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    224 views64 pages

    S&T 199 - Forgotten Axis - The Finnish Front

    Uploaded by

    Mercant85
    S&T 199

    Copyright:

    © All Rights Reserved
    Download as PDF or read online from Scribd
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    Moscow 1941 * WWI Aircraft Carriers * The Double Signal U.S. $19." Wirt Conrueve Hisroncat Gane Strafegy Utes i tala . ere eb CRY ES TE a sae NSUOJCLUTYOHON OUTGOING MAIL 1 joss rinanon St rate: g iy Bemnighof doing the simulation and Brian Train the article. Elsewhere in the 4 the Germans have taken the Soviet capital and if they did, would they still have UR CoptQoccpmmmy ci cesta Seretcortat en ney, woul hey hare out inthe skies over Europe and Donald Mack gives us a peculiar episode from Royal Navy history, ‘Some thoughts on series games ‘The idea behind series games is to use the same design system fora group of games on related subjects. The advantage of this is that gamers will need to learn the rules only once. And series games allow the designer to integrate errata as {each new game comes out. You can also provide links between several different games, as Strategy & Tactics did with the Trajan series (you can combine the ‘map from the Trajan game with Roman Civil War, Caesar in Gallia, and Germania to create one grand game of the Roman Empire). ‘What then is the problem with series games? One is that designers add rules with each new game in the series, leading to overwrought designs. You can see this in Roman Civil War and Caesar in Gallia, where we provided additional tactical and political rules to what had been originally a “clean” game system. This led to players having to relearn the rules with each new game inthe series In the final game in the series, Germania, we reverted pretty much back to the system as it was originally presented in Trajan, with some of that game's redundancies eliminated. More fundamentally, rules evolve to deal with different situations and it can become difficultto retrofit them onto previous games. For example, we are using the same basic system in the upcoming S&T game Xenophon as we did in ‘Charlemagne (ST #189), But there were critical differences in war in the Classical and Dark Ages. For example, the classical period had a money {economy which was useful in generating cash to pay the troops. Inthe Dark Ages, hhard coinage was scarce and governments, such as they were, used land grants inexchange for military service. So Thad to make some changes to Xenophon’s recruiting system to account for this—although the game rules are otherwise fairly close, Still, series games do have their advantages. The Avalon Hill “classi ‘wargames (from the 1960s) used the same rules book torecreate everything from from the Russian Front in World War II to the Battle of Waterloo. While the Avalon Hill classic games may have been deficient in the simulation department (they neglected of command control, logistics and airpower, with one or two exceptions), they did adequately demonstrate the principles of war—mass, concentration, security, and the rest. And these games allowed a generation of \Wargamers to get into the hobby. Simulations Publications, Inc.,used series rules nmany of its simulations, most notably World War II to modern era operational level games. These used multiple impulse rules to recreate complex command: control issues which have proved decisive in modern warfare. Once players Tearmed the basic system it could be applied to a variety of situations, from Stalingrad to NATO, BULK RATE ‘This issue’s game is the second in Mike Bennighof"s Forgotten Axis series. US. POSTAGE We'd like to know how you feel about more series games, PAID MOJAVE CA PERMIT NO 92 Next Issue ‘S<eommemoratesits 200i anniversary issue with French Foreign Legion, one of our ‘most highly requested topics, plus amtiles hy Jim Dunnigan and other wargaming| luminaries, 2 HI CONTENTS SEPIOCT 1999 Straws Number 199 Magtes Tt ho ae PAT URES tot ata 4 Jatkosota: Finland’s Continuation War Against the Soviet Union by Brian Train 20 The Origins of Naval Aviation in World War I by Carl Otis Schuster 41 Moscow 1941: Strategic Decision or Strategic Dead End? by Joseph Miranda 52 The Double Signal: HMS Victoria & Camperdown, 22 June 1893 by Donald Mack DEPARTMENTS 2 OUTGOING MAIL 27 FYI: FORYOUR INFORMATION 32 CLASSIFIED ADS 34 FEEDBACK QUESTIONS 36 INCOMING MAIL 38 WORKS IN PROGRESS RULES RI FORGOTTENAXIS: FIGHT TO THE FINNISH On the cover: Propaganda poster for the Finnish War. STRATEGY & TACTICS. 3 Jatkosota: Finland’s “Continuation War” Against the Soviet Union by Brian Train Soviet units are in italic, Axis units are in plain text ‘The “Winter War” between the Soviet Union and Finland was Finland’s first major campaign in the Second World War. It began on 30 November 1939) ‘when Finland resisted the Soviet Union’s peremptory territorial demands and the Red Army invaded, When. peace was signed on 13 March 1940, the Soviets had. thrown 45 divisions—almost half the Red Army then stationed in Europe and Western Siberia—and 3,000 {tanks against Finland’ snine poorly equipped but highly ‘motivated and well led infantry divisions. The Red Amy attrtioned the Finns to the point of collapse, but, the Soviets ost over200,000 dead and much material in, the process. The Soviet peace terms were harsh. Finland was forced to cede its islands in the Gulf of Finland, large sections of Lapland, and the whole of Karelia up to the borders as they had been in 1721. Finland also had to ‘grant a 30 year lease on the port of Hanko (sometimes, spelled Hango) for the Soviets to use as a naval base, ‘These losses constituted about 12% of Finland’s teri tory and displaced over 200,000 people in addition to the 220,000 civilians already displaced by the fighting, In their hubris, the Soviets did not dictate any terms, ‘concerning Finland's military, something which would ‘cause them problems later. Ne. 5 A caper STS ead PTH Less than a month after the peace treaty was signed, Nazi Germany launched its offensive in Scandinavi ‘overrunning Denmark in afew hours and seizing Nor way. By June, the Germans had completed thei light ning conquests of Holland, Belgium and France. These German victories in the Wes! and the threatening pos- ture of the USSR to the East were combined with a. feeling of abandonment by Britain and France. The Western Allieshad been eloquent with their promisesor support for the Finns during the Winter War but had ever delivered on them. This situation led the Finnish government to believe that Germany was the only power that could help them resist further Soviet e ‘croachments and to regain Iost territories, The Soviets, further increased the Finns’ anxiety by vetoing a pro- posed Scandinavian defensive alliance to include Fin- Jand, Sweden, and Norway and by annexing the Baltic States in August, 1940. In the summer of 1940 Hitler decided to invade the USSR. The invasion was to be launched in 1941 Bringing Finland into the struggle as a German ally would tie down Red Army divisions along the northern frontier, threaten the railway link from the important ‘Arctic port of Murmansk, and give Germany access to Finnish sourees of lumber, copper, nickel, and molyb. denum, The dismal performance of the Red Army against the Finns during the Winter War boosted Ger What's in a Name? ‘Many of the towns and cities name in this ancl have diferent names in Finish and Russian, This can be very confusing, depend ser ing on the maps you consult. Where possible oe -webave used the Russian ame fora town iit ‘vas par of the USSR at the begining oF the Continuation War, but i you do any further [PEE Gre toe reading onthissobectthefolloving ablemay |W revin wo prove useful Flanish name Russian name nla ‘Kandataksin Kuhumaki Medverhyegork Kiestinki ‘estenga Lost Loui Patrskot Patioravodsk* Petsamno Pechenga Soroka Belomorsk ‘aipate Priozenk Una kha or Yhua Viipuri Vyborg: Vitele Vidi *to farther confuse things, Petosko: was renamed Aanislinna while ‘twas occupied by the Finns) 1 of Finland ala: lower cla: south jarvis lake joki: river ski: waterfall kyla: village labs bay or inlet hemi: peninsula pohjolas norch sar: island solkx: wide suetch of water ‘su: mouth of river ‘ara: mountain ridge vesi: small bodies of water ‘la: upper STRATEGY & TACTICS ‘ #199 German mountain troops conferring. man confidence that the Soviets could be defeated in a quick campaign. Negotiations began between Berlin and Helsinki in August, Germany agreed to supply Finland with food, fuel and modern weapons in ex- change for the right to send German troops across Finnish territory to Kirkenes, up at the very wp of Norway ‘While the Germans built up their strength in north- em Norway, Field Marshal Gustav Mannerheim (com- ‘mander of the Finnish military) took advantage of the apparent loophole leftin the peace treaty with the Soviet Union to rebuild the army. In December 1940 the term, of service for conscripts was raised from one to two years, Seven new infantry divisions were raised, br ing the total to 16. Each division had one brigade or regiment at full strength at all times, Mannetheim also created several clite units such as two Jaeger (light infantry) brigades, a motorized cavalry brigade, and an independent heavy artillery regiment. On full mobiliza- tion, Finland would be able to field 400,000 trained troops, over 10% of the entire population. In May 1941, only one month before the opening of Operation Barbarossa, Mannetheim’s chief of staff ‘went to Salzburg to learn the German plans forinvading the Soviet Union. The Germans explained that the Finnish Army “could be most helpful” in aiding the attack, Everything was couched in hypothetical terms, bbutit was obvious that the Germans assumed the Finns would perform as directed. The Finnish government continued its negotiations with Berlin, but without any formal agreement of co-belligerency. The understand- ing was thet Finland would not fight without being attacked first. ‘When Germany launched Operation Barbarossa on 22 June 1941, the Finnish army did not move, even. though Hitler's announcement of the attack on the USSR contained the phrase “in league with Finnish divisions.” Finland had been advised of Barbarossa's start date only the week before and had ordered full ‘mobilization on 17 June. There was no direct fighting. between Finnish and Soviet forces during 22-24 June. But when German aircraft bombed Leningrad and ‘Kronstadt and refueled in Finland for the trip back to East Prussia, Stalin ondereda series of airraidson towns and airfields across southern Finland. The following, day, Finnish President Ryti declared that Finland was, fighting the Soviet Union in self defence. The Finns called the conflict Jatkosota—the Continuation War— because to them this was simply Act IL of the Winter War. 1941: Co-Belligerence in the North ‘AL the time of the German attack, the deployment of forces in Finland was as follows: * To the north of a line drawn at the level of Oulu, Finnish forces would form part of Armee Oberkommando Norwegen (AOK, Amy High Com- mand Norway, headquarters at Rovaniemi), AOK was ‘composed of three corps: ‘The Gebirgskorps (Mountain Corps) consisted of the German 2 and 3 Mountain Divisions. It would advance on Murmansk across some of the most inhos- pitable terrain in the world [see ST #194 for more on the fortunes of this corps. ed.) The German XXXVI Comps consisted of the Ger- ‘man 169 Infantry Division and SS Battlegroup “Nord”, plus 6 Finnish Division. It would advance through Salla With the ultimate objective of cutting the Murmansk Railway at Kandalaksha, ‘The Finnish III Corps consisted of 3 Finnish Divi- sion, reinforced with some extra units and divided into Groups “I” and “F’). It would advance on Kestenga, + To the south of the AOK boundary, the Finnish Karelian Army (consisting of I, IV, VI, and VI Corps, totaling 13 Finnish and one German divisions) was. expected toengage the Soviets around Lake Ladogaand ‘on the Karelian Isthmus north of Leningrad. It was also to retake Hanko. (On 29 June, AOK Norwegen began its advance. By mid-July the Gebireskorps had secured a bridgehead across the Litsa River, about 15 miles into the Soviet, Union. However, stiffening Soviet resistance and the difficult terrain, as well as the need to detail large ‘numbersof troops obaul supplies forward from Petsamo, ‘made it impossible for the Comps to advance further Murmansk lay 30 miles to the east, and the Germans, would get no closer to it during the rest of the war. On 1 July, the XXXVI Corps opened its attack on Salla, defended by 20,000 men of the Soviet 42 Rifle Conps (main units were 104 and 122 Rifle Divisions, later tobereinforced by / Tank Division which wasthen in Kandalaksha). The plan was to take Salla by a ‘concentric assault and then cut the Murmansk Railway ‘90 miles to the east at Kandalaksba, The plan was risky inthat itinvolved attacks on several widely spaced axes, by units moving across difficult terrain without any roads, One regiment ofthe 169 Infantry Division was to attack east across the border and try to take Salla directly. Meanwhile, the division’s other tworegiments ‘and Battlegroup “Nord” would approach the town from thenorth and south respectively. The Finnish 6 Division ‘was sent on a long outflanking move to croxs the border 45 miles south of Sallaand then toswing north tocut the road back to Kandalaksha at the village of Allakurtti As it turned out, the frontal attack on Salla bogged down when itran into the field fortifications the Soviets had built just inside the border and recoiled in the face of the Red Army counterattacks. General Feige, the XXXVI Corps commander, asked for and got a motor- ized machine gua battalion and a regiment of the Ger- ‘man 163 Infantry Division as reinforcements, though they did not arrive until the battle for Salla was over. Meanwhile, the encircling forces tothe north and south were delayed by hills and dense forests. The SS battlegroup performed badly when it washit by a Soviet counterattack. The SS troopers were inexperienced and ‘good leaders were almost completely lacking in the unit, However, by 6 July, a concentric attack was underway and Salla was captured on the following day. ‘The remnants of the 42 Corps withdrew ten miles to the east to the village of Kairala, astride a gap in the Maaseljaen Hills, Frontal assaults did not work, and it took mote than a month for the German and Finnish tits to advance far enough on either side of the road to ‘maneuver the Soviets from their positions. On 21 Au- gust, elements of the Finnish 6 Division blocked the road between Kairalaand Allakurti, the lasttownon the road to Kandalaksha. The Soviets tried to break out several times and withdrew to the north and east, dig- ging in again at Allakurt By I September, the Soviets were forced out of the townand fellbacka short distance tothe east where their southern flank was covered by Lake Wermann. They held there for two more weeks against the German encirclement from the north. The XXXVI Corps dis lodged the Soviets from this position but could not exploit beyond the Verma River due to exhaustion and, havinghadtosenddetachments tothe attackon Kestengs. Like the attack on Murmansk, the drive or Kandalaksha had stalled 30 miles short ofits ultimate prize, cutting the Murmansk Railway Further othe south, the Finnish IT Corps had had an ceasier time, Group “I,” consisting ofa reinforced infan- try regiment from the Finnish 3 Division, had taken the northern route from Kuusamo to Kestenga, with the “objective of cutting the Murmansk Railway atthe town of Loukhi. By July 18, Group “J” had penetrated 40 miles into the Soviet Union, taking advantage of log- ging boats and rafts to move via water. To reinforce Group “I's” success, AOK Norwegen detached ele- ‘ments of Battlegroup “Nord” (6 SS Motorized Infantry Regiment, twoartillery battalions, anda flak company), ‘On 7 August, the Axis captured Kestenga but started t0 run into serious resistance from several “scratch battal- ions” the Soviet /4 Army had thrown together from its support units. These battalions including atraining unit and the Army headquarters guard battalion. By the middle of Augustthe Soviet 88 Rifle Division had arrived from Archangel and the Finnish advance stalled, despite having received more reinforcements from SS “Nord” (a battalion of the 7 SS Motorized. Infantry Regiment, anotherartillery battalion, and some support units). Axis forces halted just a short distance beyond Kestenga and, again, about 30 miles short of ccutting the Murmansk Railway atthe town of Louk Meanwhile, Group “F” (consisting of the remaining ‘wo infantry regiments from the Finnish 3 Division) had taken the southern route from Suomussalmi to Uhtwa, crossing the border on 1 July. The Group ran into the main body of the Soviet 54 Rle Division near Ubtua and dug in at the end of August. 1941: The Karelian Army Advances Still farther south, the Finnish 14 Division was under independent command. It began moving 3 July, along the route from Repola to Rukajarvi, with the ultimate objective of Belomorsk. This town was very important, on the junction of the Murmansk railway with the recently completed spur line from the Archan- gel-Moscow railway. On July the division took Repola, ‘and eneiteled a portion of the 54 Rifle Division. When the pocket had been reduced enough to continue the advance on 23 July, the division continued another 50 German officers in conference. STRATEGY & TACTICS Orrrations ON THE Norruern Frnnisn FRont : 1941 Barents Sea oe FINLAND mG | EB cerantone A Attar HE sso BE rattogs Revit By ko g a BE Sever Tecps nasi ou 1881 ‘ies to Rukajarvi. On 11 September it took up defen- sive positions there. Itwas to advance no further during the war, ‘The Finnish main effort was made to the north of Lake Ladoga. The Karelian Army was composed of two comps each of two infantry divisions. The VI Corps had 1 Jaeger Brigade attached tit, while Group “Oinonen” (oamed after the commander of the Cavalry Brigade), ‘composed of 2 Jaeger Brigade and the Cavalry Brigade, \as on its northern flank. The Finnish 1 Division and. the German 163 Infantry Division (less one regiment, ‘which had been detached to help take Salla) were in army reserve. The general plan was to advance to the east and southeast on a broad front. The objective was toreach the Sir River which connects Lake Onega and Lake Ladoga. ‘The Karetian Army attacked on 10 July. The elite Jaeger brigades (riding bicycles) and the motorized cavalry brigade swiftly broke the front open for the 199 infantry divisions around Lake Tolvajarvi. VI Corps (consisting of Sand 11 Divisions) made for the spur line connecting Sortavala and Petrozavodsk in order to cut, off the Red Army troops near Lake Ladoga. It then hooked south to strike the coast road along the lake's. ‘easter shore. On 25 July elements of the Corps reached the Tuulos River south of Viditsa and stopped tempo- ratily to let the rest of the Army catch up. Meanwhile, ‘Vi Corps (consisting of 7 and 19 Divisions) pressed the Soviets back onto Sortavala, Mannerheim ordered Il Corpsto go over to the attack on 31 July. The 2 Division moved northeast to press on the Soviet enclave forming ‘on the northern shore of Lake Ladoga, while 15 and 18, Divisions moved southeast into the Karelian Isthmus ‘and 10 Division (from IV Corps) was moved behind them as a reserve. Sortavala fell to 7 Division on 15 August. Soviet survivors tookheavy losses trying o flee across the lake in small boats and ships. Priozersk fell on 21 August. ‘The same day, Mannetheim ordered his last corps into the attack. IV Corps advanced on Vyborg, On 24 ‘August, 18 Division wheeled half-right so as to cut the city off from the east, while elements of 8 Division landed at Koivisto othe south ofit. The Soviet division left garrisoning Vyborg surrendered on 29 August, while the other two divisions that had been defending the Karelian Isthmus fell back on Leningrad. The Finns reached the pre-Winter War border with the USSR on 31 August, Tt'was time for a political decision. Finland had now recovered almostall ofthe territory ithad lost during the ‘Winter War and was about to press on into the Soviet Union itself. The Germans wanted Finnish troops to besiege Leningrad from the north while Army Group North made the main effort from the south, However, both Mannerheim and President Ryti were reluctant because it was not yet apparent thatthe Germans were going to win the war. Needless to say, things would not, go well for a Finland on the losing side that had participated in the razing of Leningrad. Also, Finland «did not have the equipment or supplies to engage in successful urban warfare, nor could it afford the heavy infantry casualties such a battle would entail, Nonetheless, Mannerheim did commit to moving beyond the prewar border to gain some good defensive ‘ground on the Karelian Isthmus, and to renewing the offensive towards Lodeynoye Pole on the Sv He also acknowledged the importance of cutting the ‘Murmansk Railway at as many points as possible, since this would force all Lend-Lease traffic onto the over- Toaded Archangel-Moscow railway through the con necting line at Belomorsk. In Eastern Karelia, the Finns had spent several weeks replenishing and reorganizing. In early August, 17 Division was withdrawn from screening Hanko (leaving abrigade and the Swedish Volunteer Battalion, tosereen the base) and 4 Division was transferred from, River. The Finnish Air Force in World War I “Atthe beginning ofthe Winter Warin November 1939 there were only 96aireratin the Finish Air Force, some of the quite antiquated, [Although there was not much serial combat during the war due to the severe weather conditions, the Finnish goyerameat realized that a Stconaer airforce would bea valuable asset. By the saitof the Continuation War in June 1941 there were a total of 222 aireraftin the Finnish ‘Air Foroe, organized in four regiments three fighter, one bomber) pus some independent lights and squadrons. The Germans provided air “support in Finland through the Luftlowe 5, based in Nonway “Holdings of major Finnish aircraft types during the war were as follows: Aireraft Type 1941 1942 19431944 total notes Browser Buffalo P2A-1 35 088 Bristol Blenbeim MKT and 1V 20 5a. $5 assembled in Finland under license Curis Hawk 758 ” ew few ‘warhooty from France and Norway FiatG.50 28 o ought from aly Fokker & Dseves, various ypes 58 Fokker ©.X and D.XXI produced in Finland unde license ‘Morane-Saulnier MS 400 30 30 donated by France during the ‘Winter War; $7 more from war booty ‘Messerschmitt BI-109G ° bowsht fom Germany captured Soviet fighter types mostly 1153 or 16 captured Soviet bomber types 6 ‘mostly SB-2/9 or DBS Luftwaffe units on the Finnish Front, June 1941 eerie ie Marshal Mannerheim, Finnish Commander in Chief 199 the Isthmus to this area. On4 September VI Comps (now consisting of 5, 7, and 163 Divisions, plus what heavy artillery the Finns had) crossed the Tuulos River and headed for the Svir. Lodeynoye Pole fell on 7 Septem- ber, and the following day the Finns took Podporoze, the town where the Murmansk Railway crossed the Svir. By the middle ofthe month VICorps wasemplaced along the entire river line between Lake Onega and Lake Ladoga, ‘The VII Comps (now composed of 1, 4, and I Divisions, as well as 1 Jaeger and Cavalry Brigades) «drove on Petrozavodsk. The atack began on 18 Septem- ber. The elite light forces attacked from the south while | and 11 Divisions attacked from the west. Later in the ‘month, 11 Corps (the headquarters had been transferred, fromthe Isthmus and given 8 Division, 2 Jaeger Brigade and Brigade “K,” the latter a unit made up of three “tribal battalions”) pressed in from the northwest. The 71 Rifle Division was overwhelmed while defending Petrozavodsk and the town fell on 1 October. Afier consolidating, 1! and VII Corps swung north to attack Medvezhyegorsk at the top of Lake Onega. By the ‘middle of November the Finns threatened the town, but, snow had already begun to fall and the strain of five ‘months of continuous combat was beginning to tell. In a desperate attack on 5 December, II Corps took Medvezhyegorsk and Povenets fell the day after. At this point, activity stopped along the three Finn ish fronts. The troops had done all they could do in five ‘months of campaigning, and winter was setting in, Pressing further would be mostmilitarily and politically dangerous. War and Politics Ever since the conclusion of the Winter War, Fi land had been acutely aware ofthe delicate course ithad to steer between becoming a satellite of Germany and remaining on good terms with Britain and the United States. Hence, the Finnish government had been at pains stress its independent course in therenewed war with the USSR. No formal alliance had been struck between Finland and ‘Germany, there had been no declara- tion of war until the Soviet Union had struck first, and Finland was explic~ itly neutral inthe warbetween Britain and Germany. ‘Stalin had pressed Britain to declare war on Finland several times during the summer and fall of 1941, but (Churchill demurred, He did not want to drive Finland further into the Ger- man sphere of influence. While the two countries did break off diplo- ‘maticrelations in July, itwasnotuntil 28 November that Britain sent an ultimatum telling Finland to cease military operations againstthe USSR. Thedeadline was 5 December, or Britain would declare war. Churchill followed this with @ personal letter to Mannetheim offering that Britain would be satisfied if Finland sim- ply stopped fighting and blamed the inactivity on the severe weather, Mannetheim replied to Churchill on 2 December that Finland was engaged in a defensive war against the Soviet Union and would stop as soon as it had reached acceptable defensive positions (he was then awaiting news of the fall of Medvezhyegorsk). He noted later in his memoirs that he meant this as an acceptance of (Churchill offer, bu the British government decided to read it as a rejection of their ultimatum. ‘Therefore, Britain and Canada declared war on Finland on 6 December, although forces of the two countries were never to exchange fire. Despite this turn of events, Finland was still not willing to become a satrapy of Germany. By the end of | 1941, Germany had made impressive gainsin the Soviet Union, But it had not gone far enough. The Soviet counterattack at Moscow had just begun and the mag- nitude of the potential disaster for the exhausted Ger- rman Army was enormous. While Mannerheim contin: ued to plan a joint attack on Belomorsk for early 1942, hhe was beginning to entertain doubts about Germany's ultimate success in the war and did not press the Finnish {troops in Lapland to advance further on the Murmansk Railway. ‘Then there were the casualties, During 1941, Fin- land had lost 25,500 killed and missing, slightly more than they had lost during the Winter War. Mannerheim began to send men home asthe situation along the front stabilized and both sides settled into a routine of build- ing fortifications and patrolling forward. The Finnish economy was beginning to suffer from the prolonged absence of so many men from their jobs in agriculture ‘and industry, and Finland was becoming increasingly «dependent on Germany for food and finished products. In 1942 over 110,000 Finnish soldiers would be sent ‘home. Finland could not sustain the pace of fighting in Which it had been involved, 1942: Motion Is Not Progress As the Soviets began to recover from the beating they had taken in 1941, they began to conduct limited counterattacks in the north. On New Year's Day 1942, they launched an attack on Finnish II Corps (onee more reorganized, and now composed of 4 and 8 Divisions plus both Jaeger Brigades) north of Povenets, The 32 ‘Army attacked with six rifle divisions, three naval rifle brigades and a ski brigade, but they were beaten off without any significant shifting of the lines. (On 11 Aprilthe Soviets launched anotherarmy sized attack on the Svir River front (7 Army, with five rifle divisions and three naval infantry brigades) followed two weeks later by a corps attack (three rifle divisions, ‘a naval rifle brigade, and a ski brigade), The Kestenga area was defended by Group “J” and the German ‘Nord! (the later having been converted to a mountain division). The fighting, though fierce, was inconclu- In the frst half of 1942 both sides reorganized, In June, AOK Norwegen wasrenamed20 Mountain Army with General Edward Diet! as its commander, The Gebiraskorps was renamed XIX Mountain Corps, and. 3 Mountain Division was replaced by 6 Mountain Division, The Finnish 6 Division was withdrawn from, XXXVI Corps, and the German 163 Division was shifted up from the Svir River front to replace it. XVII Mountain Corps was formed in the Kestenga area to control 7 Mountain Division and 6 SS Mountain Div sion. The Finnish ITI Corps was withdrawn tothe south, Inthe south, the Karelian Army was disbanded and the Finnish Army was reorganized into three front commands: + Karelian Isthmus: 2, 10, 15, and 18 Divisions + Svir River: 5,7, 11, and 17 Divisions + Maaselkae Isthmus (north end of Lake Onega): 1,4, 8 Divisions and 3, 12 Brigades (Formed respectively from, 12 and 6 Divisions, which had been disbanded) Mannerheim also set about forming an armored division at Petrozavodsk from the hundreds of 7-26 and BT-5/7 tanks that had been captured from the Sovietsin the Winter War and the summer offensive. The high point of Axis military activity inthe north for 1942 was Operation Lachsfang (Salmon Catch), a simultaneous attack by German and Finnish forces respectively in the Kandalaksha and Belomorsk areas, with the objective of cutting the Murmansk Railway line where it really counted. If this operation had been, asuocess(andit was reasonable toexpect that one ofthe two attacks could have broken through) it would have had a great impact on the Red Army’ operations, since it was already reeling from the German offensive to- wards Stalingrad and the Caucasus. However, Mannerheim declared that Finland would not be able to do its part in this operation until the Germans had secured Leningrad and advanced Army Group North to the Svir, thus allowing him to release sufficient troops from these fronts. But Finnish troops would not be able tohelp in Leningrad's capture, forthe same reasons that held them back in 1941 (and not only that—the Finnish government had received a not-so-veiled threat from the United States that America would declare war on Finland fit madeany decisive attacks on the Murmansk Railway). AL first, the Germans agreed to this condition and started to prepare Operation Nordlicht (*Northem Lights"), an assaulton Leningrad with large numbers of aircraft and siege artillery sent up from Sevastopol. But the unrelenting pressure ofthe Soviet attacks along the ‘Volkhov front south of Lake Ladoga forced them o use Reindeer supply train. the assault troops to defend the existing battlefront. By ‘September-October the situation had stabilized but the ‘summer was over andit wastoolate toattack Leningrad, “Salmon Catch” was shelved and never was carried out 1943: The Turn of an Unfriendly Card While the Finnish military situation remained al- ‘most completely static during 1943, this year would prove to he a busy one on the diplomatic front. On 18, January the Red Army succeeded in opening a land. route to Leningrad, and two weeks later the German 6 Army surrendered in Stalingrad. It now seemed to President Ryti that Finland had backed the wrong side (not that there had been much choice), and that it was time to seek an honorable way to exit the war. ‘The Soviet Union made two separate but very severe peace offers to Finland in 1943, something it did not do, for Romania or Hungary. Alexandra Kollontai, the USSR’s ambassadorto Sweden, made itclear to Finnish representativesthat the Allied doctrine of unconditional, ‘surrender did not apply o Finland, nor would the USSR. abrogate Finland’ sindependence orforce basic changes, in its political system. At the Tehran Conference in December 1943, Stalin told Roosevelt and Churchill ‘that the two principal conditions of any peace offer to Finland would be the boundaries of 1940 and a war damage indemnity of $600 million. However, these terms were very harsh and the Germans were still able tobring considerable pressure to bear on Finland tostay in the war. So Finland refused to make peace. 1944: The End of the Continuation War On 14 January, 1944, the Red Army finally lifted the siege of Leningrad. In February, the Soviet air force STRATEGY & TACTICS Finnsh Army Order of Battle, July 1941 Finnish wnat Division (ramp ie A DH a es Prin] 2 UNIT ORGANIZATIONS ivisional Strengths German German German German Infantry Infantry Mountain Panzer. Infantry (1939-43) (1943-44) (1941-2) men 17200 12,3001) 13,056 15600 14,200 ‘machine guns 643 656 569 1067 362 mortars ry 76 18 65 18 anillery/intantry gons u 2 34 54 36 antitank guns 15 2 43 48 1% antiaircraft guns Rn 2 2 8382) 1 tanks o o 0 M3215) 0 assault unsSP artillery 0 14 0 6 0 armored cars 3 0 0 45 0 Soviet Soviet Soviet Infantry Infantry Infantry "Tank. Motorized (early 1941) (late 1941) (194) ass) (i941) men 14400, 10,700 9,500 10980 11,600 ‘machine guns aor 279 os7 2 2 mona 150 ® a a 2 antilleryfinfantsy guns 48 24 48 0 “ antitank guns 3 18 50 6 2 antiairraft guns 4 6 0 2 12 tanks 1650 0 ° 315 215 assault gun/SP artillery 0 ° 0 0 0 ‘armored cars B ° o 9s si Notes: (1) White the German 1943-45 infanty division was lower in strength than the 1939-43, ‘owing tothe increase in caliber of is mortars and antitank guns. (2) High mumber is if an antiaireraft battalion were attached (3) Lower number is for two bation tank regiment, higher number is for three battalion tank regiment (4) High number is if a tank battalion were assigned, had about 10% more firepower sae 199 Soviet Order of Battle, July 1941 fworthern [Northern JFront 5 a owes port oto oe German Command, Northern Finland, June 1941 bombed Helsinki several times, more as 2 warning what was coming than anything else. Mannerheim stepped up defensive preparations in the Karelian Isth- rmustobeready for the inevitable offensive, creating the “VT Line” six to en miles behind the front line and the “VKT Line” running before Vyborg and along the si River Priozersk. Healso began tobuildthe“U the east of Sortavala and moved the Armored Division (which was now organized around acore of 60 Sturmgeschutz III assault guns bought from Germany and the two Jaeger brigades) from Petrozavodsk to the area of Vyborg, In Jate March Finnish diplomats were secretly in vited to Moscow, where Foreign Minister Molotov laid down a new set of peace terms: «The frontiers set by the Winter Warpeace treaty would be reinstated, but Finland would also cede the Petsamo region. ‘There would be a war indemnity of $600 million (paid in US 1938 gold dollars, so actually the indemnity was loser to $900 million. + Finland was o demobilize its army within 10 weeks of treaty being signed, and during that time was to use it to intern or force out all German troops in Finland. + Finland was to break offal relations with Germany + The Soviet Union would be allowed to use Finland’s ports, airfields, and merchant fleet to pursue victory over Germany. ae oS The Finnish government rejected these terms in mid-April, but when Hitler found out about these secret negotiations he placed an embargo on food and war supplies destined for Finland. Since talk alone would not force Finland to sue for peace, Stalin decided to carry out a ground offensive in the summer. Prepara- tions bezan in May ‘The Soviet2/ Army was created on the western side of the Karelian Isthmus, next to 23 Army. It included several artillery divisions, 30 Guards Corps (a noted “breakthrough” unit), several naval rifle brigades, and 10-12 independent tank and assault gun brigades. 23 Army, in the eastern area of the Isthmus, was doubled in strength to six rifle divisions, while 7 and 32 Armies ‘were reinforced to twelve and four divisions respec: tively. The total strength involved in the offensive was about 450,000 men, 10,000 artillery pieces, 800 tanks and assault guns, and 1,500 aircraft of all types ‘The Finns had four divisions and «wo brigades facing the Soviets on the Karelian Isthmus, IV Comps was on the western side, and consisted of 10 and 2 Divisions with the Cavalry Brigade in teserve. IIT Comps ‘was onthe easter side with 18 Division andthe recently formed 19 Brigade on the line, and 15 Division in reserve. The Armored Division, 3 Division, and Infan try Regiment 200 (made up of Estonians) were in reserve in and around Vyborg. On the Svir River front ‘were VI Corps (with 5, 8 and 17 Divisions and 15 =o =, S STRATEGY & TACTICS 13, Expatriate Soldiers “Thee were several unos ris tht eve in the Finish Amy doring the Coninaton War, andsome Fins volunteered to were under tbe Germans The Sivedish Volunteer Battalion: Over 8000 Swedes volun- {ssreofepFnladin the 1939-4 Winer War organizing 4 groutdbsiside and ansir groop A smellnamber, perhaps 400, ed fehind and wore formed into a volunter bation that served in the early part of the Comtinsation War, After 17 Division was withdrawn ffm seeening Hunko in August 1941, the Swe bation an Finish reserve riage kept watch ‘the Soviet ase. The Red Navy iccesaully evacuate Rife Brigade an vations etesireralt snd sipor ont fom Hank on 4 December, andthe Swedish battalion ws the fist unit 6 xpore the hors hooby-rapped) se The “Tribal Bottalions:” Toe Finish formed thee “tba butatonsin 941 from volunteers, conscripts and prisoners of ‘arwhowere from Kerliorlngrathe era aroand Leningrad) and spoke Finish The ite were filled out oul stength by Fish ational The tal talons were frmd into “Bri de K." which fought inthe sea of Lake Lado. InfanaryResinent 200 This unit was formes of stonians who wished to ih he Soviet Union and get miliary traning to ort heir wn fight for independence-—but dd not want © be conseripted ito German units where they would have no choice of where and how they would seve, (Many Fins had joined the Imperial German Arm in Word War forthe same Purpose, so they soe! fight for thir own independence from sarit Rss.) Bafore 1983 thee were two independent com panies of Estonians in the Finnish Army, and the Swedish volunteer battalion had an Estonian reconnaissance platoon, Over 2,500 Estonians doding the German draft arrived in Finland in the last half of 1943, and the F refused German demands to extradite them. Tnearly 1944, the to Estonian companies formed the third battalion of 47 Infantry Regiment, which was then part of 18 Division on the Kareian Isthmus The battsion soon grew into An independent infantry regiment. Inthe Soviet offensive in the ‘summer of 1944 the regimentreformedasone unitanddefended a section of the VKT Line along the Vucksi River. It was relatively quiet sectorand as news arrived ofthe Sovietattackon "Narva, the rst Estoniantowntoflltothe Red Army, menbegan to desert and make their own way back o Estonia, After getting nish government Troops guard the front. 4 guarantee from the Germans that these troops would not be tried as deserters, the Finnspulledthe men of theregimentoff the line, announced that the uit was disbanded, and gave them a choice of going back to Estonia in a body or staying on in Finland. Over 90% of them chose to go home and they ett via Hanko on 18 August Onarrival back n Estonia, the Gecmans broke the Estoaians up nto two batalions, One became the thi batalion of 45 SS Grenadier Regiment, which was part of 20 8S Grenadier Divi sion (also known as “Estonian #1"), The other vas sent to ‘raining camp not far from Tallinn. Boeh units fell apart quickly in combat in mid to late September. Some men joined partisan bands and resisted the Soviet occupiers. Some of these bankls Jasted until 1949, requiring the attentions of two Red Army rifle divisions and several armored units to put them dow, Finish Volunteers in tke Waffen 88: Unlike other countries allied with Germany, Finland didnot have a Fascist government (though there was a small Faseist-style party) and the Finnish people did noe subscribe tothe racist and anti-Semitic views of| the Nazis. However, there were some Finnish volunteers forthe ‘Waffen SS—about 1,000 of them arrived in Germany’ in May/ June 1941 fora two-year engagement, Some ofthe volunteers were incomporateddiecttyinto SS Motorized Division “Wiking” and so participated inthe invasion athe Soviet Union, The rest trained a the “Finnish Volunteer Battalion ofthe Waffen SS.” The unitjoined Wiking” asthe third batalion ofthe “Nordland” Motorized Infantry Regiment in January 1942, and participated In the summer offensive towards the Caveasus, The unit fought a1 Maikep and Grozny, and a draft of several hundred replace ens from Finland made its way tit in the fall of 1942, In the spring of 1943 the volunteers indicated that they did not want to renew their engagement and the unit was sent hack 1 Finland, arriving in Hanko on 2 June 1943, Because ofthe ‘growing size ofthe Soviet forees arrayed against Finland, and Ihecause it wished to extricate set from military arrangements ‘ofthis type, the Finnish government disbanded the unit while it ‘was on leave in Finland. The men were transfered into the Finnish Amy. However, some Finns continued to serve in the “Nordland” Regiment, which was detached from “Wiking” in early 1943 to become the nucleus for 11 SS. Volunteer Panzergrenadier Division “Nordland.” This unt fought on the ‘Eastern Front uni is final destruction in the bate for Berlin, For comparison’s sake, about 1,400 Finns served in the Waffen SS while Norway contribated $,000+6,000 men an Denmark sent 6,000-7,000 and 3,00-400 Swedes also volun twored to serve. Brigade) and V Comps (with 7 and 11 Divisions, the Lake Onega Coastal Brigade, and 20 Brigade). II Comps (1, 4 and 6 Divisions and 21 Brigade) covered the Moaselkae Isthmus, On 9 June, 21 Army opened its attack all along IV Comps’ front with a massiveartllery barrage from 5,500 ‘guns and 880 multiple rocket launchers. With a density fof up to 400 gun tubes per mile, the weight of this barrage was as heavy as any delivered st Stalingrad. ‘More than 500 aireraft added their weight to the bom- bbardment. Infantry probed along the whole front but did not make any breakthroughs. The next morning the Soviets repeated the barrage and attacked with tanks and infantry, Most ofthe assault fellon 10 Division. The Finnish soldiers had been totally unprepared for the barrage, and had no weapons to counter the T-34/85 tanks and heavy assault guns the Soviets were using, ‘The Division gave way and Mannesheim ordered a general retreat to the VT Line, sending 3 Division Forward to plug the hole in the front. 4 Division was alerted to move to the Isthmus. ‘On 14 June, the Soviets hit 3 Division before it had had enough time to prepare defensive positions. The ‘entire 30 Guards Corps passed through the gap torn in the Division and headed for Vyborg, mangling the Cavalry Brigade on its way. Mannerbeim ordered a further reteat to the VKT Line and the transfer of 17 Division and 20 Brigade from the Svir River front, where the Soviets had as yet done nothing. The Ar ‘mored Division was sent to contain the breakthrough, but the advance on Vyborg continued On 18 June, Mannerhieim alerted 11 and VII Corps, then holding the Svir River and Maaselkae fronts, (0 ‘withdraw (0 the area of [lomantsi and the U Line. He appealed to Germany for help and in the following ten, days the Germans were to send 14,000 one-shot anzerfaustanti-tank weapons, 500 Panzerschrecks (an anti-tank weapon like the American bazooka), 700,000 rounds of artillery ammunition, and 150,000 stick hand ‘grenades, They also sent a bombardment group of 70 FW-190 and Ju-87 aircraft, the 303 Assault Gun Bi ‘gade, and the 122 Infantry Division However, this assistance came with a price. On 22 June, German Foreign Minister Ribbentrop visited Helsinki to make itclear that Finland must now explic- itly rule out a separate peace with the Soviet Union, or else German aid would be withdrawn. The following day, quite independently of this event, the Soviets ‘demanded that Finland capitulate before peace talks ‘could begin. President Ryti conferred with Mannerheim tnd they came up with a dodge—Ribbentrop took back to Berlin a personal etter from Ryti to Hitler declaring, that he, as head of state, would not negotiate a separate peace withthe Soviet Union, nor wouldheallow anyone else in his government to do so, without the agreement ‘of Germany. To the Germans and Americans, this, looked like a formal pact between nations. The Ger- mans continued sending military aid, and the United States broke off diplomatic relations with Finland ‘Thenew anti-tank weap- ‘ons and extra ammunition helped to slow the Soviet attack, but the Red Army still round forward. By 20 June the Finns had com- pleted the withdrawal tothe scanty fortifications of the VKT Line. Vyborg, Finland’ssecondlargesteity and the immediate objec tive of 27 Army, was pro- tected only by 20 Brigade,a newly raised unitthat hadto leave much of its heavy equipment behind in order to make itto Vyborg as fast as possible. When 21 Army ‘began to probe the outskirts Of the city with tanks, 20 Brigade routed and the So- viets took the ety with few casualties, The Finns contained this breakthrough with a screen of infantry battalions. Instead of driving for Helsinki, 2/ Army turned northeast to try and get a lodgement across the Vuoksi River (On 20 June, 32 Army attackec'in the Povenets area 7 Army attacked along the Svir River front the day after. "The Finns had already withdrawn three divisions and a brigade from the line, and the remaining four divisions, ‘and two brigades could not be expected to hold. Under pressure, VICorps withdrew tothe U Lineby 7July, and, two weeks later II Corps established itself to the north Of it. The Soviet pursuit was slow and poorly coordi aed, and the Finns lost relatively few troops. By the middle of July the tempo of the fighting on the Karelian Isthmus was winding down. Due to their unsubtle tactics, the Soviets had taken heavy casualties ‘without completely crushing the VKT Line, and an amphibious landing to the west of Vyborg by 59 Army also failed to secure a bridgehead. The front went over, to the defensive and Soviet assault units were trans- ferred out to join the offensives against Army Groups, North and Centre elsewhere in the Soviet Union, Eventhoughhis troopshadheld back the Red Army, Mannerheim knew that the Soviets could come back ‘and finish the job any time itsuited them. With the Axis, situation deteriorating inthe Baltic States, the Germans withdrew their air bombardment group on 21 July, and the 122 Division began moving back to Germany on 30, July. President Ryti resigned, to be replaced by Mannerheim himself on 4 August. Taking advantage of the legalities in Ryti’s personal letter to Hitler, “STRATEGY & TACTICS Finnish soldiers stand in formation. 1s t Soviet Order of Battle, Karelian Front, July 1943 ae be Seer | ; [—— nese a . De [oe [

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