Facts: Salazar was charged with two (2) counts of statutory rape committed on

May 18 and June 25, 1999 against AAA, a 12-year-old daughter of BBB with whom
Salazar was cohabiting. Thereafter, AAA purportedly executed an Affidavit of
Desistance wherein she stated that she was not raped by Salazar and
that she no longer intends to pursue the cases
filed against Salazar. During the hearing, she explained that her own mother
forced her to execute the affidavit upon threat of harm. The
RTC convicted the accused with two counts of statutory rape but the
CA modified it by 2 simple rapes because AAA has failed to present
evidence that she was a minor when the crime was committed. According to
the CA, a baptismal certificate is not sufficient proof of the age of a person.

Salazar appealed, claiming that the instant case should have been dismissed by
the trial court, considering that AAA had executed an affidavit of desistance
People v.
exonerating him from the crimes charged.
Salazar
(Rape, Affidavit
Issue: Whether or not the Affidavit of Desistance is a sufficient evidence to acquit
of Desistance)
Salazar – NO

Ratio: As a rule, a recantation or an affidavit of desistance is viewed with suspicion

and reservation. Jurisprudence has invariably regarded such affidavit as
exceedingly unreliable, because it can easily be secured from a poor and ignorant
witness, usually through intimidation or for monetary consideration. Moreover,
there is always the probability that it would later on be repudiated, and criminal
prosecution would thus be interminable.

By itself, an affidavit of desistance or pardon is not a ground for the dismissal of

an action, once it has been instituted in court. In the present case, private
complainant lost the right or absolute privilege to decide whether the rape charge
should proceed, because the case had already reached and must therefore
continue to be heard by the court a quo.
Facts: Myrna P. Antone executed an Affidavit-Complaint for Bigamy against Leo
R. Beronilla. She alleged that her marriage with respondent in 1978 had not yet
been legally dissolved when the latter contracted a second marriage with one
Cecile Maguillo in 1991. Pending the setting of the case for arraignment, herein
respondent moved to quash the Information on the ground that the facts
charged do not constitute an offense. He informed the court that his marriage
with petitioner was declared null and void by the RTC on 26 April 2007; that the
Antone v.
decision became final and executory on 15 May 2007. He argued that since the
Beronilla
marriage had been declared null and void from the beginning, there was actually
(Bigamy, Facts
no first marriage to speak of.
constituting
offense)
While the prosecution, through herein petitioner, maintained that the respondent
committed an act which has all the essential requisites of bigamy. After a hearing
on the motion, the RTC quashed the Information. Applying Morigo v. People. MR
was filed and denied. Petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court
filed on 26 March 2008 before the Court of Appeals, herein petitioner alleged that
the RTC in the bigamy case acted with GADALEJ when it dismissed the case of
bigamy and denied her MR.

1
 Issue: W/N the trial court acted with GADALEJ when it sustained respondent's
motion to quash – YES

Ratio: The issue on the declaration of nullity of the marriage between petitioner
and respondent only after the latter contracted the subsequent marriage is,
therefore, immaterial for the purpose of establishing that the facts alleged in the
information for Bigamy does not constitute an offense. The trial court committed
grave abuse of discretion when, in so quashing the Information in Criminal Case
No. 07-0907-CFM, it considered an evidence introduced to prove a fact not alleged
thereat disregarding the settled rules that a motion to quash is a hypothetical
admission of the facts stated in the information; and that facts not alleged thereat
may be appreciated only under exceptional circumstances, none of which is
obtaining in the instant petition.
Facts: State Prosecutor Tolentino filed an information against Tecklo for violation
of The Social Security Act of 1997. The attached certification only has the
approval of the Regional State Prosecutor (Basically, the reason why the
information was quashed.) There was no prior approval of the City Prosecutor.
Tecklo moved for the quashal of information for violation of par. (c), of Sec. 3 of
Rule 117 vis-à-vis the 3rd par of [Sec. 4 of] Rule 112), Judge Paqueo granted the
same.

Issue: W/N Tolentino is duly authorized to file the subject Information without the
Tolentino v.
approval of the City Prosecutor? – The Court held NO.
Paqueo
(Social Security
Ratio: Though the letter dated October 24, 2000 of Chief S/P Zuño, upon which
Act, No prior
Tolentino relies to support his authority to file the Information without the
approval of City
approval of the City Prosecutor, was issued before the changes in the third
prosecutor)
paragraph of Sec. 4, Rule 112 were introduced, under Sec. 8 of PD 1275 showed
that the Regional State Prosecutor’s powers do not include that of approving the
Information filed or dismissed by the investigating prosecutor. Since the Regional
State Prosecutor is not included among the law officers authorized to approve the
filing or dismissal of the Information of the investigating prosecutor, the
Information filed by Tolentino did not comply with the requirement of Sec. 4, Rule
112. There was no need to submit any evidence to support the ground for
quashing the Information, since it was apparent and within judicial notice that
Tolentino was not City/Provincial prosecutor.
Facts: Salvador and Juanita are Mayor and Treasurer of San Manuel, Pangasinan,
respectively. An Information was filed which alleged that they “willfully,
unlawfully, and criminally caused the purchase of 1 computer unit costing
Perez v.
P120,000 acquisition by personal canvass,” violating Sec. 362 and 367 of the LGC
Sandiganbayan
and the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. No public bidding occurred and no
(Computer unit,
Committee of Awards was constituted to approve the procurement Salvador and
Anti Graft,
Juanita gave Mobil Link Enterprises/Starlet Sales Center undue advantage or
Amended
preference through manifest partiality, showing evident bad faith and gross,
information)
inexcusable negligence, but this was not included in the original information, so
it was recommended by the Special Prosecutor that the information be amended
to show the manner of the commission of the offense, based on the

2
 Ombudsman’s margin notes in the original information. The amended
information was admitted.

Issue: Whether or not the Office of the Special Prosecutor has the power to file
information without delegation from the Ombudsman - NO

Ratio: The Ombudsman may delegate powers to the Office of the Special
Prosecutor, but such delegation must be shown by clear intent. The Ombudsman’s
power of control would be seriously hampered if the former were authorized to
file informations in the first instance. This is because while the Ombudsman has
full discretion to determine whether or not a criminal case should be filed in the
Sandiganbayan. Once the case has been filed with said court, it is the
Sandiganbayan, and no longer the Ombudsman, which has full control of the
case so much so that the informations may not be dismissed, without the
approval of the said court.
Facts: Provincial Fiscal Castañeda filed an information charging the petitioners
with libel upon complaint of Provincial Governor Estrella. Petitioners filed an
Omnibus Motion praying: 
for the quashing of the information, ... for that reason
the above- mentioned published parts of the article are or constitute a privileged
communication under article 354 of the Revised Penal Code.

MTQ DENIED for the reason that the published parts of the article are not
privileged and even if they were so, still they would not be a legal ground for the
quashal of the information, because, in the opinion of Judge Santiago, the
Duque v. privileged character of the allegedly libelous publication should be set up as a
Santiago defense. Judge Santiago then directed the clerk of court to set the arraignment.
(Libel, Privileged
Communication) Issue: W/N the privileged character of the publication is not a legal ground for the
quashal of the information, for it is a matter of defense – YES



Ratio: Whether the comment made by Duque is privileged speech or not are
matters which may only be determined after the trial of the petitioners. 
The
denial of a motion to quash on the ground that the publication of the parts of an
article claimed to be libelous is privileged is interlocutory and cannot be appealed.
Whether the publication is privileged or not, the trial court will have to pass upon
them and if passed upon adversely to the petitioners the same may be raised and
reviewed on appeal. 

Facts: The Office of the Ombudsman filed two informations charging Disini in the
Sandiganbayan with corruption of public officials, penalized under Article 212 in
relation to Article 210 of RPC (Criminal Case No. 28001), and with a violation of
Section 4 (a) of R.A. No. 3019 or the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act (Criminal
Disini v. Case No. 28002). Disini led a motion to quash, alleging that the criminal actions
Sandiganbayan had been extinguished by prescription, and that the informations did not
(Corruption of conform to the prescribed form. The Prosecution opposed the motion to quash.
public officials) The Sandiganbayan (First Division) promulgated a resolution denying the motion
to quash. Disini moved for the reconsideration of the resolution dated January 17,
2005, but the Sandiganbayan (First Division) denied his motion on August 10, 2005
through the second assailed resolution. Disini, then, commenced a special civil
action for certiorari

3
 The Sandiganbayan was correct to deny the motion to quash. Disini alleges that
his motion to quash should be granted on the grounds of insufficiency of the
criminal informations against him in form and substance.

Issue: W/N the information sufficiently complied with Sec. 6 Rule 110, warranting
a motion to quash to be denied. – YES

Ratio: The Court ruled that the informations in Criminal Case No. 28001 and 28002
have sufficiently complied with the requirements of Section 6, Rule 110 of the
ROC.
The fundamental test in determining whether a motion to quash may be sustained
based on this ground is whether the facts alleged, if hypothetically admitted, will
establish the essential elements of the offense as defined in the law. Extrinsic
matters or evidence aliunde are not considered. The test does not require
absolute certainty as to the presence of the elements of the offense; otherwise,
there would no longer be any need for the Prosecution to proceed to trial.
Facts: Respondent Edery is charged with a violation of the Tariff and Customs Code
for not declaring her possession of 28 gold bars upon entry to the Philippines in
the Manila International Airport. An Information and an Amended Information
was filed by the Prosecution. Edery, through counsel, filed a Motion to Quash
Information claiming that the stipulation of facts in the said Information does
not constitute the offense charged.

Petitioner opposed such claim. Respondent Court granted the motion saying that
both the Information and Amended Information did not state facts which
constitute the offense charged.
People v. Dela
Issue: W/N a motion to quash should be granted – YES
Rosa
(Tariff and
Ratio: While it is true that a hearing on a motion to quash should be resolved on
Customs Code)
the basis of the allegations on the Information, if certain facts are admitted on the
hearing which are not opposed by the prosecution, then it can be used as a basis
on ruling about the appropriateness of granting the sought after motion to quash.
Petition denied.

As a general proposition, a motion to quash on the ground that the allegations of

the information do not constitute the offense charged, or any offense for that
matter, should be resolved on the basis alone of said allegations whose truth
and veracity are hypothetically admitted. However, additional facts not alleged
in the information, but admitted or not denied by the prosecution may be
invoked in support of the motion to quash.
Facts: Street lighting projects were awarded to FABMIK without public bidding,
the subject transaction of this case, involved the supply and installation of street
lighting facilities for the ASEAN Summit in Cebu.
Braza v.
Sandiganbayan After the summit, a letter-complaint was filed before the Public Assistance and
Corruption Prevention Office (PACPO), Ombudsman –Visayas, alleging that the
ASEAN Summit street lighting projects were overpriced. Braza, being the
president of FABMIK, was impleaded as one of the respondents. On March 23,

4
2007, the fact-finding body issued its Evaluation Report recommending the filing
of charges for violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practice Act, against the
DPWH officials and employees in Region VII and the cities of Mandaue and Lapu-
lapu, and private contractors FABMIK and GAMPIK

During the proceedings, the Sandiganbayan reconsidered its August 14, 2008
resolution and directed a reinvestigation of the case. The Sandiganbayan said that
it could be reasonably inferred from the July 30, 2008 Order of the Ombudsman
that the latter would not object to the conduct of a reinvestigation of all the cases
against the accused. Braza filed his Manifestation, informing the Sandiganbayan
of his intention to abandon his previous motion for reinvestigation. He opined
that the prosecution would merely use the reinvestigation proceedings as a means
to engage in a second unbridled fishing expedition to cure the lack of probable
cause. On March 23, 2009, Braza filed a motion in support of the abandonment of
reinvestigation with a plea to vacate Information, insisting that the further
reinvestigation of the case would only afford the prosecution a second round of
preliminary investigation which would be vexatious, oppressive and violative of
his constitutional right to a speedy disposition of his case, warranting its dismissal
with prejudice.

On October 12, 2009, the Sandiganbayan issued the first assailed resolution
admitting the Amended Information, (second Information) and denying Braza's
plea for dismissal of the criminal case. The Sandiganbayan ruled that Braza would
not be placed in double jeopardy should he be arraigned anew under the second
information because his previous arraignment was conditional. It continued that
even if he was regularly arraigned, double jeopardy would still not set in because
the second information charged an offense different from, and which did not
include or was necessarily included in, the original offense charged.

Issue: W/N there is double jeopardy – NO

Ratio: The SC ruled arraignment of Braza under the 1st information was
conditional in nature as it was a mere accommodation in his favor to enable him
to travel abroad without the Sandiganbayan losing its ability to conduct trial in
absentia in case he would abscond. The Sandiganbayan’s Order clearly and
unequivocally states that if the information would be amended, he shall waive
his constitutional right to be protected against double jeopardy and shall allow
himself to be arraigned on the amended information without losing his right to
question the same. Such waiver was clear, categorical and intelligent.

Braza is now estopped from assailing its conditional nature just to conveniently
avoid being arraigned and prosecuted of the new charge under the second
information. Although violation of Sec 3(g) of RA 3019 and violation of Sec 3(e) of
the same law share a common element, the accused being a public officer, the
latter is not inclusive of the former. The essential elements of each are not
included among or do not form part of those enumerated in the other.

There is simply no double jeopardy when the subsequent information charges

another and different offense, although arising from the same act or set of acts.

5
 Prosecution for the same act is not prohibited. What is forbidden is the
prosecution for the same offense.
Facts: For failure of the principal witness, PO2 Nelson Villas, to attend several
hearings, the presiding Judge Elvira Panganiban (respondent), ordered that the
case against accused Roberta Saldariega (petitioner) for violation of Section 5 and
11 of Dangerous Drugs Act be provisionally dismissed, with the express consent
of the accused. However, on June 5, 2013, PO2 Villas moved to re-open the case
, averring that his failure to attend was due to the successive deaths of his uncle
and aunt, attaching thereto their respective death certificates. The respondent
judge then granted the motion and ordered the cases set for hearing. Roberta
moved for reconsideration, arguing that the provisional dismissal of the cases is
considered an acquittal and PO2 Villas had no personality to file the motion to re-
open case. The respondent denied her motion for reconsideration, hence, Roberta
filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 before the Supreme Court to assail the
judge’s orders.

Issue: W/N the provisional dismissal of the cases with the consent of the accused
but predicated on failure to prosecute which violates the right against double
jeopardy — NO
Salderiega v.
People
Ratio: When a criminal case is provisionally dismissed with the express consent of
(Dangerous
the accused, the case may be revived by the State within the periods provided
Drugs Act,
under the 2nd paragraph of Section 8, Rule 117 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure.
Provisional
Dismissal)
A case shall not be provisionally dismissed except with the express consent of the
accused and with notice to the offended party. Here, a perusal of the Order,
dated May 16, 2013, stresses that the dismissal of the case was provisional, i.e.,
the case could be revived at some future time. If petitioner believed that the case
against her should be dismissed with prejudice, she should not have agreed to a
provisional dismissal. She should have moved for a dismissal with prejudice so that
the court would have no alternative but to require the prosecution to present its
evidence.

There was nothing in the records showing the accused’s opposition to the
provisional dismissal nor was there any after the Order of provisional dismissal
was issued. She cannot claim now that the dismissal was with prejudice. Thus, if a
criminal case is provisionally dismissed with the express consent of the accused,
as in this case, the case may be revived by the State within the periods provided
under the 2nd paragraph of Section 8, Rule 117 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure.
There is no violation of due process as long as the revival of a provisionally
dismissed complaint was made within the time-bar provided under the law.
Facts: Jane Honrales was fatally shot by her husband, respondent Jonathan
Honrales (Jonathan). Assistant City Prosecutor Rebagay then issued a
recommendation of withdrawing the parricide and stated that respondent
Honrales v.
should be charged only of reckless imprudence resulting to parricide. An
Honrales
information for parricide was filed against Jonathan in RTC. Then prosecutor
(Parricide)
moved for the withdrawal of the Information for parricide. While the motion to
withdraw the information was still pending, a new information for reckless
imprudence was filed with the MeTC against Jonathan.

6
 The heirs of Jane Honrales meanwhile filed for a petition for review with the Office
of the President for the downgrading of the offense. While the Motion to
Withdraw was still pending, respondent Jonathan pleaded guilty and was found
guilty with the MeTC for reckless imprudence. He also filed a motion to dismiss
his parricide case with the RTC citing that his arraignment and judgment as
grounds for dismissal. Heirs then filed a certiorari with the CA as the RTC judge
granted respondent's motion to withdraw arguing that an appeal was still
pending. CA denied the certiorari and cited that double jeopardy would attach.
Petitioner argues that MeTC did not acquire jurisdiction and it remained in the
RTC and that double jeopardy does not apply as the heirs were not notified of
the proceedings in the MeTC. No conviction was also held in the RTC.

Issue: W/N the remand of the parricide case to the RTC constitutes double
jeopardy against the respondent - NO.

Ratio: It will not violate respondent’s right against double jeopardy as there was
absence of judgment rendered by a competent court which is an essential
element of double jeopardy. One of the requisites for double jeopardy to attach
is that a first jeopardy attached prior to the second. A first jeopardy only before a
competent court. In this case, the MeTC took cognizance of the Information for
reckless imprudence resulting in parricide while the criminal case for parricide was
still pending before the RTC.

When an accused has been convicted or acquitted, or the case against him
dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express consent by a court of
competent jurisdiction, upon a valid complaint or information or other formal
charge sufficient in form and substance to sustain a conviction and after the
accused had pleaded to the charge, the conviction or acquittal of the accused or
the dismissal of the case shall be a bar to another prosecution for the offense
charged, or for any attempt to commit the same or frustration thereof, or for any
offense which necessarily includes or is necessarily included in the offense charged
in the former complaint or information.
Facts: A day after the rape occurred, the victim, Erlina Dollente, and her parents,
filed a complaint for rape with robbery alleging that the accused Willy Obsania
armed with a dagger willfully had carnal knowledge of the victim. The provincial
fiscal filed an information for rape against the accused. Upon arraignment,
accused pleaded not guilty and moved for the dismissal of the case alleging that
the complaint was fatally defective for failure to allege "lewd designs." The
People v.
lower court dismissed the case ruling that the crime of "lewd designs" did not
Obsania
give the court jurisdiction to try the case. From this decision, the prosecution
(Rape, “lewd
appealed.
designs”,
waiver)
Issue: W/N the appeal placed the accused in double jeopardy? – NO

Ratio: In order to invoke double jeopardy the following requisites must obtain:
1) A valid complaint or information;
2) A competent court;

3) The defendant had pleaded to the charge; and

7
 4) The defendant was acquitted, or convicted, or the case against him was
dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express consent.

The last requisite did not obtain. Jurisprudence provides 2 streams of thought:
a) In People v. Salico, the Court held that "When the case is dismissed with the
express consent of the defendant, the dismissal will not be a bar to another
prosecution for the same offense; because, his action in having the case
dismissed constitutes a waiver of his constitutional right or privilege, for the
reason that he thereby prevents the court from proceeding to the trial on
the merits and rendering a judgment of conviction against him."

b) On the other hand, the doctrine of estoppel in relation to the plea of double
jeopardy was first enunciated in Acierto which held that when the trial court
dismisses a case on a disclaimer of jurisdiction, upon the instigation of the
accused, the latter is estopped on appeal from asserting the jurisdiction of
the lower court in support of his plea of second jeopardy.

In the case at bar, the converted dismissal was ordered by the Trial Judge upon the
defendant's motion to dismiss. The “doctrine of double jeopardy” as enunciated
in People v. Salico applies when the case is dismissed with the express consent
of the defendant – the dismissal will not be a bar to another prosecution for the
same offense because his action in having the case is dismissed constitutes a
waiver of his constitutional right/privilege for the reason that he thereby
prevents the Court from proceeding to the trial on the merits and rendering a
judgment of conviction against him. In essence, where a criminal case is dismissed
provisionally not only with the express consent of the accused but even upon the
urging of his counsel there can be no double jeopardy under Sect. 9 Rule 113, if
the indictment against him is revived by the fiscal. As such, the case was remanded
to the court of origin for further proceedings in accordance with law.
Facts: Nelson pled guilty to burglary and theft. He was sentenced under the State’s
habitual criminal statute which provided for an enhanced sentence. At the
sentencing hearing, the state sought to use the evidence of prior convictions, but
respondent indicated that one of his convictions had been pardoned. State
introduced certified copies of four prior felony convictions, one of which,
unbeknownst to the prosecutor, had been pardoned by the Governor. Respondent
later sought a writ of habeas corpus to the District Court arguing that the sentence
was invalid because it was imposed based on a pardoned offense and that
Lockhart v.
imposing such sentence would be in violation of Double Jeopardy. Defendant
Nelson
requested a new sentencing hearing.
(Habitual
Criminal
Issue: Whether the Double Jeopardy Clause allows retrial when a defendant’s
Statute, Trial
conviction must be reversed because evidence should not have been admitted
error)
against him. – NO

Ratio: Reversal based on such ordinary "trial errors" as the "incorrect receipt or
rejection of evidence implies nothing with respect to the guilt or innocence of
the defendant," but is simply "a determination that he has been convicted
through a judicial process which is defective in some fundamental respect. Clearly
with that evidence, there was enough to support the sentence: the court and jury
had before them certified copies of four prior felony convictions, and that is

8
 sufficient to support a verdict of enhancement under the statute. Permitting
retrial in this instance is not the sort of governmental oppression at which the
Double Jeopardy Clause is aimed; rather, it serves the interest of the defendant by
affording him an opportunity to obtain a fair readjudication of his guilt free from
error.
Facts: Scott, a police officer, was charged with distribution of narcotics. Over the
course of his trial, he moved several times to dismiss two counts of his indictment
on the ground that his defense had been prejudiced by preindictment delay. At
the close of evidence, the court granted the Motion, to which the government
appealed, and the Court determined that further prosecution was barred by the
Double Jeopardy clause of the Fifth Amendment. The Supreme Court granted the
petition for certiorari.
US v. Scott
(Distribution of
Issue: The issue is whether the Double Jeopardy clause prohibits subsequent
narcotics)
prosecution, on appeal, of criminal counts that are dismissed. – NO

Ratio: Double Jeopardy does not bar subsequent prosecution of a matter when
it is dismissed on a ground unrelated to factual guilt or innocence. Where a
defendant, himself, seeks to have the trial terminated without any submission to
either judge or jury as to his guilt or innocence, an appeal by the government for
his successful effort to do so is not barred by the Double Jeopardy Clause.
Facts: There was a shooting in San Ildefonso, Bulacan. The shooting claimed the
life of Alex Vinculado and seriously injured his twin brother Levi. Their uncle,
Miguel Vinculado, Jr. was also shot. Three (3) criminal Informations - one (1) for
homicide and two (2) for frustrated homicide were initially filed against Honorato
Galvez, Mayor of San Ildefonso, and Godofredo Diego, the alleged bodyguard of
the mayor. However, the charges were withdrawn and a new set was filed against
the same accused upgrading the crimes to murder and frustrated murder. Mayor
Galvez was charged, in addition, with violation of PD 1866 for unauthorized
carrying of firearm outside his residence.

The trial court found the accused Godofredo Diego guilty beyond reasonable
*People v. Hon.
doubt of the crimes of murder and double frustrated murder. However, it
Velasco
acquitted Mayor Honorato Galvez of the same charges due to insufficiency of
(Murder and
evidence. It also absolved him from the charge of illegal carrying of firearm upon
unauthorized
its finding that the act was not a violation of law.
carrying of
firearm)
The acquittal of accused Honorato Galvez was challenged by the Government
before this Court in a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.
Allegedly, in holding in favor of Galvez, the judge deliberately and wrongfully
disregarded certain facts and evidence on record which, if judiciously considered,
would have led to a finding of guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt.
Petitioner proposes that this patently gross judicial indiscretion and arbitrariness
should be rectified by a re-examination of the evidence by the Court upon a
determination that a review of the case will not transgress the constitutional
guarantee against double jeopardy. It is urged that this is necessary because the
judgment of acquittal should be nullified and substituted with a verdict of guilt.

9
Petitioner invokes the constitutional doctrine in the United States that the Double
Jeopardy Clause permits a review of acquittals decreed by US trial magistrates
where, as in this case, no retrial is required should judgment be overturned. Since
Philippine concepts on double jeopardy have been sourced from American
constitutional principles, statutes and jurisprudence, particularly the case of
Kepner v. United States and because similarly in this jurisdiction a retrial does not
follow in the event an acquittal on appeal is reversed, double jeopardy should also
be allowed to take the same directional course.

Issue: Whether a review by the Supreme Court of a judgment of acquittal in light

of the constitutional interdict against double jeopardy is permissible – NO

Ratio: It must be explained that under existing American law and jurisprudence,
appeals may be had not only from criminal convictions but also, in some limited
instances, from dismissals of criminal charges, sometimes loosely termed
"acquittals." But this is so as long as the judgments of dismissals do not involve
determination of evidence. It must involve questions of law or matters unrelated
to a factual resolution of the case which consequently, on appeal, will not involve
a review of evidence.

United States v. Scott positively spelled out that if an acquittal was based on an
appreciation of the evidence adduced, no appeal would lie. In the case at bar,
the records show that respondent trial judge based his finding of acquittal, no
matter how erroneous it might seem to petitioner, upon the evidence presented
by both parties. The judgment here was no less than a factual resolution of the
case.

The doctrine that an appeal of a judgment after the defendant had been acquitted
by the court in a bench trial is a new trial, is applicable in this case.
Requisites for invoking double jeopardy:
(a) a valid complaint or information;
(b) before a competent court before which the same is filed;
(c) the defendant had pleaded to the charge; and,
(d) the defendant was acquitted, or convicted, or the case against him dismissed
or otherwise terminated without his express consent.

It bears repeating that where acquittal is concerned, the rules do not distinguish
whether it occurs at the level of the trial court or on appeal from a judgment of
conviction. This firmly establishes the finality-of- acquittal rule in our jurisdiction.
Therefore, as mandated by our laws and jurisprudence, an acquittal is final and
unappealable on the ground of double jeopardy, whether it happens at the trial
court level or before the Court of Appeals.

In general, the rule is that a remand to a trial court of a judgment of acquittal

brought before the Supreme Court on certiorari cannot be had unless there is a
finding of mistrial. The doctrine that "double jeopardy may not be invoked after
trial" may apply only when the Court finds that the “criminal trial was a sham”
because the prosecution representing the sovereign people in the criminal case
was denied due process. The "remand of the criminal case for further hearing

10
 and/or trial before the lower courts amounts merely to a continuation of the first
jeopardy, and does not expose the accused to a second jeopardy.
Facts: Opulencia has been charged with a violation of a Batangas ordinance for
defrauding the government by installing electric wiring and devices without
proper authority in order to save costs. The CFI dismissed the case on the ground
of prescription, since it was filed 9 months after the discovery by the police,
whereas the offense has a 2-month prescription. Because of this, the Fiscal filed
another case—this time for theft of electricity under the Revised Penal Code.
Opulencia asserts that this constitutes double jeopardy. The government insists
that it is not, since the two separate informations filed refer to two different
offenses.

Issue: Whether the acquittal of Opulencia in the case for violation of the
Ordinance will bar his prosecution for theft under the RPC (a national law), even
if these laws neither punish the same offense nor have the same elements nor
legislative intent or objects?—YES

Ratio: The Court ruled in favor of Opulencia, stating that the constitutional
protection against double jeopardy is available so long as the acts which
constitute or have given rise to the first offense under a municipal ordinance are
the same acts which constitute or have given rise to the offense charged under a
statute.

1. Where one offense is charged under a municipal ordinance while the

People v. Relova
other is penalized by a statute, the critical inquiry is to the identity of the
(Theft of
acts which the accused is said to have committed and which are alleged to
electricity)
have given rise to the two offenses. The constitutional protection against
double jeopardy is available so long as the acts which constitute or have
given rise to the first offense under a municipal ordinance are the same
acts which constitute or have given rise to the offense charged under a
statute.

The Identity of offenses that must be shown need not be absolute. Identity: the
first and second offenses maybe regarded as the "same offense" where the
second offense necessarily includes the first offense or is necessarily included in
such first offense or where the second offense is an attempt to commit the first
or a frustration thereof.
1. The question of identity or lack of identity of offenses is addressed
by examining the essential elements of each of the 2 offenses
charged, as set out in the legislative definitions of the offenses
involved.
2. The question of the identity of acts which are claimed to have
generated liability both under a municipal statute and a national
statute must be addressed, in the first instance, by examining the
location of such acts in time and space. When the acts of the
accused as set out in the 2 informations are so related to each other
in time and space as to be reasonably regarded as having taken
place on the same occasion and where those acts have been moved
by one and the same, or a continuing, intent or voluntary design or

11
 negligence, such acts may be appropriately characterized as an
integral whole capable of giving rise to penal liability simultaneously
under different legal enactments (a municipal ordinance and a
national statute).
Facts: Based on a complaint filed by petitioner PSB, Bermoy Spouses were charged
with estafa thru falsification of a public document in the Regional Trial Court.
Upon arraignment, respondent spouses pleaded “not guilty” to the charge and the
case was set for trial. After the prosecution rested its case, the defense filed, with
leave of court, a demurrer to evidence on the ground that the prosecution failed
to identify respondent spouses as the accused.

The trial court dismissed the case. PSB filed a petition for certiorari with the Court
of Appeals. The CA denied petition holding that the trial court was correct in
granting the demurrer to evidence for insufficiency of evidence on account of lack
of proper identification of the accused. But even assuming that the trial court
erred, the acquittal of the accused can no longer be reviewed either on appeal or
on petition for certiorari for it would violate the right of the accused against
double jeopardy. Thus this petition. The Solicitor General contends that the trial
court’s dismissal of Criminal Case No. 96-154193 was tainted with grave abuse of
discretion thus, double jeopardy does not apply in this case.

Issue: W/N Double jeopardy applies in this case – YES

Ratio: The SC held that double jeopardy applies in this case. On the last element,
the rule is that a dismissal with the express consent or upon motion of the accused
*People v.
does not result in double jeopardy. However, this rule is subject to two
Bermoy
exceptions, namely, if the dismissal is based on insufficiency of evidence or on
(Estafa, lack of
the denial of the right to speedy trial. A dismissal upon demurrer to evidence falls
identification)
under the first exception. Since such dismissal is based on the merits, it amounts
to an acquittal. As the CA correctly held, the elements required in Section 7 were
all present in Criminal Case No. 96-154193. Thus, the Information for estafa
through falsification of a public document against respondent spouses was
sufficient in form and substance to sustain a conviction. The trial court had
jurisdiction over the case and the persons of respondent spouses. Respondent
spouses were arraigned during which they entered “not guilty” pleas. Finally,
Criminal Case No. 96-154193 was dismissed for insufficiency of evidence.
Consequently, the right not to be placed twice in jeopardy of punishment for the
same offense became vested on respondent spouses. Section 2, Rule 122 of the
Rules of Court provides that “any party may appeal from a final judgment or order,
except if the accused would be placed thereby in double jeopardy.” Here, PSB
seeks a review of the 21 April 1998 Order dismissing Criminal Case No. 96- 154193
for insufficiency of evidence. It is in effect appealing from a judgment of acquittal.
By mandate of the Constitution and Section 7, the courts are barred from
entertaining such appeal as it seeks an inquiry into the merits of the dismissal.

• GR: express consent in termination not a bar for double jeopardy.

o XPN:
 if the dismissal is based on insufficiency of evidence or
 on the denial of the right to speedy trial

12
 Facts: Jenkins was indicted for failing to submit to induction into the armed forces
of the United States after notice. It is said that Jenkins wrote the Local Board
asking to be reclassified as conscientious objector. The Board denied his request
for postponement of induction. The next day, on the day of induction, he failed to
show up and subsequently returned his conscientious objector application form.
The district court dismissed the indictment since the ruling in Ehlert which says
that local boards need not consider the conscientious objection claims filed by
registrants after receiving induction orders, cannot be given retroactive effect to
him. The Government contends that this is contrary to US v. Mercado which
applied Ehlert to a registrant with a conscientious objection claim that had
allegedly crystallized after notice of induction. The Court did not reach this issue
for lack of jurisdiction to entertain Government’s appeal.

Issue: Whether there can be a government appeal after the dismissal of the case
– NO
US v. Jenkins
Ratio: The Criminal Appeals Act allows 3 cases for appeals, one of which is “From
(Induction,
a decision arresting a judgment of conviction for insufficiency of the indictment,
admission to
where such decision is based upon the invalidity or construction of the statute
military service)
upon which the indictment is founded.” Here, although the district judge
characterized his action as dismissal, it is clear that for double jeopardy purposes,
he acquitted the defendant. His ruling was based on facts developed at trial, which
were not apparent on the face of indictment, and which went to the general
issue of the case. The district court opinion relied on the precise circumstances of
Jenkins’ case to conclude that Ehlert should not apply retroactively to him. Here,
it was not construing the statute, which Ehlert authoritatively interpreted, and
holding Jenkins did not come within it as a matter of law. It was holding that the
statute should not be applied to him as a matter of fact. The Government asserts
that the amended Criminal Appeals Act entitles it to appeal to every acquittal
which can be demonstrated to be the result of an error of law by the judge. It
contends that the Double Jeopardy clause should be read to permit retrial even
on an erroneous instruction. The Court ruled that so long as Kepner and Sisson
stand, the clause forbids retrial whenever the trier of the facts has rendered a
legal determination of innocence ‘on the basis of facts adduced at the trial
relating to the general issue of the case.’
Facts: : Romero was charged with four different criminal cases: murder, frustrated
murder, attempted murder, and illegal possession of firearms. 
He was arraigned
on December 2, 1949, and pleaded not guilty. 
After the multiple motions of
People v. postponement by the Fiscal, the Case is now at bar—the Court resolving the issue
Romero of whether or not in this case, the defendant can avail of the defense of Double
(Murder, illegal Jeopardy.
possession of
firearms, Issue: W/N there is double jeopardy – No
multiple
postponements) Ratio: The Court ruled that no, whatever reason the defendant may give (that it is
the fiscal’s fault because of his multiple postponements) it is a fact which cannot
be controverted that the dismissal of the cases against the defendant was ordered
upon the petition of defendant’s counsel. In opposing the postponement of the

13
 trial of the cases and insisting on the compliance with the order of the court dated
May 25, 1950, that the cases be dismissed if the Provincial fiscal was not ready for
trial on the continuation of the hearing on June 14, 1950, he obviously insisted
that the cases be dismissed. Therefore, not including him in the purview of the
defense of Double Jeopardy, that exemption being: “if it [the initial valid hearing]
is dismissed upon the petition or with the express consent of the defendant, the
dismissal will be without prejudice or not a bar to another prosecution for the
same offense, because, in the last case, the defendant’s action in having the case
dismissed constitutes a waiver of his constitutional right not to be prosecuted
again for the same offense.”

For purposes of the Syllabus: Nature of an appeal by the fiscal: A motion for
reconsideration filed in a criminal case in a Court of First Instance by the Fiscal on
the ground of error of law in the judgment or grave abuse of discretion is
equivalent to a motion for new trial.

Facts: Petitioner and three others were charged with grave coercion in the city
court. After three re-settings of the hearing at the instance of the prosecution, the
fiscal moved for a fourth transfer of the scheduled trial on the ground that the
complainant was sick. The accused opposed the motion and, invoking their
constitutional right to a speedy trial, insisted on the hearing of the case, stating
that otherwise, the case should be dismissed. Respondent judge provisionally
dismissed the case. Twenty-seven days later, the fiscal moved for its revival. The
motion was granted without opposition. Subsequently, however, the accused filed
a motion to dismiss on the ground of double jeopardy, which the court denied.
Hence, this petition.

Issue: W/N the revival of a grave coercion case, which was provisionally dismissed
(after the accused had been arraigned) because of complainant’s failure to appear
at the trial, would place the accused in double jeopardy, considering their
*Esmena v.
constitutional right to have a speedy trial – YES
Pogoy
(Grave coercion)
Ratio: The Supreme Court held, that jeopardy attached to the provisional
dismissal of the criminal case after arraignment, whether the same was ordered
at the court's own volition or upon motion of the accused, because the fiscal was
not ready for trial due to the absence of the complainant in court, and the
accused, invoking their right to a speedy trial, insisted on a trial. Order denying
motion to dismiss reversed and set aside.
• In order that legal jeopardy may exist, there should be (a) a valid complaint
or information (b) before a court of competent jurisdiction and (c) the
accused has been arraigned and has pleaded to the complaint or
information.
• The dismissal of a criminal case upon motion of the accused because the
prosecution was not prepared for trial since the complainant and his
witnesses did not appear at the trial is a dismissal equivalent to an acquittal
that would bar further prosecution of the defendant for the same offense.
Facts: Siblings Reynaldo Torres (Reynaldo), Jay Torres (Jay), Ronnie Torres (Ronnie)
*People v.
and appellant with the special complex crime of robbery with homicide
Torres
committed against Jaime M. Espino (Espino). The accused armed with bladed

14
(Robbery with weapons, conspiring and confederating together, with the use of force, violence
homicide) and intimidation blocked Espino’s path and forcibly grabbed his belt-bag. On the
occasion of the said robbery, the accused, in pursuance of their conspiracy, used
personal violence and abuse of superior strength upon Espino which was resisted
by the victim prompting the accused to stab the former which caused his
immediate death. They ran away with the personal properties of the victim (belt-
bag, wallet, necklace, watch and ring of undetermined amount. Only appellant
Bobby Torres was arrested. Reynaldo, Jay and Ronnie remain at-large to date. RTC
held that appellant could not have committed robbery but held him liable for
the killing of Espino. CA found that the primary intention of appellant and his co-
accused was to rob Espino and his killing was only incidental to the robbery. The
blocking of Espino's car and the struggle for possession of his belt-bag after he
alighted are clear manifestations of the intent to commit robbery. Now the
appellant claims that CA erred in finding him liable for robbery with homicide.
He argues that his appeal to the CA was limited to his conviction for murder and
excluded his acquittal for robbery.

Issue: W/N Torres’ appeal is a waiver of his right against double jeopardy – YES

Ratio: SC ruled against the appellant holding that an appeal in a criminal case
opens the entire case for review on any question including one not raised by the
parties. When an accused appeals from the sentence of the trial court, he waives
his right against double jeopardy and throws the whole case open to the review
of the appellate court, which is then called upon to render such judgment as law
and justice dictate, whether favorable or unfavorable to the appellant. When
appellant appealed the RTC's judgment of conviction for murder, he is deemed to
have abandoned his right to invoke the prohibition on double jeopardy. Thus,
appellant could not have been placed twice in jeopardy when the CA modified the
ruling of the RTC by finding him guilty of robbery with homicide as charged in
the Information instead of murder.
Facts: Sps. Aguinaldo filed before the OCP a complaint against Torres for
falsification of public documents. They alleged that the titles without their
knowledge and consent to Torres through a forged DoS. Torres denied said forgery
and claim that the respondents sold the properties to him. Finding probable cause,
the OCP recommended the filing of an information against Torres for the crime of
falsification of public document. It was filed before the MTC of Manila. Torres
moved for a reconsideration, but it was denied, so on appeal, the SOJ reversed
Torres v. the findings of the investigation prosecutor and ordered the withdrawal of the
Aguinaldo information. The MR filed by respondent was denied. A Motion to Withdraw
(Falsification of Information was filed before the MTC. Petitioner has not yet been arraigned.
public Respondents filed a petition for certiorari to the CA. This was granted. Torres filed
documents) for an MR, but it was denied. Hence the instant petition.

Issue: W/N the rule on provisional dismissal under Sec. 8, Rule 117 applies – NO

Ratio: It does not. The SC said that this contention is untenable. A motion to
withdraw is different from a motion to dismiss. Their legal effect varies. In this
case, it is a motion to withdraw that was filed, hence, the case of Banares II v.
Balising does not apply wherein the Court said that:

15
 “......an order dismissing a case without prejudice is final if no motion for
reconsideration or appeal therefrom is timely filed.”

As such is the case, the action filed (motion to withdraw) falls under Sec. 8, Rule
117 which states:
the law on provisional dismissal becomes operative once the judge dismisses, with
the express consent of the accused and with notice to the offended party:
● a case involving a penalty of imprisonment not exceeding six (6) years

or a fine of any amount, or both, where such provisional dismissal shall
become permanent one (1) year after issuance of the order without the
case having been revived; or 

● a case involving a penalty of imprisonment of more than six (6) years,
where such provisional dismissal shall become permanent two (2) years
after issuance of the order without the case having been revived.
There is provisional dismissal when a motion filed expressly for that purpose
complies with the following requisites: 

1. It must be with express consent of the accused 

2. There must be a notice to the offended party.

The Court found that the Motion did not comply with the requisites. The Motion
to Withdraw Information was filed by the Assistant City Prosecutor and
approved by the City Prosecutor without the conformity of Torres. It cannot be
said that the motion was filed with his express consent as required under Sec. 8,
Rule 117.

*People v.
Lacson
(Kuratong
Baleleng Gang)

Facts: At a checkpoint (because of the nearing election), police officers stopped a

Los Banos v.
silver-gray car on the national highway. When Pedro opened the window, Arevalo
Pedro
saw a gun carry case beside him. Pedro could not show any COMELEC authority to
16
 (Falsified carry a firearm when the checkpoint team asked for one, but he opened the case
COMELEC when asked to do so. Boac election officer filed a complaint against Pedro the
certification) election gun ban, i.e., for carrying a firearm outside of his residence or place of
business without any authority from the Comelec. After an inquest, the
Marinduque provincial prosecutor filed the above Information against Pedro with
the RTC Marinduque. Pedro filed a Motion for Preliminary Investigation, which the
RTC granted. The preliminary investigation, however, did not materialize.
Instead, Pedro filed with the RTC a Motion to Quash, attaching to his motion a
Comelec Certification that he was "exempted" from the gun ban. The provincial
prosecutor opposed the motion. The RTC quashed the Information and ordered
the police and the prosecutors to return the seized articles to Pedro. Private
prosecutor Ariel Los Baños (Los Baños), representing the checkpoint team, moved
to reopen the case, as Pedro's Comelec Certification was a "falsification", and the
prosecution was "deprived of due process" when the judge quashed the
information without a hearing. Attached to Los Baños' motion were 2 Comelec
certifications stating that: (1) Pedro was not exempted from the firearm ban; and
(2) the signatures in the Comelec Certification were forged. RTC reopened the case
prompting Pedro to aver that based on Section 8 of Rule 117, arguing that the
dismissal had become permanent. RTC rejected the position that Section 8, Rule
117 applies, and explained that this provision refers to situations where both the
prosecution and the accused mutually consented to the dismissal of the case, or
where the prosecution or the offended party failed to object to the dismissal of
the case, and not to a situation where the information was quashed upon motion
of the accused and over the objection of the prosecution.

Issue: W/N Sec 8, Rule 117 is applicable in this case? –NO

Ratio: Section 8, Rule 117 does not exactly state what a provisional dismissal is.
The modifier "provisional" directly suggests that the dismissals which Section 8
essentially refers to are those that are temporary in character (i.e., to dismissals
that are without prejudice to the re-filing of the case), and not the dismissals that
are permanent (i.e., those that bar the re- filing of the case).

Based on the law, rules, and jurisprudence, permanent dismissals are those
barred by the principle of double jeopardy. The cited basis, in fact, for Pedro's
motion to quash was a Comelec Certification (granting him an exemption from the
ban and a permit to carry firearms during the election period) that Pedro attached
to his motion to quash. This COMELEC Certification is a matter aliunde that is not
an appropriate motion to raise in, and cannot support, a motion to quash
grounded on legal excuse or justification found on the face of the Information.
Significantly, no hearing was ever called to allow the prosecution to contest the
genuiness of COMELEC certification.

17