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    S&T 196 - Vietnam Battles

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    Sees )y lao VIETNAM BatTTLes HUE & KHE SANH Also in this Issue: ¢ For Your Information OUTGOING MAIL « joseon minanoa Ih Se Se y ‘The lead is Vietnam Battles, with an analysis of operations in this war Aletkes centering around the campaigns for Hue and Khe Sanh, On the small unit level, John Burtt gives us a look at the fight for Kham Duc, an action which provides a microcosm of the war. Other articles are an in-depth look at the Luftwaffe and a different persepetive on the legendary Hannibal. ‘There has been a lot of research and analysis done on the Vietnam War. But there are still critical questions that need to be answered. Consider. Could the United State shave employed a more appropriate force mix? Out of over a half million troops committed to Vietnam in 1968, the U.S, could field scarcely 50,000 riflemen. And riflemen are critical in conduct- ing small unit actions and maintaining contact with the civilian population in this form of warfare. The majority of troops were committed to the vast chain of combat support and logistics forces which were required by the American way of war. Of course, many of these troops were in special operations, intelligence, and miliary police units which had critical func~ tions in the counterinsurgency part of the war. Stil, the vast U.S. logistics infrastructure in Vietnam tied down too much combat strength in static positions and created all sorts of vulnerabilities. Supposing, instead, that the U.S. had minimized its artillery and helicopter assets in Vietnam and instead flooded the country with infantry who were capable of controlling the countryside and securing the borders? What was the effect of the bombing of North Vietnam on enemy mo- rale? The experience of World War Two was that bombing tended to create at first a sense of outrage among the enemy civilian populace, and then apathy. The North Vietnamese did not begin to commit large numbers ‘of combat units to the war in the south until 1965 and later. Did the U.S. bombing create a sense of solidarity between the North Vietnamese populace and its government which in turn allowed this massive troops commitment? The Laotian and Cambodian sanctuaries. Did a viable Allied plan actually exist to eliminate Communist sanctuaries in Laos and Cambodia? While the U.S. did launch its incursion into Cambodia in 1970, and the South Vietnamese tried to cut the Ho Chi Minh Trail in Laos in 1971, neither operation permanently neutralized Communist bases in these countries. A major factor here, of course, was the North Vietnamese army, which was more than willing to take massive casualties in order to retain its hold on these sanctuaries. ‘These are the sorts of questions that wargaming can potentially answer. ‘The real dilemma is making such a wargame interesting enough to play. I'd like to hear reader comments on this issue. BULK RATE US. POSTAGE PAID MOJAVE CA, PERMIT NO 92 Next Issue S&T #197°s lead is Great Medieval Battles, covering Bannockburn and Tamburlaine. Plus there isan extensive analysis of conflict in Asia inthe early 21st century. In future issues, look forarticleson the origins of aircraft carrier operations 2 #198 in World War 1, Napoleon's 1813 campaign, and the Battle of Moscow 1941. CONTENTS MARIAPR 1999 S fetny Number 196 Tact ice FEATURES DEPARTMENTS 4 Battles inVietnam 1968: 2 OUTGOING MAIL Hue & Khe Sanh 27 FYI: FORYOUR by Joseph Miranda INFORMATION 34 WORKS IN PROGRESS 36 FEEDBACK QUESTIONS 21 The Battle of Kham Duc, ela 1968 by John Burtt 40 The Luftwaffe: Rise & Fall of the Reich’s Air Force by Carl O. Schuster RULES. RI VIETNAM: HUE & KHE SANH 52 Hannibal:A Stark Appraisal by James Yates STRATEGY & TACTICS 3 BATTLES IN VIETNAM 1968: HUE & KHE SANH by Joseph Miranda Somewhere over Vietnam a USAF F-108 drops its bombs. Communist units are in italics ‘The United States military had to deal witha strate- ‘fe dilemma from the beginning of its involvement in the Vietnam War. Most of the population of South ‘Vietnam (or the Republic of Vietnam—RVN) was Jocated either around Saigon, along the coastal low- Jnds, orin the Mekong Delta. But Communist infiltra- tion routes ran through the Vietnamese frontier with Laos and Cambodia and the remote regions of the Central highlands. The strategy of the commander of USS Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV), General William Westmoreland, wastoutilize the Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) to conduct counterinsurgency operations in the populated areas while the Americans hunted Communist 1: units in the remote regions. Westmoreland’s strategy ‘was supposed to reduce civilian casualties by allowing the United States toemploy itsoverwhelming firepower {n the thinly populated regions of South Vietnam. The result was endless battles in the period 1965-67, in which the United States continually inflicted massive Tosses on Communist military forces. The Communists ‘continually bounced back, because they had several advantages. The frst was in the Communist sanctuaries in North Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia, which were safe from Allied fand attacks (although not from Allied sirpower and unconventional warfare operations, the ducted by special operations forces and indigenous guerillas). The Communists used theses avoid Allied ground attacks and rebuild shatered unit, Furthermore indiscriminate Allied frepower_—despite official intent disrupted the civilian populace, reat ing a mass of refugees which undermined $a ability to maintain its legitimacy 4s a government Many Vietoamese ended up supporting the Comm nistssimply to gainrevengeagainstthe Aliesforairand antiley attacks against ther families an vilages. Bat the primary Communist advantage was thei Uindeterobnd orgatization or infrastructure, Inthe 1965 67 period, Allied efforts to destroy this infrastructure proved generally ineffective. t ws from ths infa- pee eee Ge satatre and intelligence that would give them the advantage of surprise tthe opening of the 1968 Tet Ofte: Approaching Tet-—1968 While Communist plans for their 19681 rade from their conduct of operations, The Commi nists would aack South Vietnamese cities and ARVN ytuaries to Vietnam during the ™ Tet Offensive January 1968 1 5 oS we ) : South x, China Sea STRATEGY & TACTICS. 5 4196 units, By targeting the former, they expected to initiate ‘a mass uprising. By targeting the latter, they expected South Vietnamese forces to disintegrate under the pres- sure, perhaps even defecting to the Communist cause, But to make this strategy work, the Communists had 10 draw American forces away from the populated re- gions. This would be done, apparently, by launching. feints at remote frontier bases such as Pleiku and Khe Sanh. Khe Sank, located in the extreme northwestern cor- ner of the Republic of Vietnam, had been originally ‘established as.a Special Forces base in 1962. In January 1967, the Marines deployed a regiment there, strength- ‘ened its defenses, built an airstrip, and cleared the nearby hills of enemy forces. In late 1967, American intelligence detected elements of two North Vietnam- ese Army (NVA) divisions in Khe Sanh’s vicinity. A ‘major battle seemedto be inthe making. And the United. Staies government had committed itself publicly 10 holding the firebase. Khe Sanh held some strategic importance to MACY. It was supposed to serve as a base to block Communist infiltration across the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ). Also, General Westmoreland had hopes that Khe Sanh could ‘be used as a base to launch a future incursion into Laos 10 cut the Ho Chin Minh Trail, the Communist infiltra tion and supply route, Losing Khe Sanh, Westmoreland feared, would unhinge the northern flank of the Allied position in Vietnam, The American obsession with Khe ‘Sanh was reflected in the numbers of units, land and air, which would eventually be committed t0 its defense. While the base itself was held by only a reinforced ‘Marine regiment, much of the Allied strength in the I Corps Tactical Zone was committed to relieving Khe ‘Sanh in the event of a major enemy assault. Signifi- cantly, the United States would commit one of the ‘greatest concentrations of aerial delivered firepower in history to the defense of Khe Sanh, While America’s attention was tied up at Khe Sanh, the Communists were planning for their assault on the city of Hue. This city was a vital military-political target. Hue had been the capital of Vietnam since the 17th century, becoming a symbol ofthe nation’s inde- pendence and prestige prior tothe French colonization of the country in the late 19th century. By seizing Hue, the National Liberation Front (NLF) could perhaps declare a provisional government and gain foreign recognition, ‘The ARVN's defenses around the city were light. Hue had been treated as something of an open city by both sides throughout the war in order 10 avoid the political ramifications of collateral damage. So by seiz- ing Hue in a quick coup, the Communists could present the Allies with a dilemma. If the Allies—really the ‘Americans—employed their firepower to retake the city, they would give the Communists an immense propaganda victory (vital inthis sort of warfare); or the Allies would have to surrender the city and give the ‘Communists de facto military victory. And even ifthe Allies did retake the city, by holding on at all costs the ‘Communists would show they were a force to be reck- coned with. Nonetheless, Hue itself was potentially a very de- fensible position. The city was divided into several areas. The Old City, or Citadel, was Hue’s historic district. The Citadel was surrounded by wallsand moats. ‘Within the Old City was the Palace of Peace (or Imperial Palace), the historic Vietnamese eapitol. The Old City bordered on the Perfume River to its south. Across the river was the New City. To the city's northeast was the suburb of Gia Hoi. And Hue was the headquarters of the ARVN Ist Infantry Division, which had a fortified ‘compound within the citadel. Moreover, MACV also shad a compoundin the New City. While few U.S. troops ‘werestationed in Hue, there wasastrong American unit in the vicinity, Task Force X-Ray. Task Force X-Ray Task Force X-Ray of the U.S. Marine Corps was typical othe organizational structures generated by the necessities of fighting in the chaotic situations of Viet- ‘nam, Originally, Task Force X-Ray consisted ofthe Ist and Sth Regiments of the Ist Marine Division. Task Force X-Ray had several missions—guarding the Ma- rine base at Phu Bai, Keeping Route 1 open, and sereen- ing the western approaches to Hue. While two regi- ments were considered strong enough to handle these missions, problems developed as the American com- ‘mand decided to reorganize the Task Force. Just as the Communists were beginning to infiltrate into the Hue area, the Marines were shuffling regiments about the ‘countryside, To guard the Hue area, the Allied command in ‘Vietnam deployed the ARVN Ist Division, commanded by Brigadier General Ngo Quang Truong. The Ist Division was considered to be a first line unit, with @ good combat record. The Ist Division had 12 organic infantry battalions (instead of the usual nine) and was further reinforced by two of the elite ARVN airborne battalions. With an overstrength division and the ait- bore units, ARVN should have been able to hold Hue. ‘Yet in the event, the Communists overran most of the city in one day. Despite the apparent ARVN strength, most of the ‘units were not deployed to defend the city itself. Six of the Ist Division’ infantry battalions were committed to pacification duties, deployed in the countryside in op- erations against Viet Cong guerrillas. Four more battal- ions were assigned to Hue’s northwestern approaches, and only one to the actual western and southern ap- proaches that the Communists would use to infiltrate into the city. Within Hue itself, Truong had but one infantry battalion, plus his elite Black Panther Com- ‘pany and the divisional recon company. He also had the ALLIED FORCES IN VIETNAM Higher Command Structures ‘The Allies divided the Republic of Vietam into four operational areas, Comps (North), I Comps (Center) III Comps (Saigon and environs), IV Cops (Mekong Delt). These comps were essentially geographical regions, not maneuver units. Actual chain ‘of command was somewhat complex, reflecting the multinational nature of the Allied effort “Ales” include ARVN, US, plus other Free World Forces, ef). ‘The United States ran its operations in Vietnam via the Miltary Assistance Command, Vietam (MACV), MACY was a unified command, responsible forall Amy. AirForce, Navy and Marine forces, Therealso was U.S, Asm, Vetsamn (USARV), ‘whieh was responsible for logistical and udministrative support for U.S, Army units in Vietnam. Actual US, combat command was under Ind Il Field Forces, these being corps level commands (I Field Force was in Il Corps Tactical Zone, I Feld Force vas in II Comps Tactical Zone, to confuse matters bit)- lI Marine Amphibious Force commanded units inthe | Corps Tactical Zone (where most ofthe U.S. Marine units were committed) Special operations were the responsibility of Sth Special Forces Group and MACV-Studies and Observations Group (MACY-SOG). Seventh Air Foree commanded U.S. Air Force divisions, wings and groups in Southeast Asia, Naval Forces Vietnam was responsible for naval operations. The entire U-S. war effort wa, technically, under the Commander-i-Chief, ie Command (CINCPAC), but this headquarters had litle role in actual operations, Allied Order of Battle, Vietnam, December 1967 Unit Location Uni Locat ARVN Ist fairy Divison Comps US. It Avision Brigade 1Coeps, Saigon "ARVN 2h Infantay Division [Corps US. 12h Aviation Group IN Comps, Long Binh ARVN Sst infaniry Regiment Comps US. River Patol Fore, Task Force 116 Comps ARVN Is: Rangst Group Toms Astraian Task Force Corp, Phe Le ARVN Aishome Brigade (1) Corps ‘New Zealand “W" Foss UL Coeps,Phuoe Le US. 26th Marne Regent (2) 1 Coms, Khe Sanh Philippines Ist Civie Acton Gaoup utcompe US, 3rd Marine Division 1 Corps, Bong Hi/toe Till Queen's Cobras Regiment LOL Comp, Bear Cat USS Ist Marine Division 1 Comps, Da Nang/Quang TH ARVN Tih Infantey Division IV Comps US. 23d nfaniy Division Americal G) 1 Comps, Cha ARVN oth ltaney Division IV Comps US. 31d Bde Is Caley Di. (Alnmebile) 1 Comps, Cha Li ARVN 218 Infantry Division 1V Comps US. 3rd Bde th Infanuty Divison 1 caps, Buc Po ARVN sth Ranger Group LV Comps US. 11 Brigade?23afafanny Division 1 Corp, Buc Po ARVN Maine Brigade IV comps US. 16h Aviation Geoup 1 Cops, Du Nang US. 2nd Beth terry Drsion 1 Corps, Dong Am ROK 2h Mane Brigid 1 Comps Cha Lai US. 16th Aviation Goup 1 Comps, Can Tho ARWN 22h Infantry Division Comps US. Mekong Deta Riverine ARWN 23nt Infinity Division Corps Fore, Task Force 117 Icons ARVN 420d nfintry Regiment comps ARVN 2a Ranger Grou comps ARVN Maine Brigade NCexps US. Ist Cavalry Division Corps, tong Son 1.Notes Us tuusdesiesinimyDy. nape be ea panes Cnet Ug-sagyca es Omen, iecape Marten), Ett Stare Dson basin Os 2G Antare Bre Nee (3) Special Forces teams were deployed throughout Viet- US, Mt Aviston Group 1 Corps, Nha Trane : nam on a variety of missions. Sth Special Forces also con- onsel Survellance Fare, Task Free 115 Corps, Cam Rank y ms 8, Sossig Paopedaves ee Usk rarely Ep cama ay trlled five Mobile Strike Fozees, ROK Cspital Division Corps, Binh KherQui Nhon ROK 5th lata Dission Corps, Tuy HoaNinth Hos, 2» Abbreviations Dong Ba Thi ARN: Army of the Republic of Viewam ARVN Sih Infany Diison miCorpe Bie: Brigade ARWN [Sth Infunry Divston bGoeps Div: Division ARVN 25th Infantry Division ML Comps ROK: Republic of Korea ARWN Sn Range: Group ULCoeps US Wate sie! Ae ae ee: HL Conpy 3. Arriving as reinforcements in February 1968 were the U.S. ARVN Airborne Brzate Comps 27th Marine RegimentSth Marine Division and the Sat US ae He rae Brigade/S2nd Airborne Division. The Ist Brigade/Sth Ifan- US, Istand Sed es. Infantry Dv ML Corps, Bear Ca/Tan A Sepa babet acai eine US. 25h Infnty Division LCoeps, Cu ChirTay Ninh US. dnd and 3d Bes 01st Aiboene Div. Corps, Cu ChifPhave Vinh US. 1th Ammored Cavalry UL Coeps, Xuan Loe US. 1960 nfanty Brigade Loops, Phu My STRATEGY & TACTICS 7 196 two airborne battalions, but in mid-January Saigon recalled these units into its strategic reserve, So now ‘Hue itself was defended by only one battalion, some divisional units and miscellaneous paramilitary forces. Despite the unpreparedness, MACY did have some idea of what was about to happen. Allied intelligence had determined in late January 1968 that the Commu- nists would attempt acountry wide offensive around the Tet (lunarnew year) holiday. The Allies did make some attempts 10 prepare for this offensive, but someone forgot to inform the ARVN and U.S. commanders at Hue about this. Nonetheless, General Truong did sus pect something was amiss, and sent the Ist Division's, recon company out tothe westof the city asascreen. On 30 January, Truong attended the flag-raising ceremony in the Citadel. But he left early upon being notified of Communist attacks against other cities in South Viet- ‘nam, He retumed to Ist Division's headquarters and put his troops on alert Battle at Hue In early 1968, the Communists infiltrated three NVA regiments into the Hue area, the 40h, Sih and 6th, supported by sapper and heavy weapons units. The 4th and 6th Regiments would storm Hue, while the Sth Regiment covered the area to the northwest [different Situation Along the DMZ February 1968 sources sometimes give different unit identities; this was due to the Communist practice of redesignating units and using extensive deception plans, Also, there were some NLF units assigned to these regiments. ed) Onthe morningof 31 January, the Communists launched their attack on Hue under the cover of a rocket and ‘mortar barrage, The 6th Regiment seized the Palace of | Peace, overran Hue’s airfield, and occupied most of the Citadel with the exception of the ARVN Ist Division Headquarters. South of the Perfume River, the 41h Regimentattacked the MACY compound but wasthrown back, Meanwhile, Viet Cong seized various political targets, Allied reaction to the Communist attack on Hue was piecemeal, Initially, Allied commanders were notaware of the true extent of enemy strength inthe city. So U.S. and ARVN units were launched into attacks as they arrived on the scene, Given the usual Communist mo- bile tacties, where guerrilla forees would break off when attacked, there was reason to believe that rapid counterattacks might shift the initiative back to the Allies. The Marines committed elements of their Ist Regiment (Ist Battalion plus some armor) on 31 Janu- ary, the first day of the Communist offensive. But Communist resistance was stiffer than anticipated and the Marines were forced to fall back. nits fanned owt andl Meanwhile, General Truong ordered the Ist Division’ 3rd Regiment to fight its way from outside the city into his headquarters. On the afternoon of 1 February, these troops relieved the Ist Division's head- ‘quarters compound. By 7 February, Truong had recap- ‘tured the Hue airfield and Saigon began airlfting air~ borne units back into the city. Then the Communists ccounterattacked and the ARVN offensive ground to a halt In the New City, the Communists, after some inde- cision, decided to stand and fight. While they could not ‘expect iohold against U.S. firepower, they could run up Allied casualties and gain political points as the flag of the National Liberation Front flew from key buildings. ‘On 4 February, the Marines threw in the 2nd Battalion’ ‘Sth Marine Regiment and, together with the Ist Battal ion/Ist Regiment, they cleared the southern bank of the Perfume river in sharp house-to-house fighting. Bynow, the Air Cavalry was geting intothe act. The U.S. committed the 3rd Brigade/Ist Cavalry Division (Airmobile), reinforced with a battalion of paratroopers. from the 101st Airborne and some self-propelled anti- aircraft guns, to Hue’s northwest. The sky troopers engaged a variety of North Vietnamese and Viet Cong, units ina fight for the city’s lines of communications. The NVA alfempted to move elements of two more regiments into the area, but despite some local suc- cesses could make no more headway. Within Hue itself, Allied forces engaged the Com= munists in house-to-house combat reminiscent of @ ‘World Wer IL cityfight, Making things difficult for the Allies were adverse visibility conditions which 1 stricted air support. Additional firepower was provided byan offshore U.S. Navy task force ofthreecruisers and five destroyers. As usual in a city fight, civilians were caught in the middle and thousands of noncombatants, were killed, wounded or became refugees. Some con- troversy was generated when Allied forces discovered, mass graves containing the corpses of some 2800 South, Vietnamese government officials, executed by Com- Army of the Republic of Vietnam At the time of the Tet Offensive the Army of the Republic of| Vietnam (ARVN) consisted of ten infantry divisions, three indpen- deat infantry regiments, two sirbome brigades, two marine brigades, ‘twenty ranger battalions (usually combined into ranger groups), ten armored cavalry squadrons and a palace guard brigade, Most ARVN, ‘infantry divisions were regionally eeruited and based, making rede- ployment difficult for political reasons —the troops didnot like to g0 {oo far from home, and the commanders had too many local conn tions. The airborne, anger and marine units were considered to be the elite and usually spearheaded ARVN mobile operations, ‘There were also many unconventional warfare and paramilitary Units. The ARVN special forees command (Lue Luong Dac Biet— LLDB) was responsible for teaining local forees and conducting ‘countet-guerilla warfare. Four political warfare battalions conducted propaganda ndcivicaction, Additionally, the Ministry of Revolution ary Development trained cadres and sen them into the countryside 10 build up support fr the government, Atthe local evel were wo types ‘of "milta”forees, the Regional Forces and the Popular Forces, Als, the US. Sth Special Forces Group was in charge of the Civilian Irregular Defense Group (CIDG) program, which mobilized local ‘iia and guerillas The RYN National Police had a role in the counternsurgeney This was because the police, with tei local contaes, agent networks, ‘and ight weaponry, were considered suitable for ferreting ovtthe NLF underground and fighting guerillas, The National Police consisted of three forces: the Uniformed Police (routine law and order), Special Branch intelligence). and Field Force (heavily armea types, capableat some offensive action), OTHER ALLIED FORCES IN VIETNAM Australia: The Australians sent the Ist Australian Task Force Vietnam. The Task Force was a brigade sized unit, including ewo infantry battalions, Special Air Service and armored eavalry squadrons, plus atillery and logistical units. The Australians (and New Zealanders) were very effective illaoperations owing tothe Commonwealth experience inthis New Zealand organized a battalion sized “V Force" for duty in pines: The Philippines sen their st Civie Action Group (PHILCAG) to Vietnam. The PHILCAG's primary mission was pacification, Republic of Korea (ROK): The Koreans committed their Capital and ih Infantry Divisions and the 2nd Marine brigade ‘Thailand: Thailand sent its Queen's Cobeas Regiment to Vietnam, It fought alongside the U.S. 9th Infantry Division. In 1969, the Queens’ Cobras were replaced withthe Royal Thai Army Expeditionary Division, Marines breaching a walll in Hue. STRATEGY & TACTICS 9 nmunist forces when they had briefly occupied the city. In the strategy of revolutionary terror, destroying the enemy's infrastructure was a primary objective By 22 February, the Communist position within Hue was reduced to the Palace of Peace, Two days of Fieve fighting followed as ARVN troops cleared the Palace, and on the 24th a corporal ofthe Black Panther Company raised the South Vietnamese flag over the place, The ARVN Ist Division then linked up withthe USS. IstCavalry. Remaining Communist forces led the city and on ? March the Allied command declared Hue secure. But while the fighting was winding down at Hue another bate, this time a mobile operation, was shap- ing up along the Demilitarized Zone Siege at Khe Sanh While house-to-house fighting was raging in Hue, both Communist and Allied commanders were manca Nering around the US. Marine frebase at Khe Sanh, Khe Sanihad beenundersiegesince atleast 2 Janaary, when the Marines repulsed a Communistassaulton one of their outposts, The Communists responded with an atllery barrage, causing extensive damage within the base. The outbreak of the Tet Offensive on 31 January caused mach concem in Washington DC. National leaders feared that Khe Sanh would become the Ameri- can “Dien Bien Phu,” referring othe decisive bate of the First Indochina War [see S&T #191. ed.]. Dien Bien Phu had been a base thatthe French had constructed on the Vietnamese-Laotin frontier in late 1953 during their war in Indochina. France commited Some 15,000 French Union and Indochinese troops t0 Dien Bien Phu as part of ther strategy to outmaneuver Viet Minh forces. General Vo Nguyen Giap, the Viet inh commander, lay siege to Dien Bien Phi in 1953- 54, finally reducing the base through a combination of trench warfare and open assaults. Giap's victory at Dien. Bien Phu was a military and political catastrophe for France, The French lost their elite airborne and Foreign, Legion battalions there—and hence their offensive ea- ppabilities in Indochina. Just as important, Dien Bien Phu demonstrated that the forces of revolution could sweep away entrenched colonialism, thereby giving the Viet Minh the psychological ascendancy. Giap also commanded Communist forces during the 1968 Tet, Offensive, causing American leaders to believe he ‘might try to duplicate his 1954 victory, this time at Khe ‘Sanh. The situation at Khe Sanh was taken seriously ‘enough for President Lyndon Johnson to have a terrain ‘model of the firebase Set up in the White House base- ment? Actually, the American comparison between Dien Bien Phu and Khe Sanh was not all that applicable, In 1954, the French had committed the equivalent of some 20 battalions to Dien Bien Phu (including paratroop, infantry, artillery, engineer, and imegular formations, circa 15,000 troops), while Allied forces at Khe Sanh in, 1968 amounted to around seven infantry, armor and artillery battalions, plus support units (about 6000 t0- tal), While the loss of the Khe Sanh garrison mighthave been discomforting to the Allied cause in Vietnam, it would not have been a military disaster. Moreover, \hile Dien Bien Phu was out of range of other French forces in Indochina, Khe Sanh was within marching distance of Allied bases in northern South Vietnam, ‘And American helicopter mobility meant that relief force could always be flown into the base in case of an, ‘emergency. ‘Then there were the Communists. General Giap had deployed the equivalent of five Viet Minh divisions at Dien Bien Phu, amounting to some 49,500 combat {troops and 31,500 logistical personnel, AtKhe Sanh, he deployed two NVA divisions with about 20,000 men. ‘There were also two other NVA divisions along the nearby DMZ in early 1968 which could provide some Support, but these divisions were countered by several, other Allied units in the area. The differences in intensity between the two Com- ‘munist efforts can alsobe measured by the commitment of anillery. At Dien Bien Phu, the Communists fired a total of 103,000 rounds and the French fired (by various estimates) 93-140,000 in response (a fairly even ratio; some of the incoming Communist rounds were actually French airstrikes which landed inside the base and were counted as enemy fire). At Khe Sanh, the NVA fired. 11,550 rounds while the U.S. fired back 160,000 (a 14/ | ratio in favor of the Allies!) The big difference was in airpower. In 1954, the French had amaximum of 400 World WarIlera.ircraft available for operations in Indochina (both combat and. non-combat types). In 1968, the United States could, bring to bear several thousand state-of-the-art (For the 1960s) fixed wing aircraft and helicopters anywhere in Vietnam, At Khe Sank, the United States would drop over ten times as much aerial delivered munitions on (Communist positions as the French ar force did at Dien Bien Phu, continued on page 19 US. Marine Corp 261h Marine Regiment Headquarters Company 1s Battalion 2nd Battalion 3rd Batalion 1st Battalion, 9th Marine Regiment {1st Battalion, 130) Marine Artillery Regiment 1st Provisional 155mm Howitzer Batery Detachment, 1st Searchlight Battery, 12th Marines Detachment, 3d Engineer Batalio 3nd Platoon, Company D, 3rd Recon Battalion Ist Platoon, Company A, Sih Recon Battalion Company A (9), 3 Anttank Battalion (1) ‘Company B, 3d Tank Battalion, 3rd Marine Division Company A. 3rd Shore Party Battalion 2nd Clearing Platoon, Company C, 3rd Medical Batalion ‘OwerPlatoon, H&S Company, 3rd Motor Transport Battalion, Detachment, Company A, 9th Motor Transport Battalion Detachment, SUM, Ist Radio Battalion Detachment, rd Dental Company Detachment, Headquarters Company, Headquarters Batal- jon, 3rd Marine Division 2) ‘Combined Action Company O, 3rd Combined Action Group, nTMAF Detachment, Communications Company, Headquarters Bat talion, 3rd Marine Division Detachment, th Communications Battalion ‘Detachment, 7h Communications Batson Detachment, Force Lovisties Command. Sub-team #1, {7 Inerrogator-Translator Team Detachment Oi, Headquarters & Maintenance Squadron, Marine Aireratt Group-16 Detachment 01, Marine Observation Squadron, Marine Air cralt Group-16 Detachment 2, Marine Air Support Squadron 3, Marine Ait Contr! Group-18. ‘Detachment, Headquarters & Maintenance Squadron-36, Maine Aireraft Group-36 Detachment, Marine Air Traffic Control Unit 62, Marine Aieralt Group-36, TASK ORGANIZATION AT KHE SANH, 20 JANUARY - 1 APRIL 1998 US. Navy Detachment B, Construction Battalion, Mobile Unit-30 Detachment, Mobile Constrction Battalion-10 Detachment, Mobile Construction Battalion Detachment, Mobile Construction Batalon-5 US. Army Detachment A-101, Sth Special Forces Group Detachment, 4th Anillery Detachment, 6th Arillery Datactment, 238th Couater-mortar Radar Unit, 108th Field Ani- lecy Group, Detachment, Ist Platoon (Smoke), 25th Chemical Company 44th Signal Detachment, 37th Signal Battalion US. Air Foree Detactent (Operating Location AD), 1Sth Aerial Post Squadron 366th Transport Squadron, 366th Combat Support Detachment Group Detachment, 903d Aero Medical Evacuation Squadron Detachment A, 834th Air Division ‘Army of the Republic of Vietnam 37th Ranger Batalion (2) Postal, photo, exchange, staff augmentation, cts Notes: As can be seen, the U.S. maintained extensive combat and suppor units within the Khe San firebase itself. These units were necessary tomaintain and expand the base, and to coordinate neal snd artillery delivered firepower from outside. ee U.S. Air Support for the Khe Sanh Firebase Daily average Total ‘Tactical air sorties 300 24,000 Strategic air sortios 45 2700 ‘Tons air ordnance dropped on enemy 1300——*110,008 ‘Tons supply air delivered 130-200 12,400 Aircraft + helicopters destroyed : 4 ‘Comparison with French air support for Dien Bien Phu, 1954 ‘actical ar sorties 189) 10.400 Strategic sorties : Tons air ordnance dropped on enemy 15 9800 ‘Tons supply air delivered 100-125 69001) Aircel destroyed - o (1) Mech of this dropped by parachute and landing outside the fortress STRATEGY & TACTICS Communist Assault on Hue January 31, 1968 Ge BE Connon BA Usman Foe comma rg Posi The Al Counterattack / |circa February 15, 1968 2 #196 U.S. Army Organization in Vietnam ‘The United States Army organized ts combat units sceording to the ROAD concept (Reorganization Objective Army Division), The ROADDivision was the suecessorto the Penlomic Division concept [see S&T 194, ed. Theilea behind ROAD was to have adivisional ‘ganization which was flexible, maintained its combat strength and ould deploy new weapons. The concept was loosely base an the ‘combat eommare! armored divisions theU.S, Army had organizedin Work! War II, where the division consisted of a hase element logistics, reeonaissance, engineers) and combat maneuver atta ons (armor, infants), The divisional commander would form battle groups to deal with individual tactical situations. Under ROAD, the Army would maintain several types of divi- sions —armored, mechanized infantry, infanty,atbors,airmobile ach division would have a mix of battalions which would allow it toperformitsmission.Anarmored division, forexample, might have ‘ix armored and four mechanized infantey battalions; an infantry division mighthave seven fantey,onearmoredandone mechanized battalions, and so forth Assisting the divisional commander in controlling operations were three brigade headquarters. The ROAD commander would assign battalions to each brigade t form task forces which could be ‘allored to Individual tactical situations. The brigade headguariers were lean, with litle or no organic combat or support elements (alike, for example, the World War T/Korea-era US, Army rei ‘meat which had organic recon, mortar. artillery andor armor units assigned 10 i), Instead, the ROAD divisional commander would atch elements from the divisional base, such as armored cavalry twoopsand engineer companies tothebrigades to suppeitthe combat maneuver battalions. Also, each brigade would usually have one battalion ofthe divisional anillery assigned as direst support, The fourth divisional artillery battalion (with its heavier guns) was for ‘general support, being concentrated as needed to support unis in ‘contact with the enemy or for independent fires, ‘The lack of organic brigade level support units nighthavepatthe| ROAD units asa disadvantage compared to their foes (Communist ‘unis frequently had extensive support units a the regimental level) butthis was male up for by the very efficient American fire contra system, Brigade, battalion and even company commanders could easily call in fires from divisional and non-divisionalarilery, helicopter gunships, and various types of aixeraf ‘The ROAD system ad much to recommend it, giving the ‘commander more lexiblity for fighting inindividualsinations, The system also allowed for cross-attaching units, and frequently divi 1s were assigned addtional artillery, anmor, infantry and other units © increase dheir power for individual operadons. But the increased flexibility was counterbalanced by the impermanence of the organizations, As has been found historically, ants fight best when organic elements work together on & perinanent basis. In Vietnam, unit commanders sometimes had the majority of their battalions removed from their coramands and sent elseshev. Al this was reflected in the changes to unit organizations made necessary by military conditions in Viewnar, A new form of com: ‘bined aris organization went beyond infanty-armnor-arilery. Divi- ‘ionstook onaviation (for mobility and fresupport),armor forextra punch in the attack), Jong range recon and electronic watfare units (ital forfinding and fixingenemy units), plusextensive intelligence and psychological operations assets (0 allow dhem to operate in an ‘unconventional wasfare environment in Vietnam were several separate brigades. Since these brignes were expected to act independently, they were reinforced wit additional nits beyond the normal “slice” ‘assigned toa divisional brigade, ususlly with fourmaneuver battalions and additional econaissancecompaniesandintlligence detachment, The Battalion Acthe battalion level, Viemam saw some changes to U.S. Army infancy structure, The pre-Vietnata Army battalion organization had ‘one headquarters, three rifle and ons combat suppor (with heavy weapons. engineers,etc) ennpanies. In Viet, battalion command rs often organized the combat support company a «fourth sifle ‘company. Heavy weapons uch as mortars al recoiles rifles) were frequently not takea into the field as they reduced mobility, and the addtional firepower that infantry heavy weapons provided was mini- mal compared 10 that which could be called in by artilery and serial forward observers. The Army eventually mad this change official fo ‘its sent to Southeast Asia, Each fle company was supposed to have a headquarters, three ‘fle platoons and a heavy weapons platoon, Within the rifle platoon, there were officially a headquarters, thre rifle squads snd a-weapons squad, the latter with two M-60 ight machineguns, However, practice Inthe field was to assign one or two light maichineguns to each rifle scquad and either eliminate the weapons squad entirely or utilize it as infantry The U.S. Anny also organized specialized Long Range Reconaissance Patrol (LRRP) companies, later redesignated 2s “Ranger” units, These companies conducted Tong range patrols to gather intelligence, find and fix enemy forces, ad conduct raids and ambushes, The value ofthe LRRPs is indicated by die Ammy’seven! assignment of one or more ofthese companies to each ofits divisions and separate brigades in Vietnam. Other Folk ‘The United States deployed a wide ange of other forces t fight in the unique conditions of Vietnam. These forees included the 18th Military Police Brigade, the 138th, 149%h, and 525th Miltary Intel gence Groups, the tt Psychological Operations Group (PSYOP— ‘propaganda and political warfare), and MACV-SOG (Studies and Observations Group, responsible for clandestine operations, cross ‘order ras, some PSYOP, and prisoner of war rescue). ‘Fifth Special Forces Group conducted a wide range of unconven’ tinal warfare operations threvzhout Vietnam, Is main mission was the Civilian Inegular Defense Group program, organizing 45,000, Vietnamese and Montagnard as militias and guertills, Additionally, the Sth Special Forees Group organized and commanded five Mole Strike Forces (Mike Forces), which were used as arbor reserves and raiding forces. The Mike Forees were commanded by American Special Forces personnel, hut recruited from Vietnamese, Chinese, ‘Cambodians, and other indigenous peoples. There were five of these StrikePorces, one per Corps Taetieal Zone and one under dxect control ‘of the Sth Special Forces Group at Nha ‘Tang. Fifth Special Forces Group also was responsible for numerous other special operations Projets, many of these classified to include such items as supporting MACV-S0G. ‘The Anmy organized other specialized unitsin Vietnam, including security, reconaissance, provisional ard, oe, attaions and compa nies, There werealsonumerousnon-

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