G.R. No.

L-63915 April 24, 1985

LORENZO M. TAÑADA, ABRAHAM F. SARMIENTO, and MOVEMENT OF ATTORNEYS FOR
BROTHERHOOD, INTEGRITY AND NATIONALISM, INC. [MABINI], petitioners,
vs.
HON. JUAN C. TUVERA, in his capacity as Executive Assistant to the President, HON. JOAQUIN
VENUS, in his capacity as Deputy Executive Assistant to the President , MELQUIADES P. DE LA
CRUZ, in his capacity as Director, Malacañang Records Office, and FLORENDO S. PABLO, in his
capacity as Director, Bureau of Printing, respondents.
ESCOLIN, J.:
Invoking the people's right to be informed on matters of public concern, a right recognized in Section 6, Article
IV of the 1973 Philippine Constitution, 1 as well as the principle that laws to be valid and enforceable must be
published in the Official Gazette or otherwise effectively promulgated, petitioners seek a writ of mandamus to
compel respondent public officials to publish, and/or cause the publication in the Official Gazette of various
presidential decrees, letters of instructions, general orders, proclamations, executive orders, letter of
implementation and administrative orders.
Specifically, the publication of the following presidential issuances is sought:
a] Presidential Decrees Nos. 12, 22, 37, 38, 59, 64, 103, 171, 179, 184, 197, 200, 234, 265, 286, 298, 303, 312,
324, 325, 326, 337, 355, 358, 359, 360, 361, 368, 404, 406, 415, 427, 429, 445, 447, 473, 486, 491, 503, 504,
521, 528, 551, 566, 573, 574, 594, 599, 644, 658, 661, 718, 731, 733, 793, 800, 802, 835, 836, 923, 935, 961,
1017-1030, 1050, 1060-1061, 1085, 1143, 1165, 1166, 1242, 1246, 1250, 1278, 1279, 1300, 1644, 1772, 1808,
1810, 1813-1817, 1819-1826, 1829-1840, 1842-1847.
b] Letter of Instructions Nos.: 10, 39, 49, 72, 107, 108, 116, 130, 136, 141, 150, 153, 155, 161, 173, 180, 187,
188, 192, 193, 199, 202, 204, 205, 209, 211-213, 215-224, 226-228, 231-239, 241-245, 248, 251, 253-261, 263-
269, 271-273, 275-283, 285-289, 291, 293, 297-299, 301-303, 309, 312-315, 325, 327, 343, 346, 349, 357, 358,
362, 367, 370, 382, 385, 386, 396-397, 405, 438-440, 444- 445, 473, 486, 488, 498, 501, 399, 527, 561, 576,
587, 594, 599, 600, 602, 609, 610, 611, 612, 615, 641, 642, 665, 702, 712-713, 726, 837-839, 878-879, 881,
882, 939-940, 964,997,1149-1178,1180-1278.
c] General Orders Nos.: 14, 52, 58, 59, 60, 62, 63, 64 & 65.
d] Proclamation Nos.: 1126, 1144, 1147, 1151, 1196, 1270, 1281, 1319-1526, 1529, 1532, 1535, 1538, 1540-
1547, 1550-1558, 1561-1588, 1590-1595, 1594-1600, 1606-1609, 1612-1628, 1630-1649, 1694-1695, 1697-
1701, 1705-1723, 1731-1734, 1737-1742, 1744, 1746-1751, 1752, 1754, 1762, 1764-1787, 1789-1795, 1797,
1800, 1802-1804, 1806-1807, 1812-1814, 1816, 1825-1826, 1829, 1831-1832, 1835-1836, 1839-1840, 1843-
1844, 1846-1847, 1849, 1853-1858, 1860, 1866, 1868, 1870, 1876-1889, 1892, 1900, 1918, 1923, 1933, 1952,
1963, 1965-1966, 1968-1984, 1986-2028, 2030-2044, 2046-2145, 2147-2161, 2163-2244.

e] Executive Orders Nos.: 411, 413, 414, 427, 429-454, 457- 471, 474-492, 494-507, 509-510, 522, 524-528,
531-532, 536, 538, 543-544, 549, 551-553, 560, 563, 567-568, 570, 574, 593, 594, 598-604, 609, 611- 647,
649-677, 679-703, 705-707, 712-786, 788-852, 854-857.
f] Letters of Implementation Nos.: 7, 8, 9, 10, 11-22, 25-27, 39, 50, 51, 59, 76, 80-81, 92, 94, 95, 107, 120, 122,
123.
g] Administrative Orders Nos.: 347, 348, 352-354, 360- 378, 380-433, 436-439.
The respondents, through the Solicitor General, would have this case dismissed outright on the ground that
petitioners have no legal personality or standing to bring the instant petition. The view is submitted that in the
absence of any showing that petitioners are personally and directly affected or prejudiced by the alleged non-
publication of the presidential issuances in question 2 said petitioners are without the requisite legal personality
to institute this mandamus proceeding, they are not being "aggrieved parties" within the meaning of Section 3,
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, which we quote:
SEC. 3. Petition for Mandamus.—When any tribunal, corporation, board or person unlawfully neglects the
performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or station, or
unlawfully excludes another from the use and enjoyment of a right or office to which such other is entitled, and
there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, the person aggrieved thereby
may file a verified petition in the proper court alleging the facts with certainty and praying that judgment be
rendered commanding the defendant, immediately or at some other specified time, to do the act required to be
done to Protect the rights of the petitioner, and to pay the damages sustained by the petitioner by reason of the
wrongful acts of the defendant.
Upon the other hand, petitioners maintain that since the subject of the petition concerns a public right and its
object is to compel the performance of a public duty, they need not show any specific interest for their petition
to be given due course.
The issue posed is not one of first impression. As early as the 1910 case of Severino vs. Governor General, 3
this Court held that while the general rule is that "a writ of mandamus would be granted to a private individual
only in those cases where he has some private or particular interest to be subserved, or some particular right to
be protected, independent of that which he holds with the public at large," and "it is for the public officers
exclusively to apply for the writ when public rights are to be subserved [Mithchell vs. Boardmen, 79 M.e.,
469]," nevertheless, "when the question is one of public right and the object of the mandamus is to procure the
enforcement of a public duty, the people are regarded as the real party in interest and the relator at whose
instigation the proceedings are instituted need not show that he has any legal or special interest in the result, it
being sufficient to show that he is a citizen and as such interested in the execution of the laws [High,
Extraordinary Legal Remedies, 3rd ed., sec. 431].
Thus, in said case, this Court recognized the relator Lope Severino, a private individual, as a proper party to the
mandamus proceedings brought to compel the Governor General to call a special election for the position of
municipal president in the town of Silay, Negros Occidental. Speaking for this Court, Mr. Justice Grant T. Trent
said:
We are therefore of the opinion that the weight of authority supports the proposition that the relator is a proper
party to proceedings of this character when a public right is sought to be enforced. If the general rule in
America were otherwise, we think that it would not be applicable to the case at bar for the reason 'that it is
always dangerous to apply a general rule to a particular case without keeping in mind the reason for the rule,
because, if under the particular circumstances the reason for the rule does not exist, the rule itself is not
applicable and reliance upon the rule may well lead to error'
No reason exists in the case at bar for applying the general rule insisted upon by counsel for the respondent. The
circumstances which surround this case are different from those in the United States, in as much as if the relator
is not a proper party to these proceedings no other person could be, as we have seen that it is not the duty of the
law officer of the Government to appear and represent the people in cases of this character.
The reasons given by the Court in recognizing a private citizen's legal personality in the aforementioned case
apply squarely to the present petition. Clearly, the right sought to be enforced by petitioners herein is a public
right recognized by no less than the fundamental law of the land. If petitioners were not allowed to institute this
proceeding, it would indeed be difficult to conceive of any other person to initiate the same, considering that the
Solicitor General, the government officer generally empowered to represent the people, has entered his
appearance for respondents in this case.
Respondents further contend that publication in the Official Gazette is not a sine qua non requirement for the
effectivity of laws where the laws themselves provide for their own effectivity dates. It is thus submitted that
since the presidential issuances in question contain special provisions as to the date they are to take effect,
publication in the Official Gazette is not indispensable for their effectivity. The point stressed is anchored on
Article 2 of the Civil Code:
Art. 2. Laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of their publication in the Official
Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided, ...
The interpretation given by respondent is in accord with this Court's construction of said article. In a long line of
decisions,4 this Court has ruled that publication in the Official Gazette is necessary in those cases where the
legislation itself does not provide for its effectivity date-for then the date of publication is material for
determining its date of effectivity, which is the fifteenth day following its publication-but not when the law
itself provides for the date when it goes into effect.
Respondents' argument, however, is logically correct only insofar as it equates the effectivity of laws with the
fact of publication. Considered in the light of other statutes applicable to the issue at hand, the conclusion is
easily reached that said Article 2 does not preclude the requirement of publication in the Official Gazette, even
if the law itself provides for the date of its effectivity. Thus, Section 1 of Commonwealth Act 638 provides as
follows:
Section 1. There shall be published in the Official Gazette [1] all important legislative acts and resolutions of a
public nature of the, Congress of the Philippines; [2] all executive and administrative orders and proclamations,
except such as have no general applicability; [3] decisions or abstracts of decisions of the Supreme Court and
the Court of Appeals as may be deemed by said courts of sufficient importance to be so published; [4] such
documents or classes of documents as may be required so to be published by law; and [5] such documents or
classes of documents as the President of the Philippines shall determine from time to time to have general
applicability and legal effect, or which he may authorize so to be published. ...
The clear object of the above-quoted provision is to give the general public adequate notice of the various laws
which are to regulate their actions and conduct as citizens. Without such notice and publication, there would be
no basis for the application of the maxim "ignorantia legis non excusat." It would be the height of injustice to
punish or otherwise burden a citizen for the transgression of a law of which he had no notice whatsoever, not
even a constructive one.
Perhaps at no time since the establishment of the Philippine Republic has the publication of laws taken so vital
significance that at this time when the people have bestowed upon the President a power heretofore enjoyed
solely by the legislature. While the people are kept abreast by the mass media of the debates and deliberations in
the Batasan Pambansa—and for the diligent ones, ready access to the legislative records—no such publicity
accompanies the law-making process of the President. Thus, without publication, the people have no means of
knowing what presidential decrees have actually been promulgated, much less a definite way of informing
themselves of the specific contents and texts of such decrees. As the Supreme Court of Spain ruled: "Bajo la
denominacion generica de leyes, se comprenden tambien los reglamentos, Reales decretos, Instrucciones,
Circulares y Reales ordines dictadas de conformidad con las mismas por el Gobierno en uso de su potestad.5
The very first clause of Section I of Commonwealth Act 638 reads: "There shall be published in the Official
Gazette ... ." The word "shall" used therein imposes upon respondent officials an imperative duty. That duty
must be enforced if the Constitutional right of the people to be informed on matters of public concern is to be
given substance and reality. The law itself makes a list of what should be published in the Official Gazette.
Such listing, to our mind, leaves respondents with no discretion whatsoever as to what must be included or
excluded from such publication.

The publication of all presidential issuances "of a public nature" or "of general applicability" is mandated by
law. Obviously, presidential decrees that provide for fines, forfeitures or penalties for their violation or
otherwise impose a burden or. the people, such as tax and revenue measures, fall within this category. Other
presidential issuances which apply only to particular persons or class of persons such as administrative and
executive orders need not be published on the assumption that they have been circularized to all concerned. 6

It is needless to add that the publication of presidential issuances "of a public nature" or "of general
applicability" is a requirement of due process. It is a rule of law that before a person may be bound by law, he
must first be officially and specifically informed of its contents. As Justice Claudio Teehankee said in Peralta
vs. COMELEC 7:
In a time of proliferating decrees, orders and letters of instructions which all form part of the law of the land, the
requirement of due process and the Rule of Law demand that the Official Gazette as the official government
repository promulgate and publish the texts of all such decrees, orders and instructions so that the people may
know where to obtain their official and specific contents.

The Court therefore declares that presidential issuances of general application, which have not been published,
shall have no force and effect. Some members of the Court, quite apprehensive about the possible unsettling
effect this decision might have on acts done in reliance of the validity of those presidential decrees which were
published only during the pendency of this petition, have put the question as to whether the Court's declaration
of invalidity apply to P.D.s which had been enforced or implemented prior to their publication. The answer is
all too familiar. In similar situations in the past this Court had taken the pragmatic and realistic course set forth
in Chicot County Drainage District vs. Baxter Bank 8 to wit:

The courts below have proceeded on the theory that the Act of Congress, having been found to be
unconstitutional, was not a law; that it was inoperative, conferring no rights and imposing no duties, and hence
affording no basis for the challenged decree. Norton v. Shelby County, 118 U.S. 425, 442; Chicago, 1. & L. Ry.
Co. v. Hackett, 228 U.S. 559, 566. It is quite clear, however, that such broad statements as to the effect of a
determination of unconstitutionality must be taken with qualifications. The actual existence of a statute, prior to
such a determination, is an operative fact and may have consequences which cannot justly be ignored. The past
cannot always be erased by a new judicial declaration. The effect of the subsequent ruling as to invalidity may
have to be considered in various aspects-with respect to conduct, private and official. Questions of rights
claimed to have become vested, of status, of prior determinations deemed to have finality and acted upon
accordingly, of public policy in the light of the nature both of the statute and of its previous application, demand
examination. These questions are among the most difficult of those which have engaged the attention of courts,
state and federal and it is manifest from numerous decisions that an all-inclusive statement of a principle of
absolute retroactive invalidity cannot be justified.
Consistently with the above principle, this Court in Rutter vs. Esteban 9 sustained the right of a party under the
Moratorium Law, albeit said right had accrued in his favor before said law was declared unconstitutional by this
Court.
Similarly, the implementation/enforcement of presidential decrees prior to their publication in the Official
Gazette is "an operative fact which may have consequences which cannot be justly ignored. The past cannot
always be erased by a new judicial declaration ... that an all-inclusive statement of a principle of absolute
retroactive invalidity cannot be justified."

From the report submitted to the Court by the Clerk of Court, it appears that of the presidential decrees sought
by petitioners to be published in the Official Gazette, only Presidential Decrees Nos. 1019 to 1030, inclusive,
1278, and 1937 to 1939, inclusive, have not been so published. 10 Neither the subject matters nor the texts of
these PDs can be ascertained since no copies thereof are available. But whatever their subject matter may be, it
is undisputed that none of these unpublished PDs has ever been implemented or enforced by the government. In
Pesigan vs. Angeles, 11 the Court, through Justice Ramon Aquino, ruled that "publication is necessary to
apprise the public of the contents of [penal] regulations and make the said penalties binding on the persons
affected thereby. " The cogency of this holding is apparently recognized by respondent officials considering the
manifestation in their comment that "the government, as a matter of policy, refrains from prosecuting violations
of criminal laws until the same shall have been published in the Official Gazette or in some other publication,
even though some criminal laws provide that they shall take effect immediately.

WHEREFORE, the Court hereby orders respondents to publish in the Official Gazette all unpublished
presidential issuances which are of general application, and unless so published, they shall have no binding
force and effect.

SO ORDERED.
Relova, J., concurs.
Aquino, J., took no part.
Concepcion, Jr., J., is on leave.
Separate Opinions
FERNANDO, C.J., concurring (with qualification):
There is on the whole acceptance on my part of the views expressed in the ably written opinion of Justice
Escolin. I am unable, however, to concur insofar as it would unqualifiedly impose the requirement of
publication in the Official Gazette for unpublished "presidential issuances" to have binding force and effect.
I shall explain why.
1. It is of course true that without the requisite publication, a due process question would arise if made to apply
adversely to a party who is not even aware of the existence of any legislative or executive act having the force
and effect of law. My point is that such publication required need not be confined to the Official Gazette. From
the pragmatic standpoint, there is an advantage to be gained. It conduces to certainty. That is too be admitted. It
does not follow, however, that failure to do so would in all cases and under all circumstances result in a statute,
presidential decree or any other executive act of the same category being bereft of any binding force and effect.
To so hold would, for me, raise a constitutional question. Such a pronouncement would lend itself to the
interpretation that such a legislative or presidential act is bereft of the attribute of effectivity unless published in
the Official Gazette. There is no such requirement in the Constitution as Justice Plana so aptly pointed out. It is
true that what is decided now applies only to past "presidential issuances". Nonetheless, this clarification is, to
my mind, needed to avoid any possible misconception as to what is required for any statute or presidential act to
be impressed with binding force or effectivity.

2. It is quite understandable then why I concur in the separate opinion of Justice Plana. Its first paragraph sets
forth what to me is the constitutional doctrine applicable to this case. Thus: "The Philippine Constitution does
not require the publication of laws as a prerequisite for their effectivity, unlike some Constitutions elsewhere. It
may be said though that the guarantee of due process requires notice of laws to affected Parties before they can
be bound thereby; but such notice is not necessarily by publication in the Official Gazette. The due process
clause is not that precise. 1 I am likewise in agreement with its closing paragraph: "In fine, I concur in the
majority decision to the extent that it requires notice before laws become effective, for no person should be
bound by a law without notice. This is elementary fairness. However, I beg to disagree insofar as it holds that
such notice shall be by publication in the Official Gazette. 2
3. It suffices, as was stated by Judge Learned Hand, that law as the command of the government "must be
ascertainable in some form if it is to be enforced at all. 3 It would indeed be to reduce it to the level of mere
futility, as pointed out by Justice Cardozo, "if it is unknown and unknowable. 4 Publication, to repeat, is thus
essential. What I am not prepared to subscribe to is the doctrine that it must be in the Official Gazette. To be
sure once published therein there is the ascertainable mode of determining the exact date of its effectivity. Still
for me that does not dispose of the question of what is the jural effect of past presidential decrees or executive
acts not so published. For prior thereto, it could be that parties aware of their existence could have conducted
themselves in accordance with their provisions. If no legal consequences could attach due to lack of publication
in the Official Gazette, then serious problems could arise. Previous transactions based on such "Presidential
Issuances" could be open to question. Matters deemed settled could still be inquired into. I am not prepared to
hold that such an effect is contemplated by our decision. Where such presidential decree or executive act is
made the basis of a criminal prosecution, then, of course, its ex post facto character becomes evident. 5 In civil
cases though, retroactivity as such is not conclusive on the due process aspect. There must still be a showing of
arbitrariness. Moreover, where the challenged presidential decree or executive act was issued under the police
power, the non-impairment clause of the Constitution may not always be successfully invoked. There must still
be that process of balancing to determine whether or not it could in such a case be tainted by infirmity. 6 In
traditional terminology, there could arise then a question of unconstitutional application. That is as far as it
goes.
4. Let me make therefore that my qualified concurrence goes no further than to affirm that publication is
essential to the effectivity of a legislative or executive act of a general application. I am not in agreement with
the view that such publication must be in the Official Gazette. The Civil Code itself in its Article 2 expressly
recognizes that the rule as to laws taking effect after fifteen days following the completion of their publication
in the Official Gazette is subject to this exception, "unless it is otherwise provided." Moreover, the Civil Code is
itself only a legislative enactment, Republic Act No. 386. It does not and cannot have the juridical force of a
constitutional command. A later legislative or executive act which has the force and effect of law can legally
provide for a different rule.
5. Nor can I agree with the rather sweeping conclusion in the opinion of Justice Escolin that presidential decrees
and executive acts not thus previously published in the Official Gazette would be devoid of any legal character.
That would be, in my opinion, to go too far. It may be fraught, as earlier noted, with undesirable consequences.
I find myself therefore unable to yield assent to such a pronouncement.

I am authorized to state that Justices Makasiar, Abad Santos, Cuevas, and Alampay concur in this separate
opinion.
Makasiar, Abad Santos, Cuevas and Alampay, JJ., concur.
TEEHANKEE, J., concurring:
I concur with the main opinion of Mr. Justice Escolin and the concurring opinion of Mme. Justice Herrera. The
Rule of Law connotes a body of norms and laws published and ascertainable and of equal application to all
similarly circumstances and not subject to arbitrary change but only under certain set procedures. The Court has
consistently stressed that "it is an elementary rule of fair play and justice that a reasonable opportunity to be
informed must be afforded to the people who are commanded to obey before they can be punished for its
violation,1 citing the settled principle based on due process enunciated in earlier cases that "before the public is
bound by its contents, especially its penal provisions, a law, regulation or circular must first be published and
the people officially and specially informed of said contents and its penalties.

Without official publication in the Official Gazette as required by Article 2 of the Civil Code and the Revised
Administrative Code, there would be no basis nor justification for the corollary rule of Article 3 of the Civil
Code (based on constructive notice that the provisions of the law are ascertainable from the public and official
repository where they are duly published) that "Ignorance of the law excuses no one from compliance therewith.

Respondents' contention based on a misreading of Article 2 of the Civil Code that "only laws which are silent as
to their effectivity [date] need be published in the Official Gazette for their effectivity" is manifestly untenable.
The plain text and meaning of the Civil Code is that "laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the
completion of their publication in the Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided, " i.e. a different
effectivity date is provided by the law itself. This proviso perforce refers to a law that has been duly published
pursuant to the basic constitutional requirements of due process. The best example of this is the Civil Code
itself: the same Article 2 provides otherwise that it "shall take effect [only] one year [not 15 days] after such
publication. 2 To sustain respondents' misreading that "most laws or decrees specify the date of their effectivity
and for this reason, publication in the Official Gazette is not necessary for their effectivity 3 would be to nullify
and render nugatory the Civil Code's indispensable and essential requirement of prior publication in the Official
Gazette by the simple expedient of providing for immediate effectivity or an earlier effectivity date in the law
itself before the completion of 15 days following its publication which is the period generally fixed by the Civil
Code for its proper dissemination.

MELENCIO-HERRERA, J., concurring:

I agree. There cannot be any question but that even if a decree provides for a date of effectivity, it has to be
published. What I would like to state in connection with that proposition is that when a date of effectivity is
mentioned in the decree but the decree becomes effective only fifteen (15) days after its publication in the
Official Gazette, it will not mean that the decree can have retroactive effect to the date of effectivity mentioned
in the decree itself. There should be no retroactivity if the retroactivity will run counter to constitutional rights
or shall destroy vested rights.
PLANA, J., concurring (with qualification):
The Philippine Constitution does not require the publication of laws as a prerequisite for their effectivity, unlike
some Constitutions elsewhere. * It may be said though that the guarantee of due process requires notice of laws
to affected parties before they can be bound thereby; but such notice is not necessarily by publication in the
Official Gazette. The due process clause is not that precise. Neither is the publication of laws in the Official
Gazette required by any statute as a prerequisite for their effectivity, if said laws already provide for their
effectivity date.
Article 2 of the Civil Code provides that "laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of
their publication in the Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided " Two things may be said of this
provision: Firstly, it obviously does not apply to a law with a built-in provision as to when it will take effect.
Secondly, it clearly recognizes that each law may provide not only a different period for reckoning its
effectivity date but also a different mode of notice. Thus, a law may prescribe that it shall be published
elsewhere than in the Official Gazette.
Commonwealth Act No. 638, in my opinion, does not support the proposition that for their effectivity, laws
must be published in the Official Gazette. The said law is simply "An Act to Provide for the Uniform
Publication and Distribution of the Official Gazette." Conformably therewith, it authorizes the publication of
the Official Gazette, determines its frequency, provides for its sale and distribution, and defines the authority of
the Director of Printing in relation thereto. It also enumerates what shall be published in the Official Gazette,
among them, "important legislative acts and resolutions of a public nature of the Congress of the Philippines"
and "all executive and administrative orders and proclamations, except such as have no general applicability." It
is noteworthy that not all legislative acts are required to be published in the Official Gazette but only
"important" ones "of a public nature." Moreover, the said law does not provide that publication in the Official
Gazette is essential for the effectivity of laws. This is as it should be, for all statutes are equal and stand on the
same footing. A law, especially an earlier one of general application such as Commonwealth Act No. 638,
cannot nullify or restrict the operation of a subsequent statute that has a provision of its own as to when and
how it will take effect. Only a higher law, which is the Constitution, can assume that role.
In fine, I concur in the majority decision to the extent that it requires notice before laws become effective, for no
person should be bound by a law without notice. This is elementary fairness. However, I beg to disagree insofar
as it holds that such notice shall be by publication in the Official Gazette.

Cuevas and Alampay, JJ., concur.

GUTIERREZ, Jr., J., concurring:
I concur insofar as publication is necessary but reserve my vote as to the necessity of such publication being in
the Official Gazette.
DE LA FUENTE, J., concurring:
I concur insofar as the opinion declares the unpublished decrees and issuances of a public nature or general
applicability ineffective, until due publication thereof.
Separate Opinions
FERNANDO, C.J., concurring (with qualification):

There is on the whole acceptance on my part of the views expressed in the ably written opinion of Justice
Escolin. I am unable, however, to concur insofar as it would unqualifiedly impose the requirement of
publication in the Official Gazette for unpublished "presidential issuances" to have binding force and effect.
I shall explain why.
1. It is of course true that without the requisite publication, a due process question would arise if made to apply
adversely to a party who is not even aware of the existence of any legislative or executive act having the force
and effect of law. My point is that such publication required need not be confined to the Official Gazette. From
the pragmatic standpoint, there is an advantage to be gained. It conduces to certainty. That is too be admitted. It
does not follow, however, that failure to do so would in all cases and under all circumstances result in a statute,
presidential decree or any other executive act of the same category being bereft of any binding force and effect.
To so hold would, for me, raise a constitutional question. Such a pronouncement would lend itself to the
interpretation that such a legislative or presidential act is bereft of the attribute of effectivity unless published in
the Official Gazette. There is no such requirement in the Constitution as Justice Plana so aptly pointed out. It is
true that what is decided now applies only to past "presidential issuances". Nonetheless, this clarification is, to
my mind, needed to avoid any possible misconception as to what is required for any statute or presidential act to
be impressed with binding force or effectivity.
2. It is quite understandable then why I concur in the separate opinion of Justice Plana. Its first paragraph sets
forth what to me is the constitutional doctrine applicable to this case. Thus: "The Philippine Constitution does
not require the publication of laws as a prerequisite for their effectivity, unlike some Constitutions elsewhere. It
may be said though that the guarantee of due process requires notice of laws to affected Parties before they can
be bound thereby; but such notice is not necessarily by publication in the Official Gazette. The due process
clause is not that precise. 1 I am likewise in agreement with its closing paragraph: "In fine, I concur in the
majority decision to the extent that it requires notice before laws become effective, for no person should be
bound by a law without notice. This is elementary fairness. However, I beg to disagree insofar as it holds that
such notice shall be by publication in the Official Gazette.
3. It suffices, as was stated by Judge Learned Hand, that law as the command of the government "must be
ascertainable in some form if it is to be enforced at all. 3 It would indeed be to reduce it to the level of mere
futility, as pointed out by Justice Cardozo, "if it is unknown and unknowable. 4 Publication, to repeat, is thus
essential. What I am not prepared to subscribe to is the doctrine that it must be in the Official Gazette. To be
sure once published therein there is the ascertainable mode of determining the exact date of its effectivity. Still
for me that does not dispose of the question of what is the jural effect of past presidential decrees or executive
acts not so published. For prior thereto, it could be that parties aware of their existence could have conducted
themselves in accordance with their provisions. If no legal consequences could attach due to lack of publication
in the Official Gazette, then serious problems could arise. Previous transactions based on such "Presidential
Issuances" could be open to question. Matters deemed settled could still be inquired into. I am not prepared to
hold that such an effect is contemplated by our decision. Where such presidential decree or executive act is
made the basis of a criminal prosecution, then, of course, its ex post facto character becomes evident. 5 In civil
cases though, retroactivity as such is not conclusive on the due process aspect. There must still be a showing of
arbitrariness. Moreover, where the challenged presidential decree or executive act was issued under the police
power, the non-impairment clause of the Constitution may not always be successfully invoked. There must still
be that process of balancing to determine whether or not it could in such a case be tainted by infirmity. 6 In
traditional terminology, there could arise then a question of unconstitutional application. That is as far as it
goes.
4. Let me make therefore that my qualified concurrence goes no further than to affirm that publication is
essential to the effectivity of a legislative or executive act of a general application. I am not in agreement with
the view that such publication must be in the Official Gazette. The Civil Code itself in its Article 2 expressly
recognizes that the rule as to laws taking effect after fifteen days following the completion of their publication
in the Official Gazette is subject to this exception, "unless it is otherwise provided." Moreover, the Civil Code is
itself only a legislative enactment, Republic Act No. 386. It does not and cannot have the juridical force of a
constitutional command. A later legislative or executive act which has the force and effect of law can legally
provide for a different rule.
5. Nor can I agree with the rather sweeping conclusion in the opinion of Justice Escolin that presidential decrees
and executive acts not thus previously published in the Official Gazette would be devoid of any legal character.
That would be, in my opinion, to go too far. It may be fraught, as earlier noted, with undesirable consequences.
I find myself therefore unable to yield assent to such a pronouncement.
I am authorized to state that Justices Makasiar, Abad Santos, Cuevas, and Alampay concur in this separate
opinion.
Makasiar, Abad Santos, Cuevas and Alampay, JJ., concur.
TEEHANKEE, J., concurring:
I concur with the main opinion of Mr. Justice Escolin and the concurring opinion of Mme. Justice Herrera. The
Rule of Law connotes a body of norms and laws published and ascertainable and of equal application to all
similarly circumstances and not subject to arbitrary change but only under certain set procedures. The Court has
consistently stressed that "it is an elementary rule of fair play and justice that a reasonable opportunity to be
informed must be afforded to the people who are commanded to obey before they can be punished for its
violation,1 citing the settled principle based on due process enunciated in earlier cases that "before the public is
bound by its contents, especially its penal provisions, a law, regulation or circular must first be published and
the people officially and specially informed of said contents and its penalties.
Without official publication in the Official Gazette as required by Article 2 of the Civil Code and the Revised
Administrative Code, there would be no basis nor justification for the corollary rule of Article 3 of the Civil
Code (based on constructive notice that the provisions of the law are ascertainable from the public and official
repository where they are duly published) that "Ignorance of the law excuses no one from compliance therewith.
Respondents' contention based on a misreading of Article 2 of the Civil Code that "only laws which are silent as
to their effectivity [date] need be published in the Official Gazette for their effectivity" is manifestly untenable.
The plain text and meaning of the Civil Code is that "laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the
completion of their publication in the Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided, " i.e. a different
effectivity date is provided by the law itself. This proviso perforce refers to a law that has been duly published
pursuant to the basic constitutional requirements of due process. The best example of this is the Civil Code
itself: the same Article 2 provides otherwise that it "shall take effect [only] one year [not 15 days] after such
publication. 2 To sustain respondents' misreading that "most laws or decrees specify the date of their effectivity
and for this reason, publication in the Official Gazette is not necessary for their effectivity 3 would be to nullify
and render nugatory the Civil Code's indispensable and essential requirement of prior publication in the Official
Gazette by the simple expedient of providing for immediate effectivity or an earlier effectivity date in the law
itself before the completion of 15 days following its publication which is the period generally fixed by the Civil
Code for its proper dissemination.
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J., concurring:
I agree. There cannot be any question but that even if a decree provides for a date of effectivity, it has to be
published. What I would like to state in connection with that proposition is that when a date of effectivity is
mentioned in the decree but the decree becomes effective only fifteen (15) days after its publication in the
Official Gazette, it will not mean that the decree can have retroactive effect to the date of effectivity mentioned
in the decree itself. There should be no retroactivity if the retroactivity will run counter to constitutional rights
or shall destroy vested rights.
PLANA, J., concurring (with qualification):
The Philippine Constitution does not require the publication of laws as a prerequisite for their effectivity, unlike
some Constitutions elsewhere. * It may be said though that the guarantee of due process requires notice of laws
to affected parties before they can be bound thereby; but such notice is not necessarily by publication in the
Official Gazette. The due process clause is not that precise. Neither is the publication of laws in the Official
Gazette required by any statute as a prerequisite for their effectivity, if said laws already provide for their
effectivity date.
Article 2 of the Civil Code provides that "laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of
their publication in the Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided " Two things may be said of this
provision: Firstly, it obviously does not apply to a law with a built-in provision as to when it will take effect.
Secondly, it clearly recognizes that each law may provide not only a different period for reckoning its
effectivity date but also a different mode of notice. Thus, a law may prescribe that it shall be published
elsewhere than in the Official Gazette.
Commonwealth Act No. 638, in my opinion, does not support the proposition that for their effectivity, laws
must be published in the Official Gazette. The said law is simply "An Act to Provide for the Uniform
Publication and Distribution of the Official Gazette." Conformably therewith, it authorizes the publication of
the Official Gazette, determines its frequency, provides for its sale and distribution, and defines the authority of
the Director of Printing in relation thereto. It also enumerates what shall be published in the Official Gazette,
among them, "important legislative acts and resolutions of a public nature of the Congress of the Philippines"
and "all executive and administrative orders and proclamations, except such as have no general applicability." It
is noteworthy that not all legislative acts are required to be published in the Official Gazette but only
"important" ones "of a public nature." Moreover, the said law does not provide that publication in the Official
Gazette is essential for the effectivity of laws. This is as it should be, for all statutes are equal and stand on the
same footing. A law, especially an earlier one of general application such as Commonwealth Act No. 638,
cannot nullify or restrict the operation of a subsequent statute that has a provision of its own as to when and
how it will take effect. Only a higher law, which is the Constitution, can assume that role.
In fine, I concur in the majority decision to the extent that it requires notice before laws become effective, for no
person should be bound by a law without notice. This is elementary fairness. However, I beg to disagree insofar
as it holds that such notice shall be by publication in the Official Gazette.
Cuevas and Alampay, JJ., concur.
G.R. No. 80718 January 29, 1988
FELIZA P. DE ROY and VIRGILIO RAMOS, petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and LUIS BERNAL, SR., GLENIA BERNAL, LUIS BERNAL, JR., HEIRS OF
MARISSA BERNAL, namely, GLICERIA DELA CRUZ BERNAL and LUIS BERNAL, SR.,
respondents.

RESOLUTION
CORTES, J.:
This special civil action for certiorari seeks to declare null and void two (2) resolutions of the Special First
Division of the Court of Appeals in the case of Luis Bernal, Sr., et al. v. Felisa Perdosa De Roy, et al., CA-G.R.
CV No. 07286. The first resolution promulgated on 30 September 1987 denied petitioners' motion for extension
of time to file a motion for reconsideration and directed entry of judgment since the decision in said case had
become final; and the second Resolution dated 27 October 1987 denied petitioners' motion for reconsideration
for having been filed out of time.

At the outset, this Court could have denied the petition outright for not being verified as required by Rule 65
section 1 of the Rules of Court. However, even if the instant petition did not suffer from this defect, this Court,
on procedural and substantive grounds, would still resolve to deny it.
The facts of the case are undisputed. The firewall of a burned-out building owned by petitioners collapsed and
destroyed the tailoring shop occupied by the family of private respondents, resulting in injuries to private
respondents and the death of Marissa Bernal, a daughter. Private respondents had been warned by petitioners to
vacate their shop in view of its proximity to the weakened wall but the former failed to do so. On the basis of
the foregoing facts, the Regional Trial Court. First Judicial Region, Branch XXXVIII, presided by the Hon.
Antonio M. Belen, rendered judgment finding petitioners guilty of gross negligence and awarding damages to
private respondents. On appeal, the decision of the trial court was affirmed in toto by the Court of Appeals in a
decision promulgated on August 17, 1987, a copy of which was received by petitioners on August 25, 1987. On
September 9, 1987, the last day of the fifteen-day period to file an appeal, petitioners filed a motion for
extension of time to file a motion for reconsideration, which was eventually denied by the appellate court in the
Resolution of September 30, 1987. Petitioners filed their motion for reconsideration on September 24, 1987 but
this was denied in the Resolution of October 27, 1987.
This Court finds that the Court of Appeals did not commit a grave abuse of discretion when it denied
petitioners' motion for extension of time to file a motion for reconsideration, directed entry of judgment and
denied their motion for reconsideration. It correctly applied the rule laid down in Habaluyas Enterprises, Inc. v.
Japzon, [G.R. No. 70895, August 5, 1985,138 SCRA 461, that the fifteen-day period for appealing or for filing
a motion for reconsideration cannot be extended. In its Resolution denying the motion for reconsideration,
promulgated on July 30, 1986 (142 SCRA 208), this Court en banc restated and clarified the rule, to wit:
Beginning one month after the promulgation of this Resolution, the rule shall be strictly enforced that no motion
for extension of time to file a motion for reconsideration may be filed with the Metropolitan or Municipal Trial
Courts, the Regional Trial Courts, and the Intermediate Appellate Court. Such a motion may be filed only in
cases pending with the Supreme Court as the court of last resort, which may in its sound discretion either grant
or deny the extension requested. (at p. 212)
Lacsamana v. Second Special Cases Division of the intermediate Appellate Court, [G.R. No. 73146-53, August
26, 1986, 143 SCRA 643], reiterated the rule and went further to restate and clarify the modes and periods of
appeal.
Bacaya v. Intermediate Appellate Court, [G.R. No. 74824, Sept. 15, 1986,144 SCRA 161],stressed the
prospective application of said rule, and explained the operation of the grace period, to wit:
In other words, there is a one-month grace period from the promulgation on May 30, 1986 of the Court's
Resolution in the clarificatory Habaluyas case, or up to June 30, 1986, within which the rule barring extensions
of time to file motions for new trial or reconsideration is, as yet, not strictly enforceable.
Since petitioners herein filed their motion for extension on February 27, 1986, it is still within the grace period,
which expired on June 30, 1986, and may still be allowed.

This grace period was also applied in Mission v. Intermediate Appellate Court [G.R. No. 73669, October 28,
1986, 145 SCRA 306].]
In the instant case, however, petitioners' motion for extension of time was filed on September 9, 1987, more
than a year after the expiration of the grace period on June 30, 1986. Hence, it is no longer within the coverage
of the grace period. Considering the length of time from the expiration of the grace period to the promulgation
of the decision of the Court of Appeals on August 25, 1987, petitioners cannot seek refuge in the ignorance of
their counsel regarding said rule for their failure to file a motion for reconsideration within the reglementary
period.
Petitioners contend that the rule enunciated in the Habaluyas case should not be made to apply to the case at bar
owing to the non-publication of the Habaluyas decision in the Official Gazette as of the time the subject
decision of the Court of Appeals was promulgated. Contrary to petitioners' view, there is no law requiring the
publication of Supreme Court decisions in the Official Gazette before they can be binding and as a condition to
their becoming effective. It is the bounden duty of counsel as lawyer in active law practice to keep abreast of
decisions of the Supreme Court particularly where issues have been clarified, consistently reiterated, and
published in the advance reports of Supreme Court decisions (G. R. s) and in such publications as the Supreme
Court Reports Annotated (SCRA) and law journals.
This Court likewise finds that the Court of Appeals committed no grave abuse of discretion in affirming the trial
court's decision holding petitioner liable under Article 2190 of the Civil Code, which provides that "the
proprietor of a building or structure is responsible for the damage resulting from its total or partial collapse, if it
should be due to the lack of necessary repairs.
Nor was there error in rejecting petitioners argument that private respondents had the "last clear chance" to
avoid the accident if only they heeded the. warning to vacate the tailoring shop and , therefore, petitioners prior
negligence should be disregarded, since the doctrine of "last clear chance," which has been applied to vehicular
accidents, is inapplicable to this case.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Court Resolved to DENY the instant petition for lack of merit.
Fernan (Chairman), Gutierrez, Jr., Feliciano and Bidin, JJ., concur.
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 222450, July 07, 2020
MIGUEL LUIS R. VILLAFUERTE, GOVERNOR OF THE PROVINCE OF CAMARINES SUR,
FORTUNATO PENA, VICE-GOVERNOR OF THE PROVINCE OF CAMARINES SUR, ATTY.
AMADOR L. SIMANDO, WARREN SEÑAR, GILMAR S. PACAMARRA, EMMANUEL H. NOBLE,
GIOVANNI SEÑAR, RUDITO ESPIRITU, JR., JORGE BENGUA, FABIO FIGURACION, NELSON
JULIA, MEMBERS OF THE SANGGUANING PANLALAWIGAN OF CAMARINES SUR,
PETITIONERS, V. CONSTANTINO H. CORDIAL, JR., MAYOR OF CARAMOAN, CAMARINES
SUR AND IRENE R. BREIS, VICE-MAYOR OF CARAMOAN, CAMARINES SUR, RESPONDENTS.

DECISION
REYES, J. JR., J.:
Before the Court is a Petition for Review on certiorari,1 assailing the Decision2 dated January 13, 2015 and the
Order3 dated December 15, 2015 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of San Jose, Camarines Sur, Branch 30
which annulled the Orders dated October 28, 20144 and December 12, 2014,5 and the Resolution6 dated
December 16, 2014 of the Sangguaning Panlalawigan of Camarines Sur which denied the Motion to Dismiss
filed by Mayor Constantino H. Cordial, Jr. and Vice-Mayor Irene R. Breis (respondents) on the ground of lack
of jurisdiction.
The Relevant Antecedents
On July 18, 2014, respondents, as incumbent officials of Caramoan, Camarines Sur, were administratively
charged with Grave Misconduct, Dishonesty, and Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of Service docketed
as Administrative Case No. 003-2014 by Chief of Task Force Sagip Kalikasan Fermin M. Mabulo (Mabulo),
Municipal Councilors Eduardo B. Bonita and Lydia Obias, and former Municipal Councilor Romeo Marto. The
complaint was lodged before the Sangguaning Panlalawigan of Camarines Sur, through its Special Committee
on Administrative Cases (Special Committee) headed by Atty. Amador Simando.7
In said Complaint,8 it was alleged that the respondents, through the Sangguniang Bayan of Caramoan,
Camarines Sur, passed Resolution No. 48 which requested for the removal of Task Force Sagip Kalikasan in the
entire Municipality of Caramoan, Camarines Sur without the conduct of deliberation. Prior to said incident, the
Task Force Sagip Kalikasan conducted an inspection in Barangay Gata, Caramoan, Camarines Sur because of
reported mining activities. Upon inspection, the team found 30 people engaged in illegal mining activities, holes
where minerals were being extracted, and machinery and equipment for mining and extraction. The Chief of the
Task Force, Mabulo, asked those involved if they had the necessary permits; and as they failed to show him
any, he asked them to cease from operating.
However, days after the inspection, the aforementioned Resolution was passed by the Sangguniang Bayan of
Caramoan, Camarines Sur.9
In response to the Complaint, respondents filed a Motion for Extension to File Answer.10 However, instead of
filing their Answer, respondents filed a Motion to Dismiss,11 assailing the jurisdiction of the Special
Committee, as well as its Rules of Procedure on the Investigation of Administrative and Disciplinary Cases
against Elected Municipal Officials as embodied in Resolution No. 13, Series of 2013 (Resolution No. 13-2013)
for lack of publication.
In an Order12 dated October 28, 2014, the Sangguaning Panlalawigan dismissed the motion for lack of merit.
The Sangguaning Panlalawigan maintained that the publication was duly complied with as Resolution No. 151,
Series of 2013, which incorporated Resolution No. 13-2013, was duly published.
Respondents filed a Motion for Reconsideration (MR) asserting that with the publication of the Rules of
Procedure only on October 9, 16 and 23, 2014, it became effective only on November 8, 2014, the 16th day
following its publication as held in the case of Tañada v. Tuvera,13 interpreting the Article 2 of the Civil Code
of the Philippines.14
Said MR was denied in an Order15 dated December 12, 2014. The Sangguaning Panlalawigan of Camarines
Sur maintained that the publication requirement anent ordinances and resolutions of local government units was
governed by the Local Government Code, and not by the Civil Code as pronounced in Tañada.
Corollary, the Sangguaning Panlalawigan of Camarines Sur issued a Resolution16 dated December 16, 2014,
recommending that respondents be placed under preventive suspension for a period of 60 days.
Aggrieved by the turn of events, respondents filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for the
issuance of Temporary Restraining Order, Preliminary Injunction, and Prohibitory Injunction before the RTC.
In their Petition,17 respondents insisted, among others, that the Rules of Procedure as embodied in Resolution
No. 13-2013 must be published; and failure to observe such requirement not only rendered said Resolution
ineffective, but likewise removed the jurisdiction of the Sangguaning Panlalawigan of Camarines Sur over the
proceedings.
In a Decision18 dated January 13, 2015, the RTC construed that the lack of publication of the Rules of
Procedure embodied in Resolution No. 13-2013 stripped off the Sangguaning Panlalawigan of Camarines Sur of
jurisdiction over the conduct of the administrative hearing against respondents.
The Issue
Essentially, the issue in this case is whether or not the non-publication of Resolution No. 13-2013 divested the
Sangguaning Panlalawigan of Camarines Sur of jurisdiction over the proceedings of the case.
The Court's Ruling
Notably, petitioners resorted to the Court via a Petition for Review on certiorari in assailing the ruling of the
RTC.
In the issuances of the extraordinary writs of certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, and habeas
corpus, the Court, the CA, and the RTC share original and concurrent jurisdiction. However, in accordance with
the doctrine of hierarchy of courts, the parties are mandated to initially file their petitions before lower rank
courts. As imprinted in the case of Gios-Samar, Inc. v. Department of Transportation and Communications,19
the Court expounded on this constitutional imperative by emphasizing the structure of our judicial system — the
trial courts decide on questions of fact and law in the first instance; the intermediate courts resolve both
questions of fact and law; and the Court generally decides only questions of law.
As a constitutional mechanism, the doctrine of hierarchy of courts is established to enable the Court to
concentrate on its constitutional tasks, guided by the judicial compass in disposing of matters without need for
factual determination.
In a rare instance, the Constitution itself mandates the exercise of judicial power over a case even with the
existence of factual issues. Such sole exception is stated in Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution, that is,
when the matter involved is the review of sufficiency of factual basis of the President's proclamation of martial
law and the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus.
Although several exceptions were carved out from the general rule of the observance of hierarchy of courts, the
nature of the question raised by the parties shall be one of law. In other words, resort to the Court is permitted
only when the issues are purely legal.
Likewise relevant is Section 4, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court, which allows direct resort to the Court from the
RTC via a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of said Rules when the issues raised are questions of
law.
In this case, petitioners assail the ruling of the RTC in maintaining that Resolution No. 13-2013 requires
publication; and that the absence of such publication stripped off the Sangguaning Panlalawigan of jurisdiction
over the case. Clearly, the determination of the publication requirement is a question of law.
On this note, the Court likewise deems it proper to discuss the rule on the exhaustion of administrative
remedies.
It is notable that respondents sought relief from the RTC to nullify the action of the Sangguaning Panlalawigan
of Camarines Sur. Instead of filing an appeal before the Office of the President,20 which is the available remedy
to respondents under Republic Act No. 7160 or the Local Government Code of 1991 (LGC), they filed a
petition for certiorari and prohibition. As raised by the petitioners in their Memoranda/Comments before the
RTC,21 respondents failed to exhaust administrative remedies.
The thrust of the rule on exhaustion of administrative remedies is that the courts must allow administrative
agencies to carry out their functions and discharge their responsibilities within the specialized areas of their
respective competence.22 Generally, relief to the courts of justice is not sanctioned when the law provides for
remedies against the action of an administrative board, body, or officer.23 The availability of such remedy
prevents the petitioners from resorting to a petition for certiorari and prohibition, being extraordinary remedies.
However, exceptions to this rule allow the deviation from such procedural rule. Among which is when the
question raised is purely legal in nature, as in this case.
The Court now resolves.
Ignorantia juris non excusat. That every person is presumed to know the law is a conclusive presumption.
However, before one may be bound by a law, he must be fully and categorically informed of its contents.24 For
this purpose, the Civil Code clearly mandates the publication of "laws":
ART. 2. Laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of their publication in the Official
Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided. This Code shall take effect one year after such publication.
This is fundamentally the essence of due process.
The significance of publication is illuminated in the 1985 landmark case of Tañada v. Tuvera.25 The Court,
speaking through Justice Escolin, emphasized that laws of "public nature" or of "general applicability" must be
published. In the 1986 Tañada26 case, the Court resolved petitioners' MR, seeking clarification as to the scope
of "law of public nature" or "general applicability," among others. The Court, thus, definitively expounded that
"laws" should refer to all laws. After all, a law which has no impact on the public is considered invalid for
several reasons, e.g., intrusion of privacy or ultra vires act of the legislature.27 Thus, an indirect effect of a
particular law to the public does not necessarily call for the dispensability of the publication requirement.
Therefore, the Court was forthright in stating that "all statutes, including those of local application and private
laws, shall be published as a condition for their effectivity."28
However, the Court clarified that "interpretative regulations and those merely internal in nature, that is,
regulating only the personnel of the administrative agency and not the public" and "letters of instruction issued
by administrative superiors relative to guidelines to be followed by their subordinates in the performance of
their duties" need not be published. Interpretative regulations are merely annotative; and internal rules are
directly related to the conduct of government personnel, and not the public in general.
On a different plane, however, are municipal ordinances which are not covered by the Civil Code, but by the
LGC.
On this note, the nature of municipal ordinances or resolutions which require publication is embodied in
Sections 59, 188, and 511 of the LGC:
SEC. 59. Effectivity of Ordinances or Resolutions.
xxxx
(c) The gist of all ordinances with penal sanctions shall be published in a newspaper of general circulation
within the province where the local legislative body concerned belongs. In the absence of any newspaper of
general circulation within the province, posting of such ordinances shall be made in all municipalities and cities
of the province where the Sanggunian of origin is situated.
(d) In the case of highly urbanized cities, the main features of the ordinance or resolution duly enacted or
adopted shall, in addition to being posted, be published once in a local newspaper of general circulation within
the city: Provided, That in the absence thereof the ordinance or resolution shall be published in any newspaper
of general circulation.
xxxx
SEC. 188. Publication of Tax ordinances and Revenue Measures. – Within ten (10) days after their approval,
certified true copies of all provincial, city, and municipal tax ordinances or revenue shall be published in full for
three (3) consecutive days in a newspaper of local circulation: Provided, however, That in provinces, cities and
municipalities where there are no newspapers of local circulation, the same may be posted in at least two (2)
conspicuous and publicly accessible places.
xxxx
SEC. 511. Posting and Publication of Ordinances with Penal Sanctions. – (a) ordinances with penal sanctions
shall be posted at prominent places in the provincial capitol, city, municipal or Barangay hall, as the case may
be, for a minimum period of three (3) consecutive weeks. Such ordinances shall also be published in a
newspaper of general circulation, where available, within the territorial jurisdiction of the local government unit
concerned, except in the case of Barangay ordinances. Unless otherwise provided therein, said ordinances shall
take effect on the day following its publication, or at the end of the period of posting, whichever occurs later.

(b) Any public officer or employee who violates an ordinance may be meted administrative disciplinary action,
without prejudice to the filing of the appropriate civil or criminal action.
(c) The secretary to the Sanggunian concerned shall transmit official copies of such ordinances to the chief
executive officer of the Official Gazette within seven (7) days following the approval of the said ordinance for
publication purposes. The Official Gazette may publish ordinances with penal sanctions for archival and
reference purposes. In the instant case, what was being assailed is Resolution No. 13-2013, which provides for
the rules of procedure concerning the conduct of investigation against municipal officials in said province,
issued by the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Camarines Sur. Clearly, it is neither penal in nature as it does not
provide for any sanction or punishment nor a tax measure. It is merely interpretative of Title II, Chapter 4 of the
LGC, which outlines the procedure when a disciplinary action is instituted against an elective local official.
Based on the foregoing, Resolution No. 13-2013 need not be published.
Also, it bears stressing that the RTC erroneously concluded that the element of publication is an essential
element of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Camarines Sur's jurisdiction over the proceedings of the case.
The publication requirement on laws accomplishes the constitutional mandate of due process. In the 1985 and
1986 Tañada cases, the Court explained that the object of Article 2 of the Civil Code is to give notice to the
public of the laws to allow them to properly conduct themselves as citizens. That omission of publication of
laws is tantamount to denying the public of knowledge and information of the laws that govern it; hence, a
violation of due process. Effectivity of laws, thus, depends on their publication. Without such notice and
publication, the conclusive presumption cannot apply.
Jurisdiction over the subject matter, on the other hand, is conferred by law and is determined by the allegations
in the complaint.29
Sections 61 and 6230 of the LGC, as well as Sections 125 and 12631 of its Implementing Rules and Regulations
or Administrative Order No. 270, provide that the Sangguaning Panlalawigan of Camarines Sur has jurisdiction
over complaints filed against any erring municipal official within its jurisdiction. Upon the filing of said
complaint, the Sangguaning Panlalawigan shall require the filing of the respondent's verified answer.
Investigation shall ensue accordingly.
In this case, the allegations in the Complaint32 filed by Mabulo, et al. against the respondents, as local
municipal officials of Caramoan, Camarines Sur, vested the Sangguaning Panlalawigan of Camarines Sur of
jurisdiction over the case.
As it is, the RTC failed to discern the import of the publication requirement. Publication or lack of it is relevant
in determining the observance of due process.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is hereby GRANTED. Accordingly, the Decision
dated January 13, 2015 and the Order dated December 15, 2015 of the Regional Trial Court of San Jose,
Camarines Sur, Branch 30 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
The Orders dated October 28, 2014 and December 12, 2014, and the Resolution dated December 16, 2014
issued by the Sangguaning Panlalawigan of Camarines Sur are hereby REINSTATED. SO ORDERED.

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 202889, March 02, 2020

RODOLFO CARANTO, PETITIONER, v. ANITA AGRA CARANTO, RESPONDENT.

DECISION

HERNANDO, J.:

Before this Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari1 assailing the April 18, 2012 Decision2 of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 90285 and its July 31, 2012 Resolution3 which partly affirmed the October
22, 2007 Decision4 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 212 of Mandaluyong City in Civil Case No.
MC01-1454, and denied petitioner Rodolfo Caranto's (Rodolfo) Motion for Reconsideration,5 respectively.

The Factual Antecedents

Respondent Anita Agra Caranto (Anita) is the registered owner of a 347-square-meter parcel of land situated in
Barangay Hagdang Bato, Mandaluyong City which is covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No.
7884.6 Sometime in 2001, Rodolfo filed a Complaint7 for cancellation of title and reconveyance against Anita
seeking to: (a) cancel the title of the subject land; (b) reconvey one-half of the same to him; and (c) pay the sum
equal to 25% of the value of the recoverable property as attorney's fees as well as costs of suit.

Rodolfo alleged that he is the son of Juan C. Caranto, Sr. and Guillerma Lopez-Caranto. He has a sister named
Rizalina Caranto (Rizalina), and a brother named Juan Caranto (Juan) who was Anita's husband.

On May 12, 1972, Juan executed a Special Power of Attorney8 in favor of Rizalina authorizing her to execute a
deed of extrajudicial settlement involving the subject property that was previously covered by TCT No. 277297.
A few months later or on September 18, 1972, the siblings executed an Extrajudicial Settlement of the Estate of
the Deceased Guillerma 0. Lopez Caranto9 which stated, among others, the following:

8. That the parties herein have therefor agreed, as they do hereby agree, to divide and settle the aforementioned
estate between and among them in the following manner, to wit:

(a) Property to be adjudicated to Juan L. Caranto: The parcel of land specified and described in
paragraph 5(a) hereinabove (TCT No. 277297- Rizal); [subject property]

(b) Property to be adjudicated to Rizalina Caranto Balaoeg: The parcel of land specified and described in
paragraph 5(b) hereinabove (TCT No. 23542 – Rizal);

(c) Property to be adjudicated to Rodolfo L. Caranto: The parcel of land specified and described in paragraph
5(c) and the three (3) door residential apartment described in paragraph 5(d) hereinabove. (TCT No. 59009 –
Rizal)

(d) Properties to be adjudicated to Juan L. Caranto, Rizalina Caranto Balaoeg and Rodolfo L. Caranto, in equal
one-third undivided interest each:

The parcels of land specified and described in paragraph 5(e) - TCT 23453 (Rizal); 5(f)-OCT 0-304 (La Union)
and 5(g)-Tax Dec. No. 27418 (La Union).10

Juan died intestate on May 22, 1983. Afterwards, on August 14, 1993, Anita executed an Affidavit of Self-
Adjudication11 adjudicating upon herself the subject property. As a result, TCT No. 277297 (later referred to as
TCT No. 391576)12 was cancelled and TCT No. 7884 was issued in the name of Anita.

When Rodolfo learned about Anita's Affidavit of Self-Adjudication, he filed a Notice of Adverse Claim to
protect his share in the subject property. He also filed a criminal complaint for falsification of public documents
against Anita before the Office of the City Prosecutor of Mandaluyong City. In his September 3, 1998
Resolution,13 the city prosecutor recommended the filing of an Information for falsification against Anita.

Rodolfo alleged that the Affidavit of Self-Adjudication was a total falsity because at the time of his demise,
Juan was survived not only by his wife Anita, but also by him and their sister Rizalina, as collateral relatives.
Considering that Rizalina executed a Deed of Waiver of Rights14 on January 16, 1990 whereby she relinquished
all her rights and participation over the subject property in his favor, Rodolfo alleged that he is now entitled to
one half thereof.
For her part, Anita sought the dismissal of the complaint for lack of cause of action and that Rodolfo is barred
by laches or prescription. Further, Anita claimed that the subject property is her exclusive property since she
purchased the same with her own money. She denied that Rodolfo is a legitimate brother of her husband, Juan.
Anita further denied committing any falsehood or misrepresentation in the execution of the Affidavit of Self
Adjudication. Lastly, she belied Rodolfo's allegation that he exerted earnest efforts to settle the dispute between
them prior to the filing of the complaint considering that she was already residing in the United States.

Anita, in turn, filed a compulsory claim for damages against Rodolfo for filing a baseless and malicious suit
against her.

During the trial, Dante Agra, the brother of Anita and her attorney-in-fact,15 testified that Juan disclosed to him
that Rodolfo was his illegitimate brother and that he also has an illegitimate sister. Further, Dante narrated that
Juan informed him that he was the only son of Dolores Lopez who was the latter's mother as stated in the
Marriage Certificate16 of Juan and Anita. Anita presented a Certification17 from the National Archives that it has
no file of the Makati City Register of Births for the year 1935; hence, there was no available record about the
birth of Juan on April 4, 1935 to Juan Caranto, Sr., as his father, and Dolores Lopez, as his mother. On the other
hand, the Office of the Local Civil Registrar of Bacnotan, La Union,18 stated that Rodolfo was born on May 21,
1945, to Juan Caranto as his father and Guillerma Lopez, as his mother.

Ruling of the Regional Trial Court

In its October 22, 2007 Decision,19 the RTC ruled that the Extrajudicial Settlement of the Estate of the Deceased
Guillerma Lopez-Caranto does not suffice to support Rodolfo's claim that he is the brother of Juan. Moreover,
the Deed of Waiver of Rights executed by Rizalina in his favor, and the Special Power of Attorney executed by
Juan designating Rizalina as his attorney-in-fact, were inadmissible for being mere photocopies of the originals.
Besides, even if admitted, these also did not serve as proofs of Rodolfo's filiation with Juan.

The trial court further observed that Rodolfo did not present the birth certificate of Juan showing that his mother
was also Guillerma Lopez Caranto. It could have disproved Dante's testimony that Juan's mother was Dolores
Lopez with said evidence.

Anent the compulsory claim of Anita, the trial court awarded exemplary damages in her favor for failure of
Rodolfo to prove his cause of action. Anita was also adjudged entitled to attorney's fees, litigation expenses and
costs of suit. The fallo of the Decision reads in this wise:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the court hereby renders judgment in favor of defendant Anita Agra
Caranto and against plaintiff Rodolfo Caranto, ordering said plaintiff –

1) to pay the amount of Php20,000.00 as exemplary damages;

2) to pay the amount of Php20,000.00 as attorney's fees;

3) to pay the amount of Php10,000.00 as litigation expenses and cost of suit.

SO ORDERED.20

Undeterred, Rodolfo appealed to the CA21 averring that the trial court erred: (a) in not declaring Anita in
estoppel in impugning his relationship with her husband; (b) in ruling that he failed to sufficiently prove that he
is the brother of Juan; (c) in not giving credence to the Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate of the Late Guillerma
O. Lopez-Caranto even in the absence of Juan's signature; (d) in not ordering the reversion of the property to
him considering that the property was originally owned by his mother, Guillerma Lopez Caranto; and (e) in
awarding exemplary damages and attorney's fees to Anita despite lack of bases thereof.22

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

In its April 18, 2012 Decision,23 the CA partly granted Rodolfo's appeal. It agreed with the trial court's findings
that Rodolfo failed to prove that he is the brother of Anita's husband, Juan, so as to have the right to inherit a
portion of the subject property. Likewise, there was insufficient evidence to prove his title over the same to
warrant an action for reconveyance as well as the cancellation of the title of the subject property.

Nonetheless, the appellate court held that the award of exemplary damages was improper for lack of basis.
Further, there was no factual finding as to whether Rodolfo acted in a wanton, oppressive or malevolent manner
in filing the complaint against Anita.

The dispositive portion of the appellate court's Decision reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Court partially AFFIRMS in part the October 22, 2007 Decision of
the Regional Trial Court, Branch 212 of Mandaluyong City. This Court partially DISMISSES the instant
appeal without prejudice to the filing before the appropriate court of an intestate proceeding for the purpose of
determining the heirs who may be entitled to inherit to the estate, including the property covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 7884, previously under Transfer Certificate of Title No. 391576, of deceased Juan L.
Caranto. Additionally, the award of exemplary damages is DELETED but the awards of P20,000.00 as
attorney's fees and P10,000.00 litigation expenses and cost of suit are AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.24

Aggrieved, Rodolfo filed a Motion for Reconsideration,25 but the appellate court denied the same in its July 31,
2012 Resolution26 for lack of merit.

Hence, the instant Petition for Review on Certiorari.27

The Issues

The core issues for resolution are:

(1) whether Anita is estopped from impugning the relationship between her late husband, Juan, and Rodolfo;

(2) whether the evidence of Rodolfo, particularly the Extrajudicial Settlement of the Estate of the Late
Guillerma O. Lopez-Caranto, sufficed to prove that he is entitled to one-half of the subject property of Juan by
way of inheritance and by virtue of the waiver of rights executed by Rizalina in his favor; and

(3) assuming that Juan's mother was named Dolores Lopez, whether Rodolfo is entitled to the whole subject
property by reason that it was previously owned by his mother Guillerma.

The Court's Ruling

The Petition must be denied. The allegations of Rodolfo are a mere rehash of his arguments before the CA and
essentially raise questions of fact as to be beyond the ambit of a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45
of the Rules of Court.

Rule 45 of the Rules of Court lays down the rule that only questions of law should be raised in petitions filed
under the said rule since factual questions are not the proper subject of an appeal by certiorari. The Court will
thus not entertain questions of fact as the factual findings of the appellate court are considered final, binding, or
conclusive on the parties and upon this Court especially when supported by substantial evidence.28

In Century Iron Works, Inc. v. Bañas,29 the Court differentiated a question of law from a question of fact in this
manner:

A question of law arises when there is doubt as to what the law is on a certain state of facts, while there is a
question of fact when the doubt arises as to the truth or falsity of the alleged facts. For a question to be one of
law, the question must not involve an examination of the probative value of the evidence presented by the
litigants or any of them. The resolution of the issue must rest solely on what the law provides on the given set of
circumstances. Once it is clear that the issue invites a review of the evidence presented, the question posed is
one of fact.

Thus, the test of whether a question is one of law or of fact is not the appellation given to such question by the
party raising the same; rather, it is whether the appellate court can determine the issue raised without reviewing
or evaluating the evidence, in which case, it is a question of law; otherwise it is a question of fact. (Citations
omitted)

However, there are 10 recognized exceptional circumstances wherein the Court admits and reviews questions of
fact. These are enumerated in Medina v. Mayor Asistio, Jr.30 as follows:

(1) When the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculation, surmises or conjectures; (2) When the
inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; (3) Where there is a grave abuse of discretion; (4)
When the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts; (5) When the findings of fact are conflicting; (6)
When the Court of Appeals, in making its findings, went beyond the issues of the case and the same is contrary
to the admissions of both appellant and appellee; (7) The findings of the Court of Appeals are contrary to those
of the trial court: (8) When the findings of fact are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which
they are based; (9) When the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioner's main and reply briefs are
not disputed by the respondents; and (10) The finding of fact of the Court of Appeal s is premised on the
supposed absence of evidence and is contradicted by the evidence on record. (Citations omitted)

The allegations asseverated by Rodolfo such as: (a) that Anita is estopped from impugning that he and Juan are
siblings; and (b) he is entitled to one half or the whole of the subject property, hinge on his claim that he has
sufficiently proven by preponderance of evidence his cause of action in the complaint for annulment of title and
reconveyance of the subject property that he filed against Anita.

In civil cases, the burden of proof rests upon the plaintiff, who is required to establish his/her case by a
preponderance of evidence.31 Preponderance of evidence is defined as the weight, credit, and value of the
aggregate evidence on either side and is usually considered to be synonymous with the term "greater weight of
the evidence" or "greater weight of the credible evidence."32 It is a phrase that, in the last analysis, means
probability of the truth. It is evidence that is more convincing to the court as it is worthier of belief than that
which is offered in opposition thereto.33

Preponderance of evidence refers to the probability to truth of the matters intended to be proven as facts. As
such, it concerns a determination of the truth or falsity of the alleged facts based on the evidence presented by a
party, who in this case is Rodolfo.34

Rodolfo's arguments are essentially questions of fact. Rodolfo argues that he is the brother of Juan although his
birth certificate stated that his mother was Guillerma Lopez-Caranto while the marriage contract between Juan
and Anita indicated that Juan's mother was Dolores Lopez, and both documents stated that Juan Caranto, Sr.
was their father. Rodolfo stresses that, assuming that he and Juan have different mothers, he is therefore entitled
to the ownership of the entire property being the legitimate heir of Guillerma Lopez-Caranto and because of
Rizalina's relinquishment of her rights over the same in his favor.

It is thus clear that if the Court has to entertain the above-mentioned contentions assailing the findings of the
appellate court, it has to review the probative value and evaluate once again the evidence presented by the
contending parties. This is evidently beyond the purview of a petition for review under Rule 45.

In his vain attempt to prove that his petition should be given due course despite raising factual issues, Rodolfo
interposes that the following six exceptions wherein the Court may review factual issues exist: (a) the findings
of the appellate court are grounded entirely on speculation, surmises and conjectures; (b) its inference from the
findings of fact is manifestly mistaken/absurd; (c) it went beyond the issues of the case and the same are
contrary to the admissions of both parties; (d) its judgment is premised on misapprehension of facts; (e) it failed
to notice certain relevant facts which, if properly considered, will justify a different conclusion; and (f) its
findings of fact are based on the absence of evidence but contradicted by the evidence on record.

None of these exceptions is present in the case.

A close perusal of Rodolfo's arguments in the petition shows that these are simply a mere rehash of his claims in
his appeal before the appellate court which it already thoroughly passed upon. Coming before this Court,
Rodolfo alleges that the appellate court gravely erred in its findings resulting in the presence of the exceptional
circumstances aforementioned. Unfortunately, he failed to demonstrate any compelling reason that would
warrant the reversal of the findings and conclusions of the appellate court that Rodolfo failed to sufficiently
prove that he is the brother of Juan and therefore he had no share in the latter's estate.

Indubitably, the Court will not review the factual findings of the appellate court as there is not even a scintilla of
evidence that the instant petition falls under any of the exceptions laid down in Medina. To stress, the burden of
proof lies upon Rodolfo who failed to convince the Court that a review of the factual findings is necessary.35 His
mere assertion and claim that the case falls under the exceptions is not enough.

At this juncture, we quote with approval the findings of the Court of Appeals:

Thus, it is incumbent upon Rodolfo to prove that he is the brother of the decedent. Unfortunately, Rodolfo
failed to overcome this burden. The record is bereft of any evidence submitted by Rodolfo to prove his
relationship with the decedent. Indeed, Rodolfo could have submitted documents, such as birth certificates, duly
showing that he and Juan have the same mother, father or both.

From the foregoing discussions, it is without a doubt that Rodolfo Jailed to prove his title to the 347-square
meter Jot covered by TCT No. 7884, previously under TCT No. 391576, in order to successfully maintain an
action for reconveyance. In addition thereto, he failed to prove by preponderance of evidence that he is the
brother of deceased Juan. In the absence of evidence to support his cause, the right to inheritance sought by
Rodolfo is untenable for lack of ground or basis therefor.36

All told, considering that the issues were factual in nature as it involved the determination of whether Rodolfo
sufficiently proved his claim by preponderance of evidence, the Court sees no reason to warrant the exercise of
its judicial discretion to review the same. Hence, there is no need to discuss the other issues raised by Rodolfo.

WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review on Certiorari is DENIED. The April 18, 2012 Decision of the Court
of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 92085 is AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 179922             December 16, 2008

JUAN DE DIOS CARLOS, petitioner,

vs.
FELICIDAD SANDOVAL, also known as FELICIDAD S. VDA. DE CARLOS or FELICIDAD
SANDOVAL CARLOS or FELICIDAD SANDOVAL VDA. DE CARLOS, and TEOFILO CARLOS
II, respondents.

DECISION

REYES, R.T., J.:

ONLY a spouse can initiate an action to sever the marital bond for marriages solemnized during the effectivity
of the Family Code, except cases commenced prior to March 15, 2003. The nullity and annulment of a marriage
cannot be declared in a judgment on the pleadings, summary judgment, or confession of judgment.

We pronounce these principles as We review on certiorari the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) which
reversed and set aside the summary judgment2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in an action for declaration of
nullity of marriage, status of a child, recovery of property, reconveyance, sum of money, and damages.

The Facts

The events that led to the institution of the instant suitare unveiled as follows:

Spouses Felix B. Carlos and Felipa Elemia died intestate. They left six parcels of land to their compulsory heirs,
Teofilo Carlos and petitioner Juan De Dios Carlos. The lots are particularly described as follows:

Parcel No. 1

Lot No. 162 of the MUNTINLUPA ESTATE SUBDIVISION, Case No. 6137 of the Court of Land
Registration.

Exemption from the provisions of Article 567 of the Civil Code is specifically reserved.

Area: 1 hectare, 06 ares, 07 centares.

Parcel No. 2

A parcel of land (Lot No. 159-B), being a portion of Lot 159, situated in the Bo. of Alabang,
Municipality of Muntinlupa, Province of Rizal, x x x containing an area of Thirteen Thousand Four
Hundred Forty One (13,441) square meters.
 Parcel No. 3

A parcel of land (Lot 159-B-2 of the subd. plan [LRC] Psd-325903, approved as a non-subd. project),
being a portion of Lot 159-B [LRC] Psd- Alabang, Mun. of Muntinlupa, Metro Manila, Island of Luzon.
Bounded on the NE, points 2 to 4 by Lot 155, Muntinlupa Estate; on the SE, point 4 to 5 by Lot 159-B-
5; on the S, points 5 to 1 by Lot 159-B-3; on the W, points 1 to 2 by Lot 159-B-1 (Road widening) all of
the subd. plan, containing an area of ONE HUNDRED THIRTY (130) SQ. METERS, more or less.

PARCEL No. 4

A parcel of land (Lot 28-C of the subd. plan Psd-13-007090, being a portion of Lot 28, Muntinlupa
Estate, L.R.C. Rec. No. 6137), situated in the Bo. of Alabang, Mun. of Muntinlupa, Metro Manila.
Bounded on the NE, along lines 1-2 by Lot 27, Muntinlupa Estate; on the East & SE, along lines 2 to 6
by Mangangata River; and on the West., along line 6-1, by Lot 28-B of the subd. plan x x x containing
an area of ONE THUSAND AND SEVENTY-SIX (1,076) SQUARE METERS.

PARCEL No. 5

PARCELA DE TERRENO No. 50, Manzana No. 18, de la subd. de Solocan. Linda por el NW, con la
parcela 49; por el NE, con la parcela 36; por el SE, con la parcela 51; y por el SW, con la calle Dos
Castillas. Partiendo de un punto marcado 1 en el plano, el cual se halla a S. gds. 01'W, 72.50 mts. Desde
el punto 1 de esta manzana, que es un mojon de concreto de la Ciudad de Manila, situado on el esquina
E. que forman las Calles Laong Laan y Dos. Castillas, continiendo un extension superficial de CIENTO
CINCUENTA (150) METROS CUADRADOS.

PARCEL No. 6

PARCELA DE TERRENO No. 51, Manzana No. 18, de la subd. De Solocon. Linda por el NW, con la
parcela 50; por el NE, con la parcela 37; por el SE, con la parcela 52; por el SW, con la Calle Dos
Castillas. Partiendo de un punto Marcado 1 en el plano, el cual se halla at S. 43 gds. 01'E, 82.50 mts.
Desde el punto 1 de esta manzana, que es un mojon de concreto de la Ciudad de Manila, situado on el
esquina E. que forman las Calles Laong Laan y Dos. Castillas, continiendo una extension superficial de
CIENTO CINCUENTA (150) METROS CUADRADOS.3

During the lifetime of Felix Carlos, he agreed to transfer his estate to Teofilo. The agreement was made in order
to avoid the payment of inheritance taxes. Teofilo, in turn, undertook to deliver and turn over the share of the
other legal heir, petitioner Juan De Dios Carlos.

Eventually, the first three (3) parcels of land were transferred and registered in the name of Teofilo. These three
(3) lots are now covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 234824 issued by the Registry of Deeds of
Makati City; TCT No. 139061 issued by the Registry of Deeds of Makati City; and TCT No. 139058 issued by
the Registry of Deeds of Makati City.

Parcel No. 4 was registered in the name of petitioner. The lot is now covered by TCT No. 160401 issued by the
Registry of Deeds of Makati City.

On May 13, 1992, Teofilo died intestate. He was survived by respondents Felicidad and their son, Teofilo
Carlos II (Teofilo II). Upon Teofilo's death, Parcel Nos. 5 & 6 were registered in the name of respondent
Felicidad and co-respondent, Teofilo II. The said two (2) parcels of land are covered by TCT Nos. 219877 and
210878, respectively, issued by the Registry of Deeds of Manila.
In 1994, petitioner instituted a suit against respondents before the RTC in Muntinlupa City, docketed as Civil
Case No. 94-1964. In the said case, the parties submitted and caused the approval of a partial compromise
agreement. Under the compromise, the parties acknowledged their respective shares in the proceeds from the
sale of a portion of the first parcel of land. This includes the remaining 6,691-square-meter portion of said land.

On September 17, 1994, the parties executed a deed of extrajudicial partition, dividing the remaining land of the
first parcel between them.

Meanwhile, in a separate case entitled Rillo v. Carlos,4 2,331 square meters of the second parcel of land were
adjudicated in favor of plaintiffs Rillo. The remaining 10,000-square meter portion was later divided between
petitioner and respondents.

The division was incorporated in a supplemental compromise agreement executed on August 17, 1994, with
respect to Civil Case No. 94-1964. The parties submitted the supplemental compromise agreement, which was
approved accordingly.

Petitioner and respondents entered into two more contracts in August 1994. Under the contracts, the parties
equally divided between them the third and fourth parcels of land.

In August 1995, petitioner commenced an action, docketed as Civil Case No. 95-135, against respondents
before the court a quo with the following causes of action: (a) declaration of nullity of marriage; (b) status of a
child; (c) recovery of property; (d) reconveyance; and (e) sum of money and damages. The complaint was
raffled to Branch 256 of the RTC in Muntinlupa.

In his complaint, petitioner asserted that the marriage between his late brother Teofilo and respondent Felicidad
was a nullity in view of the absence of the required marriage license. He likewise maintained that his deceased
brother was neither the natural nor the adoptive father of respondent Teofilo Carlos II.

Petitioner likewise sought the avoidance of the contracts he entered into with respondent Felicidad with respect
to the subject real properties. He also prayed for the cancellation of the certificates of title issued in the name of
respondents. He argued that the properties covered by such certificates of title, including the sums received by
respondents as proceeds, should be reconveyed to him.

Finally, petitioner claimed indemnification as and by way of moral and exemplary damages, attorney's fees,
litigation expenses, and costs of suit.

On October 16, 1995, respondents submitted their answer. They denied the material averments of petitioner's
complaint. Respondents contended that the dearth of details regarding the requisite marriage license did not
invalidate Felicidad's marriage to Teofilo. Respondents declared that Teofilo II was the illegitimate child of the
deceased Teofilo Carlos with another woman.

On the grounds of lack of cause of action and lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter, respondents prayed
for the dismissal of the case before the trial court. They also asked that their counterclaims for moral and
exemplary damages, as well as attorney's fees, be granted.

But before the parties could even proceed to pre-trial, respondents moved for summary judgment. Attached to
the motion was the affidavit of the justice of the peace who solemnized the marriage. Respondents also
submitted the Certificate of Live Birth of respondent Teofilo II. In the certificate, the late Teofilo Carlos and
respondent Felicidad were designated as parents.

On January 5, 1996, petitioner opposed the motion for summary judgment on the ground of irregularity of the
contract evidencing the marriage. In the same breath, petitioner lodged his own motion for summary judgment.
Petitioner presented a certification from the Local Civil Registrar of Calumpit, Bulacan, certifying that there is
no record of birth of respondent Teofilo II.

Petitioner also incorporated in the counter-motion for summary judgment the testimony of respondent Felicidad
in another case. Said testimony was made in Civil Case No. 89-2384, entitled Carlos v. Gorospe, before the
RTC Branch 255, Las Piñas. In her testimony, respondent Felicidad narrated that co-respondent Teofilo II is her
child with Teofilo.5

Subsequently, the Office of the City Prosecutor of Muntinlupa submitted to the trial court its report and
manifestation, discounting the possibility of collusion between the parties.

RTC and CA Dispositions

On April 8, 1996, the RTC rendered judgment, disposing as follows:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, defendant's (respondent's) Motion for Summary Judgment is

hereby denied. Plaintiff's (petitioner's) Counter-Motion for Summary Judgment is hereby granted and
summary judgment is hereby rendered in favor of plaintiff as follows:

1. Declaring the marriage between defendant Felicidad Sandoval and Teofilo Carlos solemnized at
Silang, Cavite on May 14, 1962, evidenced by the Marriage Certificate submitted in this case, null and
void ab initio for lack of the requisite marriage license;

2. Declaring that the defendant minor, Teofilo S. Carlos II, is not the natural, illegitimate, or legally
adopted child of the late Teofilo E. Carlos;

3. Ordering defendant Sandoval to pay and restitute to plaintiff the sum of P18,924,800.00 together with
the interest thereon at the legal rate from date of filing of the instant complaint until fully paid;

4. Declaring plaintiff as the sole and exclusive owner of the parcel of land, less the portion adjudicated
to plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 11975, covered by TCT No. 139061 of the Register of Deeds of Makati
City, and ordering said Register of Deeds to cancel said title and to issue another title in the sole name of
plaintiff herein;

5. Declaring the Contract, Annex "K" of complaint, between plaintiff and defendant Sandoval null and
void, and ordering the Register of Deeds of Makati City to cancel TCT No. 139058 in the name of
Teofilo Carlos, and to issue another title in the sole name of plaintiff herein;

6. Declaring the Contract, Annex M of the complaint, between plaintiff and defendant Sandoval null and
void;

7. Ordering the cancellation of TCT No. 210877 in the names of defendant Sandoval and defendant
minor Teofilo S. Carlos II and ordering the Register of Deeds of Manila to issue another title in the
exclusive name of plaintiff herein;

8. Ordering the cancellation of TCT No. 210878 in the name of defendant Sandoval and defendant
Minor Teofilo S. Carlos II and ordering the Register of Deeds of Manila to issue another title in the sole
name of plaintiff herein.
 Let this case be set for hearing for the reception of plaintiff's evidence on his claim for moral damages,
exemplary damages, attorney's fees, appearance fees, and litigation expenses on June 7, 1996 at 1:30
o'clock in the afternoon.

SO ORDERED.6

Dissatisfied, respondents appealed to the CA. In the appeal, respondents argued, inter alia, that the trial court
acted without or in excess of jurisdiction in rendering summary judgment annulling the marriage of Teofilo, Sr.
and Felicidad and in declaring Teofilo II as not an illegitimate child of Teofilo, Sr.

On October 15, 2002, the CA reversed and set aside the RTC ruling, disposing as follows:

WHEREFORE, the summary judgment appealed from is REVERSED and SET ASIDE and in lieu
thereof, a new one is entered REMANDING the case to the court of origin for further proceedings.

SO ORDERED.7

The CA opined:

We find the rendition of the herein appealed summary judgment by the court a quo contrary to law and
public policy as ensconced in the aforesaid safeguards. The fact that it was appellants who first sought
summary judgment from the trial court, did not justify the grant thereof in favor of appellee. Not being
an action "to recover upon a claim" or "to obtain a declaratory relief," the rule on summary judgment
apply (sic) to an action to annul a marriage. The mere fact that no genuine issue was presented and the
desire to expedite the disposition of the case cannot justify a misinterpretation of the rule. The first
paragraph of Article 88 and 101 of the Civil Code expressly prohibit the rendition of decree of
annulment of a marriage upon a stipulation of facts or a confession of judgment. Yet, the affidavits
annexed to the petition for summary judgment practically amount to these methods explicitly proscribed
by the law.

We are not unmindful of appellee's argument that the foregoing safeguards have traditionally been
applied to prevent collusion of spouses in the matter of dissolution of marriages and that the death of
Teofilo Carlos on May 13, 1992 had effectively dissolved the marriage herein impugned. The fact,
however, that appellee's own brother and appellant Felicidad Sandoval lived together as husband and
wife for thirty years and that the annulment of their marriage is the very means by which the latter is
sought to be deprived of her participation in the estate left by the former call for a closer and more
thorough inquiry into the circumstances surrounding the case. Rather that the summary nature by which
the court a quo resolved the issues in the case, the rule is to the effect that the material facts alleged in
the complaint for annulment of marriage should always be proved. Section 1, Rule 19 of the Revised
Rules of Court provides:

"Section 1. Judgment on the pleadings. - Where an answer fails to tender an issue, or otherwise
admits the material allegations of the adverse party's pleading, the court may, on motion of that
party, direct judgment on such pleading. But in actions for annulment of marriage or for legal
separation, the material facts alleged in the complaint shall always be proved." (Underscoring
supplied)

Moreover, even if We were to sustain the applicability of the rules on summary judgment to the case at
bench, Our perusal of the record shows that the finding of the court a quo for appellee would still not be
warranted. While it may be readily conceded that a valid marriage license is among the formal requisites
of marriage, the absence of which renders the marriage void ab initio pursuant to Article 80(3) in
relation to Article 58 of the Civil Code the failure to reflect the serial number of the marriage license on
 the marriage contract evidencing the marriage between Teofilo Carlos and appellant Felicidad Sandoval,
although irregular, is not as fatal as appellee represents it to be. Aside from the dearth of evidence to the
contrary, appellant Felicidad Sandoval's affirmation of the existence of said marriage license is
corroborated by the following statement in the affidavit executed by Godofredo Fojas, then Justice of the
Peace who officiated the impugned marriage, to wit:

"That as far as I could remember, there was a marriage license issued at Silang, Cavite on May
14, 1962 as basis of the said marriage contract executed by Teofilo Carlos and Felicidad
Sandoval, but the number of said marriage license was inadvertently not placed in the marriage
contract for the reason that it was the Office Clerk who filled up the blanks in the Marriage
Contract who in turn, may have overlooked the same."

Rather than the inferences merely drawn by the trial court, We are of the considered view that the
veracity and credibility of the foregoing statement as well as the motivations underlying the same should
be properly threshed out in a trial of the case on the merits.

If the non-presentation of the marriage contract - the primary evidence of marriage - is not proof that a
marriage did not take place, neither should appellants' non-presentation of the subject marriage license
be taken as proof that the same was not procured. The burden of proof to show the nullity of the
marriage, it must be emphasized, rests upon the plaintiff and any doubt should be resolved in favor of
the validity of the marriage.

Considering that the burden of proof also rests on the party who disputes the legitimacy of a particular
party, the same may be said of the trial court's rejection of the relationship between appellant Teofilo
Carlos II and his putative father on the basis of the inconsistencies in appellant Felicidad Sandoval's
statements. Although it had effectively disavowed appellant's prior claims regarding the legitimacy of
appellant Teofilo Carlos II, the averment in the answer that he is the illegitimate son of appellee's
brother, to Our mind, did not altogether foreclose the possibility of the said appellant's illegitimate
filiation, his right to prove the same or, for that matter, his entitlement to inheritance rights as such.

Without trial on the merits having been conducted in the case, We find appellee's bare allegation that
appellant Teofilo Carlos II was merely purchased from an indigent couple by appellant Felicidad
Sandoval, on the whole, insufficient to support what could well be a minor's total forfeiture of the rights
arising from his putative filiation. Inconsistent though it may be to her previous statements, appellant
Felicidad Sandoval's declaration regarding the illegitimate filiation of Teofilo Carlos II is more credible
when considered in the light of the fact that, during the last eight years of his life, Teofilo Carlos
allowed said appellant the use of his name and the shelter of his household. The least that the trial court
could have done in the premises was to conduct a trial on the merits in order to be able to thoroughly
resolve the issues pertaining to the filiation of appellant Teofilo Carlos II.8

On November 22, 2006, petitioner moved for reconsideration and for the inhibition of the ponente, Justice
Rebecca De Guia-Salvador. The CA denied the twin motions.

Issues

In this petition under Rule 45, petitioner hoists the following issues:

1. That, in reversing and setting aside the Summary Judgment under the Decision, Annex A hereof, and
in denying petitioner's Motion for reconsideration under the Resolution, Annex F hereof, with respect to
the nullity of the impugned marriage, petitioner respectfully submits that the Court of Appeals
committed a grave reversible error in applying Articles 88 and 101 of the Civil Code, despite the fact
that the circumstances of this case are different from that contemplated and intended by law, or has
 otherwise decided a question of substance not theretofore decided by the Supreme Court, or has decided
it in a manner probably not in accord with law or with the applicable decisions of this Honorable Court;

2. That in setting aside and reversing the Summary Judgment and, in lieu thereof, entering another
remanding the case to the court of origin for further proceedings, petitioner most respectfully submits
that the Court of Appeals committed a serious reversible error in applying Section 1, Rule 19 (now
Section 1, Rule 34) of the Rules of Court providing for judgment on the pleadings, instead of Rule 35
governing Summary Judgments;

3. That in reversing and setting aside the Summary Judgment and, in lieu thereof, entering another
remanding the case to the court of origin for further proceedings, petitioner most respectfully submits
that the Court of Appeals committed grave abuse of discretion, disregarded judicial admissions, made
findings on ground of speculations, surmises, and conjectures, or otherwise committed misapplications
of the laws and misapprehension of the facts.9 (Underscoring supplied)

Essentially, the Court is tasked to resolve whether a marriage may be declared void ab initio through a
judgment on the pleadings or a summary judgment and without the benefit of a trial. But there are other
procedural issues, including the capacity of one who is not a spouse in bringing the action for nullity of
marriage.

Our Ruling

I. The grounds for declaration of absolute nullity of marriage must be proved. Neither judgment on the
pleadings nor summary judgment is allowed. So is confession of judgment disallowed.

Petitioner faults the CA in applying Section 1, Rule 1910 of the Revised Rules of Court, which provides:

SECTION 1. Judgment on the pleadings. - Where an answer fails to tender an issue, or otherwise admits
the material allegations of the adverse party's pleading, the court may, on motion of that party, direct
judgment on such pleading. But in actions for annulment of marriage or for legal separation, the material
facts alleged in the complaint shall always be proved.

He argues that the CA should have applied Rule 35 of the Rules of Court governing summary judgment, instead
of the rule on judgment on the pleadings.

Petitioner is misguided. The CA did not limit its finding solely within the provisions of the Rule on judgment on
the pleadings. In disagreeing with the trial court, the CA likewise considered the provisions on summary
judgments, to wit:

Moreover, even if We are to sustain the applicability of the rules on summary judgment to the case at
bench, Our perusal of the record shows that the finding of the court a quo for appellee would still not be
warranted. x x x11

But whether it is based on judgment on the pleadings or summary judgment, the CA was correct in reversing the
summary judgment rendered by the trial court. Both the rules on judgment on the pleadings and summary
judgments have no place in cases of declaration of absolute nullity of marriage and even in annulment of
marriage.

With the advent of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, known as "Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void
Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages," the question on the application of summary judgments or
even judgment on the pleadings in cases of nullity or annulment of marriage has been stamped with clarity. The
significant principle laid down by the said Rule, which took effect on March 15, 200312 is found in Section
17, viz.:

SEC. 17. Trial. - (1) The presiding judge shall personally conduct the trial of the case. No delegation of
evidence to a commissioner shall be allowed except as to matters involving property relations of the
spouses.

(2) The grounds for declaration of absolute nullity or annulment of marriage must be proved. No
judgment on the pleadings, summary judgment, or confession of judgment shall be allowed.
(Underscoring supplied)

Likewise instructive is the Court's pronouncement in Republic v. Sandiganbayan.13 In that case, We excluded
actions for nullity or annulment of marriage from the application of summary judgments.

Prescinding from the foregoing discussion, save for annulment of marriage or declaration of its nullity or
for legal separation, summary judgment is applicable to all kinds of actions.14 (Underscoring supplied)

By issuing said summary judgment, the trial court has divested the State of its lawful right and duty to intervene
in the case. The participation of the State is not terminated by the declaration of the public prosecutor that no
collusion exists between the parties. The State should have been given the opportunity to present controverting
evidence before the judgment was rendered.15

Both the Civil Code and the Family Code ordain that the court should order the prosecuting attorney to appear
and intervene for the State. It is at this stage when the public prosecutor sees to it that there is no suppression of
evidence. Concomitantly, even if there is no suppression of evidence, the public prosecutor has to make sure
that the evidence to be presented or laid down before the court is not fabricated.

To further bolster its role towards the preservation of marriage, the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of
Void Marriages reiterates the duty of the public prosecutor, viz.:

SEC. 13. Effect of failure to appear at the pre-trial. -  (a) x x x

(b) x x x If there is no collusion, the court shall require the public prosecutor to intervene for the State
during the trial on the merits to prevent suppression or fabrication of evidence. (Underscoring supplied)

Truly, only the active participation of the public prosecutor or the Solicitor General will ensure that the interest
of the State is represented and protected in proceedings for declaration of nullity of marriages by preventing the
fabrication or suppression of evidence.16

II. A petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage may be filed solely by the husband or
wife. Exceptions: (1) Nullity of marriage cases commenced before the effectivity of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC;
and (2) Marriages celebrated during the effectivity of the Civil Code.

Under the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable

Marriages, the petition for declaration of absolute nullity of marriage may not be filed by any party outside of
the marriage. The Rule made it exclusively a right of the spouses by stating:

SEC. 2. Petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages. -

(a) Who may file. - A petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage may be filed solely by
the husband or the wife. (Underscoring supplied)
Section 2(a) of the Rule makes it the sole right of the husband or the wife to file a petition for declaration of
absolute nullity of void marriage. The rationale of the Rule is enlightening, viz.:

Only an aggrieved or injured spouse may file a petition for annulment of voidable marriages
or declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages. Such petition cannot be filed by compulsory or
intestate heirs of the spouses or by the State. The Committee is of the belief that they do not have a legal
right to file the petition. Compulsory or intestate heirs have only inchoate rights prior to the death of
their predecessor, and, hence, can only question the validity of the marriage of the spouses upon the
death of a spouse in a proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the deceased spouse filed in the
regular courts. On the other hand, the concern of the State is to preserve marriage and not to seek its
dissolution.17 (Underscoring supplied)

The new Rule recognizes that the husband and the wife are the sole architects of a healthy, loving, peaceful
marriage. They are the only ones who can decide when and how to build the foundations of marriage. The
spouses alone are the engineers of their marital life. They are simultaneously the directors and actors of their
matrimonial true-to-life play. Hence, they alone can and should decide when to take a cut, but only in
accordance with the grounds allowed by law.

The innovation incorporated in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC sets forth a demarcation line between marriages covered
by the Family Code and those solemnized under the Civil Code. The Rule extends only to marriages entered
into during the effectivity of the Family Code which took effect on August 3, 1988.18

The advent of the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages marks the beginning of the end of
the right of the heirs of the deceased spouse to bring a nullity of marriage case against the surviving spouse. But
the Rule never intended to deprive the compulsory or intestate heirs of their successional rights.

While A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC declares that a petition for declaration of absolute nullity of marriage may be
filed solely by the husband or the wife, it does not mean that the compulsory or intestate heirs are without any
recourse under the law. They can still protect their successional right, for, as stated in the Rationale of the Rules
on Annulment of Voidable Marriages and Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages, compulsory or
intestate heirs can still question the validity of the marriage of the spouses, not in a proceeding for declaration of
nullity but upon the death of a spouse in a proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the deceased spouse
filed in the regular courts.19

It is emphasized, however, that the Rule does not apply to cases already commenced before March 15, 2003
although the marriage involved is within the coverage of the Family Code. This is so, as the new Rule which
became effective on March 15, 200320 is prospective in its application. Thus, the Court held in Enrico v. Heirs
of Sps. Medinaceli,21 viz.:

As has been emphasized, A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC covers marriages under the Family Code of the
Philippines, and is prospective in its application.22 (Underscoring supplied)

Petitioner commenced the nullity of marriage case against respondent Felicidad in 1995. The marriage in
controversy was celebrated on May 14, 1962. Which law would govern depends upon when the marriage took
place.23

The marriage having been solemnized prior to the effectivity of the Family Code, the applicable law is the Civil
Code which was the law in effect at the time of its celebration.24 But the Civil Code is silent as to who may
bring an action to declare the marriage void. Does this mean that any person can bring an action for the
declaration of nullity of marriage?
We respond in the negative. The absence of a provision in the Civil Code cannot be construed as a license for
any person to institute a nullity of marriage case. Such person must appear to be the party who stands to be
benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit, or the party entitled to the avails of the suit.25 Elsewise stated,
plaintiff must be the real party-in-interest. For it is basic in procedural law that every action must be prosecuted
and defended in the name of the real party-in-interest.26

Interest within the meaning of the rule means material interest or an interest in issue to be affected by the decree
or judgment of the case, as distinguished from mere curiosity about the question involved or a mere incidental
interest. One having no material interest to protect cannot invoke the jurisdiction of the court as plaintiff in an
action. When plaintiff is not the real party-in-interest, the case is dismissible on the ground of lack of cause of
action.27

Illuminating on this point is Amor-Catalan v. Court of Appeals,28 where the Court held:

True, under the New Civil Code which is the law in force at the time the respondents were married, or
even in the Family Code, there is no specific provision as to who can file a petition to declare the nullity
of marriage; however, only a party who can demonstrate "proper interest"  can file the same. A petition
to declare the nullity of marriage, like any other actions,  must be prosecuted or defended in the name of
the real party-in-interest  and must be based on a cause of action. Thus, in Niñal v. Badayog,  the Court
held that the children have the personality to file the petition to declare the nullity of marriage of their
deceased father to their stepmother as it affects their successional rights.

xxxx

In fine, petitioner's personality to file the petition to declare the nullity of marriage cannot be ascertained
because of the absence of the divorce decree and the foreign law allowing it. Hence, a remand of the
case to the trial court for reception of additional evidence is necessary to determine whether respondent
Orlando was granted a divorce decree and whether the foreign law which granted the same allows or
restricts remarriage. If it is proved that a valid divorce decree was obtained and the same did not allow
respondent Orlando's remarriage, then the trial court should declare respondent's marriage as bigamous
and void ab initio  but reduced the amount of moral damages from P300,000.00 to P50,000.00 and
exemplary damages from P200,000.00 to P25,000.00. On the contrary, if it is proved that a valid divorce
decree was obtained which allowed Orlando to remarry, then the trial court must dismiss the instant
petition to declare nullity of marriage on the ground that petitioner Felicitas Amor-Catalan lacks legal
personality to file the same.29 (Underscoring supplied)

III. The case must be remanded to determine whether or not petitioner is a real-party-in-interest to seek
the declaration of nullity of the marriage in controversy.

In the case at bench, the records reveal that when Teofilo died intestate in 1992, his only surviving compulsory
heirs are respondent Felicidad and their son, Teofilo II. Under the law on succession, successional rights are
transmitted from the moment of death of the decedent and the compulsory heirs are called to succeed by
operation of law.30

Upon Teofilo's death in 1992, all his property, rights and obligations to the extent of the value of the inheritance
are transmitted to his compulsory heirs. These heirs were respondents Felicidad and Teofilo II, as the surviving
spouse and child, respectively.

Article 887 of the Civil Code outlined who are compulsory heirs, to wit:

(1) Legitimate children and descendants, with respect to their legitimate parents and ascendants;
 (2) In default of the foregoing, legitimate parents and ascendants, with respect to their legitimate
children and descendants;

(3) The widow or widower;

(4) Acknowledged natural children, and natural children by legal fiction;

(5) Other illegitimate children referred to in Article 287 of the Civil Code.31

Clearly, a brother is not among those considered as compulsory heirs. But although a collateral relative, such as
a brother, does not fall within the ambit of a compulsory heir, he still has a right to succeed to the estate.
Articles 1001 and 1003 of the New Civil Code provide:

ART. 1001. Should brothers and sisters or their children survive with the widow or widower, the latter
shall be entitled to one-half of the inheritance and the brothers and sisters or their children to the other
half.

ART. 1003. If there are no descendants, ascendants, illegitimate children, or a surviving spouse, the
collateral relatives shall succeed to the entire estate of the deceased in accordance with the following
articles. (Underscoring supplied)

Indeed, only the presence of descendants, ascendants or illegitimate children excludes collateral relatives from
succeeding to the estate of the decedent. The presence of legitimate, illegitimate, or adopted child or children of
the deceased precludes succession by collateral relatives.32 Conversely, if there are no descendants, ascendants,
illegitimate children, or a surviving spouse, the collateral relatives shall succeed to the entire estate of the
decedent.33

If respondent Teofilo II is declared and finally proven not to be the legitimate, illegitimate, or adopted son of
Teofilo, petitioner would then have a personality to seek the nullity of marriage of his deceased brother with
respondent Felicidad. This is so, considering that collateral relatives, like a brother and sister, acquire
successional right over the estate if the decedent dies without issue and without ascendants in the direct line.

The records reveal that Teofilo was predeceased by his parents. He had no other siblings but petitioner. Thus, if
Teofilo II is finally found and proven to be not a legitimate, illegitimate, or adopted son of Teofilo, petitioner
succeeds to the other half of the estate of his brother, the first half being allotted to the widow pursuant to
Article 1001 of the New Civil Code. This makes petitioner a real-party-interest to seek the declaration of
absolute nullity of marriage of his deceased brother with respondent Felicidad. If the subject marriage is found
to be void ab initio, petitioner succeeds to the entire estate.

It bears stressing, however, that the legal personality of petitioner to bring the nullity of marriage case is
contingent upon the final declaration that Teofilo II is not a legitimate, adopted, or illegitimate son of Teofilo.

If Teofilo II is proven to be a legitimate, illegitimate, or legally adopted son of Teofilo, then petitioner has no
legal personality to ask for the nullity of marriage of his deceased brother and respondent Felicidad. This is
based on the ground that he has no successional right to be protected, hence, does not have proper interest. For
although the marriage in controversy may be found to be void from the beginning, still, petitioner would not
inherit. This is because the presence of descendant, illegitimate,34 or even an adopted child35 excludes the
collateral relatives from inheriting from the decedent.

Thus, the Court finds that a remand of the case for trial on the merits to determine the validity or nullity of the
subject marriage is called for. But the RTC is strictly instructed to dismiss the nullity of marriage case for
lack of cause of action if it is proven by evidence that Teofilo II is a legitimate, illegitimate, or legally
adopted son of Teofilo Carlos, the deceased brother of petitioner.

IV. Remand of the case regarding the question of filiation of respondent Teofilo II is proper and in order.
There is a need to vacate the disposition of the trial court as to the other causes of action before it.

Petitioner did not assign as error or interpose as issue the ruling of the CA on the remand of the case concerning
the filiation of respondent Teofilo II. This notwithstanding, We should not leave the matter hanging in limbo.

This Court has the authority to review matters not specifically raised or assigned as error by the parties, if their
consideration is necessary in arriving at a just resolution of the case.36

We agree with the CA that without trial on the merits having been conducted in the case, petitioner's bare
allegation that respondent Teofilo II was adopted from an indigent couple is insufficient to support a total
forfeiture of rights arising from his putative filiation. However, We are not inclined to support its
pronouncement that the declaration of respondent Felicidad as to the illegitimate filiation of respondent Teofilo
II is more credible. For the guidance of the appellate court, such declaration of respondent Felicidad should not
be afforded credence. We remind the CA of the guaranty provided by Article 167 of the Family Code to protect
the status of legitimacy of a child, to wit:

ARTICLE 167. The child shall be considered legitimate although the mother may have declared against
its legitimacy or may have been sentenced as an adulteress. (Underscoring supplied)

It is stressed that Felicidad's declaration against the legitimate status of Teofilo II is the very act that is
proscribed by Article 167 of the Family Code. The language of the law is unmistakable. An assertion by the
mother against the legitimacy of her child cannot affect the legitimacy of a child born or conceived within a
valid marriage.37

Finally, the disposition of the trial court in favor of petitioner for causes of action concerning reconveyance,
recovery of property, and sum of money must be vacated. This has to be so, as said disposition was made on the
basis of its finding that the marriage in controversy was null and void ab initio.

WHEREFORE, the appealed Decision is MODIFIED as follows:

1. The case is REMANDED to the Regional Trial Court in regard to the action on the status and
filiation of respondent Teofilo Carlos II and the validity or nullity of marriage between respondent
Felicidad Sandoval and the late Teofilo Carlos;

2. If Teofilo Carlos II is proven to be the legitimate, or illegitimate, or legally adopted son of the late
Teofilo Carlos, the RTC is strictly INSTRUCTED to DISMISS the action for nullity of marriage for
lack of cause of action;

3. The disposition of the RTC in Nos. 1 to 8 of the fallo of its decision is VACATED AND SET
ASIDE.

The Regional Trial Court is ORDERED to conduct trial on the merits with dispatch and to give this case
priority in its calendar.

No costs.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 174238               July 7, 2009
ANITA CHENG, Petitioner,
vs.
SPOUSES WILLIAM SY and TESSIE SY, Respondents.
DECISION
NACHURA, J.:
This is a petition1 for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court of the Order dated January 2,
20062 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 18, Manila in Civil Case No. 05-112452 entitled Anita Cheng
v. Spouses William Sy and Tessie Sy.
The antecedents are as follows—
Petitioner Anita Cheng filed two (2) estafa cases before the RTC, Branch 7, Manila against respondent spouses
William and Tessie Sy (Criminal Case No. 98-969952 against Tessie Sy and Criminal Case No. 98-969953
against William Sy) for issuing to her Philippine Bank of Commerce (PBC) Check Nos. 171762 and 71860 for
₱300,000.00 each, in payment of their loan, both of which were dishonored upon presentment for having been
drawn against a closed account.
Meanwhile, based on the same facts, petitioner, on January 20, 1999, filed against respondents two (2) cases for
violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang (BP Blg.) 22 before the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC), Branch 25,
Manila (Criminal Case Nos. 341458-59).
On March 16, 2004, the RTC, Branch 7, Manila dismissed the estafa cases for failure of the prosecution to
prove the elements of the crime. The Order dismissing Criminal Case No. 98-969952 contained no declaration
as to the civil liability of Tessie Sy.3 On the other hand, the Order in Criminal Case No. 98-969953 contained a
statement, "Hence, if there is any liability of the accused, the same is purely ‘civil,’ not criminal in nature."4
Later, the MeTC, Branch 25, Manila, dismissed, on demurrer, the BP Blg. 22 cases in its Order5 dated February
7, 2005 on account of the failure of petitioner to identify the accused respondents in open court. The Order also
did not make any pronouncement as to the civil liability of accused respondents.1avvphi1
On April 26, 2005, petitioner lodged against respondents before the RTC, Branch 18, Manila, a complaint6 for
collection of a sum of money with damages (Civil Case No. 05-112452) based on the same loaned amount of
₱600,000.00 covered by the two PBC checks previously subject of the estafa and BP Blg. 22 cases.
In the assailed Order7 dated January 2, 2006, the RTC, Branch 18, Manila, dismissed the complaint for lack of
jurisdiction, ratiocinating that the civil action to collect the amount of ₱600,000.00 with damages was already
impliedly instituted in the BP Blg. 22 cases in light of Section 1, paragraph (b) of Rule 111 of the Revised Rules
of Court.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration8 which the court denied in its Order9 dated June 5, 2006. Hence,
this petition, raising the sole legal issue –
Whether or not Section 1 of Rule 111 of the 2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure and Supreme Court Circular No.
57-97 on the Rules and Guidelines in the filing and prosecution of criminal cases under BP Blg. 22 are
applicable to the present case where the nature of the order dismissing the cases for bouncing checks against the
respondents was [based] on the failure of the prosecution to identify both the accused (respondents herein)?10
Essentially, petitioner argues that since the BP Blg. 22 cases were filed on January 20, 1999, the 2000 Revised
Rules on Criminal Procedure promulgated on December 1, 2000 should not apply, as it must be given only
prospective application. She further contends that that her case falls within the following exceptions to the rule
that the civil action correspondent to the criminal action is deemed instituted with the latter—
(1) additional evidence as to the identities of the accused is necessary for the resolution of the civil aspect of the
case;
(2) a separate complaint would be just as efficacious as or even more expedient than a timely remand to the trial
court where the criminal action was decided for further hearings on the civil aspect of the case;
(3) the trial court failed to make any pronouncement as to the civil liability of the accused amounting to a
reservation of the right to have the civil liability litigated in a separate action;
(4) the trial court did not declare that the facts from which the civil liability might arise did not exist;
(5) the civil complaint is based on an obligation ex-contractu and not ex-delicto pursuant to Article 3111 of the
Civil Code; and
(6) the claim for civil liability for damages may be had under Article 2912 of the Civil Code.
Petitioner also points out that she was not assisted by any private prosecutor in the BP Blg. 22 proceedings.
The rule is that upon the filing of the estafa and BP Blg. 22 cases against respondents, where the petitioner has
not made any waiver, express reservation to litigate separately, or has not instituted the corresponding civil
action to collect the amount of ₱600,000.00 and damages prior to the criminal action, the civil action is deemed
instituted with the criminal cases.13
This rule applies especially with the advent of the 2000 Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure. Thus, during the
pendency of both the estafa and the BP Blg. 22 cases, the action to recover the civil liability was impliedly
instituted and remained pending before the respective trial courts. This is consonant with our ruling in
Rodriguez v. Ponferrada14 that the possible single civil liability arising from the act of issuing a bouncing check
can be the subject of both civil actions deemed instituted with the estafa case and the prosecution for violation
of BP Blg. 22, simultaneously available to the complaining party, without traversing the prohibition against
forum shopping.15 Prior to the judgment in either the estafa case or the BP Blg. 22 case, petitioner, as the
complainant, cannot be deemed to have elected either of the civil actions both impliedly instituted in the said
criminal proceedings to the exclusion of the other.16
The dismissal of the estafa cases for failure of the prosecution to prove the elements of the crime beyond
reasonable doubt—where in Criminal Case No. 98-969952 there was no pronouncement as regards the civil
liability of the accused and in Criminal Case No. 98-969953 where the trial court declared that the liability of
the accused was only civil in nature—produced the legal effect of a reservation by the petitioner of her right to
litigate separately the civil action impliedly instituted with the estafa cases, following Article 29 of the Civil
Code.17
However, although this civil action could have been litigated separately on account of the dismissal of the estafa
cases on reasonable doubt, the petitioner was deemed to have also elected that such civil action be prosecuted
together with the BP Blg. 22 cases in light of the Rodriguez v. Ponferrada ruling.
With the dismissal of the BP Blg. 22 cases for failure to establish the identity of the accused, the question that
arises is whether such dismissal would have the same legal effect as the dismissed estafa cases. Put differently,
may petitioner’s action to recover respondents’ civil liability be also allowed to prosper separately after the BP
Blg. 22 cases were dismissed?
Section 1 (b), Rule 111 of the 2000 Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure states –
Section 1. Institution of criminal and civil actions. –
xxx
(b) The criminal action for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 shall be deemed to include the corresponding
civil action. No reservation to file such civil action separately shall be allowed.
Upon filing of the joint criminal and civil actions, the offended party shall pay in full the filing fees based on the
amount of the check involved, which shall be considered as the actual damages claimed. Where the complaint
or information also seeks to recover liquidated, moral, nominal, temperate or exemplary damages, the offended
party shall pay the filing fees based on the amounts alleged therein. If the amounts are not so alleged but any of
these damages [is] subsequently awarded by the court, the filing fees based on the amount awarded shall
constitute a first lien on the judgment.
Where the civil action has been filed separately and trial thereof has not yet commenced, it may be consolidated
with the criminal action upon application with the court trying the latter case. If the application is granted, the
trial of both actions shall proceed in accordance with section 2 of this Rule governing consolidation of the civil
and criminal actions.
Petitioner is in error when she insists that the 2000 Rules on Criminal Procedure should not apply because she
filed her BP Blg. 22 complaints in 1999. It is now settled that rules of procedure apply even to cases already
pending at the time of their promulgation. The fact that procedural statutes may somehow affect the litigants’
rights does not preclude their retroactive application to pending actions. It is axiomatic that the retroactive
application of procedural laws does not violate any right of a person who may feel that he is adversely affected,
nor is it constitutionally objectionable. The reason for this is that, as a general rule, no vested right may attach
to, nor arise from, procedural laws.18
Indeed, under the present revised Rules, the criminal action for violation of BP Blg. 22 includes the
corresponding civil action to recover the amount of the checks. It should be stressed, this policy is intended to
discourage the separate filing of the civil action. In fact, the Rules even prohibits the reservation of a separate
civil action, i.e., one can no longer file a separate civil case after the criminal complaint is filed in court. The
only instance when separate proceedings are allowed is when the civil action is filed ahead of the criminal case.
Even then, the Rules encourages the consolidation of the civil and criminal cases. Thus, where petitioner’s
rights may be fully adjudicated in the proceedings before the court trying the BP Blg. 22 cases, resort to a
separate action to recover civil liability is clearly unwarranted on account of res judicata, for failure of petitioner
to appeal the civil aspect of the cases. In view of this special rule governing actions for violation of BP Blg. 22,
Article 31 of the Civil Code is not applicable.19
Be it remembered that rules governing procedure before the courts, while not cast in stone, are for the speedy,
efficient, and orderly dispensation of justice and should therefore be adhered to in order to attain this
objective.20
However, in applying the procedure discussed above, it appears that petitioner would be left without a remedy
to recover from respondents the ₱600,000.00 allegedly loaned from her. This could prejudice even the
petitioner’s Notice of Claim involving the same amount filed in Special Proceedings No. 98-88390 (Petition for
Voluntary Insolvency by Kolin Enterprises, William Sy and Tessie Sy), which case was reportedly archived for
failure to prosecute the petition for an unreasonable length of time.21 Expectedly, respondents would raise the
same defense that petitioner had already elected to litigate the civil action to recover the amount of the checks
along with the BP Blg. 22 cases.
It is in this light that we find petitioner’s contention that she was not assisted by a private prosecutor during the
BP Blg. 22 proceedings critical. Petitioner indirectly protests that the public prosecutor failed to protect and
prosecute her cause when he failed to have her establish the identities of the accused during the trial and when
he failed to appeal the civil action deemed impliedly instituted with the BP Blg. 22 cases. On this ground, we
agree with petitioner.
Faced with the dismissal of the BP Blg. 22 cases, petitioner’s recourse pursuant to the prevailing rules of
procedure would have been to appeal the civil action to recover the amount loaned to respondents
corresponding to the bounced checks. Hence, the said civil action may proceed requiring only a preponderance
of evidence on the part of petitioner. Her failure to appeal within the reglementary period was tantamount to a
waiver altogether of the remedy to recover the civil liability of respondents. However, due to the gross mistake
of the prosecutor in the BP Blg. 22 cases, we are constrained to digress from this rule.
It is true that clients are bound by the mistakes, negligence and omission of their counsel.22 But this rule admits
of exceptions – (1) where the counsel’s mistake is so great and serious that the client is prejudiced and denied
his day in court, or (2) where the counsel is guilty of gross negligence resulting in the client’s deprivation of
liberty or property without due process of law.23 Tested against these guidelines, we hold that petitioner’s lot
falls within the exceptions.
It is an oft-repeated exhortation to counsels to be well-informed of existing laws and rules and to keep abreast
with legal developments, recent enactments and jurisprudence. Unless they faithfully comply with such duty,
they may not be able to discharge competently and diligently their obligations as members of the Bar.24 Further,
lawyers in the government service are expected to be more conscientious in the performance of their duties as
they are subject to public scrutiny. They are not only members of the Bar but are also public servants who owe
utmost fidelity to public service.25 Apparently, the public prosecutor neglected to equip himself with the
knowledge of the proper procedure for BP Blg. 22 cases under the 2000 Rules on Criminal Procedure such that
he failed to appeal the civil action impliedly instituted with the BP Blg. 22 cases, the only remaining remedy
available to petitioner to be able to recover the money she loaned to respondents, upon the dismissal of the
criminal cases on demurrer. By this failure, petitioner was denied her day in court to prosecute the respondents
for their obligation to pay their loan.
Moreover, we take into consideration the trial court’s observation when it dismissed the estafa charge in
Criminal Case No. 98-969953 that if there was any liability on the part of respondents, it was civil in nature.
Hence, if the loan be proven true, the inability of petitioner to recover the loaned amount would be tantamount
to unjust enrichment of respondents, as they may now conveniently evade payment of their obligation merely
on account of a technicality applied against petitioner.
There is unjust enrichment when (1) a person is unjustly benefited, and (2) such benefit is derived at the
expense of or with damages to another. This doctrine simply means that a person shall not be allowed to profit
or enrich himself inequitably at another’s expense. One condition for invoking this principle of unjust
enrichment is that the aggrieved party has no other recourse based on contract, quasi-contract, crime, quasi-
delict or any other provision of law.26
Court litigations are primarily designed to search for the truth, and a liberal interpretation and application of the
rules which will give the parties the fullest opportunity to adduce proof is the best way to ferret out the truth.
The dispensation of justice and vindication of legitimate grievances should not be barred by technicalities.27 For
reasons of substantial justice and equity, as the complement of the legal jurisdiction that seeks to dispense
justice where courts of law, through the inflexibility of their rules and want of power to adapt their judgments to
the special circumstances of cases, are incompetent to do so,28 we thus rule, pro hac vice, in favor of petitioner.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. Civil Case No. 05-112452 entitled Anita Cheng v. Spouses William
Sy and Tessie Sy is hereby ordered REINSTATED. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.

THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 189649, April 20, 2015

ADORACION CAROLINO (SPOUSE AND IN SUBSTITUTION OF THE DECEASED JEREMIAS A.

CAROLINO), Petitioner, v. GEN. GENEROSO SENGA, AS CHIEF OF STAFF OF THE ARMED
FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES (AFP); BRIG. GEN. FERNANDO ZABAT, AS CHIEF OF THE AFP
FINANCE CENTER; COMMO. REYNALDO BASILIO, AS CHIEF OF THE AFP-GHQ
MANAGEMENT AND FISCAL OFFICE; AND COMMO. EMILIO MARAYAG, PENSION AND
GRATUITY OFFICER, PENSION AND GRATUITY MANAGEMENT CENTER, AFP FINANCE
CENTER, Respondent.

DECISION

PERALTA, J.:

Before us is a petition for review under Rule 45 seeking to reverse and set aside the Decision1 dated May 25,
2009 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 103502 and the Resolution2 dated September 10, 2009
denying reconsideration thereof.

The factual and legal antecedents are as follows:

On December 1, 1976, Jeremias A. Carolino, petitioner's husband, retired3 from the Armed Forces of the
Philippines (AFP) with the rank of Colonel under General Order No. 1208 dated November 29, 1976, pursuant
to the provisions of Sections 1(A) and 10 of Republic Act (RA) No. 340,4 as amended. He started receiving his
monthly retirement pay in the amount of P18,315.00 in December 1976 until the same was withheld by
respondents in March 2005. On June 3, 2005, Jeremias wrote a letter5 addressed to the AFP Chief of Staff
asking for the reasons of the withholding of his retirement pay. In a letter reply,6 Myrna F. Villaruz, LTC (FS)
PA, Pension and Gratuity Officer of the AFP Finance Center, informed Jeremias that his loss of Filipino
citizenship caused the deletion of his name in the alpha list of the AFP Pensioners' Payroll effective March 5,
2005; and that he could avail of re-entitlement to his retirement benefits and the restoration of his name in the
AFP Pensioners' Masterlist Payroll by complying with the requirements prescribed under RA No. 9225, or
the Dual Citizenship Act.

It appeared that the termination of Jeremias' pension was done pursuant to Disposition Form7 dated October 29,
2004, which was approved by the Chief of Staff and made effective in January 2005. In the said Disposition
Form, the AFP Judge Advocate General opined that under the provisions of Sections 4, 5, and 6 of RA No. 340,
retired military personnel are disqualified from receiving pension benefits once incapable to render military
service as a result of his having sworn allegiance to a foreign country. It was also mentioned that termination of
retirement benefits of pensioner of the AFP could be done pursuant to the provisions of Presidential Decree
(PD) No. 16388 which provides that the name of a retiree who loses his Filipino citizenship shall be removed
from the retired list and his retirement benefits terminated upon such loss. It being in consonance with the
policy consideration that all retirement laws inconsistent with the provisions of PD No. 1638 are repealed and
modified accordingly.

On August 24, 2006, Jeremias filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City, a Petition for
Mandamus9 against Gen. Generoso Senga, as Chief of Staff of the AFP, Brig. Gen. Fernando Zabat, as Chief of
the AFP Finance Center, Comm. Reynaldo Basilio, as Chief of the AFP-GHQ Management and Fiscal Office,
and Comm. Emilio Marayag, Pension and Gratuity Management Officer, Pension and Gratuity Management
Center, AFP Finance Center, seeking reinstatement of his name in the list of the AFP retired officers,
resumption of payment of his retirement benefits under RA No. 340, and the reimbursement of all his retirement
pay and benefits which accrued from March 5, 2005 up to the time his name is reinstated and, thereafter, with
claim for damages and attorney's fees. The case was docketed as Civil Case No. Q-06-58686, and raffled off to
Branch 220.

On February 26, 2007, the RTC rendered its Decision10 granting the petition for mandamus, the dispositive
portion of which reads:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered ordering General Hermogenes Esperon, Jr., as Chief of Staff of
the AFP, Brigadier General Fernando Zabat, as the Commanding Officer of the AFP Finance Center,
Commodore Reynaldo Basilio, as Chief of the AFP-GFIQ Management and Fiscal Office, and Captain Theresa
M. Nicdao, as Pension and Gratuity Officer of the Pension and Gratuity Management Center, or any of their
respective successors and those taking instructions from them as agents or subordinates,
to:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

a. immediately reinstate the name of petitioner in the list of retired AFP Officers, and to
resume payment of his retirement benefits under RA 340; and

b. release to [petitioner] all retirement benefits due him under RA 340 which accrued to him
from March 2005 continuously up to the time his name is reinstated in the list of AFP
retired officers.11

The RTC found that the issue for resolution is the applicability of RA No. 340 and PD No. 1638 upon Jeremias'
retirement benefits. It found that he retired as a commissioned officer of the AFP in 1976; thus, RANo. 340 is
the law applicable in determining his entitlement to his retirement benefits and not PD No. 1638 which was
issued only in 1979. Article 4 of the Civil Code provides that "laws shall have no retroactive effect unless the
contrary is provided." PD No. 1638 does not provide for such retroactive application. Also, it could not have
been the intendment of PD No. 1638 to deprive its loyal soldiers of a monthly pension during their old age
especially where, as here, the right had been vested to them through time. RA No. 340 does not provide that the
loss of Filipino citizenship would terminate one's retirement benefits; and that PD No. 1638 does not reduce
whatever benefits that any person has already been receiving under existing law.

Respondents sought reconsideration,12  but the RTC denied the same in an Order13 dated May 25, 2007, the
decretal portion of which reads:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Motion for Reconsideration is hereby DENIED, considering
that the questioned decision has not yet attained.its finality. The Motion for Execution in the meantime is
hereby DENIED.14cralawlawlibrary
Aggrieved, respondents elevated the case to the CA. After the submission of the parties' respective memoranda,
the case was submitted for decision.

Jeremias died on September 30, 200715 and was substituted by his wife, herein petitioner.

On May 25, 2009, the CA granted respondents' appeal. The dispositive portion of the CA decision
reads:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant appeal is GRANTED. The appealed decision
is REVOKED and SET ASIDE.16cralawlawlibrary
In so ruling, the CA found that while it is true that Jeremias retired in 1976 under the provisions of RA No. 340,
as amended, which does not contain any provision anent cessation or loss of retirement benefits upon acquiring
another citizenship, PD No. 1638, which was signed in 1979, effectively repealed RA No. 340, as amended.
Section 27 of PD No. 1638, which provides that the name of a retiree who loses his Filipino citizenship shall be
removed from the retired list and his retirement benefits terminated upon such loss, was correctly made
applicable to Jeremias' retirement benefits. Logic dictates that since Jeremias had already renounced his
allegiance to the Philippines, he cannot now be compelled by the State to render active service and to render
compulsory military service when the need arises. The CA found that for the writ of mandamus to lie, it is
essential that Jeremias should have a clear legal right to the thing demanded and it must be the imperative duty
of respondents to perform the act required which petitioner failed to show; thus, mandamus will not lie.

Petitioner's motion for reconsideration was denied in a Resolution dated September 10, 2009.

Hence, this petition raising the following:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE REVERSIBLE ERROR IN RENDERING
THE ASSAILED DECISION AND RESOLUTION WHICH SET ASIDE AND REVERSED THE 26
FEBRUARY 2007 DECISION OF THE QC RTC BECAUSE:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
PD 1638 should not have been applied and cannot be used against petitioner as her husband's retirement and
pension were granted to him by the AFP under RA 340 which was not superseded by PD 1638, a later statute.

Petitioner correctly availed of the remedy of mandamus to compel the reinstatement of his pension and benefits
from the AFP under RA 340 as PD 1638 was not applicable to him.
Petitioner contends that her husband's retirement from the active service in 1976 was pursuant to the provisions
of RA No. No. 340 as PD No. 1638 was not yet in existence then, and there was nothing in RA No. 340 that
disqualifies a retired military personnel from receiving retirement benefits after acquiring foreign citizenship.
The concept of retirement benefits is such that one is entitled to them for services already rendered and not for
those to be made at a future time. Retirement benefits due petitioner's husband under RA No. 340, is an
acquired right which cannot be taken away by a subsequent law. PD No. 1638 does not expressly provide for its
retroactive application. Respondents, being officers of the AFP tasked to implement the provisions of RA No.
340 have neglected their function thereunder by delisting petitioner's husband as a retiree, thus, mandamus is
proper.

In his Comment, the Solicitor General argues that PD No. 1638 applies to all military personnel in the service of
the AFP whether active or retired; hence, it applies retroactively to petitioner's husband. Even when a retiree is
no longer in the active service, his being a Filipino still makes him a part of the Citizen Armed Forces; that
whether a military personnel retires under the provisions of RA No. 340 or under PD No. 1638, he is still in the
service of the military and/or the State only that he is retired, thus, they should not be treated differently upon
the loss of Filipino citizenship. He argues when there is an irreconcilable conflict between the two laws of
different vintages, i.e., RA No. 340 and PD No. 1638, the latter enactment prevails.

The Solicitor General argues that mandamus will not issue to enforce a right to compel compliance with a duty
which is questionable or over which a substantial doubt exists. In this case, petitioner's husband does not have a
well-defined, clear and certain legal right to continuously receive retirement benefits after becoming an
American citizen. Likewise, the AFP does not have a clear and imperative duty to grant the said benefits
considering that Section 27 of PD No. 1638 provides that the name of a retiree who loses his Filipino
citizenship shall be removed from the retired list and his retirement benefits terminated upon such loss.

Petitioner filed her reply thereto. We find merit in the petition.

Petitioner's husband retired in 1976 under RA No. 340. He was already receiving his monthly retirement benefit
in the amount of P18,315.00 since December 1976 until it was terminated in March 2005. Section 5, RA No.
340 provides:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Sec. 5. Officers and enlisted men placed in the retired list shall be subject to the rules and articles of war and to
trial by court-martial for any breach thereof. At any time said officers and enlisted men may be called to active
service by the President. Refusal on the part of any officer or enlisted man to perform such services shall
terminate his right to further participation in the benefits of this Act provided he resides in the Philippines and is
physically fit for service. Such fitness for service shall be determined by applicable regulations.
The afore-quoted provision clearly shows how a retiree's retirement benefits may be terminated, i.e., when the
retiree refuses to perform active service when called to do so provided that (1) the retiree resides in the
Philippines and (2) is physically fit for service. There is no other requirement found in the law which would be
the reason for the termination of a retiree's retirement benefits. Petitioner's husband was never called to perform
active service and refused to do so, however, his retirement benefit was terminated. The reason for such
termination was his loss of Filipino citizenship based on Section 27 of PD No. 1638, to
wit:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Section 27. Military personnel retired under Sections 4, 5, 10, 11 and 12 shall be carried in the retired list of the
Armed Forces of the Philippines. The name of a retiree who loses his Filipino citizenship shall be removed from
the retired list and his retirement benefits terminated upon such loss.
We find that the CA erred in applying PD No. 1638 to the retirement benefits of petitioner's husband.

Firstly, PD No. 1638 was signed by then President Ferdinand Marcos on September 10, 1979. Under Article 4
of the Civil Code, it is provided that laws shall have no retroactive effect, unless the contrary is provided. It is
said that the law looks to the future only and has no retroactive effect unless the legislator may have formally
given that effect to some legal provisions;17 that all statutes are to be construed as having only prospective
operation, unless the purpose and intention of the legislature to give them a retrospective effect is expressly
declared or is necessarily implied from the language used; and that every case of doubt must be resolved against
retrospective effect.18 These principles also apply to amendments of statutes.

PD No. 1638 does not contain any provision regarding its retroactive application, nor the same may be implied
from its language. In fact, Section 36 of PD No. 1638 clearly provides that the decree shall take effect upon its
approval. As held in Parreno v. COA,19 there is no question that PD No. 1638, as amended, applies
prospectively. Since PD No. 1638, as amended, is about the new system of retirement and separation from
service of military personnel, it should apply to those who were in the service at the time of its
approval.20 Conversely, PD No. 1638 is not applicable to those who retired before its effectivity in 1979. The
rule is familiar that after an act is amended, the original act continues to be in force with regard to all rights that
had accrued prior to such amendment.21

Moreover, Section 27 of PD No. 1638 specifically provides for the retirees to whom the law shall be applied, to
wit:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Section 27. Military personnel retired under Sections 4, 5, 10, 11 and 12 shall be carried in the retired list of
the Armed Forces of the Philippines. The name of a retiree who loses his Filipino citizenship shall be removed
from the retired list and his retirement benefits terminated upon such loss, (emphasis supplied)
Notably, petitioner's husband did not retire under those above-enumerated Sections of PD No. 1638 as he
retired under RA No. 340.

Secondly, it has been held that before a right to retirement benefits or pension vests in an employee, he must
have met the stated conditions of eligibility with respect to the nature of employment, age, and length of
service.22 Undeniably, petitioner's husband had complied with the conditions of eligibility to retirement benefits
as he was then receiving his retirement benefits on a monthly basis until it was terminated. Where the employee
retires and meets the eligibility requirements, he acquires a vested right to the benefits that is protected by the
due process clause.23 It is only upon retirement that military personnel acquire a vested right to retirement
benefits.24 Retirees enjoy a protected property interest whenever they acquire a right to immediate payment
under pre-existing law.25
In Ayog v. Cusi,26 we expounded the nature of a vested right, thus:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
"A right is vested when the right to enjoyment has become the property of some particular person or persons as
a present interest" (16 C.J.S. 1173). It is "the privilege to enjoy property legally vested, to enforce contracts, and
enjoy the rights of property conferred by the existing law" (12 C.J.S. 955, Note 46, No. 6) or "some right or
interest in property which has become fixed and established and is no longer open to doubt or controversy"
(Downs vs. Blount 170 Fed. 15, 20, cited in Balboa vs. Farrales, 51 Phil. 498, 502).

The due process clause prohibits the annihilation of vested rights. "A state may not impair vested rights by
legislative enactment, by the enactment or by the subsequent repeal of a municipal ordinance, or by a change in
the constitution of the State, except in a legitimate exercise of the police power" (16 C.J.S. 1177-78).

It has been observed that, generally, the term "vested right" expresses the concept of present fixed interest,
which in right reason and natural justice should be protected against arbitrary State action, or an innately just
and imperative right which an enlightened free society, sensitive to inherent and irrefragable individual rights,
cannot deny (16 C.J.S. 1174, Note 71, No. 5, citing Pennsylvania Greyhound Lines, Inc. vs. Rosenthal, 192 Atl.
2nd 587).27cralawlawlibrary
Petitioner's husband acquired vested right to the payment of his retirement benefits which must be respected and
cannot be affected by the subsequent enactment of PD No. 1638 which provides that loss of Filipino citizenship
terminates retirement benefits. Vested rights include not only legal or equitable title to the enforcement of a
demand, but also an exemption from new obligations after the right has vested.28

In fact, Sections 33 and 35 of PD No. 1638 recognize such vested right, to wit:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Section 33. Nothing in this Decree shall be construed in any manner to reduce whatever retirement and
separation pay or gratuity or other monetary benefits which any person is heretofore receiving or is entitled to
receive under the provisions of existing law.

xxxx

Section. 35. Except those necessary to give effect to the provisions of this Decree and to preserve the rights
granted to retired or separated military personnel, all laws, rules and regulations inconsistent with the provisions
of this Decree are hereby repealed or modified accordingly.
Section 33 of PD No. 1638 is clear that the law has no intention to reduce or to revoke whatever retirement
benefits being enjoyed by a retiree at the time of its passage. Hence, Section 35 provides for an exception to
what the decree repealed or modified, i.e., except those necessary to preserve the rights granted to retired or
separated military personnel.

We also find that the CA erred in finding that mandamus will not lie.

Section 3, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court lay down under what circumstances petition for mandamus may be
filed, to wit:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
SEC. 3. Petition for mandamus. - When any tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person unlawfully neglects
the performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or station,
or unlawfully excludes another from the use and enjoyment of a right or office to which such other is entitled,
and there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, the person aggrieved
thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court, alleging the facts with certainty and praying that
judgment be rendered commanding the respondent, immediately or at some other time to be specified by the
court, to do the act required to be done to protect the rights of the petitioner, and to pay the damages sustained
by the petitioner by reason of the wrongful acts of the respondent.
A writ of mandamus can be issued only when petitioner's legal right to the performance of a particular act
which is sought to be compelled is clear and complete. A clear legal right is a right which is indubitably granted
by law or is inferable as a matter of law.29 A doctrine well-embedded in our jurisprudence is that mandamus will
issue only when the petitioner has a clear legal right to the performance of the act sought to be compelled and
the respondent has an imperative duty to perform the same.30 The remedy of mandamus lies to compel the
performance of a ministerial duty.31 A purely ministerial act or duty is one that an officer or tribunal performs in
a given state of facts, in a prescribed manner, in obedience to the mandate of a legal authority, without regard to
or the exercise of its own judgment upon the propriety or impropriety of the act done.32 If the law imposes a
duty upon a public officer, and gives him the right to decide how or when the duty shall be performed, such
duty is discretionary and not ministerial.33

The petition for mandamus filed by petitioner's husband with the RTC was for the payment of his terminated
retirement benefits, which has become vested, and being a ministerial duty on the part of the respondents to pay
such claim, mandamus is the proper remedy to compel such payment.

The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies calls for resort first to the appropriate administrative
authorities in the resolution of a controversy falling under their jurisdiction before the same may be elevated to
the courts of justice for review.34 However, the principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies need not be
adhered to when the question is purely legal.35 This is because issues of law cannot be resolved with finality by
the administrative officer.36 Appeal to the administrative officer would only be an exercise in futility.37 Here, the
question raised is purely legal, i.e., what law should be applied in the payment of retirement benefits of
petitioner's husband. Thus, there was no need to exhaust all administrative remedies before a judicial relief can
be sought.cralawred

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated May 25, 2009 and the Resolution dated
September 10, 2009 of the Court of Appeals are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Decision dated
February 26, 2007 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 220, is AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

A.M. No. MTJ-92-706 March 29, 1995

LUPO ALMODIEL ATIENZA, complainant,

vs.
JUDGE FRANCISCO F. BRILLANTES, JR., Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 28, Manila, respondent.

QUIASON, J.:

This is a complaint by Lupo A. Atienza for Gross Immorality and Appearance of Impropriety against Judge
Francisco Brillantes, Jr., Presiding Judge of the Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 20, Manila.

Complainant alleges that he has two children with Yolanda De Castro, who are living together at No. 34 Galaxy
Street, Bel-Air Subdivision, Makati, Metro Manila. He stays in said house, which he purchased in 1987,
whenever he is in Manila.

In December 1991, upon opening the door to his bedroom, he saw respondent sleeping on his (complainant's)
bed. Upon inquiry, he was told by the houseboy that respondent had been cohabiting with De Castro.
Complainant did not bother to wake up respondent and instead left the house after giving instructions to his
houseboy to take care of his children.

Thereafter, respondent prevented him from visiting his children and even alienated the affection of his children
for him.

Complainant claims that respondent is married to one Zenaida Ongkiko with whom he has five children, as
appearing in his 1986 and 1991 sworn statements of assets and liabilities. Furthermore, he alleges that
respondent caused his arrest on January 13, 1992, after he had a heated argument with De Castro inside the
latter's office.

For his part, respondent alleges that complainant was not married to De Castro and that the filing of the
administrative action was related to complainant's claim on the Bel-Air residence, which was disputed by De
Castro.

Respondent denies that he caused complainant's arrest and claims that he was even a witness to the withdrawal
of the complaint for Grave Slander filed by De Castro against complainant. According to him, it was the sister
of De Castro who called the police to arrest complainant.

Respondent also denies having been married to Ongkiko, although he admits having five children with her. He
alleges that while he and Ongkiko went through a marriage ceremony before a Nueva Ecija town mayor on
April 25, 1965, the same was not a valid marriage for lack of a marriage license. Upon the request of the parents
of Ongkiko, respondent went through another marriage ceremony with her in Manila on June 5, 1965. Again,
neither party applied for a marriage license. Ongkiko abandoned respondent 17 years ago, leaving their children
to his care and custody as a single parent.

Respondent claims that when he married De Castro in civil rites in Los Angeles, California on December 4,
1991, he believed, in all good faith and for all legal intents and purposes, that he was single because his first
marriage was solemnized without a license.

Under the Family Code, there must be a judicial declaration of the nullity of a previous marriage before a party
thereto can enter into a second marriage. Article 40 of said Code provides:

The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for the purposes of remarriage on the
basis solely of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void.

Respondent argues that the provision of Article 40 of the Family Code does not apply to him considering that
his first marriage took place in 1965 and was governed by the Civil Code of the Philippines; while the second
marriage took place in 1991 and governed by the Family Code.

Article 40 is applicable to remarriages entered into after the effectivity of the Family Code on August 3, 1988
regardless of the date of the first marriage. Besides, under Article 256 of the Family Code, said Article is given
"retroactive effect insofar as it does not prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights in accordance with the
Civil Code or other laws." This is particularly true with Article 40, which is a rule of procedure. Respondent has
not shown any vested right that was impaired by the application of Article 40 to his case.

The fact that procedural statutes may somehow affect the litigants' rights may not preclude their retroactive
application to pending actions. The retroactive application of procedural laws is not violative of any right of a
person who may feel that he is adversely affected (Gregorio v. Court of Appeals, 26 SCRA 229 [1968]). The
reason is that as a general rule no vested right may attach to, nor arise from, procedural laws (Billones v. Court
of Industrial Relations, 14 SCRA 674 [1965]).
Respondent is the last person allowed to invoke good faith. He made a mockery of the institution of marriage
and employed deceit to be able to cohabit with a woman, who beget him five children.

Respondent passed the Bar examinations in 1962 and was admitted to the practice of law in 1963. At the time
he went through the two marriage ceremonies with Ongkiko, he was already a lawyer. Yet, he never secured
any marriage license. Any law student would know that a marriage license is necessary before one can get
married. Respondent was given an opportunity to correct the flaw in his first marriage when he and Ongkiko
were married for the second time. His failure to secure a marriage license on these two occasions betrays his
sinister motives and bad faith.

It is evident that respondent failed to meet the standard of moral fitness for membership in the legal profession.

While the deceit employed by respondent existed prior to his appointment as a Metropolitan Trial Judge, his
immoral and illegal act of cohabiting with De Castro began and continued when he was already in the judiciary.

The Code of Judicial Ethics mandates that the conduct of a judge must be free of a whiff of impropriety, not
only with respect to his performance of his judicial duties but also as to his behavior as a private individual.
There is no duality of morality. A public figure is also judged by his private life. A judge, in order to promote
public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary, must behave with propriety at all times, in
the performance of his judicial duties and in his everyday life. These are judicial guideposts too self-evident to
be overlooked. No position exacts a greater demand on moral righteousness and uprightness of an individual
than a seat in the judiciary (Imbing v. Tiongzon, 229 SCRA 690 [1994]).

WHEREFORE, respondent is DISMISSED from the service with forfeiture of all leave and retirement benefits
and with prejudice to reappointment in any branch, instrumentality, or agency of the government, including
government-owned and controlled corporations. This decision is immediately executory.

SO ORDERED.

THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 211353, June 10, 2019

WILLIAM G. KWONG MANAGEMENT, INC. AND WILLIAM G. KWONG, PETITIONERS, v.

DIAMOND HOMEOWNERS & RESIDENTS ASSOCIATION, RESPONDENT.

DECISION

LEONEN, J.:

A homeowners' association may regulate passage into a subdivision for the safety and security of its residents,
even if its roads have already been donated to the local government. It has the right to set goals for the
promotion of safety and security, peace, comfort, and the general welfare of its residents.1

This Court resolves the Petition for Review on Certiorari2 assailing the Court of Appeals' July 5, 2013
Decision3 and February 12, 2014 Resolution4 in CA-G.R. SP No. 115198. The Court of Appeals set aside the
Office of the President's March 24, 2010 Decision5 and found the "No Sticker, No ID, No Entry" Policy valid
and issued within the authority of the homeowners' association.
Diamond Subdivision is a residential subdivision in Balibago, Angeles City, Pampanga with several
commercial establishments operating within it. These establishments include beer houses, karaoke bars, night
clubs, and other drinking joints.6

Because of these, patrons, customers, and many other people freely come in and out of Diamond Subdivision.
Such unrestricted access to the subdivision, however, also exposed its residents to incidents of robbery, akyat-
bahay, prostitution, rape, loud music, and noise that would last until the wee hours of the morning.7

Diamond Homeowners & Resident Association (Diamond Homeowners), the legitimate homeowners'
association of Diamond Subdivision, sought to address the residents' peace and security issues by raising their
concerns to the City Council of Angeles City (Angeles City Council).8

On February 24, 2003, the Angeles City Council issued Ordinance No. 132,9 series of 2003, reclassifying
Diamond Subdivision as exclusively residential and prohibited the further establishment and operation of any
business except for those already existing.10 The Ordinance states:

Whereas, legitimate homeowners of the Diamond Subdivision have presented to the City Council their serious
concern on what is presently occurring in their subdivision;

Whereas, with the present classification of Diamond Subdivision constant problems of peace and order have
confronted the homeowners and residents affecting their lives, property and security;

Whereas, the introduction of business establishments in an uncontrolled manner have likewise proliferated due
to the current classification of the subdivision;

Whereas, due to the R-2 classification of Diamond Subdivision the value of property have not increase[d],
despite its strategic location;

Whereas, there is an urgent need to address all the concern[s] of the homeowners and residents of Diamond
Subdivision;

Whereas, the appropriate and immediate solution to the present concerns is the reclassification of Diamond
Subdivision from Residential 2 to Residential 1 Classification.

Now therefore foregoing considered, the City Council of Angeles City in session assembled hereby resolved to
ordain:

Section 1. An Ordinance reclassifying Diamond Subdivision located in Balibago, Angeles City from Residential
2 to Residential 1 Classification status, be as it is hereby, approved.

Section 2. Arayat and S.L. Orosa Streets and the service road of Diamond Subdivision are exempted from this
new classification.

Section 3. That existing and legitimate business establishments operating within the territorial boundaries of the
said Diamond Subdivision as of approval of the ordinance shall remain and continue to operate and no
commercial establishment of any kind shall be allowed thereafter.

Section 4. Unless by hereditary succession no business establishment rights shall be transferred to any
individual or entity after approval of this ordinance.

Section 5. This Ordinance shall take effect upon its approval.11

However, this Ordinance was not complied with as more beer gardens and nightclubs were still put up. The
peace, order, and security situation in the subdivision did not improve.12

Among those affected was William G. Kwong (Kwong). A resident of Diamond Subdivision for more than 38
years, he runs three (3) motels13 in the subdivision under his company, William G. Kwong Management, Inc.14

Seeking to address his security concerns, Kwong proposed to his neighbors that guard posts with telephone
lines be set up at the entry and exit points on the street where he resides to screen all incoming and outgoing
visitors.15 In an August 3, 2006 Letter, Kwong wrote:
TO THE RESIDENTS OF EMMANUEL STREET
Diamond Subdivision, Balibago
Angeles City

Dear MR/MS _______,

In direct response to a sharp increase in criminal activities in our subdivision, a number of which have remained
unreported, I would like to ask your approval and cooperation on a number of proposals, which I outlined
below, for our own protection and safety:
1. To put up security gates on both entry/exit points of Emmanuel Street.

2. To permanently seal off the proposed gate at Emmanuel Street corner V.Y. Orosa Street.

3. To engage the services of two security guards to man the gate 24 hours a day at Emmanuel Street comer
Marlim Avenue.

4. To install a telephone line at the guard's booth to screen all incoming and outgoing visitors and outsiders. The
guard will have to call the residents for approval before he lets anyone in.
With regard to the costs of this project, I am willing to shoulder the cost of the two security gates and one-half
(1/2) of the monthly security and telephone fees, which amounts to approximately Nine Thousand Pesos
(PhP9,000.00). In support of this project, I would like to request the residents to shoulder the remaining one-
half (1/2) of the monthly costs of security and telephone fees, which also amounts to approximately Nine
Thousand Pesos (PhP9,000.0[0]) for 15 household or Six Hundred Pesos (PhP600.00) a month per household.

It is with the sense of cooperation and solidarity that I ask you to consider this project for the security and safety
of our family.

Thank you for most (sic) kind attention and understanding.16

However, the other residents of Diamond Subdivision also wanted their security concerns addressed. Thus, to
safeguard the whole subdivision, Diamond Homeowners proposed the "No Sticker, No ID, No Entry" Policy
(the Policy).17

Under the Policy, visitors on vehicles who sought to enter the premises must leave with the subdivision guards
their identification cards, which they may reclaim upon leaving the subdivision. Visitors on foot were not
required to surrender theirs. Meanwhile, residents with vehicles may obtain stickers to identify themselves so
that they did not need to surrender any identification card.18

After consultations and meetings, the Policy was approved in December 2006. Diamond Homeowners later
issued a Memorandum to inform residents that the Policy would be implemented by March 15, 2007.19

Kwong, however, contested the Policy.

When Diamond Homeowners did not heed his objection, Kwong filed before the Housing and Land Use
Regulatory Board Regional Office a Complaint for the issuance of a cease and desist order with application for
a temporary restraining order. He argued that the Policy was invalid because the subdivision roads have been
donated to the City of Angeles in 1974 and were, thus, public roads that must be open for public use. Likewise,
he contended that the screening of visitors would be cumbersome for his customers, affecting his businesses.20

Ruling in Kwong's favor, the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board Regional Office issued a Cease and
Desist Order and a Temporary Restraining Order. The records were later forwarded to the Housing and Land
Use Regulatory Board Arbiter for final disposition.21

In his August 10, 2007 Decision,22 the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board Arbiter lifted the Cease and
Desist Order and dismissed Kwong's Complaint. He ruled that the Policy's alleged damage to Kwong's business
was "imaginary, unsubstantiated[,] and hypothetical[.]"23

The Arbiter further held that the protection and security of Diamond Subdivision's residents were the primary
and utmost concern, and must be prioritized over the convenience of motel patrons.24 He ruled that the Policy's
objective to protect the community at large was far greater than Kwong's business concerns.25

Upholding the Policy's validity, the Arbiter found that it neither prohibited nor impaired the use of the roads.
Neither did it change the classification of the roads nor usurp the government's authority. Moreover, the roads
were still for public use, and the public was still allowed to pass as long as they presented identification cards.
The Arbiter noted that there was no evidence showing that persons were being refused access or asked to pay
for its use.26

On appeal before the Board of Commissioners of the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board, the Arbiter's
ruling was reversed. In its September 12, 2008 Decision,27 the Board of Commissioners found merit in Kwong's
appeal and declared the Policy void for being "unjustifiable and without legal basis."28

In subjecting the subdivision roads to the Policy, the Board of Commissioners found that they were turned into
private roads-inaccessible, not open to the public, and under the control of Diamond Homeowners. It also ruled
that Kwong and William G. Kwong Management, Inc. have already acquired a vested right to unrestricted
passage through the subdivision roads since 1974 because they owned the subdivision lots and because the
public use of the roads is guaranteed by law. It found that to limit or impose pecuniary conditions for their
enjoyment over the roads violates the roads' public character.29

The Board of Commissioners also ruled that the Policy must be justified by an issue so serious and
overwhelming that it is prioritized over the lot owners' rights. Diamond Homeowners, it fmmd, failed to present
evidence of peace and security issues within the subdivision.30

The Office of the President, in its March 24, 2010 Decision,31 affirmed the Board of Commissioners'
Decision in toto. It noted that the factual findings of the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board, as the
administrative agency with the technical expertise on the matter, were entitled to great respect.32

Hence, Diamond Homeowners elevated the case to the Court of Appeals via a Petition for Review.33

In its July 5, 2013 Decision,34 the Court of Appeals granted Diamond Homeowners' Petition and set aside the
Office of the President's Decision.35 It found that Diamond Homeowners was authorized in enacting the
Policy.36

The Court of Appeals ruled that while the local government acquires ownership rights, these rights should be
harmonized with the interests of homeowners who invested life savings in exchange for special amenities,
comfort, and tighter security, which non-subdivisions did not offer.37
The Court of Appeals found that the State recognized this interest in Presidential Decree No. 957, as amended
by Presidential Decree No. 1216, and recently in Republic Act No. 9904, or the Magna Carta for Homeowners
and Homeowners' Associations.38

The Court of Appeals noted that Presidential Decree No. 957, as amended by Presidential Decree No. 1216,
required the donation of subdivision roads to the local government. While the issuance was silent on regulating
access to subdivision roads, it found that the requirement was imposed to benefit homeowners, amid
subdivision developers who tended to fail in maintaining the upkeep of subdivision roads, alleys, and
sidewalks.39 It cited Albon. v. Fernando,40 which explained that subdivision owners or developers were relieved
of maintaining roads and open spaces once they have been donated to the local government.41

Likewise, the Court of Appeals noted the Magna Carta for Homeowners and Homeowners' Associations, under
which homeowners were given the: right to organize to protect and promote their mutual benefits and the power
to create rules necessary to regulate and operate the subdivision facilities.42 Section 10(d) provided homeowners'
associations the right to regulate access to and passage through the subdivision roads to preserve privacy,
tranquility, internal security, safety, and traffic order.43

The Court of Appeals further noted that the law did not distinguish between roads donated to the local
government and those retained by the subdivision owners or developers. This showed that while the local
government had ownership of subdivision roads, homeowners' associations maintained their enjoyment,
possession, and management.44

Likewise, the Court of Appeals held that the Policy was reasonably exercised.45 It ruled that Ordinance No. 132
was sufficient to show that Diamond Subdivision was encountering peace, order, and security problems, as it
explicitly stated that the subdivision was confronted with such issues affecting the residents and homeowners.
As a public document, it is prima facie evidence of facts stated in it.46 The Court of Appeals further found that
the City of Angeles would not have approved Ordinance No. 132 had it not been substantiated by these facts.47

Moreover, the Court of Appeals held the Policy reasonable because its purpose was to secure and ensure the
peace, safety, and security of homeowners and residents. It found that not only was the Policy supported by 314
Diamond Homeowners members, but that only Kwong opposed it, and he himself recognized the security
concerns when he had proposed to set up gates at the entry and exit points on the street where he resides.48

The Court of Appeals further found that even if Kwong's proprietary rights may be affected, it is still his duty as
a Diamond Homeowners member to support and participate in the association's projects. Likewise, it held that
his personal interests may be limited for the promotion of the association's goals for the community at large.49

The dispositive portion of the Decision read:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Office of the
President dated March 24, 2010 and its Order dated June 10, 2010 are hereby SET ASIDE. Accordingly, the
complaint for the issuance of a cease and desist order plus damages with application for temporary restraining
order filed before the House (sic) and Land Use Regulatory Board Region III is hereby DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.50 (Emphasis in the original)

The Court of Appeals denied Kwong's Motion for Reconsideration in its February 12, 2014 Resolution.51

Hence, Kwong and William G. Kwong Management, Inc. filed this Petition.52

Diamond Homeowners filed a Comment53 and, in turn, petitioners filed their Reply.54

The parties later submitted their respective Memoranda.55

Petitioners insist that the Policy is invalid.

They assert that the subdivision roads are public roads for public use, and outside the commerce of man, having
been donated to the Angeles City government since 1974.56 They maintain that access to and use of Diamond
Subdivision roads should be open to the general public, not limited to privileged individuals.57 They point out
that these roads cannot be alienated, leased, be the subject of contracts, be acquired by prescription, be
subjected to attachment and execution, be burdened by any voluntary easement, or be under the control of
private persons or entities, including homeowners' associations.58

Petitioners further argue that the Policy is an unauthorized restriction on the use of public roads as it unduly
converts them to private roads, hinders their accessibility from the public, and subjects them under the exclusive
control of Diamond Homeowners.59

Petitioners insist that it is the City of Angeles that has the power to control and regulate the use of roads.60 As
such, they argue that Diamond Homeowners should have had the city government address its concerns.61

Petitioners contend that the Local Government Code has conferred local government units with the authority to
regulate the use of public roads and ensure protection and promotion of public welfare,62 well before the Magna
Carta for Homeowners and Homeowners' Associations was enacted.63

Petitioners claim that the local governments' power to regulate roads cannot be exercised by a private entity. To
do so would be a usurpation of the local government's authority, and an illegal abdication of power on the part
of the latter. Thus, they posit that, to their and the public's prejudice, the Policy disregards the primary right,
power, and authority of the City of Angeles to regulate the use of the public roads.64

Petitioners further insist that nothing in Presidential Decree Nos. 957 and 1216 or in Albon, which the Court of
Appeals relied on, gives homeowners' associations the authority to regulate the use of subdivision roads that
have already been donated to the local government.65

Petitioners also contend that since the Policy was issued before the Magna Carta for Homeowners and
Homeowners' Associations, it should not apply retroactively.66 In any case, they assert that the law did not give
homeowners' associations absolute and unbridled power to regulate the use of subdivision roads. They cite
Section 10(d), which lists the requisites that limit a homeowners' association's rights and powers,67 showing that
its power is merely delegated and conditional. A homeowners' association cannot arrogate unto itself the power
to issue the Policy or limit or prevent the free use of public roads without complying with the law's requisites, as
it would be ultra vires.68

Petitioners point out that because respondent failed to comply with the requisites under Section 10(d),69 it
violated the law.70 They claim that the required public consultations must include the general public who use the
public road, and should not be limited to the subdivision residents or the homeowners' association members.
They argue that it should be done the same way public hearings are conducted by the Sangguniang Panlungsod
before the enactment of an ordinance or resolution.71

Petitioners further allege that no authority from or memorandum of agreement with the City of Angeles was
obtained. They maintain that Ordinance No. 132 cannot be treated as the required memorandum of agreement
because it made no mention of the Policy. They argue that a separate ordinance is necessary to comply with the
requirements.72

Petitioners further allege that while Ordinance No. 132 reclassified Diamond Subdivision as exclusively
residential, it still expressly exempted Arayat and S.L. Orosa Streets and the service road from the
classification. The ordinance, they point out, also recognized that the existing businesses have acquired a vested
right to operate within the subdivision as it allowed them to continue their operations.73

Petitioners also cite Sections 2 and 18 of the Magna Carta for Homeowners and Homeowners' Associations,
which provide that homeowners' associations are encouraged to actively cooperate with the local government
unit to pursue common goals and provide vital and basic services. They claim that to perform this mandate, the
homeowners' association should not disregard the law that gives them the power to regulate roads.74

Petitioners contend that if the provisions of the Local Government Code and the Magna Carta for Homeowners
and Homeowners' Associations were to be harmonized, it is the local government unit that has the primary right
and power to regulate the use of the public roads. Homeowners' associations only have limited, delegated
power, which may only be exercised upon compliance with the conditions in the law.75

Moreover, petitioners deny that there are security concerns within the subdivision. They claim that the Policy
was enacted based on a speculative, conjectural, and negative exaggeration of the actual situation, as there is no
single evidence of an actual crime committed.76 Likewise, they submit that Ordinance No. 132 cannot be
considered as competent evidence of the alleged criminality in the subdivision.77

Finally, petitioners argue that the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board has the technical expertise and
special competence on matters involving the business of developing subdivisions and condominiums. Thus, its
factual findings should be respected.78

On the other hand, respondent insists that the Policy is valid.

In its Memorandum, respondent asserts it has the right and authority to issue the Policy under Section 10(d) of
the Magna Carta for Homeowners and Homeowners' Associations. It insists that it issued the Policy to preserve
"privacy, tranqui[l]ity, internal security[,] safety[,] and traffic order."79

Respondent further cites Section 30 of Presidential Decree No. 957, which mandates subdivision associations to
promote and protect the mutual interests of homeowners, and Section 5 of the Rules on Registration and
Supervision of Homeowners Association, which empowers homeowners' associations to adopt rules and
regulations, and to exercise other powers necessary to govern and operate the association. It argues that this
right and authority applies even if the subdivision roads have been donated to the local government.80

Respondent points out that it issued the Policy to only regulate the use of roads and streets inside Diamond
Subdivision. It neither recategorized them as private property nor exercised acts of private ownership over
them. It emphasizes that the roads are still public roads, open for public use.81

Respondent claims that subdivision owners were required to donate their roads to the local government
primarily to protect and benefit the residents themselves, as some developers would lose interest in maintaining
the subdivision's upkeep.82 They claim that no law puts the exclusive authority to control, dispose, and enjoy the
roads to local government units, to the exclusion of the homeowners, especially since the donation was intended
for the latter's benefit. Moreover, no law denies associations their right to regulate open spaces and roads within
their subdivisions.83

Respondent argues that the Court of Appeals correctly ruled that while the local government units own the lots,
their enjoyment, possession, and management are retained by the homeowners and their association.84

Respondent further asserts that there was a valid reason for the Policy's adoption.85 It was not a whimsical
exercise of authority to exclude the public from using the roads, but an effort to attain peace and order within
the subdivision.86
Respondent emphasizes that the Policy was applied because the public's uncontrolled and unrestricted passage
into the subdivision has made crimes rampant within it. It asserts that the situation has caused its residents fear,
discomfort, and disquiet.87

Respondent argues that while the Angeles City Council recognized issues of peace and order in Ordinance No.
132,88 its intervention was not sufficient to abate the recurring crimes.89

Respondent narrates that after the residents of the subdivision clamored for action, it studied and sought advice
from other subdivisions in Angeles City that implemented the same Policy, as they had minimal security
problems within their subdivision. Respondent alleges that when the Policy was approved by 314 legitimate
residents90 and implemented, the crimes decreased as it was able to deter lawless elements.91 Thus, the Policy
has improved the peace and order of the subdivision.92

Respondent points out that only petitioner Kwong questioned the policy, even if he recognized the crime and
disorder issue himself. It points out that prior to the Policy, he was willing to shoulder the cost of putting up
security gates on both the entry and exit points of the street where he resides to prohibit by-passers.93 He even
sought to block those who do not live on his street, whether or not the person was a Diamond Subdivision
resident.94 It is, therefore, contradictory for him to oppose the more reasonable solution of implementing the
Policy in the entire subdivision.95

Respondent further argues that under the Magna Carta for Homeowners and Homeowners' Associations,
subdivision residents are duty bound to support and participate in the association's projects and activities,
especially if the project is supported by 314 members, with petitioner Kwong as the only opposition.96

Respondent further maintains that every person's right to life, property, and security is constitutionally
protected. The Policy, thus, is a reasonable means to ensure that these rights are guarded, especially since the
local police were unable to stop the threats to it.97

Respondent further posits that petitioner Kwong's ownership and personal or business interests may be limited
for the interests of the community at large. Such interests cannot defeat the association's right to regulate and
administer the use of the roads inside the subdivision, in accordance with existing laws and regulations, and for
the welfare of the homeowners and residents of Diamond Subdivision.98

Respondent asserts that entry to the subdivision was not confined to privileged individuals, and that it exercised
no discrimination in the Policy's implementation.99 The regulations, it alleges, were not so rigid as to make it
difficult for the riding public to comply with.100 It further points out that the roads within Diamond Subdivision
are not the main entry and exit points to the highway or main roads of Angeles City.101

Respondent, thus, claims that it is actually working hand in hand with the City of Angeles in protecting the
lives, property, and security of its residents from lawless elements.102

Lastly, respondent denies that the Court of Appeals disregarded the special competence of the lower
administrative bodies. It points out that the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board Arbiter even ruled in its
favor and found the Policy to be justified.103

This Court resolves the following issues:

First, whether or not the factual findings of the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board are entitled to respect;

Second, whether or not the security concerns within Diamond Subdivision were established; and

Finally, whether or not respondent Diamond Homeowners & Residents Association was authorized in issuing
the "No Sticker, No ID, No Entry" Policy despite the roads having been donated to the local government.

This Court denies the Petition.

Petitioners argue that the factual findings of the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board should be respected
as it is the agency with the technical know-how on matters involving the development of
subdivisions.104 Respondent, however, denies that the agency's special competence was disregarded, pointing
out that even the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board Regional Office found that the Policy was
justified.105

Petitioners are correct that the factual findings of administrative agencies with special competence should be
respected if supported by substantial evidence.106 However, this Court finds that the Housing and Land Use
Regulatory Board's findings were not disregarded.

To begin with, the proper procedure was followed. The matter was brought before the Housing and Land Use
Regulatory Board, which exercised jurisdiction and ruled on the merits of the case. The appellate process then
took place from the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board Arbiter to the Board of Commissioners, to the
Office of the President, to the Court of Appeals, and now, to this Court.

However, because the factual findings of the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board Arbiter and the Board of
Commissioners are conflicting, they cannot be deemed conclusive as to preclude any examination on appeal.

On one hand, the Arbiter found that the Policy did not prohibit or impair the use of the roads.107 He noted that
there was no evidence showing that persons were being refused access or asked to pay for its use.108 He also
found no evidence of any damage to petitioners' business. He lent credence to respondent's allegation that there
was a need for the protection and security of its residents, which must be prioritized over the convenience of
motel patrons.109 These findings were affirmed by the Court of Appeals.

On the other hand, the Board of Commissioners and the Office of the President ruled that there was no evidence
of peace and security issues within Diamond Subdivision. It held that subjecting the subdivision roads to the
Policy converts them to private roads, which are inaccessible, not open to the public, and under respondent's
control.110

Since the factual findings are conflicting, they cannot be deemed conclusive as to preclude any examination on
appeal and, therefore, cannot bind this Court. As such, this Court may determine what is more consistent with
the evidence on record. While only questions of law may be raised in Rule 45 petitions, this rule is not without
exceptions. In Spouses Miano v. Manila Electric Company:111
The Rules of Court states that a review of appeals filed before this Court is "not a matter of right, but of sound
judicial discretion." The Rules of Court further requires that only questions of law should be raised in petitions
filed under Rule 45 since factual questions are not the proper subject of an appeal by certiorari. It is not this
Court's function to once again analyze or weigh evidence that has already been considered in the lower courts.

....

However, the general rule for petitions filed under Rule 45 admits exceptions. Medina v. Mayor Asistio, Jr. lists
down the recognized exceptions:
(1) When the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculation, surmises or conjectures; (2) When the
inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; (3) Where there is a grave abuse of discretion; (4)
When the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts; (5) When the findings of fact are conflicting; (6)
When the Court of Appeals, in making its findings, went beyond the issues of the case and the same is contrary
to the admissions of both appellant and appellee:, (7) The findings of the Court of Appeals are contrary to those
of the trial court; (8) When the findings of fact are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which
they are based; (9) When the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioner's main and reply briefs are
not disputed by the respondents; and (10) The finding of fact of the Court of Appeals is premised on the
supposed absence of evidence and is contradicted by the evidence on record.
These exceptions similarly apply in petitions for review filed before this Court involving civil, labor, tax, or
criminal cases.112 (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted)
Since the findings of the lower tribunals are cont1icting as to whether there were security concerns within
Diamond Subdivision that would warrant the issuance of the Policy, this Court may exercise its discretion to
resolve this factual issue.

II

The case records reveal that Diamond Subdivision was experiencing security concerns.

In Ordinance No. 132, the Angeles City Council acknowledged that Diamond Subdivision had been having
security problems that seriously affected the homeowners and residents. The whereas clauses state:
Whereas, legitimate homeowners of the Diamond Subdivision have presented to the City Council their serious
concern on what is presently occurring in their subdivision;

Whereas, with the present classification of Diamond Subdivision constant problems of peace and order have
confronted the homeowners and residents affecting their lives, property and security;

Whereas, the introduction of business establishments in an uncontrolled manner have likewise proliferated due
to the current classification of the subdivision;

Whereas, due to the R-2 classification of Diamond Subdivision the value of property have not increase[d],
despite its strategic location;

Whereas, there is an urgent need to address all the concern[s] of the homeowners and residents of Diamond
Subdivision[.]113 (Emphasis supplied)
Ordinance No. 132 explicitly states that "with the present classification of Diamond Subdivision[,] constant
problems of peace and order have confronted the homeowners and residents affecting their lives, property[,] and
security."114

Ordinan4e No. 132 is a public document. Under Rule 132, Section 19(a) of the Rules of Court, written official
acts of the sovereign authority, official bodies and tribunals, and public officers of the Philippines are public
documents. The provision states:
SECTION 19. Classes of documents. - For the purpose of their presentation in evidence, documents are either
public or private.

Public documents are:

(a) The written official acts, or records of the official acts of the sovereign authority, official bodies and
tribunals, and public officers, whether of the Philippines, or of a foreign country;

(b) Documents acknowledged before a notary public except last wills and testaments; and

(c) Public records, kept in the Philippines, of private documents required by law to be entered therein.

All other writings are private.

Public documents are prima facie evidence of the facts stated m them.115 Rule 132, Section 23 of the Rules of
Court provides:
SECTION 23. Public documents as evidence. - Documents consisting of entries in public records made in the
performance of a duty by a public officer are prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated. All other public
documents are evidence, even against a third person, of the fact which gave rise to their execution and of the
date of the latter.
Thus, there is prima facie evidence of the security and safety issues within Diamond Subdivision.

Besides, these security concerns were affirmed by petitioner Kwong himself. In his August 3, 2006 Letter, he
acknowledged that there was a "sharp increase in criminal activities" in Diamond Subdivision, "a number of
which remain[ed] unreported."116 He also proposed to shoulder the costs of putting up security gates on both
entry and exit points of the street where he resides, and the hiring of security guards to screen incoming and
outgoing visitors.117 These constitute admissions, or declarations "as to a relevant fact that may be given in
evidence against him."118

Petitioner Kwong presented no evidence to counter these documents. Thus, this Court affirms that Diamond
Subdivision was experiencing security concerns.

III

Diamond Subdivision was, likewise, authorized m enacting the Policy.

There is no question that the subdivision roads have been donated to the City of Angeles.119 Therefore, they are
public property, for public use.

According to the Deed of Donation,120 the donation was done in compliance with Resolution No. 162, series of
1974, of the Municipal Board of Angeles City.121

This donation is consistent with Section 31 of Presidential Decree No. 957, or the Subdivision and
Condominium Buyers' Protection Decree. The provision states:
SECTION 31. Donation of Roads and Open Spaces to Local Government. -The registered owner or developer
of the subdivision or condominium project, upon completion of the development of said project may, at his
option, convey by way of donation the roads and open spaces found within the project to the city or
municipality wherein the project is located. Upon acceptance of the donation by the city or municipality
concerned, no portion of the area donated shall thereafter be converted to any other purpose or purposes unless
after hearing, the proposed conversion is approved by the Authority.
On October 14, 1977, Presidential Decree No. 957 was amended by Presidential Decree No. 1216, which made
the donation to the local government unit mandatory:
SECTION 2. Section 31 of Presidential Decree No. 957 is hereby amended to read as follows:
SEC. 31. Roads, Alleys, Sidewalks and Open Spaces. - The owner as developer of a subdivision shall provide
adequate roads, alleys and sidewalks. For subdivision projects one (1) hectare or more, the owner or developer
shall reserve thirty percent (30%) of the gross area for open space. . . .

....

Upon their completion as certified to by the Authority, the roads, alleys, sidewalks and playgrounds shall be
donated by the owner or developer to the city or municipality and it shall be mandatory for the local
governments to accept; provided, however, that the parks and playgrounds may be donated to the Homeowners
Association of the project with the consent of the city or municipality concerned. No portion of the parks and
playgrounds donated thereafter shall be converted to any other purpose or purposes. (Emphasis supplied)
The whereas clauses of Presidential Decree No. 1216 explicitly state that roads, alleys, and sidewalks in
subdivisions are for public use, and are beyond the commerce of men:
WHEREAS, there is a compelling need to create and maintain a healthy environment in human settlements by
providing open spaces, roads, alleys and sidewalks as may be deemed suitable to enhance the quality of life of
the residents therein;

WHEREAS, such open spaces, roads, alleys and sidewalks in residential subdivision are for public use and
are, therefore, beyond the commerce of men[.] (Emphasis supplied)
Moreover, both parties admit that the subdivision roads are public. Thus, there is no issue on the roads'
ownership: it belongs to the Angeles City government.

However, both Presidential Decree Nos. 957 and 1216 are silent on the right of homeowners' associations to
issue regulations on using the roads to ensure the residents' safety and security.

This silence was addressed in 2010 when Republic Act No. 9904, or the Magna Carta for Homeowners and
Homeowners' Associations, was enacted. Section 10(d) states:
SECTION 10. Rights and Powers of the Association. - An association shall have the following rights and shall
exercise the following powers:

. . . . 
 
(d) Regulate access to, or passage through the subdivision/village roads for purposes of preserving privacy,
tranquility, internal security, safety and traffic order: Provided, That: (1) public consultations are held; (2)
existing laws and regulations are met; (3) the authority of the concerned government agencies or units are
obtained; and (4) the appropriate and necessary memoranda of agreement are executed among the
concerned parties[.]
Section 10(d) gives homeowners' associations the right to "[r]egulate access to, or passage through the
subdivision/village roads for purposes of preserving privacy, tranquility, internal security, safety[,] and traffic
order" as long as they complied with the requisites. The law does not distinguish whether the roads have been
donated to the local government or not.122

Petitioners argue that the Magna Carta for Homeowners and Homeowners' Associations does not apply because
it was not yet in effect when the Policy was issued. Assuming that it applies, they assert that respondent failed
to comply with the stated requisites.123

Petitioners are correct. The Policy was approved in 2006, way before the law was enacted in 2010. Diamond
Homeowners, then, could not have yet complied with the conditions provided. It would, thus, be unjustified if
the Policy were to be invalidated on the ground that these conditions were not followed.

Laws are not retroactive. Article 4 of the Civil Code states that "laws shall have no retroactive effect, unless the
contrary is provided." Lex prospicit, non respicit; the law looks forward, not backward. This is due to the
unconstitutional result of retroacting a law's application: it divests rights that have already become vested or
impairs obligations of contract.124 In Espiritu v. Cipriano:125
Likewise the claim of private respondent that the act is remedial and may, therefore, be given retroactive effect
is untenable. A close study of the provisions discloses that far from being remedial, the statute affects
substantive rights and hence a strict and prospective construction thereof is in order. Article 4 of the New Civil
Code ordains that laws shall have no retroactive effect unless the contrary is provided and that where the law is
clear, Our duty is equally plain. We must apply it to the facts as found. . . . The said law did not, by its express
terms, purport to give a retroactive operation. It is a well-established rule of statutory construction that
"Expressium facit cessare tacitum" and, therefore, no reasonable implication that the Legislature ever intended
to give the law in question a retroactive effect may be accorded to the same. . . .

....

. . . Well-settled is the principle that while the Legislature has the power to pass retroactive laws which do not
impair the obligation of contracts, or affect injuriously vested rights, it is equally true that statutes are not to be
construed as intended to have a retroactive effect so as to affect pending proceedings, unless such intent is
expressly declared or clearly and necessarily implied from the language of the enactment.126 (Citations. omitted)
The Magna Carta for Homeowners and Homeowners' Associations does not state that it has a retroactive effect.
Thus, it cannot be applied to the Policy. This Court must rule on the Policy's validity based on the laws, rules,
and court doctrines in force at the time of its issuance.

Under Section 16 of the Local Government Code, local governments have the power to govern the welfare of
those within its territorial jurisdiction:
SECTION 16. General Welfare. - Every local government unit shall exercise the powers expressly granted,
those necessarily implied therefrom, as well as powers necessary, appropriate, or incidental for its efficient and
effective governance, and those which are essential to the promotion of the general welfare. Within their
respective territorial jurisdictions, local government units shall ensure and support, among other things, the
preservation and enrichment of culture, promote health and safety, enhance the right of the people to a balanced
ecology, encourage and support the development of appropriate and self-reliant scientific and technological
capabilities, improve public morals, enhance economic prosperity and social justice, promote full employment
among their residents, maintain peace and order, and preserve the comfort and convenience of their inhabitants.
This includes the power to close and open roads, whether permanently or temporarily:
SECTION 21. Closure and Opening of Roads. - (a) A local government unit may, pursuant to an ordinance,
permanently or temporarily close or open any local road, alley, park, or square falling within its
jurisdiction: Provided, however, That in case of permanent closure, such ordinance must be approved by at least
two-thirds (2/3) of all the members of the sanggunian, and when necessary, an adequate substitute for the public
facility that is subject to closure is provided.

(b) No such way or place or any part thereof shall be permanently closed without making provisions for the
maintenance of public safety therein. A property thus permanently withdrawn from public use may be used or
conveyed for any purpose for which other real property belonging to the local government unit concerned may
be lawfully used or conveyed: Provided, however, That no freedom park shall be closed permanently without
provision for its transfer or relocation to a new site.

(c) Any national or local road, alley, park, or square may be temporarily closed during an actual emergency, or
fiesta celebrations, public rallies, agricultural or industrial fairs, or an undertaking of public works and
highways, telecommunications, and waterworks projects, the duration of which shall be specified by the local
chief executive concerned in a written order: Provided, however, That no national or local road, alley, park, or
square shall be temporarily closed for athletic, cultural, or civic activities not officially sponsored, recognized,
or approved by the local government unit concerned.

(d) Any city, municipality, or barangay may, by a duly enacted ordinance, temporarily close and regulate the
use of any local street, road, thoroughfare, or any other public place where shopping malls, Sunday, flea or
night markets, or shopping areas may be established and where goods, merchandise, foodstuffs, commodities,
or articles of commerce may be sold and dispensed to the general public.
More relevantly, local governments may also enact ordinances to regulate and control the use of the roads:
SECTION 458. Powers, Duties, Functions and Compensation. - (a) The sangguniang panlungsod, as the
legislative body of the city, shall enact ordinances, approve resolutions and appropriate funds for the general
welfare of the city and its inhabitants pursuant to Section 16 of this Code and in the proper exercise of the
corporate powers of the city as provided for under Section 22 of this Code, and shall:
....

(5) Approve ordinances which shall ensure the efficient and effective delivery of the basic services and facilities
as provided for under Section 17 of this Code, and in addition to said services and facilities, shall:
....

(v) Regulate the use of streets, avenues, alleys, sidewalks, bridges, parks and other public places and approve
the construction, improvement, repair and maintenance of the same[.]
In Albon, this Court upheld the City of Marikina's right to enact an ordinance to widen, clear, and repair the
existing sidewalks of Marikina Greenheights Subdivision that have been donated to it:
Like all LGUs, the City of Marikina is empowered to enact ordinances for the purposes set forth in the Local
Government Code (RA 7160). It is expressly vested with police powers delegated to LGUs under the general
welfare clause of R.A. 7160. With this power, LGUs may prescribe reasonable regulations to protect the lives,
health, and property of their constituents and maintain peace and order within their respective territorial
jurisdictions.

Cities and municipalities also have the power to exercise such powers and discharge such functions and
responsibilities as may be necessary, appropriate or incidental to efficient and effective provisions of the basic
services and facilities, including infrastructure facilities intended primarily to service the needs of their residents
and which are financed by their own funds. These infrastructure facilities include municipal or city roads and
bridges and similar facilities.

There is no question about the public nature and use of the sidewalks in the Marikina Greenheights Subdivision.
One of the "whereas clauses" of P.D. 1216 (which amended P.D. 957) declares that open spaces, roads, alleys
and sidewalks in a residential subdivision are for public use and beyond the commerce of man. In conjunction
herewith, P.D. 957, as amended by P.D. 1216, mandates subdivision owners to set aside open spaces which
shall be devoted exclusively for the use of the general public.

....

Moreover, the implementing rules of P.D. 957, as amended by P.D. 1216, provide that it is the registered owner
or developer of a subdivision who has the responsibility for the maintenance, repair and improvement of road
lots and open spaces of the subdivision prior to their donation to the concerned LGU. The owner or developer
shall be deemed relieved of the responsibility of maintaining the road lots and open space only upon securing a
certificate of completion and executing a deed of donation of these road lots and open spaces to the
LGU.127 (Citations omitted)
Nonetheless, homeowners' associations are not entirely powerless in protecting the interests of homeowners and
residents. Section 31 of Presidential Decree No. 957 recognizes the need for a homeowners' association to
promote and protect their mutual interest and assist in community development:
SECTION 30. Organization of Homeowners Association. - The owner or developer of a subdivision project or
condominium project shall initiate the organization of a homeowners association among the buyers and
residents of the projects for the purpose of promoting and protecting their mutual interest and assist in their
community development.
Moreover, the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board issued Resolutions that provided the powers and rights
of homeowners' associations. Its Resolution No. R-771-04, or the Rules on the Registration and Supervision of
Homeowners Associations, states:
SECTION 5. Powers and Attributes of a Homeowners Association. - The powers and attributes of the
Homeowners Association are those stated in its by-laws, which shall include the following:
a. To adopt and amend by-laws, rules and regulations;

b. To adopt an annual program of activities and the corresponding budget therefor, subject to the limitations and
conditions imposed under the by-laws;

c. To impose and collect reasonable fees on members and nonmember residents who avail of or benefit from the
facilities and services of the association, to defray necessary operational expenses, subject to the limitations and
conditions imposed under e law, regulations of the Board and the association by-laws;

d. To sue and be sued in its name;

e. To enter into contracts for basic and necessary services for the general welfare of the association and its
members;

f. To acquire, hold, encumber and convey in its own name any right, title or interest to any property;

g. To impose reasonable sanctions upon its members for violations and/or non-compliance with the association
by laws; and upon non-member residents by reason of any act and/or omission prejudicial to the interest of the
association or its members; and

h. To exercise other powers necessary for the governance and operation of the association.
Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board Resolution No. 770-04, or the Framework for Governance of
Homeowners Associations, states that associations are expected to promote the security of residents in their
living environment:
WHEREAS, there is a need to highlight the basic roles, powers and responsibilities of a homeowners
association and its officers and members under existing laws and regulations;

WHEREAS, there is also a need to promote and operationalize the best practices and norms of good governance
in the management of a homeowners association:

WHEREAS, the active and enlightened management of the affairs of a homeowners association will enhance
the delivery of basic services to and promote the general welfare of its members;

....

SECTION 3. General Principles. - An Association should-

a. endeavor to serve the interest of its members through equity of access in the decision-making process,
transparency and accountability, and the promotion of security in their living environment;

b. establish its vision, define and periodically assess its mission, policies, and objectives and the means to attain
the same; and

c. without abandoning its non-partisan character:

i. actively cooperate with local government units and national government agencies, in furtherance of its
common goals and activities for the benefit of the residents inside and outside of the subdivision; and

ii. complement, support and strengthen local government units and national government agencies in providing
vital services to its members and in helping implement local government policies, programs, ordinances, and
rules.
This Court has also acknowledged the right of homeowners' associations to set goals for the promotion of safety
and security, peace, comfort, and the general welfare of their residents.128 In Bel Air Village Association, Inc. v.
Dionisio:129
The petitioner also objects to the assessment on the ground that it is unreasonable, arbitrary, discriminatory,
oppressive and confiscatory. According to him the assessment is oppressive because the amount assessed is not
based on benefits but on the size of the area of the lot, discriminatory and unreasonable because only the owners
of the lots are required to pay the questioned assessment and not the residents who are only renting inside the
village; and confiscatory because under the by-laws of the respondent association, the latter holds a lien on the
property assessed if the amount is not paid.

We agree with the lower court's findings, to wit:

....

The second question has reference to the reasonableness of the resolution assessing the monthly dues in
question upon the defendant. The exhibits annexed to the stipulation of facts describe the purpose or goals for
which these monthly dues assessed upon the members of the plaintiff including the defendant are to be
disbursed. They are intended for garbage collection, salary of security guards, cleaning and maintenance of
streets, establishment of parks, etc. Living in this modern, complex society has raised complex problems of
security, sanitation, communitarian comfort and convenience and it is now a recognized necessity that members
of the community must organize themselves for the successful solution of these problems. Goals intended for the
promotion of their safety and security, peace, comfort, and general welfare cannot be categorized as
unreasonable. Indeed, the essence of community life is association and cooperation for without these such
broader welfare goals cannot be attained. It is for these reasons that modern subdivisions are imposing
encumbrance upon titles of prospective lot buyers a limitation upon ownership of the said buyers that they
automatically become members of homeowners' association living within the community of the
subdivision.130 (Emphasis supplied)
In Spouses Anonuevo v. Court of Appeals,131 this Court, quoting the Court of Appeals Decision, affirmed that
ownership of public spaces is with the local government, while enjoyment, possession, and control are with the
residents and homeowners:
It appears that reliance was placed by the lower court upon the fact that TCT No. 37527 covering Lot II, Block
6 did not contain an annotation as to the open space character of said piece of land. But the argument does not
find justification with applicable jurisprudence. When the lot in question had been allotted as an open space by
Carmel Corporation, it had become the property of the Quezon City government and/or the Republic of the
Philippines held under the management, control and enjoyment of the residents and homeowners of Carmel II-
A Subdivision. . . .

....

Therefore, with the approval of the subdivision plan of Carmel II A followed with it the exclusion of the land
from the commerce of man. It would not be too presumptuous to conclude that the sale by Carmel Corporation
which resulted in the subsequent private dealings involving this public property is void ab initio. And the mere
fact that Carmel Corporation did not consider Lot II, Block 6 as the designated open space would not give it
licentious freedom to sell such public property "under the nose"! so to speak, of the Quezon City government,
the Republic of the Philippines, and the homeowners who are the direct beneficiaries thereof. While the afore-
enumerated entities do not hold the owners' duplicate title over the open space, hence, could not properly
forewarned of any prejudicial act of conveyance or encumbrance perpetrated by the subdivision
owner/developer, they should not be faulted for taking a belated attempt to question these conveyances affecting
the open space which are made manifest only during the actual disruptions accompanying the exercise of
ownership and possession by the ultimate vendee.132 (Emphasis in the original, citation omitted)
From all these, we hold that the Policy is valid. In De Guzman v. Commission on Audit:133
It is a basic principle in statutory construction that when faced with apparently irreconcilable inconsistencies
between two laws, the first step is to attempt to harmonize the seemingly inconsistent laws. In other words,
courts must first exhaust all efforts to harmonize seemingly conflicting laws and only resort to choosing which
law to apply when harmonization is impossible.134 (Citations omitted)
The Policy maintains the public nature of the subdivision roads. It neither prohibits nor impairs the use of the
roads. It does not prevent the public from using the roads, as all are entitled to enter, exit, and pass through
them. One must only surrender an identification card to ensure the security of the residents. As stated, the
residents and homeowners, including petitioner Kwong, have valid security concerns amid a sharp increase in
criminal activities within the subdivision.

The Policy, likewise, neither denies nor impairs any of the local government's rights of ownership. Respondent
does not assert that it owns the subdivision roads or claims any private right over them. Even with the Policy,
the State still has the jus possidendi (right to possess), jus utendi (right to use), just fruendi (right to its
fruits), jus abutendi (right to consume), and jus disponendi (right to dispose) of the subdivision roads. It still has
the power to temporarily close, permanently open, or generally regulate the subdivision roads.

It must be pointed out that this case is not even between a homeowners' association and the local government,
but a homeowners' association and a resident who disagrees with the Policy. Respondent, therefore, is not
asserting any right against any local government act on the subdivision roads. Neither is the local government
claiming that its right to regulate the roads is being impinged upon.

Furthe1more, Section 31 of Presidential Decree No. 957, as amended, on the donation of subdivision roads to
the local government, "was [enacted] to remedy the situation prevalent at that time where owners/developers
fail to keep up with their obligation of providing and maintaining the subdivision roads, alleys[,] and
sidewalks."135 The whereas clauses of Presidential Decree No. 957 reveal the legislative intent:
WHEREAS, it is the policy of the State to afford its inhabitants the requirements of decent human settlement
and to provide them with ample opportunities for improving their quality of life;

WHEREAS, numerous reports reveal that many real estate subdivision owners, developers, operators, and/or
sellers have reneged on their representations and obligations to provide and maintain properly subdivision
roads, drainage, sewerage, water systems, lighting systems, and other similar basic requirements, thus
endangering the health and safety of home and lot buyers;

WHEREAS, reports of alarming magnitude also show cases of swindling and fraudulent manipulations
perpetrated by unscrupulous subdivision and condominium sellers and operators, such as failure to deliver titles
to the buyers or titles free from liens and encumbrances, and to pay real estate taxes, and fraudulent sales of the
same subdivision lots to different innocent purchasers for value;

WHEREAS, these acts not only undermine the land and housing program of the government but also defeat the
objectives of the New Society, particularly the promotion of peace and order and the enhancement of the
economic, social and moral condition of the Filipino people;

WHEREAS, this state of affairs has rendered it imperative that the real estate subdivision and condominium
businesses be closely supervised and regulated, and that penalties be imposed on fraudulent practices and
manipulations committed in connection therewith. (Emphasis supplied)
Evidently, here, the donation was for the benefit of the subdivision's homeowners, lot buyers, and residents.
This must be taken into consideration in interpreting the provision for the donation:
In the construction or interpretation of a legislative measure a presidential decree in these cases - the primary
rule is to search for and determine the intent and spirit of the law. Legislative intent is the controlling factor, for
in the words of this Court in Hidalgo v. Hidalgo, per Mr. Justice Claudio Teehankee, whatever is within the
spirit of a statute is within the statute, and this has to be so if strict adherence to the letter would result in
absurdity, injustice and contradictions.136 (Emphasis in the original, citation omitted)
In Spouses Belo v. Philippine National Bank:137
It is well settled that courts are not to give a statute a meaning that would lead to absurdities. If the words of a
statute are susceptible of more than one meaning, the absurdity of the result of one construction is a strong
argument against its adoption, and in favor of such sensible interpretation. We test a law by its result. A law
should not be interpreted so as not to cause an injustice. There are laws which are generally valid but may seem
arbitrary when applied in a particular case because of its peculiar circumstances. We are not bound to apply
them in slavish obedience to their language.138 (Citations omitted)
Thus, the donation of the roads to the local government should not be interpreted in a way contrary to the
legislative intent of benefiting the residents. Conversely, residents should not be disempowered from taking
measures for the proper maintenance of their residential area. Under Section 30 of Presidential Decree No. 957,
they may protect their mutual interests. Here, the Policy was not inconsistent with this purpose. To rule against
it would be contrary to the intention of the law to protect their rights.

This Court further notes that the Deed of Donation recognizes the Diamond Subdivision's power to monitor the
security within the subdivision. The Deed of Donation between the developer of Diamond Subdivision and the
City of Angeles states:
That it is a condition of this donation, that the Severina Realty Corporation will have the exclusive right to
appoint and to enter into a contract with any duly licensed security guard agency for the security guard services
of the Diamond Subdivision, Angeles City.139
Thus, the subdivision is still empowered to determine how best to maintain the security and safety within the
subdivision.

Moreover, it is common knowledge that when homeowners purchase their properties from subdivisions, they
pay a more valuable consideration in exchange for better facilities, safer security, and a higher degree of peace,
order, and privacy. Some may also have purchased their properties in contemplation of their right to organize
and to take measures to protect these interests. It would be an injustice if these were not taken into consideration
in determining the validity of the Policy.

Here, the Policy was enacted to ensure the safety and security of Diamond Subdivision residents who have
found themselves exposed to heightened crimes and lawlessness. The Policy was approved by 314 members of
the homeowners' association, with only petitioner Kwong protesting the solution. His protest is ultimately
rooted in the damage that the Policy has allegedly caused to his businesses. However, he failed to present any
evidence of this damage.

It is established that he who alleges a fact has the burden of proving it. In Republic v. Estate of Hans Menzi:140
It is procedurally required for each party in a case to prove his own affirmative allegations by the degree of
evidence required by law. In civil cases such as this one, the degree of evidence required of a party in order to
support his claim is preponderance of evidence, or that evidence adduced by one party which is more conclusive
and credible than that of the other party. It is therefore incumbent upon the plaintiff who is claiming a right to
prove his case. Corollarily, the defendant must likewise prove its own allegations to buttress its claim that it is
not liable.

The party who alleges a fact has the burden of proving it. The burden of proof may be on the plaintiff or the
defendant. It is on the defendant if he alleges an affirmative defense which is not a denial of an essential
ingredient in the plaintiff's cause of action, but is one which, if established, will be a good defense - i.e., an
"avoidance" of the claim.141 (Citations omitted)
Since petitioner Kwong presented no evidence of the damage caused to him, this Court cannot rule in his favor.

In any case, the community's welfare should prevail over the convenience of subdivision visitors who seek to
patronize petitioners' businesses. Article XII, Section 6 of the Constitution provides that the use of property
bears a social function, and economic enterprises of persons are still subject to the promotion of distributive
justice and state intervention for the common good:
SECTION 6. The use of property bears a social function, and all economic agents shall contribute to the
common good. Individuals and private groups, including corporations, cooperatives, and similar collective
organizations, shall have the right to own, establish, and operate economic enterprises, subject to the duty of the
State to promote distributive justice and to intervene when the common good so demands.
Article XIII, Section 1 of the Constitution states that the State may regulate the use of property and its
increments for the common good:
SECTION 1. The Congress shall give highest priority to the enactment of measures that protect and enhance the
right of all the people to human dignity, reduce social, economic, and political inequalities, and remove cultural
inequities by equitably diffusing wealth and political power for the common good.

To this end, the State shall regulate the acquisition, ownership, use, and disposition of property and its
increments.
These provisions reveal that the property ownership and the rights that come with it are not without restrictions,
but rather come with the consideration and mindfulness for the welfare of others in society. The Constitution
still emphasizes and prioritizes the people's needs as a whole. Such is the case here: even if petitioner Kwong's
rights are subordinated to the rights of the many, the Policy improves his own wellbeing and quality of life.
In Bel Air Village Association, Inc.:
Even assuming that defendant's ownership and enjoyment of the lot covered by TCT No. 81136 is limited
because of the burden of being a member of plaintiff association the goals and objectives of the association are
far greater because they apply to and affect the community at large. It can be justified on legal grounds that a
person's enjoyment of ownership may be restricted and limited if to do so the welfare of the community of which
he is a member is promoted and attained. These benefits in which the defendant participates more than offset
the burden and inconvenience that he may suffer.142 (Emphasis supplied)
WHEREFORE, this Court AFFIRMS the Court of Appeals' July 5, 2013 Decision and February 12, 2014
Resolution in CA-G.R. SP No. 115198. This Court finds that Diamond Homeowners & Residents Association's
"No Sticker, No ID, No Entry" Policy is valid and consistent with law and jurisprudence.

SO ORDERED.

THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 214593, July 17, 2019

DANA S. SANTOS, PETITIONER, v. LEODEGARIO R. SANTOS, RESPONDENT.

DECISION

A. REYES, JR., J.:

This is a petition for review on certiorari1 under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court, dated November 24,
2014, assailing two Resolutions of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 115420, respectively dated
April 15, 2014,2 which denied petitioner Dana S. Santos' (Dana) Motion to Open and/or Reinstate Petition; and
September 26, 2014,3 which denied Dana's Motion for Reconsideration and/or to Submit Petition for Decision
(with Plea to Preserve Marital Union). The case arose from a petition for relief from judgment against the
Decision4 dated June 24, 2009 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Antipolo City, Branch 72, in Civil Case
No. 03-6954 declaring the marriage between Dana and respondent Leodegario S. Santos (Leodegario) null and
void on the ground of psychological incapacity under Article 36 of Executive Order No. 209, otherwise known
as the Family Code of the Philippines.

The Facts
Dana and Leodegario first met each other in 1982, in a wake, through a common friend. Their relationship
developed into a romance. Soon, the couple began living together. Their cohabitation produced two children. As
their business ventures prospered, Dana and Leodegario married each other on December 3, 1987, before a
Catholic priest. Two more children were born to the couple after the marriage. However, their relationship
started to deteriorate as time passed by. Heated arguments and suspicions of infidelity marred their marriage so
much, so that in 2001, Dana and Leodegario filed a joint petition for the dissolution of their conjugal
partnership, which was granted.5

The final straw came on September 11, 2003, when Leodegario filed a petition for declaration of absolute
nullity of marriage with the RTC, docketed as Civil Case No. 03-6954, alleging psychological incapacity on the
part of Dana. The case was assigned to Branch 72 of the aforesaid court. On April 2, 2004, Dana filed her
Answer, alleging that Leodegario filed the petition in order to marry his paramour, with whom he had a son.6

The case proceeded to trial on the merits. The Public Prosecutor found no evidence of collusion between Dana
and Leodegario. Both parties appeared in the pre-trial conference and marked their documentary exhibits.
Leodegario presented as witnesses a clinical psychologist, a former employee of the couple's joint business, and
himself. However, when it was Dana's turn to present evidence, her counsel failed to appear despite notice. On
February 26, 2009, the trial court issued an Order declaring Dana to have waived her right to present evidence
and ordering Leodegario to submit his memorandum, after which the case would be deemed submitted for
decision.7

On June 24, 2009, the trial court rendered its Decision.8 It declared the marriage between Dana and Leodegario
null and void on the ground of psychological incapacity. The court held that Dana was afflicted with grave,
incurable, and juridically antecedent Histrionic Personality Disorder. Dana received a copy of the decision on
August 26, 2009.

Dana filed a Notice of Appeal on September 4, 2009; but she withdrew her appeal and instead filed a Petition
for Relief from Judgment with the RTC, dated October 19, 2009, alleging that extrinsic fraud and mistake
prevented her from presenting her case at the trial. Leodegario filed a comment on the petition.

In an Order9 dated February 17, 2010, the trial court denied Dana's petition, ruling that there was no sufficient
allegation of fraud or mistake in the petition.

Dana filed a motion for reconsideration, which the trial court denied in an Order10 dated April 22, 2010.
Aggrieved, she filed a petition for certiorari with the CA,11 ascribing grave abuse of discretion on the part of the
trial court when it denied her petition for relief and allowed the Decision dated June 24, 2009 to stand despite
her inability to present her evidence. After a further exchange of pleadings, the appellate court, in a
Resolution12 dated February 7, 2011, referred Dana's petition to the Philippine Mediation Center.

On June 6, 2011, under the auspices of the appellate court mediator, Dana and Leodegario entered into a
compromise agreement,13 where they agreed to transfer the titles to their conjugal real properties in the name of
their four common children. On June 16, 2011, Dana moved for the archival of the case. On July 19, 2011, the
CA issued a Resolution14 declaring the case closed and terminated by virtue of the compromise agreement and
ordering the issuance of entry of judgment.

On July 3, 2012, Dana filed a Manifestation15 alleging that Leodegario was not complying with the compromise
agreement. She reiterated this allegation in her Motion to Reopen and/or Reinstate the Petition16 which she filed
on August 14, 2012. Ordered by the appellate court to comment on the Motion to Reopen, Leodegario
countered that he has complied with the essential obligations under the compromise agreement. He,
subsequently, filed a Manifestation showing such compliance, attaching the copies of the transfer certificates of
title with the required annotations thereon, deeds of sale in favor of their common children, and the new transfer
certificates of title in the names of their common children.17
Resolution dated April 15, 2014

On April 15, 2014, the Former 15th Division of the CA rendered the first assailed Resolution18 denying Dana's
Motion to Reopen, thusly:cralawred

WHEREFORE, the motion to open and/or reinstate the petition is hereby DENIED for lack of merit.
Respondent's manifestation showing compliance with the compromise agreement is hereby NOTED.

SO ORDERED.19

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The appellate court noted Leodegario's Manifestation showing his compliance with the terms of the compromise
agreement; on the other hand, it found that Dana did not make any allegation or showing of her compliance with
the terms of the compromise agreement. It then concluded that the motion was unmeritorious since Dana, as a
party to the compromise agreement herself, should also prove her faithful compliance therewith.

Undaunted, Dana filed a Motion for Reconsideration and/or to Submit Petition for Decision (with Plea to
Preserve Marital Union),20 asserting that the compromise agreement was never intended to settle the issue of the
validity and subsistence of her marriage to Leodegario.

Resolution dated September 26, 2014

On September 26, 2014, the Former 15th Division of the CA rendered the second assailed Resolution21 denying
Dana's Motion for Reconsideration and/or to Submit Petition for Decision, disposing, thus:cralawred

WHEREFORE, the Motion for Reconsideration and/or to Submit Petition for Decision is DENIED for lack of
merit.

SO ORDERED.22

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The appellate court found the Motion for Reconsideration and/or to Submit Petition for Decision unmeritorious.
It held that the marital ties between Dana and Leodegario had been severed by the trial court's decision of June
24, 2009; hence, the compromise agreement did not involve the validity of their marriage but only their
property relations. Furthermore, the appellate court found that Dana, in her Motion to Archive Case, had
conceded her intention to have the case dismissed upon compliance with the stipulations of the Compromise
Agreement.23

Aggrieved, Dana filed the present petition for review on certiorari before this Court on November 24, 2014.
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) and Leodegario filed their respective Comments on the petition.

The Issues

Dana raises the following issues for resolution by this Court:cralawred

1) Whether or not the assailed resolutions of the CA, which terminated her case by reason of the compromise
agreement, were erroneous for being contrary to the State's legal mandate to defend the sanctity of marriage;
2) Whether or not the assailed resolutions of the CA, which in effect upheld the order of the trial court
dismissing her petition for relief, violated her right to due process; and

3) Whether or not the CA erred in ruling that the trial court's decision declaring the marriage void had attained
finality despite the filing of the petition for relief from judgment.24

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Dana argues that she never intended to compromise the issue of the validity of her marriage, as this cannot be
the subject of compromise under Article 2035 of the New Civil Code. She further asserts that under Article
2041 of the New Civil Code, as applied in Miguel v. Montanez,25 she is entitled to simply consider the
compromise agreement as rescinded, since Leodegario committed a breach of the agreement. Dana also claims
that the termination of the case on the basis of the compromise agreement violated her right to due process,
since she was unable to present her side of the controversy. Lastly, she contends that the appellate court erred in
ruling that the trial court decision declaring the marriage void had become final, claiming that her petition for
relief amounted to a motion for new trial, the filing of which is one of the requirements for filing an appeal
under A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC.26

The defensor vinculi, in his Comment, asserts that Dana's failure to file a motion for reconsideration or an
appeal paved the way for the trial court judgment to attain finality. Due to Dana's failure to file an appeal in
accordance with Section 20 of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, the OSG now contends, as the appellate court similarly
concluded, that the trial court decision had attained finality.

Ruling of the Court

The petition has no merit.

The core issue in this petition is the propriety of setting aside the judgment upon compromise rendered by the
court a quo. Dana maintains that the judgment should be vacated because of Leodegario's alleged breach of
their compromise; and because she did not intend to compromise the issue of the validity of her marriage. To
bolster her stand, she invokes Sections 1 and 2, Article XV of the Constitution and urges the State to uphold, or
at least try to uphold, her marriage. Leodegario, on the other hand, asserts the binding force of the trial court's
decision and the judgment on compromise, claiming that the courts a quo acted according to law and
jurisprudence in rendering the assailed judgments.

It must be borne in mind that Civil Case No. 03-6954 is a proceeding for the declaration of nullity of the
marriage between Dana and Leodegario on the ground of psychological incapacity. The applicable substantive
laws are, therefore, the Family Code and the New Civil Code, while the governing procedural law is A.M. No.
02-11-10-SC, with the Rules of Court applying suppletorily.27

In the case at bar, the CA28 and the OSG29 both concluded that the trial court decision had attained finality after
Dana's inability to file an appeal therefrom. The two resolutions of the appellate court presuppose that the
judgment on the validity of Dana and Leodegario's marriage had attained finality. Dana, on the other hand,
asserts that it had not.

The Court agrees with the conclusion of the CA and the defensor vinculi regarding the finality of the RTC
decision; however, we do not agree with their assertions as to the effect of the decision on the subsequent
proceedings a quo.

There is indeed no showing in the record that Dana moved for reconsideration or new trial from the RTC
decision. She, nevertheless, filed an appeal. However, probably cognizant of the proscription in Section 2030 of
A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, which makes the filing of a motion for reconsideration or a motion for new trial a
precondition for filing an appeal, she withdrew her appeal and filed a petition for relief from judgment.

There is no provision in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC prohibiting resort to a petition for relief from judgment in a
marriage nullity case. Furthermore, the said Rule sanctions the suppletory application of the Rules of Court31 to
cases within its ambit. It cannot, therefore, be said that Dana availed of an inappropriate remedy to question the
decision of the trial court. Indeed, the trial court admitted Dana's petition for relief, heard the parties on the
issues thereon, and rendered an order denying the petition. Dana then properly and seasonably assailed the order
of denial via certiorari to the CA. It is, therefore, clear that the proceedings in Civil Case No. 03-6954
continued even after the trial court had rendered judgment and even after the lapse of the 15-day period for
appealing the decision.

Nevertheless, considering the nature and office of a petition for relief, which is to set aside
a final judgment,32 the Court cannot agree with Dana's assertion that the decision of the RTC in Civil Case No.
03-6954 had not attained finality. In fact, the decision has already been annotated in their marriage
contract.33 This finding, however, does not detract from the fact that the proceedings in Civil Case No. 03-
6954 continued even after the trial court had rendered judgment, precisely because Dana filed a petition for
relief from that judgment. From the denial of her petition, she sought recourse to the appellate court. The
appellate court, in dismissing the case upon the parties' compromise on their conjugal properties, invoked the
finality of the RTC decision as a bar to the litigation of the other issues raised by Dana's petition. This
conclusion is untenable.

In Samia v. Medina,34 which involved the application of the statutory ascendant of Rule 38 in the old Code of
Civil Procedure, the Court held:cralawred

There is a great deal of similarity between an order granting a motion for a new trial based upon "accident or
surprise which ordinary prudence could not have guarded against" under section 145 of the Code of Civil
Procedure, and an order granting a motion for a new trial based upon "mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or
excusable neglect," under section 113 of the Code of Civil Procedure, as both set aside the judgment, order, or
proceeding complained of; both call for a new trial, and in both the injured party may question the order
granting the motion for the new trial upon appeal from the new judgment rendered upon the merits of the case.
The only fundamental difference lies in this, that while the judgment, order, or proceeding coming under section
145 of the Code of Civil Procedure is not final, that coming under section 113 is final. But this does not alter the
nature or effect of the order granting the new trial, for this order does not put an end to the litigation in the
sense that the party injured thereby has no other remedy short of appeal; he may question the propriety
of the new trial on appeal from an adverse judgment rendered after such trial.35 (Emphasis and
underscoring Ours)

In Servicewide Specialists, Inc. v. Sheriff of Manila,36 decided prior to the enactment of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, the Court held:cralawred

There is no question that a judgment or order denying relief under Rule 38 is final and appealable, unlike an
order granting such relief which is interlocutory. However, the second part of the above-quoted provision (that
in the course of an appeal from the denial or dismissal of a petition for relief, a party may also assail the
judgment on the merits) may give the erroneous impression that in such appeal the appellate court may reverse
or modify the judgment on the merits. This cannot be done because the judgment from which relief is sought is
already final and executor. x x x

The purpose of the rule is to enable the appellate court to determine not only the existence of any of the grounds
relied upon whether it be fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence, but also and primarily the merit of
the petitioner's cause of action or defense, as the case may be. If the appellate court finds that one of the grounds
exists and, what is of decisive importance, that the petitioner has a good cause of action or defense, it will
reverse the denial or dismissal, set aside the judgment in the main case and remand the case to the lower court
for a new trial in accordance with Section 7 of Rule 38.37 (Citations omitted)

The 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure changed the nature of an order of denial of a petition for relief from
judgment, making it unappealable38 and, hence, assailable only via a petition for certiorari.39 Nevertheless, the
appellate court, in deciding such petitions against denials of petitions for relief, remains tasked with making a
factual determination, i.e., whether or not the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion in denying the
petition. To do so, it is still obliged, as Service Specialists instructs, to "determine not only the existence of any
of the grounds relied upon whether it be fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence, but also and
primarily the merit of the petitioner's cause of action or defense, as the case may be."40 Stated otherwise, the
finality of the RTC decision cannot bar the appellate court from determining the issues raised in the petition for
relief, if only to determine the existence of grave abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court in denying
such petition. While a Rule 38 Petition does not stay the execution of the judgment,41 the grant thereof reopens
the case for a new trial;42 and thus, if merit be found in Dana's certiorari petition assailing the trial court's denial
of her petition for relief, the case will be reopened for new trial.

The CA, therefore, erred in refusing to reopen Dana's petition on the basis of the finality of the trial court
decision.

The Court now resolves the question regarding the propriety of setting aside the judgment on compromise.

On one hand, the immutability and immediate effect of judgments upon compromise is well-settled.
In Magbanua v. Uy,43 it was held that:cralawred

When a compromise agreement is given judicial approval, it becomes more than a contract binding upon the
parties. Having been sanctioned by the court, it is entered as a determination of a controversy and has the force
and effect of a judgment. It is immediately executory and not appealable, except for vices of consent or forgery.
The nonfulfillment of its terms and conditions justifies the issuance of a writ of execution; in such an instance,
execution becomes a ministerial duty of the court.44

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However, like any other judgment, a judgment upon compromise which is contrary to law is a void judgment;
and "[a] void judgment or order has no legal and binding effect. It does not divest rights, and no rights can be
obtained under it; all proceedings founded upon a void judgment are equally worthless."45

On the other hand, Article 2035(2) and Article 5 of the New Civil Code provide:cralawred

ART. 2035. No compromise upon the following questions shall be valid:cralawred

xxxx

(2) The validity of a marriage or a legal separation;

xxxx

ART. 5. Acts executed against the provisions of mandatory or prohibitory laws shall be void, except when the
law itself authorizes their validity.

Again, the Court reiterates, at the risk of being repetitive, that the petition which gave rise to these proceedings
is for the declaration of nullity of Dana and Leodegario's marriage. Dana's petition for certiorari with the CA,
which is nothing but a consequence of the proceedings before the RTC, alleges the fraudulent deprivation of her
chance to refute and controvert Leodegario's allegations and to present her side of the issue, which she also lays
down in her petition. The core issue of Dana's petition is, therefore, the validity of her marriage to Leodegario.
The termination of the case by virtue of the compromise agreement, therefore, necessarily implies the
settlement by compromise of the issue of the validity of Dana and Leodegario's marriage.

In Uy v. Chua,46 which also involves an issue not subject to compromise under Article 2035, the Court
held:cralawred

The Compromise Agreement between petitioner and respondent, executed on 18 February 2000 and approved
by RTC-Branch 9 in its Decision dated 21 February 2000 in Special Proceeding No. 8830-CEB, obviously
intended to settle the question of petitioner's status and filiation, i.e., whether she is an illegitimate child of
respondent. In exchange for petitioner and her brother Allan acknowledging that they are not the children of
respondent, respondent would pay petitioner and Allan P2,000,000.00 each. Although unmentioned, it was a
necessary consequence of said Compromise Agreement that petitioner also waived away her rights to
future support and future legitime as an illegitimate child of respondent. Evidently, the Compromise
Agreement dated 18 February 2000 between petitioner and respondent is covered by the prohibition
under Article 2035 of the Civil Code.47 (Emphasis and underscoring Ours)

In a long line of cases,48 the Court has censured and punished lawyers, and even judges, who have drafted
agreements to dissolve marriages or to sanction adulterous relations. The rule applies a fortiori to the CA. It
was, therefore, erroneous for the appellate court to terminate Dana's suit - which puts in issue the validity of her
marriage - by virtue of the execution of the Decision 11 Q.R. No. 214593 compromise agreement which only
covers the property relations of the spouses. While these issues are intertwined, a compromise of the latter issue
should not and cannot operate as a compromise of the former, per Article 2035 of the Civil Code.

The Court cannot give its imprimatur to the dismissal of the case at bar even if, as the appellate court held, it
was Dana's intention49 to have the case terminated upon the execution of the compromise agreement.
Nevertheless, the Court agrees with the appellate court when it ruled that the scope of the compromise
agreement is limited to Dana and Leodegario's property relations vis-à-vis their children, as Article 2036 of the
Civil Code provides that "[a] compromise comprises only those objects which are definitely stated therein, or
which by necessary implication from its terms should be deemed to have been included in the same." As held
by the appellate court:cralawred

The agreement makes no mention of the marital ties between [Leodegario] and [Dana] but is limited only to
their property relations vis-à-vis their children.50

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However, despite the error committed by the appellate court, absent vices of consent or other defects, the
compromise agreement remains valid and binding upon Dana and Leodegario, as they have freely and willingly
agreed to, and have already complied with, the covenants therein. The agreement operates as a partial
compromise on the issue of the disposition of the properties of the marriage.

Nevertheless, the Court is constrained to uphold the appellate court's decision, because the trial court's denial of
Dana's petition for relief from judgment does not amount to grave abuse of discretion.

While the remaining issues in the petition partake of a factual nature, the Court deems it necessary to
write finis to this case at this level in order to avoid remanding the case to the appellate court. It has been held
that "remand is not necessary if the Court is in a position to resolve a dispute on the basis of the records before
it; and if such remand would not serve the ends of justice."51 A careful perusal of the petitions filed by Dana
before the trial court, the appellate court, and this Court betrays the lack of allegations sufficient to support a
petition for relief from judgment under Rule 38.

Jurisprudence provides that fraud, as a ground for a petition for relief, refers to extrinsic or collateral
fraud52 which, in turn, has been defined as fraud that prevented the unsuccessful party from fully and fairly
presenting his case or defense and from having an adversarial trial of the issue, as when the lawyer connives to
defeat or corruptly sells out his client's interest. Extrinsic fraud can be committed by a counsel against his client
when the latter is prevented from presenting his case to the court.53 In Lasala v. National Food Authority,54 the
Court defined extrinsic fraud in relation to parties represented by counsel, viz.:cralawred

Extrinsic fraud x x x refers to "any fraudulent act of the prevailing party in litigation committed outside of the
trial of the case, where the defeated party is prevented from fully exhibiting his side by fraud or deception
practiced on him by his opponent, such as by keeping him away from court, by giving him a false promise of a
compromise, or where an attorney fraudulently or without authority connives at his defeat."

Because extrinsic fraud must emanate from the opposing party, extrinsic fraud concerning a party's lawyer often
involves the latter's collusion with the prevailing party, such that his lawyer connives at his defeat or corruptly
sells out his client's interest.

In this light, we have ruled in several cases that a lawyer's mistake or gross negligence does not amount to the
extrinsic fraud that would grant a petition for annulment of judgment.

We so ruled not only because extrinsic fraud has to involve the opposing party, but also because the negligence
of counsel, as a rule, binds his client.55 (Citations omitted)

Given this definition, the Court found the following circumstances sufficient to make out a case for extrinsic
fraud:cralawred

The party in the present case, the NFA, is a government agency that could rightly rely solely on its legal officers
to vigilantly protect its interests. The NFA's lawyers were not only its counsel, they were its employees tasked
to advance the agency's legal interests.

Further, the NFA's lawyers acted negligently several times in handling the case that it appears deliberate on
their part.

First, Atty. Mendoza caused the dismissal of the NFA's complaint against Lasala by negligently and repeatedly
failing to attend the hearing for the presentation of the NFA's evidence-in-chief. Consequently, the NFA lost its
chance to recover from Lasala the employee benefits that it allegedly shouldered as indirect employer.

Atty. Mendoza never bothered to provide any valid excuse for this crucial omission on his part. Parenthetically,
this was not the first time Atty. Mendoza prejudiced the NFA; he did the same when he failed to file a motion
for reconsideration and an appeal in a prior 1993 case where Lasala secured a judgment of P34,500,229.67
against the NFA.

For these failures, Atty. Mendoza merely explained that the NFA's copy of the adverse decision was lost and
was only found after the lapse of the period for appeal. Under these circumstances, the NFA was forced to file
an administrative complaint against Atty. Mendoza for his string of negligent acts.

Atty. Cahucom, Atty. Mendoza's successor in handling the case, notably did not cross-examine Lasala's
witnesses, and did not present controverting evidence to disprove and counter Lasala's counterclaim. Atty.
Cahucom further prejudiced the NFA when he likewise failed to file a motion for reconsideration or an appeal
from the trial court's September 2, 2002 decision, where Lasala was awarded the huge amount of
P52,788,970.50, without any convincing evidence to support it.

When asked to justify his failure, Atty. Cahucom, like Atty. Mendoza, merely mentioned that the NFA's copy of
the decision was lost and that he only discovered it when the period for appeal had already lapsed.

The trial court's adverse decision, of course, could have been avoided or the award minimized, if Atty.
Cahucom did not waive the NFA's right to present its controverting evidence against Lasala's counterclaim
evidence. Strangely, when asked during hearing, Atty. Cahucom refused to refute Lasala's testimony and instead
simply moved for the filing of a memorandum.

The actions of these lawyers, that at the very least could be equated with unreasonable disregard for the case
they were handling and with obvious indifference towards the NFA's plight, lead us to the conclusion that Attys.
Mendoza's and Cahucom's actions amounted to a concerted action with Lasala when the latter secured the trial
court's huge and baseless counterclaim award. By this fraudulent scheme, the NFA was prevented from making
a fair submission in the controversy.56

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Lasala has been subsequently reiterated in Cagayan Economic Zone Authority v. Meridien Vista Gaming
Corporation,57 where the Court held that:cralawred

[I]n cases of gross and palpable negligence of counsel and of extrinsic fraud, the Court must step in and accord
relief to a client who suffered thereby. x x x [F]or the extrinsic fraud to justify a petition for relief from
judgment, it must be that fraud which the prevailing party caused to prevent the losing party from being heard
on his action or defense. Such fraud concerns not the judgment itself but the manner in which it was obtained.
Guided by these pronouncements, the Court in the case of Apex Mining, Inc. vs. Court of
Appeals wrote:cralawred

If the incompetence, ignorance or inexperience of counsel is so great and the error committed as a result thereof
is so serious that the client, who otherwise has a good cause, is prejudiced and denied his day in court,
the litigation may be reopened to give the client another chance to present his case. Similarly, when an
unsuccessful party has been prevented from fully and fairly presenting his case as a result of his lawyer's
professional delinquency or infidelity, the litigation may be reopened to allow the party to present his side.
Where counsel is guilty of gross ignorance, negligence and dereliction of duty, which resulted in the clients
being held liable for damages in a damage suit, the client is deprived of his day in court and the judgment may
be set aside on such ground.58 (Citations omitted and emphases in the original)

As in Lasala, the Court found sufficient factual justification for the grant of CEZA's petition for
relief, viz.:cralawred

At the inception, CEZA was already deprived of its right to present evidence during the trial of the case when
Atty. Baniaga filed a joint manifestation submitting the case for decision based on the pleadings without
informing CEZA. In violation of his sworn duty to protect his client's interest, Atty. Baniaga agreed to submit
the case for decision without fully substantiating their defense. Worse, after he received a copy of the decision,
he did not even bother to inform his client and the OGCC of the adverse judgment. He did not even take steps to
protect the interests of his client by filing an appeal. Instead, he allowed the judgment to lapse into finality.
Such reckless and gross negligence deprived CEZA not only of the chance to seek reconsideration thereof but
also the opportunity to elevate its case to the CA.59

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Turning now to the case at bar, it is clear that Dana's allegations in her petition for relief fall way short of the
jurisprudential threshold for extrinsic fraud. The Court quotes the allegations Dana made in her petition for
relief with the trial court:cralawred

In all candor, [Dana] wanted to present her side of the controversy and all she intended was to take the witness
stand. Without her knowing it, however, her time to present her evidence passed without her being able to do
so. Her previous counsel did not remind, much less advice [sic], her of the hearing dates to present her case.
Particularly, she was not simply aware of the hearings held by this [h]onorable [c]ourt on February 26 and
March 26, 2009. She can only surmise that somebody must have maneuvered to impress, if not mislead, the
[h]onorable [c]ourt that she was not interested to present her side.

This must be so since after [Dana] confronted her counsel about the promulgation of the Decision without her
being able to present evidence, her counsel nonchalantly told her that it was their mutual decision not to present
any evidence. This was not what [Dana] thought and knew. In the first place, she filed her Answer to the
petition and assailed all the material allegations therein. She found no reason to abandon her case.

[Dana], by these assertions does not accuse her previous counsel any wrongdoing or neglect, or any other
parties probably in cahoots with her said counsel. But it certainly had caused some harm to and, in fact,
defrauded this [h]onorable [c]ourt which was led into believing that [Dana] was not interested in presenting her
evidence. Hence, this [h]onorable [c]ourt found that [Dana] failed to appear despite notice as already mentioned
above. Had it known that she was interested on [sic] presenting her side, this [h]onorable [c]ourt certainly
would not have denied her that right. Otherwise put, by the deception, this Honorable Court was not aware that
[Dana] was deprived of her day in court.60 (Emphasis and underlining Ours)

Dana's petition is anchored on two main allegations: first, that her counsel failed to notify her of the hearings
dated February 26 and March 26, 2009; and second, that her counsel nonchalantly told her that it was their
mutual decision to not present any evidence. However, she categorically admits that she "does not accuse her
previous counsel [of] any wrongdoing or neglect, or any other parties probably in cahoots with her said
counsel."61 Furthermore, the petition makes no specific citation of other acts or circumstances attributable to her
counsel that fraudulently deprived Dana of her opportunity to fully ventilate her claims and defenses with the
trial court. The acts complained of in the petition constitute neither "gross and palpable negligence" nor
corruption or collusion amounting to extrinsic fraud. The general rule, which binds the client to the negligence
of her counsel, remains applicable to this case. All told, the trial court did not commit grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it dismissed her petition for relief.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby DENIED. The Resolutions dated April 15, 2014
and September 26, 2014 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 115420, are hereby AFFIRMED insofar
as they declared the proceedings CLOSED and TERMINATED.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 150429 August 29, 2006

ROBERTO G. FAMANILA, Petitioner,
vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS (Spc. Fmr. Seventh Division) and BARBERSHIP MANAGEMENT
LIMITED and NFD INTERNATIONAL MANNING AGENTS, INC. Respondents.
  

DECISION

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

Before us is a petition for review on certiorari assailing the Decision 1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP
No. 50615 dated March 30, 2001 which affirmed the Decision 2 of the National Labor Relations Commission
(NLRC) dated March 31, 1998 dismissing petitioner’s complaint for payment of disability and other benefits for
lack of merit and the Resolution 3 dated October 5, 2001 of the Court of Appeals denying petitioner’s motion
for reconsideration.

The antecedent facts are as follows:

In 1989, respondent NFD International Manning Agents, Inc. hired the services of petitioner Roberto G.
Famanila as Messman 4 for Hansa Riga, a vessel registered and owned by its principal and co-respondent,
Barbership Management Limited.

On June 21, 1990, while Hansa Riga was docked at the port of Eureka, California, U.S.A. and while petitioner
was assisting in the loading operations, the latter complained of a headache. Petitioner experienced dizziness
and he subsequently collapsed. Upon examination, it was determined that he had a sudden attack of left cerebral
hemorrhage from a ruptured cerebral aneurysm. 5 Petitioner underwent a brain operation and he was confined at
the Emmanuel Hospital in Portland, Oregon, U.S.A. On July 19, 1990, he underwent a second brain operation.

Owing to petitioner’s physical and mental condition, he was repatriated to the Philippines. On August 21, 1990,
he was examined at the American Hospital in Intramuros, Manila where the examining physician, Dr. Patricia
Abesamis declared that he "cannot go back to sea duty and has been observed for 120 days, he is being declared
permanently, totally disabled." 6

Thereafter, authorized representatives of the respondents convinced him to settle his claim amicably by
accepting the amount of US$13,200. 7 Petitioner accepted the offer as evidenced by his signature in the Receipt
and Release dated February 28, 1991. 8 His wife, Gloria Famanila and one Richard Famanila, acted as witnesses
in the signing of the release.

On June 11, 1997, petitioner filed a complaint 9 with the NLRC which was docketed as NLRC OCW Case No.
6-838-97-L praying for an award of disability benefits, share in the insurance proceeds, moral damages and
attorney’s fees. On September 29, 1997, Acting Executive Labor Arbiter Voltaire A. Balitaan dismissed the
complaint on the ground of prescription. Petitioner appealed the decision with the NLRC. On March 31, 1998,
the NLRC promulgated its decision 10 finding the appeal to be without merit and ordered its dismissal. When the
motion for reconsideration 11 was denied by the NLRC in its resolution dated June 29, 1998, 12 petitioner filed a
petition for certiorari with this Court. On December 2, 1998, we resolved to refer the case to the Court of
Appeals pursuant to our ruling in St. Martin Funeral Home v. National Labor Relations Commission. 13

On March 30, 2001, the Court of Appeals promulgated the assailed decision which dismissed the petition for
lack of merit. Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was denied, hence, the present petition for review raising
the following issues:

I. THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK

OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN UPHOLDING THE VALIDITY OF THE RECEIPT AND RELEASE
SINCE PETITIONER’S CONSENT THERETO WAS VITIATED THEREBY MAKING THE SAME VOID
AND UNENFORCEABLE.
II. THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO
LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN HOLDING THAT THE PRESCRIPTION PERIOD
APPLICABLE TO THE CLAIM OF THE PETITIONER IS THE 3-YEAR PERIOD PROVIDED FOR
UNDER THE LABOR CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES AND NOT THE 10-YEAR PERIOD PROVIDED FOR
UNDER THE CIVIL CODE.

Petitioner claims that he did not sign the Receipt and Release voluntarily or freely because he was permanently
disabled and in financial constraints. These factors allegedly vitiated his consent which makes the Receipt and
Release void and unenforceable.

The petition lacks merit.

It is fundamental that the scope of the Supreme Court’s judicial review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court is
confined only to errors of law. It does not extend to questions of fact. More so in labor cases where the doctrine
applies with greater force. 14 The Labor Arbiter and the NLRC have already determined the factual issues, and
these were affirmed by the Court of Appeals. Thus, they are accorded not only great respect but also finality and
are deemed binding upon this Court so long as they are supported by substantial evidence. 15 We reviewed the
records of the case and we find no reason to deviate from the findings of the labor arbiter, NLRC and the Court
of Appeals.

A vitiated consent does not make a contract void and unenforceable. A vitiated consent only gives rise to a
voidable agreement. Under the Civil Code, the vices of consent are mistake, violence, intimidation, undue
influence or fraud. 16 If consent is given through any of the aforementioned vices of consent, the contract is
voidable. 17 A voidable contract is binding unless annulled by a proper action in court. 18

Petitioner contends that his permanent and total disability vitiated his consent to the Receipt and Release
thereby rendering it void and unenforceable. However, disability is not among the factors that may vitiate
consent. Besides, save for petitioner’s self-serving allegations, there is no proof on record that his consent was
vitiated on account of his disability. In the absence of such proof of vitiated consent, the validity of the Receipt
and Release must be upheld. We agree with the findings of the Court of Appeals that:

In the case at bar, there is nothing in the records to show that petitioner’s consent was vitiated when he signed
the agreement. Granting that petitioner has not fully recovered his health at the time he signed the subject
document, the same cannot still lead to the conclusion that he did not voluntar[il]y accept the agreement, for his
wife and another relative witnessed his signing.

Moreover, the document entitled receipt and release which was attached by petitioner in his appeal does not
show on its face any violation of law or public policy. In fact, petitioner did not present any proof to show that
the consideration for the same is not reasonable and acceptable. Absent any evidence to support the same, the
Court cannot, on its own accord, decide against the unreasonableness of the consideration. 19

It is true that quitclaims and waivers are oftentimes frowned upon and are considered as ineffective in barring
recovery for the full measure of the worker’s right and that acceptance of the benefits therefrom does not
amount to estoppel. 20 The reason is plain. Employer and employee, obviously do not stand on the same
footing. 21 However, not all waivers and quitclaims are invalid as against public policy. If the agreement was
voluntarily entered into and represents a reasonable settlement, it is binding on the parties and may not later be
disowned simply because of change of mind. It is only where there is clear proof that the waiver was wangled
from an unsuspecting or gullible person, or the terms of the settlement are unconscionable on its face, that the
law will step in to annul the questionable transaction. But where it is shown that the person making the waiver
did so voluntarily, with full understanding of what he was doing, and the consideration for the quitclaim is
credible and reasonable, the transaction must be recognized as a valid and binding undertaking, 22 as in this case.
To be valid and effective, waivers must be couched in clear and unequivocal terms, leaving no doubt as to the
intention of those giving up a right or a benefit that legally pertains to them. 23 We have reviewed the terms and
conditions contained in the Receipt and Release and we find the same to be clear and unambiguous. The signing
was even witnessed by petitioner’s wife, Gloria T. Famanila and one Richard T. Famanila. The Receipt and
Release provides in part:

That for and in consideration of the sum of THIRTEEN THOUSAND TWO HUNDRED DOLLARS
(US$13,200.00) or its equivalent in Philippine currency THREE HUNDRED SIXTY FIVE THOUSAND NINE
HUNDRED FOUR PESOS (365,904.00), the receipt of which is hereby acknowledged to my full and complete
satisfaction x x x I, ROBERTO G. FAMANILA, x x x hereby remise, release and forever discharge said vessel
"HANSA RIGA", her Owners, operators, managers, charterers, agents, underwriters, P and I Club, master,
officers, and crew and all parties at interest therein or thereon, whether named or not named, including but not
limited to BARBER SHIP MANAGEMENT LIMITED, NFD INTERNATIONAL MANNING AGENTS, INC.
and ASSURANCEFORENIGEN GARD from any and all claims, demands, debts, dues, liens, actions or causes
of action, at law or in equity, in common law or in admiralty, statutory or contractual, arising from and under
the laws of the United States of America, Norway, Hongkong or the Republic of the Philippines and/or any
other foreign country now held, owned or possessed by me or by any person or persons, arising from or related
to or concerning whether directly or indirectly, proximately or remotely, without being limited to but including
the said illness suffered by me on board the vessel "HANSA RIGA" on or about 21st June 1990 at Portland,
Oregon and disability compensation in connection therewith.

This instrument is a GENERAL RELEASE intended to release all liabilities of any character and/or claims or
damages and/or losses and/or any other liabilities whatsoever, whether contractual or statutory, at common law
or in equity, tortious or in admiralty, now or henceforth in any way related to or occurring as a consequence of
the illness suffered by me as Messman of the vessel "HANSA RIGA", including but not limited to all damages
and/or losses consisting of loss of support, loss of earning capacity, loss of all benefits of whatsoever nature and
extent incurred, physical pain and suffering and/or all damages and/or indemnities claimable in law, tort,
contract, common law, equity and/or admiralty by me or by any person or persons pursuant to the laws of the
United States of America, Norway, Hongkong or the Republic of the Philippines and of all other countries
whatsoever.

I hereby certify that I am of legal age and that I fully understand this instrument which was read to me in the
local dialect and I agree that this is a FULL AND FINAL RELEASE AND DISCHARGE of all parties and
things referred to herein, and I further agree that this release may be pleaded as an absolute and final bar to any
suit or suits or legal proceedings that may hereafter be prosecuted by me or by any one claiming by, through, or
under me, against any of the persons or things

referred to or related herein, for any matter or thing referred to or related herein. 24

It is elementary that a contract is perfected by mere consent and from that moment the parties are bound not
only to the fulfillment of what has been expressly stipulated but also to all the consequences which, according
to their nature, may be in keeping with good faith, usage and law. 25 Further, dire necessity is not an acceptable
ground for annulling the Receipt and Release since it has not been shown that petitioner was forced to sign it. 26

Regarding prescription, the applicable prescriptive period for the money claims against the respondents is the
three year period pursuant to Article 291 of the Labor Code which provides that:

ART. 291. Money Claims. – All money claims arising from employer-employee relations accruing during the
effectivity of this Code shall be filed within three (3) years from the time the cause of action accrued; otherwise
they shall be forever barred.

xxxx
Since petitioner’s demand for an award of disability benefits is a money claim arising from his employment,
Article 291 of the Labor Code applies. From the time petitioner was declared permanently and totally disabled
on August 21, 1990 which gave rise to his entitlement to disability benefits up to the time that he filed the
complaint on June 11, 1997, more than three years have elapsed thereby effectively barring his claim.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated March 30, 2001 in CA-
G.R. SP No. 50615 which affirmed the Decision of the National Labor Relations Commission dismissing
petitioner’s complaint for disability and other benefits for lack of merit, and

the Resolution dated October 5, 2001 denying the motion for reconsideration, are AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 163707             September 15, 2006

MICHAEL C. GUY, petitioner,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, HON. SIXTO MARELLA, JR., Presiding Judge, RTC, Branch 138,
Makati City and minors, KAREN DANES WEI and KAMILLE DANES WEI, represented by their
mother, REMEDIOS OANES, respondents.

DECISION

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

This petition for review on certiorari assails the January 22, 2004 Decision1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
SP No. 79742, which affirmed the Orders dated July 21, 20002 and July 17, 20033 of the Regional Trial Court of
Makati City, Branch 138 in SP Proc. Case No. 4549 denying petitioner's motion to dismiss; and its May 25,
2004 Resolution4 denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration.

The facts are as follows:

On June 13, 1997, private respondent-minors Karen Oanes Wei and Kamille Oanes Wei, represented by their
mother Remedios Oanes (Remedios), filed a petition for letters of administration5 before the Regional Trial
Court of Makati City, Branch 138. The case was docketed as Sp. Proc. No. 4549 and entitled Intestate Estate of
Sima Wei (a.k.a. Rufino Guy Susim).

Private respondents alleged that they are the duly acknowledged illegitimate children of Sima Wei, who died
intestate in Makati City on October 29, 1992, leaving an estate valued at P10,000,000.00 consisting of real and
personal properties. His known heirs are his surviving spouse Shirley Guy and children, Emy, Jeanne, Cristina,
George and Michael, all surnamed Guy. Private respondents prayed for the appointment of a regular
administrator for the orderly settlement of Sima Wei's estate. They likewise prayed that, in the meantime,
petitioner Michael C. Guy, son of the decedent, be appointed as Special Administrator of the estate. Attached to
private respondents' petition was a Certification Against Forum Shopping6 signed by their counsel, Atty.
Sedfrey A. Ordoñez.

In his Comment/Opposition,7 petitioner prayed for the dismissal of the petition. He asserted that his deceased
father left no debts and that his estate can be settled without securing letters of administration pursuant to
Section 1, Rule 74 of the Rules of Court. He further argued that private respondents should have established
their status as illegitimate children during the lifetime of Sima Wei pursuant to Article 175 of the Family Code.
The other heirs of Sima Wei filed a Joint Motion to Dismiss8 on the ground that the certification against forum
shopping should have been signed by private respondents and not their counsel. They contended that Remedios
should have executed the certification on behalf of her minor daughters as mandated by Section 5, Rule 7 of the
Rules of Court.

In a Manifestation/Motion as Supplement to the Joint Motion to Dismiss,9 petitioner and his co-heirs alleged
that private respondents' claim had been paid, waived, abandoned or otherwise extinguished by reason of
Remedios' June 7, 1993 Release and Waiver of Claim stating that in exchange for the financial and educational
assistance received from petitioner, Remedios and her minor children discharge the estate of Sima Wei from
any and all liabilities.

The Regional Trial Court denied the Joint Motion to Dismiss as well as the Supplemental Motion to Dismiss. It
ruled that while the Release and Waiver of Claim was signed by Remedios, it had not been established that she
was the duly constituted guardian of her minor daughters. Thus, no renunciation of right occurred. Applying a
liberal application of the rules, the trial court also rejected petitioner's objections on the certification against
forum shopping.

Petitioner moved for reconsideration but was denied. He filed a petition for certiorari before the Court of
Appeals which affirmed the orders of the Regional Trial Court in its assailed Decision dated January 22, 2004,
the dispositive portion of which states:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the present petition is hereby DENIED DUE COURSE and
accordingly DISMISSED, for lack of merit. Consequently, the assailed Orders dated July 21, 2000 and
July 17, 2003 are hereby both AFFIRMED. Respondent Judge is hereby DIRECTED to resolve the
controversy over the illegitimate filiation of the private respondents (sic) minors [-] Karen Oanes Wei
and Kamille Oanes Wei who are claiming successional rights in the intestate estate of the deceased Sima
Wei, a.k.a. Rufino Guy Susim.

SO ORDERED.10

The Court of Appeals denied petitioner's motion for reconsideration, hence, this petition.

Petitioner argues that the Court of Appeals disregarded existing rules on certification against forum shopping;
that the Release and Waiver of Claim executed by Remedios released and discharged the Guy family and the
estate of Sima Wei from any claims or liabilities; and that private respondents do not have the legal personality
to institute the petition for letters of administration as they failed to prove their filiation during the lifetime of
Sima Wei in accordance with Article 175 of the Family Code.

Private respondents contend that their counsel's certification can be considered substantial compliance with the
rules on certification of non-forum shopping, and that the petition raises no new issues to warrant the reversal of
the decisions of the Regional Trial Court and the Court of Appeals.

The issues for resolution are: 1) whether private respondents' petition should be dismissed for failure to comply
with the rules on certification of non-forum shopping; 2) whether the Release and Waiver of Claim precludes
private respondents from claiming their successional rights; and 3) whether private respondents are barred by
prescription from proving their filiation.

The petition lacks merit.

Rule 7, Section 5 of the Rules of Court provides that the certification of non-forum shopping should be
executed by the plaintiff or the principal party. Failure to comply with the requirement shall be cause for
dismissal of the case. However, a liberal application of the rules is proper where the higher interest of justice
would be served. In Sy Chin v. Court of Appeals,11 we ruled that while a petition may have been flawed where
the certificate of non-forum shopping was signed only by counsel and not by the party, this procedural lapse
may be overlooked in the interest of substantial justice.12 So it is in the present controversy where the merits13 of
the case and the absence of an intention to violate the rules with impunity should be considered as compelling
reasons to temper the strict application of the rules.

As regards Remedios' Release and Waiver of Claim, the same does not bar private respondents from claiming
successional rights. To be valid and effective, a waiver must be couched in clear and unequivocal terms which
leave no doubt as to the intention of a party to give up a right or benefit which legally pertains to him. A waiver
may not be attributed to a person when its terms do not explicitly and clearly evince an intent to abandon a
right.14

In this case, we find that there was no waiver of hereditary rights. The Release and Waiver of Claim does not
state with clarity the purpose of its execution. It merely states that Remedios received P300,000.00 and an
educational plan for her minor daughters "by way of financial assistance and in full settlement of any and all
claims of whatsoever nature and kind x x x against the estate of the late Rufino Guy Susim."15 Considering that
the document did not specifically mention private respondents' hereditary share in the estate of Sima Wei, it
cannot be construed as a waiver of successional rights.

Moreover, even assuming that Remedios truly waived the hereditary rights of private respondents, such waiver
will not bar the latter's claim. Article 1044 of the Civil Code, provides:

ART. 1044. Any person having the free disposal of his property may accept or repudiate an inheritance.

Any inheritance left to minors or incapacitated persons may be accepted by their parents or
guardians. Parents or guardians may repudiate the inheritance left to their wards only by judicial
authorization.

The right to accept an inheritance left to the poor shall belong to the persons designated by the testator to
determine the beneficiaries and distribute the property, or in their default, to those mentioned in Article
1030. (Emphasis supplied)

Parents and guardians may not therefore repudiate the inheritance of their wards without judicial approval. This
is because repudiation amounts to an alienation of property16 which must pass the court's scrutiny in order to
protect the interest of the ward. Not having been judicially authorized, the Release and Waiver of Claim in the
instant case is void and will not bar private respondents from asserting their rights as heirs of the deceased.

Furthermore, it must be emphasized that waiver is the intentional relinquishment of a known right. Where one
lacks knowledge of a right, there is no basis upon which waiver of it can rest. Ignorance of a material fact
negates waiver, and waiver cannot be established by a consent given under a mistake or misapprehension of
fact.17

In the present case, private respondents could not have possibly waived their successional rights because they
are yet to prove their status as acknowledged illegitimate children of the deceased. Petitioner himself has
consistently denied that private respondents are his co-heirs. It would thus be inconsistent to rule that they
waived their hereditary rights when petitioner claims that they do not have such right. Hence, petitioner's
invocation of waiver on the part of private respondents must fail.

Anent the issue on private respondents' filiation, we agree with the Court of Appeals that a ruling on the same
would be premature considering that private respondents have yet to present evidence. Before the Family Code
took effect, the governing law on actions for recognition of illegitimate children was Article 285 of the Civil
Code, to wit:
 ART. 285. The action for the recognition of natural children may be brought only during the lifetime of
the presumed parents, except in the following cases:

(1) If the father or mother died during the minority of the child, in which case the latter may file
the action before the expiration of four years from the attainment of his majority;

(2) If after the death of the father or of the mother a document should appear of which nothing had been
heard and in which either or both parents recognize the child.

In this case, the action must be commenced within four years from the finding of the document.
(Emphasis supplied)

We ruled in Bernabe v. Alejo18 that illegitimate children who were still minors at the time the Family Code took
effect and whose putative parent died during their minority are given the right to seek recognition for a period
of up to four years from attaining majority age. This vested right was not impaired or taken away by the passage
of the Family Code.19

On the other hand, Articles 172, 173 and 175 of the Family Code, which superseded Article 285 of the Civil
Code, provide:

ART. 172. The filiation of legitimate children is established by any of the following:

(1) The record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment; or

(2) An admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private handwritten instrument and
signed by the parent concerned.

In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the legitimate filiation shall be proved by:

(1) The open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child; or

(2) Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws.

ART. 173. The action to claim legitimacy may be brought by the child during his or her lifetime and
shall be transmitted to the heirs should the child die during minority or in a state of insanity. In these
cases, the heirs shall have a period of five years within which to institute the action.

The action already commenced by the child shall survive notwithstanding the death of either or both of
the parties.

ART. 175. Illegitimate children may establish their illegitimate filiation in the same way and on the
same, evidence as legitimate children.

The action must be brought within the same period specified in Article 173, except when the action is
based on the second paragraph of Article 172, in which case the action may be brought during the
lifetime of the alleged parent.

Under the Family Code, when filiation of an illegitimate child is established by a record of birth appearing in
the civil register or a final judgment, or an admission of filiation in a public document or a private handwritten
instrument signed by the parent concerned, the action for recognition may be brought by the child during his or
her lifetime. However, if the action is based upon open and continuous possession of the status of an illegitimate
child, or any other means allowed by the rules or special laws, it may only be brought during the lifetime of the
alleged parent.

It is clear therefore that the resolution of the issue of prescription depends on the type of evidence to be adduced
by private respondents in proving their filiation. However, it would be impossible to determine the same in this
case as there has been no reception of evidence yet. This Court is not a trier of facts. Such matters may be
resolved only by the Regional Trial Court after a full-blown trial.

While the original action filed by private respondents was a petition for letters of administration, the trial court
is not precluded from receiving evidence on private respondents' filiation. Its jurisdiction extends to matters
incidental and collateral to the exercise of its recognized powers in handling the settlement of the estate,
including the determination of the status of each heir.20 That the two causes of action, one to compel recognition
and the other to claim inheritance, may be joined in one complaint is not new in our jurisprudence.21 As held
in Briz v. Briz:22

The question whether a person in the position of the present plaintiff can in any event maintain a
complex action to compel recognition as a natural child and at the same time to obtain ulterior relief in
the character of heir, is one which in the opinion of this court must be answered in the affirmative,
provided always that the conditions justifying the joinder of the two distinct causes of action are present
in the particular case. In other words, there is no absolute necessity requiring that the action to compel
acknowledgment should have been instituted and prosecuted to a successful conclusion prior to the
action in which that same plaintiff seeks additional relief in the character of heir. Certainly, there is
nothing so peculiar to the action to compel acknowledgment as to require that a rule should be here
applied different from that generally applicable in other cases. x x x

The conclusion above stated, though not heretofore explicitly formulated by this court, is undoubtedly to
some extent supported by our prior decisions. Thus, we have held in numerous cases, and the doctrine
must be considered well settled, that a natural child having a right to compel acknowledgment, but who
has not been in fact acknowledged, may maintain partition proceedings for the division of the
inheritance against his coheirs (Siguiong vs. Siguiong, 8 Phil., 5; Tiamson vs. Tiamson, 32 Phil., 62);
and the same person may intervene in proceedings for the distribution of the estate of his deceased
natural father, or mother (Capistrano vs. Fabella, 8 Phil., 135; Conde vs. Abaya, 13 Phil., 249; Ramirez
vs. Gmur, 42 Phil., 855). In neither of these situations has it been thought necessary for the plaintiff to
show a prior decree compelling acknowledgment. The obvious reason is that in partition suits and
distribution proceedings the other persons who might take by inheritance are before the court; and the
declaration of heirship is appropriate to such proceedings.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED. The Decision dated January 22, 2004 of the Court of Appeals
in CA-G.R. SP No. 79742 affirming the denial of petitioner's motion to dismiss; and its Resolution dated May
25, 2004 denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration, are AFFIRMED. Let the records be REMANDED to
the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 138 for further proceedings.

SO ORDERED.

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 189516, June 08, 2016

 EDNA MABUGAY-OTAMIAS, JEFFREN M. OTAMIAS AND MINOR JEMWEL M. OTAMIAS,
REPRESENTED BY THEIR MOTHER EDNA MABUGAY-OTAMIAS, Petitioners, v. REPUBLIC OF
THE PHILIPPINES, REPRESENTED BY COL. VIRGILIO O. DOMINGO, IN HIS CAPACITY AS
THE COMMANDING OFFICER OF THE PENSION AND GRATUITY MANAGEMENT CENTER
(PGMC) OF THE ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

DECISION

LEONEN, J.:

A writ of execution lies against the pension benefits of a retired officer of the Armed Forces of the Philippines,
which is the subject of a deed of assignment drawn by him granting support to his wife and five (5) children.
The benefit of exemption from execution of pension benefits is a statutory right that may be waived, especially
in order to comply with a husband's duty to provide support under Article XV of the 1987 Constitution and the
Family Code.

Petitioner Edna Mabugay-Otamias (Edna) and retired Colonel Francisco B. Otamias (Colonel Otamias) were
married on June 16, 1978 and had five (5) children.1ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

On September 2000, Edna and Colonel Otamias separated due to his alleged infidelity.2 Their children remained
with Edna.3ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

On August 2002, Edna filed a Complaint-Affidavit against Colonel Otamias before the Provost Marshall
Division of the Armed Forces of the Philippines.4 Edna demanded monthly support equivalent to 75% of
Colonel Otamias' retirement benefits.5 Colonel Otamias executed an Affidavit,
stating:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

That sometime in August or September 2002, I was summoned at the Office of the Provost Marshal, Philippine
Army, in connection with a complaint affidavit submitted to said Office by my wife Mrs. Edna M. Otamias
signifying her intention 75% of my retirement benefits from the AFP;

That at this point, I can only commit 50% of my retirement benefits to be pro-rated among my wife and five (5)
children;

That in order to implement this compromise, I am willing to enter into Agreement with my wife covering the
same;

That I am executing this affidavit to attest to the truth of the foregoing facts and whatever legal purpose it may
serve.6cralawred
On February 26, 2003, Colonel Otamias executed a Deed of Assignment where he waived 50% of his salary and
pension benefits in favor of Edna and their children.7 The Deed of Assignment was considered by the parties as
a compromise agreement.8 It stated:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
This Assignment, made and executed unto this 26th day of February 2003 at Fort Bonifacio, Makati City, by the
undersigned LTC Francisco B. Otamias, 0-0-111045 (INP) PA, of legal age, married and presently residing at
Dama De Noche St., Pembo, Makati City.

WITNESSETH

WHEREAS, the undersigned affiant is the legal husband of EDNA M. OTAMIAS and the father of Julie Ann,
Jonathan, Jennifer, Jeffren and Jemwel all residing at Patag, Cagayan de Oro City;
WHEREAS, the undersigned will be retiring from the military service and expects to receive retirement benefits
from the Armed Forces of the Philippines;

WHEREAS, the undersigned had expressed his willingness to give a share in his retirement benefits to my wife
and five (5) abovenamed children,

NOW, THEREFORE, for and in consideration of the foregoing premises, the undersigned hereby stipulated the
following:

1. That the undersigned will give to my legal wife and five (5) children FIFTY PERCENT (50%) of my
retirement benefits to be pro rated among them.

2. That a separate check(s) be issued and to be drawn and encash [sic] in the name of the legal wife and five (5)
children pro-rating the fifty (50%) percent of my retirement benefits.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand this 26th day of February 2003 at Fort Bonifacio,
Makati City.9cralawred
Colonel Otamias retired on April 1, 2003.10ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

The agreement was honored until January 6, 2006.11 Edna alleged that "the A[rmed] F[orces] [of the]
Philippines] suddenly decided not to honor the agreement"12 between Colonel Otamias and his legitimate
family.

In a letter13 dated April 3, 2006, the Armed Forces of the Philippines Pension and Gratuity Management Center
(AFP PGMC) informed Edna that a court order was required for the AFP PGMC to recognize the Deed of
Assignment.14ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

In another letter15 dated April 17, 2006, the AFP PGMC reiterated that it could not act on Edna's request to
receive a portion of Colonel Otamias' pension "unless ordered by [the] appropriate
court."16ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

Heeding the advice of the AFP PGMC, Edna, on behalf of herself and Jeffren M. Otamias and Jemwel M.
Otamias (Edna, et al.), filed before the Regional Trial Court of Cagayan de Oro, Misamis Oriental an action for
support, docketed as F.C. Civil Case No. 2006-039.17ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

The trial court's Sheriff tried to serve summons on Colonel Otamias several times, to no avail. 18 Substituted
service was resorted to.19 Colonel Otamias was subsequently declared in default for failure to file a responsive
pleading despite order of the trial court.20ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

The trial court ruled in favor of Edna, et al. and ordered the automatic deduction of the amount of support from
the monthly pension of Colonel Otamias.21ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

The dispositive portion of the trial court's Decision stated:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

ALL THE FOREGOING CONSIDERED, and in consonance with the legal obligation of the defendant to the
plaintiffs, the Armed Forces of the Philippines, through its Finance Center and/or appropriate Finance Officer
thereof, is thereby ordered to release to Edna Mabugay Otamias and minor Jemwel M. Otamias, herein
represented by his mother Edna, their fifty (50%) per cent share of each of the monthly pension due to Colonel
Francisco B. Otamias, AFP PA (Retired).

Defendant Francisco Otamias is also ordered to pay plaintiff Edna M. Otamias, fifty (50%) per cent of whatever
retirement benefits he has already received from the Armed Forces of the Philippines AND the arrears in
support, effective January 2006 up to the time plaintiff receives her share direct from the Finance Center of the
Armed Forces of the Philippines.

IT IS SO ORDERED.22cralawred
The Armed Forces of the Philippines, through the Office of the Judge Advocate General, filed a
Manifestation/Opposition23 to the Decision of the trial court, but it was not given due course due to its late
filing.24ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

Edna, et al., through counsel, filed a Motion for Issuance of Writ of Execution25 dated February 22, 2008. The
trial court granted the Motion, and a writ of execution was issued by the trial court on April 10,
2008.26ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

The Armed Forces of the Philippines Finance Center (AFP Finance Center), tlirough the Office of the Judge
Advocate General, filed a Motion to Quash27 the writ of execution and argued that the AFP Finance Center's
duty to disburse benefits is ministerial. It releases benefits only upon the AFP PGMC's
approval.28ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

The trial court denied the Motion to Quash and held that:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Under the law and existing jurisprudence, the "right to support" is practically equivalent to the "right to life."
The "right to life" always takes precedence over "property rights." The "right to support/life" is also a
substantive right which always takes precedence over technicalities/procedural rules. It being so, technical rules
must yield to substantive justice. Besides, this Court's Decision dated February 27, 2007 has long acquired
finality, and as such, is ripe for enforcement/execution.

THE FOREGOING CONSIDERED, the instant Motion is hereby DENIED.29cralawred

The AFP PGMC moved for reconsideration of the order denying the Motion to Quash,30 but the Motion was
also denied by the trial court in the Order31 dated August 6, 2008.

A Notice of Garnishment was issued by the trial court on July 15, 2008 and was received by the AFP PGMC on
September 9, 2008.32ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

The AFP PGMC filed before the Court of Appeals a Petition for Certiorari and
Prohibition.33ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

The Court of Appeals granted34 the Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition and partially nullified the trial court's
Decision insofar as it directed the automatic deduction of support from the pension benefits of Colonel Otamias.

The Court of Appeals discussed that Section 3135 of Presidential Decree No. 1638, otherwise known as the AFP
Military Personnel Retirement and Separation Decree of 1979, "provides for the exemption of the monthly
pension of retired military personnel from execution and attachment[,]"36 while Rule 39, Section 13 of the Rules
of Court provides:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
SEC. 13. Property exempt from execution. Except as otherwise expressly provided by law, the following
property, and no other, shall be exempt from execution:

....

(1) The right to receive legal support, or money or property obtained as such support, or any pension or gratuity
from the Government[.]cralawred
The Court of Appeals also cited Pacific Products, Inc. vs. Ong:37
[M]oneys sought to be garnished, as long as they remain in the hands of the disbursing officer of the
Government, belong to the latter, although the defendant in garnishment may be entitled to a specific portion
thereof. And still another reason which covers both of the foregoing is that every consideration of public policy
forbids it.38cralawred
In addition, the AFP PGMC was not impleaded as a party in the action for support; thus, it is not bound by the
Decision.39ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

The dispositive portion of the Court of Appeals Decision reads:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 19,
Cagayan de Oro City dated February 27, 2007 in Civil Case No. 2006-039 is PARTIALLY NULLIFIED in so
far as it directs the Armed Forces of the Philippines Finance Center to automatically deduct the financial
support in favor of private respondents, Edna Otamias and her children Jeffren and Jemwel Otamias, from the
pension benefits of Francisco Otamias, a retired military officer. The Order dated June 10, 2008, Order dated
August 6, 2008 and Writ of Execution dated April 10, 2008, all issued by the court a quo are likewise SET
ASIDE. Perforce, let a writ of permanent injunction issue enjoining the implementation of the assailed Writ of
Execution dated April 10, 2008 and the corresponding Notice of Garnishment dated July 15, 2008. No
pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.40 (Emphasis in the original)cralawred

Edna, et al. moved for reconsideration, but the Motion was denied by the Court of
Appeals.41ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

Edna, et al. filed before this Court a Petition for Review on Certiorari42 on November 11, 2009. In the
Resolution43 dated January 20, 2010, this Court required respondent to comment.

In the Resolution44 dated August 4, 2010, this Court noted the Comment filed by the Office of the Solicitor
General and required Edna, et al. to file a reply.45ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

A Reply46 was filed on September 27, 2010.

Edna, et al. argue that the Deed of Assignment Colonel Otamias executed Is valid and
legal.47ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

They claim that Section 31 of Presidential Decree No. 163848 "does not include support";49 hence, the retirement
benefits of Colonel Otamias can be executed upon.

Edna, et al. also argue that the Court of Appeals erred in granting respondent's Petition because it effectively
rendered the Deed of Assignment of no force and effect.50 On the other hand, the trial court's Decision
implements the Deed of Assignment and Edna, et al.'s right to support.51ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

Further, the AFP PGMC had already recognized the validity of the agreement and had made payments to them
until it suddenly stopped payment.52 After Edna, et al. obtained a court order, the AFP PGMC still refused to
honor the Deed of Assignment.53ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

The Armed Forces of the Philippines, through the Office of the Solicitor General, argues that it was not a party
to the case filed by Edna, et al.54 Thus, "it cannot be compelled to release part of the monthly pension benefits of
retired Colonel Otamias in favor of [Edna, et al]."55ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

The Office of the Solicitor General avers that the AFP PGMC never submitted itself to the jurisdiction of the
trial court.56 It was not a party to the case as the trial court never acquired jurisdiction over the AFP
PGMC.57ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

The Office of the Solicitor General also argues that Section 31 of Presidential Decree No. 1638 and Rule 39,
Section 13(1) of the Rules of Court support the Court of Appeals Decision that Colonel Otamias' pension
benefits are exempt from execution.58ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

Section 31 of Presidential Decree No. 1638 "does not deprive the survivor/s of a retired or separated officer or
enlisted man of their right to support."59 Rather, "[w]hat is prohibited is for respondent [AFP PGMC] to
segregate a portion of the pension benefit in favor of the retiree's family while still in the hands of the A[rmed]
F[orces] [of the] Philippines]."60ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

Thus, the AFP PGMC "cannot be compelled to directly give or issue a check in favor of [Edna, et al.] out of the
pension gratuity of Col. Otamias."61ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

In their Reply,62 Edna, et al. argue that the Armed Forces of the Philippines should not be allowed to question
the legal recourse they took because it was an officer of the Armed Forces of the Philippines who had advised
them to file an action for support.63ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

They argue that the phrase "while in the active service" in Section 31 of Presidential Decree No. 1638 refers to
the "time when the retired officer incurred his accountabilities in favor of a private creditor[,]"64 who is a third
person. The phrase also "serves as a timeline designed to separate the debts incurred by the retired officer after
his retirement from those which he incurred prior thereto."65ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

Further, the accountabilities referred to in Section 31 of Presidential Decree No. 1638 refer to debts or loans,
not to support.66ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

The issues for resolution are:

First, whether the Court of Appeals erred in ruling that the AFP Finance Center cannot be directed to
automatically deduct the amount of support needed by the legitimate family of Colonel Otamias; and

Second, whether Colonel Otamias' pension benefits can be executed upon for the financial support of his
legitimate family.

The Petition is granted.

Article 6 of the Civil Code provides:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

Article 6. Rights may be waived, unless the waiver is contrary to law, public order, public policy, morals or
good customs, or prejudicial to a third person with a right recognized by law.cralawred
The concept of waiver has been defined by this Court as:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
a voluntary and intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known existing legal right, advantage, benefit,
claim or privilege, which except for such waiver the party would have enjoyed; the voluntary abandonment or
surrender, by a capable person, of a right known by him to exist, with the intent that such right shall be
surrendered and such person forever deprived of its benefit; or such conduct as warrants an inference of the
relinquishment of such right; or the intentional doing of an act inconsistent with claiming it.67cralawred
In determining whether a statutory right can be waived, this Court is guided by the following
pronouncement:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
[T]he doctrine of waiver extends to rights and privileges of any character, and, since the word 'waiver' covers
every conceivable right, it is the general rule that a person may waive any matter which affects his property, and
any alienable right or privilege of which he is the owner or which belongs to him or to which he is legally
entitled, whether secured by contract, conferred with statute, or guaranteed by constitution, provided such
rights and privileges rest in the individual, are intended for his sole benefit, do not infringe on the rights
of others, and further provided the waiver of the right or privilege is not forbidden by law, and does not
contravene public policy; and the principle is recognized that everyone has a right to waive, and agree to
waive, the advantage of a law or rule made solely for the benefit and protection of the individual in his private
capacity, if it can be dispensed with and relinquished without infringing on any public right, and without
detriment to the community at large[.]68 (Emphasis in the original)cralawred
When Colonel Otamias executed the Deed of Assignment, he effectively waived his right to claim that his
retirement benefits are exempt from execution. The right to receive retirement benefits belongs to Colonel
Otamias. His decision to waive a portion of his retirement benefits does not infringe on the right of third
persons, but even protects the right of his family to receive support.

In addition, the Deed of Assignment should be considered as the law between the parties, and its provisions
should be respected in the absence of allegations that Colonel Otamias was coerced or defrauded in executing it.
The general rule is that a contract is the law between parties and parties are free to stipulate terms and
conditions that are not contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order, or public
policy.69ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

The Deed of Assignment executed by Colonel Otamias was not contrary to law; it was in accordance with the
provisions on support in the Family Code. Hence, there was no reason for the AFP PGMC not to recognize its
validity.

Further, this Court notes that the AFP PGMC granted the request for support of the wives of other retired
military personnel in a similar situation as that of petitioner in this case. Attached to the Petition are the
affidavits of the wives of retired members of the military, who have received a portion of their husbands'
pensions.70ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

One affidavit stated:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

4. That when I consulted and appeared before the Office of PGMC, I was instructed to submit a
Special Power of Authority from my husband so they can release part of his pension to me;

5. That my husband signed the Special Power of Attorney at the PGMC ceding 50% of his pension
to me; the SPA form was given to us by the PGMC and the same was signed by my husband at
the PGMC;. . .

....

7. That the amount was deposited directly to my account by the PGMC- Finance Center AFP out of
the pension of my husband;

8. That only the Special Power of Attorney was required by the PGMC in order for them to
segregate my share of my husband's pension and deposit the same to my account[.]71

The other affidavit stated:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

8. That my husband signed the Special Power of Attorney at the PGMC ceding 50% of his pension
to me; the SPA form was given to us by the PGMC and the same was signed by my husband at
the PGMC[.]72

In addition, the AFP PGMC's website informs the public of the following
procedure:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Tanong: My husband-retiree cut-off my allotment. How can I have it restored?
Sagot: Pension benefits are separate properties of the retiree and can not [sic] be subject of a Ocurt [sic] Order
for execution nor can they be assigned to any third party (Sec 31, PD 1638, as amended). However, a valid
Special Power of Attorney (SPA) by the retiree himself empowering the AFP Finance Center to deduct certain
amount from his lumpsum [sic] or pension pay as the case maybe, as a rule, is a valid waiver of rights which
can be effectively implemented by the AFP F[inance] C[enter].73cralawred
Clearly, the AFP PGMC allows deductions from a retiree's pension for as long as the retiree executes a Special
Power of Attorney authorizing the AFP PGMC to deduct a certain amount for the benefit of the retiree's
beneficiary.

It is curious why Colonel Otamias was allowed to execute a Deed of Assignment by the administering officer
when, in the first place, the AFP PGMC's recognized procedure was to execute a Special Power of Attorney,
which would have been the easier remedy for Colonel Otamias' family.

Instead, Colonel Otamias' family was forced to incur litigation expenses just to be able to receive the financial
support that Colonel Otamias was willing to give to Edna, et al.

II

Section 31 of Presidential Decree No. 1638 provides:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

Section 31. The benefits authorized under this Decree, except as provided herein, shall not be subject to
attachment, garnishment, levy, execution or any tax whatsoever; neither shall they be assigned, ceded, or
conveyed to any third person: Provided, That if a retired or separated officer or enlisted man who is entitled to
any benefit under this Decree has unsettled money and/or property accountabilities incurred while in the active
service, not more than fifty per centum of the pension gratuity or other payment due such officer or enlisted
man or his survivors under this Decree may be withheld and be applied to settle such accountabilities.cralawred
Under Section 31, Colonel Otamias' retirement benefits are exempt from execution. Retirement benefits are
exempt from execution so as to ensure that the retiree has enough funds to support himself and his family.

On the other hand, the right to receive support is provided under the Family Code. Article 194 of the Family
Code defines support as follows:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Art. 194. Support comprises everything indispensable for sustenance, dwelling, clothing, medical attendance,
education and transportation, in keeping with the financial capacity of the family.

The education of the person entitled to be supported referred to in the preceding paragraph shall include his
schooling or training for some profession, trade or vocation, even beyond the age of majority. Transportation
shall include expenses in going to and from school, or to and from place of work.cralawred
The provisions of the Family Code also state who are obliged to give support,
thus:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Art. 195. Subject to the provisions of the succeeding articles, the following are obliged to support each other to
the whole extent set forth in the preceding article:

(1) The spouses;

(2) Legitimate ascendants and descendants;

(3) Parents and their legitimate children and the legitimate and illegitimate children of the latter;

(4) Parents and their illegitimate children and the legitimate and illegitimate children of the latter; and

(5) Legitimate brothers and sisters, whether of the full or half- blood.
Art. 196. Brothers and sisters not legitimately related, whether of the full or half-blood, are likewise bound to
support each other to the full extent set forth in Article 194 except only when the need for support of the brother
or sister, being of age, is due to a cause imputable to the claimant's fault or negligence.

Art. 197. For the support of legitimate ascendants; descendants, whether legitimate or illegitimate; and brothers
and sisters, whether legitimately or illegitimately related, only the separate property of the person obliged to
give support shall be answerable provided that in case the obligor has no separate property, the absolute
community or the conjugal partnership, if financially capable, shall advance the support, which shall be
deducted from the share of the spouses obliged upon the liquidation of the absolute community or of the
conjugal partnership[.]cralawred
The provisions of Rule 39 of the Rules of Court that are applicable to this case are in apparent conflict with
each other. Section 4 provides that judgments in actions for support are immediately executory. On the other
hand, Section 13(1) provides that the right to receive pension from government is exempt from execution,
thus:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
RULE 39

EXECUTION, SATISFACTION, AND EFFECT OF JUDGMENTS

....

SEC. 4. Judgments not stayed by appeal. — Judgments in actions for injunction, receivership, accounting and
support, and such other judgments as are now or may hereafter be declared to be immediately executory, shall
be enforceable after their rendition and shall not, be stayed by an appeal taken therefrom, unless otherwise
ordered by the trial court. On appeal therefrom, the appellate court in its discretion may make an order
suspending, modifying, restoring or granting the injunction, receivership, accounting, or award of support.

The stay of execution shall be upon such terms as to bond or otherwise as may be considered proper for the
security or protection of the rights of the adverse party.

....

SEC. 13. Property exempt from execution. — Except as otherwise expressly provided by law, the following
property, and no other, shall be exempt from execution:

....

(1) The right to receive legal support, or money or property obtained as such support, or any pension or gratuity
from the Government;

....

But no article or species of property mentioned in this section shall be exempt from execution issued upon a
judgment recovered for its price or upon a judgment of foreclosure of a mortgage thereon. (Emphasis
supplied)cralawred
Based on the Family Code, Colonel Otamias is obliged to give support to his family, petitioners in this case.
However, he retired in 2003, and his sole source of income is his pension. Judgments in actions for support are
immediately executory, yet under Section 31 of Presidential Decree No. 1638, his pension cannot be executed
upon.

However, considering that Colonel Otamias has waived a portion of his retirement benefits through his Deed of
Assignment, resolution on the conflict between the civil code provisions on support and Section 31 of
Presidential Decree No. 1638 should be resolved in a more appropriate case.

III

Republic v. Yahon74 is an analogous case because it involved the grant of support to the spouse of a retired
member of the Armed Forces of the Philippines.

In Republic v. Yahon, Daisy R. Yahon filed a Petition for the Issuance of Protection Order under Republic Act
No. 9262.75 She alleged that she did not have any source of income because her husband made her resign from
her job.76 The trial court issued a temporary restraining order, a portion of which
stated:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
To insure that petitioner [Daisy R. Yahon] can receive a fair share of respondent's retirement and other
benefits, the following agencies thru their heads are directed to WITHHOLD any retirement, pension [,]
and other benefits of respondent, S/SGT. CHARLES A. YAHON, a member of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines assigned at 4ID, Camp Evangelista, Patag, Cagayan de Oro City until further orders from the
court:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
1. Commanding General/Officer of the Finance Center of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, Camp Emilio
Aguinaldo, Quezon City;

2. The Management of RSBS, Camp Emilio Aguinaldo, Quezon City;

3. The Regional Manager of PAG-IBIG, Mortola St., Cagayan de Oro City.77 (Emphasis in the
original)cralawred
The trial court subsequently granted Daisy's Petition and issued a permanent protection order78 and
held:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Pursuant to the order of the court dated February 6, 2007, respondent, S/Sgt. Charles A. Yahon is directed to
give it to petitioner 50% of whatever retirement benefits and other claims that may be due or released to him
from the government and the said share of petitioner shall be automatically deducted from respondent's benefits
and claims and be given directly to the petitioner, Daisy R. Yahon.

Let copy of this decision be sent to the Commanding General/Officer of Finance Center of the Armed Forces of
the Philippines, Camp Emilio Aguinaldo, Quezon City; the Management of RSBS, Camp Emilio Aguinaldo,
Quezon City and the Regional Manager of PAG-IBIG, Mortola St., Cagayan de Oro City for their guidance and
strict compliance.79cralawred
In that case, the AFP Finance Center filed before the trial court a Manifestation and Motion stating that "it was
making a limited and special appearance"80 and argued that the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over the
Armed Forces of the Philippines. Hence, the Armed Forces of the Philippines is not bound by the trial court's
ruling.81ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

The Armed Forces of the Philippines also cited Pacific Products, where this Court ruled
that:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
A rule, which has never been seriously questioned, is that money in the hands of public officers, although it may
be due government employees, is not liable to the creditors of these employees in the process of garnishment.
One reason is, that the State, by virtue of its sovereignty may not be sued in its own courts except by express
authorization by the Legislature, and to subject its officers to garnishment would be to permit indirectly what is
prohibited directly. Another reason is that moneys sought to be garnished, as long as they remain in the hands of
the disbursing officer of the Government, belong to the latter, although the defendant in garnishment may be
entitled to a specific portion thereof. And still another reason which covers both of the foregoing is that every
consideration of public policy forbids it.82 (Citations omitted)cralawred
This Court in Republic v. Yahon denied the Petition and discussed that because Republic Act No. 9262 is the
later enactment, its provisions should prevail,83 thus:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
We hold that Section 8(g) of R.A. No. 9262, being a later enactment, should be construed as laying down an
exception to the general rule above stated that retirement benefits are exempt from execution. The law itself
declares that the court shall order the withholding of a percentage of the income or salary of the respondent by
the employer, which shall be automatically remitted directly to the woman "[n]otwithstanding other laws to the
contrary"84 (Emphasis in the original)cralawred
IV

The 1987 Constitution gives much importance to the family as the basic unit of society, such that Article
XV85 is devoted to it.

The passage of the Family Code further implemented Article XV of the Constitution. This Court has recognized
the importance of granting support to minor children, provided that the filiation of the child is proven. In this
case, the filiation of Jeffren M. Otamias and Jemwel M. Otamias was admitted by Colonel Otamias in the Deed
of Assignment.86ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

Even before the passage of the Family Code, this Court has given primary consideration to the right of a child to
receive support. In Samson v. Yatco,87 a petition for support was dismissed with prejudice by the trial court on
the ground that the minor asking for support was not present in court during trial. An appeal was filed, but it
was dismissed for having been filed out of time. This Court relaxed the rules of procedure and held that "[i]f the
order of dismissal with prejudice of the petition for support were to stand, the petitioners would be deprived of
their right to present and nature support."88ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

In Gan v. Reyes,89 Augustus Caezar R. Gan (Gan) questioned the trial court's decision requiring him to give
support and claimed that that he was not the father of the minor seeking support. He also argued that he was not
given his day in court. This Court held that Gan's arguments were meant to delay the execution of the judgment,
and that in any case, Gan himself filed a Motion for Leave to Deposit in Court Support Pendente
Lite:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
In all cases involving a child, his interest and welfare are always the paramount concerns. There may be
instances where, in view of the poverty of the child, it would be a travesty of justice to refuse him support until
the decision of the trial court attains finality while time continues to slip away. An excerpt from the early case
of De Leon v. Soriano is relevant, thus:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
The money and property adjudged for support and education should and must be given presently and without
delay because if it had to wait the final judgment, the children may in the meantime have suffered because of
lack of food or have missed and lost years in school because of lack of funds. One cannot delay the payment of
such funds for support and education for the reason that if paid long afterwards, however much the accumulated
amount, its payment cannot cure the evil and repair the damage caused. The children with such belated payment
for support and education cannot act as gluttons and eat voraciously and unwisely, afterwards, to make up for
the years of hunger and starvation. Neither may they enrol in several classes and schools and take up numerous
subjects all at once to make up for the years they missed in school, due to non-payment of the funds when
needed.90cralawred
V

The non-inclusion of the AFP PGMC or the AFP Finance Center in the action for support was proper,
considering that both the AFP PGMC and the AFP Finance Center are not the persons obliged to give support to
Edna, et al. Thus, it was not a real party-in-interest.91 Nor was the AFP PGMC a necessary party because
complete relief could be obtained even without impleading the AFP PGMC.92ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The Court of Appeals Decision dated May 22, 2009 and
Resolution dated August 11, 2009 in CA-G.R. SP No. 02555-MIN are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The
Regional Trial Court Decision dated February 27, 2007 in F.C. Civil Case No. 2006-039 is REINSTATED.

SO ORDERED.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

G.R. No. 174689             October 22, 2007

ROMMEL JACINTO DANTES SILVERIO, petitioner,

vs.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.

DECISION

CORONA, J.:

When God created man, He made him in the likeness of God; He created them male and female.
(Genesis 5:1-2)

Amihan gazed upon the bamboo reed planted by Bathala and she heard voices coming from inside the
bamboo. "Oh North Wind! North Wind! Please let us out!," the voices said. She pecked the reed once,
then twice. All of a sudden, the bamboo cracked and slit open. Out came two human beings; one was a
male and the other was a female. Amihan named the man "Malakas" (Strong) and the woman
"Maganda" (Beautiful). (The Legend of Malakas and Maganda)

When is a man a man and when is a woman a woman? In particular, does the law recognize the changes made
by a physician using scalpel, drugs and counseling with regard to a person’s sex? May a person successfully
petition for a change of name and sex appearing in the birth certificate to reflect the result of a sex reassignment
surgery?

On November 26, 2002, petitioner Rommel Jacinto Dantes Silverio filed a petition for the change of his first
name and sex in his birth certificate in the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 8. The petition, docketed as
SP Case No. 02-105207, impleaded the civil registrar of Manila as respondent.

Petitioner alleged in his petition that he was born in the City of Manila to the spouses Melecio Petines Silverio
and Anita Aquino Dantes on April 4, 1962. His name was registered as "Rommel Jacinto Dantes Silverio" in his
certificate of live birth (birth certificate). His sex was registered as "male."

He further alleged that he is a male transsexual, that is, "anatomically male but feels, thinks and acts as a
female" and that he had always identified himself with girls since childhood.1 Feeling trapped in a man’s body,
he consulted several doctors in the United States. He underwent psychological examination, hormone treatment
and breast augmentation. His attempts to transform himself to a "woman" culminated on January 27, 2001 when
he underwent sex reassignment surgery2 in Bangkok, Thailand. He was thereafter examined by Dr. Marcelino
Reysio-Cruz, Jr., a plastic and reconstruction surgeon in the Philippines, who issued a medical certificate
attesting that he (petitioner) had in fact undergone the procedure.

From then on, petitioner lived as a female and was in fact engaged to be married. He then sought to have his
name in his birth certificate changed from "Rommel Jacinto" to "Mely," and his sex from "male" to "female."
An order setting the case for initial hearing was published in the People’s Journal Tonight, a newspaper of
general circulation in Metro Manila, for three consecutive weeks.3 Copies of the order were sent to the Office of
the Solicitor General (OSG) and the civil registrar of Manila.

On the scheduled initial hearing, jurisdictional requirements were established. No opposition to the petition was
made.

During trial, petitioner testified for himself. He also presented Dr. Reysio-Cruz, Jr. and his American fiancé,
Richard P. Edel, as witnesses.

On June 4, 2003, the trial court rendered a decision4 in favor of petitioner. Its relevant portions read:

Petitioner filed the present petition not to evade any law or judgment or any infraction thereof or for any
unlawful motive but solely for the purpose of making his birth records compatible with his present sex.

The sole issue here is whether or not petitioner is entitled to the relief asked for.

The [c]ourt rules in the affirmative.

Firstly, the [c]ourt is of the opinion that granting the petition would be more in consonance with the
principles of justice and equity. With his sexual [re-assignment], petitioner, who has always felt, thought
and acted like a woman, now possesses the physique of a female. Petitioner’s misfortune to be trapped
in a man’s body is not his own doing and should not be in any way taken against him.

Likewise, the [c]ourt believes that no harm, injury [or] prejudice will be caused to anybody or the
community in granting the petition. On the contrary, granting the petition would bring the much-awaited
happiness on the part of the petitioner and her [fiancé] and the realization of their dreams.

Finally, no evidence was presented to show any cause or ground to deny the present petition despite due
notice and publication thereof. Even the State, through the [OSG] has not seen fit to interpose any
[o]pposition.

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered GRANTING the petition and ordering the Civil Registrar
of Manila to change the entries appearing in the Certificate of Birth of [p]etitioner, specifically for
petitioner’s first name from "Rommel Jacinto" to MELY and petitioner’s gender from "Male"
to FEMALE. 5

On August 18, 2003, the Republic of the Philippines (Republic), thru the OSG, filed a petition for certiorari in
the Court of Appeals.6 It alleged that there is no law allowing the change of entries in the birth certificate by
reason of sex alteration.

On February 23, 2006, the Court of Appeals7 rendered a decision8 in favor of the Republic. It ruled that the trial
court’s decision lacked legal basis. There is no law allowing the change of either name or sex in the certificate
of birth on the ground of sex reassignment through surgery. Thus, the Court of Appeals granted the Republic’s
petition, set aside the decision of the trial court and ordered the dismissal of SP Case No. 02-105207. Petitioner
moved for reconsideration but it was denied.9 Hence, this petition.

Petitioner essentially claims that the change of his name and sex in his birth certificate is allowed under Articles
407 to 413 of the Civil Code, Rules 103 and 108 of the Rules of Court and RA 9048.10

The petition lacks merit.

A Person’s First Name Cannot Be Changed On the Ground of Sex Reassignment

Petitioner invoked his sex reassignment as the ground for his petition for change of name and sex. As found by
the trial court:

Petitioner filed the present petition not to evade any law or judgment or any infraction thereof or for any
unlawful motive but solely for the purpose of making his birth records compatible with his present
sex. (emphasis supplied)

Petitioner believes that after having acquired the physical features of a female, he became entitled to the civil
registry changes sought. We disagree.

The State has an interest in the names borne by individuals and entities for purposes of identification.11 A
change of name is a privilege, not a right.12 Petitions for change of name are controlled by statutes.13 In this
connection, Article 376 of the Civil Code provides:

ART. 376. No person can change his name or surname without judicial authority.

This Civil Code provision was amended by RA 9048 (Clerical Error Law). In particular, Section 1 of RA 9048
provides:

SECTION 1. Authority to Correct Clerical or Typographical Error and Change of First Name or
Nickname.  – No entry in a civil register shall be changed or corrected without a judicial order, except for
clerical or typographical errors and change of first name or nickname which can be corrected or changed
by the concerned city or municipal civil registrar or consul general in accordance with the provisions of
this Act and its implementing rules and regulations.

RA 9048 now governs the change of first name.14 It vests the power and authority to entertain petitions for
change of first name to the city or municipal civil registrar or consul general concerned. Under the law,
therefore, jurisdiction over applications for change of first name is now primarily lodged with the
aforementioned administrative officers. The intent and effect of the law is to exclude the change of first name
from the coverage of Rules 103 (Change of Name) and 108 (Cancellation or Correction of Entries in the Civil
Registry) of the Rules of Court, until and unless an administrative petition for change of name is first filed and
subsequently denied.15 It likewise lays down the corresponding venue,16 form17 and procedure. In sum, the
remedy and the proceedings regulating change of first name are primarily administrative in nature, not judicial.

RA 9048 likewise provides the grounds for which change of first name may be allowed:

SECTION 4. Grounds for Change of First Name or Nickname. – The petition for change of first name
or nickname may be allowed in any of the following cases:

(1) The petitioner finds the first name or nickname to be ridiculous, tainted with dishonor or extremely
difficult to write or pronounce;

(2) The new first name or nickname has been habitually and continuously used by the petitioner and he
has been publicly known by that first name or nickname in the community; or

(3) The change will avoid confusion.

Petitioner’s basis in praying for the change of his first name was his sex reassignment. He intended to make his
first name compatible with the sex he thought he transformed himself into through surgery. However, a change
of name does not alter one’s legal capacity or civil status.18 RA 9048 does not sanction a change of first name
on the ground of sex reassignment. Rather than avoiding confusion, changing petitioner’s first name for his
declared purpose may only create grave complications in the civil registry and the public interest.

Before a person can legally change his given name, he must present proper or reasonable cause or any
compelling reason justifying such change.19 In addition, he must show that he will be prejudiced by the use of
his true and official name.20 In this case, he failed to show, or even allege, any prejudice that he might suffer as
a result of using his true and official name.

In sum, the petition in the trial court in so far as it prayed for the change of petitioner’s first name was not
within that court’s primary jurisdiction as the petition should have been filed with the local civil registrar
concerned, assuming it could be legally done. It was an improper remedy because the proper remedy was
administrative, that is, that provided under RA 9048. It was also filed in the wrong venue as the proper venue
was in the Office of the Civil Registrar of Manila where his birth certificate is kept. More importantly, it had no
merit since the use of his true and official name does not prejudice him at all. For all these reasons, the Court of
Appeals correctly dismissed petitioner’s petition in so far as the change of his first name was concerned.

No Law Allows The Change of Entry In The Birth Certificate As To Sex On the Ground of Sex
Reassignment

The determination of a person’s sex appearing in his birth certificate is a legal issue and the court must look to
the statutes.21 In this connection, Article 412 of the Civil Code provides:

ART. 412. No entry in the civil register shall be changed or corrected without a judicial order.

Together with Article 376 of the Civil Code, this provision was amended by RA 9048 in so far as clerical or
typographical errors are involved. The correction or change of such matters can now be made through
administrative proceedings and without the need for a judicial order. In effect, RA 9048 removed from the
ambit of Rule 108 of the Rules of Court the correction of such errors.22 Rule 108 now applies only to substantial
changes and corrections in entries in the civil register.23

Section 2(c) of RA 9048 defines what a "clerical or typographical error" is:

SECTION 2. Definition of Terms. – As used in this Act, the following terms shall mean:

xxx       xxx       xxx

(3) "Clerical or typographical error" refers to a mistake committed in the performance of clerical
work in writing, copying, transcribing or typing an entry in the civil register that is harmless and
innocuous, such as misspelled name or misspelled place of birth or the like, which is visible to
the eyes or obvious to the understanding, and can be corrected or changed only by reference to
other existing record or records: Provided, however, That no correction must involve the
change of nationality, age, status or sex of the petitioner. (emphasis supplied)

Under RA 9048, a correction in the civil registry involving the change of sex is not a mere clerical or
typographical error. It is a substantial change for which the applicable procedure is Rule 108 of the Rules of
Court.

The entries envisaged in Article 412 of the Civil Code and correctable under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court are
those provided in Articles 407 and 408 of the Civil Code:24
 ART. 407. Acts, events and judicial decrees concerning the civil status of persons shall be recorded in
the civil register.

ART. 408. The following shall be entered in the civil register:

(1) Births; (2) marriages; (3) deaths; (4) legal separations; (5) annulments of marriage; (6) judgments
declaring marriages void from the beginning; (7) legitimations; (8) adoptions; (9) acknowledgments of
natural children; (10) naturalization; (11) loss, or (12) recovery of citizenship; (13) civil interdiction;
(14) judicial determination of filiation; (15) voluntary emancipation of a minor; and (16) changes of
name.

The acts, events or factual errors contemplated under Article 407 of the Civil Code include even those that
occur after birth.25 However, no reasonable interpretation of the provision can justify the conclusion that it
covers the correction on the ground of sex reassignment.

To correct simply means "to make or set aright; to remove the faults or error from" while to change means "to
replace something with something else of the same kind or with something that serves as a substitute."26 The
birth certificate of petitioner contained no error. All entries therein, including those corresponding to his first
name and sex, were all correct. No correction is necessary.

Article 407 of the Civil Code authorizes the entry in the civil registry of certain acts (such as legitimations,
acknowledgments of illegitimate children and naturalization), events (such as births, marriages, naturalization
and deaths) and judicial decrees (such as legal separations, annulments of marriage, declarations of nullity of
marriages, adoptions, naturalization, loss or recovery of citizenship, civil interdiction, judicial determination of
filiation and changes of name). These acts, events and judicial decrees produce legal consequences that touch
upon the legal capacity, status and nationality of a person. Their effects are expressly sanctioned by the laws. In
contrast, sex reassignment is not among those acts or events mentioned in Article 407. Neither is it recognized
nor even mentioned by any law, expressly or impliedly.

"Status" refers to the circumstances affecting the legal situation (that is, the sum total of capacities and
incapacities) of a person in view of his age, nationality and his family membership.27

The status of a person in law includes all his personal qualities and relations, more or less permanent
in nature, not ordinarily terminable at his own will, such as his being legitimate or illegitimate, or his
being married or not. The comprehensive term status… include such matters as the beginning and end of
legal personality, capacity to have rights in general, family relations, and its various aspects, such as
birth, legitimation, adoption, emancipation, marriage, divorce, and sometimes even
succession.28 (emphasis supplied)

A person’s sex is an essential factor in marriage and family relations. It is a part of a person’s legal capacity and
civil status. In this connection, Article 413 of the Civil Code provides:

ART. 413. All other matters pertaining to the registration of civil status shall be governed by special
laws.

But there is no such special law in the Philippines governing sex reassignment and its effects. This is fatal to
petitioner’s cause.

Moreover, Section 5 of Act 3753 (the Civil Register Law) provides:

SEC. 5. Registration and certification of births.  – The declaration of the physician or midwife in
attendance at the birth or, in default thereof, the declaration of either parent of the newborn child, shall
 be sufficient for the registration of a birth in the civil register. Such declaration shall be exempt from
documentary stamp tax and shall be sent to the local civil registrar not later than thirty days after the
birth, by the physician or midwife in attendance at the birth or by either parent of the newborn child.

In such declaration, the person above mentioned shall certify to the following facts: (a) date and hour of
birth; (b) sex and nationality of infant; (c) names, citizenship and religion of parents or, in case the
father is not known, of the mother alone; (d) civil status of parents; (e) place where the infant was born;
and (f) such other data as may be required in the regulations to be issued.

xxx       xxx       xxx (emphasis supplied)

Under the Civil Register Law, a birth certificate is a historical record of the facts as they existed at the time of
birth.29 Thus, the sex of a person is determined at birth, visually done by the birth attendant (the physician or
midwife) by examining the genitals of the infant. Considering that there is no law legally recognizing sex
reassignment, the determination of a person’s sex made at the time of his or her birth, if not attended by
error,30 is immutable.31

When words are not defined in a statute they are to be given their common and ordinary meaning in the absence
of a contrary legislative intent. The words "sex," "male" and "female" as used in the Civil Register Law and
laws concerning the civil registry (and even all other laws) should therefore be understood in their common and
ordinary usage, there being no legislative intent to the contrary. In this connection, sex is defined as "the sum of
peculiarities of structure and function that distinguish a male from a female"32 or "the distinction between male
and female."33 Female is "the sex that produces ova or bears young"34 and male is "the sex that has organs to
produce spermatozoa for fertilizing ova."35 Thus, the words "male" and "female" in everyday understanding do
not include persons who have undergone sex reassignment. Furthermore, "words that are employed in a statute
which had at the time a well-known meaning are presumed to have been used in that sense unless the context
compels to the contrary."36 Since the statutory language of the Civil Register Law was enacted in the early
1900s and remains unchanged, it cannot be argued that the term "sex" as used then is something alterable
through surgery or something that allows a post-operative male-to-female transsexual to be included in the
category "female."

For these reasons, while petitioner may have succeeded in altering his body and appearance through the
intervention of modern surgery, no law authorizes the change of entry as to sex in the civil registry for that
reason. Thus, there is no legal basis for his petition for the correction or change of the entries in his birth
certificate.

Neither May Entries in the Birth Certificate As to First Name or Sex Be Changed on the Ground of
Equity

The trial court opined that its grant of the petition was in consonance with the principles of justice and equity. It
believed that allowing the petition would cause no harm, injury or prejudice to anyone. This is wrong.

The changes sought by petitioner will have serious and wide-ranging legal and public policy consequences.
First, even the trial court itself found that the petition was but petitioner’s first step towards his eventual
marriage to his male fiancé. However, marriage, one of the most sacred social institutions, is a special contract
of permanent union between a man and a woman.37 One of its essential requisites is the legal capacity of the
contracting parties who must be a male and a female.38 To grant the changes sought by petitioner will
substantially reconfigure and greatly alter the laws on marriage and family relations. It will allow the union of a
man with another man who has undergone sex reassignment (a male-to-female post-operative transsexual).
Second, there are various laws which apply particularly to women such as the provisions of the Labor Code on
employment of women,39 certain felonies under the Revised Penal Code40 and the presumption of survivorship
in case of calamities under Rule 131 of the Rules of Court,41 among others. These laws underscore the public
policy in relation to women which could be substantially affected if petitioner’s petition were to be granted.

It is true that Article 9 of the Civil Code mandates that "[n]o judge or court shall decline to render judgment by
reason of the silence, obscurity or insufficiency of the law." However, it is not a license for courts to engage in
judicial legislation. The duty of the courts is to apply or interpret the law, not to make or amend it.

In our system of government, it is for the legislature, should it choose to do so, to determine what guidelines
should govern the recognition of the effects of sex reassignment. The need for legislative guidelines becomes
particularly important in this case where the claims asserted are statute-based.

To reiterate, the statutes define who may file petitions for change of first name and for correction or change of
entries in the civil registry, where they may be filed, what grounds may be invoked, what proof must be
presented and what procedures shall be observed. If the legislature intends to confer on a person who has
undergone sex reassignment the privilege to change his name and sex to conform with his reassigned sex, it has
to enact legislation laying down the guidelines in turn governing the conferment of that privilege.

It might be theoretically possible for this Court to write a protocol on when a person may be recognized as
having successfully changed his sex. However, this Court has no authority to fashion a law on that matter, or on
anything else. The Court cannot enact a law where no law exists. It can only apply or interpret the written word
of its co-equal branch of government, Congress.

Petitioner pleads that "[t]he unfortunates are also entitled to a life of happiness, contentment and [the]
realization of their dreams." No argument about that. The Court recognizes that there are people whose
preferences and orientation do not fit neatly into the commonly recognized parameters of social convention and
that, at least for them, life is indeed an ordeal. However, the remedies petitioner seeks involve questions of
public policy to be addressed solely by the legislature, not by the courts.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED.

Costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

Decision 5 G.R. No. 249011 Ruling of the Court of Appeals By its assailed Decision15 dated July 24, 2019, the
Court of Appeals affirmed. The Court of Appeals ruled that Article 78 of the old Civil Code was unequivocal -it
only referred to celebration of marriage. There was nothing therein implying that the framers also intended to
include the validity of divorce decreed in accordance with non-Christian rites or customs. As the statute is clear,
its literal meaning must be applied without attempt at any further interpretation.16 More, Section 8, Rule VI of
the Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of Republic Act No. 83 71 (RA 83 71 ), otherwise known as the
Indigenous People's Rights Act of 1997 (IPRA) also limits the State's recognition of marriages to those
solemnized pursuant to the non-Christian's rites and customs. It does not mention anything about the State
recognition of dissolution of marriages in accordance with non-Christian practices.17 It is true that the State has
permitted divorce between Muslim Fi lipinos after the enactment of the Code of Muslim Personal Laws; but
not divorce in other local tribes.18 The Court of Appeals opined that while it commiserated with the plight of
petitioners and the rest of those non-Christians who contracted subsequent marriages, honestly believing that
their previous marriages had already been dissolved by a divorce decree in accordance with their customs, the
court cannot do anything as the matter is for the exclusive consideration of the legislature and not of the
judiciary. 19 The Present Petition Petitioners now pray that the disposition of the Court of Appeals be reversed
and set aside. They maintain that Pedrito' s marriage with Virginia had already been legally dissolved before he
got married to their mother Pepang. As marriages solemnized in accordance with a tribe's customs and rites are
recognized by the State, the subsequent dissolution of these marriages in accordance with the same customs and
rites must also be recognized. 20 15 Penned by Associate Justice Tita Marilyn Payoyo-Villordon and concurred
in by Associate Justice Ricardo R. Rosario (now a member of the Court) and Associate Justice Victoria Isabel
A. Paredes, id. at 23-34. 16 Id. at 30. 17 /d.at31. 18 Id. at 32-33. 19 Id. at 33. 20 Id. at 15. f
Decision 6 G.R. No. 249011 Admittedly, Article 78 did not expressly state that marriages may be dissolved
according to customs, rites, or practices of non-Christians, but it cannot be denied that the framers of the law
intended to recognize all the existing customs, rites, or practices of non-Christians, for how else would a
marriage solemnized in accordance with non-Christian's customs, rites, or practices be dissolved if not in also
accordance with the same customs, rites, or practices?21 The Court of Appeals also failed to give due attention
to the IPRA. Its passage has been the very legal basis of the recognition of customary laws and practices of the
indigenous people (IPs) and indigenous cultural communities (ICCs). It is a policy of the State to maintain the
cultural integrity of the IC Cs and f Ps .22 This is precisely the reason why the Philippine Statistics Authority
(PSA) now applies Administrative Order No. 3 (AO 3), Series of 2004 to govern the procedures and guidelines
for the effective civil registration, among others, of births, marriages, dissolution of marriages, and other civil
concerns of the ICCs and IPs. It defines dissolution of marriage among IPs as the termination of marriage per
ruling of the council of elders for causes sanctioned by established customary laws or practices after exhausting
all possible means of reconciliation between the couple. This was what happened to the marriage of Pedrito and
Virginia. The Ibaloi council of elders decreed their separation and thereafter allowed their father to marry their
mother.23 In their Opposition/Motion to Deny Due Course24 dated October 28, 2019, respondents pray that the
petition be denied due course on ground that petitioners failed to furnish their (respondents) counsel with a
copy of the petition. Petitioners only sent a copy of the petition to them, not their counsel in violation of Section
5, Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court and of established jurisprudence stating that service must be made to
counsel if the adverse party is represented by one. They were duly represented by counsel, hence, service of the
petition should have been made on their counsel. The State, on the other hand, through Assistant Solicitor
General Rex Bernardo L. Pascual, Senior State Solicitor Joel N. Villaseran, and State Solicitor Soleil C. Flores,
avers25 that the marriage between Pedrito and Pepang is void. Customs and traditions cannot be made to apply
over and above existing laws unless otherwise allowed by these laws. The old civil code which was in effect at
the time Pedrito and Pepang got married simply 2 1 Id. at 17. 22 ld.atl7-l8. 23 Id. at 18-19. 24 Id. at 70-76. 25
/d.atl03-l16. f
Decision 7 G.R. No. 249011 stated that marriages may be performed in accordance with the parties' customs,
rites, or practices. It did not state that marriages may be dissolved according to these customs, rites, and
practices. Nothing therein implied that the lawmakers intended to allow as well securing a divorce in
accordance with tribal customs, rites, or practices.26 More, customs must be proven as a fact. Here,
petitioners failed to sufficiently prove their specific customs, if any, governing divorce. They did not present
evidence that conclusively establish that Pedrito's purported divorce from Virginia was in accord with their
customs. They similarly failed to present any ruling or decision rendered by the council of elders supposedly
approving the dissolution of Pedrito's marriage with Virginia. Further, they failed to prove that Pedrito and
Virginia complied with the required rituals for completion of the divorce process. In fine, it cannot be safely
assumed that Pedrito's marriage with Virginia was validly tenninated.27 Issue Is Pedri to Anaban' s divorce
from Virginia Erasmo claimed to have been decreed in accordance with the Ibaloi customs be recognized under
our laws? Ruling We answer in the negative. At the threshold, we emphasize that the action below is for
partition of Pedrito's estate. In determining who should succeed to the estate, the court may pass upon the
validity of the subsequent marriage between Pedrito and Pepang. Thus, in De Castro v. Assidao-De Castro,28
the Court decreed: However, other than for purposes of remarriage, no judicial action is necessary to declare a
marriage an absolute nullity. For other purposes, such as but not limited to determination of heirship, legitimacy
or illegitimacy of a child, settlement of estate, dissolution of property regime, or a criminal case for that matter,
the court may pass upon the validity of marriage even in a suit not directly instituted to question the same so
long as it is essential to the determination of the case. This is without prejudice to any issue that may arise in
the case. When such need arises, a final judgment of declaration of nullity is necessary even if the purpose is
other than to remarry. The clause "on the basis of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void" in
Article 40 of the Family Code connotes that such final judgment need not be obtained only for purpose of
remarriage. 26 Id. at I 08-109. 27 Rollo, pp. I I 0-28 568 Phil. 724, 731-732 (2008), citing Nina/ v. Bayadog,
384 Phil. 661, 675 (2000).
Decision 8 G.R. No. 249011 Likewise, in Nicdao Carino v. Yee Carino, the Court ruled that it is clothed with
sufficient authority to pass upon the validity of two marriages despite the main case being a claim for death
benefits. Reiterating Nina!, we held that the Court may pass upon the validity of a marriage even in a suit not
directly instituted to question the validity of said marriage, so long as it is essential to the determination of the
case. However, evidence must be adduced, testimonial or documentary, to prove the existence of grounds
rendering such a marriage an absolute nullity. (Empahsis supplied) Here, there is no dispute that Pedrito was
first married to Virginia, although petitioners assert this marriage was later on validly dissolved by the divorce
decree handed down by the Ibaloi council of elders which consequently allowed Pedrito to remarry. The
question now comes to fore: can the divorce granted under Ibaloi customs and practices be legally recognized as
to make Pedri to' s subsequent marriage to Pepang as valid. All of the courts below resolved the validity of the
so-called divorce between Pedrito and Virginia through the lens of the old Civil Code. But, in reality, when
Pedrito and Virginia got married and even when they later on supposedly divorced, the old Civil Code was not
yet in effect. For it took effect on June 18, 1949, or two (2) years after the divorce decree was purportedly
handed down by the Ibaloi council of elders. The law in effect prior thereto was still the Spanish Civil Code of
1889, Article 5 of which stated: 29 Article 5. Laws are abrogated only by other subsequent laws, and the disuse
or any custom or practice to the contrary shall not prevail against their observance. (Emphasis supplied) This
was the equivalent of Article 11 of the old Civil Code which provides that customs which are contrary to law,
public order or public policy shall not be countenanced. For purposes of determining whether divorce was
contrary to law, public order or public policy at the time Pedrito and Virginia allegedly obtained their own
divorce, we trace back the history of divorce or dissolution of marriage starting from the Spanish regime.
During the Spanish colonization, Las Siete Partidas was passed which only allowed relative divorce or what is
known now as legal separation. This allowed spouses to be free of all marital obligations while their marriage
subsists in the eyes of the law. In 1917, however, Las Siete 29 See the Spanish Code of 1889 translation at
https:/ /arch i ve.org/stream/spanishcivi lcode00spairich/span ishcivi lcode00spairich d jvu. txt last accessed on
November 12, 2020.
Decision 9 GR. No. 249011 Partidas was repealed by Act No. 271030 which took effect on March 11, 1917.
Section 1 of Act No. 2710 reads: Section 1. A petition for divorce can only be filed for adultery on the part of
the wife or concubinage on the part of the husband, committed in any of the forms described in article four
hundred and thirty-seven of the Penal Code. Divorce, then, can be granted only on two (2) grounds, i.e.,
adultery and concubinage. This was the prevailing law when Pedrito and Virginia got married in 1942. In 1943,
however, during the Japanese occupation, Act No. 2710 was abolished and Executive Order No. 141 (EO 141)
was enacted and took effect on March 25, 1943. Under EO 141, absolute divorce may be granted on these
grounds: (a) adultery and concubinage; (b) attempt on the life of one spouse by the other; ( c) a subsequent
marriage by either party before the previous one was dissolved; ( d) loathsome contagious diseases contracted
by either spouse; ( e) incurable insanity; (f) impotency; (g) repeated bodily violence by one against the other;
(h) intentional or unjustified desertion continuously for at least one year; (i) unexplained absence from the last
conjugal abode continuously for at least three years; and (j) slander by deed or gross insult by one spouse
against the other. Only a little over a year, however, after the Americans had taken over the Japanese as
colonizers again of the Philippines, EO 141 became ineffective and Act No. 2710, which allowed divorce on
ground of concubinage and adultery, was once again reinstated. This was the prevailing law when Pedrito and
Virginia were granted divorce by the Ibaloi council of elders in 194 7. Thus, in 1947, only two (2) grounds
were accepted for divorce, i.e., adultery and concubinage. Neither was the reason for Pedrito and Virginia's
divorce. The Ibaloi council of elders granted the divorce on ground of Virginia's alleged insanity. The divorce,
therefore, is contrary to law, hence, cannot be recognized. The issue of whether divorce based on customs and
practices can be legally recognized during the effectivity of Act No. 2710 has been resolved by the Court as
early as 1933 in People v. Bitdu.3 1 The Court held that Mora Bitdu's divorce from Moro Halid in accordance
with the Mohammedan customs cannot be recognized. For divorce cannot be had except in that court upon
which the state has conferred jurisdiction, and then only for those causes and with those formalities which the
state has, by statute, prescribed. The Court explained: 30 An Act to Establish Divorce. 31 58 Phil. 817, 821-822
(1933).
Decision 10 GR. No. 249011 There is little to add to the well considered decision of the trial judge. It seems to
us unnecessary to determine whether or not the divorce in ques-tion was granted in accordance with the
Mohammedan religious practices, as to which there seems to exist considerable uncertainty, because in our
view of the case a valid divorce can be granted only by the courts and for the reasons specified in Act No.
2710. It is not claimed that the ap-pellant was divorced from her first husband in accordance with said Act. In
the case of Francisco vs. Tayao (50 Phil., 42), it was held that in the Philippines the causes for divorce are
prescribed by statute or Act No. 2710 that ( of adultery on the part of the) wife or concubinage on the part of the
husband. In the recent decision of People vs. Bituanan (Moro), (56 Phil., 23), where the defendant and a Moro
woman were married by a datu according to Moro customs and usages and afterwards divorced by the datu
according to the same customs and usages, it was held that the marriage performed according to the rites of the
Mohammedan religion was valid, and as-sumed, for the purpose of that case, that the defendant and his wife
were not legally divorced. Section 25 of the Marriage Law (Act No. 3613) provides that marriages between
Mohammedans may be performed in accordance with the rites or practice of their religion, but there is no
provision of law which author-izes the granting of divorces in accordance with the rites or practices of their
religion. A divorce cannot be had except in that court upon which the state has conferred jurisdiction, and then
only for those causes and with those formalities which the state has by statute prescribed (19 C.J., 19). It is
conceded in all jurisdictions that public policy, good morals, and the interests of society require that the
marriage relation should be sounded with every safeguard and its severance allowed only in the manner
prescribed and for the causes specified by law. And the parties can waive nothing essential to the validity of the
proceedings (19 C.J., 20). With respect to the contention that the appellant acted in good faith in contracting
second marriage, believing that she had been validly di-vorced from her first husband, it is sufficient to say that
everyone is presumed to know the law, and the fact that one does not know that is act constitutes a violation of
the law does not exempt him from the consequences thereof.xx x (Emphasis supplied) As the trial court in Bitdu
held, the laws governing marriage and its incidents are moral in nature and as such they are laws relating to
public policy. The habits and customs of a people, the dogmas and doctrines of a religion cannot be superior to
or have precedence over laws relating to public policy, because as stated above laws relating to marriage and its
incidents are normal in nature and as such they affect public policy. This holds true even up to this time.
Decision 11 G.R. No. 249011 Since there was no legal and valid ground for the divorce of Pedrito and Virginia,
in the eyes of the law, they were still married and their marriage was not dissolved as to permit Pedrito to
remarry. Pedrito's subsequent marriage to petitioners' mother Pepang, therefore, is void for being bigamous.
Verily, the RTC and the Court of Appeals did not err when they ruled so and declared petitioners as Pedrito's
illegitimate children. Petitioners insists, however, that since the old Civil Code and the IPRA recognize
customs in the solemnization of marriage, the same should be applied in cases of dissolution as marriage. But,
as discussed, customs which are contrary to law, public policy and public order cannot be recognized. Also,
even assuming that the old Civil Code was applicable in the present case, the Court would arrive at the same
conclusion. Article 78 of the old Civil Code provided: Article 78. Marriages between Mohammedans or pagans
who live in the non-Christian provinces may be performed in accordance with their customs, rites or practices.
No marriage license or formal requisites shall be necessary. Nor shall the persons solemnizing these marriages
be obliged to comply with Article 92. XXX XXX XXX Section 8, Rule 6 of the IRR of IPRA is similarly
worded: Section 8. Recognition of Customary Laws and Practices Governing Civil Relations. Marriage as an
inviolable social institution shall be protected. Marriages performed in accordance with customary laws, rites,
traditions and practices shall be recognized as valid. As proof of marriage, the testimony of authorized
community elders or authorities of traditional sociopolitical structures shall be recognized as evidence of
marriage for purposes of registration. x x x Clearly, both the old Civil Code and the IPRA-IRR prov1s10ns
limited the State recognition to "marriages performed" in accordance with customary laws, rites, traditions, and
practices. There is no mention of the recognition of dissolution of marriage in accordance with the IP's customs.
On this score, we emphasize that Muslim customs, rites, and practices are the only non-Christian customary law
recognized by the State through the enactment of Presidential Decree No. 1083 otherwise known as the Code of
Muslim Personal Laws of the Philippines.32 The same in fact bears an entire chapter exclusively dedicated to
divorce. Notably, its applicability clause states: 32 S igned by former President Ferdinand E. Marcos on
February 4 , 1977.
Decision 12 GR. No. 249011 Article 13. Application. (1) The provisions of this Title shall apply to marriage
and divorce wherein both parties are Muslims, or wherein only the male party is a Muslim and the marriage is
solemnized in accordance with Muslim law or this Code in any part of the Philippines. At present, there is no
similar law explicitly recogmzmg the matrimonial customs, rites, and practices of the Ibaloi Tribe. Even if we
are to assume that the constitutional and statutory right to cultural integrity includes recognition of indigenous
divorce or any other form of indigenous dissolution of marriages, the record is bereft of evidence that: (i) the
culture of the Ibaloi recognizes divorce or any other form of dissolution of marriage; (ii) this recognition is a
central aspect of their cultural integrity and not merely peripheral to it; (iii) this recognition has been a central
cultural practice since time immemorial and lasted to this day in its modem forms; and (iv) the contents of and
procedures for this central cultural practice, if any. The lead government agency for this determination - in the
words of the learned counsel of the State, the proof of customary law as a fact - is the National Commission on
Indigenous Peoples. But nothing from their end could answer how, why, and when the dissolution of marriages
is central to the right to cultural integrity and what it means to say so. It would, therefore, be speculative at this
point to link this right to cultural integrity to the dissolution of marriages between members of the IP
communities, sans any supporting evidence. Lastly, petitioners invoke PSA's AO 3, series of 2004 governing
the procedures and guidelines for civil registration of births, marriages, dissolution of marriages, and other civil
concerns of the ICCs and IPs. According to petitioners, AO 3 defines dissolution of marriage among IPs as the
termination of marriage per ruling of the council of elders for causes sanctioned by established customary law
or practice after exhausting all possible means of reconciliation between the couple. But, AO 3 only took effect
in 2004, fifty-seven (57) years after the divorce was supposedly granted by the Ibaloi council of elders to
Pedrito and Virginia. It cannot be applied retroactively, but only prospectively. Besides, AO 3 is only a
procedural avenue to recognize divorce or any other form of dissolution of marriage where the substantive law
already recognizes such change in a person's civil status. AO 3 cannot confer substantive rights because the role
of the PSA and now the National Statistics Office is to record the civil status of persons but not to issue laws on
how to obtain or confer status.
Decision 13 GR. No. 249011 All told, we hold that the Court of Appeals did not err in pronouncing that the
marriage of Pedrito and Virginia was not legally dissolved. As a consequence, Pedri to' s subsequent marriage
to Pepang was bigamous, thus, void from the beginning. The status of petitioners as illegitimate children of
Pedrito and their heirship as such insofar as Pedrito's estate is concerned can no longer be questioned.
ACCORDINGLY, the petition is DENIED and the Decision dated July 24, 2019 of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. SP No. 154216 is AFFIRMED. SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 193707               December 10, 2014

NORMA A. DEL SOCORRO, for and in behalf of her minor child RODERIGO NORJO VAN
WILSEM, Petitioner,
vs.
ERNST JOHAN BRINKMAN VAN WILSEM, Respondent.

DECISION

PERALTA, J.:

Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking to reverse and
set aside the Orders1 dated February 19, 2010 and September 1, 2010, respectively, of the Regional Trial Court
of Cebu City (RTC-Cebu), which dismissed the criminal case entitled People of the Philippines v. Ernst Johan
Brinkman Van Wilsem, docketed as Criminal Case No. CBU-85503, for violation of Republic Act (R.A.) No.
9262, otherwise known as the Anti-Violence Against Women and Their Children Act of 2004.

The following facts are culled from the records:

Petitioner Norma A. Del Socorro and respondent Ernst Johan Brinkman Van Wilsem contracted marriage in
Holland on September 25, 1990.2 On January 19, 1994, they were blessed with a son named Roderigo Norjo
Van Wilsem, who at the time of the filing of the instant petition was sixteen (16) years of age.3

Unfortunately, their marriage bond ended on July 19, 1995 by virtue of a Divorce Decree issued by the
appropriate Court of Holland.4 At that time, their son was only eighteen (18) months old.5 Thereafter, petitioner
and her son came home to the Philippines.6

According to petitioner, respondent made a promise to provide monthly support to their son in the amount of
Two Hundred Fifty (250) Guildene (which is equivalent to Php17,500.00 more or less).7 However, since the
arrival of petitioner and her son in the Philippines, respondent never gave support to the son, Roderigo.8

Not long thereafter, respondent cameto the Philippines and remarried in Pinamungahan, Cebu, and since then,
have been residing thereat.9 Respondent and his new wife established a business known as Paree Catering,
located at Barangay Tajao, Municipality of Pinamungahan, Cebu City.10 To date, all the parties, including their
son, Roderigo, are presently living in Cebu City.11

On August 28, 2009, petitioner, through her counsel, sent a letter demanding for support from respondent.
However, respondent refused to receive the letter.12

Because of the foregoing circumstances, petitioner filed a complaint affidavit with the Provincial Prosecutor of
Cebu City against respondent for violation of Section 5, paragraph E(2) of R.A. No. 9262 for the latter’s unjust
refusal to support his minor child with petitioner.13 Respondent submitted his counter-affidavit thereto, to which
petitioner also submitted her reply-affidavit.14 Thereafter, the Provincial Prosecutor of Cebu City issued a
Resolution recommending the filing of an information for the crime charged against herein respondent.

The information, which was filed with the RTC-Cebu and raffled to Branch 20 thereof, states that:

That sometime in the year 1995 and up to the present, more or less, in the Municipality of Minglanilla, Province
of Cebu, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, did then
and there wilfully, unlawfully and deliberately deprive, refuse and still continue to deprive his son RODERIGO
NORJO VAN WILSEM, a fourteen (14) year old minor, of financial support legally due him, resulting in
economic abuse to the victim. CONTRARY TO LAW.15

Upon motion and after notice and hearing, the RTC-Cebu issued a Hold Departure Order against
respondent.16 Consequently, respondent was arrested and, subsequently, posted bail.17 Petitioner also filed a
Motion/Application of Permanent Protection Order to which respondent filed his Opposition.18 Pending the
resolution thereof, respondent was arraigned.19 Subsequently, without the RTC-Cebu having resolved the
application of the protection order, respondent filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground of: (1) lack of
jurisdiction over the offense charged; and (2) prescription of the crime charged.20

On February 19, 2010, the RTC-Cebu issued the herein assailed Order,21 dismissing the instant criminal case
against respondent on the ground that the facts charged in the information do not constitute an offense with
respect to the respondent who is an alien, the dispositive part of which states:

WHEREFORE, the Court finds that the facts charged in the information do not constitute an offense with
respect to the accused, he being an alien, and accordingly, orders this case DISMISSED.

The bail bond posted by accused Ernst Johan Brinkman Van Wilsem for his provisional liberty is hereby
cancelled (sic) and ordered released.

SO ORDERED.

Cebu City, Philippines, February 19, 2010.22

Thereafter, petitioner filed her Motion for Reconsideration thereto reiterating respondent’s obligation to support
their child under Article 19523 of the Family Code, thus, failure to do so makes him liable under R.A. No. 9262
which "equally applies to all persons in the Philippines who are obliged to support their minor children
regardless of the obligor’s nationality."24

On September 1, 2010, the lower court issued an Order25 denying petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration and
reiterating its previous ruling. Thus:

x x x The arguments therein presented are basically a rehash of those advanced earlier in the memorandum of
the prosecution. Thus, the court hereby reiterates its ruling that since the accused is a foreign national he is not
subject to our national law (The Family Code) in regard to a parent’s duty and obligation to givesupport to his
child. Consequently, he cannot be charged of violating R.A. 9262 for his alleged failure to support his child.
Unless it is conclusively established that R.A. 9262 applies to a foreigner who fails to give support tohis child,
notwithstanding that he is not bound by our domestic law which mandates a parent to give such support, it is the
considered opinion of the court that no prima faciecase exists against the accused herein, hence, the case should
be dismissed.

WHEREFORE, the motion for reconsideration is hereby DENIED for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.

Cebu City, Philippines, September 1, 2010.26

Hence, the present Petition for Review on Certiorari raising the following issues:
 1. Whether or not a foreign national has an obligation to support his minor child under Philippine law;
and

2. Whether or not a foreign national can be held criminally liable under R.A. No. 9262 for his unjustified
failure to support his minor child.27

At the outset, let it be emphasized that We are taking cognizance of the instant petition despite the fact that the
same was directly lodged with the Supreme Court, consistent with the ruling in Republic v. Sunvar Realty
Development Corporation,28 which lays down the instances when a ruling of the trial court may be brought on
appeal directly to the Supreme Court without violating the doctrine of hierarchy of courts, to wit:

x x x Nevertheless, the Rules do not prohibit any of the parties from filing a Rule 45 Petition with this Court, in
case only questions of law are raised or involved. This latter situation was one that petitioners found themselves
in when they filed the instant Petition to raise only questions of law. In Republic v. Malabanan, the Court
clarified the three modes of appeal from decisions of the RTC, to wit: (1) by ordinary appeal or appeal by writ
of error under Rule 41, whereby judgment was rendered in a civil or criminal action by the RTC in the exercise
of its original jurisdiction; (2) by a petition for review under Rule 42, whereby judgment was rendered by the
RTC in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction; and (3) by a petition for review on certiorari before the
Supreme Court under Rule 45. "The first mode of appeal is taken to the [Court of Appeals] on questions of fact
or mixed questions of fact and law. The second mode of appeal is brought to the CA on questions of fact, of
law, or mixed questions of fact and law. The third mode of appealis elevated to the Supreme Court only on
questions of law." (Emphasis supplied)

There is a question of law when the issue does not call for an examination of the probative value of the evidence
presented or of the truth or falsehood of the facts being admitted, and the doubt concerns the correct application
of law and jurisprudence on the matter. The resolution of the issue must rest solely on what the law provides on
the given set of circumstances.29

Indeed, the issues submitted to us for resolution involve questions of law – the response thereto concerns the
correct application of law and jurisprudence on a given set of facts, i.e.,whether or not a foreign national has an
obligation to support his minor child under Philippine law; and whether or not he can be held criminally liable
under R.A. No. 9262 for his unjustified failure to do so.

It cannot be negated, moreover, that the instant petition highlights a novel question of law concerning the
liability of a foreign national who allegedly commits acts and omissions punishable under special criminal laws,
specifically in relation to family rights and duties. The inimitability of the factual milieu of the present case,
therefore, deserves a definitive ruling by this Court, which will eventually serve as a guidepost for future cases.
Furthermore, dismissing the instant petition and remanding the same to the CA would only waste the time,
effort and resources of the courts. Thus, in the present case, considerations of efficiency and economy in the
administration of justice should prevail over the observance of the hierarchy of courts.

Now, on the matter of the substantive issues, We find the petition meritorious. Nonetheless, we do not fully
agree with petitioner’s contentions.

To determine whether or not a person is criminally liable under R.A. No. 9262, it is imperative that the legal
obligation to support exists.

Petitioner invokes Article 19530 of the Family Code, which provides the parent’s obligation to support his child.
Petitioner contends that notwithstanding the existence of a divorce decree issued in relation to Article 26 of the
Family Code,31 respondent is not excused from complying with his obligation to support his minor child with
petitioner.
On the other hand, respondent contends that there is no sufficient and clear basis presented by petitioner that
she, as well as her minor son, are entitled to financial support.32 Respondent also added that by reason of the
Divorce Decree, he is not obligated topetitioner for any financial support.33

On this point, we agree with respondent that petitioner cannot rely on Article 19534 of the New Civil Code in
demanding support from respondent, who is a foreign citizen, since Article 1535 of the New Civil Code stresses
the principle of nationality. In other words, insofar as Philippine laws are concerned, specifically the provisions
of the Family Code on support, the same only applies to Filipino citizens. By analogy, the same principle
applies to foreigners such that they are governed by their national law with respect to family rights and duties.36

The obligation to give support to a child is a matter that falls under family rights and duties. Since the
respondent is a citizen of Holland or the Netherlands, we agree with the RTC-Cebu that he is subject to the laws
of his country, not to Philippinelaw, as to whether he is obliged to give support to his child, as well as the
consequences of his failure to do so.37

In the case of Vivo v. Cloribel,38 the Court held that –

Furthermore, being still aliens, they are not in position to invoke the provisions of the Civil Code of the
Philippines, for that Code cleaves to the principle that family rights and duties are governed by their personal
law, i.e.,the laws of the nation to which they belong even when staying in a foreign country (cf. Civil Code,
Article 15).39

It cannot be gainsaid, therefore, that the respondent is not obliged to support petitioner’s son under Article195
of the Family Code as a consequence of the Divorce Covenant obtained in Holland. This does not, however,
mean that respondent is not obliged to support petitioner’s son altogether.

In international law, the party who wants to have a foreign law applied to a dispute or case has the burden of
proving the foreign law.40 In the present case, respondent hastily concludes that being a national of the
Netherlands, he is governed by such laws on the matter of provision of and capacity to support.41 While
respondent pleaded the laws of the Netherlands in advancing his position that he is not obliged to support his
son, he never proved the same.

It is incumbent upon respondent to plead and prove that the national law of the Netherlands does not impose
upon the parents the obligation to support their child (either before, during or after the issuance of a divorce
decree), because Llorente v. Court of Appeals,42 has already enunciated that:

True, foreign laws do not prove themselves in our jurisdiction and our courts are not authorized to takejudicial
notice of them. Like any other fact, they must be alleged and proved.43

In view of respondent’s failure to prove the national law of the Netherlands in his favor, the doctrine of
processual presumption shall govern. Under this doctrine, if the foreign law involved is not properly pleaded
and proved, our courts will presume that the foreign law is the same as our local or domestic or internal
law.44 Thus, since the law of the Netherlands as regards the obligation to support has not been properly pleaded
and proved in the instant case, it is presumed to be the same with Philippine law, which enforces the obligation
of parents to support their children and penalizing the non-compliance therewith.

Moreover, while in Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera,45 the Court held that a divorce obtained in a foreign land as well as
its legal effects may be recognized in the Philippines in view of the nationality principle on the matter of status
of persons, the Divorce Covenant presented by respondent does not completely show that he is notliable to give
support to his son after the divorce decree was issued. Emphasis is placed on petitioner’s allegation that under
the second page of the aforesaid covenant, respondent’s obligation to support his child is specifically
stated,46 which was not disputed by respondent.
We likewise agree with petitioner that notwithstanding that the national law of respondent states that parents
have no obligation to support their children or that such obligation is not punishable by law, said law would still
not find applicability,in light of the ruling in Bank of America, NT and SA v. American Realty Corporation,47 to
wit:

In the instant case, assuming arguendo that the English Law on the matter were properly pleaded and proved in
accordance with Section 24, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court and the jurisprudence laid down in Yao Kee, et al.
vs. Sy-Gonzales, said foreign law would still not find applicability.

Thus, when the foreign law, judgment or contract is contrary to a sound and established public policy of the
forum, the said foreign law, judgment or order shall not be applied.

Additionally, prohibitive laws concerning persons, their acts or property, and those which have for their object
public order, public policy and good customs shall not be rendered ineffective by laws or judgments
promulgated, or by determinations or conventions agreed upon in a foreign country.

The public policy sought to be protected in the instant case is the principle imbedded in our jurisdiction
proscribing the splitting up of a single cause of action.

Section 4, Rule 2 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure is pertinent

If two or more suits are instituted on the basis of the same cause of action, the filing of one or a judgment upon
the merits in any one is available as a ground for the dismissal of the others. Moreover, foreign law should not
be applied when its application would work undeniable injustice to the citizens or residents of the forum. To
give justice is the most important function of law; hence, a law, or judgment or contract that is obviously unjust
negates the fundamental principles of Conflict of Laws.48

Applying the foregoing, even if the laws of the Netherlands neither enforce a parent’s obligation to support his
child nor penalize the noncompliance therewith, such obligation is still duly enforceable in the Philippines
because it would be of great injustice to the child to be denied of financial support when the latter is entitled
thereto.

We emphasize, however, that as to petitioner herself, respondent is no longer liable to support his former wife,
in consonance with the ruling in San Luis v. San Luis,49 to wit:

As to the effect of the divorce on the Filipino wife, the Court ruled that she should no longerbe considered
marriedto the alien spouse. Further, she should not be required to perform her marital duties and obligations. It
held:

To maintain, as private respondent does, that, under our laws, petitioner has to be considered still married to
private respondent and still subject to a wife's obligations under Article 109, et. seq. of the Civil Code cannot be
just. Petitioner should not be obliged to live together with, observe respect and fidelity, and render support to
private respondent. The latter should not continue to be one of her heirs with possible rights to conjugal
property. She should not be discriminated against in her own country if the ends of justice are to be served.
(Emphasis added)50

Based on the foregoing legal precepts, we find that respondent may be made liable under Section 5(e) and (i) of
R.A. No. 9262 for unjustly refusing or failing to give support topetitioner’s son, to wit:
SECTION 5. Acts of Violence Against Women and Their Children.- The crime of violence against women and
their children is committed through any of the following acts:

xxxx

(e) Attempting to compel or compelling the woman or her child to engage in conduct which the woman or her
child has the right to desist from or desist from conduct which the woman or her child has the right to engage in,
or attempting to restrict or restricting the woman's or her child's freedom of movement or conduct by force or
threat of force, physical or other harm or threat of physical or other harm, or intimidation directed against the
woman or child. This shall include, butnot limited to, the following acts committed with the purpose or effect of
controlling or restricting the woman's or her child's movement or conduct:

xxxx

(2) Depriving or threatening to deprive the woman or her children of financial support legally due her or her
family, or deliberately providing the woman's children insufficient financial support; x x x x

(i) Causing mental or emotional anguish, public ridicule or humiliation to the woman or her child, including, but
not limited to, repeated verbal and emotional abuse, and denial of financial support or custody of minor
childrenof access to the woman's child/children.51

Under the aforesaid special law, the deprivation or denial of financial support to the child is considered anact of
violence against women and children.

In addition, considering that respondent is currently living in the Philippines, we find strength in petitioner’s
claim that the Territoriality Principle in criminal law, in relation to Article 14 of the New Civil Code, applies to
the instant case, which provides that: "[p]enal laws and those of public security and safety shall be obligatory
upon all who live and sojourn in Philippine territory, subject to the principle of public international law and to
treaty stipulations." On this score, it is indisputable that the alleged continuing acts of respondent in refusing to
support his child with petitioner is committed here in the Philippines as all of the parties herein are residents of
the Province of Cebu City. As such, our courts have territorial jurisdiction over the offense charged against
respondent. It is likewise irrefutable that jurisdiction over the respondent was acquired upon his arrest.

Finally, we do not agree with respondent’s argument that granting, but not admitting, that there is a legal basis
for charging violation of R.A. No. 9262 in the instant case, the criminal liability has been extinguished on the
ground of prescription of crime52 under Section 24 of R.A. No. 9262, which provides that:

SECTION 24. Prescriptive Period. – Acts falling under Sections 5(a) to 5(f) shall prescribe in twenty (20) years.
Acts falling under Sections 5(g) to 5(I) shall prescribe in ten (10) years.

The act of denying support to a child under Section 5(e)(2) and (i) of R.A. No. 9262 is a continuing
offense,53 which started in 1995 but is still ongoing at present. Accordingly, the crime charged in the instant
case has clearly not prescribed.

Given, however, that the issue on whether respondent has provided support to petitioner’s child calls for an
examination of the probative value of the evidence presented, and the truth and falsehood of facts being
admitted, we hereby remand the determination of this issue to the RTC-Cebu which has jurisdiction over the
case.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Orders dated February 19, 2010 and September 1, 2010,
respectively, of the Regional Trial Court of the City of Cebu are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The case
is REMANDED to the same court to conduct further proceedings based on the merits of the case.
SO ORDERED.