Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Date of Submission
i
Statement of Originality
This work has not previously been submitted for a degree or diploma in any university.
To the best of my knowledge and belief, the exegesis contains no material previously
published or written by another person except where due reference is made in the
exegesis itself.
…………………………………………… ….....................
Jennifer Robyn Andrews
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Acknowledgements
I wish to acknowledge the ongoing, consistent encouragement and support of
my primary supervisor, Professor Ross Woodrow. I also wish to acknowledge the
insights, especially at critical times, of my associate supervisor, Dr George Petelin and
his informative lectures and notes throughout my candidature.
I acknowledge the enthusiastic assistance of Dr Bill Metcalf (Research
Methodologist, Griffith Graduate Research School, Griffith University), at a crucial
early stage of my candidature. I am grateful for the patient and attentive editorial input
of Eva Franzidis (Editor, Queensland College of Art).
To my post-graduate colleagues, thank you for you collegiality and your
insights.
To my husband, Ian Dearden and daughter Natasha Dearden, thank you for your
patience and your unswerving support.
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Abstract
This exegesis considers how a contemporary artist can use mimesis to connect
viewers to the natural environment in a time when photographic mimesis is ubiquitous,
but often stage-managed and commodified. Mimesis—often defined as mimicry or
imitation—has been a contentious term since the days of the ancient Greeks In the
visual arts, debates about mimesis have largely focused on the power of mimesis to hold
the attention and even the mind of the beholder. Recent neurological research indicates
that seeing and perceiving are complex processes, and that mimesis, although a basic
human activity, is also a complex and subtle neurological process of perception and
interpretation. Consequently, the “innocent eye” understanding of seeing is, in
neurological terms, incorrect. Mindful of this knowledge, my research questions the
validity of schemas, or blueprints, for the visual artists’ representation of the world that
were established in the Renaissance and echoed in photographic mimesis.
Contemporary neurological research also indicates that mimesis is able to engage the
viewer with an image because of perceptual activity in the viewer’s mind, and the role
of mirror neurons is paramount to these findings. Drawing on research and writings by
Barbara Maria Stafford and Vilayanur S. Ramachandran, my own research has
identified and explored perceptual pathways that viewers use.
Freed from traditional approaches to mimesis, my art work embraces the role of
perception in the mimetic process. Visual data was collected from two sites: the iconic
site of Australia’s first major environmental confrontation at Terania Creek, in the lush
rainforest of northern New South Wales, and the man-made rainforest of the inner city
arcadia of Mt Coot-tha Botanical Gardens. The final series of drawings Uncharted
Terrains brings together the use of the photograph as a source of mimetic data, the use
of the photograph to trigger memory of experience and information, the use of digital
technology as an extension of the mind, the mimetic action of the artist’s creation of the
work through physical movement and the direction of water. These works also explore
the neurological insights, regarding perception, into the mimetic impulse and apply the
understanding of mimesis as being an interpretative process. In so doing, mimesis
becomes part of an active process, one that embraces representation as re-presentation
and invites the viewer to embrace a perceptual dialogue with the image.
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Table of Contents
STATEMENT OF ORIGINALITY ..............................................................................II
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ......................................................................................... III
ABSTRACT .................................................................................................................. IV
Chapter 1 Introduction
1.1 Setting the Scene
In the twenty-first century, many people are becoming acutely aware of the need
to examine ways of co-existing with the natural world (Hatfield 2008). Central to such
eco-theory is the critical importance of art as a means of facilitating change (Orenstein
1990 cited in Blandy & Hoffman 1993, p.25). Douglas Blandy and Elizabeth Hoffman
(1993, p.28) believe that a broadened awareness of environment issues through visual
images will stimulate greater critical thinking. In turn, they believe, this will contribute
to ongoing environmental debate and policy development.
As an artist working mainly in drawing, mixed media and digital media, I find
myself challenged as to how to contribute to this ongoing critical conversation between
the viewer and nature. This led to my research question: in an era when photographic
mimesis is ubiquitous, and often contrived and commodified, how can a contemporary
artist use mimesis to connect viewers to the natural environment?
My overall aim was to produce artworks that connect viewers with nature while
avoiding the stereotypical eco-tourist images so readily available in our society.
“Nature” is defined as “the material world, especially as surrounding humankind and
existing independently of their activities” (Butler 2009, p.835).
approach. Consequently, I feel that my work transcends the contrived processes often
associated with mimesis, as it is cognisant of the inextricably intertwined relationship
between the mimetic process and perception.
gives a brief overview of some philosophical and scientific insights into mimesis. It
addresses the issue that, although mimesis is a basic human activity, it is also a
complex and subtle neurological process of perceiving and interpreting. Drawing on
this knowledge, Chapter 3 gives an overview of my studio project’s development, and
explores further knowledge I gained along the way. An essential component of my
approach to my studio work is Hulick’s (1990) belief that digital photography and co-
existing computer technologies should be treated as an extension of the mind. My final
chapter, the conclusion, confirms that mimesis becomes part of an active process, one
that involves the artist, the act of creating, and the viewer.
the optic nerve and then to two main centres, which can be referred to as the old
pathway and the new pathway. Ramachandran (2003b, n.p )
(T)he old pathway.. (is) in the brain stem and it is called the superior colliculus.
The second pathway goes to the cortex, the visual cortex in the back of the brain
and it's called the new pathway. The new pathway in the cortex is doing most of
what we usually think of as vision, like recognizing objects, consciously. The old
pathway, on the other hand, is involved in locating objects in the visual field, so
that you can orient to it, swivel your eyeballs towards it, rotate your head towards
it.
Whereas the early Renaissance observer experienced some difficulties seeing the
foreshortening distortions as realistic, contemporary viewers of photographic mimetic
images experience no such difficulties. Centuries’ worth of accepting the Renaissance
perspective model, and the current inundation of the mimetic image, equips today’s
viewer with both experience and knowledge about how to read a photograph without
having to stand in the position of actual viewpoint (Coppel 1982, p.270). Contemporary
society is accustomed to viewing and visually processing multitudes of mimetic
photographs taken from different angles and viewpoints; “As soon as they are shown
the picture of a man, they reconstitute the viewing points in their minds, based on the
knowledge of body proportion which is stored in their memory” (Coppel 1982, p.271).
This process also applies to the reconstruction of the original form when size is altered.
Coppel gives the example of when birds in the distance appear smaller, our minds
know that they are not in fact shrinking. Similarly, the mind reconstructs the enlarged
images of figures on the cinema screen so as to perceptually comply with normal
proportions. By giving such examples, Coppel (1982) demonstrates that the mind
learns to read Renaissance mimesis as realistic.
Coppel (1982 p.273) characterises the camera as “one-eyed and ‘paralysed’” and
therefore incapable of performing multiple tasks that seeing and perceiving requires.
While in the process of vision, the human observer “reconstructs a scene from many
perceptions” (Coppel 1982, p.273) and would normally look and move around the
environment (Blinder 1986), whereas the contemporary viewer has developed the
inherent ability to accept the fixity of the photographic mimetic image (Coppel 1982).
Einstein’s “Theory of Relativity”. His concludes that “[a]ll legitimate perspectives are
equally valid because each one exhaust its own reality” (Coppel 1982, p.275).
This incorporation of the mind and the eye in the act of perception is discussed
in Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s (1945) analysis on Paul Cézanne’s works. Cézanne
advocated looking beyond the perspective of the camera and developed a method of
working with a “lived perspective, that which we actually perceive, [which] is not a
geometric or a photographic one” (Merleau-Ponty 1945, p.278). Cézanne aimed to
represent objects as he experienced them and believed that to achieve this he needed to
avoid the painting formulas of the classical artists. Emile Bernard (cited in Merleau-
Ponty 1945, p.276.) explains “that for the classical artists, painting demanded outline,
composition, and distribution of light”. Cezanne wanted to avoid painting a
photographically mimetic image of the scene. His method was to study the structure of
a landscape he was to paint, and to meditate on the landscape.
The task before him was, first, to forget all he had ever learned from science and,
second through these sciences to recapture the structure of the landscape as an
emerging organism. To do this, all the partial views one catches sight of must be
welded together; all that the eye's versatility disperses must be reunited…
(Merleau-Ponty 1945, p.281 original emphasis)
Avoiding traditional solutions and schemas, Cézanne became open to the “chaos of
sensation” (Merleau-Ponty 1945, p. 276) that often resulted in distorted ellipses and
forms. Merleau-Ponty (1945) believed this approach more accurately reflected our true
perception of an object as our eye and our head move in the process of seeing. By
abandoning traditionally accepted techniques, Cézanne did not want to abandon
intelligence. Instead, he wished to paint nature and “confront the sciences with the
nature ‘from which they came’” (Merleau-Ponty 1945, p.277.). Through this approach,
Cezanne aimed, in his landscapes, to capture the essential purity of nature. Merleau-
Ponty (1945, p.277) notes “photographs of the same landscapes suggest man's works,
conveniences, and imminent presence.”
The mirror is another device that can be used to create a sense of mimetic
agency. This is most famously demonstrated in Las Meninas (1656), painted by
seventeenth-century artist, Diego Velázquez [Illustration1.5]. In the painting,
Velázquez is depicted looking at the sitters and the viewers. The other participants in
the painting also look out at the sitters who are only visible through the reflection in the
mirror, hung in the far back of the depicted interior. As viewers we become one with
the sitters; “The mirror provides a metathesis of visibility that affects both the space
represented in the picture and its nature as representation: it allows us to see, the centre
of the canvas, what in the painting is of necessity doubly invisible” (Foucault 1982.
p.8).
Where does the agency of the mimetic image lie: in its representational capacity
to record and thus interpret experience in such a way as to trigger involuntary
memory; in its presentational power to create an entirely new experience—a
substance for the real thing; or in its ability to do both simultaneously? (original
emphasis)
Benjamin’s (1936 ch3) reference to the experience of nature‘s aura is also very relevant
to this project.
The concept of aura which was proposed above with reference to historical
objects may usefully be illustrated with reference to the aura of natural ones. We
define the aura of the latter as the unique phenomenon of a distance, however
close it may be. If, while resting on a summer afternoon, you follow with your
eyes a mountain range on the horizon or a branch which casts its shadow over
you, you experience the aura of those mountains, of that branch.
The search for alternatives to formal linear perspective is not new. Likewise, the
awareness that the mimetic agency of the image to hold the focus of not only a viewer’s
eye, but also their mind, is not new. What is new is neurological sciences’ validation of
the activity involved in the mind’s process of seeing and perceiving the world around
us. Although my art works portray nature, my aim was to explore the concept of
mimetic agency in capturing the viewer’s attention, allowing insights from recent
neurological studies to inform my work.
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A term that spans across the arts, mimesis is as much a theory of art as it “is an
integral part of human nature” (Potolsky 2006, p.136). In “Doctrine of the Similar”
(1933), Walter Benjamin writes “there may not be a single one of the higher human
functions which is not decisively co-determined by the mimetic faculty” (Benjamin &
Tarnowski 1979, p.65). Imitation informs memory and habit as well as social behaviour
(Tarde 1962, cited in Potolsky 2006). It shapes both our sense of identity (Sigmund
Freud cited in Potolsky 2006, p.9) and our culture (Stafford 2007, p.83). With reference
to the visual arts, mimesis is described by Moxey (2009, p.1) as “… that unending
record of our continuing beguilement with the appearance of the world around us”.
Current neurological research into the activity of mirror neurons validates the
debate over mimetic techniques employed by both Renaissance and photographic
mimesis (Stafford 2007). My art works, which I describe in length in Chapter 3, were
informed by a multi-pronged research process that involved learning about the several
neurological activities relevant to mimesis that have been identified, and which are
detailed in section 2.2. I then philosophically contextualized this information by
revisiting selected ancient Greek mimetic theories, which are discussed in section 2.3.
Irving Massey (2009, p.6) believes that the impact of recent knowledge gained
as a result of ongoing neurological studies may be “comparable to the introduction of
treatises on perspective during the Renaissance”. These discoveries confirm Ernst
Gombrich’s (1959, p.148) understanding that perception is an active process and that
representation was always “a two way affair. It creates links by teaching us how to
switch from one reading to another”. Based on this new scientifically proven
knowledge, Stafford (2007, p.4) asserts that the person is both “a boundary for the
mind… [and] a distributed agent entangled in the world”.
As a result of significant developments made in the neurosciences, the 1990s
have been described as the “decade of the mind” (Onians 2007, p.2). By attaching
scanners to high-performance computers, neuroscientists developed brain-imaging
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techniques (Massey 2009, p.ix) that provide insights into how the brain/mind interacts
with the visual image. This information elucidates how the brain/mind can create a
sense of experience from and engagement with visual, mimetic images.
Perception and imitation are important aspects of mimesis. Recent neurological
discoveries on mirror neurons’ activities indicate that the human mind is hard-wired for
mimetic activity. This suggests that there are some basic human neurological activities
that are triggered by mimetic images (Ramachandran, 2009).
Mirror neurons and emotional states are closely linked. Stafford (2007) posits
that within the human brain/mind are “plural images of our own body functions” and
“the maintenance of a stable inner equilibrium is achieved via ongoing adaptations to
the environmental stimulus” (Stafford 2007, p.167). Furthermore, “Mimesis orientates
beings… and is a central feature of our cognitive archaeology” (Stafford 2007, p.77).
Because of its relevance to my project, one of the neurological activities I focus
on is the ability to empathise. It is through empathy that we come to understand and
relate to our world (Massey 2009) and through empathy the viewer becomes engaged
in the active process of perception. Stafford (2007, p.177) links mimesis to our need to
organize our “inscape” with “the self organizing external world” (Stafford 2007,
p.177); one that is in a constant state of change. Charles Darwin (cited in Stafford 2007,
p.98) explains that “we continually oscillate between absorbing a changing outside
world and struggling to maintain a balanced sense of sameness of self”. Sameness or
imitation requires our brains to adopt the point of view of another (Ramachandran
2009).
Stafford (2007, p.75) describes the mirror-neuron activity as “‘wireless’ visual
communication”. Linking neurons are a series of synapses along which a “chemical
signal neurotransmitter” is released (Stafford 2007, p.49). Ramachandran (2009)
identifies firing mirror neurons as the means through which humans acquire and
disseminate knowledge. Simplistically, the process can be described as: we see, we do
(Ramachandran 2007). For example, mirror neurons will fire when we perform a task,
such as reaching out for food. Watching another person reach out for the same food
will also trigger the same mirror-neuron activity (Stafford 2007).
Experiments reveal that the process of touch is important to the process of
empathy. When our arms are touched, neurons are fired in our minds. If we see
someone else’s arm is touched, similar neural activity takes place in our minds. Further
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experiments indicate that it is only the nerve receptors in the arm’s skin that sends
feedback to the brain that the touch is to our body. Of this, Ramachandran (2009)
states:
…there is a feedback signal that vetos the signal of the mirror neuron preventing
you from consciously experiencing that touch. But if you remove the arm, you
simply anesthetize my arm, so you put an injection into my arm, anesthetize the
brachial plexus, so the arm is numb, and there is no sensations coming in, if I
now watch you being touched, I literally feel it in my hand. In other words, you
have dissolved the barrier between you and other human beings. So, I call them
Gandhi neurons, or empathy.
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Aristotle was more liberal in his interpretation of the role of imitation in the arts.
He “preserved the thesis that art imitates reality but imitation meant to him not faithful
copying but a free and easy approach to reality; the artist who imitates can present
15
reality in his own way” (Tatarkiewicz 1968, p.226). A pivotal difference in the status
given to mimesis by Plato and Aristotle is that while Plato was wary of mimesis
because of its potential to misdirect and remove humanity from the truth, Aristotle
believed that “mimesis was important for human development in that it served to
ensure successful socialization by placing the ‘pleasure’ of imitation in the service of
‘knowledge’” (Poiana 2007, p34). Aristotle’s mimesis is more complex than a
photographic mimesis, moving beyond resemblance to “relations between things”
(Hagberg 1989, p.366).
Aristotle’s view of mimesis (cited by Hagberg 1984, p.366) moves away from
the physical resemblance of things to the “relations between things or the mechanism
between things” (cited by Hagberg 1984). Aristotle refers to metaphor as a method for
creating connections in a manner that “Illuminate[s] facts” (Hagberg 1984, p.368)
while also allowing for aesthetic interpretation over historical narrative accuracy.
Harberg identifies in Artistotle’s theories three stages of mimetic representation which
map a move from a simplistic to a complex understanding of mimesis. These stages
involve the literal, the interpretive and the anticipatory. Hagberg (1984, p.368) explains
the interpretive stage “as clearly not what we usually think of as imitation; the measure
of the mime's skill is the extent to which he precisely captures, say, the way someone
walks.” So mimesis does not dictate that the original be imitated in its entirely.
As I have previously established, the debate over the value of mimetic
techniques employed by both Renaissance and photographic mimesis is validated by
the current neurological research into the activity of mirror neurons (Stafford 2007).
Building on this knowledge as my “licence” to explore the role of mimesis in my
representation of nature, the Ancient Greek understanding of mimesis as imitation
provides a philosophical springboard to my practice. In this context, imitation is
differentiated from copying. It suggests a deeper response to the true character of the
form than mechanical copying and, importantly, implies a degree of interpretation
(Golden 1975).
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3.1 Methodology
17
to my studio work and its theoretical and visual context. Schön (1995 p.56) refers to the
process of “reflection-in-practice [as hinging] on the experience of surprise”. This
process of openness to the unexpected or the divergent (Schön 1995) underpins my
approach to both perception and technique throughout this project. An inherent part of
this methodology is reflection-on-action (Schön 1995, p.278). I constantly evaluated
both the outcomes of finished works and works in progress so as to gain a critical
overview, as well as to plan the next stage of the work.
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During the studio component of this research, I found the following artists’ work
to be relevant: Paul Cézanne, Claire Watkins, Jim Lambie, Giuseppe Penone, Susan
Pickering and Julie Mehrutu.
I have already made brief mention of Cézanne, Watkins and Lambie (whose
spider web-like construction of line and mass suggests the sprawling network of
connections seen in the neuron network, Illustration 2.2). While Mehrutu’s work will
be referred to later in the later discussion of “Uncharted Terrains”, I will now briefly
introduce selected relevant works by the other remaining artists.
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Simon Schama (1995) observes that forests are more than their parts, as
they are also made up of memories and history. However, I decided to look closely at
the “parts”—the rocks, wood and water—which are the basic building-blocks of the
forest, and to focus on the “hidden landscapes” inherent within these elements.
In Chapter 2, I discussed how both Lambie and Holbein use the mimetic gaze to
engage the viewer. As I wanted to avoid placing actual sitters into the scenes the device
of the mimetic gaze was not available to me. Instead, in the Bejewelled series, I
employed the mirror device: the bubble becomes a mirror. The reflection of the forest
canopy suggests that we are no longer just spectators but also participants, located
between the water and the canopy. As in Las Meninas, the “mirror” includes us in the
scene. Hulick (1990) observes that digital equipment allows for an extension of the
mind’s eye. I used the computer to digitally manipulate the froth around the bubble into
a perfect circle. Perfect circles are machine made, and are a marker for mankind’s
intrusion into the otherwise natural scene depicted.
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viewers, about what we were seeing, while simultaneously aiming to establish a sense
of connection, through association and empathy, with the suggested human form.
Stafford (2007) identifies inferring and associating as two mental activities that bridge
the gap between the mind/brain and the outer world. However I felt that I was dictating
an interpretation of the scene and limiting the viewer’s participation.
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(Illustrations 3.9A and 3.9B). Here, empathy is explored further by examining the
relationship of edges. Stafford (2007) states that mimesis and emotions are closely
bound; Stafford also tells us that “enfolding the subject in darkness apparently
encourages our sensory neurons to wander free. The overshooting brain [is] a
hyperactive operating ‘detective device’ obeying its mimetic impulse to find agency”
(Stafford 2007, p.110). Applying this concept to the image, by darkening areas as if in
a cave, invites the viewer to become involved in the active perceptual search for
constancies and relationships, which may suggest associated human experiences of
physical connection or embrace.
The enlarged ripples ((Illustrations 3.10B, 3.10C) were divided into equal
sections, suggesting that each section is important and demands our specific and
equivalent attention. The sharp geometric division reflects the mechanical process
involved in the production and is reminiscent of the manipulated circle used in the
Bejewelled series (illustrations 3.6A and 3.6B). The concepts of inference, and the
need to find constancies and a sense of order out of chaos, become apparent in works
like Turbulence (Illustration 3.11A). As with the Ripple series, by desaturating the
image and inverting it, the tone directs the viewer’s focus to the shapes and the pattern.
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This search for order out of chaos can also be seen in my Study of Swirling
Water (Illustration 3.15B), a forerunner of the Uncharted Terrain series. My aim was
to understand the movement of the water, while also exploring the pattern-seeking
aspect of perception, an aspect that links, our inner and outer scapes (Stafford 2007).
Visual clues, other than the water, were excluded, in order to draw the attention to the
inherent patterns.
As indicated above I decided to focus on wood, water and rock and to explore
the inherent potential of these elements without assumptions of what the viewer, or I,
might see. Rather than interpreting the image for the viewer as I did in Living Water, I
aimed to involve the viewer in the search for some constancy or sense of order as the
basis for some form of perceptual connection. The concepts of both “living earth” and
“hidden landscape” became more dominant in my approach.
By enlarging scale and eliminating extra ‘clues’, such as creek banks and colour
details, a sense of ambiguity and the suggestion of “hidden landscapes” began to
emerge. In our search for order, Gombrich observes that the mind will test for
consistencies and look for an answer based on consistencies and “transform the
ambiguous stimulus pattern into the image of ‘something out there’” (Gombrich 1956,
p. 241). In Ripple (Illustration 3.13A), I again explored the ambiguity of the form
when visual clues are minimised. It could be wood, rock or water, or a creature’s eye, a
chimera, staring out from under a heavy lid. Again this triggers a search for association
or empathy, in order to create some form of order and connection. The ambiguity as to
the original form is demonstrated by comparison with the creek bedrock seen in the
photograph (Illustration 3.13B).
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Again, this work assisted me in examining the visual possibilities offered by two of the
forest’s basic building blocks, wood and water.
The art critic Andre Bazin is cited by D.E. Hulick (1990, p.423), as stating that
photography is the “only art form that gains its strength through the absence of human
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As well as selectively framing the world (Hulick 1990, p. 419), the camera can
also records detail beyond the ability of the eye (Hulick 1990, p.419) and photographs
can trigger memory (Moxey 2009). I chose to use photography for its ability to trigger
my memory of the initial experience of the forest. I selected photographs that provided
additional information to the memory. The photograph Illustration 3.15A was the
mimetic starting point for Swirling Waters (Illustration 3.16). I chose this image not
because it was expertly captured, but because it triggered my memory of the sound and
movement of the creek. On the occasion when I attempted to work from a photograph
that had some interesting patterns, but lacked structural information and detail, the
work failed.
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shadowy layers of the original images were left. As I worked into these drawings I
kept in mind Stafford’s (2007) claim that only essential detail was needed to trigger
associations and empathy and I found this freed me from superficial copying and
allowed the process of to include interpretation. Working from both the original
photograph and photographs of sections of the second drawing, I resolved the work
(refer to Illustration 3.16).
I am aware that I am drawing nature and not creating nature. At times in this
process, the memory of marks left on the surface dictate the next marks to be made, as
if aiding in the decoding process. This is reminiscent of Hagberg’s reference (1984,
p.368) of the mime artist’s capturing the way a person walks without having to create a
complete copy of the person.
Not all of my drawings were washed down or rubbed back. Some, such as
Illustration 3.24, were selectively wiped back, erased back and lightly sanded. I
26
found that this process of layering allowed for more flexibly in my response to the
mimetic image.
Another observation on this process was that the actual surface had to be
allowed to play a part in the image. Like the marks left in the forest by weathering
and time, the washed back shadows themselves became mimetic images of a stage in
the work. A constant juxtaposition between working from the source photograph,
referring to the images of the second stage drawing, and just working one on one
with the surface the marks and the medium meant that the process became a flow of
mimetic data which became imitated and interpreted over time. The paper’s surface,
like the forest needs to be able to breathe. The surface and materiality becomes an
integral part of the process.
The washing of the image with the water imitates the washing of the rocks by
the creek and allows for a sense of time and layering in the drawing as seen in
Illustration 3.22. This work was washed back numerous times, hosed down and
drawn into with the dremel.
Taking care not to interpret the inherent marks into body parts, as I did in Living
Water, I was pleased to hear viewers delight in identifying faces and forms within
these metaphoric landscapes. My delight stemmed from the viewer’s actively
perceptually problem solving, applying grouping (Ramachandran 2003c) and
empathising with the inherent patterns.
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In Illustration 3.17 I again embraced the concept of the water washing the
image. This scene is a close-up of the waterfall ledge. As the water in the waterfalls
falls vertically I used a hose and water to work into the charcoal and ink. Sandpaper
was also use to buff back the image in places to achieve the sense of layering.
In Illustration 3.25A, charcoal washes, rather than ink washes, were applied.
This allowed for more flexibility in the layering techniques. An electric dremel was
used to engrave lines into the drawing. Only selected areas were washed down.
Erasing and sanding were also used to create layering effects. Having had some
etching experience, I found I was using many of the etching techniques of
burnishing, and engraving on the paper.
When I drew the water, my hand moved in a motion mimetic of the actual
movement of the water. I became aware that when I look at a photograph I
consciously tap into my memory of the experience and my drawing action reflects
the memory of the motion. I recalled Ramachandran’s (2009) observations that both
touch and action mirror neurons are fired in the mimetic process. No doubt these
would have been fired when I visited the site and again as I studied the image for the
movements and shapes within the image frame. By mimicking the action of the
water through the movement of my hand, and the washing-down process, action
becomes involved in the creation process of the static image.
These drawings bring together the use of the photograph as a source of mimetic
data, the use of the photograph to trigger memory of experience and information, the
use of digital technology as an extension of the mind, and the mimetic action of the
artist’s creation of the work through physical movement and the direction of water.
These works also explore the neurological insights as outlined in Chapter 2,
regarding the role of perception in the mimetic impulse and they apply the
understanding of mimesis being an interpretative process.
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Chapter 4 Conclusion
Having concluded that mimesis and perception are intertwined and that both are
complex neurological processes allowed me to avoid the traditional concepts of
mimesis, established in the Renaissance.
The connection between the artist (myself) and the act of creating (i.e., the
process) becomes an essential part of the mimetic process. The contemporary artist can
employ digital media as an extension of their mind (Hulick 1984) and the photograph
can trigger memory and provide detailed information.
Triggering my memory in this way recaptured the initial “experience” and the
aura (Benjamin 1936) of the forest. The importance of touch and action with surface
became important in the drawing process but was absent in the digital graphics. The
process of drawing can include movement and this movement can be mimetic of
movement of the water and the direction of the grain of wood and rock. As a result, a
meshing of “experience”, detail, surface, action and materials can occur. This can have
the effect of seemingly transcending time and physical boundaries confirming
Ramachandran’s (2009) conclusion that barriers between self and others, and in fact the
outer world, are only skin deep.
My aim was to produce artwork that will engage the viewer while avoiding the
stereotypical eco-tourist images so readily available in mass-produced images.
Consequently, connection or engagement between the work and the viewer is of
ultimate importance. Being hardwired for mimesis, the viewer will have an innate
impulse to perceptually solve problems, to empathise, to associate, to infer and create
sympathies. All of these activities will assist in engaging the viewer in the work.
In my Uncharted Terrain drawings I re-presented my photographic, mimetic
records, often more than once on the same surface, exploring the code-like character of
the drawing marks to encourage viewer participation in the ongoing mimetic activity of
engaging or connecting with nature. In so doing, mimesis becomes part of an active
process, one that embraces representation as re-presentation and invites the viewer to
embrace a perceptual dialogue with the image.
29
Illustrations List
(http://arturogoicoecheablog.files.wordpress.com/2010/05/neuron-network.jpg)
p.35 Illustration 2:2B Claire Watkins, Lungs , 2010. Stainless steel, wires
and motors. Dimensions variable.
(http://www.artnet.com/artwork/426105868/lungs.html)
p.35 Illustration 2:2C Claire Watkins, Thinking Three Thoughts at Once, 2009
Magnets, motors, metal, LED’stool clip
30
(http://www.artnet.com/artwork/426105869/thinking-three-thoughts-at-
once.html
p.36 Illustration 2.3 Thomas Demand, Window, 1998, digital
chromogenic print mounted to Diasec ,183.5 x 286.5cm.
(http://www.christies.com/lotfinder)
31
p.43 Illustration 3.12 Intarsia, 2009 – 2010 Epson Print on Pearl Rag
p.43 Illustration 3.13A Ripple, 2009, Epson Print 48x32.5
p.43 Illustration 3.13B Photograph of a rock demonstrating ambiguity
p.43 Illustration 3.14 At The Base
32
33
Illustrations
Illustrations for Chapter 1
Illustration 1:1 Eco-tourism
advertisement
Illustration1.2
Andrea Mantegna.
The Dead Christ
1470-80.
Illustration1.3
Hans Holbein.
The Ambassadors 1533
Illustration 1:5
Diego Velazquez La Meninas 1656
Illustration1.4
Jim Lambie, Screamadelica 2005
34
Illustration 2.1A
Richard Gregory
Dalmatian
Illustration 2.1B
Image of a Neuron network
35
Illustration 2.2A
Claire Watkins
Flock of Needle 2009
Illustration 2.2B
Claire Watkins
Lungs 2010
Stainless steel, wires and
motors. Dimensions
Illustration 2.2C
Claire Watkins
Thinking Three Thoughts at Once 2009
Magnets, motors, metal, LED’stool clip
36
Illustration 2.3
Thomas Demand
“Window” 1998
digital chromogenic print mounted to Diasec (183.5 x 286.5cm.)
http://www.christies.com/lotfinder
37
Illustration 3.3B
Julie Mehretu Berliner Plaetze
2008/09 Ink and Acrylic on Canvas,
304,8 x 426,7 cm
Illustration 3.3A
Julie Mehretu
Seven Acts of Mercy 2004,
ink and acrylic
38
Illustration 3.4
Plein air site visit
sketch 2009
Charcoal on Canvas on
ply board 41x60cm
Illustration 3.5
Plein air site visit sketch 2009
Charcoal canvas, 40x71cm
39
Illustrations 3.7
A Matter of Choice, 2009
Acrylic on canvas
102x152cm
40
41
Illustration 3.10A
Photograph used in Ripple
series , 2009
Illustration 3.10B The Forest Ripple 2009 Epson Print on Pearl Rag,
Each panel 25x65cm
Illustration 3.10C
Rainforest Ripple, 2009
Epson Print on Pearl Rag,
90x60cm (outside
measurement)
42
43
44
Illustration 3.14
At The Base
45
Illustration 3.15A
This was one of the mimetic stating points for Swirling Waters” Illustration 3.16. I
chose this image not because it was expertly captured, but because it triggered my
memory of the sound and movement of the creek.
Illustration 3.15B
Process drawing based on photograph 3.15A for Swirling Water , Illustration 3.16,
charcoal on canvas, 2009
152x102cm
46
Illustration 3.15C
Initial drawing
Illustration 3.15E
Washing back
Illustration 3.15F
Second washing back.
47
The Final work developed through the process shown in Illustrations 3.15 A-F above.
48
Weeping Ledges
2010, 98 x63cm
49
50
Illustration 3.18A
Close up of
Where the Rocks Still Weep
51
3.19
Waterfall’s Ledge
2011 98 x 63cm
52
53
Tumble
2010 97 x 63cm
54
55
56
57
58
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