lied to the trial court when he declared
that his motivation for adoption was because he and his wife,
Rosario, were childless,74 to the prejudice of their daughter,
Joanne. The consent of Rosario to the adoption was also
disputed by Rosario and alleged to be
fraudulent.75chanrobleslaw
All these tactics were employed by Jose, not only to induce the
trial court in approving his petition, but also to prevent Rosario
and Joanne from participating in the proceedings or opposing
the petition.
The appellate court erroneously classified the fraud employed
by Jose as intrinsic on the basis that they were "forged
instruments or perjured testimonies"76 presented during the
trial. It failed to understand, however, that fraud is considered
intrinsic when the other party was either present at the trial or
was a participant in the proceedings when such instrument or
testimony was presented in court,
thus:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
[I]ntrinsic fraud refers to the acts of a party at a trial that
prevented a fair and just determination of the case, but the
difference is that the acts or things, like falsification and false
testimony, could have been litigated and determined at the trial
or adjudication of the case. In other words, intrinsic fraud does
not deprive the petitioner of his day in court because he can
guard against that kind of fraud through so many means,
including a thorough trial preparation, a skillful, cross-
examination, resorting to the modes of discovery, and proper
scientific or forensic applications. Indeed, forgery of documents
and evidence for use at the trial and perjury in court testimony
have been regarded as not preventing the participation of any
party in the proceedings, and are not, therefore, constitutive of
extrinsic fraud.77 (Emphasis supplied)
When fraud is employed by a party precisely to prevent the
participation of any other interested party, as in this case, then
the fraud is extrinsic, regardless of whether the fraud was
committed through the use of forged documents or perjured
testimony during the trial.
Jose's actions prevented Rosario and Joanne from having a
reasonable opportunity to contest the adoption. Had Rosario
and Joanne been allowed to participate, the trial court would
have hesitated to grant Jose's petition since he failed to fulfill
the necessary requirements under the law. There can be no
other conclusion than that because of Jose's acts, the trial
court granted the decree of adoption under fraudulent
circumstances.
The law itself provides for penal sanctions for those who
violate its provisions. Under Article VII, Section 21 of Republic
Act No. 8552:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
ARTICLE VII
VIOLATIONS AND PENALTIES
SEC. 21. Violations and Penalties. —
(a) The penalty of imprisonment ranging from six (6) years and
one (1) day to twelve (12) years and/or a fine not less than
Fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00), but not more than Two
hundred thousand pesos (P200,000.00) at the discretion of
the court shall be imposed on any person who shall commit
any of the following acts:
(i) obtaining consent for an adoption through coercion, undue
influence, fraud, improper material inducement, or other
similar acts;
(ii) non-compliance with the procedures and safeguards
provided by the law for adoption; or
(iii) subjecting or exposing the child to be adopted to danger,
abuse, or exploitation.
(b) Any person who shall cause the fictitious registration of the
birth of a child under the name(s) of a person(s) who is not
his/her biological parent(s) shall be guilty of simulation of
birth, and shall be punished by prision mayor in its medium
period and a fine not exceeding Fifty thousand pesos
(P50.000.00). (Emphasis supplied)
Unfortunately, Jose's death carried with it the extinguishment
of any of his criminal liabilities.78 Republic Act No. 8552 also
fails to provide any provision on the status of adoption decrees
if the adoption is found to have been obtained fraudulently.
Petitioners also cannot invoke Article VI, Section 19 of
Republic Act No. 855279 since rescission of adoption can only
be availed of by the adoptee. Petitioners, therefore, are left
with no other remedy in law other than the annulment of the
judgment.
The fraud employed in this case has been to Joanne's
prejudice. There is reason to believe that Joanne has grown up
having never experienced the love and care of a father, her
parents having separated a year after her birth. She has never
even benefited from any monetary support from her father.
Despite all these adversities, Joanne was able to obtain a
medical degree from the University of the Philippines College
of Medicine80 and is now working as a doctor in
Canada.81 These accomplishments, however, are poor
substitutes if the injustice done upon her is allowed to continue.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The decision dated

October 16, 2000 of the Regional Trial Court of Batac, Ilocos
Norte, Branch 17 in SP. Proc. No. 3445-17 is
rendered NULL and VOID.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 192531 November 12, 2014
BERNARDINA P. BARTOLOME, Petitioner,
vs.
SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM and SCANMAR MARITIME
SERVICES, INC., Respondents.
DECISION
VELASCO, JR., J.:
Nature of the Case
This Appeal, filed under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court, seeks to
annul the March 17, 2010 Decision1 of the Employees
Compensation Commission (ECC) in ECC Case No. SL-
18483-0218-10, entitled Bernardina P. Bartolome v. Social
Security System (SSS) [Scanmar Maritime Services, Inc.},
declaring that petitioner is not a beneficiary of the deceased
employee under Presidential Decree No. (PD) 442, otherwise
known as the Labor Code of the Philippines, as amended by
PD 626.2
The Facts
John Colcol (John), born on June 9, 1983, was employed as
electrician by Scanmar Maritime Services, Inc., on board the
vessel Maersk Danville, since February 2008. As such, he was
enrolled under the government's Employees' Compensation
Program (ECP).3 Unfortunately, on June 2, 2008, an accident
occurred on board the vessel whereby steel plates fell on John,
which led to his untimely death the following day.4
John was, at the time of his death, childless and unmarried.
Thus, petitioner Bernardina P. Bartolome, John’s biological
mother and, allegedly, sole remaining beneficiary, filed a claim
for death benefits under PD 626 with the Social Security
System (SSS) at San Fernando City, La Union. However, the
SSS La Union office, in a letter dated June 10,
20095 addressed to petitioner, denied the claim, stating:
We regret to inform you that wecannot give due course to your
claim because you are no longer considered as the parent of
JOHN COLCOL as he was legally adopted by CORNELIO
COLCOL based on documents you submitted to us.
The denial was appealed tothe Employees’ Compensation
Commission (ECC), which affirmed the ruling of the SSS La
Union Branch through the assailed Decision, the dispositive
portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is AFFIRMED and the
claim is hereby dismissed for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.6
In denying the claim, both the SSS La Union branch and the
ECC ruled against petitioner’s entitlement to the death benefits
sought after under PD 626 on the ground she can no longer be
considered John’s primary beneficiary. As culled from the
records, John and his sister Elizabeth were adopted by their
great grandfather, petitioner’s grandfather, Cornelio Colcol
(Cornelio), by virtue of the Decision7 in Spec. Proc. No. 8220-
XII of the Regional Trial Court in Laoag City dated February 4,
1985, which decree of adoption attained
finality.8 Consequently, as argued by the agencies, it is
Cornelio who qualifies as John’s primary beneficiary, not
petitioner. Neither, the ECC reasoned, would petitioner qualify
as John’s secondary beneficiary even if it wereproven that
Cornelio has already passed away. As the ECC ratiocinated:
Under Article 167 (j) of P.D. 626, as amended, provides (sic)
that beneficiaries are the "dependent spouse until he remarries
and dependent children, who are the primary beneficiaries. In
their absence, the dependent parentsand subject to the
restrictions imposed on dependent children, the illegitimate
children and legitimate descendants who are the secondary
beneficiaries; Provided; that the dependent acknowledged
natural child shall be considered as a primary beneficiary when
there are no other dependent children who are qualified and
eligible for monthly income benefit."
The dependent parent referred to by the above provision
relates to the legitimate parent of the covered member, as
provided for by Rule XV, Section 1 (c) (1) of the Amended
Rules on Employees’ Compensation. This Commission
believes that the appellant is not considered a legitimate parent
of the deceased, having given up the latter for adoption to Mr.
Cornelio C. Colcol. Thus, in effect, the adoption divested her of
the statusas the legitimate parent of the deceased.
xxxx
In effect, the rights which previously belong [sic] to the
biological parent of the adopted child shall now be upon the
adopting parent. Hence, in this case, the legal parent referred
to by P.D. 626, as amended, as the beneficiary, who has the
right to file the claim, is the adoptive father of the deceased
and not herein appellant.9 (Emphasis supplied)
Aggrieved, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which
was likewise denied by the ECC.10 Hence, the instant petition.
The Issues
Petitioner raises the following issues in the petition:
ASSIGNMENT OF ERRORS
I. The Honorable ECC’s Decision is contrary to
evidence on record.
II. The Honorable ECC committed grave abuse in
denying the just, due and lawful claims of the
petitioner as a lawful beneficiary of her deceased
biological son.
III. The Honorable ECC committed grave abuse of
discretion in not giving due course/denying
petitioner’s otherwise meritorious motion for
reconsideration.11
In resolving the case, the pivotal issue is this: Are the biological
parents of the covered, but legally adopted, employee
considered secondary beneficiaries and, thus, entitled, in
appropriate cases, to receive the benefits under the ECP?
The Court's Ruling
The petition is meritorious.
The ECC’s factual findings are not consistent with the evidence
on record
To recall, one of the primary reasons why the ECC denied
petitioner’s claim for death benefits is that eventhough she is
John’s biological mother, it was allegedly not proven that his
adoptive parent, Cornelio, was no longer alive. As intimated by
the ECC:
Moreover, there had been no allegation in the records as to
whether the legally adoptive parent, Mr. Colcol, is dead, which
would immediately qualify the appellant [petitioner] for Social
Security benefits. Hence, absent such proof of death of the
adoptive father, this Commission will presume him to be alive
and well, and as such, is the one entitled to claim the benefit
being the primary beneficiary of the deaceased. Thus,
assuming that appellant is indeed a qualified beneficiary under
the Social Security law, in view of her status as other
beneficiary, she cannot claim the benefit legally provided by
law to the primary beneficiary, in this case the adoptive father
since he is still alive.
We disagree with the factual finding of the ECC on this point.
Generally, findings of fact by administrative agencies are
generally accorded great respect, if not finality, by the courts
by reason of the special knowledge and expertise of said
administrative agenciesover matters falling under their
jurisdiction.12 However, in the extant case, the ECC had
overlooked a crucial piece of evidence offered by the petitioner
– Cornelio’s death certificate.13
Based on Cornelio’s death certificate, it appears that John’s
adoptive father died on October 26, 1987,14 or only less than
three (3) years since the decree of adoption on February 4,
1985, which attained finality.15 As such, it was error for the
ECC to have ruled that it was not duly proven that the adoptive
parent, Cornelio, has already passed away.
The rule limiting death benefits claims to the legitimate parents
is contrary to law
This brings us to the question of whether or not petitioner is
entitled to the death benefits claim in view of John’s work-
related demise. The pertinent provision, in this regard, is Article
167 (j) of the Labor Code, as amended, which reads:
ART. 167. Definition of terms. - Asused in this Title unless the
context indicates otherwise:
xxxx
(j) 'Beneficiaries' means the dependent spouse until he
remarries and dependent children, who are the primary
beneficiaries. In their absence, the dependent parents and
subject to the restrictions imposed on dependent children, the
illegitimate children and legitimate descendants who are
thesecondary beneficiaries; Provided, that the dependent
acknowledged natural child shall be considered as a primary
beneficiary when there are no other dependent children who
are qualified and eligible for monthly income benefit.
(Emphasis supplied)
Concurrently, pursuant to the succeeding Article 177(c)
supervising the ECC "[T]o approve rules and regulations
governing the processing of claims and the settlement of
disputes arising therefrom as prescribed by the System," the
ECC has issued the Amended Rules on Employees’
Compensation, interpreting the above-cited provision as
follows:
RULE XV – BENEFICIARIES
SECTION 1. Definition. (a) Beneficiaries shall be either primary
or secondary, and determined atthe time of employee’s death.
(b) The following beneficiaries shall be considered
primary:
(1) The legitimate spouse living with the
employee at the time of the employee’s
death until he remarries; and
(2) Legitimate, legitimated, legally adopted or
acknowledged natural children, who are
unmarried not gainfully employed, not over
21 years of age, or over 21 years of age
provided that he is incapacitated and
incapable of self - support due to physicalor
mental defect which is congenital or acquired
during minority; Provided, further, that a
dependent acknowledged natural child shall
be considered as a primary beneficiary only
when there are no other dependent children
who are qualified and eligible for monthly
income benefit; provided finally, that if there
are two or more acknowledged natural
children, they shall be counted from the
youngest and without substitution, but not
exceeding five.
(c) The following beneficiaries shall be considered
secondary:
(1) The legitimate parentswholly dependent
upon the employee for regular support;
(2) The legitimate descendants and
illegitimate children who are unmarried, not
gainfully employed, and not over 21 years of
age, or over 21 years of age providedthat he
is incapacitated and incapable of self -
support dueto physical or mental defect
which is congenital or acquired during
minority. (Emphasis supplied)
Guilty of reiteration, the ECC denied petitioner’s claim on the
ground that she is no longer the deceased’s legitimate parent,
as required by the implementing rules. As held by the ECC, the
adoption decree severed the relation between John and
petitioner, effectively divesting her of the status of a legitimate
parent, and, consequently, that of being a secondary
beneficiary.
We disagree.
a. Rule XV, Sec. 1(c)(1) of the Amended Rules on Employees’
Compensation deviates from the clear language of Art. 167 (j)
of the Labor Code, as amended
Examining the Amended Rules on Employees’ Compensation
in light of the Labor Code, as amended, it is at once apparent
that the ECC indulged in an unauthorized administrative
legislation. In net effect, the ECC read into Art. 167 of the Code
an interpretation not contemplated by the provision. Pertinent
in elucidating on this point isArticle 7 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines, which reads:
Article 7. Laws are repealed only by subsequent ones, and
their violation or non-observance shall not beexcused by
disuse, or custom or practice to the contrary.
When the courts declared a law to be inconsistent with the
Constitution, the former shall be void and the latter shall
govern.
Administrative or executive acts, orders and regulations shall
be valid only when they are not contrary to the laws or the
Constitution.(Emphasis supplied)
As applied, this Court held in Commissioner of Internal
Revenue v. Fortune Tobacco Corporation 16 that:
As we have previously declared, rule-making power must be
confined to details for regulating the mode or proceedings in
order to carry into effect the law as it has been enacted, and it
cannot be extended to amend or expand the statutory
requirements or to embrace matters not covered by the statute.
Administrative regulations must always be in harmony with the
provisions of the law because any resulting discrepancy
between the two will always be resolved in favor of the basic
law. (Emphasis supplied)
Guided by this doctrine, We find that Rule XV of the Amended
Rules on Employees’ Compensation is patently a wayward
restriction of and a substantial deviation from Article 167 (j) of
the Labor Code when it interpreted the phrase "dependent
parents" to refer to "legitimate parents."
It bears stressing that a similar issue in statutory construction
was resolved by this Court in Diaz v. Intermediate Appellate
Court17 in this wise:
It is Our shared view that the word "relatives" should be
construed in its general acceptation. Amicus curiae Prof.
Ruben Balane has this to say:
The term relatives, although used many times in the Code, is
not defined by it. In accordancetherefore with the canons of
statutory interpretation, it should beunderstood to have a
general and inclusive scope, inasmuch as the term is a general
one. Generalia verba sunt generaliter intelligenda. That the law
does not make a distinction prevents us from making one: Ubi
lex non distinguit, nec nos distinguera debemus. xxx
According to Prof. Balane, to interpret the term relatives in
Article 992 in a more restrictive sense thanit is used and
intended is not warranted by any rule ofinterpretation. Besides,
he further states that when the law intends to use the termin a
more restrictive sense, it qualifies the term with the word
collateral, as in Articles 1003 and 1009 of the New Civil Code.
Thus, the word "relatives" is a general term and when used in
a statute it embraces not only collateral relatives but also all
the kindred of the person spoken of, unless the context
indicates that it was used in a more restrictive or limited sense
— which as already discussed earlier, is not so in the case at
bar. (Emphasis supplied)
In the same vein, the term "parents" in the phrase "dependent
parents" in the afore-quoted Article 167 (j) of the Labor Code is
usedand ought to be taken in its general sense and cannot be
unduly limited to "legitimate parents" as what the ECC did. The
phrase "dependent parents" should, therefore, include all
parents, whether legitimate or illegitimate and whether by
nature or by adoption. When the law does not distinguish, one
should not distinguish. Plainly, "dependent parents" are
parents, whether legitimate or illegitimate, biological or by
adoption,who are in need of support or assistance.
Moreover, the same Article 167 (j),as couched, clearly shows
that Congress did not intend to limit the phrase "dependent
parents" to solely legitimate parents. At the risk of being
repetitive, Article 167 provides that "in their absence, the
dependent parents and subject to the restrictions imposed on
dependent children, the illegitimate children and legitimate
descendants who are secondary beneficiaries." Had the
lawmakers contemplated "dependent parents" to mean
legitimate parents, then it would have simply said descendants
and not "legitimate descendants." The manner by which the
provision in question was crafted undeniably show that the
phrase "dependent parents" was intended to cover all parents
– legitimate, illegitimate or parents by nature or adoption.
b. Rule XV, Section 1(c)(1) of the Amended Rules on
Employees’ Compensation is in contravention of the equal
protection clause
To insist that the ECC validly interpreted the Labor Code
provision is an affront to the Constitutional guarantee of equal
protection under the laws for the rule, as worded, prevents the
parents of an illegitimate child from claiming benefits under Art.
167 (j) of the Labor Code, as amended by PD 626. To Our
mind, such postulation cannot be countenanced.
As jurisprudence elucidates, equal protection simply requires
that all persons or things similarly situated should be treated
alike, both as to rights conferred and responsibilities imposed.
It requires public bodies and institutions to treat similarly
situated individuals in a similar manner.18 In other words, the
concept of equal justice under the law requires the state to
govern impartially, and it may not drawdistinctions between
individuals solely on differences that are irrelevant to a
legitimate governmental objective.19
The concept of equal protection, however, does not require the
universal application of the laws to all persons or things without
distinction. What it simply requires isequality among equals as
determined according to a valid classification. Indeed, the
equal protection clause permits classification. Such
classification, however, to be valid must pass the test of
reasonableness. The test has four requisites: (1) The
classification rests on substantial distinctions; (2) It is germane
tothe purpose of the law; (3) It is not limited to existing
conditions only; and (4) It applies equally to all members of the
same class. "Superficial differences do not make for a valid
classification."20
In the instant case, there is no compelling reasonable basis to
discriminate against illegitimate parents. Simply put, the above-
cited rule promulgated by the ECC that limits the claim of
benefits to the legitimate parents miserably failed the test of
reasonableness since the classification is not germane to the
law being implemented. We see no pressing government
concern or interest that requires protection so as to warrant
balancing the rights of unmarried parents on one hand and the
rationale behind the law on the other. On the contrary, the SSS
can better fulfill its mandate, and the policy of PD 626 – that
employees and their dependents may promptly secure
adequate benefits in the event of work-connected disability or
death - will be better served if Article 167 (j) of the Labor Code
is not so narrowly interpreted.
There being no justification for limiting secondary parent
beneficiaries to the legitimate ones, there can be no other
course of action to take other than to strikedown as
unconstitutional the phrase "illegitimate" as appearing in Rule
XV, Section 1(c)(1) of the Amended Rules on Employees’
Compensation.
Petitioner qualifies as John’s dependent parent
In attempting to cure the glaring constitutional violation of the
adverted rule, the ECC extended illegitimate parents an
opportunity to file claims for and receive death benefitsby
equating dependency and legitimacy to the exercise of
parental authority. Thus, as insinuated by the ECC in its
assailed Decision, had petitioner not given up John for
adoption, she could have still claimed death benefits under the
law.
To begin with, nowhere in the law nor in the rules does it say
that "legitimate parents" pertain to those who exercise parental
authority over the employee enrolled under the ECP. Itwas
only in the assailed Decision wherein such qualification was
made. In addition, assuming arguendothat the ECC did not
overstep its boundaries in limiting the adverted Labor Code
provision to the deceased’s legitimate parents, and that the
commission properly equated legitimacy to parental authority,
petitioner can still qualify as John’s secondary beneficiary.
True, when Cornelio, in 1985, adoptedJohn, then about two (2)
years old, petitioner’s parental authority over John was
severed. However, lest it be overlooked, one key detail the
ECC missed, aside from Cornelio’s death, was that when the
adoptive parent died less than three (3) years after the
adoption decree, John was still a minor, at about four (4) years
of age.
John’s minority at the time of his adopter’s death is a
significant factor in the case at bar. Under such circumstance,
parental authority should be deemed to have reverted in favor
of the biological parents. Otherwise, taking into account Our
consistent ruling that adoption is a personal relationship and
that there are no collateral relatives by virtue of
adoption,21 who was then left to care for the minor adopted
child if the adopter passed away?
To be sure, reversion of parental authority and legal custody in
favor of the biological parents is not a novel concept. Section
20 of Republic Act No. 855222 (RA 8552), otherwise known as
the Domestic Adoption Act, provides:
Section 20. Effects of Rescission.– If the petition [for rescission
of adoption] is granted, the parental authority of the adoptee's
biological parent(s), if known, or the legal custody of the
Department shall be restored if the adoptee is still a minoror
incapacitated. The reciprocal rights and obligations of the
adopter(s) and the adoptee to each other shall be
extinguished. (emphasis added)
The provision adverted to is applicable herein by analogy
insofar as the restoration of custody is concerned.1âwphi1 The
manner herein of terminating the adopter’s parental authority,
unlike the grounds for rescission,23 justifies the retention of
vested rights and obligations between the adopter and the
adoptee, while the consequent restoration of parental authority
in favor of the biological parents, simultaneously, ensures that
the adoptee, who is still a minor, is not left to fend for himself at
such a tender age.
To emphasize, We can only apply the rule by analogy,
especially since RA 8552 was enacted after Cornelio’s death.
Truth be told, there is a lacuna in the law as to which provision
shall govern contingencies in all fours with the factual milieu of
the instant petition. Nevertheless, We are guided by the catena
of cases and the state policies behind RA 8552 24 wherein the
paramount consideration is the best interest of the child, which
We invoke to justify this disposition. It is, after all, for the best
interest of the child that someone will remain charged for his
welfare and upbringing should his or her adopter fail or is
rendered incapacitated to perform his duties as a parent at a
time the adoptee isstill in his formative years, and, to Our mind,
in the absence or, as in this case, death of the adopter, no one
else could reasonably be expected to perform the role of a
parent other than the adoptee’s biological one.
Moreover, this ruling finds support on the fact that even though
parental authority is severed by virtue of adoption, the ties
between the adoptee and the biological parents are not entirely
eliminated. To demonstrate, the biological parents, insome
instances, are able to inherit from the adopted, as can be
gleaned from Art. 190 of the Family Code:
Art. 190. Legal or intestate succession to the estate of the
adopted shall be governed by the following rules:
xxx
(2) When the parents, legitimate or illegitimate, or the
legitimate ascendants of the adopted concur withthe adopter,
they shall divide the entire estate, one-half tobe inherited by
the parents or ascendants and the other half, by the adopters;
xxx
(6) When only collateral blood relatives of the adopted survive,
then the ordinary rules of legal or intestate succession shall
apply.
Similarly, at the time of Cornelio Colcol’s death, which was
prior to the effectivity of the Family Code, the governing
provision is Art. 984 of the New Civil Code, which provides:
Art. 984. In case of the death of an adopted child, leaving no
children or descendants, his parents and relatives by
consanguinity and not by adoption, shall be his legal heirs.
From the foregoing, it is apparent that the biological parents the Employees' Compensation Program shall accrue solely to
retain their rights of succession tothe estate of their child who herein petitioner, John's sole remaining beneficiary.
was the subject of adoption. While the benefits arising from the
death of an SSS covered employee do not form part of the WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The March
estateof the adopted child, the pertinent provision on legal or 17, 2010 Decision of the Employees' Compensation
intestate succession at least reveals the policy on the rights of Commission, in ECC Case No. SL-18483-0218-10, is
the biological parents and those by adoption vis-à-vis the right REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The ECC is hereby directed to
to receive benefits from the adopted. In the same way that release the benefits due to a secondary beneficiary of the
certain rights still attach by virtue of the blood relation, so too deceased covered employee John Colcol to petitioner
should certain obligations, which, We rule, include the exercise Bernardina P. Bartolome.
of parental authority, in the event of the untimely passing of
their minor offspring’s adoptive parent. We cannot leave
undetermined the fate of a minor child whose second chance
ata better life under the care of the adoptive parents was
snatched from him by death’s cruel grasp. Otherwise, the
adopted child’s quality of life might have been better off not
being adopted at all if he would only find himself orphaned in
the end. Thus, We hold that Cornelio’s death at the time of
John’sminority resulted in the restoration of petitioner’s
parental authority over the adopted child.

On top of this restoration of parental authority, the fact of

petitioner’s dependence on John can be established from the
documentary evidence submitted to the ECC. As it appears in
the records, petitioner, prior to John’s adoption, was a
housekeeper. Her late husband died in 1984, leaving her to
care for their seven (7) children. But since she was unable to
"give a bright future to her growing children" as a housekeeper,
she consented to Cornelio’s adoption of Johnand Elizabeth in
1985.

Following Cornelio’s death in 1987, so records reveal, both

petitioner and John repeatedly reported "Brgy. Capurictan,
Solsona, Ilocos Norte" as their residence. In fact, this
veryaddress was used in John’s Death Certificate25 executed
in Brazil, and in the Report of Personal Injury or Loss of Life
accomplished by the master of the vessel boarded by
John.26 Likewise, this is John’s known address as per the
ECC’s assailed Decision.27Similarly, this same address was
used by petitioner in filing her claim before the SSS La Union
branch and, thereafter, in her appeal with the ECC. Hence, it
can be assumed that aside from having been restored parental
authority over John, petitioner indeed actually execised the
same, and that they lived together under one roof.

Moreover, John, in his SSS application,28 named petitioner as

one of his beneficiaries for his benefits under RA 8282,
otherwise known as the "Social Security Law." While RA 8282
does not cover compensation for work-related deaths or injury
and expressly allows the designation of beneficiaries who are
not related by blood to the member unlike in PD 626, John’s
deliberate act of indicating petitioner as his beneficiary at least
evinces that he, in a way, considered petitioner as his
dependent. Consequently, the confluence of circumstances –
from Cornelio’s death during John’s minority, the restoration
ofpetitioner’s parental authority, the documents showing
singularity of address, and John’s clear intention to designate
petitioner as a beneficiary - effectively made petitioner, to Our
mind, entitled to death benefit claims as a secondary
beneficiary under PD 626 as a dependent parent.

All told, the Decision of the ECC dated March 17, 2010 is
bereft of legal basis. Cornelio’s adoption of John, without more,
does not deprive petitioner of the right to receive the benefits
stemming from John’s death as a dependent parent given
Cornelio’s untimely demise during John’s minority. Since the
parent by adoption already died, then the death benefits under