G.R. No.

78214 December 5, 1988

YOLANDA CABALLES, petitioner,
vs.
DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM, HON. HEHERSON T. ALVAREZ and BIENVENIDO
ABAJON, respondents.

SARMIENTO, J.:

Before us is a petition for certiorari seeking the annulment of an Order issued by the public respondent Ministry of Agrarian Reform , now the
Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR), through its then Minister, the Hon. Heherson Alvarez, finding the existence of a tenancy relationship
between the herein petitioner and the private respondent and certifying the criminal case for malicious mischief filed by the petitioner against
the private respondent as not proper for trial.

The facts as gathered by the MAR are as follows:

The landholding subject of the controversy, which consists of only sixty (60) square meters (20
meters x 3 meters) was acquired by the spouses Arturo and Yolanda Caballes, the latter being the
petitioner herein, by virtue of a Deed of Absolute Sale dated July 24, 1978 executed by Andrea
Alicaba Millenes This landholding is part of Lot No. 3109-C, which has a total area of about 500
square meters, situated at Lawaan Talisay, Cebu. The remainder of Lot No. 3109-C was
subseconsequently sold to the said spouses by Macario Alicaba and the other members of the
Millenes family, thus consolidating ownership over the entire (500-square meter) property in favor of
the petitioner.

In 1975, before the sale in favor of the Caballes spouses, private respondent Bienvenido Abajon
constructed his house on a portion of the said landholding, paying a monthly rental of P2.00 to the
owner, Andrea Millenes. The landowner likewise allowed Abajon to plant on a portion of the land,
agreeing that the produce thereof would be shared by both on a fitfy-fifty basis. From 1975-1977,
Abajon planted corn and bananas on the landholding. In 1978, he stopped planting corn but
continued to plant bananas and camote. During those four years, he paid the P2.00 rental for the lot
occupied by his house, and delivered 50% of the produce to Andrea Millenes.

Sometime in March 1979, after the property was sold, the new owners, Arturo and Yolanda
Caballes, told Abajon that the poultry they intended to build would be close to his house and
pursuaded him to transfer his dwelling to the opposite or southern portion of the landholding. Abajon
offered to pay the new owners rental on the land occupied by his house, but his offer was not
accepted. Later, the new owners asked Abajon to vacate the premises, saying that they needed the
property. But Abajon refused to leave. The parties had a confrontation before the Barangay Captain
of Lawaan in Talisay, Cebu but failed to reach an agreement. All the efforts exerted by the
landowners to oust Abajon from the landholding were in vain as the latter simply refused to budge.

On April 1, 1982, the landowner, Yolanda Caballes, executed an Affidavit stating that immediately
after she reprimanded Abajon for harvesting bananas and jackfruit from the property without her
knowledge, the latter, with malicious and ill intent, cut down the banana plants on the property worth
about P50.00. A criminal case for malicious mischief was filed against Abajon and which was
docketed as Criminal Case No. 4003. Obviously, all the planting on the property, including that of the
banana plants, had been done by Abajon. On September 30, 1982, upon motion of the defense in
open court pursuant to PD 1038, the trial court ordered the referral of the case to the Regional Office
No. VII of the then MAR for a preliminary determination of the relationship between the parties. As a
result, the Regional Director of MAR Regional VII, issued a certification   dated January 24, 1 983, 1
stating that said Criminal Case No. 4003 was not proper for hearing on the bases of the following
findings:

That herein accused is a bona-fide tenant of the land owned by the complaining
witness, which is devoted to bananas;

That thin case is filed patently to harass and/or eject the tenant from his farmholding,
which act is prohibited by law; and

That this arose out of or is connected with agrarian relations.

From the said certification, the petitioner appealed to the then MAR, now the respondent DAR.
Acting on said appeal, the respondent DAR, through its then Minister Conrado Estrella, reversed the
previous certification in its Order   of February 3, 1986, declaring Criminal Case No. 4003 as proper
2

for trial as "the land involved is a residential lot consisting of only 60 square meters whereon the
house of the accused is constructed and within the industrial zone of the town as evinced from the
Certification issued by the Zoning Administrator of Talisay, Cebu."

Upon motion for reconsideration filed by Abajon, the respondent DAR, through its new Minister,
herein respondent Heherson Alvarez, issued an Orders dated November 15, 1986, setting aside the
previous Order   dated February 3, 1986, and certifying said criminal case as not proper for trial,
3

finding the existence of a tenancy relationship between the parties, and that the case was designed
to harass the accused into vacating his tillage.

In the summary investigation conducted by the DAR, the former landowner, Andrea Millenes,
testified that Bienvenido Abajon dutifully gave her 50% share of the produce of the land under his
cultivation. The grandson of Andrea Millenes, Roger Millenes, corroborated the testimony of the
former, stating that he received said share from Abajon. Roger Millenes further testified that the
present owners received in his presence a bunch of bananas from the accused representing ½ or
50% of the two bunches of bananas gathered after Caballes had acquired the property.  4

From these factual findings, the DAR concluded that Abajon was a tenant of Andrea Millenes, the
former owner, who had testified that she shared the produce of the land with Abajon as truer
thereof.   Thus, invoking Sec. 10 of RA 3844, as amended, which provides that "[T]he agricultural
5

leasehold relation under this Code shall not be extinguished by mere expiration of the term or period
in a leasehold contract nor by the sale, alienation or transfer of the legal possession of the
landholding"; and that "(I)n case the agricultural lessor sells, alienates or transfers the legal
possession of the landholding, the purchaser or transferee thereof shall be subrogated to the rights
and substituted to the obligations of the agricultural lessor," the MAR ruled that 'the new owners are
legally bound to respect the tenancy, notwithstanding their claim that the portion tilled by Abajon was
small, consisting merely of three (3) meters wide and twenty (20) meters long, or a total of sixty (60)
square meters." 6

Hence, this petition for certiorari alleging that:

I. Respondents DAR and Hon. Heherson T. Alvarez committed "grave abuse of power and discretion
amounting to lack of jurisdiction" in holding that private respondent Abajon is an agricultural tenant
even if he is cultivating only a 60-square meter (3 x 20 meters) portion of a commercial lot of the
petitioner.
II. Public respondents gravely erred in holding that Criminal Case No. 4003 is not proper for trial and
hearing by the court. 7

We hold that the private respondent cannot avail of the benefits afforded by RA 3844, as amended.
To invest him with the status of a tenant is preposterous.

Section 2 of said law provides:

It is the policy of the State:

(1) To establish cooperative-cultivatorship among those who live and work on the
land as tillers, owner-cultivatorship and the economic family-size farm as the basis of
Philippine agriculture and, as a consequence, divert landlord capital in agriculture to
industrial development;

xxx xxx xxx

RA 3844, as amended, defines an economic family-size farm as "an area of farm land that permits
efficient use of labor and capital resources of the farm family and will produce an income sufficient to
provide a modest standard of living to meet a farm family's needs for food, clothing, shelter, and
education with possible allowance for payment of yearly installments on the land, and reasonable
reserves to absorb yearly fluctuations in income." 8

The private respondent only occupied a miniscule portion (60 square meters) of the 500-square
meter lot. Sixty square meters of land planted to bananas, camote, and corn cannot by any stretch of
the imagination be considered as an economic family-size farm. Surely, planting camote, bananas,
and corn on a sixty-square meter piece of land can not produce an income sufficient to provide a
modest standard of living to meet the farm family's basic needs. The private respondent himself
admitted that he did not depend on the products of the land because it was too small, and that he
took on carpentry jobs on the side.   Thus, the order sought to be reviewed is patently contrary to the
9

declared policy of the law stated above.

The DAR found that the private respondent shared the produce of the land with the former owner,
Andrea Millenes. This led or misled, the public respondents to conclude that a tenancy relationship
existed between the petitioner and the private respondent because, the public respondents continue,
by operation of Sec. 10 of R.A. 3844, as amended, the petitioner new owner is subrogated to the
rights and substituted to the obligations of the supposed agricultural lessor (the former owner).

We disagree.

The essential requisites of a tenancy relationship are:

1. The parties are the landowner and the tenant;

2. The subject is agricultural land;
3. There is consent;
4. The purpose is agricultural production;
5. There is personal cultivation; and
6. There is sharing of harvests.

All these requisites must concur in order to create a tenancy relationship between the parties. The
absence of one does not make an occupant of a parcel of land, or a cultivator thereof, or a planter
thereon, a de jure tenant. This is so because unless a person has established his status as a de
jure tenant, he is not entitled to security of tenure nor is he covered by the Land Reform Program of
the Government under existing tenancy laws. 10

Therefore, the fact of sharing alone is not sufficient to establish a tenancy relationship. Certainly, it is
not unusual for a landowner to accept some of the produce of his land from someone who plants
certain crops thereon. This is a typical and laudable provinciano trait of sharing or patikim, a native
way of expressing gratitude for favor received. This, however, does not automatically make the tiller-
sharer a tenant thereof specially when the area tilled is only 60, or even 500, square meters and
located in an urban area and in. the heart of an industrial or commercial zone at that. Tenancy status
arises only if an occupant of a parcel of land has been given its possession for the primary purpose
of agricultural production. The circumstances of this case indicate that the private respondent's
status is more of a caretaker who was allowed by the owner out of benevolence or compassion to
live in the premises and to have a garden of some sort at its southwestern side rather than a tenant
of the said portion.

Agricultural production as the primary purpose being absent in the arrangement, it is clear that the
private respondent was never a tenant of the former owner, Andrea Millenes. Consequently, Sec. 10
of RA of 3844, as amended, does not apply. Simply stated, the private respondent is not a tenant of
the herein petitioner.

Anent the second assignment of error, the petitioner argues that since Abajon, is not an agricultural
tenant, the criminal case for malicious mischief filed against him should be declared as proper for
trial so that proceedings in the lower court can resume.

Notwithstanding our ruling that the private respondent is not a tenant of the petitioner, we hold that
the remand of the case to the lower court for the resumption of the criminal proceedings is not in the
interest of justice. Remand to the Municipal Court of Talisay, Cebu, would not serve the ends of
justice at all, nor is it necessary, because this High Tribunal is in a position to resolve with finality the
dispute before it. This Court, in the public interest, and towards the expeditious administration of
justice, has decided to act on the merits and dispose of the case with finality.  11

The criminal case for malicious mischief filed by the petitioner against the private respondent for
allegedly cutting down banana trees worth a measly P50.00 will take up much of the time and
attention of the municipal court to the prejudice of other more pressing cases pending therein.
Furthermore, the private respondent will have to incur unnecessary expenses to finance his legal
battle against the petitioner if proceedings in the court below were to resume. Court litigants have
decried the long and unnecessary delay in the resolution of their cases and the consequent costs of
such litigations. The poor, particularly, are victims of this unjust judicial dawdle, Impoverished that
they are they must deal with unjust legal procrastination which they can only interpret as harassment
or intimidation brought about by their poverty, deprivation, and despair. It must be the mission of the
Court to remove the misperceptions aggrieved people have of the nature of the dispensation of
justice. If justice can be meted out now, why wait for it to drop gently from heaven? Thus,
considering that this case involves a mere bagatelle the Court finds it proper and compelling to
decide it here and now, instead of further deferring its final termination.

As found by the DAR, the case for malicious mischief stemmed from the petitioner's affidavit stating
that after she reprimanded private respondent Abajon for harvesting bananas and jackfruit from the
property without her knowledge, the latter, with ill intent, cut the banana trees on the property worth
about P50.00.
This was corroborated by a certain Anita Duaban, a friend of the petitioner, who likewise executed
an affidavit to the effect that she saw the private respondent indiscriminately cutting the banana
trees.
12

The Revised Penal Code, as amended, provides that "any person who shall deliberately cause to
the property of another any damage not falling within the terms of the next preceding chapter shall
be guilty of malicious mischief."
13

The elements of the crime of malicious mischief are:

1. The offender deliberately caused damage to the property of another;

2. The damage caused did not constitute arson or crimes involving destruction;
3. The damage was caused maliciously by the offender.

After a review of the facts and circumstances of this case, we rule that the aforesaid criminal case
against the private respondent be dismissed.

The private respondent can not be held criminally liable for malicious mischief in cutting the banana
trees because, as an authorized occupant or possessor of the land, and as planter of the banana
trees, he owns said crops including the fruits thereof The private respondent's possession of the land
is not illegal or in bad faith because he was snowed by the previous owners to enter and occupy the
premises. In other words, the private respondent worked the land in dispute with the consent of the
previous and present owners. Consequently, whatever the private respondent planted and cultivated
on that piece of property belonged to him and not to the landowner. Thus, an essential element of
the crime of malicious mischief, which is "damage deliberately caused to the property of another," is
absent because the private respondent merely cut down his own plantings.

WHEREFORE, the Order of public respondents dated November 15, 1986 is SET ASIDE and
Criminal Case No. 4003, is hereby DISMISSED. Let a copy of this decision be sent to the Municipal
Trial Court of Talisay, Cebu for appropriate action. This Decision is IMMEDIATELY EXECUTORY.

No costs.

SO ORDERED.
 FIRST DIVISION

[G.R. No. 95318.  June 11, 1991.]

LOURDES PEÑA QUA, assisted by her husband, JAMES QUA, petitioner, 

vs.

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS (SECOND DIVISION), CARMEN

CARILLO, EDUARDO CARILLO, JOSEPHINE CARILLO, REBECCA
CARILLO, MARIA CEPRES, CECILIO CEPRES and SALVADOR CARILLO,
JR., respondents.

Brotamonte Law Office for petitioner.

Isabel E. Florin for private respondents.

DECISION

GANCAYCO, J  : p

        This case deals with the issue of whether or not private respondents possess the
status of agricultural tenants entitled to, among others, the use and possession of a home
lot.

        Respondent Court of Appeals, 1 in denying due course to the petition

for certiorari filed by petitioner, stated the antecedents of this case in the lower courts as
follows:

. . . [O]n July 17, 1986, petitioner Lourdes Peña Qua filed a complaint for ejectment
with damages against private respondents claiming that she is the owner of a parcel of
residential land, Lot No. 2099 of the Malinao Cadastre, situated at Poblacion, Tinapi,
Malinao, Albay, with an area of 346 square meters, which is registered in her name
under TCT T-70368; that inside the land in question is an auto repair shop and three
houses, all owned by private respondents; and that said respondents' stay in the land
was by mere tolerance and they are in fact nothing but squatters who settled on the
land without any agreement between her (sic), paying no rents to her nor realty taxes
to the government.

In their answer, private respondent Carmen Carillo, surviving spouse of the late
Salvador Carillo (and [respectively the] mother and mother-in-law of the other
[private] respondents), alleged that the lot in question is a farm lot [home lot] because
she and her late husband were tenants of the same including the two other lots
adjoining the lot in question, Lots No. 2060 and 2446, which also belong to petitioner;
that as tenants, they could not just be ejected without cause; that it was not petitioner
who instituted them as tenants in the land in question but the former owner,
Leovigildo Peña, who permitted the construction of the auto repair shop, the house of
Carmen Carillo and the other two houses.

After trial, the Municipal Court [found private respondents to be mere squatters and]
2 
rendered judgment   ordering . . . [them] to vacate and remove their houses and [the]
auto repair shop from the lot in question and to pay the petitioner attorney's fees and a
monthly rental of P200.00.

On appeal to respondent [Regional Trial] Court, the judgment was modified by

ordering the case dismissed [insofar as] Carmen Carillo [was concerned being
qualified as an agricultural tenant and] declaring that the home lot and her house
3
standing thereon should be respected.  

        Believing that even private respondent Carmen Carillo does not qualify as an
agricultural tenant, petitioner pursues her cause before this forum citing only one ground
for the entertainment of her petition, to wit:
 

THAT PUBLIC RESPONDENT [Court of Appeals] COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE

OF DISCRETION AND ACTED CONTRARY TO THE ADMITTED FACTS AND
APPLICABLE JURISPRUDENCE, AMOUNTING TO LACK OF JURISDICTION,
FOR DENYING DUE COURSE TO THE PETITIONER'S CRY FOR JUSTICE
4
AND FOR DISMISSING THE PETITION. 

        The Court agrees and finds that respondent Court of Appeals committed a grave
abuse of discretion in dismissing the petition for review of the decision of the Regional
Trial Court, the same being replete with inconsistencies and unfounded conclusions.
Because of this jurisdictional issue raised by petitioner, the Court hereby treats this
petition as a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.  5
        The Regional Trial Court 6 made the following observations:

The land in question is a measly three hundred forty six (346) square meters and
adjoining another two (2) lots which are separately titled having two thousand four
hundred thirteen (2,413) square meters and eight thousand two hundred ninety eight
(8,298) square meters — the three (3) lots having a total area of eleven thousand fifty
seven (11,057) square meters, more or less, or over a hectare of land owned by the
plaintiff or by her predecessors-in-interest.

In the 346 square meters lot stand (sic) four (4) structures, [to wit]: an auto repair
shop, a house of [private respondent] Carmen Carillo and two (2) other houses owned
or occupied by the rest of the [private respondents] . . .; in other words, the [private
respondents] almost converted the entire area as their homelot for their personal
aggrandizement, believing that they are all tenants of the [petitioner]

Claimed, the defendants planted five hundred (500) coconut trees and only fifty (50)
coconut trees survived in the land in question and/or in the entire area of the three lots.
Such an evidence (sic) is very untruthful, unless it is a seed bed for coconut trees as
the area is so limited.But found standing in the area in question or in the entire three
(3) lots are only seven (7) coconut trees, the harvest of which is [allegedly] 2/3 share
for the [petitioner] and the 1/3 share for the [private respondents]. The share, if ever
there was/were, could not even suffice [to pay] the amount of taxes of the land (sic)
7 
paid religiously by the [petitioner] yearly.   (Emphasis supplied.)

        It is clear from the foregoing that the source of livelihood of private respondents is
not derived from the lots they are allegedly tenanting. This conclusion is further
supported by private respondent Carmen Carillo's assertion that the auto repair shop was
constructed with the consent of petitioner's predecessor-in-interest for whom her husband
served as a driver-mechanic.  8

        From private respondents' manner of caring for the lots, it is also apparent that
making the same agriculturally viable was not the main purpose of their occupancy, or
else they should have immediately replanted coconut trees in place of those that did not
survive. Indeed, the location of their auto repair shop being near the poblacion and along
the highway, private respondents chose to neglect the cultivation and propagation of
coconuts, having earned, through the automobile repair shop, more than enough not only
for their livelihood but also for the construction of two other dwelling houses thereon. It
is also intimated by the Regional Trial Court that there is no direct evidence to confirm
that the parties herein observed the sharing scheme allegedly set-up between private
respondents and petitioner's predecessor-in-interest.
        Notwithstanding the foregoing indicia of a non-agricultural tenancy relationship,
however, the Regional Trial Court decided in favor of private respondent Carmen Carillo
and ruled, thus:
  cdll

        In View of the Foregoing, and Premises considered, the Court renders judgment:

1.      Ordering defendants, namely: Eduardo Carillo, Josephine P. Carillo, Rebecca

Carillo, Maria Cepres, Cecilio Cepres and Salvador Carillo, Jr., to vacate and remove
their two (2) houses and the auto repair shop from the premises in question, and
restoring the area to the lawful owner, the herein plaintiff;

2.      Ordering said six defendants to pay the plaintiff jointly and severally the amount
of Four Thousand (P4,000.00) Pesos as attorney's fees and litigation expenses;

3.      Ordering said six defendants to pay plaintiff the sum of One Hundred Seventy
One Pesos and Thirty Six Centavos (P171.36) monthly, for the use of the area in
question, commencing July 17, 1986 the date the plaintiff filed this action in Court, up
to the time the defendants vacate the area in question and restore the same to the
plaintiff peacefully.

4.      And ordering said six (6) defendants to pay the costs proportionately.

The case against defendant, Carmen Carillo, is hereby ordered DISMISSED. The
home lot and where her house stands is respected. And without pronouncement as to
its costs (sic).
9 
IT IS SO ORDERED.   (Emphasis supplied.).

        Without explaining why, the Regional Trial Court chose not to believe the findings
of the Municipal Circuit Trial Court and instead, adopted the recommendation of the
Regional Director for Region V, acting for the Secretary of the Department of Agrarian
Reform, without making separate findings and arriving at an independent conclusion as
to the nature of the relationship between the parties in this case. This is evident in the
following excerpt of the judgment of the Regional Trial Court:

The dispositive part of the Resolution of this Civil Case No. T-1317 for Ejectment
with Damages, Referral Case No. 880054 states and is quoted verbatim:

"WHEREFORE, premises considered, we are constrained

to issue the following resolutions:
 1)      Certifying this case as NOT PROPER FOR TRIAL
in as far as the homelot and house built thereon by the spouses
Carmen Carillo (sic);

2)      Advising the plaintiff to institute proper cause of

action in as far as the auto repair shop and the two (2) houses
erected on her landholdings by the children of tenant-farmer
Salvador Carillo since they appear as not the lawful tenants
thereat.

SO RESOLVED.

xxx                    xxx                    xxx

From the foregoing dispositive part of the resolution penned down by the Regional
10
Director, it defines and explains the status of each of the defendants. 

        Time and again, the Court has ruled that, as regards relations between litigants in
land cases, the findings and conclusions of the Secretary of Agrarian Reform, being
preliminary in nature, are not in any way binding on the trial courts 11 which must
endeavor to arrive at their own independent conclusions.

        Had the Regional Trial Court hearkened to this doctrine, proceeded to so conduct its
own investigation and examined the facts of this case, a contrary conclusion would have
been reached, and the findings of the Municipal Circuit Trial Court, sustained,
particularly when the circumstances obtaining in this case are examined in the light of the
essential requisites set by law for the existence of a tenancy relationship, thus: (1) the
parties are the landowner and the tenant; (2) the subject is agricultural land; (3) the
purpose is agricultural production; and (4) there is consideration. 12 It is also understood
that (5) there is consent to the tenant to work on the land, that (6) there is personal
cultivation by him and that the consideration consists of sharing the harvest. 13

        It is contended by petitioner that the parcel of land occupied by private respondents,
Lot No. 2099, with an area of only 346 square meters is residential in nature, being
situated near the poblacion of Malinao, Albay, and as evidenced by the tax declaration
obtained by petitioner to this effect. Indeed, the municipal trial court judge ordered the
ejectment of the private respondents on this basis. On the other hand, private respondents
aver that the lot is agricultural being bounded by two other agricultural lands planted to
coconuts titled in the name of petitioner and all three parcels being cultivated by them.

        The Court is not prepared to affirm the residential status of the land merely on the
basis of the tax declaration, in the absence of further showing that all the requirements for
conversion of the use of land from agricultural to residential prevailing at the start of the
controversy in this case have been fully satisfied. 14

        Be that as it may and recognizing the consent to the presence of private respondents
on the property as given by petitioner's predecessor-in-interest, the situation obtaining in
this case still lacks, as discussed earlier, three of the afore-enumerated requisites, namely:
agricultural production, personal cultivation and sharing of harvests.  

        The Court reiterates the ruling in Tiongson v. Court of Appeals,   15 that

All these requisites are necessary in order to create tenancy relationship between the
parties and the absence of one or more requisites do (sic) not make the alleged tenant
a de facto tenant as contradistinguished from a de jure tenant. This is so because
unless a person has established his status as a de jure tenant, he is not entitled to
security of tenure nor is he covered by the Land Reform Program of the Government
under existing tenancy laws.

        Under the foregoing, private respondent Carmen Carillo is not entitled to be

considered an agricultural tenant. Therefore, she may be not allowed the use of a home
lot, a privilege granted by Section 35 of Republic Act No. 3844, as amended, in relation
to Section 22 (3) of Republic Act No. 1199, as amended,  16 only to persons satisfying the
qualifications of agricultural tenants of coconut lands.

        WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The decision of respondent Court of

Appeals is hereby SET ASIDE and a new one is issued REINSTATING the decision of
the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Malinao-Tiwi, Albay, Fifth Judicial Region dated 19
August 1987. No pronouncement as to costs.

        SO ORDERED.