CASE ASSIGNMENT #3 – CONFLICTS OF LAW  It must first obtain la license to transact business in the

Philipppines, and a certificate from the appropriate government

1. CDMI (ASPAC) vs CA and ITEC Inc.
Topic: Foreign corporation doing business in the Philippines
without license; requisites for a court to aquire jurisdiction in a
COL case, estoppel, doctrine of lack of capacity to sue, forum
non conveniens;
Facts:
1. CDMI (ASPAC) (domestic corp) entered into a “representative
agreement” with ITEC Inc (foreign corporation unlicensed-
USA ALBAMA) where in the former were appointed as local
technical representatives to create a service center for ITEC
products sold locally.
2. ITEC terminated its contract because of the alleged violations
of CDMI. It was alleged that CDMI uses its acquired
knowledge and info of ITEC’s product to develop their own
line of product. Hence, ITEC filed a complaint in RTC Makati
against CDMI for:
a. Cease and desist from selling copied products from ITEC
b. Cease and desist from using its corporate name in all its
dealing
c. Recovery of damages
3. CDMI filed a motion to dismiss on the following grounds:
a. Plaintiff ITEC has no legal capacity to sue because it is an
unlicensed foreign corporation doing business in the
Philippines
b. Plaintiff ITEC is simply engaged in forum shopping and
that forum non conveniens principle should be applied
against it.
4. RTC and CA ruled in favor of ITEC and dismissed the motion
to dismiss
5. Petitioner CDMI elevated the case under rule 45 before SC
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not private respondent ITEC is an unlicensed
corporation doing business in the Philippines - YES
2. If yes, whether or not it is barred from invoking the
injunctive authority of Philippine courts (to sue) – NO
Held:
1. SC is persuaded that ITEC is doing business in the Philippines
scrutinizing the contracts entered into with ASPAC and TESSI.
These entities indicate that ITEC’s Purpose is to bring about the
situation among its customers and the general public that there
are dealing directly with ITEEC and that that ITEEC is actively
engaging in business in the country. As per usual, it shows that
there are provisions which are highly restrictive in nature, such
as to reduce petitioner ASPAC to a mere extension or instrument
of the private respondent. The terms and conditions of the
contract as well as ITEC’s conduct indicate that they establish
within the Philippines a continuous business, and not merely one
of temporary character.
2. No. ITEC may sue in the Philippines although not authorized to
do business here in the Philippines against a Philippine citizen or
entity who had contracted with and benefited by said
corporation. ASPAC is stopped to challenge the personality of a
corporation acter acknowledging the same by entering into a
contract with it,. This is to prevent a person contracting with a
foreign corporation from later taking advantage of its non-
compliance with the state especially when such person received
benefits from such contract.
agencies.
 Unlicensed FC doing business in the Philippines – sue or be sued
rules:
a. GENERAL RULE – shall not be permitted to maintain or
intervene in any action, suit or proceeding in any court,
administrative agency, but it may be sued on any valid cause
of action recognized under the Philippine Laws
 Purpose of requiring license and to appoint an agent for
service of processes is so that Philippine courts may
acquire jurisdiction
 Legislature does not intent to prevent FC from
performing single acts, but to prevent it from acquiring a
domicile for the purpose of business without taking
necessary steps to render it open to suit in local courts
b. EXCEPTION – ESTOPPEL by the person or entity who entered
into a contract and benefited by such with the Foreign
corporation
 FC although not authorized to do business here in the
Philippines against a Philippine citizen or entity who had
contracted with and benefited by said corporation.
 DOCTRINE OF LACK OF CAPACITY TO SUE – license
requirement is imposed to subject the FC doing business
to the jurisdiction of the court. It was NEVER intended to
favor domestic corporations who enter into transactions
with foreign firms and then repudiate their obligations
simply because the latter are not licensed to do business
in this country
 A foreign corporation may be exempted from the license
requirement in order to institute an action in our courts if
its representative in the country maintained an
independent status during the existence of the disputed
contract.
 The parties are charged with knowledge of the existing law at
the time they enter into a contract and at the time it is to
become operative—and, a person is presumed to be more
knowledgeable about his own state law than his alien or foreign
contemporary.
 In this case, the record shows that, at least, petitioner had
actual knowledge of the applicability of R.A. No. 5455 at the time
the contract was executed and at all times thereafter. This
conclusion is compelled by the fact that the same statute is now
being propounded by the petitioner to bolster its claim.

Rationale:

 True test what constitutes “Doing business in the Philippines” –

whether the FC is continuing the body or substance of the
business or enterprise for which it was organized. There is no
exact rule – must be adjudged upon its peculiar facts and the
applicable statute.
 Foreign Corporation – has no legal existence with the state in
which it is foreign, since judicial existence of a corporation
confined only within the territory of the state under which it was
organized and incorporated.
 2. General Milling Corporation vs. Torres (196 SCRA 215 [G.R
No. 9366, April 22, 1991])
FACTS:
Earl Timothy Cone is a US citizen, who was hired by General
Milling as a sports consultant and assistant coach. He possessed
an alien employment permit which was changed to pre-arranged
employee by the Board of Special Inquiry of the Commission on
Immigration and Deportation. GMC requested that Cone’s
employment permit be changed to a full-fledged coach, which
was contested by The Basketball Coaches Association of the
Philippines. Alleging that GMC failed to show that there is no
competent person in the Philippines to do the coaching job.
Secretary of Labor cancelled Cone’s employment permit.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Secretary of Labor act with grave abuse of
discretion in revoking Cone’s Alien Employment Permit?
HELD:
The Secretary of Labor did not act with grave abuse of discretion
in revoking Cone’s Alien Employment Permit. GMC’s claim that
hiring of a foreign coach is an employer’s prerogative has no
legal basis. Under Section 40 of the Labor Code, an employer
seeking employment of an alien must first obtain an
employment permit from the Department of labor.
GMC’s right to choose whom to employ is limited by the
statutory requirement of an employment permit. The Labor
Code empowers the Labor Secretary to determine as to the
availability of the services of a “person in the Philippines who is
competent, able and willing at the time of the application to
perform the services for which an alien is desired.” DOLE is the
agency vested with jurisdiction to determine the question of
availability of local workers.
 Contracts; Provisions of applicable laws especially those relating
to matters affected with public policy, are deemed written into
contracts.—Neither can petitioners validly claim that
implementation of respondent Secretary’s decision would amount
to an impairment of the obligations of contracts. The provisions of
the Labor Code and its Implementing Rules and Regulations
requiring alien employment permits were in existence long before
petitioners entered into their contract of employment. It is firmly
settled that provisions of applicable laws, especially provisions
relating to matters affected with public policy, are deemed
written into contracts. Private parties cannot constitutionally
contract away the otherwise applicable provisions of law.
Development Corporation. Buen Realty, as the new owner of the
subject property, wrote to the lessees demanding the latter to vacate
the premises. In its reply, it stated that Buen Realty and Development
Corporation brought the property subject to the notice of lis pendens.
ISSUE:
Can Buen Realty be bound by the writ of execution by virtue of the
notice of lis pendens?
RULING:
No. An obligation is a juridical necessity to give, to do or not to do (Art.
1156, Civil Code).
The obligation is upon the concurrence of the essential elements
thereof, viz:
(a) the vinculum juris or juridical tie which is the efficient cause established by
the various sources of obligations; (b) the object which is the prestation or
conduct, required to be observed; and (c) the subject-persons who, viewed
demandability of the obligation are the active (oblige) andthe passive (obligor)
subjects.
Among the sources of an obligation is a contract (Art. 1157), which is a meeting
of minds between two persons whereby one binds himself, with respect to the
other, to give something or to render some service.
A contract undergoes various stages that include its negotiation or preparation,
its perfection and, finally, its consummation. Until the contract is perfected, it
cannot, as an independent source of obligation, serve as a binding juridical
relation. In sales, particularly, to which the case at bench belongs, the contract
is perfected when a person, called the seller, obligates himself, for a price
certain, to deliver and to transfer ownership of a thing or right to another,
called the buyer, over which the latter agrees.
The registration of lis pendens must be independently addressed in appropriate
proceedings. Therefore, Buen Realty cannot be held subject to the writ of
execution issued by the respondent Judge, let alone ousted from the ownership
and possession of the property, without first being duly afforded its day in
court.

3. ANG YU ASUNCION VS. CA

FACTS:

A complaint for Specific Performance was filed by Ang Yu Asuncion et

al., against Bobby Cu Unjieng and Jose Tan. The plaintiffs were tenants
or lessees of residential and commercial spaces owned by defendants
in Binondo. On several conditions defendants informed the plaintiffs
that they are offering to sell the premises and are giving them priority
to acquire the same.

During negotiations, Cu Unjieng offered a price of P6- million while

plaintiffs made a counter of offer of P5-million. Plaintiff thereafter
asked the defendants to put their offer in writing to which the
defendants acceded. In reply to defendants’ letter, plaintiffs wrote,
asking thatthey specify the terms and conditions of the offer to sell.
When the plaintiffs did not receive any reply, they sent another letter
with the same request. Since defendants failed to specify the terms
and conditions of the offer to sell and because of information received
that the defendants were about to sell the property, plaintiffs were
compelled to file the complaint to compel defendants to sell the
property to them.

The court dismissed the complaint on the ground that the parties did
not agree upon the terms and conditions of the proposed sale, hence,
there was no contact of sale atall. The Cu Unjieng spouses executed a
Deed of Sale transferring the property inquestion to Buen Realty and
4. CADELIN vs POEA
FACTS:
This is a consolidation of 3 cases of SPECIAL CIVIL ACTIONS in the
Supreme Court for Certiorari.
On June 6, 1984, Cadalin, Amul and Evangelista, in their own behalf
and on behalf of 728 other OCWs instituted a class suit by filing an
“Amended Complaint” with the POEA for money claims arising from
their recruitment by ASIA INTERNATIONAL BUILDERS CORPORATION
(AIBC) and employment by BROWN & ROOT INTERNATIONAL, INC (BRI)
which is a foreign corporation with headquarters in Houston, Texas,
and is engaged in construction; while AIBC is a domestic corporation
licensed as a service contractor to recruit, mobilize and deploy Filipino
workers for overseas employment on behalf of its foreign principals.
The amended complaint sought the payment of the unexpired portion
of the employment contracts, which was terminated prematurely, and
secondarily, the payment of the interest of the earnings of the Travel
and Reserved Fund; interest on all the unpaid benefits; area wage and
salary differential pay; fringe benefits; reimbursement of SSS and
premium not remitted to the SSS; refund of withholding tax not
remitted to the BIR; penalties for committing prohibited practices; as
well as the suspension of the license of AIBC and the accreditation of
BRII
On October 2, 1984, the POEA Administrator denied the “Motion to
Strike Out of the Records” filed by AIBC but required the claimants to
correct the deficiencies in the complaint pointed out.
AIB and BRII kept on filing Motion for Extension of Time to file their
answer. The POEA kept on granting such motions.
On November 14, 1984, claimants filed an opposition to the motions
for extension of time and asked that AIBC and BRII declared in default
for failure to file their answers.
On December 27, 1984, the POEA Administrator issued an order
directing AIBC and BRII to file their answers within ten days from
receipt of the order.
(at madami pang motions ang na-file, new complainants joined the
case, ang daming inavail na remedies ng both parties)
On June 19, 1987, AIBC finally submitted its answer to the complaint.
At the same hearing, the parties were given a period of 15 days from
said date within which to submit their respective position papers. On
February 24, 1988, AIBC and BRII submitted position paper. On
October 27, 1988, AIBC and BRII filed a “Consolidated Reply,” POEA
Adminitartor rendered his decision which awarded the amount of
$824, 652.44 in favor of only 324 complainants. Claimants submitted
their “Appeal Memorandum For Partial Appeal” from the decision of
the POEA. AIBC also filed its MR and/or appeal in addition to the
“Notice of Appeal” filed earlier.
NLRC promulgated its Resolution, modifying the decision of the POEA.
The resolution removed some of the benefits awarded in favor of the
claimants. NLRC denied all the MRs. Hence, these petitions filed by the
claimants and by AlBC and BRII.
The case rooted from the Labor Law enacted by Bahrain where most of
the complainants were deployed. His Majesty Ise Bin Selman Al Kaifa,
Amir of Bahrain, issued his Amiri Decree No. 23 on June 16, 1176,
otherwise known re the Labour Law for the Private Sector. Some of the
provision of Amiri Decree No. 23 that are relevant to the claims of the
complainants-appellants are as follows:
“Art. 79: x x x A worker shall receive payment for each extra hour
equivalent to his wage entitlement increased by a minimum of twenty-
rive per centurn thereof for hours worked during the day; and by a
minimum off fifty per centurn thereof for hours worked during the
night which shall be deemed to being from seven o’clock in the
evening until seven o’clock in the morning .”
Art. 80: Friday shall be deemed to be a weekly day of rest on full pay.
If employee worked, 150% of his normal wage shall be paid to him x x
x.”
Art. 81; x x x When conditions of work require the worker to work on
any official holiday, he shall be paid an additional sum equivalent to
150% of his normal wage.”
Art. 84: Every worker who has completed one year’s continuous
service with his employer shall be entitled to Laos on full pay for a
period of not less than 21 days for each year increased to a period not
less than 28 days after five continuous years of service.”
A worker shall be entitled to such leave upon a quantum meruit in
respect of the proportion of his service in that year.”
Art. 107: A contract of employment made for a period of indefinite
duration may be terminated by either party thereto after giving the
other party prior notice before such termination, in writing, in respect
of monthly paid workers and fifteen days’ notice in respect of other
workers. The party terminating a contract without the required notice
shall pay to the other party compensation equivalent to the amount of
wages payable to the worker for the period of such notice or the
unexpired portion thereof.”
Art. Ill: x x x the employer concerned shall pay to such worker, upon
termination of employment, a leaving indemnity for the period of his
employment calculated on the basis of fifteen days’ wages for each
year of the first three years of service and of one month’s wages for
each year of service thereafter. Such worker shall be entitled to
payment of leaving indemnity upon a quantum meruit in proportion to
the period of his service completed within a year.”
ISSUE:
1. WON the foreign law should govern or the contract of the parties.
(WON the complainants who have worked in Bahrain are entitled to
the above-mentioned benefits provided by Amiri Decree No. 23 of
Bahrain).
2. WON the Bahrain Law should apply in the case. (Assuming it is
applicable WON complainants’ claim for the benefits provided therein
have prescribed.)
3. Whether or not the instant cases qualify as; a class suit (siningit ko
nalang)
(the rest of the issues in the full text of the case refer to Labor Law)
RULING:
1. NLRC set aside Section 1, Rule 129 of the 1989 Revised Rules on
Evidence governing the pleading and proof of a foreign law and
admitted in evidence a simple copy of the Bahrain’s Amiri Decree No.
23 of 1976 (Labour Law for the Private Sector).
NLRC applied the Amiri Deere, No. 23 of 1976, which provides for
greater benefits than those stipulated in the overseas-employment
contracts of the claimants. It was of the belief that where the laws of
the host country are more favorable and beneficial to the workers,
then the laws of the host country shall form part of the overseas
employment contract. It approved the observation of the POEA
Administrator that in labor proceedings, all doubts in the
implementation of the provisions of the Labor Code and its
implementing regulations shall be resolved in favor of labor.
The overseas-employment contracts, which were prepared by AIBC
and BRII themselves, provided that the laws of the host country
became applicable to said contracts if they offer terms and conditions
more favorable than those stipulated therein. However there was a
part of the employment contract which provides that the
compensation of the employee may be “adjusted downward so that
the total computation plus the non-waivable benefits shall be
equivalent to the compensation” therein agree,’ another part of the
same provision categorically states “that total remuneration and
benefits do not fall below that of the host country regulation and
custom.”
Any ambiguity in the overseas-employment contracts should be
interpreted against AIBC and BRII, the parties that drafted it. Article
1377 of the Civil Code of the Philippines provides:
‘The interpretation of obscure words or stipulations in a contract shall
not favor the party who caused the obscurity.”
Said rule of interpretation is applicable to contracts of adhesion where
there is already a prepared form containing the stipulations of the
employment contract and the employees merely “take it or leave it.”
The presumption is that there was an imposition by one party against
the other and that the employees signed the contracts out of necessity
that reduced their bargaining power.
We read the overseas employment contracts in question as adopting
the provisions of the Amiri Decree No. 23 of 1976 as part and parcel
thereof. The parties to a contract may select the law by which it is to
be governed. In such a case, the foreign law is adopted as a “system”
to regulate the relations of the parties, including questions of their
capacity to enter into the contract, the formalities to be observed by
them, matters of performance, and so forth. Instead of adopting the
entire mass of the foreign law, the parties may just agree that specific
provisions of a foreign statute shall be deemed incorporated into their
contract “as a set of terms.” By such reference to the provisions of the
foreign law, the contract does not become a foreign contract to be
governed by the foreign law. The said law does not operate as a
statute but as a set of contractual terms deemed written in the
contract.
A basic policy of contract is to protect the expectation of the parties.
Such party expectation is protected by giving effect to the parties’ own
choice of the applicable law. The choice of law must, however, bear
some relationship the parties or their transaction. There is no question
that the contracts sought to be enforced by claimants have a direct
connection with the Bahrain law because the services were rendered
in that country.
2. NLRC ruled that the prescriptive period for the filing of the claims of
the complainants was 3 years, as provided in Article 291 of the Labor
Code of the Philippines, and not ten years as provided in Article 1144
of the Civil Code of the Philippines nor one year as provided in the
Amiri Decree No. 23 of 1976.
Article 156 of the Amiri Decree No. 23 of 1976 provides:
“A claim arising out of a contract of employment shall not actionable
after the lapse of one year from the date of the expiry of the Contract”.
As a general rule, a foreign procedural law will not be applied in the
forum (local court), Procedural matters, such as service of process,
joinder of actions, period and requisites for appeal, and so forth, are
governed by the laws of the forum. This is true even if the action is
based upon a foreign substantive law.
A law on prescription of actions is sui generis in Conflict of Laws in the
sense that it may be viewed either as procedural or substantive,
depending on the characterization given such a law.
However the characterization of a statute into a procedural or
substantive law becomes irrelevant when the country of the forum
(local Court) has a “borrowing statute.” Said statute has the practical
effect of treating the foreign statute of limitation as one of substance.
A “borrowing statute” directs the state of the forum (local Court) to
apply the foreign statute of limitations to the pending claims based on
a foreign law.
Section 48 of Code of Civil Procedure is of this kind. It provides: “If by
the laws of the state or country where the cause of action arose, the
action is barred, it is also barred in the Philippine Islands.”
Section 48 has not been repealed or amended by the Civil Code of the
Philippines. In the light of the 1987 Constitution, however, Section 48
cannot be enforced ex proprio vigore insofar as it ordains the
application in this jurisdiction of Section 156 of the Amiri Decree No.
23 of 1976.
The courts of the forum (local Court) will not enforce any foreign claim
obnoxious to the forum’s public policy. To enforce the one-year
prescriptive period of the Amiri Decree No. 23 of 1976 as regards the
claims in question would contravene the public policy on the
protection to labor.
In the Declaration of Principles and State Policies, the 1987
Constitution emphasized that:“The state shall promote social justice in
all phases of national development” (Sec. 10).
‘The state affirms labor as a primary social economic force. It shall
protect the rights of workers and promote their welfare” (Sec. 18).
In Article XIII on Social Justice and Human Rights, the 1987 Constitution
provides:
“Sec. 3. The State shall afford full protection to labor, local and
overseas, organized and unorganized, and promote full employment
and equality of employment opportunities for all.”
Thus, the applicable law on prescription is the Philippine law.
The next question is whether the prescriptive period governing the
filing of the claims is 3 years, as provided by the Labor Code or 10
years, as provided by the Civil Code of the Philippines.
Article 1144 of the Civil Code of the Philippines provides:
“The following actions must be brought within ten years from the time
the right of action accross:
(1) Upon a written contract; (2) Upon an obligation created by law; (3)
Upona judgment”
In this case, the claim for pay differentials is primarily anchored on the
written contracts between the litigants, the ten-year prescriptive
period provided by Art. 1144(l) of the New Civil Code should govern.
3. NO. A class suit is proper where the subject matter of the
controversy is one of common or general interest to many and the
parties are so numerous that it is impracticable to bring them all
before the court. When all the claims are for benefits granted under
the Bahrain law many of the claimants worked outside Bahrain. Some
of the claimants were deployed in Indonesia under different terms and
condition of employment.
Inasmuch as the First requirement of a class suit is not present
(common or general interest based on the Amiri Decree of the State of
Bahrain), it is only logical that only those who worked in Bahrain shall
be entitled to rile their claims in a class suit.
While there are common defendants (AIBC and BRII) and the nature of
the claims is the same (for employee’s benefits), there is no common
question of law or fact. While some claims are based on the Amiri Law
of Bahrain, many of the claimants never worked in that country, but
were deployed elsewhere. Thus, each claimant is interested only in his
own demand and not in the claims of the other employees of
defendants. A claimant has no concern in protecting the interests of
the other claimants as shown by the fact, that hundreds of them have
abandoned their co-claimants and have entered into separate
compromise settlements of their respective claims. The claimants who
worked in Bahrain can not be allowed to sue in a class suit in a judicial
proceeding.
WHEREFORE, all the three petitioners are DISMISSED
SO ORDERED.
 of such vessel, or of a person authorized by the owner, shall have a
maritime lien on the vessel, which may be enforced by suit in rem, and
it shall be necessary to allege or prove that credit was given to the
vessel.

5. K.K. Shell Sekiyu Osaka Hatsubaisho and Fu Hing Oil Co., LTD., vs.
Court of
Appeals G.R. Nos. 90306-07 July 30, 1990 Justice Cortes
Facts:
On January 7,1987, Kumagai Kaiun Kaisha, Ltd. (hereinafter referred to
as Kumagai), a
corporation formed and existing under the laws of Japan, filed a
complaint for the collection of a sum of money with preliminary
attachment against Atlantic Venus Co., S.A. (hereinafter referred to as
"Atlantic"), a corporation registered in Panama, the vessel MV Estella
and Crestamonte Shipping Corporation (hereinafter referred to as
"Crestamonte"), a Philippine corporation. Atlantic is the owner of
the MV Estella. The complaint, docketed as Civil Case No. 8738930 of
the Regional Trial Court, Branch XIV, Manila alleged that Crestamonte,
as bareboat charterer and operator of the MV Estella, appointed N.S.
Shipping Corporation (hereinafter referred to as"NSS"), a Japanese
corporation, as its general agent in Japan. The appointment was
formalized inan Agency Agreement. NSS in turn appointed Kumagai as
its local agent in Osaka, Japan.
Kumagai supplied the MV Estella with supplies and services but despite
repeated demands Crestamonte failed to pay the amounts due. NSS
and Keihin Narasaki Corporation (hereinafter referred to a Keihin filed
complaints-in-intervention.
Private respondents on the other hand argue that even if
P.D. No. 1521 is applicable,K.K. Shell cannot rely on the maritime lien
because the fuel was provided not exclusively for thebenefit of the MV
Estella, but for the benefit of Crestamonte in general. Under the law it
must be established that the credit was extended to the vessel itself.
Now, this is a defense that calls precisely for a factual determination by
the trial court of who benefitted from the delivery of the fuel. Hence,
again, the necessity for the reception of evidence before the trial
court.
In other words, considering the dearth of evidence due to the fact
that the private respondents have yet to file their answer in the
proceedings below and trial on the merits is still to be conducted,
whether or not petitioners are indeed maritime lienholders and as
such may enforce the lien against the MV Estella are matters that still
have to be established.
Neither are we ready to rule on the private respondents' invocation of
the doctrine of forum non conveniens, as the exact nature of the
relationship of the parties is still to be established. We leave this
matter to the sound discretion of the trial court judge who is in the
best position, after some vital facts are established, to determine
whether special circumstances require that his court desist from
assuming jurisdiction over the suit

On May 19,1987, petitioner Fu Hing Oil Co., Ltd. (hereinafter referred

to as Fu Hing"), a corporation organized in Hong Kong and not doing
business in the Philippines, filed a motion for leave to intervene with
an attached complaint-in-intervention, alleging that Fu Hing supplied
marine diesel oil/fuel to the MV Estella and incurred barge expenses
for the total sum of One Hundred Fifty-two Thousand Four
Hundred Twelve Dollars and Fifty-Six Cents (US$152,412.56) but
such has remained unpaid despite demand and that the claim
constitutes a maritime lien. The issuance of a writ of attachment was
also prayed for.

On July 16, 1987, petitioner K.K. Shell Sekiyu Osaka Hatsubaisho

(hereinafter referredto as K.K. Shell"), a corporation organized in Japan
and not doing business in the Philippines, likewise filed a motion to
intervene with an attached complaint-in-intervention, alleging that
upon request of NSS, Crestamonte's general agent in Japan, K.K. Shell
provided and supplied marine diesel oil/fuel to the W Estella at the
ports of Tokyo and Mutsure in Japan and that despite previous
demands Crestamonte has failed to pay the amounts of Sixteen
Thousand Nine Hundred Ninety-Six Dollars and Ninety- Six Cents
(US$16,996.96) and One Million Yen (Y1,000,000.00) and that K.K.
Shell's claim constitutes a maritime lien on the MV Estella. The
complaint-in-intervention sought the issuance of a writ of preliminary
attachment

Issue:

Whether the court has acquired jurisdiction?

Ruling:

Private respondents have anticipated the possibility that the

courts will not find that K.K.Shell is expressly bound by the Agency
Agreement, and thus they fall back on the argument that even if this
were so, the doctrine of forum non conveniens would be a valid
ground to cause the dismissal of K.K. Shell's complaint-in-intervention.
K.K. Shell counters this argument by invoking its right as maritime
lienholder. It cites Presidential Decree No. 1521, the Ship Mortgage
Decree of 1978, which provides:

SEC. 21. Maritime Lien for Necessaries; person

entitled to such lien-Any person furnishing repairs, supplies, to
wage, use of dry dock or marine railway, or other necessaries, to
any vessel, whether foreign or domestic, upon the order of the owner
 CASE ASSIGNMENT #3

1. CDMI (ASPAC) vs CA and ITEC Inc.

2. General Milling Corporation vs. Torre
3. ANG YU ASUNCION VS. CA
4. CADELIN vs POEA
5. K.K. Shell Sekiyu Osaka Hatsubaisho and Fu Hing Oil Co.,
LTD., vs. CA