Compilation of Case Digests Consti 12224631431417673001

Constitutional Law 1
(1) Manila Prince Hotel vs. GSIS 267 SCRA 408 (1997) .............................................7
(2) Lambino vs. COMELEC GR 174153 (2006)...........................................................8
(3) Marbury vs. Madison, 5 US 137 ..............................................................................9
(4) Angara vs. Electoral Commission, 63 Phil 139 (1936) ..........................................10
(5) Maria Carolina P. Araullo, et al. vs. Benigno Simeon C. Aquino III et al, GR 209287,
July 1, 2014 ..................................................................................................................11
(6) Francisco vs. House of Representatives GR, 160261 (Nov 10, 2003) ...................12
(7) Mariano vs. Comelec, GR 118577 .........................................................................13
(8) Montesclaros vs. Comelec, GR 152295 (2002) .....................................................14
(9) Belgica vs. Ochoa, GR 208566, 710 SCRA 1,89, Nov 19, 2013 ...........................15
(10) Ocampo vs Enriquez GR 225973, November 8, 2016 .........................................16
(11) Imbong v. Ochoa, GR 204819, April 8, 2014 ......................................................17
(12) Estrada v. Sandiganbayan, GR 148560 (2001) ....................................................18
(13) Imbong v. Ochoa, GR 204819, April 8, 2014 ......................................................19
(14) Disini, Jr. v. The Secretary of Justice, Gr 203335, February 11, 2014 ................20
(15) Gonzales III v. Office of the President .................................................................21
(16) Vinuya v. Romulo, GR 162230, April 28, 2010 ..................................................22
(17) Gonzales v. Narvasa, GR 140835 ........................................................................23
(18) Lacson v. Perez, GR 147780 ................................................................................24
(19) Defunis v. Odegard ..............................................................................................25
(20) Interational Service for the Acquisition of Agri-biotech Applications, Inc. v.
Greenpeace Southeast Asia, GR 209271, December 8, 2015 ......................................26
(21) David vs. Arroyo, GR 171396, May 03, 2006 [Per J. Sandoval-Gutierrez] ........27
(22) Belgica, et al vs. Exec. Sec. Ochoa, et al, GR No. 208566, November 19, 2013 [Per
J. Perlas-Bernabe, En Banc].........................................................................................28
(23) KMU Labor Center vs. Garcia, GR 115381, December 23, 1994 [Per J. Kapunan,
First Division] ..............................................................................................................29
(24) IBP vs. Zamora, GR 141284, August 15, 2000 [Per J. Kapunan, En Banc] ........30
(25) Tanada vs. Tuvera, GR L-63915, April 24, 1985 [Per J. Escolin, En Banc] .......31
(26) Ople vs. Torres, GR 127685, July 23, 1998 [Per J. Puno, En Banc] ...................32
(27) Information Technology Foundation vs. ComElec, GR 159139 [Per J. Panganban,
En Banc].......................................................................................................................33
(28) Kilosbayan vs. Guingona, GR 113375, May 5, 1994 [Per J. Davide, En Banc] ..34
(29) Ocampo, et al vs. Admiral Enriquez, GR 225973, November 08, 2016 [Per J.
Peralta, En Banc] .........................................................................................................35
(30) Arigo vs. Swift, et al, GR 206510, Septeber 16, 2014 [Per J. Villarama, En Banc]36
(31) MIRASOL VS CA ...............................................................................................37
(32) SAYSON VS SINGSON .....................................................................................39
(33) REPUBLIC VS PURISIMA ................................................................................41
(34) UP VS DIZON .....................................................................................................42
(35) RAYO VS CFI .....................................................................................................44
(36) FAROLAN VS CTA ............................................................................................45
(37) REPUBLIC VS SANDIGANBAYAN ................................................................46
(38) SANTIAGO VS REPUBLIC ...............................................................................47
(39) DOTC VS SPS. ABECINA .................................................................................48
(40) AMIGABLE VS CUENCA .................................................................................49
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(41) EPG CONSTRUCTION VS VIGILAR ...............................................................50

(42) TORIO v. FONTANILLA ...................................................................................51
(43) ARIGO v. SWIFT G.R. No. 206510 ....................................................................52
(44) Holy See vs. Rosario G.R. 101949 (1994) ...........................................................53
(45) USA vs Ruiz G.R. No. L-35645...........................................................................54
(46) MINUCHER VS. COURT OF APPEALS ..........................................................55
(47) REPUBLIC OF INDONESIA VS VINZON .......................................................56
(48) DFA v. NLRC G.R. No. 113191 ..........................................................................57
(49) ATCI v. Echin 632 SCRA 528 (2010) .................................................................58
(50) Animos vs. PVAO G.R. No. 79156 .....................................................................59
(51) USA v. Reyes, GR No. 79233 (1993) ..................................................................60
(52) Shauf v. CA, 191 SCRA 713 (1990) ....................................................................61
(53) Nessia v. Fermin, 220 SCRA 615 (1993).............................................................62
(54) Caloocan City v. Allarde, GR No. 107721 (2003) ...............................................63
(55) Pable Ocampo v. HRET, GR No. 158466 (2004) ................................................64
(56) Maquiling v. COMELEC, GR No. 195649 (2013) ..............................................65
(57) Villavivencio v. Lukban, 39 Phil 778 (1919) .......................................................66
(58) Agustin v. Edu, 88 SCRA 195 (1979) ..................................................................67
(59) Ichong v. Hernandez, 101 Phil 115 (1957) ..........................................................68
(60) Deutsche Bank AG Manila Branch v. CIR, 704 SCRA 216 (2013) ....................69
(61) IN RE GARCIA ...................................................................................................70
(62) PEOPLE VS LAGMAN.......................................................................................71
(63) ESTRADA VS ESCRITOR .................................................................................72
(64) REPUBLIC VS MANALO ..................................................................................73
(65) SALONGA VS CRUZ .........................................................................................74
(66) SERRANO DE AGBAYANI VS PNB ................................................................75
(67) CIR VS SAN ROQUE POWER CORP ...............................................................76
(68) MARIA CAROLINA ARAULLO VS BENIGNO AQUINO III, JULY 1,201477
(69) MARIA CAROLINA ARAULLO VS BENIGNO AQUINO III, FEBRUARY 3,
2015 (ENBANC) .........................................................................................................78
(70) MAGALLONA VS ERMITA ..............................................................................79
(71) Province of North Cotabato vs GRP Peace Panel on Ancestral ...........................80
(72) Reagan v CIR , 30 SCRA 968 (1969) ..................................................................81
(73) People vs Gozo 53 SCRA 476 .............................................................................82
(74) Lee vs. Director of Lands GR 128195 .................................................................83
(75) Republic vs Chule Lim GR 153883 .....................................................................84
(76) Calilung vs Datumanong GR 160869 ..................................................................85
(77) Republic vs Nora Sagun GR 187567 (2012) ........................................................86
(78) In re Ching, Bar Matter 914 (1999)......................................................................87
(79) Co v HRET 199 SCRA 692 .................................................................................88
(80) Bengson v HRET GR 142840 ..............................................................................89
(81) So v Republic 513 SCRA 268 (2007) ..................................................................90
(82) David vs. Agbay G.R. No. 199113 March 18, 2015 ............................................92
(83) Nicolas-Lewis, et al vs. Comelec GR 162759 August 4, 2006 ............................93
(84) JOSE AZNAR vs COMELEC and Emilio Mario Renner Osmeña GR 83820 25 May
1990..............................................................................................................................94
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(85) Valles v COMELEC GR 137000, Aug. 9, 2000 ..................................................95

(86) MARY GRACE NATIVIDAD S POE- LLAMANZARES vs. COMELEC,et al. GR
221697 , GR 221698-700 March 8,2016 .....................................................................96
(87) DEPT OF AGRICULTURE VS NLRC GR 104269 November 11, 1993 ..........98
(88) Philippine Agila Sattelite Inc. vs. Lichauco G.R. No. 142362, May 3, 2006 ......99
(89) Lansang vs. CA G.R. No. 102667, February 23, 2000 ......................................101
(90) Republic vs. Sandoval 220 SCRA 124...............................................................102
(91) Bayan v Exec Secretary GR 138570 ..................................................................103
(92) Pamatong v Comelec GR 161872 ......................................................................104
(93) Garcia v Drilon 699 SCRA 352 ........................................................................105
(94) PASEI v Drilon 163 SCRA 386 .........................................................................106
(95) UP BOR v CA GR 134625` ...............................................................................107
(96) CoTesCUP v Secretary of Education GR 216930 .............................................108
(97) University v CA 230 SCRA 761 ........................................................................109
(98) SSS vs CA 175 SCRA 686.................................................................................110
(99) Oposa v Factoran GR 101083 ............................................................................111
(100) Republic v Albios 707 SCRA 5584 (2013) ......................................................112
(101) Imbong vs Ochoa, 721 SCRA 584 (2013) .......................................................114
(102) Roe vs Wade, 410 US 113 ...............................................................................115
(103) Limbona vs Conte Mangelin, 170 SCRA 786..................................................116
(104) Mamiscal vs Abdullah 761 SCRA 39 (2015)...................................................117
(105) In RE Laureta and Maravilla 148 SCRA 382 ..................................................118
(106) INS vs Chadha, 462 US 919 (1983) .................................................................119
(107) Arnault vs Balagtas, 97 Phil 358 (1955) ..........................................................120
(108) Belgica vs Ochoa, Jr, 710 SCRA 1(2013) ........................................................121
(109) Mendoza vs People, 659 SCRA 681 (2011) ....................................................122
(110) NPC Drivers and Mechanical Association vs Napocor, 503 SCRA 138 (2006)123
(111) Garcia v. Executive Secretary, 211 SCRA 219 ................................................125
(112) US v. Tang Ho, 43 Phil 1 .................................................................................126
(113) CoTeSCUP v. Secretary of Education, G.R. 216930, October 2018 ...............127
(114) Pelaez v. Auditor General, 15 SCRA 569 ........................................................128
(115) People v. Judge Dacuycuy, 173 SCRA 90 .......................................................129
(116) Sema v. COMELEC, G.R. 177597, (2008) ......................................................130
(117) Jose Jesus M. Disini, Jr., et al. v. The Secretary of Justice, et al., G.R. No. 203335,
Feb. 11, 2014..............................................................................................................131
(118) Powell v. McCormack 395 US 486 ..................................................................132
(119) Pobre v Defensor-Santiago 597 SCRA 1 (2009) .............................................133
(120) Aquino III vs COMELEC 617 SCRA 623 (2010) ...........................................134
(121) Aldaba vs. COMELEC 611 SCRA 147 (2010)................................................135
(122) Naval v Comelec, 729 SCRA 299 (2014) ........................................................136
(123) Bagabuyo v Comelec, 573 SCRA 290 (2008) .................................................137
(124) Reyes v Comelec, 699 SCRA 522 (2013) and 708 SCRA 197 (2013 .............138
(125) Banat v Comelec, GR 179271 (2009) ..............................................................139
(126) Ang Ladlad v Comelec, GR 190582 (2010) ....................................................140
(127) Walden Bello v Comelec GR 191998 (2010) ..................................................141
(128) Atong Paglaum v Comelec, GR 203766 ..........................................................142
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(129) Coalition of Asso. of Senior Citizens in the Phil. v Comelec, 201 SCRA 786 (2013)
....................................................................................................................................143
(130) Lico v Comelec, GR 205505, Sep 29, 2015 .....................................................144
(131) Abang Lingkod vs. Comelec 2013 ...................................................................145
(132) Akbayan vs HRET ...........................................................................................146
(133) Aquino vs. Comelec .........................................................................................147
(134) Abayon vs HRET .............................................................................................148
(135) Santiago vs Guingona.......................................................................................149
(136) Avelino vs Cuenco ...........................................................................................150
(137) Alejandrino vs Quezon .....................................................................................151
(138) De Venecia vs Sandiganbayan .........................................................................152
(139) Pobre vs. Defensor Santiago ............................................................................153
(140) Philconsa vs. Mathay........................................................................................154
(141) Ligot vs. Mathay, 56 SCRA 823 (1974) ..........................................................155
(142) People vs. Jalosjos, GR 132875-76, February 3, 2000 ....................................156
(143) Adaza vs Pacana, 135 SCRA 431 (1985) .........................................................157
(144) Puyat vs. De Guzman, 113 SCRA 31 (1982) ...................................................158
(145) Liban vs. Gordon, 593 SCRA 68 (2009) and 639 SCRA 709 (2011) ..............159
(146) Macalintal vs. COMELEC, GR 157013, July 10, 2003 ...................................160
(147) Abakada Group Party list vs. Purisima, GR 166715, August 14, 2008 ...........161
(148) Bengzon vs. Blue Ribbon Committee, 203 SCRA 767....................................162
(149) Arnault vs. Nazareno, GR L-3820, July 18, 1950 ............................................163
(150) PHILCOMSAT Holdings Corporation vs. Senate, GR 180308, June 19, 2012164
(151) Neri v Senate Committee on Accountability of Public Officers 549 SCRA 77 and
564 SCRA 152) ..........................................................................................................165
(152) Balag v. Senate GR 234608 .............................................................................166
(153) Senate v. Ermita GR 169777 ............................................................................167
(154) Belgica v. Executive Secretary GR 208566 .....................................................168
(155) Araullo v Abad GR 209287 .............................................................................169
(156) Lawyers against Monopoly and Poverty (LAMP) v. The Secretary of Budget and
Management GR 164987 ...........................................................................................170
(157) Arnault v. Balagtas 97 Phil 358 .......................................................................171
(158) Imbong v. Ochoa 721 SCRA 146.....................................................................172
(159) Tanada v. Tuvera 136 SCRA 27 ......................................................................173
(160) Abbas v. SET....................................................................................................174
(161) Bondoc vs Pineda .............................................................................................175
(162) Codilla vs De Venecia ......................................................................................176
(163) Cunanan vs Tan ................................................................................................177
(164) Velasco vs Belmonte ........................................................................................178
(165) Ty-Delgado vs HRET.......................................................................................179
(166) Republic vs Sandiganbayan .............................................................................180
(167) Estrada vs Arroyo .............................................................................................181
(168) Macalintal vs PET ............................................................................................182
(169) Pormento vs Estrada .........................................................................................183
(170) Laurel vs Garcia ...............................................................................................184
(171) Marcos v. Manglapus .......................................................................................185
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(172) Saguisag v. Ochoa ............................................................................................186

(173) Funa v. Ermita ..................................................................................................187
(174) Funa v. Agra .....................................................................................................188
(175) De Castro v. JBC ..............................................................................................189
(176) Velicaria-Garafil v. OP ....................................................................................190
(177) Manalo v. Sistosa .............................................................................................192
(178) Hontiveros-Baraquel v. TollRegulatory Board ................................................193
(179) Resident Marine Mammals of the Protected Seascape TanonStrait, et al v. Secretary
Angelo Reyes, et al ....................................................................................................194
(180) Kulayan v. Tan .................................................................................................196
(181) Ampatuan vs Puno ...........................................................................................198
(182) Fortun vs Arroyo ..............................................................................................199
(183) Lagman vs Medialdea ......................................................................................200
(184) Monsantos vs Factoran Jr. ................................................................................201
(185) Rosa-Vidal vs Comelec ....................................................................................202
(186) Saguisag vs Ochoa Jr........................................................................................203
(187) Bayan vs Exec Secretary ..................................................................................204
(188) Biraogo vs Philippine Truth Commission ........................................................205
(189) Chavez vs. JBC ................................................................................................206
(190) Jardeleza vs. Sereno .........................................................................................207
(191) Villanueva vs JBC ............................................................................................208
(192) RE: COAopinion on the computation of the appraised value of the properties
purchased by the retired Chief / associate justices of the supreme court A.M. NO. 11-7-
10-SC JULY 31, 2012................................................................................................209
(193) RE: Request for guidance/clarification on Section 7, Rule III of RA NO 10154,
Requiring retiring government employees to secure a clearance of pendency/non-
pendency of case/s from the Civi Service Commission.............................................210
(194) RE: Save the SC judicial independence and fiscal autonomy movement v abolition
of judiciary development fund(JDF) and reduction of fiscal autonomy UDK-15143, Jan.
21, 2015......................................................................................................................211
(195) RE: Petition for recognition of exemption of the GSIS from payment of legal fees
612 SCRA 193 (2010) ...............................................................................................212
(196) Cayetano v Monsod ..........................................................................................213
(197) Gaminde v COA ..............................................................................................214
(198) Brillantes v Yorac............................................................................................216
(199) CSC v DBM .....................................................................................................217
(200) Funa v Duque ...................................................................................................218
(201) Sarmiento v Comelec .......................................................................................219
(202) Ambil v Comelec .............................................................................................220
(203) Brillantes v comelec .........................................................................................221
(204) Sandoval v comelec ..........................................................................................222
(205) Al haj v comelec ...............................................................................................223
(206) General v Roco .................................................................................................224
(207) CSC v salas.......................................................................................................225
(208) Office of the ombudsman v CSC .....................................................................226
(209) Vistan v nicolas ................................................................................................227
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(210) Domingo v zamora ...........................................................................................228

(211) OP v Buenaobra ...............................................................................................229
(212) Capablanca v. CSC ...........................................................................................230
(213) DBP v. COA 231 SCRA 202 ...........................................................................231
(214) Bustamante v. COA..........................................................................................232
(215) DBP v. COA GR 88435 ...................................................................................233
(216) Nuñez v. Sandiganbayan ..................................................................................234
(217) Roxas v. Vasquez .............................................................................................235
(218) People v. Velez .................................................................................................236
(219) Ledesma v. CA .................................................................................................237
(220) Ombudsman v. Madriaga .................................................................................238
(221) Ombudsman v. Madriaga .................................................................................239
(222) Caoibes v. Ombudsman....................................................................................240
(223) Zaldivar v. Sandiganbayan ...............................................................................241
(224) Orap v. Sandiganbayan ....................................................................................242
(225) Canonizado vs Aguirre .....................................................................................244
(226) Carino v CHR ...................................................................................................245
(227) PBM Employees v. PBM Co............................................................................246
(228) MMDA v. Viron Trans.....................................................................................247
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(1) Manila Prince Hotel vs. GSIS 267 SCRA 408 (1997)
ISSUE: Whether or Not the provisions of the Constitution, particularly Article XII Section 10,
are self-executing.
FACTS: The GSIS, pursuant to the privatization program of the Government under
Proclamation 50 dated 8 December 1986, decided to sell through public bidding 30% to 51% of
the issued and outstanding shares of the Manila Hotel (MHC).
DECISION: Dismissed
RATIO DECIDENDI: Yes. Sec 10, Art. XII of the 1987 Constitution is a self-executing
provision. A provision which lays down a general principle, such as those found in Article II of
the 1987 Constitution, is usually not self-executing. But a provision which is complete in itself
and becomes operative without the aid of supplementary or enabling legislation, or that which
supplies sufficient rule by means of which the right it grants may be enjoyed or protected, is self-
executing.
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(2) Lambino vs. COMELEC GR 174153 (2006)
ISSUE: Whether or not the Court should revisit its ruling in Santiago declaring RA 6735
“incomplete, inadequate or wanting in essential terms and conditions” to implement the initiative
clause on proposals to amend the Constitution
FACTS: Lambino et al filed a petition with the COMELEC to hold a plebiscite that will ratify
their initiative petition to change the 1987 Constitution under Section 5(b) and (c)2 and Section
73 of Republic Act No. 6735 or the Initiative and Referendum Act. They alleged that their
petition had the support of 6,327,952 individuals constituting at least twelve per centum (12%) of
all registered voters, with each legislative district represented by at least three per centum (3%)
of its registered voters. They also claimed that COMELEC election registrars had verified the
signatures of the 6.3 million individuals.The Lambino Group’s initiative petition changes the
1987 Constitution by modifying Sections 1-7 of Article VI (Legislative Department)4 and
Sections 1-4 of Article VII (Executive Department) and by adding Article XVIII entitled
“Transitory Provisions.” These proposed changes will shift the present Bicameral-Presidential
system to a Unicameral-Parliamentary form of government.
DECISION: Dismissed
RATIO DECIDENDI: The present petition warrants dismissal for failure to comply with the
basic requirements of Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution on the conduct and scope of a
people’s initiative to amend the Constitution. There is no need to revisit this Court’s ruling in
Santiago declaring RA 6735 “incomplete, inadequate or wanting in essential terms and
conditions” to cover the system of initiative to amend the Constitution. An affirmation or
reversal of Santiago will not change the outcome of the present petition. Thus, this Court must
decline to revisit Santiago which effectively ruled that RA 6735 does not comply with the
requirements of the Constitution to implement the initiative clause on amendments to the
Constitution.
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(3) Marbury vs. Madison, 5 US 137
ISSUE: Does the Supreme Court have original jurisdiction to issue writs of mandamus?
FACTS: On the last day in office President John Adams names forty-two justices of the peace
and sixteen new circuit court justices for the District of Columbia under the Organic Law, to take
control of the federal judiciary before the Thomas Jefferson took office.The commission was
signed by President Adams and sealed by acting Secretary of State, John Marshall but they
wenot delivered before the expiration of Adam’s term as President. When the new President
Thomas Jefferson took office he refused to honor the commissions, claiming that they were
invalid because they have not been delivered before the end of Adam’s term as president.
William Marbury was one of the intended recipient of an appointment as justice of the peace.
Marbury directly went tothe supreme court to file his complaint, refusing for a writ of Mandamus
to compel Jefferson’s Secretary James Madisonto deliver the commissions. At that time The
Judiciary Act 1789 had granted the Supreme Court original jurisdiction to issue writs of
Mandamus toany courts appointed or persons holding office, under the authority of the United
States
DECISION: Dismissed
RATIO DECIDENDI: No. The Supreme Court does not have original jurisdiction to issue
writs of mandamus. To enable this court then to issue a mandamus, it must be shown to be an
exercise of appellate jurisdiction, or to be necessary to enable them to exercise appellate
jurisdiction. It is the essential criterion of appellate jurisdiction that it revises and corrects the
proceedings in a cause already instituted, and does not create that case. Although, therefore, a
mandamus may be directed to courts, yet to issue such a writ to an officer for the delivery of a
paper is, in effect, the same as to sustain an original action for that paper, and is therefore a
matter of original jurisdiction.
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(4) Angara vs. Electoral Commission, 63 Phil 139 (1936)
ISSUE: Whether or not The Electoral Commission has acted without or in excess of its
jurisdiction.
FACTS: In the elections of Sept. 17, 1935, petitioner Jose A. Angara and the respondents Pedro
Ynsua, Miguel Castillo, and Dionisio Mayor were candidates for the position of members of the
National Assembly for the first district of Tayabas. On Oct. 7, 1935, the provincial board of
canvassers proclaimed Angara as member-elect of the National Assembly and on Nov. 15, 1935,
he took his oath of office. On Dec. 3, 1935, the National Assembly passed Resolution No. 8,
which in effect, fixed the last date to file election protests. On Dec. 8, 1935, Ynsua filed before
the Electoral Commission a "Motion of Protest" against Angara and praying, among other things,
that Ynsua be named/declared elected Member of the National Assembly or that the election of
said position be nullified. On Dec. 9, 1935, the Electoral Commission adopted a resolution (No.
6) stating that last day for filing of protests is on Dec. 9. Angara contended that the Constitution
confers exclusive jurisdiction upon the Electoral Commission solely as regards the merits of
contested elections to the National Assembly and the Supreme Court therefore has no
jurisdiction to hear the case.
DECISION: Dismissed
RATIO DECIDENDI: In this case, the nature of the present controversy shows the necessity of
a final constitutional arbiter to determine the conflict of authority between two agencies created
by the Constitution. The court has jurisdiction over the Electoral Commission and the subject
matter of the present controversy for the purpose of determining the character, scope and extent
of the constitutional grant to the Electoral Commission as "the sole judge of all contests relating
to the election, returns and qualifications of the members of the National Assembly." (Sec 4 Art.
VI 1935 Constitution). It is held, therefore, that the Electoral Commission was acting within the
legitimate exercise of its constitutional prerogative in assuming to take cognizance of the
election protest filed by Ynsua.
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(5) Maria Carolina P. Araullo, et al. vs. Benigno Simeon C. Aquino III et al, GR 209287,
July 1, 2014
ISSUE: Are the acts and practices under the DAP, particularly their non-conformity with
Section 25(5), Article VI of the Constitution and the principles of separation of power and equal
protection, constitutional?
FACTS: In this Motion for Reconsideration, Aquino III, et al. maintain that the issues in these
consolidated cases were mischaracterized and unnecessarily constitutionalized because the
Court’s interpretation of savings can be overturned by legislation considering that savings is
defined in the General Appropriations Act (GAA), hence making savings a statutory issue. They
aver that the withdrawn unobligated allotments and unreleased appropriations constitute savings
and may be used for augmentation and that the Court should apply legally recognized norms and
principles, most especially the presumption of good faith, in resolving their motion. On their
part, Araullo, et al. pray for the partial reconsideration of the decision on the ground that the
Court failed to declare as unconstitutional and illegal all moneys under the Disbursement
Acceleration Program (DAP) used for alleged augmentation of appropriation items that did not
have actual deficiencies. They submit that augmentation of items beyond the maximum amounts
recommended by the President for the programs, activities and projects (PAPs) contained in the
budget submitted to Congress should be declared unconstitutional.
DECISION: WHEREFORE, the Court PARTIALLY GRANTS the petitions for certiorari and
prohibition; and DECLARES the following acts and practices under the Disbursement
Acceleration Program, National Budget Circular No. 541 and related executive issuances
UNCONSTITUTIONAL for being in violation of Section 25(5), Article VI of the 1987
Constitution and the doctrine of separation of powers
RATIO DECIDENDI: No. Regardless of the perceived beneficial purposes of the DAP, and
regardless of whether the DAP is viewed as an effective tool of stimulating thenational economy,
the acts and practices under the DAP and the relevant provisions of NBC No. 541 cited in the
Decision should remain illegal and unconstitutional as long as the funds used to finance the
projects mentioned therein are sourced from savings that deviated from the relevant provisions of
the GAA, as well as the limitation on the power to augment under Section 25(5), Article VI of
the Constitution. In a society governed by laws, even the best intentions must come within the
parameters defined and set by the Constitution and the law. Laudable purposes must be carried
out through legal methods.
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(6) Francisco vs. House of Representatives GR, 160261 (Nov 10, 2003)
ISSUE: Whether or not the certiorari jurisdiction of the court may be invoked to determine the
validity of the second impeachment complaint pursuant to Article XI of the Constitution.
FACTS: An impeachment complaint against Chief Justice Hilario Davide and seven Asociate
Justices was filed on 2 June 2003 but was dismissed by The House Committee on Justice on 22
October 2003 for being insufficient in substance. On 23 October 2003, Representative Gilbert
Teodoro and Felix Fuentabella filed a new impeachment complaint against the Chief Justice.
Thus arose the instant petitions against the House of Representatives et al, most of which
contend that the filing of the second impeachment complaint is unconstitutional as it violates the
provision of Section 5, Article XI of the Constitution, “no impeachment proceedings shall be
initiated against the same official more than once within the period of one year.” Senator
Aquilino Pimintel Jr, filed a Motion to Intervene, stating that the consolidated petitions be
dismissed for lack of jurisdiction of the Court and that the sole power, authority and jurisdiction
of the Senate as the impeachment court be recognized and upheld pursuant to the provision of
Article XI of the Constitution.
DECISION: The second impeachment complaint against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr.
which was filed by Representatives Gilberto C. Teodoro, Jr. and Felix William B. Fuentebella
with the Office of the Secretary General of the House of Representatives on October 23, 2003 is
barred under paragraph 5, section 3 of Article XI of the Constitution
RATIO DECIDENDI: Having concluded that the initiation takes place by the act of filing of
the impeachment complaint and referral to the House Committee on Justice, the initial action
taken thereon, the meaning of Section 3 (5) of Article XI becomes clear. Once an impeachment
complaint has been initiated in the foregoing manner, another may not be filed against the same
official within a one year period following Article XI, Section 3(5) of the Constitution. In fine,
considering that the first impeachment complaint, was filed by former President Estrada against
Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., along with seven associate justices of this Court, on June 2,
2003 and referred to the House Committee on Justice on August 5, 2003, the second
impeachment complaint filed by Representatives Gilberto C. Teodoro, Jr. and Felix William
Fuentebella against the Chief Justice on October 23, 2003 violates the constitutional prohibition
against the initiation of impeachment proceedings against the same impeachable officer within a
one-year period.
12 | P a g e
(7) Mariano vs. Comelec, GR 118577
ISSUE: Whether or not there is an actual case or controversy to challenge the constitutionality
of one of the questioned sections of R.A. No. 7854
FACTS: The petitioners assails certain provisions of RA 7854, Section 51 on the ground that it
attempts to alter or restart the "3-consecutive term" limit for local elective officials, disregarding
the term previously served by them which collides with Section 8 Article X and Section 7,
Article VI of the constitution
DECISION: Dismissed
RATIO DECIDENDI: The requirements before a litigant can challenge the constitutionality of
a law are well delineated. They are: 1) there must be an actual case or controversy; (2) the
question of constitutionality must be raised by the proper party; (3) the constitutional question
must be raised at the earliest possible opportunity; and (4) the decision on the constitutional
question must be necessary to the determination of the case itself. Petitioners have far from
complied with these requirements. The petition is premised on the occurrence of many
contingent events, i.e., that Mayor Binay will run again in this coming mayoralty elections; that
he would be re-elected in said elections; and that he would seek re-election for the same position
in the 1998 elections. Considering that these contingencies may or may not happen, petitioners
merely pose a hypothetical issue which has yet to ripen to an actual case or controversy.
Petitioners who are residents of Taguig (except Mariano) are not also the proper partiesto raise
this abstract issue. Worse, they hoist this futuristic issue in a petition for declaratory relief over
which this Court has no jurisdiction.
13 | P a g e
(8) Montesclaros vs. Comelec, GR 152295 (2002)
ISSUE: Whether or not there was grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction imputable to respondents.
FACTS: Petitioners sought to prevent the postponement of the 2002 SK election to a later date
since doing so may render them unqualified to vote or be voted for in view of the age limitation
set by law for those who may participate. The SK elections was postponed since it was deemed
"operationally very difficult" to hold both SK and Barangay elections simultaneously in May
2002. Petitioners also sought to enjoin the lowering of age for membership in the SK.
DECISION: Denied
RATIO DECIDENDI: The Court held that, in the present case, there was no actual controversy
requiring the exercise of the power of judicial review. While seeking to prevent a postponement
of the May 6, 2002 SK elections, petitioners are nevertheless amenable to a resetting of the SK
elections to any date not later than July 15, 2002. RA No. 9164 has reset the SK elections to July
15, 2002, a date acceptable to petitioners. Under the same law, Congress merely restored the age
requirement in PD No. 684, the original charter of the SK, which fixed the maximum age for
membership in the SK to youths less than 18 years old. Petitioners do not have a vested right to
the permanence of the age requirement under Section 424 of the Local Government Code of
1991.
14 | P a g e
(9) Belgica vs. Ochoa, GR 208566, 710 SCRA 1,89, Nov 19, 2013
ISSUE: Whether or not the 2013 PDAF Article and all other Congressional Pork Barrel Laws
similar thereto are unconstitutional considering that they violate the principles of/constitutional
provisions on (a) separation of powers; (b) non-delegability of legislati
FACTS: The NBI Investigation was spawned by sworn affidavits of six (6) whistle-blowers
who declared that JLN Corporation (Janet Lim Napoles) had swindled billions of pesos from the
public coffers for "ghost projects" using dummy NGOs. Thus, Criminal complaints were filed
before the Office of the Ombudsman, charging five (5) lawmakers for Plunder, and three (3)
other lawmakers for Malversation, Direct Bribery, and Violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act. Also recommended to be charged in the complaints are some of the lawmakers’
chiefs -of-staff or representatives, the heads and other officials of three (3) implementing
agencies, and the several presidents of the NGOs set up by Napoles. Whistle-blowers alleged
that" at least P900 Million from royalties in the operation of the Malampaya gas project off
Palawan province intended for agrarian reform beneficiaries has gone into a dummy NGO.
Several petitions were lodged before the Court similarly seeking that the "Pork Barrel System"
be declared unconstitutional
DECISION: The petitions are PARTLY GRANTED. In view of the constitutional violations
discussed in this Decision, the Court hereby declares as UNCONSTITUTIONAL:
RATIO DECIDENDI: Jurisprudence provides that an actual case or controversy is one which
"involves a conflict of legal rights, an assertion of opposite legal claims, susceptible of judicial
resolution as distinguished from a hypothetical or abstract difference or dispute. In other words,
"there must be a contrariety of legal rights that can be interpreted and enforced on the basis of
existing law and jurisprudence." Related to the requirement of an actual case or controversy is
the requirement of "ripeness," meaning that the questions raised for constitutional scrutiny are
already ripe for adjudication. "A question is ripe for adjudication when the act being challenged
has had a direct adverse effect on the individual challenging it. It is a prerequisite that something
had then been accomplished or performed by either branch before a court may come into the
picture, and the petitioner must allege the existence of an immediate or threatened injury to itself
as a result of the challenged action." "Withal, courts will decline to pass upon constitutional
issues through advisory opinions, bereft as they are of authority to resolve hypothetical or moot
questions." Based on these principles, the Court finds that there exists an actual and justiciable
controversy in these cases. The requirement of contrariety of legal rights is clearly satisfied by
the antagonistic positions of the parties on the constitutionality of the "Pork Barrel System."
Also, the questions in these consolidated cases are ripe for adjudication since the challenged
funds and the provisions allowing for their utilization – such as the 2013 GAA for the PDAF, PD
910 for the Malampaya Funds and PD 1869, as amended by PD 1993, for the Presidential Social
Fund – are currently existing and operational; hence, there exists an immediate or threatened
injury to petitioners as a result of the unconstitutional use of these public funds.
15 | P a g e
(10) Ocampo vs Enriquez GR 225973, November 8, 2016
ISSUE: [1] Would respondents gravely abuse their discretion in allowing Marcos' burial in the
LNMB? [2] Would Marcos' burial be violative of the 1987 Constitution, jurisprudence and the
law?
FACTS: President Duterte allowed the burial of President Marcos's remains in the Libingan ng
Mga Bayani (LNMB). He ordered herein respondent's superior to prepare the burial.
DECISION: Dismissed
RATIO DECIDENDI: It is not. The Supreme Court found for the respondents. It is the
President's discretion to allow who should be buried in the LNMB. In fact, even Congress may
and can enact a law allowing anyone to be buried therein. Since the LNMB is under the authority
of the AFP and the Commander-in-Chief of the AFP is the President, it is within the President's
discretion to allow or disallow the burial of anyone in the LNMB. The Pantheon Law does not
cover the LNMB. It is merely a national shrine converted into a memorial shrine. Hence, anyone
buried therein would not be treated as a hero and would not be labeled as one who is worth
emulating or who is an inspiration to the youth.
16 | P a g e
(11) Imbong v. Ochoa, GR 204819, April 8, 2014
ISSUE: Whether or not the petition present an actual case or controversy even though the RH
Law is not yet effective
FACTS: On December 21, 2012, Congress enacted RH Law (RA 10354). RH Law is an
enhancement measure to fortify and make effective the current laws on contraception, women’s
health and population control. Petitioners assail its constitutionality because according to them, it
violates the right to health of women and the sanctity of life, which the State is mandated to
protect and promote. The proponents of the RH law, however, contend that the petitions do not
present any actual case or controversy because the RH Law has yet to be implemented. They
claim that the questions raised by the petitions are not yet concrete and ripe for adjudication
since no one has been charged with violating any of its provisions and that there is no showing
that any of the petitioners' rights has been adversely affected by its operation.
DECISION:
RATIO DECIDENDI: The petition present an actual case or controversy even though RH Law
is not yet effective. An actual case or controversy means an existing case or controversy that is
appropriate or ripe for determination. The fact of the law or act in question being not yet
effective does not negate ripeness. Concrete acts under a law are not necessary to render the
controversy ripe. Even a singular violation of the Constitution and/or the law is enough to
awaken judicial duty. Here, an actual case or controversy exists and that the same is ripe for
judicial determination. Considering that the RH Law and its implementing rules have already
taken effect and that budgetary measures to carry out the law have already been passed, it is
evident that the subject petitions present a justiciable controversy. When an action of the
legislative branch is seriously alleged to have infringed the Constitution, it not only becomes a
right, but also a duty of the Judiciary to settle the dispute. Hence, the court shall take cognizance
of the case.
17 | P a g e
(12) Estrada v. Sandiganbayan, GR 148560 (2001)
ISSUE: Whether or not RA 7080 is unconstitutional for being vague

FACTS: Petitioner Joseph Estrada was prosecuted under RA 7080 (Plunder Law). He assailed,
however, that the Plunder Law does not constitute an indictable offense because of its failure to
provide for the statutory definition of the terms "combination" and "series" in the key phrase "a
combination or series of overt or criminal acts" found in Sec. 1, par. (d), and Sec. 2, and the word
"pattern" in Sec. 4. These omissions, according to Estrada, render the Plunder Law
unconstitutional for being impermissibly vague and overbroad and deny him the right to be
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him, hence, violative of his
fundamental right to due process.
DECISION:
RATIO DECIDENDI: Tha Plunder Law is not unconstitutional for being vague. Congress is
not restricted in the form of expression of its will, and its inability to so define the words
employed in a statute will not necessarily result in the vagueness or ambiguity of the law so long
as the legislative will is clear, or at least, can be gathered from the whole act, which is distinctly
expressed in the Plunder Law. The void-for-vagueness doctrine states that a statute which either
forbids or requires the doing of an act in terms so vague that men of common intelligence must
necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application, violates the first essential of due
process of law. The overbreadth doctrine, on the other hand, decrees that "a governmental
purpose may not be achieved by means which sweep unnecessarily broadly and thereby invade
the area of protected freedoms. The overbreadth and vagueness doctrines apply only to free
speech cases, but not to penal statutes.
18 | P a g e
(13) Imbong v. Ochoa, GR 204819, April 8, 2014
ISSUE: Whether or not the RH Law cannot be challenged “on its face” because it is not a
speech regulating measure
FACTS: On December 21, 2012, Congress enacted RH Law (RA 10354). RH Law is an
enhancement measure to fortify and make effective the current laws on contraception, women’s
health and population control. Petitioners assail its constitutionality because according to them, it
violates the right to health of women and the sanctity of life, which the State is mandated to
protect and promote. The proponents of the RH law, however, assails the propriety of the facial
challenge lodged by the subject petitions, contending that the RH Law cannot be challenged "on
its face" as it is not a speech regulating measure.
DECISION:
RATIO DECIDENDI: While the Court has withheld the application of facial challenges to
strictly penal statues, it has expanded its scope to cover statutes not only regulating free speech,
but also those involving religious freedom, and other fundamental rights. The underlying reason
for this modification is simple. For unlike its counterpart in the U.S., this Court, under its
expanded jurisdiction, is mandated by the Fundamental Law not only to settle actual
controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, but also to
determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government. Consequently,
considering that the foregoing petitions have seriously alleged that the constitutional human
rights to life, speech and religion and other fundamental rights have been violated by the assailed
legislation, the Court has authority to take cognizance of the petitions and to determine if the RH
Law can indeed pass constitutional scrutiny.
19 | P a g e
(14) Disini, Jr. v. The Secretary of Justice, Gr 203335, February 11, 2014
ISSUE: Whether or not aiding or abetting libel on the cyberspace is consitutional.

FACTS: RA 10175 (Cybercrime Law) was enacted, which aims to regulate access to and use of
the cyberspace. Petitioners filed petitions to declare several provisions of Cybercrime Law
unconsitutional and void. One of the assailed provisions is Section 5, which punishes the aiding
or abetting and attempt in the commission of Cybercrimes such as libel. Petitioners argue that
such provision suffers from overbreadth, creating chilling and deterrent effect on protected
expression. The OSG, however, contends that the current body of jurisprudence and laws on
aiding and abetting sufficiently protects the freedom of expression of "netizens," the multitude
that avail themselves of the services of the internet. He points out that existing laws and
jurisprudence sufficiently delineate the meaning of "aiding or abetting" a crime as to protect the
innocent.
DECISION:
RATIO DECIDENDI: When a penal statute encroaches upon the freedom of speech, a facial
challenge grounded on the void-for-vagueness doctrine is acceptable. The inapplicability of the
doctrine must be carefully delineated. A petitioner may for instance mount a "facial" challenge to
the constitutionality of a statute even if he claims no violation of his own rights under the
assailed statute where it involves free speech on grounds of overbreadth or vagueness of the
statute. The rationale for this exception is to counter the "chilling effect" on protected speech that
comes from statutes violating free speech. A person who does not know whether his speech
constitutes a crime under an overbroad or vague law may simply restrain himself from speaking
in order to avoid being charged of a crime. The overbroad or vague law thus chills him into
silence. Here, the terms "aiding or abetting" constitute broad sweep that generates chilling effect
on those who express themselves through cyberspace posts, comments, and other messages.
Hence, Section 5 of the cybercrime law that punishes "aiding or abetting" libel on the cyberspace
is a nullity.
20 | P a g e
(15) Gonzales III v. Office of the President
ISSUE: Whether or not a Deputy Ombudsman may be subjected to the administrative

disciplinary jurisdiction of the President (concurrently with that of the Ombudsman) is a
justiciable not a political question.
FACTS: Rolando Mendoza (Mendoza) was dismissed in the PNP on account of the extortion
incident, which led him to hijack a tourist bus that resulted his death and several others on board.
Said incident is on account of Mendoza’s plea to the Office of the Ombudsman to reconsider his
case. President Benigno Aquino III created an Incident Investigation and Review Committee
(IIRC) to conduct an investigation relative to the incident of hostage-taking. Subsequently, IIRC
charged and dismissed Deputy Ombudsman Emilio Gonzales III (Gonzales), who handled
Mendoza’s case. Gonzales argues that the Office of the President has no administrative
disciplinary jurisdiction over a Deputy Ombudsman.
DECISION:
RATIO DECIDENDI: The issue of whether a Deputy Ombudsman may be subjected to the
administrative disciplinary jurisdiction of the President (concurrently with that of the
Ombudsman) is a justiciable not a political question. A justiciable question is one which is
inherently susceptible of being decided on grounds recognized by law, as where the court finds
that there are constitutionally-imposed limits on the exercise of the powers conferred on a
political branch of the government. Here, in resolving the petitions, the Court does not inquire
into the wisdom of the Congress’ choice to grant concurrent disciplinary authority to the
President, but as to whether the statutory grant violates the Constitution.
21 | P a g e
(16) Vinuya v. Romulo, GR 162230, April 28, 2010
ISSUE: Can the Supreme Court decide as to whether the Philippine government should espouse
claims of its nationals against Japan?
FACTS: The petitioner Malaya Lolas is an organization established for the purpose of
providing aid to the victims of rape by Japanese military forces in the Philippines during World
War II. Malaya Lolas filed a petition to compel the respondents to espouse their claims for
official apology and other forms of reparations against Japan before the International Court of
Justice and other international tribunals. According to them, the general waiver of claims by the
Philippine government in the peace treaty with Japan is void.
DECISION: Dismissed.
RATIO DECIDENDI: No. The question whether the Philippine government should espouse
claims of its nationals against a foreign government is a foreign relations matter, the authority for
which is demonstrably committed by our Constitution not to the courts but to the political
branches. In this case, the Executive Department has already decided that it is to the best interest
of the country to waive all claims of its nationals for reparations against Japan in the Treaty of
Peace of 1951. The wisdom of such decision is not for the courts to question. Neither could
petitioners herein assail the said determination by the Executive Department via the instant
petition for certiorari.
22 | P a g e
(17) Gonzales v. Narvasa, GR 140835
ISSUE: Whether or not the court can take cognizance of the case
FACTS: On November 26, 1998, President Joseph Estrada created the Preparatory Commission
on Consitutional Reform (PCCR) by virtue of Executive Order No. 43 to study and recommend
proposed amendments and/or revisions to the 1987 Consitution, and the manner implementing
the same. On November 9, 1999, Petitioner, in his capacity as a citizen and taxpayer, assails the
consitutionality of the creation of the PCCR. On December 20, 1999, the PCCR submitted its
recommendations to the President, and was dissolved by the President on the same day.
DECISION: Dismissed
RATIO DECIDENDI: The case has become moot and academic. An action is considered
"moot" when it no longer presents a justiciable controversy because the issues involved have
become academic or dead. The PCCR submitted its recommendations to the President on
December 20, 1999 and was dissolved by the President on the same day. It had likewise spent
the funds allotted to it. Thus, the PCCR has ceased to exist, having lost its raison d’etre.
Subsequent events have overtaken the petition and the Court has nothing left to resolve. The
staleness of the issue before us is made more manifest by the impossibility of granting the relief
prayed for by petitioner.
23 | P a g e
(18) Lacson v. Perez, GR 147780
ISSUE: Whether or not the Petitions have been rendered moot and academic
FACTS: On May 1, 2001, President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo (GMA) issued Proclamation No.
38 declaring a state of rebellion in the NCR. She likewise issued General Order No. 1 directing
the AFP and the PNP to suppress the rebellion in the NCR. Petitioners assail the declaration of a
state of rebellion and the warrantless arrest allegedly effected by virtue thereof, as having no
basis both in fact and in law. On May 6, 2001, President Macapagal-Arroyo ordered the lifting of
the declaration of a state of rebellion in Metro Manila.
RATIO DECIDENDI: The Petitions have been rendered moot and academic when GMA lifted
the declaration of a state of rebellion in Metro Manila.
24 | P a g e
(19) Defunis v. Odegard
ISSUE: Whether or not the petition is moot and academic

FACTS: DeFunis was denied admission at the University of Washington Law School, a state-
operated institution. He sued a state education official, Odegaard, as well as the law school
admissions committee on the basis that it had violated the Equal Protection Clause because its
policies and procedures had resulted in discrimination against him because of his race. He sought
a mandatory injunction from the trial court that would compel Odegaard to grant him admission
into the first-year law school class because his application had been unconstitutionally denied.
He prevailed in the lower court and was admitted to the law school, pending Odegaard's appeal.
The state Supreme Court eventually ruled that the law school admissions policy was
constitutional.DeFunis received a writ of certiorari from the U.S. Supreme Court, which stayed
the judgment of the Washington Supreme Court until the U.S. Supreme Court had resolved the
case. DeFunis was already in his third and final year of law school when the Court granted his
petition.
DECISION:
RATIO DECIDENDI: Because petitioner will complete law school at the end of the term for
which he has registered regardless of any decision, the case is moot. Mootness here does not
depend upon a "voluntary cessation" of the school's admissions practices, but upon the simple
fact that petitioner is in his final term, and the school's fixed policy to permit him to complete the
term. The case presents no question that is "capable of repetition, yet evading review," since
petitioner will never again have to go through the school's admissions process, and since it does
not follow that the issue petitioner raises will in the future evade review merely because this case
did not reach the Court until the eve of petitioner's graduation.
25 | P a g e
(20) Interational Service for the Acquisition of Agri-biotech Applications, Inc. v.

Greenpeace Southeast Asia, GR 209271, December 8, 2015
ISSUE: Whether or not the case is moot and academic.

FACTS: On September 24, 2010, a Memorandum of Undertaking was executed pursuant to
collaborative research and development project on eggplants. The petitioners conducted field
trials for "bioengineered eggplants," known as Bacillus thuringiensis (Bt) eggplant (Bt talong).
Bt talong contains the crystal toxin genes from the soil bacterium Bt, which produces the CrylAc
protein that is toxic to target insect pests. The Cry1Ac protein is said to be highly specific to
lepidopteran larvae such as the fruit and shoot borer, the most destructive insect pest to
eggplants. Subsequently, respondents filed a Petition for Writ of Kalikasan alleging that the field
trials violated their consitutional right to health and a balance ecology considering that BT talong
is presumed harmful to human health and the environment
DECISION:
RATIO DECIDENDI: The case is not moot and academic. An action is considered “moot”
when it presents a justiciable controversy becasue the issues involved have become academic or
dead or when the matter in dispute has already been resolved and hence, one is not entitled to
judicial intervention unless the issue is likely to be raised again between the parties. The case
falls under the “capable of repetition yet evading review” exception to the mootness principle.
The human and environmental health hazards posed by the introduction of a genetically modified
plant which is a very popular staple vegetable among Filipinos is an issue of paramount public
interest.
26 | P a g e
(21) David vs. Arroyo, GR 171396, May 03, 2006 [Per J. Sandoval-Gutierrez]
ISSUE: Whether or not the petition is moot and academic.

FACTS: On February 24, 2006, as the nation celebrated the 20th Anniversary of Edsa People
Power I, President Arroyo issued PP 1017 declaring a state of national emergency. President
Arroyo by virtue of the powers vested upon her by Section 18, Article 7 of the Philippine
Constitution commanded the Armed Forces of the Philippines to maintain peace and order
throughout the Philippines, prevent and suppress all forms of lawless violence as well as any act
of insurrection or rebellion. Comes petitioners Randolf S. David, et al, who was arrested without
warrant on the basis of PP 1017 and was brought to Camp Karingal, Quezon City where he was
finger printed, photographed and booked like a criminal suspect. He was also treated brusquely
by policemen and was charged with violation of BP Blg. 880 and later on detained for 7 hours
and was released thereafter due to insuffiecieny of evidence. The petition herein assailed PP
1017 on the grounds that (1) it encroaches on the emergency powers of Congress; (2) it is a
subterfuge to avoid the constitutional requireents for the imposition of Martial Law; and (3) it
violates the constitutional guarantees of freedom of press, speech and of assembly.
DECISION: The petition was PARTLY GRANTED.
RATIO DECIDENDI: The case was partly granted since the court finds and so holds PP 1017
constitutional insofar as it constitutes a call by the President for the AFP to prevent ot suppress
lawless violence. The proclamation is sustained by Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution.
However, PP 1017's extraneous provisions giving the President express or implied power (1) to
issue decrees; (2) to direct AFP to enforce obedience to all laws even those not related to lawless
violenece as well as decrees promulgated by the President; (3) to imposed standards on media or
any form of prior restraint on the press are ultra vires and unconstitutional. The court also rules
that under Section 17, Article XII of the Constitution, the President, in the absence of legislation,
cannot take over privately-owned public utility and private business afftected with public
interest.
27 | P a g e
(22) Belgica, et al vs. Exec. Sec. Ochoa, et al, GR No. 208566, November 19, 2013 [Per J.
Perlas-Bernabe, En Banc]
ISSUE: Whether or not the petition is moot and academic.

FACTS: On September 3, 2013, petitioners Belgica et al filed an Urgent Petition for Certiorari
and Prohibition with Prayer for the immediate issuance of TRO and or writ of Preliminary
injunction seeking that the annual "Pork Barrel System," presently embodied in the provisions of
the GA of 2013 which provided for the 2013 PDAF, and the Executive's lump-sum, discretionary
funds, such as the Malampaya Funds and the Presidential Social Fund, be declared
unconstitutional and null and void for being acts constituting grave abuse of discretion.
DECISION: The petition was PARTLY GRANTED.
RATIO DECIDENDI: The case is not moot as the proposed reforms on the PDAF and the
abolition thereof does not actually terminate the controversy on the matter. The President does
not have constitutional authority to nullify or annul the legal existence of the PDAF. The “moot
and academic principle” cannot stop the Court from deciding the case considering that: (a)
petitioners allege grave violation of the constitution, (b) the constitutionality of the pork barrel
system presents a situation of exceptional character and is a matter of paramount public interest,
(c) there is a practical need for a definitive ruling on the system’s constitutionality to guide the
bench, the bar and the public, and (d) the preparation and passage of the national budget is an
annual occurrence.
28 | P a g e
(23) KMU Labor Center vs. Garcia, GR 115381, December 23, 1994 [Per J. Kapunan, First
Division]
ISSUE: Whether or not Kilusang Mayo Uno has legal standing to file a petition against LTFRB.
FACTS: The Kilusang Mayo Uno Labor Center (KMU) assails the constitutionality and validity
of a memorandum which, among others, authorize provincial bus and jeepney operators to
increase or decrease the prescribed transportation fares without application therefore with the
LTFRB, and without hearing and approval thereof by said agency.
DECISION: The petition was GRANTED.
RATIO DECIDENDI: Petitioner KMU has the standing to sue. The requirement of LOCUS
STANDI inheres from the definition of judicial power. In the case at bench, petitioner, whose
members had suffered and continue to suffer grave and irreparable injury and damage from the
implementation of the questioned memoranda, circulars and/or orders, has shown that it has a
clear legal right that was violated and continues to be violated with the enforcement of the
challenged memoranda, circulars and/or orders. KMU members, who avail of the use of buses,
trains and jeepneys everyday, are directly affected by the burdensome cost of arbitrary increase
in passenger fares. They are part of the millions of commuters who comprise the riding public.
Certainly, their rights must be protected, not neglected nor ignored.
29 | P a g e
(24) IBP vs. Zamora, GR 141284, August 15, 2000 [Per J. Kapunan, En Banc]
ISSUE: Whether or not IBP has legal standing to assail constitutionality of calling the AFP to
assist PNP to suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion.
FACTS: Invoking his powers as Commander-in-Chief under Sec. 18, Art. VII of the
Constitution, President Ejercito Estrada directed the Armed Forces of the Philippines Chief of
Staff and Philippine National Police Chief to coordinate with each other for the proper
deployment and utilization of the Marines to assist the PNP in preventing or suppressing criminal
or lawless violence. The President declared that the services of the Marines in the anti-crime
campaign are merely temporary in nature and for a reasonable period only, until such time when
the situation shall have improved. The Integrated Bar of the Philippines filed a petition seeking
to declare the deployment of the Philippine Marines null and void and unconstitutional. Solicitor
General contend that petitioner has no legal standing to assail.
DECISION: The petition was DISMISSED.
RATIO DECIDENDI: IBP primarily anchors its standing on its alleged responsibility to
uphold the rule of law and the Constitution. Apart from this declaration the IBP asserts no other
basis in support of its locus standi. While undoubtedly true it is not sufficient to merit standing.
However, when the issues raised are of paramount importance to the public, the Court may brush
aside technicalities of procedure. The Court relaxed the rules on standing and resolved the issue
now.
30 | P a g e
(25) Tanada vs. Tuvera, GR L-63915, April 24, 1985 [Per J. Escolin, En Banc]
ISSUE: Whether or not Petitioners have legal standing.

FACTS: Petitioners seek a writ of mandamus to compel respondent public officials to publish,
and/or cause the publication in the Official Gazette of various presidential decrees, letters of
instructions, general orders, proclamations, executive orders, letter of implementation and
administrative orders. Respondents, through the Solicitor General, would have this case
dismissed outright on the ground that petitioners have no legal personality or standing to bring
the instant petition and that it is not required for a law to be published when the date of its
effectivity are expressly mentioned in said laws. Petitioners then contended that the publication
of said Presidential Issuances is a public right and that compelling the respondent to publish it is
a public duty that does not need any other specific interest from the petitioner to be given due
course.
RATIO DECIDENDI: Yes, the Court agrees with petitioners that although they are private
citizens, the subject of the Petition is a public right and thus they, being citizens of this country,
have the proper interest in seeing this case resolved.
31 | P a g e
(26) Ople vs. Torres, GR 127685, July 23, 1998 [Per J. Puno, En Banc]
ISSUE: Whether or not Senator Ople has standing to maintain suit.

FACTS: Administrative Order No 308, otherwise known as “Adoption of a National
Computerized Identification Reference System” was issued by President Fidel Ramos on 12
December 1996. Senator Blas Ople filed a petition to invalidate the said order for violating the
right to privacy. He contends that the order must be invalidated on two constitutional grounds,
(1) that it is a usurpation of the power to legislate; and (2) that it intrudes the citizen’s right to
privacy.
RATIO DECIDENDI: Petitioner, Senator Ople is a distinguished member of the Senate. As a
Senator, petitioner is possessed of the requisite standing to bring suit raising the issue that the
issue of Administrative Order No 308 is a usurpation of legislative power. Ople’s concern that
the Executive branch not to trespass on the lawmaking domain of Congress is understandable.
The blurring demarcation line between the power of legislature to make laws and the power of
executive to execute laws will disturb their delicate balance and cannot be allowed.
32 | P a g e
(27) Information Technology Foundation vs. ComElec, GR 159139 [Per J. Panganban, En

Banc]
ISSUE: Whether or not ITF has standing to file the case.

FACTS: RA 8046 was passed on 07 June 1995 authorizing COMELEC to conduct nationwide
computerized election system. Gloria Arroyo allocated php 2.5 billion fund for the automated
election system on 24 January 2003. The bidding process commenced on the same month and
out of the 57 bidders it was awarded to MPC and TIMC. Although DOST’s evaluation report
states that the two obtained a number of failed marks in the technical evaluation. Five individuals
and entities protested the matter to COMELEC Chairman Benjamin Abalos Sr. Abalos rejected
the protest, hence the present petition.
RATIO DECIDENDI: The case at bar is a matter of public concern and imbued with public
interest, it is of paramount public interest and transcendental importance. Taxpayers are allowed
to sue when there is a claim of “illegal disbursement of public funds” or if public money is being
“deflected to any improper use,” or when petitioner seek to restrain “wasting of public funds
through the enforcement of an unconstitutional law.”
33 | P a g e
(28) Kilosbayan vs. Guingona, GR 113375, May 5, 1994 [Per J. Davide, En Banc]
ISSUE: Whether or not Kilosbayan has standing to maintain instant suit.

FACTS: Pursuant to Section 1 of the charter of the PCSO (R.A. No. 1169, as amended by B.P.
Blg. 42) which grants it the authority to hold and conduct “charity sweepstakes races, lotteries
and other similar activities,” the PCSO decided to establish an on- line lottery system for the
purpose of increasing its revenue base and diversifying its sources of funds. Sometime before
March 1993, after learning that the PCSO was interested in operating an on-line lottery system,
the Berjaya Group Berhad became interested to offer its services and resources to PCSO. Berjaya
Group Berhad organized with some Filipino investors in March 1993 a Philippine corporation
known as the Philippine Gaming Management Corporation (PGMC), which “was intended to be
the medium through which the technical and management services required for the project would
be offered and delivered to PCSO.” KILOSBAYAN submit that the PCSO cannot validly enter
into the assailed Contract of Lease with the PGMC because it is an arrangement wherein the
PCSO would hold and conduct the on-line lottery system in “collaboration” or “association” with
the PGMC, in violation of Section 1(B) of R.A. No. 1169, as amended by B.P. Blg. 42.
respondents allege that the petitioners have no standing to maintain the instant suit, citing our
resolution in Valmonte vs. Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office.
RATIO DECIDENDI: Yes. Issue on the locus standi of the petitioners should, indeed, be
resolved in their favor. A party’s standing before this Court is a procedural technicality which it
may, in the exercise of its discretion, set aside in view of the importance of the issues raised. In
the landmark Emergency Powers Cases, 29 this Court brushed aside this technicality because
“the transcendental importance to the public of these cases demands that they be settled promptly
and definitely, brushing aside, if we must, technicalities of procedure.
34 | P a g e
(29) Ocampo, et al vs. Admiral Enriquez, GR 225973, November 08, 2016 [Per J. Peralta,
En Banc]
ISSUE: Whether petitioners have locus standi to file the instant petitions.
FACTS: During the campaign period for the 2016 Presidential Election, then candidate Rodrigo
R. Duterte publicly announced that he would allow the burial of former President Ferdinand E.
Marcos at the Libingan Ng Mga Bayani (LNMB). He won the May 9, 2016 election, garnering
16,601,997 votes. At noon of June 30, 2016, he formally assumed his office at the Rizal Hall in
the Malacañang Palace. August 7, 2016, public respondent Secretary of National Defense Delfin
N. Lorenzana issued a Memorandum to the public respondent Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces
of the Philippines (AFP), General Ricardo R. Visaya, regarding the interment of Marcos at the
LNMB
RATIO DECIDENDI: Yes. Petitioners, who filed their respective petitions for certiorari,
prohibition and mandamus, in their capacities as citizens, human rights violations victims,
legislators, members of the Bar and taxpayers, have no legal standing to file such petitions
because they failed to show that they have suffered or will suffer direct and personal injury as a
result of the interment of Marcos at the LNMB.
35 | P a g e
(30) Arigo vs. Swift, et al, GR 206510, Septeber 16, 2014 [Per J. Villarama, En Banc]
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioners have legal standing.

FACTS: The USS Guardian is an Avenger-class mine countermeasures ship of the US Navy. In
December 2012, the US Embassy in the Philippines requested diplomatic clearance for the said
vessel “to enter and exit the territorial waters of the Philippines and to arrive at the port of Subic
Bay for the purpose of routine ship replenishment, maintenance, and crew liberty.” On January 6,
2013, the ship left Sasebo, Japan for Subic Bay, arriving on January 13, 2013 after a brief stop
for fuel in Okinawa, Japan. On January 15, 2013, the USS Guardian departed Subic Bay for its
next port of call in Makassar, Indonesia. On January 17, 2013 at 2:20 a.m. while transiting the
Sulu Sea, the ship ran aground on the northwest side of South Shoal of the Tubbataha Reefs,
about 80 miles east-southeast of Palawan. No one was injured in the incident, and there have
been no reports of leaking fuel or oil. Petitioners claim that the grounding, salvaging and post-
salvaging operations of the USS Guardian cause and continue to cause environmental damage of
such magnitude as to affect the provinces of Palawan, Antique, Aklan, Guimaras, Iloilo, Negros
Occidental, Negros Oriental, Zamboanga del Norte, Basilan, Sulu, and Tawi-Tawi, which events
violate their constitutional rights to a balanced and healthful ecology.
DECISION: The petition was DENIED.
RATIO DECIDENDI: Yes. Petitioners have legal standing Locus standi is “a right of
appearance in a court of justice on a given question.” Specifically, it is “a party’s personal and
substantial interest in a case where he has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result” of the
act being challenged, and “calls for more than just a generalized grievance.” However, the rule
on standing is a procedural matter which this Court has relaxed for non-traditional plaintiffs like
ordinary citizens, taxpayers and legislators when the public interest so requires, such as when the
subject matter of the controversy is of transcendental importance, of overreaching significance to
society, or of paramount public interest.
36 | P a g e
(31) MIRASOL VS CA
ISSUE: Whether or not the Trial Court has jurisdiction to declare a statute unconstitutional
without notice to the Solicitor General where the parties have agreed to submit such issue for the
resolution of the Trial Court. Whether PD 579 and subsequent issuance
FACTS: The Mirasols are sugarland owners and planters.Philippine National Bank (PNB)
financed the Mirasols' sugar production venture FROM 1973-1975 under a crop loan financing
scheme. The Mirasols signed Credit Agreements, a Chattel Mortgage on Standing Crops, and a
Real Estate Mortgage in favor of PNB. The Chattel Mortgage empowered PNB to negotiate and
sell the latter'ssugar and to apply the proceeds to the payment of their obligations to it.President
Marcos issued PD 579 in November, 1974 authorizing Philippine Exchange Co., Inc. (PHILEX)
to purchase sugar allocated for export and authorized PNB to finance PHILEX's purchases. The
decree directed that whatever profit PHILEX might realize was to be remitted to the government.
Believing that the proceeds were more than enough to pay their obligations, petitioners asked
PNB for an accounting of the proceeds which it ignored. Petitioners continued to avail of other
loans from PNB and to make unfunded withdrawals from their accounts with said bank. PNB
asked petitioners to settle their due and demandable accounts. As a result, petitioners, conveyed
to PNB real properties by way of dacion en pago still leaving an unpaid amount. PNB proceeded
to extra judicially foreclose the mortgaged properties. PNB still had a deficiency claim.
Petitioners continued to ask PNB to account for the proceeds, insisting that said proceeds, if
properly liquidated, could offset their outstanding obligations. PNB remained adamant in its
stance that under P.D. No. 579, there was nothing to account since under said law, all earnings
from the export sales of sugar pertained to the National Government. On August 9, 1979, the
Mirasols filed a suit for accounting, specific performance, and damages against PNB.
RATIO DECIDENDI: It is settled that Regional Trial Courts have the authority and
jurisdiction to consider the constitutionality of a statute, presidential decree, or executive order.
The Constitution vests the power of judicial review or the power to declare a law, treaty,
international or executive agreement, presidential decree, order, instruction, ordinance, or
regulation not only in this Court, but in all regional trial courts The purpose of the mandatory
notice in Rule 64, Section 3 is to enable the Solicitor General to decide whether or not his
intervention in the action assailing the validity of a law or treaty is necessary. To deny the
Solicitor General such notice would be tantamount to depriving him of his day in court. We must
stress that, contrary to petitioners' stand, the mandatory notice requirement is not limited to
actions involving declaratory relief and similar remedies. The rule itself provides that such notice
is required in "any action" and not just actions involving declaratory relief. Where there is no
ambiguity in the words used in the rule, there is no room for construction. In all actions assailing
the validity of a statute, treaty, presidential decree, order, or proclamation, notice to the Solicitor
General is mandatory. Petitioners contend that P.D. No. 579 and its implementing issuances are
void for violating the due process clause and the prohibition against the taking of private
property without just compensation. Petitioners now ask this Court to exercise its power of
judicial review. Jurisprudence has laid down the following requisites for the exercise of this
power: First, there must be before the Court an actual case calling for the exercise of judicial
review. Second, the question before the Court must be ripe for adjudication. Third, the person
challenging the validity of the act must have standing to challenge. Fourth, the question of
37 | P a g e
constitutionality must have been raised at the earliest opportunity, and lastly, the issue of
constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the case
38 | P a g e
(32) SAYSON VS SINGSON
ISSUE: WON the mandamus suit of the respondent (Singson) involving a money claim against
the government, predicated on a contract is valid
FACTS: "In January 1967, the Office of the District Engineer requisitioned various items of
spare parts for the repair of a D-8 bulldozer which was signed by the District Engineer
Fernandez, and the Requisitioning Officer (civil engineer), Manuel S. Lepatan. ... It was
approved by the Secretary of Public Works and Communications, Antonio V. Raquiza. It is
noted in the approval of the said requisition that "This is an exception to the telegram dated Feb.
21, 1967 of the Secretary of Public Works and Communications." ... So, a canvass or public
bidding was conducted on May 5, 1967. The committee on award accepted the bid of the
Singkier Motor Service for the sum of P43,530.00. ... Subsequently, it was approved by the
Secretary of Public Works and Communications; and on May 16,1967 the Secretary sent a letter-
order to the Singkier Motor Service, Mandaue, Cebu requesting it to immediately deliver the
items listed therein for the lot price of P43,530.00. ...It would appear that a purchase order signed
by the District Engineer, the Requisitioning Officer and the Procurement Officer, was addressed
to the Singkier Motor Service. ... In due course the Voucher No. 07806 reached the hands of
Highway Auditor Sayson for pre-audit. He then made inquiries about the reasonableness of the
price. ... Thus, after finding from the indorsements of the Division Engineer and the
Commissioner of Public Highways that the prices of the various spare parts are just and
reasonable and that the requisition was also approved by no less than the Secretary of Public
Works and Communications with the verification of V.M. Secarroa representative of the Bureau
of Supply Coordination, Manila, he approved it for payment in the sum of P34,824.00, with the
retention of 20% equivalent to P8,706.00 to submit the voucher with the supporting papers to the
Supervising Auditor, which he did. ... The voucher was paid on June 9, 1967 in the amount of
P34,824.00 to Singson. On June 10,1967, Highway Auditor Sayson received a telegram from
Supervising Auditor Fornier quoting a telegraphic message of the General Auditing Office which
states: "In view of excessive prices charge for purchase of spare parts and equipment shown by
vouchers already submitted this Office direct all highway auditors refer General Office payment
similar nature for appropriate action." ... In the interim it would appear that when the voucher
and the supporting papers reached the GAO, a canvass was made of the spare parts among the
suppliers in Manila, particularly, the USI(Phil.), which is the exclusive dealer of the spare parts
of the caterpillar tractors in the Philippines. Said firm thus submitted its quotations at P2,529.64
only which is P40,000.00 less than the price of the Singkier. ... In view of the overpricing the
GAO took up the matter with the Secretary of Public Works in a third indorsement of July 18,
1967. ... The Secretary then circularized a telegram holding the district engineer responsible for
overpricing." What is more, charges for malversation were filed against the district engineer and
the civil engineer involved. It was the failure of the Highways Auditor, one of the petitioners
before us, that led to the filing of the mandamus suit below, with now respondent Singson as sole
proprietor of Singkier Motor Service, being adjudged as entitled to collect the balance of
P8,706.00, the contract in question having been upheld. Hence this appeal by certiorari
DECISION: No
RATIO DECIDENDI: the claim is void for the cause or consideration is contrary to law,
morals or public policy, mandamus is not the remedy to enforce the collection of such claim
39 | P a g e
against the State but an ordinary action for specific performance. the suit disguised as one for
mandamus to compel the Auditors to approve the vouchers for payment, is a suit against the
State, which cannot prosper or be entertained by the Court except with the consent of the State.
In other words, the respondent should have filed his claim with the General Auditing Office,
under the provisions of Com. Act 327 which prescribe the conditions under which money claim
against the government may be filed: "In all cases involving the settlement of accounts or claims,
other than those of accountable officers, the Auditor General shall act and decide the same within
sixty days, exclusive of Sundays and holidays, after their presentation. If said accounts or claims
need reference to other persons, office or offices, or to a party interested, the period aforesaid
shall be counted from the time the last comment necessary to a proper decision is received by
him." Thereafter, the procedure for appeal is indicated: "The party aggrieved by the final
decision of the Auditor General in the settlement of an account or claim may, within thirty days
from receipt of the decision, take an appeal in writing: (a) To the President of the United States,
pending the final and complete withdrawal of her sovereignty over the Philippines, or (b) To the
President of the Philippines, or (c) To the Supreme Court of the Philippines if the appellant is a
private person or entity. "Once consent is secured, an action may be filed. There is nothing to
prevent the State, however, in such statutory grant, to require that certain administrative
proceedings be had and be exhausted. Also, the proper forum in the judicial hierarchy can be
specified if thereafter an appeal would be taken by the party aggrieved. Here, there was no ruling
of the Auditor General. Even had there been such, the court to which the matter should have
been elevated is this Tribunal; the lower court could not legally act on the matter.
40 | P a g e
(33) REPUBLIC VS PURISIMA
ISSUE: WON the respondent’s decision is valid

FACTS: A motion to dismiss was filed on September 7, 1972 by defendant Rice and Corn
Administration in a pending civil suit in the sala of respondent Judge for the collection of a
money claim arising from an alleged breach of contract, the plaintiff being private respondent
Yellow Ball Freight Lines, Inc. At that time, the leading case of Mobil Philippines Exploration
Inc. v. Customs Arrastre Service where Justice Bengzon stressed the lack of jurisdiction of a
court to pass on the merits of a claim against any office or entity acting as part of the machinery
of the national government unless consent be shown, had been applied in 53 other decisions.
Respondent Judge Amante P. Purisima of the Court of First Instance of Manila denied the
motion to dismiss dated October 4, 1972. Hence, the petition for certiorari and prohibition.
DECISION: No
RATIO DECIDENDI: The position of the Republic has been fortified with the explicit
affirmation found in this provision of the present Constitution: "The State may not be sued
without its consent. "The doctrine of non-suability recognized in this jurisdiction even prior to
the effectivity of the [1935] Constitution is a logical corollary of the positivist concept of law
which, to para-phrase Holmes, negates the assertion of any legal right as against the state, in
itself the source of the law on which such a right may be predicated. Nor is this all, even if such a
principle does give rise to problems, considering the vastly expanded role of government
enabling it to engage in business pursuits to promote the general welfare, it is not obeisance to
the analytical school of thought alone that calls for its continued applicability. Nor is injustice
thereby cause private parties. They could still proceed to seek collection of their money claims
by pursuing the statutory remedy of having the Auditor General pass upon them subject to appeal
to judicial tribunals for final adjudication. We could thus correctly conclude as we did in the
cited Providence Washington Insurance
DECISION: "Thus the doctrine of non-suability of the government without its consent, as it has
operated in practice, hardly lends itself to the charge that it could be the fruitful parent of
injustice, considering the vast and ever-widening scope of state activities at present being
undertaken. Whatever difficulties for private claimants may still exist,is, from an objective
appraisal of all factors, minimal. In the balancing of interests, so unavoidable in the
determination of what principles must prevail if government is to satisfy the public weal, the
verdict must be, as it has been these so many years, for its continuing recognition as a
fundamental postulate of constitutional law." [ Switzerland General Insurance Co., Ltd. v.
Republic of the Philippines] ***The consent, to be effective, must come from the State acting
through a duly enacted statute as pointed out byJustice Bengzon in Mobil. Thus, whatever
counsel for defendant Rice and Corn Administration agreed to had no binding force on the
government
41 | P a g e
(34) UP VS DIZON
ISSUE: Was UP's funds validly garnished?

FACTS: University of the Philippines (UP) entered into a General Construction Agreement
with respondent Stern Builders Corporation (Stern Builders) for the construction and renovation
of the buildings in the campus of the UP in Los Bas. UP was able to pay its first and second
billing. However, the third billing worth P273,729.47 was not paid due to its disallowance by the
Commission on Audit (COA). Thus, Stern Builders sued the UP to collect the unpaid balance.
On November 28, 2001, the RTC rendered its decision ordering UP to pay Stern Builders. Then
on January 16, 2002, the UP filed its motion for reconsideration. The RTC denied the motion.
The denial of the said motion was served upon Atty. Felimon Nolasco (Atty.Nolasco) of the
UPLB Legal Office on May 17, 2002. Notably, Atty. Nolasco was not the counsel of record of
the UP but the OLS in Diliman, Quezon City. Thereafter, the UP filed a notice of appeal on June
3, 2002. However, the RTC denied due course to the notice of appeal for having been filed out of
time. On October 4, 2002, upon motion of Stern Builders, the RTC issued the writ of execution.
On appeal, both the CA and the High Court denied UPs petition. The denial became final and
executory. Hence, Stern Builders filed in the RTC its motion for execution despite their previous
motion having already been granted and despite the writ of execution having already issued. On
June 11, 2003, the RTC granted another motion for execution filed on May 9, 2003 (although the
RTC had already issued the writ of execution on October 4, 2002). Consequently, the sheriff
served notices of garnishment to the UPs depositary banks and the RTC ordered the release of
the funds. Aggrieved, UP elevated the matter to the CA. The CA sustained the RTC. Hence, this
petition.
DECISION: Granted
RATIO DECIDENDI: UP's funds, being government funds, are not subject to garnishment.
(Garnishment of public funds; suability vs. liability of the State) Despite its establishment as a
body corporate, the UP remains to be a "chartered institution" performing a legitimate
government function. Irrefragably, the UP is a government instrumentality, performing the States
constitutional mandate of promoting quality and accessible education. As a government
instrumentality, the UP administers special funds sourced from the fees and income enumerated
under Act No. 1870 and Section 1 of Executive Order No. 714, and from the yearly
appropriations, to achieve the purposes laid down by Section 2 of Act 1870, as expanded in
Republic Act No. 9500. All the funds going into the possession of the UP, including any interest
accruing from the deposit of such funds in any banking institution, constitute a "special trust
fund," the disbursement of which should always be aligned with the UPs mission and purpose,
and should always be subject to auditing by the COA. The funds of the UP are government funds
that are public in character. They include the income accruing from the use of real property
ceded to the UP that may be spent only for the attainment of its institutional objectives. A
marked distinction exists between suability of the State and its liability. As the Court succinctly
stated in Municipality of San Fernando, La Union v. Firme: A distinction should first be made
between suability and liability. "Suability depends on the consent of the state to be sued, liability
on the applicable law and the established facts. The circumstance that a state is suable does not
necessarily mean that it is liable; on the other hand, it can never be held liable if it does not first
consent to be sued. Liability is not conceded by the mere fact that the state has allowed itself to
42 | P a g e
be sued. When the state does waive its sovereign immunity, it is only giving the plaintiff the
chance to prove, if it can, that the defendant is liable. The Constitution strictly mandated that "no
money shall be paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation made by law."
The execution of the monetary judgment against the UP was within the primary jurisdiction of
the COA. It was of no moment that a final and executory decision already validated the claim
against the UP.
43 | P a g e
(35) RAYO VS CFI
ISSUE: Whether respondent National Power Corporation performs a governmental function

with respect to the management and operation of the Angat Dam; and Whether the power of
respondent National Power Corporation to sue and be sued under its organic charter inclu
FACTS: On October 26, 1978, typhoon “Kading” struck Bulacan. Due to this, the National
Power Corporation (NPC), through its plant superintendent Benjamin Chavez, simultaneously
opened 3 floodgates of Angat Dam.The opening of the floodgates caused several towns to be
inundated (the town of Norzagaray was the most affected one). It resulted to a hundred deaths
and damage to properties that were worth over a million pesos. Petitioners (victims) filed a
complaint for damages against NPC, including plant superintendent Benjamin Chavez.
Respondent filed counterclaims and put up a special and affirmative defense that “in the
operation of the Angat Dam,” it is “performing a purely governmental function”, hence it
“cannot be sued without the express consent of the State.”Petitioners oppose the defense,
contending that the NPC is not performing governmental but merely proprietary functions and
that under its own organic act, Section 3 (d) of Republic Act No. 6395, it can sue and be sued in
any court. CFI dropped the NPC from the complaint and left Chavez as the sole party-defendant.
DECISION: Upon a motion for reconsideration, the CFI ruled that petitioners’ reliance on Sec.
3 of RA 6395 is not tenable since the same refer to such matters that are only within the scope of
the other corporate powers of said defendant and not matters of tort as in the instant cases. Being
an agency performing a purely governmental function in the operation of the Angat Dam, said
defendant was not given any right to commit wrongs upon individuals. To sue said defendant for
tort may require the express consent of the State. PETITION DISMISSED.
RATIO DECIDENDI: SC reversed the CFI decision and GRANTED petitioners to reinstate
their complaint against the NPC.It is sufficient to say that the government has organized a private
corporation, put money in it and has allowed it to sue and be sued in any court under its charter.
(R.A. No. 6395). As a government owned and controlled corporation, it has a personality of its
own, distinct and separate from that of the Government. Moreover, the charter provision that the
NPC can “sue and be sued in any court” is without qualification on the cause of action and
accordingly it can include a tort claim such as the one instituted by the petitioners.
44 | P a g e
(36) FAROLAN VS CTA
ISSUE: Whether or not the Collector of Customs may be held liable for the 43,050
yardsactually lost by the private respondent.
FACTS: S/S Pacific Hawk vessel with Registry No. 170 arrived on January 30, 1972 at the Port
of Manila carrying among others, 80 bales of screen net consigned to Bagong Buhay Trading
(Bagong Buhay). The import was classified under Tariff Heading no. 39.06-B of theTariff and
Customs Code at 35% ad valorem. Bagong Buhay paid the duties and taxes due in the amount of
P11,350.00. The Office of the Collector of Customs ordered a re-examination of the shipment
upon hearing the information that the shipment consisted of mosquito net made of nylon under
Tariff Heading No. 62.02 of the Tariff and Customs Code. Upon re-examination, it turns out that
the shipment was undervalued in quantity and value as previously declared. Thus the Collector
of Customs forfeited the shipment in favor of the government. Private respondent filed a petition
on August 20, 1976 for the release of the questioned goods which the Court denied. On June
2,1986, 64 bales out of the 80 bales were released to Bagong Buhay after several motion. The
sixteen remaining bales were missing. The respondent claims that of the 143,454 yards released,
only 116,950 yards were in good condition and the rest were in bad condition. Thus, respondents
demand that the Bureau of Customs be ordered to pay for damages for the 43,050 yards it
actually lost.
DECISION:
RATIO DECIDENDI: Bureau of Customs cannot be held liable for actual damages that the
private respondent sustained with regard to its goods. Otherwise, to permit private respondent's
claim to prosper would violate the doctrine of sovereign immunity. Since it demands that the
Commissioner of Customs be ordered to pay for actual damages it sustained, for which
ultimately liability will fall on the government, it is obvious that this case has been converted
technically into a suit against the state. On this point, the political doctrine that “state may not be
sued without its consent,” categorically applies. As an unincorporated government agency
without any separate judicial personality of its own, the Bureau of Customs enjoys immunity
from suit. Along with the Bureau of Internal Revenue, it is invested with an inherent power of
sovereignty, namely taxation. As an agency, the Bureau of Customs performs the governmental
function of collecting revenues which is defined not a proprietary function. Thus private
respondents claim for damages against the Commissioner of Customs must fails.
45 | P a g e
(37) REPUBLIC VS SANDIGANBAYAN
ISSUE: WON the Republic can invoke state immunity.

FACTS: The PCGG issued writs placing under sequestration all business enterprises, entities
and other properties, real and personal, owned or registered in the name of private respondent
Benedicto, or of corporations in which he appeared to have controlling or majority interest due to
his involvement incases of ill-gotten wealth. Among the properties thus sequestered and taken
over by PCGG fiscal agents were the 227 shares in NOGCCI owned by and registered under the
name of private respondent. As sequester of the 227 shares formerly owned by Benedicto, PCGG
did not pay the monthly membership fee. Later on, the shares were declared to be delinquent to
be put into an auction sale. Despite filing a writ of injunction, it was nevertheless dismissed. So
petitioner Republic and private respondent Benedicto entered into a Compromise Agreement
which contains a general release clause where petitioner agreed and bound itself to lift the
sequestration on the227 NOGCCI shares acknowledging that it was within private respondent’s
capacity to acquire the same shares out of his income from business and the exercise of his
profession. Implied in this undertaking is the recognition by petitioner that the subject shares of
stock could not have been ill-gotten Benedicto filed a Motion for Release from Sequestration and
Return of Sequestered Shares/Dividends praying, inter alia, that his NOGCCI shares of stock be
specifically released from sequestration and returned, delivered or paid to him as part of the
parties’ Compromise Agreement in that case. It was granted but the shares were ordered to be
put under the custody of the Clerk of Court. Along with this, PCGG was ordered to deliver the
shares to the Clerk of Court which it failed to comply with without any justifiable grounds. In a
last-ditch attempt to escape liability, petitioner Republic, through the PCGG, invokes state
immunity from suit.
DECISION: No
RATIO DECIDENDI: In fact, by entering into a Compromise Agreement with private
respondent Benedicto, petitioner Republic thereby stripped itself of its immunity from suit and
placed itself in the same level of its adversary. When the State enters into contract, through its
officers or agents, in furtherance of a legitimate aim and purpose and pursuant to constitutional
legislative authority, whereby mutual or reciprocal benefits accrue and rights and obligations
arise therefrom, the State may be sued even without its express consent, precisely because by
entering into a contract the sovereign descends to the level of the citizen. Its consent to be sued is
implied from the very act of entering into such contract, breach of which on its part gives the
corresponding right to the other party to the agreement.
46 | P a g e
(38) SANTIAGO VS REPUBLIC
ISSUE: Whether or not the state can be sued without its consent.
FACTS: On August 9, 1976, Ildefonso Santiago through his counsel filed an action for
revocation of a Deed of Donation executed by him and his spouse in January of 1971, with the
Bureau of Plant Industry as the Donee, in the Court of First Instance of Zamboanga City. Mr.
Santiago alleged that the Bureau, contrary to the terms of donation, failed to install lighting
facilities and water system on the property and to build an office building and parking lot thereon
which should have been constructed and ready for occupancy on before December7, 1974. That
because of the circumstances, Mr. Santiago concluded that he was exempt from compliance with
an explicit constitutional command, as invoked in the Santos v Santos case, a 1952 decision
which is similar. The Court of First Instance dismissed the action in favor of the respondent on
the ground that the state cannot be sued without its consent, and Santos v Santos case is
discernible. The Solicitor General, Estelito P. Mendoza affirmed the dismissal on ground of
constitutional mandate. Ildefonso Santiago filed a petition for certiorari to the Supreme Court.
DECISION:
RATIO DECIDENDI: The Supreme Court rules, that the constitutional provision shows a
waiver. Where there is consent, a suit may be filed. Consent need not to be express. It can be
implied. In this case it must be emphasized, goes no further than a rule that a donor, with the
Republic or any of its agency being a Donee, is entitle to go to court in case of an alleged breach
of the conditions of such donation. The writ of Certiorari prayed is granted and the order of
dismissal of October 20, 1977 is nullified, set aside and declare to be without force and effect.
The Court of First Instance of Zamboanga City, Branch II, is hereby directed to proceed with this
case, observing the procedure set forth in the rules of court. No cost.
47 | P a g e
(39) DOTC VS SPS. ABECINA
ISSUE: Whether or not DOTC may properly invoke state immunity

FACTS: In February 1993, the DOTC awarded Digitel Telecommunications Philippines, Inc.
(Digitel) a contract for the management, operation, maintenance, and development of a Regional
Telecommunications Development Project (RTDP) under the National Telephone Program,
Phase I, Tranche 1 (NTPI-1). Later on, the municipality of Jose Panganiban, Camarines Norte,
donated a one thousand two hundred (1,200)square-meter parcel of land to the DOTC for the
implementation of the RDTP in the municipality. However, the municipality erroneously
included portions of the respondents' property in the donation. Pursuant to the FLAs, Digitel
constructed a telephone exchange on the property which encroached on the properties of the
respondent spouses. It argues that while the DOTC, in good faith and in the performance of its
mandate, took private property without formal expropriation proceedings, the taking was
nevertheless an exercise of eminent domain. The Department prays that instead of allowing
recovery of the property, the case should be remanded to the RTC for determination of just
compensation.
DECISION: NOT A VALID EXERCISE OF EMINENTDOMAIN BECAUSE NO
EXPROPRIATIONPROCEEDINGS WERE HELD.
RATIO DECIDENDI: It is unthinkable then that precisely because there was a failure to abide
by what the law requires, the government would stand to benefit. It is just as important, if not
more so, that there be fidelity to legal norms on the part of officialdom if the rule of law were to
be maintained. It is not too much to say that when the government takes any property for public
use, which is conditioned upon the payment of just compensation, tobe judicially ascertained, it
makes manifest that it submits to the jurisdiction of a court. There is no thought then that the
doctrine of immunity from suit could still be appropriately invoked.
48 | P a g e
(40) AMIGABLE VS CUENCA
ISSUE: W/N the appellant may properly sue the government.

FACTS: Victoria Amigable is the is the registered owner of a lot which, without prior
expropriation proceedings or negotiated sale, was used by the government. Amigable's counsel
wrote the President of the Philippines requesting payment of the portion of her lot which had
been expropriated by the government. Amigable later filed a case against Cuenca, the
Commissioner of Public Highways, for recovery of ownership and possession of the said lot. She
also sought payment for compensatory damages, moral damages and attorney's fees. The
defendant said that the case was premature, barred by prescription, and the government did not
give its consent to be sued.
DECISION: Where the government takes away property from a private landowner for public
use without going through the legal process of expropriation or negotiated sale, the aggrieved
party may properly maintain a suit against the government without violating the doctrine of
governmental immunity from suit. The doctrine of immunity from suit cannot serve as an
instrument for perpetrating an injustice to a citizen. The only relief available is for the
government to make due compensation which it could and should have done years ago. To
determine just compensation of the land, the basis should be the price or value at the time of the
taking.
RATIO DECIDENDI:
49 | P a g e
(41) EPG CONSTRUCTION VS VIGILAR
ISSUE: Whether or not the Principle of State Immunity is applicable in the case at bar.
FACTS: (1983) The herein petitioners-contractors, under contracts with DPWH,constructed
145 housing units but coverage of construction and funding under the saidcontracts was only for
2/3 of each housing unit. Through the verbal request andassurance of then DPWH
Undersecretary Canlas, they undertook additional constructionsfor the completion of the project,
but said additional constructions were not issued payment by DPWH.With a favorable
recommendation from the DPWH Asst. Secretary for LegalAffairs, the petitioners sent a demend
letter to the DPWH Secretary. The DPWH Auditor did not object to the payment subject to
whatever action COA may adopt.(1992) Through the request of then DPWH Secretary De Jesus,
the DBM releasedthe amount for payment but (1996) respondent DPWH Secreatry Vigilar
denied themoney claims prompting petitioners to file a petition for mandamus before the
RTCwhich said trial court denied. Hence, this petition.Among others, respondent-secretary
argues that the state may not be suedinvoking the constitutional doctrine of Non-suability of the
State also known as the RoyalPrerogative of Dishonesty
DECISION: Petition Granted
RATIO DECIDENDI: The respondent may not conveniently hide under the State's cloak of
invincibility against suit, considering that this principle yields to certain settled exceptions. The
State's immunity cannot serve as an instrument perpetrating injustice
50 | P a g e
(42) TORIO v. FONTANILLA
ISSUE: Whether or not the Municipality of Malasiqui may be held liable.

FACTS: On October 21, 1978, the municipal council of Malasiqui, Pangasinan passed 2
resolutions: one for management of the town fiesta celebration and the other for the creation of
the Malasiqui Town Fiesta Executive Committee. The Executive Committee, in turn, organized a
sub-committee on entertainment and stage with Jose Macaraeg as Chairman. The council
appropriated the amount of P100.00 for the construction of 2 stages, one for the "zarzuela" and
another for the cancionan. While the zarzuela was being held, the stage collapsed. Vicente
Fontanilla was pinned underneath and died in the afternoon of the following day. Fontanilla’s
heirs filed a complaint for damages with the CFI of Manila. The defendants were the
municipality, the municipal council and the municipal council members. In its Answer,
defendant municipality argued that as a legally and duly organized public corporation it performs
sovereign functions and the holding of a town fiesta was an exercise of its governmental
functions from which no liability can arise to answer for the negligence of any of its agents.
DECISION: Yes. The Municipality of Malasiqui was held liable.
RATIO DECIDENDI: Under the doctrine of respondent superior, petitioner-municipality is
liable for damages for the death of Vicente Fontanilla because the accident was attributable to
the negligence of the municipality's officers, employees, or agents.
51 | P a g e
(43) ARIGO v. SWIFT G.R. No. 206510
ISSUE: Whether or not immunity from suits can be invoked within territorial waters.
FACTS: The USS Guardian is an Avenger-class mine countermeasures ship of the US Navy. In
December 2012, the US Embassy in the Philippines requested diplomatic clearance for the said
vessel “to enter and exit the territorial waters of the Philippines and to arrive at the port of Subic
Bay for the purpose of routine ship replenishment, maintenance, and crew liberty.” On January 6,
2013, the ship left Sasebo, Japan for Subic Bay, arriving on January 13, 2013 after a brief stop
for fuel in Okinawa, Japan. On January 15, 2013, the USS Guardian departed Subic Bay for its
next port of call in Makassar, Indonesia. On January 17, 2013 at 2:20 a.m. while transiting the
Sulu Sea, the ship ran aground on the northwest side of South Shoal of the Tubbataha Reefs,
about 80 miles eastsoutheast of Palawan. No cine was injured in the incident, and there have
been no reports of leaking fuel or oil.
DECISION: Yes. Immunity from suits can be invoked within territorial waters, except from the
exceptions set by UNCLOS.
RATIO DECIDENDI: Warships enjoy sovereign immunity from suit as extensions of their
flag State, Art. 31 of the UNCLOS creates an exception to this rule in cases where they fail to
comply with the rules and regulations of the coastal State regarding passage through the latter’s
internal waters and the territorial sea.
52 | P a g e
(44) Holy See vs. Rosario G.R. 101949 (1994)
ISSUE: Whether the Holy See is immune from suit insofar as its business relations regarding
selling a lot to a private entity.
FACTS: Petition arose from a controversy over a parcel of land. Lot 5-A, registered under the
name Holy See, was contiguous to Lot 5-B and 5-D under the name of Philippine Realty
Corporation (PRC). The land was donated by the Archdiocese of Manila to the Papal Nuncio,
which represents the Holy See, who exercises sovereignty over the Vatican City, Rome, Italy, for
his residence. Said lots were sold through an agent to Ramon Licup who assigned his rights to
respondents Starbright Sales Enterprises, Inc. When the squatters refuse to vacate the lots, a
dispute arose between the two parties because both were unsure whose responsibility was it to
evict the squatters from said lots. Respondent Starbright Sales Enterprises Inc. insists that Holy
See should clear the property while Holy See says that respondent corporation should do it or the
earnest money will be returned. With this, Msgr. Cirilios, the agent, subsequently returned the
P100,000 earnest money. The same lots were then sold to Tropicana Properties and Development
Corporation. Starbright Sales Enterprises, Inc. filed a suit for annulment of the sale, specific
performance and damages against Msgr. Cirilios, PRC as well as Tropicana Properties and
Development Corporation. The Holy See and Msgr. Cirilos moved to dismiss the petition for
lack of jurisdiction based on sovereign immunity from suit
DECISION: Petiton granted.
RATIO DECIDENDI: The Holy See is immune from suit because the act of selling the lot of
concern is non-propriety in nature. The lot was acquired through a donation from the
Archdiocese of Manila, not for a commercial purpose, but for the use of petitioner to construct
the official place of residence of the Papal Nuncio thereof. The transfer of the property and its
subsequent disposal are likewise clothed with a governmental (non-proprietal) character as
petitioner sold the lot not for profit or gain rather because it merely cannot evict the squatters
living in said property.
53 | P a g e
(45) USA vs Ruiz G.R. No. L-35645
ISSUE: Whether the United States Naval Base in bidding for said contracts exercise
governmental functions to be able to invoke state immunity.
FACTS: The United States of America had a naval base in Subic, Zambales. The base was one
of those provided in the Military Bases Agreement between the Philippines and the United
States. Sometime in May, 1972, the United States invited the submission of bids for a couple of
repair projects. Eligio de Guzman land Co., Inc. responded to the invitation and submitted bids.
Subsequent thereto, the company received from the US two telegrams requesting it to confirm its
price proposals and for the name of its bonding company. The company construed this as an
acceptance of its offer so they complied with the requests. The company received a letter which
was signed by William I. Collins of Department of the Navy of the United States, also one of the
petitioners herein informing that the company did not qualify to receive an award for the projects
because of its previous unsatisfactory performance rating in repairs, and that the projects were
awarded to third parties. For this reason, a suit for specific performance was filed by him against
the US.
DECISION: Yes. The Supreme Court held that the contract relates to the exercise of its
sovereign functions
RATIO DECIDENDI: The Supreme Court held that the contract relates to the exercise of its
sovereign functions. In this case the projects are an integral part of the naval base which is
devoted to the defense of both the United States and the Philippines, indisputably a function of
the government of the highest order, they are not utilized for nor dedicated to commercial or
business purposes.
54 | P a g e
(46) MINUCHER VS. COURT OF APPEALS
ISSUE: Whether the Doctrine of State Immunity from suit is applicable herein.
FACTS: Violation of the “Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972,” was filed against Minucher
following a “buy-bust operation” conducted by Philippine police narcotic agents accompanied by
Scalzo in the house of Minucher, an Iranian national, where heroin was said to have been seized.
Minucher was later acquitted by the court. Minucher later on filed for damages due to trumped-
up charges of drug trafficking made by Arthur Scalzo. Scalzo on his counterclaims that he had
acted in the discharge of his official duties as being merely an agent of the Drug Enforcement
Administration of the United States Department of Justice. Scalzo subsequently filed a motion to
dismiss the complaint on the ground that, being a special agent of the United States Drug
Enforcement Administration, he was entitled to diplomatic immunity.
DECISION: Case was dismissed.
RATIO DECIDENDI: A foreign agent, operating within a territory, can be cloaked with
immunity from suit as long as it can be established that he is acting within the directives of the
sending state.
55 | P a g e
(47) REPUBLIC OF INDONESIA VS VINZON
ISSUE: Whether or not the Republic of Indonesia can invoke the doctrine of sovereign
immunity from suit.
FACTS: Petitioner, Republic of Indonesia, represented by its Counsellor, Siti Partinah, entered
into a Maintenance Agreement with respondent James Vinzon, sole proprietor of Vinzon Trade
and Services. The equipment covered by the Maintenance Agreement are air conditioning units
and was to take effect in a period of four years. When Indonesian Minister Counsellor Kasim
assumed the position of Chief of Administration, he allegedly found respondent’s work and
services unsatisfactory and not in compliance with the standards set in the Maintenance
Agreement. Hence, the Indonesian Embassy terminated the agreement. The respondent claims
that the aforesaid termination was arbitrary and unlawful. Hence, he filed a complaint against the
petitioners which opposed by invoking immunity from suit.
DECISION: Yes. The Republic of Indonesia can invoke the doctrine of sovereign immunity
from suit.
RATIO DECIDENDI: The Republic of Indonesia is acting in pursuit of a sovereign activity
when it entered into a contract with the respondent. The maintenance agreement was entered into
by the Republic of Indonesia in the discharge of its governmental functions.
56 | P a g e
(48) DFA v. NLRC G.R. No. 113191
ISSUE: Whether the ADB is correct in invoking its immunity from suit.
FACTS: On January 27, 1993, private respondent initiated NLRC-NCR Case for his alleged
illegal dismissal by Asian Development Bank and the latter's violation of the "labor-only"
contracting law. Two summonses were served, one to the ADB and the other through the DFA.
Forthwith, the ADB and the DFA notified respondent Labor Arbiter that the ADB, as well as its
President and Office, were covered by an immunity from legal processes except for borrowing,
guaranties or the sale of securities pursuant to the Agreement Establishing the Asian
Development Bank (the "Charter") and the Agreement Between the Bank and the Government of
the Philippines regarding the Banker's Headquarters (the "Headquarters Agreement). The Labor
Arbiter took cognizance of the complaint on the impression that the ADB had waived its
diplomatic immunity from suit. The ADB did not appeal the decision. Instead, the DFA referred
the matter to the NLRC; in its referral, the DFA sought a "formal vacation of the void
jugdgment".
DECISION: Yes. The stipulations of both the Charter and the Headquarter's Agreement
establish that, except in the specified cases of borrowing and guarantee operations, as well as the
purchase, sale and underwriting of securities, the ADB enjoys immunity from legal process of
every form
RATIO DECIDENDI: The Bank's officers, on their part, enjoy immunity in respect of all acts
performed by them in their official capacity. The granting of these immunities and privileges are
treaty covenants ans commitments voluntarily assumed by the Philippine Government. Being an
international organization that has been extended diplomatic status, the ADB is independent of
the municipal law.
57 | P a g e
(49) ATCI v. Echin 632 SCRA 528 (2010)
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioners be held liable considering that the contract specifically
stipulates that respondent‘s employment shall be governed by the Civil Service Law and
Regulations of Kuwait.
FACTS: Respondent Echin was hired by petitioner ATCI in behalf of its principal co-petitioner,
Ministry of PublicHealth of Kuwait, for the position of medical technologist under a two-year
contract with a monthlysalary of US$1,200.00. Within a year, Respondent was terminated for not
passing the probationaryperiod which was under the Memorandum of Agreement. Ministry
denied respondent‘s request and she returned to the Philippines shouldering her own fair.
Respondent filed with the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) a complaint against
ATCI forillegal dismissal. Labor Arbiter rendered judgment in favor of respondent and ordered
ATCI to pay her$3,600.00, her salary for the three months unexpired portion of the contract.
ATCI appealed Labor Arbiter‘s decision, however, NLRC affirmed the latter‘s decision and
denied petitioner ATCI‘s motion for reconsideration. Petitioner appealed to the Court Appeals
contending thattheir principal being a foreign government agency is immune from suit, and as
such, immunity extendedto them.
DECISION: Petition denied.
RATIO DECIDENDI: According to RA 8042: The obligations covenanted in the
recruitmentagreement entered into by and between the local agent and its foreign principal are
not coterminouswith the term of such agreement so that if either or both of the parties decide to
end the agreement,the responsibilities of such parties towards the contracted employees under
the agreement do not at allend, but the same extends up to and until the expiration of the
employment contracts of the employeesrecruited and employed pursuant to the said recruitment
agreement. In international law, the party whowants to have a foreign law applied to a dispute or
case has the burden of proving the foreign law.Where a foreign law is not pleaded or, even if
pleaded, is not proved, the presumption is that foreignlaw is the same as ours. Thus, we apply
Philippine labor laws in determining the issues presented before us.
58 | P a g e
(50) Animos vs. PVAO G.R. No. 79156
ISSUE: Whether or not the complaint against PVAO can be considered a suit against the state.
FACTS: Isidro Animos is a World War II veteran, having been a member of the USAFFE and
the guerilla forces thereafter. Originally, the case was a suit for mandamus by the petitioners
against PVAO, for the payment of full pension benefits, retroactive to 1947, under Republic Act
No. 65, as amended. However, the petitioner’s claim was denied on the basis that Animos’
disability was only considered partial, rather than total, according to the “Rules on Disability
Ratings”, thus precluding the maximum payment of his pension benefits. The petitioner submits
that the rating system adopted by PVAO is null and void.
DECISION: No. The doctrine of immunity from the suit will not apply and may not be invoked
where the public official is being sued in his private and personal capacity as an ordinary citizen.
RATIO DECIDENDI: When officers and agents of the government are sued in their individual
capacity, the cloak of protection from the government is removed. According to the doctrine in
Ruiz vs. Cabahug: “We hold that under the facts and circumstances alleged in the amended
complaint, which should be taken on its face value, the suit is not one against the Government, or
a claim against it, but one against the officials to compel them to act in accordance with the
rights to be established by the contending architects, or to prevent them from making payment
and recognition until the contending architects have established their respective rights and
interests in the funds retained and in the credit for the work done”. Hence, the complaint cannot
be considered a suit against the state because it is a well-settled principle of law that we may
consider a public official liable in his personal private capacity for the damage caused by his acts
when done with malice and in bad faith, or beyond the scope of his authority and jurisdiction.
59 | P a g e
(51) USA v. Reyes, GR No. 79233 (1993)
ISSUE: Whether or not Bradford enjoys state immunity

FACTS: Nelia T. Montoya, an American citizen employed as an identification checker at the
U.S. Navy Exchange (NEX) at the Joint United States Military Assistance Group (JUSMAG)
headquarters in Quezon City, filed a complaint against Maxine Bradford, also an American
citizen working as a manager at JUSMAG Headquarter’s activity exchange, for damages due to
the oppressive and discriminatory acts committed by the latter in excess of her authority as store
manager of the NEX JUSMAG. This was due to the incident on January 22, 1987 when Bradford
searched Montoya’s body and belongings while the latter was already in the parking area after
buying some items NEX JUSMAG’s retail store, where she had purchasing privileges. Bradford
then invoked his non-suability on the ground of state immunity.
DECISION: No, Bradford does not enjoy state immunity.
RATIO DECIDENDI: The rule that a state may not be sued without its consent is expressly
declared in the Constitution. It also applies to complaints filed against officials of the state for
acts allegedly performed by them in the discharge of its duties. However, it is a different matter
where the public official is made to account in his capacity as such for acts contrary to law and
injurious to the rights of plaintiff. In other words, the doctrine of immunity from suit will not
apply and may not be invoked where the public official is being sued in his private and personal
capacity as an ordinary citizen. Here, Bradford acted beyond his authority when he searched
Montoya in the parking lot, that is, outside of NEX JUSMAG. Hence, he may be sued in his
private and personal capacity.
60 | P a g e
(52) Shauf v. CA, 191 SCRA 713 (1990)
ISSUE: Whether or not private respondents are immune from suit being officers of the US
ArmedForces
FACTS: Loida Shauf, a Filipino by origin, filed for damages and equal employment
opportunity complaint against Don Detwiler and Anthony Persi, both officers of the Base
Education Office at Clark Air Base. The former was allegedly rejected for a position of Guidance
Counselor in the said institution because of her sex, color, and origin. The respondents defended
that they are immune from suit for acts done made by them inperformance of their official
governmental functions.
DECISION: No, the respondents cannot rely on the US blanket of diplomatic immunity for all
its acts orthe acts of its agents in the Philippines.
RATIO DECIDENDI: The rule that a state may not be sued without its consent is expressly
declared in the Constitution. It also applies to complaints filed against officials of the state for
acts allegedly performed by them in the discharge of its duties. However, it is a different matter
where the public official is made to account in his capacity as such for acts contrary to law and
injurious to the rights of plaintiff. In other words, the doctrine of immunity from suit will not
apply and may not be invoked where the public official is being sued in his private and personal
capacity as an ordinary citizen. Here, the respondents were found guilty of discriminating against
Shauf on account of her sex, origin and color. Hence, the respondents may be sued in their
private and personal capacity.
61 | P a g e
(53) Nessia v. Fermin, 220 SCRA 615 (1993)
ISSUE: Whether or not Fermin was acting within the scope of his authority.
FACTS: Nessia was the Deputy Municipal Assesor of Victorias, Negros Occidental. He filed a
complaint for recovery of damages and reimbursement of expenses against respondent Fermin
and Municipality of Victorias. He alleged that respondent deliberately ignored and caused non-
payment of the vouchers because he defied the latter’s request to register and vote in the local
elections. On the other hand, Fermin countered that Nessia’s claims could not be approved
because they exceeded budgetary appropriations. The Municipality, for its part, added that
Nessia was also at fault since he did not give justification for drawing funds in excess of the
budget.
DECISION: No, he acted maliciously and intended to prejudice Nessia
RATIO DECIDENDI: The Court held that while it is true that Fermin may not be compelled
by mandamus to approve vouchers because they exceeded the budgetary appropriations, he may,
nevertheless, be held liable for damages under Art. 27 for malicious inaction because he did not
act on the vouchers. It is apparent that public officials are called upon to act expeditiously on
matters pending before them. For only in acting thereon either by signifying approval or
disapproval may the plaintiff continue on to the next step of the bureaucratic process. On the
other hand, official inaction brings to a standstill the administrative process and the plaintiff is
left in the darkness of uncertainty. In this regard, official "inaction" cannot be equated with
"disapproval."
62 | P a g e
(54) Caloocan City v. Allarde, GR No. 107721 (2003)
ISSUE: Is Judge Allarde correct in ordering the garnishment of City funds to satisfy the
judgment in favor of Santiago?
FACTS: The City Mayor, through an ordinance, abolished the position of Assistant City
Administrator and 17 other positions from the plantilla of the local government of Caloocan.
Later, all dismissed employees were paid their back wages except respondent Santiago who was
only partially paid. When the City Council of Caloocan enacted appropriation Ordinance No.
0134, Series of 1992 which included the amount of P439,377.14 claimed by Santiago, Judge
Allarde issued an order for the City of Caloocan to deliver to the RTC a manager’s check for the
satisfaction of the judgment. When the City Mayor refused to sign the check intended for
Santiago’s payment, Judge Allarde ordered the Sheriff to garnish the funds of the City of
Caloocan. The order was questioned by the City contending their public funds are beyond the
reach of garnishment.
DECISION: Yes, Judge Allarde's action were proper.
RATIO DECIDENDI: The rule is and has always been that all government funds may not be
subject to garnishment or levy, in the absence of a corresponding appropriation as required by
law. However, the rule admits a qualification, that is, when there is a corresponding
appropriation as required by law. In other words, the rule on the immunity of public funds from
seizure or garnishment does not apply where the funds sought to be levied under execution are
already allocated by law specifically for the satisfaction of the money judgment against the
government. In such a case, the monetary judgment may be legally enforced by judicial
processes. Here, the amount was allocated for the back-pay obligation. Hence, The judgment of
the trial court could then be validly enforced against such funds.
63 | P a g e
(55) Pable Ocampo v. HRET, GR No. 158466 (2004)
ISSUE: Whether or not the candidate who has the second highest vote should be declared as
winner considering that the duly-elected representative is not eligible for the office.
FACTS: Mario B. Crespo aka Mark Jimenez, a duly-elected congressman of the 6th district of
Manila, was declared ineligible for the position in which he was elected for lack of residency in
the district and was ordered to vacate his office. Ocampo then averred that since Crespo was
declared as such, he should be declared the winner, having garnered the second highest number
of votes.
DECISION: No, it is not the proper procedure.
RATIO DECIDENDI: The fact that the candidate who had the highest number of votes is later
declared to be disqualified or ineligible for office does not give rise to the right of the candidate
who garnered the second highest vote to be declared winner. To do otherwise would be anathema
to the most basic precepts of republicanism and democracy. Therefore, the only recourse to
ascertain the new choice of the electorate is to hold another election.
64 | P a g e
(56) Maquiling v. COMELEC, GR No. 195649 (2013)
ISSUE: Is the rule on succession in the Local Government Code applicable?

FACTS: Rommel Arnado is a natural bon Filipino citizen who lost his citizenship upon his
naturalization as an American citizen. Subsequently, he renounced his American citizenship and
ran as a Mayor of Lanao del Norte. After he was proclaimed the winner, the COMELEC anulled
such proclamation and consequently directed that the order of succession under the Local
Government Code be followed. Maquiling, another candidate for mayor, and who garnered the
second highest number of votes in the election intervened the case, claims that he should be
proclaimed as the winner.
DECISION: No, it is not applicable.
RATIO DECIDENDI: The disqualifying circumstance surrounding Arnado's candidacy
involves his citizenship. It does not involve the commission on election offenses as provided for
in the Omnibus Election Code, the effect of which is to disqualify the individual from continuing
as a candidate, or if he has already been elected, from holding the office. Arnado being a non-
candidate, the votes cast in his favor should not have been counted. This leaves Maquiling as the
qualified candidate who obtained the highest number of votes. The old doctrine was that the vice
mayor or the vice governor, as the case may be, shall succeed the disqualified winning candidate,
not the candidate for the same position who had received the next highest vote.
65 | P a g e
(57) Villavivencio v. Lukban, 39 Phil 778 (1919)
ISSUE: Whether or not mayor of Manila had the power to deport the women without their
knowledge.
FACTS: In 1918, the mayor of Manila had 170 "women of ill repute" forcibly rounded up, put
on a ship, and sent to Davao as laborers. A writ of habeas corpus was filed against him. The
Supreme Court said that the women were not chattels but Filipino citizens who had the
fundamental right not to be forced to change their place of residence. This case justifies one of
the basic rights of citizen, the right of domain. Justo Lukban as Manila City's Mayor together
with Anton Hohmann, the city's Chief of Police, took custody of about 170 women at the night
of October 25 beyond the latters consent and knowledge and thereafter were shipped to
Mindanao specifically in Davao where they were signed as laborers. Said women are inmates of
the houses of prostitution situated in Gardenia Street, in the district of Sampaloc.
DECISION: No, he did not have such power.
RATIO DECIDENDI: Lukban committed a grave abuse of discretion by deporting the
prostitutes to a new domicile against their will. There is no law expressly authorizing his action.
On the contrary, there is a law punishing public officials, not expressly authorized by law or
regulation, who compels any person to change his residence Furthermore, the prostitutes are still,
as citizens of the Philippines, entitled to the same rights, as stipulated in the Bill of Rights, as
every other citizen.
66 | P a g e
(58) Agustin v. Edu, 88 SCRA 195 (1979)
ISSUE: Whether or not the assailed Letter of Instruction is invalid and violated constitutional
guarantees of due process.
FACTS: This is a petition questioning the validity of a Letter of Instruction providing for an
early warning device mandatory for motor vehicles. It is assailed in this prohibition proceeding
as being violative to the constitutional guarantee of due process in as far as the rules and
regulations for its implementation are concerned.
DECISION: No, the LOI is valid.
RATIO DECIDENDI: The assailed Letter of Instruction was a valid exercise of police power
and there was no unlawful delegation of legislative power on the part of the respondent. As
identified, police power is a state authority to enact legislation that may interfere personal liberty
or property in order to promote the general welfare. In this case, the particular exercise of police
power was clearly intended to promote public safety. In addition, the UN and the Vienna
Convention, both ratified by the Philippine Government recommended the enactment of local
legislation for the installation of road safety signs and devices. The Constitution provides that the
Philippines adopts the generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the
land. It is not for this country to repudiate a commitment to which it had pledged its word.
67 | P a g e
(59) Ichong v. Hernandez, 101 Phil 115 (1957)
ISSUE: Whether or not a law may invalidate or supersede treaties or generally accepted
principles.
FACTS: Lao Ichong, representing himself and other resident-aliens who are engagedin the
retail industry in the Philippines petitioned the Supreme Court to declare RA1180 (An Act to
Regulate the Retail Business) as unconstitutional. One of the provisions of the Act was the
prohibition of persons, not Filipino citizens, and against associations, partnerships, or
corporations not wholly-owned by citizens of the Philippines from engaging directly or indirectly
in the retail trade. Petitioners said that the act denies them the equal protection of laws and
deprives them of their liberty and property without due process.
DECISION: Yes, a law may supersed a treaty or a generally accepted principle.
RATIO DECIDENDI: In this case, the Supreme Court saw no conflict between the raised
generally accepted principle and with RA 1180. The equal protection of the law clause “does not
demand absolute equality amongst residents; it merely requires that all persons shall be treated
alike, under like circumstances and conditions both as to privileges conferred and liabilities
enforced”; and, that the equal protection clause “is not infringed by legislation which applies
only to those persons falling within a specified class, if it applies alike to all persons within such
class, and reasonable grounds exist for making a distinction between those who fall within such
class and those who do not.”
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(60) Deutsche Bank AG Manila Branch v. CIR, 704 SCRA 216 (2013)
ISSUE: Whether or not Deutsche Bank is no longer entitled to the treaty relief due to failure to
comply with the application first with the BIR.
FACTS: Deutsche Bank applied for a tax refund by virtue of the preferential rate of 10% BPRT
provided by the RP-Germany Tax Treaty as it had erroneously paid the regular 15% rate. When
the matter was elevated to the Court of Tax Appeals, the tax refund was denied due to the failure
of the taxpayer to file an application with the BIR prior to the availment of the preferential tax
rate under the RP-Germany Tax Treaty.
DECISION: Deutsche bank is still entitled.
RATIO DECIDENDI: The Court held that the BIR must not impose additional requirements
that would negate the availment of the reliefs provided for under international agreements.
Ultimately, the Supreme Court held that the failure to strictly comply with RMO 1-2000 will not
deprive the taxpayer of the benefits provided under the RP-Germany Tax Treaty for as long as it
possesses all the requirements stated therein. It went on to state that at most, the application for a
tax treaty relief from the BIR should merely operate to confirm the entitlement of the taxpayer to
the relief under the RP-Germany Tax Treaty.
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(61) IN RE GARCIA
ISSUE: Whether or not a treaty may enable Garcia to practice law in the Philippines?
FACTS: Arturo E. Garcia, a Filipino citizen, finished a law course in Spain and was thereafter
allowed to practice law. He contends that he is entitled to practice law in the Philippines without
submitting himself to the bar examinations under the Treaty of Academic Degree and the
Exercise of Professions between the Philippines and Spain.
DECISION: No. The treaty only applies to Filipino citizens desiring to practice their
profession in Spain and Spanish citizens desiring to practice their profession in the Philippines.
RATIO DECIDENDI: Since, Garcia is a Filipino citizen, he is therefore subject to the laws of
his own country. The executive department may not encroach upon the constitutional
prerogative of the Supreme Court to promulgate rules for admission to the practice of law in the
Philippines.
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(62) PEOPLE VS LAGMAN
ISSUE: Whether or not Sec. 60 of the Commonwealth Act 1 is constitutional?

FACTS: In 1936, Tranquilino Lagman, a Filipino citizen whom have attained the age of 20, is
being compelled by Section 60 of the Commonwealth Act 1, otherwise known as the “National
Defense Law’ to join and render the military service. Lagman refused to join the military and
argued the provision was unconstitutional. He also defended that reason he does not want to
serve the military is because he has a father to support, has no military leanings and he does not
wish to kill or be killed.
DECISION: Yes. Sec. 60 of Commonwealth Act 1 is constitutional.
RATIO DECIDENDI: Because it is the duty of the Government to defend the State cannot be
performed except through an army. Thus, the National Defense Law, may require its citizens to
compulsory render military service. Sec. 4, Art. II of the Constitution states that “The prime
duty of government, and in the fulfillment of this duty all citizens may be required by law to
render personal military or civil service.”
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(63) ESTRADA VS ESCRITOR
ISSUE: Whether or Not the State could penalize respondent for such conjugal arrangement
FACTS: Escritor is the Court Interpreter of RTC Branch 253 of Las Piñas City. Estrada
requested an investigation of respondent for cohabiting with a man not her husband and having a
child with the latter while she was still married.Estrada believes that Escritor is committing a
grossly immoral act which tarnishes the image of the judiciary, thus she should not be allowed
to remain employed therein as it might appear that the court condones her act. Escritor admitted
the above-mentioned allegations but denies any liability for the alleged gross immoral conduct
for the reason that she is a member of the religious sect Jehovah’s Witness and Watch Tower
Society and her conjugal arrangement is approved and is in conformity with her religious
beliefs.
DECISION: No. The State could not penalize respondent for she is exercising her right to
freedom of religion.
RATIO DECIDENDI: The free exercise of religion is specifically articulated as one of the
fundamental rights in our Constitution. the State has not evinced any concrete interest in
enforcing the concubinage or bigamy charges against respondent or her partner. Thus the State’s
interest only amounts to the symbolic preservation of an unenforced prohibition. Furthermore, a
distinction between public and secular morality and religious morality should be kept in mind.
72 | P a g e
(64) REPUBLIC VS MANALO
ISSUE: Whether or not the CA erred in holding that the Manila RTC committed grave abuse of
discretion in issuing the joint order?
FACTS: Republic of the Philippines, represented in this case by the Anti-Money Laundering
Council (AMLC), filed a complaint for civil forfeiture. In the said civil forfeiture cases, the
Republic sought the forfeiture in its favor of certain deposits and government securities
maintained in several bank accounts by the defendants therein, which were related to the
unlawful activity of fraudulently accepting investments from the public, in violation of the
Securities Regulation Code as well as the Anti-Money Laundering Act of 2001. In a Decision
dated May 21, 2009, the CA granted respondents' petition, ruling that the Manila RTC gravely
abused its discretion in denying respondents' separate motions for intervention. Feeling
aggrieved, the Republic moved for reconsideration which was, however, denied by the CA.
DECISION: No. The petition must be dismissed for having become moot and academic. A
case or issue is considered moot and academic when it ceases to present a justiciable
controversy by virtue of supervening events, so that an adjudication of the case or a declaration
on the issue would be of no practical value or use.
RATIO DECIDENDI: In such instance, there is no actual substantial relief which a petitioner
would be entitled to, and which would be negated by the dismissal of the petition.In this case ,
the Manila RTC's rendition of the Decision dated September 23, 2010 as well as the Decision
dated February 11, 2011 and the Amended Decision dated May 9, 2011 by virtue of which the
assets subject of the said cases were all forfeited in favor of the government, are supervening
events which have effectively rendered the essential issue in this case moot and academic, that
is, whether or not respondents should have been allowed by the Manila RTC to intervene on the
ground that they have a legal interest in the forfeited assets.
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(65) SALONGA VS CRUZ
ISSUE: Whether or not Salongas alleged remarks are protected by thefreedom of speech.
FACTS: Jovito Salonga was charged with the violation of the Revised Anti-Subversion Act
after he was implicated, along with other 39 accused, byVictor Lovely in the series of bombings
in Metro Manila. He was tagged by Lovely in his testimony as the leader of subversive
organizations for two reasons 1) because his house was used as contact point; and because of his
remarks during the party of RaulDaza in Los Angeles. Heallegedly opined about the likelihood
of a violent struggle in the Philippinesif reforms are not instituted immediately by then President
Marcos.
DECISION: Yes the petitioners is a legitimate exercise of freedom of thought and expression.
RATIO DECIDENDI: In PD 885, political discussion will only constitute prima facieevidence
of membership in a subversive organization if such discussionamounts to conferring with
officers or other members of such association or organization in furtherance of any plan or
enterprise thereof. In the case,there is noproof that such discussion was in furtherance of any
plan tooverthrow the government through illegalmeans. Lovely also declared thathis bombing
mission was not against the government, but directedagainst aparticular family. Such a
statement negates any politically motivated or subversive assignment.
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(66) SERRANO DE AGBAYANI VS PNB
ISSUE: WON the action prescribed?

FACTS: In 1939, Agbayani borrowed P450 from PNB secured by a realty mortgage. In1944,
the loan matured but PNB could not collect because it was at thistime of the war. In 1945,
Pres.Osmena issued the Debt Moratorium Law (EO #32), suspending the payment of loans for
four years due to the ravagesof war. In 1948, RA 342 extended the Debt Moratorium Law for
another eight years (up to 1956). In 1953, however, the SC declared RA 342 as unconstitutional
in the case of Rutter v Esteban. In 1959, PNB filed a suit for payment of the loan.
DECISION: No. The action could still prosper.
RATIO DECIDENDI: The period from 1945 when the law was promulgated, to 1953 when
itwas declared unconstitutional should not be counted for the purpose ofprescription since the
Debt Moratorium Law was operative during this time. Ineffect, only 7 years had elapsed (1944-
45, 1953-59). Indeed, it would be unjust topunish the creditor who could not collect prior to
1953 because the DebtMoratorium Law was effective, only to be told later that his respect
foranapparently valid law made him lose his right to collect. Art. 7 of the Civil Code which
provides that, "When the courtsdeclare a law to be inconsistent with the Constitution, the former
shall be voidand the latter shall govern."
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(67) CIR VS SAN ROQUE POWER CORP
ISSUE: WON San Roque is entitled to tax refund?

FACTS: On October 11, 1997, San Roque entered into a Power Purchase Agreement (PPA)
with the National Power Corporation (NPC) by building the San Roque Multi- Purpose Project in
San Manuel, Pangasinan. The San Roque Multi-Purpose Project allegedly incurred, excess input
VAT in the amount of P559,709,337.54 for taxable year 2001 which it declared in its Quarterly
VAT Returns filed for the same year. San Roque duly filed with the BIR separate claims for
refund, amounting to P559,709,337.54, representing unutilized input taxes as declared in its
VAT returns for taxable year 2001. However, on March 28, 2003, San Roque filed amended
Quarterly VAT Returns for the year2001 since it increased its unutilized input VAT To the
amount of P560,200,283.14. SanRoque filed with the BIR on the same date, separate amended
claims for refund in the aggregate amount of P560,200,283.14. On April 10, 2003, a mere 13
days after it filed its amended administrative claim with the CIR on March 28, 2003, San Roque
filed a Petition for Review with the CTA. CIR alleged that the claim by San Roque was
prematurely filed with the CTA.
DECISION: No. SC granted the petition of CIR to deny the tax refund or credit claim of San
Roque.
RATIO DECIDENDI: San Roque is not entitled to a tax refund because it failed to comply
with the mandatory and jurisdictional requirement of waiting 120 days before filing its judicial
claim. On April 10, 2003, a mere 13 days after it filed its amended administrative claim with the
CIR on March 28, 2003, San Roque filed a Petition for Review with the CTA, which showed
that San Roque did not wait for the 120-day period to lapse before filing its judicial claim.
Compliance with the 120-day waiting period is mandatory and jurisdictional, under RA8424 or
the Tax Reform Act of 1997. Failure to comply renders the petition void. Article 5 of the Civil
Code provides, "Acts executed against provisions of mandatory or prohibitory laws shall be void,
except when the law itself authorizes their validity." Section 112(D) of the 1997 Tax Code is
clear, unequivocal, and categorical that the CIR has 120 days to act on an administrative claim.
The taxpayer can file the judicial claim(1) Only within 30 days after the CIR partially or fully
denies the claim within the 120-day period, or(2) only within 30 days from the expiration of the
120- day period if the CIR does not act within the 120-day period.
76 | P a g e
(68) MARIA CAROLINA ARAULLO VS BENIGNO AQUINO III, JULY 1,2014
ISSUE: 1.Whether or not the DAP violates Sec. 29, Art. VI of the 1987 Constitution, which
provides: "No money shall be paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation
made by law." 2. Whether or not the DAP, NBC No. 541, and all other execu
FACTS: Senator Jinggoy Estrada, in his privileged speech, revealed that some senators had
been allotted an additional PHP50 million each as incentive for voting in favor of the
impeachment of Chief Justice Corona. As a response, Department of Budget and Management
Secretary Abad explained that the funds released had been part of the DAP, a program designed
by the DBM to ramp up spending to accelerate economic expansion. The DAP is a stimulus
package intended to fast track public spending and to push economic growth by investing on
high-impact budgetary programs, activities, or projects to be funded from the savings generated
during the year as well as from unprogrammed funds. Petitioners contend that the appropriations
funded under the DAP, being an appropriation that set aside public funds for public use, should
require an enabling law for its validity. Petitioners also question the constitutionality of such
realignments and transfers pursuant to Section 25 (5) Article VI of the 1987 Constitution.
DECISION: 1.No. The SC held that the DAP did not violate this constitutional provision.
2.Disbursement Acceleration Program, National Budget Circular No. 541 and related executive
declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL.
RATIO DECIDENDI: 1.DAP was merely a program of the Executive and is not a fund nor is
it an appropriation. It is a program for prioritizing government spending. As such, no additional
funds were withdrawn from the Treasury; otherwise, an appropriation law would have been
signed. Funds already appropriated were merely realigned. 2. DAP being in violation of Section
25(5), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution and the doctrine of separation of powers, namely: (a)
The withdrawal of unobligated allotments from the implementing agencies, and the declaration
of the withdrawn unobligated allotments and unreleased appropriations as savings prior to the
end of the fiscal year and without complying with the statutory definition of savings contained
in the General Appropriations Acts; (b) The cross-border transfers of the savings of the
Executive to augment the appropriations of other offices outside the Executive; and (c) The
funding of projects, activities and programs that were not covered by any appropriation in the
General Appropriations Act.
77 | P a g e
(69) MARIA CAROLINA ARAULLO VS BENIGNO AQUINO III, FEBRUARY 3, 2015

(ENBANC)
ISSUE: Whether or not the DAP realignments or transfers are unconstitutional?

FACTS: Section 24 and 26(2), Article VI, 1987 When President Benigno Aquino III took
office, his administration noticed the sluggish growth of the economy. The World Bank advised
that the economy needed a stimulus plan. Budget Secretary Florencio “Butch” Abad then came
up with a program called the Disbursement Acceleration Program (DAP). The DAP was seen as
a remedy to speed up the funding of government projects. DAP enables the Executive to realign
funds from slow moving projects to priority projects instead of waiting for next year’s
appropriation. So what happens under the DAP was that if a certain government project is being
undertaken slowly by a certain executive agency, the funds allotted therefor will be withdrawn
by the Executive. Once withdrawn, these funds are declared as “savings” by the Executive and
said funds will then be reallotted to other priority projects. The DAP program did work to
stimulate the economy as economic growth was in fact reported and portion of such growth was
attributed to the DAP (as noted by the Supreme Court).
DECISION: Yes. The Court held that for the transfer of appropriated funds to be valid
RATIO DECIDENDI: Such transfer must be made upon the concurrence of the following
requisites, namely: (1) there is a law authorizing the president, the Senate President, the Speaker
of the HOR, the Chief Justice of the SC, and the heads of the Constitutional Commissions to
transfer such funds within their respective offices; (2) the funds to be transferred are savings,
generated from the appropriations for their respective offices; and (3) the purpose of the transfer
is to augment an item in the General Appropriations Law for their respective offices. That law,
generally, is the GAA of a given fiscal year. To comply with the first requisite, the GAAs
should expressly authorize such transfers. Whereas the GAAs of 2011 and 2012 lacked valid
provisions to authorize transfers of funds under the DAP, such transfers were unconstitutional.
DAP also failed to comply with the second requisite since the DAP transfers are not savings
contrary to what was being declared by the Executive. Under the definition of savings in the
GAA, savings only occur, among other instances, when there is an excess in the funding of a
certain project once it is completed, discontinued, or abandoned. The GAA does not refer to
savings as funds withdrawn from a slow moving project. Thus, since the statutory definition of
savings was not complied with under the DAP, there is no basis for the transfers, further,
savings should only be declared at the end of the fiscal year. However, under the DAP, funds are
already being withdrawn from certain projects in the middle of the year and subsequently being
declared as savings by the Executive through the DBM.
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(70) MAGALLONA VS ERMITA
ISSUE: Whether or not Republic Act 9522 is unconstitutional for reducing the Philippine
Maritime Territory?
FACTS: Magallona, et. al., assailed the constitutionality of Republic Act 9522 which mandates
the adjustment of the country’s archipelagic baselines and classifying the baseline regime of
nearby territories. Historically, Republic Act No. 3046 is the ruling law which demarcates the
maritime baselines of the Philippines, as an archipelago. Republic Act No. 3046 follows the
framing of the Convention on Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone of 1958, which codifies
the sovereign rights of the states over their territorial sea. Republic Act No. 9522 aims to amend
Republic Act No. 3046 by complying with the terms of United Nations Convention on the Law
of the Sea III which took between 1973 and 1982.
DECISION: No. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea III (UNCLOS III) has
nothing to do with the acquisition or loss territory.
RATIO DECIDENDI: It is a multilateral treaty regulating sea use rights over maritime zones.
Baseline laws such as Republic Act 9522 are enacted pursuant to UNCLOS III and only serves
to mark out specific basepoints from which baselines are drawn straight or curve, and to serve
and to start as geographic starting points to measure the breadth of maritime zones and
continental shelf.
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(71) Province of North Cotabato vs GRP Peace Panel on Ancestral
ISSUE: Whether or not Republic Act 9522 is unconstitutional for reducing the Philippine
Maritime Territory?
FACTS: The MOA on the Ancestral Domain Aspect of the GRP-MILF Tripoli Agreement of
Peace of 2001 is assailed on its constitutionality. This document prepared by the joint efforts of
the Government of the Republic of the Philippines (GRP) Peace Panel and the Moro Islamic
Liberation Front (MILF) Peace Panel, was merely a codification of consensus points reached
between both parties and the aspirations of the MILF to have a Bangsamoro homeland.
DECISION: The MOA on the Ancestral Domain Aspect of the GRP-MILF Tripoli Agreement
on Peace of 2001 is declared contrary to law and the Constitution.
RATIO DECIDENDI: Yes. Since the MOA has not been signed, its provisions will not at all
come into effect. The MOA will forever remain a draft that has never been finalized. It is now
nothing more than a piece of paper, with no legal force or binding effect. It cannot be the source
of, nor be capable of violating, any right. The instant Petitions, therefore, and all other
oppositions to the MOA, have no more leg to stand on. They no longer present an actual case or
a justiciable controversy for resolution by this Court.
80 | P a g e
(72) Reagan v CIR , 30 SCRA 968 (1969)
ISSUE: Whether or not a sale made on a foreign military base is excluded from tax
FACTS: Petitioner questioned the payment of an income tax assessed on him by public
respondent on an amount realized by him on a sale of his automobile to a member of the US
Marine Corps, the transaction having taken place at the Clark Field Air Base. Petitioner contends
that the base is outside Philippine territory and therefore beyond the jurisdictional power to tax.
DECISION: The decision of the CTA asof May 12, 1966 denying the refund of P2,979.00 as
the income tax paid by petitioner is affirmed. With costs against petitioner.
RATIO DECIDENDI: No. The said foreign military bases is not a foreign soil or territory for
purposes of income tax legislation. Philippine jurisdictional rights including the power to tax are
preserved.
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(73) People vs Gozo 53 SCRA 476
ISSUE: Whether or not the State can exercise administrative jurisdiction within the naval base
leased by the Philippines to the American armed forces.
FACTS: Appellant seeks to set aside a judgment of the Court of First Instance of Zambales,
convicting her of a violation of an ordinance of Olongapo, Zambales, requiring a permit from the
municipal mayor for the construction or erection of a building, as well as any modification,
alteration, repair or demolition thereof. She questions its validity on the pretext that her house
was constructed within the naval base leased to the American armed forces. While yielding to the
well-settled doctrine that it does not thereby cease to be Philippine territory, she in effect seek to
emasculate the State's sovereign rights by the assertion that the latter cannot exercise therein
administrative jurisdiction.
DECISION: The appealed decision of November 11, 1969 is affirmed insofar as it found the
accused, Loreta Gozo, guilty beyond reasonable doubt of a violation of Municipal Ordinance No.
14,
RATIO DECIDENDI: The Philippine Government has not abdicated its sovereignty over the
bases as part of the Philippine territory or divested itself completely of jurisdiction over offenses
committed therein. Under the terms of the treaty, the United States Government has prior or
preferential but not exclusive jurisdiction of such offenses. The Philippine Government retains
not only jurisdictional lights not granted, but also all such ceded rights as the United States
Military authorities for reasons of their own decline to make use of.
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(74) Lee vs. Director of Lands GR 128195
ISSUE: Whether or not the lot can revert back to the owner.
FACTS: The sale of the land in question was consummated sometime in March 1936, during
the effectivity of the1935 Constitution which prohibits aliens to acquire private agricultural
lands, save in cases of hereditary succession.Thus, Lee Liong, a Chinese citizen, was disqualified
to acquire the land in question. The former owners filed with theCourt of First Instance, Capiz an
action against the heirs of Lee Liong for annulment of sale and recovery of land.
DECISION: The Court REVERSES and SETS ASIDE the decision of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G. R. SP No. 36274. In lieu thereof, the Court sets aside the order of reconstitution of title in
Reconstitution Case No. R-1928, Regional Trial Court, Roxas City, and dismisses the petition,
without prejudice.
RATIO DECIDENDI: No. The land is now in the hands of Filipinos. If the land was invalidly
transferred to an alien who subsequently becomes a citizen or transfers it to a citizen, the flaw in
the original transaction is considered cured and the title of the transferee is valid.
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(75) Republic vs Chule Lim GR 153883
ISSUE: Whether or not Lim complied with the legal requirement in electing her citizenship
FACTS: Chule Y. Lim filed a petition for correction of entries under Rule 108 of the Rules of
Court with the Regional Trial Court of Lanao del Norte. She claimed that she was born on 29
October 1954 in Buru-an, Iligan City. Her birth was registered in Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte
but the Municipal Civil Registrar of Kauswagan transferred her record of birth to Iligan City.
The Court finding the petition sufficient in form and substance ordered the publication of the
hearing of the petition.
DECISION: The instant petition for review is DENIED. Accordingly, the Civil Registrar of
Iligan City is DIRECTED to make the following corrections in the birth record of respondent
Chule Y. Lim, to wit: 1. Her family name from "YO" to "YU"; 2. Her father’s name from "YO
DIU TO (CO TIAN)" to "YU DIOTO (CO TIAN)"; 3. Her status from "legitimate" to
"illegitimate" by changing "YES" to "NO" in answer to the question "LEGITIMATE?"; and, 4.
Her citizenship from "Chinese" to "Filipino".
RATIO DECIDENDI: The Republic avers that respondent did not comply with the
constitutional requirement of electing Filipino citizenship when she reached the age of majority.
It cites Article IV, Section 1(3) of the 1935 Constitution, which provides that the citizenship of a
legitimate child born of a Filipino mother and an alien father followed the citizenship of the
father, unless, upon reaching the age of majority, the child elected Philippine citizenship.
Likewise, the Republic invokes the provision in Section 1 of Commonwealth Act No. 625, that
legitimate children born of Filipino mothers may elect Philippine citizenship by expressing such
intention “in a statement to be signed and sworn to by the party concerned before any officer
authorized to administer oaths, and shall be filed with the nearest civil registry. The said party
shall accompany the aforesaid statement with the oath of allegiance to the Constitution and the
Government of the Philippines.”
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(76) Calilung vs Datumanong GR 160869
ISSUE: Whether or not RA 9225 is unconstitutional by recognizing and allowing dual

allegiance
FACTS: Petitioner prays for a writ of prohibition be issued to stop respondent from
implementing RA 9225, or Act Making the Citizenship of the Philippine Citizens Who Acquire
Foreign Citizenship Permanent, Amending for the Purpose Commonwealth Act No. 63, as
Amended, and for Other Purposes. Petitioner avers that said Act is unconstitutional as it violates
Section 5, Article IV of the 1987 Constitution: "Dual allegiance of citizens is inimical to the
national interest and shall be dealt with by law."
DECISION: Dismissed
RATIO DECIDENDI: What RA 9225 does is to allow dual citizenship to natural-born Filipino
citizens who have lost their Philippine citizenship, by reason of naturalization as citizens of a
foreign country. In its face, it does not recognize dual allegiance.
85 | P a g e
(77) Republic vs Nora Sagun GR 187567 (2012)
ISSUE: Has Norma complied with the procedural requirements in the election of Philippine
citizenship?
FACTS: Nora Fe Sagun is the legitimate child of Albert S. Chan, a Chinese national, and Marta
Borromeo, a Filipino citizen. She was born on August 8, 1959 in Baguio City and did not elect
Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of majority. In 1992, at the age of 33 and after
getting married to Alex Sagun, she executed an Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the
Philippines. Said document was notarized but was not recorded and registered with the Local
Civil Registrar of Baguio City.
DECISION: Petition Granted
RATIO DECIDENDI: The respondent clearly failed to comply with the procedural
requirements for a valid and effective election of Philippine citizenship. Respondent cannot
assert that the exercise of suffrage and the participation in election exercises constitutes a
positive act of election of Philippine citizenship since the law specifically lays down the
requirements for acquisition of citizenship by election. The mere exercise of suffrage, continuous
and uninterrupted stay in the Philippines, and other similar acts showing exercise of Philippine
citizenship cannot take the place of election of Philippine citizenship. Hence, respondent cannot
now be allowed to seek the intervention of the court to confer upon her Philippine citizenship
when clearly she has failed to validly elect Philippine citizenship.
86 | P a g e
(78) In re Ching, Bar Matter 914 (1999)
ISSUE: Whether or not Ching should be allowed to take the lawyer’s oath
FACTS: Vicente D. Ching, the legitimate son of the spouses Tat Ching, a Chinese citizen, and
Prescila A. Dulay, a Filipino, was born in Francia West, Tubao, La Union on 11 April 1964.
Since his birth, Ching has resided in the Philippines. In 1998, Vicente Ching finished his law
degree at the Saint Louis University in Baguio City. He eventually passed the bar but he was
advised that he needs to show proof that he is a Filipino citizen before he be allowed to take his
oath. Apparently, Ching’s father was a Chinese citizen but his mother was a Filipino citizen. His
parents were married before he was born in 1963. Under the 1935 Constitution, a legitimate
child, whose one parent is a foreigner, acquires the foreign citizenship of the foreign parent.
Ching maintained that he has always considered himself as a Filipino; that he is a certified public
accountant – a profession reserved for Filipinos; that he even served as a councilor in a
municipality in La Union.
DECISION: The Court Resolves to DENY Vicente D. Ching's application for admission to the
Philippine Bar.
RATIO DECIDENDI: No. In the present case, Ching was already thirty-five (35) years old
when he complied with the requirements of CA No. 625 or fourteen years after he had reached
the age of majority. The age of majority commenced upon reaching twenty-one (21) years. The
Supreme Court noted that the period is originally 3 years but it was extended to 7 years. (It
seems it can’t be extended any further). Ching’s special circumstances can’t be considered. It is
not enough that he considered all his life that he is a Filipino; that he is a professional and a
public officer (was) serving this country. The rules for citizenship are in place. Further, Ching
didn’t give any explanation why he belatedly chose to elect Filipino citizenship (but I guess it’s
simply because he never thought he’s Chinese not until he applied to take the bar). The
prescribed procedure in electing Philippine citizenship is certainly not a tedious and painstaking
process. All that is required of the elector is to execute an affidavit of election of Philippine
citizenship and, thereafter, file the same with the nearest civil registry. Ching’s unreasonable and
unexplained delay in making his election cannot be simply glossed over.
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(79) Co v HRET 199 SCRA 692
ISSUE: Whether or Not Jose Ong, Jr. is a natural born citizen of the Philippines
FACTS: On May 11, 1987, the congressional election for the second district of Northern Samar
was held. Among the candidates who vied for the position of representative in the second
legislative district of Northern Samar are the petitioners, Sixto Balinquit and Antonio Co and the
private respondent, Jose Ong, Jr. Respondent Ong was proclaimed the duly elected
representative of the second district of Northern Samar. The petitioners filed election protests
against the private respondent premised on the following grounds: 1)Jose Ong, Jr. is not a
natural born citizen of the Philippines; and 2)Jose Ong, Jr. is not a resident of the second district
of Northern Samar.
DECISION: Dismissed
RATIO DECIDENDI: The Court interprets Sec 1, Par 3 of Art 4 above as applying not only to
those who elect Philippine citizenship after February 2, 1987 but also to those who, having been
born of Filipino mothers, elected citizenship before that date. The provision in question was
enacted to correct the anomalous situation where one born of a Filipino father and an alien
mother was automatically granted the status of a natural-born citizen while one born of a Filipino
mother and an alien father would still have to elect Philippine citizenship. If one so elected, he
was not, under earlier laws, conferred the status of a natural-born.
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(80) Bengson v HRET GR 142840
ISSUE: Whether or Not respondent Cruz is a natural born citizen of the Philippines in view of
the constitutional requirement that "no person shall be a Member of the House of Representative
unless he is a natural-born citizen.”
FACTS: Respondent Teodoro Cruz was a natural-born citizen of the Philippines. He was born
in San Clemente, Tarlac, on April 27, 1960, of Filipino parents. The fundamental law then
applicable was the 1935 Constitution. On November 5, 1985, however, respondent Cruz enlisted
in the United States Marine Corps and without the consent of the Republic of the Philippines,
took an oath of allegiance to the United States. As a Consequence, he lost his Filipino citizenship
for under Commonwealth Act No. 63, section 1(4), a Filipino citizen may lose his citizenship by,
among other, "rendering service to or accepting commission in the armed forces of a foreign
country.” He was naturalized in US in 1990. On March 17, 1994, respondent Cruz reacquired his
Philippine citizenship through repatriation under Republic Act No. 2630. He ran for and was
elected as the Representative of the Second District of Pangasinan in the May 11, 1998 elections.
He won over petitioner Antonio Bengson III, who was then running for reelection.
DECISION: Dismissed
RATIO DECIDENDI: Respondent is a natural born citizen of the Philippines. As distinguished
from the lengthy process of naturalization, repatriation simply consists of the taking of an oath of
allegiance to the Republic of the Philippine and registering said oath in the Local Civil Registry
of the place where the person concerned resides or last resided. This means that a naturalized
Filipino who lost his citizenship will be restored to his prior status as a naturalized Filipino
citizen. On the other hand, if he was originally a natural-born citizen before he lost his Philippine
citizenship, he will be restored to his former status as a natural-born Filipino.
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(81) So v Republic 513 SCRA 268 (2007)
ISSUE: Whether or not Edison So did meet all the qualification needed to be a naturalized
Filipino citizen
FACTS: He was born on February 17, 1982, in Manila; he is a Chinese citizen who has lived in
No. 528 Lavezares St., Binondo, Manila, since birth; as an employee, he derives an average
annual income of around P100,000.00 with free board and lodging and other benefits; he is
single, able to speak and write English, Chinese and Tagalog; he is exempt from the filing of
Declaration of Intention to become a citizen of the Philippines pursuant to Section 6 of
Commonwealth Act (C.A.) No. 473. On March 22, 2002, the RTC issued an Order8 setting the
petition for hearing at 8:30 a.m. of December 12 and 17, 2002 during which all persons
concerned were enjoined to show cause, if any, why the petition should not be granted. The
entire petition and its annexes, including the order, were ordered published once a week for three
consecutive weeks in the Official Gazette and also in a newspaper of general circulation in the
City of Manila. The RTC likewise ordered that copies of the petition and notice be posted in
public and conspicuous places in the Manila City Hall Building.9 During the hearing, petitioner
presented Atty. Adasa, Jr. who testified that he came to know petitioner in 1991 as the legal
consultant and adviser of the So family’s business. He would usually attend parties and other
social functions hosted by petitioner’s family. He knew petitioner to be obedient, hardworking,
and possessed of good moral character, including all the qualifications mandated by law.
Another witness for petitioner, Mark Salcedo, testified that he has known petitioner for ten (10)
years; they first met at a birthday party in 1991. He and petitioner were classmates at the
University of Santo Tomas (UST) where they took up Pharmacy. Petitioner was a member of
some school organizations and mingled well with friends. The RTC granted the petition on June
4, 2003.
DECISION: Denied
RATIO DECIDENDI: Naturalization signifies the act of formally adopting a foreigner into the
political body of a nation by clothing him or her with the privileges of a citizen.44 Under current
and existing laws, there are three ways by which an alien may become a citizen by
naturalization: (a) administrative naturalization pursuant to R.A. No. 9139; (b) judicial
naturalization pursuant to C.A. No. 473, as amended; and (c) legislative naturalization in the
form of a law enacted by Congress bestowing Philippine citizenship to an alien. First. C.A. No.
473 and R.A. No. 9139 are separate and distinct laws – the former covers all aliens regardless of
class while the latter covers native-born aliens who lived here in the Philippines all their lives,
who never saw any other country and all along thought that they were Filipinos; who have
demonstrated love and loyalty to the Philippines and affinity to the customs and traditions.52 To
reiterate, the intention of the legislature in enacting R.A. No. 9139 was to make the process of
acquiring Philippine citizenship less tedious, less technical and more encouraging which is
administrative rather than judicial in nature. Thus, although the legislature believes that there is a
need to liberalize the naturalization law of the Philippines, there is nothing from which it can be
inferred that C.A. No. 473 was intended to be amended or repealed by R.A. No. 9139. What the
legislature had in mind was merely to prescribe another mode of acquiring Philippine citizenship
which may be availed of by native born aliens. The only implication is that, a native born alien
has the choice to apply for judicial or administrative naturalization, subject to the prescribed
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qualifications and disqualifications. In naturalization proceedings, it is the burden of the

applicant to prove not only his own good moral character but also the good moral character of
his/her witnesses, who must be credible persons.56 Within the purview of the naturalization law,
a "credible person" is not only an individual who has not been previously convicted of a crime;
who is not a police character and has no police record; who has not perjured in the past; or whose
affidavit or testimony is not incredible. What must be credible is not the declaration made but the
person making it. This implies that such person must have a good standing in the community;
that he is known to be honest and upright; that he is reputed to be trustworthy and reliable; and
that his word may be taken on its face value, as a good warranty of the applicant’s worthiness. e
do not agree with petitioner’s argument that respondent is precluded from questioning the RTC
decision because of its failure to oppose the petition. A naturalization proceeding is not a judicial
adversary proceeding, and the decision rendered therein does not constitute res judicata. A
certificate of naturalization may be cancelled if it is subsequently discovered that the applicant
obtained it by misleading the court upon any material fact. Law and jurisprudence even authorize
the cancellation of a certificate of naturalization upon grounds or conditions arising subsequent
to the granting of the certificate.59 If the government can challenge a final grant of citizenship,
with more reason can it appeal the decision of the RTC within the reglementary period despite its
failure to oppose the petition before the lower court.
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(82) David vs. Agbay G.R. No. 199113 March 18, 2015
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner may be indicted for falsification for representing himself as a
Filipino in his Public Land Application despite his subsequent re-acquisition of Philippine
citizenship under the provisions of R.A. 9225
FACTS: Petitioner migrated to Canada where he became a Canadian citizen by naturalization.
Upon retirement, petitioner and his wife returned to the Philippines and purchased a lot along the
beach in Oriental Mindoro where they constructed a residential house. However, the portion
where they built their house is public land and part of the salvage zone. Petitioner filed a
Miscellaneous Lease Application (MLA) over the subject land with the DENR. In the said
application, petitioner indicated that he is a Filipino citizen. Private respondent Editha Agbay
opposed the application on the ground that petitioner, a Canadian citizen, is disqualified to own
land. She also filed a criminal complaint for falsification of public documents under Article 172
of the RPC against the petitioner. Meanwhile, petitioner re-acquired his Filipino citizenship
under the provisions of Republic Act No. 9225. The CENRO rejected petitioner’s MLA, ruling
that petitioner’s subsequent re-acquisition of Philippine citizenship did not cure the defect in his
MLA which was void ab initio. An information for Falsification of Public Document was filed
before the MTC and a warrant of arrest was issued against the petitioner. Since the crime for
which petitioner was charged was alleged and admitted to have been committed before he had
reacquired his Philippine citizenship, the MTC concluded that petitioner was at that time still a
Canadian citizen. Petitioner elevated the case to the RTC via a petition for certiorari under Rule
65, alleging grave abuse of discretion on the part of the MTC. The petition was denied.
DECISION: Denied
RATIO DECIDENDI: Considering that petitioner was naturalized as a Canadian citizen prior
to the effectivity of R.A. 9225, he belongs to the first category of natural- born Filipinos under
the first paragraph of Section 3 who lost Philippine citizenship by naturalization in a foreign
country. As the new law allows dual citizenship, he was able to re-acquire his Philippine
citizenship by taking the required oath of allegiance. For the purpose of determining the
citizenship of petitioner at the time of filing his MLA, it is not necessary to discuss the rulings in
Frivaldo and Altarejos on the retroactivity of such reacquisition because R.A. 9225 itself treats
those of his category as having already lost Philippine citizenship, in contradistinction to those
natural-born Filipinos who became foreign citizens after R.A. 9225 came into force. In other
words, Section 2 declaring the policy that considers Filipinos who became foreign citizens as not
to have lost their Philippine citizenship, should be read together with Section 3, the second
paragraph of which clarifies that such policy governs all cases after the new law’s effectivity.
Petitioner made the untruthful statement in the MLA, a public document, that he is a Filipino
citizen at the time of the filing of said application, when in fact he was then still a Canadian
citizen. Under CA 63, the governing law at the time he was naturalized as Canadian citizen,
naturalization in a foreign country was among those ways by which a natural-born citizen loses
his Philippine citizenship. While he re-acquired Philippine citizenship under R.A. 9225 six
months later, the falsification was already a consummated act, the said law having no retroactive
effect insofar as his dual citizenship status is concerned. The MTC therefore did not err in
finding probable cause for falsification of public document under Article 172, paragraph 1.
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(83) Nicolas-Lewis, et al vs. Comelec GR 162759 August 4, 2006
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioners may participate in the election sans the compliance of the 1
year residency.
FACTS: Petitioners were dual citizens by virtue of RA 9225. Petitioners sought to avail their
right of suffrage under RA 9189 or the Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003. Comelec,
however, did not allow petitioners to vote in the 2004 election, reasoning the petitioners faield to
comply with the requirement of 1-year residency prior the elections as provided for under Article
5, Sec 1 of the Constitution.
DECISION: Granted
RATIO DECIDENDI: The Court held that those who retained or reacquired their citizenship
under RA 9225 may exercise their right to vote under the Overseas Absentee Voting Act of
2003, RA 9189. Article 5, Section 2 of the Constitution provides for the exception to the
residency requirement in Section 1 of the same article. The voting mechanism in RA 9189 was
practically set forth to provide a system wherein Filipinos of dual citizenship and are, at the same
time, not residing in the Philippines are empowered to vote. The Court held that present day
duals may now exercise their right of suffrage provided they meet the requirements under
Section 1, Article V of the Constitution in relation to R.A. 9189
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(84) JOSE AZNAR vs COMELEC and Emilio Mario Renner Osmeña GR 83820 25 May
1990
ISSUE: Whether or not Osmeña remains a Filipino and loss of his Philippine Citizenship cannot
be presumed.
FACTS: On 19 November 1987, private respondent filed his certification of candidacy with the
COMELEC for the position of Governor of Cebu. Petitioner filed with the COMELEC a petition
for disqualification of Osmeña on the ground that he is allegedly not a Filipino citizen. In 27
January 1988, Petitioner filed a Formal Manifestation submitting a certificate issued by the then
Immigration and Deportation Commission that Osmeña is an American Citizen. According to the
evidence presented, Osmeña maintained that he is a Filipino Citizen, that he is a legitimate son of
Emilio Osmeña, a Filipino and son of the Late President Sergio Osmeña Sr., that he is a holder of
a valid and subsisting Philippine passport and been continuously residing in the Philippines since
birth and that he has been a registered voter in the Philippines. COMELEC dismissed the
petition for Disqualification for not having been timingly filed and for lack of sufficient proof
that private respondent is not s Filipino citizen and Osmeña was proclaim of winning candidates
for obtaining the highest number of votes.
DECISION: Granted
RATIO DECIDENDI: Yes, Petitioner failed to present direct proof that Osmeña had lost his
Filipino Citizenship by any of the modes provided for under C.A. No. 63 these are : 1. By
naturalization in foreign country; 2. By express renunciation of Citizenship; and 3. By
subscribing to an oath of allegiance to support the Constitution or Law of the foreign country.
The evidence clearly shows that Osmeña did not lose his Philippine citizenship by any of the
three (3) mentioned hereinaboved or any other modes of losing Philippine citizenship. The
1987 Constitution, Article IV, Section 5 states “Dual allegiance of citizens is iniminical to the
national interest and shall be dealt with by law” has no retroactive effect.
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(85) Valles v COMELEC GR 137000, Aug. 9, 2000
ISSUE: Whether or not Rosalind is an Australian or a Filipino

FACTS: Rosalind Ybasco Lopez was born on May 16, 1934 in Australia to a Filipino father and
an Australian mother. In 1949, at the age of fifteen, she left Australia and came to settle in the
Philippines, where she later married a Filipino and has since then participated in the electoral
process not only as a voter but as a candidate, as well. In the May 1998 elections, she ran for
governor but Valles filed a petition for her disqualification as candidate on the ground that she is
an Australian.
DECISION: Granted
RATIO DECIDENDI: The Philippine law on citizenship adheres to the principle of jus
sanguinis. Thereunder, a child follows the nationality or citizenship of the parents regardless of
the place of his/her birth, as opposed to the doctrine of jus soli which determines nationality or
citizenship on the basis of place of birth. Rosalind Ybasco Lopez was born a year before the
1935 Constitution took into effect and at that time, what served as the Constitution of the
Philippines were the principal organic acts by which the United States governed the country.
These were the Philippine Bill of July 1, 1902 and the Philippine Autonomy Act of Aug. 29,
1916, also known as the Jones Law. Under both organic acts, all inhabitants of the Philippines
who were Spanish subjects on April 11, 1899 and resided therein including their children are
deemed to be Philippine citizens. Private respondents father, Telesforo Ybasco, was born on Jan.
5, 1879 in Daet, Camarines Norte.... Thus, under the Philippine Bill of 1902 and the Jones Law,
Telesforo Ybasco was deemed to be a Philippine citizen. By virtue of the same laws, which were
the laws in force at the time of her birth, Telesforo’s daughter, herein private respondent
Rosalind Ybasco Lopez, is likewise a citizen of the Philippines. The signing into law of the 1935
Philippine Constitution has established the principle of jus sanguinis as basis for the acquisition
of Philippine citizenship, xxx So also, the principle of jus sanguinis, which confers citizenship by
virtue of blood relationship, was subsequently retained under the 1973 and 1987 Constitutions.
Thus, the herein private respondent, Rosalind Ybasco Lopez, is a Filipino citizen, having been
born to a Filipino father. The fact of her being born in Australia is not tantamount to her losing
her Philippine citizenship. If Australia follows the principle of jus soli, then at most, private
respondent can also claim Australian citizenship resulting to her possession of dual citizenship.
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(86) MARY GRACE NATIVIDAD S POE- LLAMANZARES vs. COMELEC,et al. GR

221697 , GR 221698-700 March 8,2016
ISSUE: (1) Whether or not Grace Poe- Llamanzares is a natural- born Filipino citizen (2)
Whether or not Poe satisfies the 10-year residency requirement
FACTS: In her COC for Presidency on the May 2016 elections, Grace Poe declared that she is a
natural-born citizen of the Philippines and that her residence up to day before May 9, 2016
would be 10 years and 11 months counted from May 24, 2005. Grace Poe was born in 1968.,
found as newborn infant in Jaro,Iloilo and was legally adopted by RONALD ALLAN KELLY
POE (FPJ) and JESUS SONORA POE (SUSAN ROCES) in 1974. She immigrated to the US in
1991 after her marriage to Theodore Llamanzares who was then based at the US. Grace Poe then
became a naturalized American citizen in 2001. On December 2004, he returned to the
Philippines due to his father’s deteriorating medical condition, who then eventually demice on
February 3,2005. She then quitted her job in the US to be with her grieving mother and finally
went home for good to the Philippines on MAY 24, 2005. On JULY 18, 2006, the BI granted her
petition declaring that she had reacquired her Filipino citizenship under RA 9225. She registered
as a voter and obtained a new Philippine Passport. In 2010, before assuming her post as
appointes Chairperson of the MTRCB , she renounced her American citizenship to satisfy the
RA 9225 requirements as to Reacquistion of Filipino Citizenship. From then on, she stopped
using her American passport. Petitions were filed before the COMELEC to deny or cancel her
candidacy on the ground particularly among others, that she cannot be considered a natural born
Filipino citizen since she was a FOUNDLING and that her bioligical parents cannot be proved as
Filipinos. The Comelec en banc cancelled her candidacy on the ground that she is in want of
citizenship and residence requirements and that she committed misrepresentation in her COC.
On CERTIORARI, the SUPREME COURT, reversed the ruling and held a vote of 9-6 that POE
is qualified as candidate for Presidency.
DECISION: Granted
RATIO DECIDENDI: YES. GRACE POE is considerably a natural-born Filipino Citizen. For
that, she satisfied the constitutional reqt that only natural-born Filipinos may run for Presidency.
(1) there is high probability that Poe’s parents are Filipinos, as being shown in her physical
features which are typical of Filipinos, aside from the fact that she was found as an infant in Jaro,
Iloilo, a municipality wherein there is 99% probability that residents there are Filipinos,
consequently providing 99% chance that Poe’s bilogical parents are Filipinos. Said probability
and circumstancial evidence are admissible under Rule 128, Sec 4 of the Rules on Evidence. (2)
The SC pronounced that FOUNDLINGS are as a class, natural born- citizens as based on the
deliberations of the 1935 Constitutional Convention, wherein though its enumeration is silent as
to foundlings, there is no restrictive language either to definitely exclude the foundlings to be
natural born citizens. (3) That Foundlings are automatically conferred with the natural-born
citizenship as to the country where they are being found, as covered and supported by the UN
Convention Law. As to the residency issue, Grace Poe satisfied the 10-year residency because
she satisfied the requirements of ANIMUS MANENDI (intent to remain permanently) coupled
with ANIMUS NON REVERTENDI (intent of not returning to US) in acquiring a new domicile
in the Philippines. Starting May 24,2005, upon returning to the Philippines, Grace Poe presented
overwhelming evidence of her actual stay and intent to abandon permanently her domicile in the
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US, coupled with her eventual application to reacquire Filipino Citizenship under RA 9225.
Hence, her candidacy for Presidency was granted by the SC.
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(87) DEPT OF AGRICULTURE VS NLRC GR 104269 November 11, 1993
ISSUE: Whether or not the doctrine of non-suability of the State applies in the case.
FACTS: The case is regarding money claim against Department of Agriculture (DA) as filed
and requested by National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC). Petitioner Department of
Agriculture and Sultan Security Agency entered into a contract for security services to be
provided by the latter to the said governmental entity. Pursuant to their arrangements, guards
were deployed by Sultan Security Agency in the various premises of the DA. Thereafter, several
guards filed a complaint for underpayment of wages, non-payment of 13th month pay, uniform
allowances, night shift differential pay, holiday pay, and overtime pay, as well as for damages
against the DA and the security agency. The Labor Arbiter rendered a decision finding the DA
jointly and severally liable with the security agency for the payment of money claims of the
complainant security guards. The DA and the security agency did not appeal the decision. Thus,
the decision became final and executory. The Labor Arbiter issued a writ of execution to enforce
and execute the judgment against the property of the DA and the security agency. Thereafter, the
City Sheriff levied on execution the motor vehicles of the DA. The petitioner charges the NLRC
with grave abuse of discretion for refusing to quash the writ of execution. The petitioner faults
the NLRC for assuming jurisdiction over a money claim against the Department, which, it
claims, falls under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Commission on Audit. More importantly, the
petitioner asserts, the NLRC has disregarded the cardinal rule on the non-suability of the State.
The private respondents, on the other hand, argue that the petitioner has impliedly waived its
immunity from suit by concluding a service contract with Sultan Security Agency.
DECISION: Denied
RATIO DECIDENDI: No. The rule does not say that the State may not be sued under any
circumstances. The State may at times be sued. The general law waiving the immunity of the
state from suit is found in Act No. 3083, where the Philippine government “consents and submits
to be sued upon any money claims involving liability arising from contract, express or implied,
which could serve as a basis of civil action between private parties.” n this case, The DA has not
pretended to have assumed a capacity apart from its being a governmental entity when it entered
into the questioned contract; nor that it could have, in fact, performed any act proprietary in
character. But the claims of the complainant security guards clearly constitute money claims.
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(88) Philippine Agila Sattelite Inc. vs. Lichauco G.R. No. 142362, May 3, 2006
ISSUE: Is the suit one against the state?

FACTS: Petitioner Philippine Agila Satellite Inc. is a duly organized corporation, whose
President and Chief Executive Officer is co-petitioner Michael C.U. De Guzman. PASI was
established by a consortium of private telecommunications carriers which in 1994 had entered
into a Memorandum of Understanding with the DOTC, through its then Secretary Jesus Garcia,
concerning the planned launch of a Philippine-owned satellite into outer space. The Philippine
government, through the DOTC, was tasked under the MOU to secure from the International
Telecommunication Union the required orbital slots and frequency assignments for the
Philippine satellite. The government, together with PASI, coordinated through the International
Telecommunication Union two orbital slots, designated as 161º East Longitude and 153º East
Longitude, for Philippine satellites. PASI wrote then DOTC Secretary Amado S. Lagdameo, Jr.,
seeking for official Philippine government confirmation on the assignment of the two
aforementioned Philippine orbital slots to PASI for its satellites. Secretary Lagdameo, Jr. replied
in a letter confirming “the Philippine Government’s assignment of Philippine orbital slots 161E
and 153E to PASI for its satellites.” PASI averred that after having secured the confirmation
from the Philippine government, it proceeded with preparations for the launching, operation and
management of its satellites, including the availment of loans, the increase in its capital.
However, respondent Lichauco, then DOTC Undersecretary for Communications, allegedly
“embarked on a crusade to malign the name of Michael de Guzman and sabotage the business of
PASI.” Aggrieved by Lichauco’s actions, PASI and De Guzman instituted a civil complaint
against Lichauco, by then the Acting Secretary of the DOTC. The complaint, alleging three
causes of action, was for injunction, declaration of nullity of award, and damages. The third
cause of action, for damages, imputed several acts to Lichauco as part of her alleged “crusade” to
malign the name of plaintiff De Guzman and sabotage the business of PASI.
DECISION: Denied
RATIO DECIDENDI: The hornbook rule is that a suit for acts done in the performance of
official functions against an officer of the government by a private citizen that would result in a
charge against or financial liability to the government must be regarded as a suit against the State
itself, although the latter has not been formally impleaded. However, government immunity from
suit will not shield the public official being sued if the government no longer has an interest to
protect in the outcome of a suit; or if the liability of the officer is personal because it arises from
a tortious act in the performance of his duties. As earlier noted, the complaint alleges three
causes of action against Lichauco: one for injunction against her performing any act in relation to
orbital slot 153º East Longitude; one for declaration of nullity of award, seeking to nullify the
alleged award of orbital slot 153º East Longitude; and one for damages against Lichauco herself.
As stated earlier, it is when the acts done in the performance of official functions by an officer of
the government will result in a charge against or financial liability to the government that the
complaint must be regarded as a suit against the State itself. However, the distinction must also
be raised between where the government official concerned performs an act in his/her official
and jurisdictional capacity and where he performs an act that constitutes grave abuse of
discretion tantamount to lack of jurisdiction. In the latter case, the Constitution itself assures the
availability of judicial review, and it is the official concerned who should be impleaded as the
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proper party- defendant or respondent. As to the first two causes of action, the Court ruled that
the defense of state immunity from suit do not apply since said causes of action cannot be
properly considered as suits against the State in constitutional contemplation. These causes of
action do not seek to impose a charge or financial liability against the State, but merely the
nullification of state action. The prayers attached to these two causes of action are for the
revocation of the Notice of Bid and the nullification of the purported award, nothing more. Had it
been so that petitioner additionally sought damages in relation to said causes of action, the suit
would have been considered as one against the State. Had the petitioner impleaded the DOTC
itself, an unincorporated government agency, and not Lichauco herself, the suit would have been
considered as one against the State. But neither circumstance obtains in this case. The doctrine,
as summarized in Shauf v. Court of Appeals states: “While the doctrine appears to prohibit only
suits against the state without its consent, it is also applicable to complaints filed against officials
of the state for acts allegedly performed by them in the discharge of their duties. The rule is that
if the judgment against such officials will require the state itself to perform an affirmative act to
satisfy the same, such as the appropriation of the amount needed to pay the damages awarded
against them, the suit must be regarded as against the state itself although it has not been
formally impleaded. It must be noted, however, that the rule is not so all-encompassing as to be
applicable under all circumstances.” It is a different matter where the public official is made to
account in his capacity as such for acts contrary to law and injurious to the rights of plaintiff. As
was clearly set forth by Justice Zaldivar in Director of the Bureau of Telecommunications, et al.
vs. Aligaen, etc., et al.: “Inasmuch as the State authorizes only legal acts by its officers,
unauthorized acts of government officials or officers are not acts of the State, and an action
against the officials or officers by one whose rights have been invaded or violated by such acts,
for the protection of his rights, is not a suit against the State within the rule of immunity of the
State from suit. In the same tenor, it has been said that an action at law or suit in equity against a
State officer or the director of a State department on the ground that, while claiming to act for the
State, he violates or invades the personal and property rights or the plaintiff, under an
unconstitutional act or under an assumption of authority which he does not have, is not a suit
against the State within the constitutional provision that the State may not be sued without its
consent.' The rationale for this ruling is that the doctrine of state immunity cannot be used as an
instrument for perpetrating an injustice
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(89) Lansang vs. CA G.R. No. 102667, February 23, 2000
ISSUE: Whether or not the complaint filed against the petitioner is in reality a complaint against
the State, which could not prosper without the State’s consent
FACTS: Private respondents General Assembly of the Blind, Inc. (GABI) and Jose Iglesias
were allegedly awarded a verbal contract of lease in 1970 to occupy a portion of Rizal Park by
the National Parks Development Committee (NPDC), a government initiated civic body engaged
in the development of national parks. Private respondents were allegedly given office and library
space as well as kiosks area selling food and drinks. Private respondent GABI was to remit to
NPDC 40% of the profits derived from operating the kiosks. After the EDSA Revolution,
petitioner Lansang, the new Chairman of the NPDC, sought to clean up Rizal Park. Petitioner
terminated the so-called verbal agreement with GABI and demanded that the latter vacate the
premises and the kiosks it ran privately within the public park. On the day of the supposed
eviction, GABI filed an action for damages and injunction against petitioner.
DECISION: Denied
RATIO DECIDENDI: The doctrine of state immunity from suit applies to complaints filed
against public officials for acts done in the performance of their duties. The rule is that the suit
must be regarded as one against the state where satisfaction of the judgment against the public
official concerned will require the state itself to perform a positive act, such as appropriation of
the amount necessary to pay the damages awarded to the plaintiff. The rule does not apply where
the public official is charged in his official capacity for acts that are unlawful and injurious to the
rights of others. Public officials are not exempt, in their personal capacity, from liability arising
from acts committed in bad faith. Neither does its apply where the public official is clearly being
sued not in his official capacity but in his personal capacity, although the acts complained of may
have been committed while he occupied a public position. In the case, the petitioner is being
sued not in his capacity as NPDC chairman but in his personal capacity. It is also evident the
petitioner is sued allegedly for having personal motives in ordering the ejectment of GABI from
Rizal Park. The important question to consider is whether or not petitioner abused his authority
in ordering the ejectment of GABI. The Court found no evidence of such abuse of authority.
Rizal Park is beyond the commerce of man and, thus, could not be the subject of lease contract.
That private respondents were allowed to occupy office and kiosk spaces in the park was only a
matter of accommodation by the previous administrator. This being so, petitioner may validly
discontinue the accommodation extended to private respondents, who may be ejected from the
park when necessary. Private respondents cannot and do not claim a vested right to continue to
occupy Rizal Park.
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(90) Republic vs. Sandoval 220 SCRA 124
ISSUE: (1) Whether or not there is a valid waiver of immunity (2) Whether or not the State is
liable for damages
FACTS: Farmer-rallyists marched to Malacanang calling for a genuine land reform program.
There was a marchers-police confrontation which resulted in the death of 12 rallyists and scores
were wounded. As a result, then Pres. Aquino issued AO 11 creating the Citizens Mendiola
Commission for the purpose of conducting an investigation. The most significant
recommendation of the Commission was for the heirs of the deceased and wounded victims to be
compensated by the government. Based on such recommendation, the victims of Mendiola
massacre filed an action for damages against the Republic and the military/police officers
involved in the incident.
DECISION: Denied
RATIO DECIDENDI: The Court held that there was no valid waiver of immunity as claimed
by the petitioners. The recommendation made by the Commission to indemnify the heirs of the
deceased and the victims does not in any way mean that liability attaches to the State. AO 11
merely states the purpose of the creation of the Commission and, therefore, whatever is the
finding of the Commission only serves as the basis for a cause of action in the event any party
decides to litigate the same. Thus, the recommendation of the Commission does not in any way
bind the State. The State cannot be made liable because the military/police officers who
allegedly were responsible for the death and injuries suffered by the marchers acted beyond the
scope of their authority. It is a settled rule that the State as a person can commit no wrong. The
military and police officers who were responsible for the atrocities can be held personally liable
for damages as they exceeded their authority, hence, the acts cannot be considered official.
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(91) Bayan v Exec Secretary GR 138570
ISSUE: Whether or not the Supreme Court has jurisdiction.

FACTS: On March 14, 1947, the Philippines and the United States of America forged a
Military Bases Agreement which formalized, among others, the use of installations in the
Philippine territory by United States military personnel. In view of the impending expiration of
the RP-US Military Bases Agreement in 1991, the Philippines and the United States negotiated
for a possible extension of the military bases agreement. On September 16, 1991, the Philippine
Senate rejected the proposed RP-US Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Security which, in
effect, would have extended the presence of US military bases in the Philippines. On July 18,
1997, the United States panel, headed by US Defense Deputy Assistant Secretary for Asia
Pacific Kurt Campbell, met with the Philippine panel, headed by Foreign Affairs Undersecretary
Rodolfo Severino Jr., to exchange notes on “the complementing strategic interests of the United
States and the Philippines in the Asia-Pacific region.” Both sides discussed, among other things,
the possible elements of the Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA for brevity). Thereafter, then
President Fidel V. Ramos approved the VFA, which was respectively signed by public
respondent Secretary Siazon and Unites States Ambassador Thomas Hubbard. On October 5,
1998, President Joseph E. Estrada, through respondent Secretary of Foreign Affairs, ratified the
VFA. On October 6, 1998, the President, acting through respondent Executive Secretary Ronaldo
Zamora, officially transmitted to the Senate of the Philippines, the Instrument of Ratification, the
letter of the President and the VFA, for concurrence pursuant to Section 21, Article VII of the
1987 Constitution
DECISION: Dismissed
RATIO DECIDENDI: No. In fine, absent any clear showing of grave abuse of discretion on
the part of respondents, the Court as the final arbiter of legal controversies and staunch sentinel
of the rights of the people is then without power to conduct an incursion and meddle with such
affairs purely executive and legislative in character and nature. For the Constitution no less,
maps out the distinct boundaries and limits the metes and bounds within which each of the three
political branches of government may exercise the powers exclusively and essentially conferred
to it by law.
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(92) Pamatong v Comelec GR 161872
ISSUE: Is there a constitutional right to run for or hold office

FACTS: Petitioner Pamatong filed his Certificate of Candidacy (COC) for President.
Respondent COMELEC declared petitioner and 35 others as nuisance candidates who could not
wage a nationwide campaign and/or are not nominated by a political party or are not supported
by a registered political party with a national constituency. Pamatong filed a Petition For Writ of
Certiorari with the Supreme Court claiming that the COMELEC violated his right to "equal
access to opportunities for public service" under Section 26, Article II of the 1987 Constitution,
by limiting the number of qualified candidates only to those who can afford to wage a
nationwide campaign and/or are nominated by political parties. The COMELEC supposedly
erred in disqualifying him since he is the most qualified among all the presidential candidates,
i.e., he possesses all the constitutional and legal qualifications for the office of the president, he
is capable of waging a national campaign since he has numerous national organizations under his
leadership, he also has the capacity to wage an international campaign since he has practiced law
in other countries, and he has a platform of government.
DECISION: Dismissed
RATIO DECIDENDI: No. What is recognized in Section 26, Article II of the Constitution is
merely a privilege subject to limitations imposed by law. It neither bestows such a right nor
elevates the privilege to the level of an enforceable right. There is nothing in the plain language
of the provision which suggests such a thrust or justifies an interpretation of the sort.
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(93) Garcia v Drilon 699 SCRA 352
ISSUE: Whether or not the CA erred in dismissing the petition on the theory that the issue of
constitutionality was not raised at the earliest opportunity and that the petition constitutes a
collateral attack on the validity of the law.
FACTS: Private respondent Rosalie filed a petition before the RTC of Bacolod City a
Temporary Protection Order against her husband, Jesus, pursuant to R.A. 9262, entitled “An Act
Defining Violence Against Women and Their Children, Providing for Protective Measures for
Victims, Prescribing Penalties Therefor, and for Other Purposes.” She claimed to be a victim of
physical, emotional, psychological and economic violence, being threatened of deprivation of
custody of her children and of financial support and also a victim of marital infidelity on the part
of petitioner. The TPO was granted but the petitioner failed to faithfully comply with the
conditions set forth by the said TPO, private-respondent filed another application for the issuance
of a TPO ex parte. The trial court issued a modified TPO and extended the same when petitioner
failed to comment on why the TPO should not be modified. After the given time allowance to
answer, the petitioner no longer submitted the required comment as it would be an “axercise in
futility.” Petitioner filed before the CA a petition for prohibition with prayer for injunction and
TRO on, questioning the constitutionality of the RA 9262 for violating the due process and equal
protection clauses, and the validity of the modified TPO for being “an unwanted product of an
invalid law.” The CA issued a TRO on the enforcement of the TPO but however, denied the
petition for failure to raise the issue of constitutionality in his pleadings before the trial court and
the petition for prohibition to annul protection orders issued by the trial court constituted
collateral attack on said law. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied. Thus,
this petition is filed.
DECISION: Dismissed
RATIO DECIDENDI: Petitioner contends that the RTC has limited authority and jurisdiction,
inadequate to tackle the complex issue of constitutionality. Family Courts have authority and
jurisdiction to consider the constitutionality of a statute. The question of constitutionality must be
raised at the earliest possible time so that if not raised in the pleadings, it may not be raised in the
trial and if not raised in the trial court, it may not be considered in appeal.
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(94) PASEI v Drilon 163 SCRA 386
ISSUE: Whether or not there has been a valid classification in the challenged Department Order
No. 1.
FACTS: Petitioner, Phil association of Service Exporters, Inc., is engaged principally in the
recruitment of Filipino workers, male and female of overseas employment. It challenges the
constitutional validity of Dept. Order No. 1 (1998) of DOLE entitled “Guidelines Governing the
Temporary Suspension of Deployment of Filipino Domestic and Household Workers.” It claims
that such order is a discrimination against males and females. The Order does not apply to all
Filipino workers but only to domestic helpers and females with similar skills, and that it is in
violation of the right to travel, it also being an invalid exercise of the lawmaking power. Further,
PASEI invokes Sec 3 of Art 13 of the Constitution, providing for worker participation in policy
and decision-making processes affecting their rights and benefits as may be provided by law.
Thereafter the Solicitor General on behalf of DOLE submitting to the validity of the challenged
guidelines involving the police power of the State and informed the court that the respondent
have lifted the deployment ban in some states where there exists bilateral agreement with the
Philippines and existing mechanism providing for sufficient safeguards to ensure the welfare and
protection of the Filipino workers.
DECISION: Dismissed
RATIO DECIDENDI: the petition ruled that there has been valid classification, the Filipino
female domestics working abroad were in a class by themselves, because of the special risk to
which their class was exposed. There is no question that Order No.1 applies only to female
contract workers but it does not thereby make an undue discrimination between sexes. It is well
settled hat equality before the law under the constitution does not import a perfect identity of
rights among all men and women. It admits of classification, provided that: (1) Such
classification rests on substantial distinctions (2.) That they are germane to the purpose of the
law (3). They are not confined to existing conditions (4.) They apply equally to al members of
the same class In the case at bar, the classifications made, rest on substantial distinctions. Dept.
Order No. 1 does not impair the right to travel. The consequence of the deployment ban has on
the right to travel does not impair the right, as the right to travel is subjects among other things,
to the requirements of “public safety” as may be provided by law. Deployment ban of female
domestic helper is a valid exercise of police power. Police power as been defined as the state
authority to enact legislation that may interfere with personal liberty or property in order to
promote general welfare. Neither is there merit in the contention that Department Order No. 1
constitutes an invalid exercise of legislative power as the labor code vest the DOLE with rule
making powers.
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(95) UP BOR v CA GR 134625`
ISSUE: Whether or not Arokiaswamy William Margaret Celine was deprived of her right to
substantive due process.
FACTS: Respondent Arokiaswamy William Margaret Celine enrolled in the doctoral program
in Anthropology of the UP CSSP Diliman. She already completed the units of course work
required and finished her dissertation and was ready for oral defense. After going over her
dissertation, Dr. Medina informed CSSP Dean Paz that she committed plagiarism. However,
respondent was allowed to defend her dissertation. Four out of the five panelists gave a passing
mark except Dr. Medina. UP held meeting against her case and some of the panels indicated
disapproval. Hence, she expressed her disappointments over the CSSP administration and
warned Dean Paz. However, Dean Paz request the exclusion of Celine’s name from the list of
candidates for graduation but it did not reach the Board of Regents on time, hence Celine
graduated. Dr. Medina formally charged private respondent with plagiarism and recommended
that the doctorate granted to her be withdrawn. Dean Paz informed private respondent of the
charges against her. CSSP College Assembly unanimously approved the recommendation to
withdraw private respondent's doctorate degree. The Board sent her a letter indicating that they
resolved to withdraw her Doctorate Degree recommended by the University Council. She sought
an audience with the Board of Regents and/or the U.P. President, which request was denied by
President Hence, Celine then filed a petition for mandamus with a prayer for a writ of
preliminary mandatory injunction and damages, alleging that petitioners had unlawfully
withdrawn her degree without justification and without affording her procedural due process.
DECISION: Dismissed
RATIO DECIDENDI: No. Respondent Arokiaswamy William Margaret Celine was indeed
heard several times. Several committees and meetings had been formed to investigate the charge
that private respondent had committed plagiarism and she was heard in her defense. In
administrative proceedings, the essence of due process is simply the opportunity to explain one's
side of a controversy or a chance seek reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of. A
party who has availed of the opportunity to present his position cannot tenably claim to have
been denied due process. In the case at bar, Celine was informed in writing of the charges against
her and given opportunities to answer them. She was asked to submit her written explanation
which she submiited. She, as well, met with the U.P. chancellor and the members of the Zafaralla
committee to discuss her case. In addition, she sent several letters to the U.P. authorities
explaining her position. It is not tenable for private respondent to argue that she was entitled to
have an audience before the Board of Regents. Due process in an administrative context does not
require trial-type proceedings similar to those in the courts of justice. It is noteworthy that the
U.P. Rules do not require the attendance of persons whose cases are included as items on the
agenda of the Board of Regents.
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(96) CoTesCUP v Secretary of Education GR 216930
ISSUE: Whether the K to 12 Law violates petitioners' right to substantive due process and equal
protection of the laws.
FACTS: In an attempt to bolster petitioner case against the K to 12 Law, petitioners also raised
the following policy issues: 1)K to 12 only increases the resource gap by creating more need for
resources. The solution to the problem is closing the resource gap by giving priority to education
in the budget and public spending program of the government and addressing the issue of
poverty and malnutrition and programs aimed at alleviating if not eradicating poverty in the long
run but instead government comes up with the K to 12 Law which is a copycat and elitist
solution.275 2)K to 12 is problem-ridden. Instead, what we need is to prioritize deficiencies in
personnel, facilities and materials; and a nationalist-oriented curriculum relevant to the needs of
the people.276 3)The Philippine government does not have enough funds to add two (2) more
years of senior high school.277 4)Student-teacher ratio is far from ideal.278 5)Teachers are paid
low salaries.279 6)There is no assurance that senior high school results in good employment.
DECISION: Denied
RATIO DECIDENDI: Policy matters are not the concern of the Court. To reiterate,
government policy is within the exclusive dominion of the political branches of the government.
It is not for the Court to look into the wisdom or propriety of legislative determination. Stated
otherwise, the judiciary does not pass upon questions of wisdom, justice or expediency of
legislation. Indeed, whether an enactment is wise or unwise, whether it is based on sound
economic theory, whether it is the best means to achieve the desired results, whether, in short,
the legislative discretion within its prescribed limits should be exercised in a particular manner
— all these are matters for the judgment of the legislature, and the serious conflict of opinions
does not suffice to bring them within the range of judicial cognizance. When the validity of a
statute is challenged on constitutional grounds, the sole function of the court is to determine
whether it transcends constitutional limitations or the limits of legislative power.Further, the
courts accord the presumption of constitutionality to legislative enactments, not only because the
legislature is presumed to abide by the Constitution, but also because the judiciary, in the
determination of actual cases and controversies, must reflect the wisdom and justice of the
people as expressed through their representatives in the executive and legislative departments of
the government.The Court, despite its vast powers, will not review the wisdom, merits, or
propriety of governmental policies, but will strike them down only on either of two grounds: (1)
unconstitutionality or illegality and/or (2) grave abuse of discretionFor having failed to show any
of the above in the passage of the assailed law and the department issuances, the petitioners'
remedy thus lies not with the Court, but with the executive and legislative branches of the
government.
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(97) University v CA 230 SCRA 761
ISSUE: Wheter or not the That Mandamus will not lie to compel the respondents to enroll
petitioning students because of their academic deficiencies and that this refusal of respondent
university falls within its right to do so under the academic freedom clause o
FACTS: Private respondents Antonio Marco Ho, Ma. Elaine Magante, Roy D. Sancho, Michael
Kim So and Bernardita Cainoy were third year Nursing students of petitioner University of San
Agustin (USA) who were refused re-admission in the summer classes of 1989 and last two
semesters of school year 1989-1990 on the alleged ground that they failed to obtain grades of not
lower than 80% in Nursing 104 (Nursing Practice II With Related Learning Experience). Its
persistent refusal to re-admit them prejudiced their right to freely choose their field of study and
finish a college degree and worse, no other school within the city and nearby areas is willing to
accept them due to the difference in the curriculum and school residency requirement. Thus, they
filed a petition for mandamus before the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo City, to command
petitioner USA to re-admit them. Aside from the prayer for re-admission, they also prayed for
actual and moral damages in the amount of P50,000.00 for each of them. Submitting a joint
answer to the petition, petitioner USA and the other petitioners, Dean Concepcion Cajilig and
Clinical Instructors Nenalyn Abioda, Mary Espino, Rhodora Azucena, Ma. Dulce Socorro Posa
and Cosette Monteblanco admitted having barred private respondents from finishing their
Nursing course but justified the decision not to re-admit them as being in pursuance of the
school's policy that only students with grades of at least 80% in any major Nursing subject,
including Nursing 104, and two minor subjects, are allowed enrollment in the following year.
Private respondents were duly informed and forewarned of their below 80% performance rating.
To buttress petitioners' stance, they placed reliance on Section 9(2) of the Education Act of 1982
(B.P. Blg. 232) which recognizes the right of students to freely choose their field of study subject
to existing curricula, and to continue their course up to graduation, except in cases of academic
deficiency or violation of disciplinary regulations; and Section 13(2) thereof vesting in
institutions of higher learning the right to determine on academic grounds who shall be admitted
to study, who may teach, and what shall be the subjects of study and research.Additionally,
petitioners contended that private respondents have no cause of action for mandamus under the
premises because there is no clear and well-defined right of the latter which has been violated
neither do the former have a corresponding ministerial duty to re-admit them, since petitioner
USA is a private educational institution not performing public functions and duties. Under the
Manual of Regulations for Private Schools, petitioner USA enjoys the right to academic
freedom.
DECISION: Granted
RATIO DECIDENDI: Equally mandated by Article XIV, Section 5(2) of the 1987
Constitution is that academic freedom shall be enjoyed in all institutions of higher learning.
Academic freedom of educational institutions has been defined as the right of the school or
college to decide for itself, its aims and objectives, and how best to attain them - free from
outside coercion or interference save possibly when the overriding public welfare calls for some
restraint. It has a wide sphere of autonomy certainly extending to the choice of students. Said
constitutional provision is not to be construed in a niggardly manner or in a grudging fashion.
That would be to frustrate its purpose and nullify its intent.
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(98) SSS vs CA 175 SCRA 686
ISSUE: whether or not the Regional Trial Court can enjoin the Social Security System
Employees Association (SSSEA) from striking and order the striking employees to return to
work. Collaterally, it is whether or not employees of the Social Security System (SSS)
FACTS: On June 11, 1987, the SSS filed with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City a
complaint for damages with a prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction against petitioners,
alleging that on June 9, 1987, the officers and members of SSSEA staged an illegal strike and
baricaded the entrances to the SSS Building, preventing non-striking employees from reporting
for work and SSS members from transacting business with the SSS; that the strike was reported
to the Public Sector Labor - Management Council, which ordered the strikers to return to work;
that the strikers refused to return to work; and that the SSS suffered damages as a result of the
strike. The complaint prayed that a writ of preliminary injunction be issued to enjoin the strike
and that the strikers be ordered to return to work; that the defendants (petitioners herein) be
ordered to pay damages; and that the strike be declared illegal. It appears that the SSSEA went
on strike after the SSS failed to act on the union's demands, which included: implementation of
the provisions of the old SSS-SSSEA collective bargaining agreement (CBA) on check-off of
union dues; payment of accrued overtime pay, night differential pay and holiday pay; conversion
of temporary or contractual employees with six (6) months or more of service into regular and
permanent employees and their entitlement to the same salaries, allowances and benefits given to
other regular employees of the SSS; and payment of the children's allowance of P30.00, and after
the SSS deducted certain amounts from the salaries of the employees and allegedly committed
acts of discrimination and unfair labor practices
DECISION: Denied
RATIO DECIDENDI: The court ruled that Government employees may, therefore, through
their unions or associations, either petition the Congress for the betterment of the terms and
conditions of employment which are within the ambit of legislation or negotiate with the
appropriate government agencies for the improvement of those which are not fixed by law. If
there be any unresolved grievances, the dispute may be referred to the Public Sector Labor -
Management Council for appropriate action. But employees in the civil service may not resort to
strikes, walk-outs and other temporary work stoppages, like workers in the private sector, to
pressure the Govemment to accede to their demands. As now provided under Sec. 4, Rule III of
the Rules and Regulations to Govern the Exercise of the Right of Government- Employees to
Self- Organization, which took effect after the instant dispute arose, "[t]he terms and conditions
of employment in the government, including any political subdivision or instrumentality thereof
and government- owned and controlled corporations with original charters are governed by law
and employees therein shall not strike for the purpose of securing changes thereof."
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(99) Oposa v Factoran GR 101083
ISSUE: Do the petitioner-minors have a cause of action in filing a class suit to “prevent the
misappropriation or impairment of Philippine rainforests?”
FACTS: A taxpayer’s class suit was filed by minors Juan Antonio Oposa, et al., representing
their generation and generations yet unborn, and represented by their parents against Fulgencio
Factoran Jr., Secretary of DENR. They prayed that judgment be rendered ordering the defendant,
his agents, representatives and other persons acting in his behalf to: 1. Cancel all
existing Timber Licensing Agreements (TLA) in the country; 2. Cease and desist from
receiving, accepting, processing, renewing, or appraising new TLAs; and granting the plaintiffs
“such other reliefs just and equitable under the premises.” They alleged that they have a clear
and constitutional right to a balanced and healthful ecology and are entitled to protection by the
State in its capacity as parens patriae. Furthermore, they claim that the act of the defendant in
allowing TLA holders to cut and deforest the remaining forests constitutes a misappropriation
and/or impairment of the natural resources property he holds in trust for the benefit of the
plaintiff minors and succeeding generations. The defendant filed a motion to dismiss the
complaint on the following grounds: 1. Plaintiffs have no cause of action against him;
2. The issues raised by the plaintiffs is a political question which properly pertains to the
legislative or executive branches of the government.
DECISION: Granted
RATIO DECIDENDI: Yes. Petitioner-minors assert that they represent their generation as well
as generations to come. The Supreme Court ruled that they can, for themselves, for others of
their generation, and for the succeeding generation, file a class suit. Their personality to sue in
behalf of succeeding generations is based on the concept of intergenerational responsibility
insofar as the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is concerned. Such a right considers the
“rhythm and harmony of nature” which indispensably include, inter alia, the judicious
disposition, utilization, management, renewal and conservation of the country’s forest, mineral,
land, waters, fisheries, wildlife, offshore areas and other natural resources to the end that their
exploration, development, and utilization be equitably accessible to the present as well as the
future generations. Needless to say, every generation has a responsibility to the next to preserve
that rhythm and harmony for the full enjoyment of a balanced and healthful ecology. Put a little
differently, the minor’s assertion of their right to a sound environment constitutes at the same
time, the performance of their obligation to ensure the protection of that right for the generations
to come.
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(100) Republic v Albios 707 SCRA 5584 (2013)
ISSUE: Whether or not the marriage of Albios and Fringer be declared null and void.
FACTS: Respondent Libert Albios married Daniel Lee Fringer, an American citizen. She later
on filed a petition to nullify their marriage. She alleged that immediately after their marriage,
they separated and never lived as husband and wife because they never really had any intention
of entering into a married state or complying with any of their essential marital obligations. She
said that she contracted Fringer to enter into a marriage to enable her to acquire American
citizenship; that in consideration thereof, she agreed to pay him the sum of $2,000.00; that after
the ceremony, the parties went their separate ways; that Fringer returned to the United States and
never again communicated with her; and that, in turn, she did not pay him the $2,000.00 because
he never processed her petition for citizenship. She described their marriage as one made in jest
and, therefore, null and void ab initio. The RTC ruled in her favor. In declaring the respondent’s
marriage void, the RTC ruled that when a marriage was entered into for a purpose other than the
establishment of a conjugal and family life, such was a farce and should not be recognized from
its inception. In its resolution denying the OSG’s motion for reconsideration, the RTC went on to
explain that the marriage was declared void because the parties failed to freely give their consent
to the marriage as they had no intention to be legally bound by it and used it only as a means for
the respondent to acquire American citizenship. Not in conformity, the OSG filed an appeal
before the CA. The CA, however, upheld the RTC decision. Agreeing with the RTC, the CA
ruled that the essential requisite of consent was lacking. It held that the parties clearly did not
understand the nature and consequence of getting married. As in the Rubenstein case, the CA
found the marriage to be similar to a marriage in jest considering that the parties only entered
into the marriage for the acquisition of American citizenship in exchange of $2,000.00. They
never intended to enter into a marriage contract and never intended to live as husband and wife
or build a family. The OSG then elevate the case to the Supreme Court
DECISION: Granted
RATIO DECIDENDI: No, respondent’s marriage is not void. The court said: “Based on the
above, consent was not lacking between Albios and Fringer. In fact, there was real consent
because it was not vitiated nor rendered defective by any vice of consent. Their consent was also
conscious and intelligent as they understood the nature and the beneficial and inconvenient
consequences of their marriage, as nothing impaired their ability to do so. That their consent was
freely given is best evidenced by their conscious purpose of acquiring American citizenship
through marriage. Such plainly demonstrates that they willingly and deliberately contracted the
marriage. There was a clear intention to enter into a real and valid marriage so as to fully comply
with the requirements of an application for citizenship. There was a full and complete
understanding of the legal tie that would be created between them, since it was that precise legal
tie which was necessary to accomplish their goal.” The court also explained that “There is no law
that declares a marriage void if it is entered into for purposes other than what the Constitution or
law declares, such as the acquisition of foreign citizenship. Therefore, so long as all the essential
and formal requisites prescribed by law are present, and it is not void or voidable under the
grounds provided by law, it shall be declared valid.” “No less than our Constitution declares that
marriage, as an in violable social institution, is the foundation of the family and shall be
protected by the State. It must, therefore, be safeguarded from the whims and caprices of the
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contracting parties. This Court cannot leave the impression that marriage may easily be entered
into when it suits the needs of the parties, and just as easily nullified when no longer needed.”
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(101) Imbong vs Ochoa, 721 SCRA 584 (2013)
ISSUE: SUBSTANTIAL ISSUES: Whether or not (WON) RA 10354/Reproductive Health

(RH) Law is unconstitutional for violating the: Right to life Right to health Freedom of religion
and right to free speech Right to privacy (marital privacy and autonomy) Freedom of e
FACTS: Republic Act (R.A.) No. 10354, otherwise known as the Responsible Parenthood and
Reproductive Health Act of 2012 (RH Law), was enacted by Congress on December 21, 2012.
Challengers from various sectors of society are questioning the constitutionality of the said Act.
The petitioners are assailing the constitutionality of RH Law on the following grounds:
SUBSTANTIAL ISSUES: The RH Law violates the right to life of the unborn. The RH Law
violates the right to health and the right to protection against hazardous products. The RH Law
violates the right to religious freedom. The RH Law violates the constitutional provision on
involuntary servitude. The RH Law violates the right to equal protection of the law. The RH Law
violates the right to free speech. The RH Law is “void-for-vagueness” in violation of the due
process clause of the Constitution. The RH Law intrudes into the zone of privacy of one’s family
protected by the Constitution PROCEDURAL: Whether the Court may exercise its power of
judicial review over the controversy. Power of Judicial Review Actual Case or Controversy
Facial Challenge Locus Standi Declaratory Relief One Subject/One Title Rule
DECISION:
RATIO DECIDENDI: SUBSTANTIAL Majority of the Members of the Court believe that the
question of when life begins is a scientific and medical issue that should not be decided, at this
stage, without proper hearing and evidence. However, they agreed that individual Members
could express their own views on this matter. Article II, Section 12 of the Constitution states:
“The State recognizes the sanctity of family life and shall protect and strengthen the family as a
basic autonomous social institution. It shall equally protect the life of the mother and the life of
the unborn from conception.”
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(102) Roe vs Wade, 410 US 113
ISSUE: Whether or not a woman’s right to privacy as protected by the constitution includes the
right to abort her child.
FACTS: This is an appeal of the decision of a US District Court in Texas, which granted the
declaratory relief prayed for by the plaintiff who challenged the constitutionality of the Texas
Criminal abortion laws; but denied issuing an injunction against enforcement of such statutes.
In 1970, Norma L McCorvey ( “Jane Roe” ), a pregnant single woman (allegedly a result of
rape), filed a suit against the defendant, District Attorney Henry Wade questioning Texas State
Laws which proscribe procuring or attempting an abortion except on medical advice for the
purpose of saving the mother’s life. She argues that said laws are unconstitutionally vague and
that they abridge her right of personal privacy as guaranteed and protected by the First, Fourth,
Fifth, Ninth, and Fourteenth Amendments. Later, she amended her complaint as to represent or
sue “ on behalf of herself and all other women similarly situated;” thereby becoming a class suit.
DECISION:
RATIO DECIDENDI: Yes. The “right of privacy x x x is broad enough to encompass a
woman’s decision whether or not to terminate her pregnancy. We therefore conclude that the
right of personal privacy includes abortion decision, but that this right is not unqualified and
must be considered against important state interests in regulation.” “A state criminal
abortion statute of the current Texas type that exempts from criminality only a lifesaving
procedure on behalf of the mother, without regard to pregnancy stage and without recognition of
the interests involved (such as liberty interests), is violative of the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment.”
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(103) Limbona vs Conte Mangelin, 170 SCRA 786
ISSUE: Is the expulsion valid? Are the so-called autonomous governments of Mindanao, as
they are now constituted, subject to the jurisdiction of the national courts? In other words, what
is the extent of self-government given to the two autonomous governments of
FACTS: Petitioner was appointed member of the Sanguniang Pampook, Regional Autonomous
Government and was later elected Speaker of the Regional Legislative Assembly. Congressman
Datu invited petitioner in his capacity as Speaker of the Assembly for consulations and dialogues
on the recent and present political developments and other issues affecting Regions IX and XII
hopefully resulting to chart the autonomous governments of the two regions as envisioned and
may prod the President to constitute immediately the Regional Consultative Commission as
mandated by the Commission. Consistent with the said invitation, Petitioner addressed all
Assemblymen that there shall be no session in November as “our presence in the house
committee hearing of Congress take (sic) precedence over any pending business in batasang
pampook … .” In defiance of Petitioner’s advice, After declaring the presence of a quorum, the
Speaker Pro-Tempore was authorized to preside in the session. On Motion to declare the seat of
the Speaker vacant, all Assemblymen in attendance voted in the affirmative.
DECISION:
RATIO DECIDENDI: We therefore order reinstatement, with the caution that should the past
acts of the petitioner indeed warrant his removal, the Assembly is enjoined, should it still be so
minded, to commence proper proceedings therefor in line with the most elementary requirements
of due process. And while it is within the discretion of the members of the Sanggunian to punish
their erring colleagues, their acts are nonetheless subject to the moderating band of this Court in
the event that such discretion is exercised with grave abuse. the Decree PD 168 established
“internal autonomy” in the two regions “[w]ithin the framework of the national sovereignty and
territorial integrity of the Republic of the Philippines and its Constitution,” with legislative and
executive machinery to exercise the powers and responsibilities specified therein
116 | P a g e
(104) Mamiscal vs Abdullah 761 SCRA 39 (2015)
ISSUE: Whether or not Mamiscal had validly effected a divorce from his wife is a matter that
must first be addressed by the Shari'a Circuit Court which, under the Code of Muslim Personal
Laws of the Philippines (Muslim Code),enjoys exclusive original jurisdictio
FACTS: Mamiscal and Adelaidah decided to have divorce repudiated Adelaidahs (talaq)
embodied in an agreement (kapasadan) but later on they reconciled. Despite such, Adelaidah still
filed the Certificate of Divorce (COD) with the office of Abdullah for registration. Albeit the
same was not signed by Mamiscal it was annotated in the certificate that it was executed in the
presence of two witnesses and in accordance with Islamic Law. Abdullah then issued the
Certificate of Registration of Divorce finalizing the same.
DECISION: WHEREFORE, the administrative matter against Macalinog S. Abdullah, Clerk of
Court II, Shari'a Circuit Court, Marawi City, for partiality, violation of due process, dishonesty,
and conduct unbecoming a court employee is DISMISSED for lack of jurisdiction, without
prejudice. The complaint of Baguan M. Mamiscal against Macalinog S. Abdullah is hereby
REFERRED to the Office of the Mayor, Marawi City and the Civil Service Commission for
appropriate action.
RATIO DECIDENDI: The Court ruled that they do not have jurisdiction to impose the proper
disciplinary action against civil registrars. Shari’a Circuit Court which, under the Code of
Muslim Personal Laws of the Philippines (Muslim Code) enjoys exclusive original jurisdiction to
resolve disputes relating to divorce. The civil registrar is the person charged by law for the
recording of vital events and other documents affecting the civil status of persons. The Civil
Registry Law embraces all acts of civil life affecting the status of persons and is applicable to all
persons residing in the Philippines. The test of jurisdiction is the nature of the offense and not the
personality of the offender. The fact that the complaint charges Abdullah for "conduct
unbecoming of a court employee" is of no moment. Well-settled is the rule that what controls is
not the designation of the offense but the actual facts recited in the complaint. Unless jurisdiction
has been conferred by some legislative act, no court or tribunal can act on a matter submitted to
it.
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(105) In RE Laureta and Maravilla 148 SCRA 382
ISSUE: WON privacy of communication was violated

FACTS: Maravilla Illustre wrote to the justices of the SC, complaining about the dismissal of
the her case(aland dispute involving large estate) by a minute-resolution. Illustre claims that it
was an unjust resolution deliberately and knowingly promulgated by the 1st Division, that it was
railroaded with such hurry beyond the limits of legal and judicial ethics.Illustre also threatened in
her letter that, “there is nothing final in this world. This case is far fromfinished by a long shot.”
She threatened that she would call for a press conference. Illustre’s letter basically attacks the
participation of Justice Pedro Yap in the first division. It was established that Justice Yap was
previously a law partner of Atty. Ordonez, now the Solgen and counsel for the opponents. The
letters were referred to the SC en banc. The SC clarified that when the minute-resolution was
issued, the presiding justice then was not Justice Yap but Justice Abad Santos (who was about to
retire), and that Justice Yap was not aware that Atty Ordonez was the opponents counsel. It was
also made clear that Justice Yap eventually inhibited himself from the case. Still, Illustre wrote
letters to the other justices (Narvasa, Herrera,Cruz), again with more threats to “exposethe kind
of judicial performance readily constituting travesty of justice.”True to her threats, Illustre later
filed a criminal complaint before the Tanodbayan, charging the Justices with knowingly
rendering an unjust Minute Resolution. Justice Yap and Solgen Ordonez were also charged of
using their influence in the First Division in rendering said Minute Resolution. Atty LAURETA
was the counsel of Illustre. He circulate copies of the complain to thepress, without any copy
furnished the Court, nor the Justices charged. It was made to appear that the Justices were
charged with graft and corruption. The Tanodbayan dismissed the complaint. Now, the SC is
charging them with contempt.They claim that the letters were private communication, and that
they did not intend to dishonor the court.
DECISION:
RATIO DECIDENDI: The letters formed part of the judicial record and are a matter of
concern for the entire court.There is no vindictive reprisal involved here. The Court’s authority
and duty under the premises is unmistakable. It must act to preserve its honor and dignity from
the scurrilous attacks of an irate lawyer, mouthed by his client, and to safeguard the morals and
ethics of the legal profession.
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(106) INS vs Chadha, 462 US 919 (1983)
ISSUE: Whether a single house can vote to override an executive decision such that it violates
the principle of separation of powers.
FACTS: An immigration law passed by Congress holds that the attorney general can suspend
the deportation of an illegal immigrant if the immigrant would sustain “severe hardship” as a
result. Additionally, if either the Senate or House of Representatives voted by majority to veto
the attorney general’s decision regarding deportation. Chadha was a student who had remained
in the US with an expired Visa. The attorney general held that he should remain in the US due to
hardship. The House of Representatives vetoed the decision to grant amnesty, thereby sustaining
the deportation order. Chadha brought this litigation after the legislative veto.
DECISION:
RATIO DECIDENDI: Yes, Act invalidated. The court recognize the argument of “efficiency”
regarding a single house vote. Efficiency is achieved by this measure because the attorney
general may frequently override deportation and calling both houses of the legislature to vote for
each instance would be time consuming and burdensome. However, the constitution is very clear
that legislative decisions are to be bicameral. There are reasons relating to fair representation of
states that maintain this justification as paramount, particularly when weighed against arguments
of efficiency. The act of overriding an executive veto is inherently legislative and therefore
requires bicameral, legislative support.
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(107) Arnault vs Balagtas, 97 Phil 358 (1955)
ISSUE: Whether or not Congress has authority to punish recalcitrant witness?

FACTS: Arnault continuously withheld information. This time about an affidavit supposedly
giving details surrounding the acquisitions of the estates. To this he gave the name Jesse Santos
as the person he gave the amount to.
DECISION:
RATIO DECIDENDI: Judgment appealed reversed. Provided the contempt is related to the
exercise of the legislative power and is committed in the course of legislative process, the
legislative authority is supreme. Said power must be considered implied or incidental to the
exercise of legislative power or necessary to effectuate said power.
120 | P a g e
(108) Belgica vs Ochoa, Jr, 710 SCRA 1(2013)
ISSUE: Whether or not the 2013 PDAF article and all other Congressional Pork Barrel laws are
unconstitutional for violating the constitutional provisions on separation of powers, non-
delegability of legislative power and checks and balances.
FACTS: Petitioner sought that the annual pork barrel system be declared unconstitutional and
null and void for being acts constituting grave abuse of discretition.
DECISION:
RATIO DECIDENDI: The post enactent measures including project identification, fund
relelase, and fund alignment are not related to functions of congressional oversight and does not
allow legislature to intervene and/or assume duties that properly belong to the sphere belongs to
the executive department.
121 | P a g e
(109) Mendoza vs People, 659 SCRA 681 (2011)
ISSUE: Without violating the separation of powers, can the Supreme Court recommend to the
President, the grant of executive clemency to a convict?
FACTS: Romarico Mendoza (petitioner) is a company boss/employer convicted for violating a
special law known as the Social Security Condonation Law of 2009 for non-remittance of the
Social Security Service (SSS) contributions to his employees. The offense is criminal in nature.
Nevertheless, Mendoza admitted his fault, as he said, he acted in good faith. But still, the Court
has to render judgment and apply the proper penalty how harsh it may be dura lex sed lex). The
Court sentenced Mendoza to an indeterminate prison term. Considering the circumstances, the
court the Court transmitted the case to the Chief Executive, through the Department of Justice,
and RECOMMENDS the grant of executive clemency to the petitioner
DECISION:
RATIO DECIDENDI: The Court the discretion to recommend to the President actions it deems
appropriate but are beyond its power when it considers the penalty imposed as excessive. It is
clearly stated in the Revised Penal Code which provides; “Whenever a court has knowledge of
any act which it may deem proper to repress and which is not punishable by law, it shall render
the proper decision, and shall report to the Chief Executive, through the Department of Justice,
the reasons which induce the court to believe that said act should be made the subject of
legislation. In the same way, the court shall submit to the Chief Executive, through the
Department of Justice, such statement as may be deemed proper, without suspending the
execution of the sentence, when a strict enforcement of the provisions of this Code would result
in the imposition of a clearly excessive penalty, taking into consideration the degree of malice
and the injury caused by the offense.”
122 | P a g e
(110) NPC Drivers and Mechanical Association vs Napocor, 503 SCRA 138 (2006)
ISSUE: The issue was whether or not NPB Resolution Nos. 2002-124 and 2002-125 were
properly enacted.
FACTS: On June 8, 2001, Republic Act 9136, otherwise known as the “Electric Power Industry
Reform Act of 2001” (EPIRA Law), was approved and signed into law by President Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo. It took effect on 26 June 2001. Under Section 48 of the EPIRA Law,[2] a
new National Power Board (NPB) of Directors was formed. An energy restructuring committee
(Restructuring Committee) was also created to manage the privatization and the restructuring of
the National Power Corporation (NPC), the National Transmission Corporation (TRANSCO),
and the Power Sector Assets and Liabilities Corporation (PSALC). On November 18 , 2002,
pursuant to Section 63[3] of the EPIRA Law and Rule 33[4] of the Implementing Rules and
Regulations (IRR), the NPB passed NPB Resolution No. 2002-124, which provided for
“Guidelines on the Separation Program of the NPC and the Selection and Placement of
Personnel.” Under this Resolution, the services of all NPC personnel shall be legally
terminated on January 31, 2003, and shall be entitled to separation benefits provided therein. On
the same day, the NPB approved NPB Resolution 2002-125, constituting a Transition Team to
manage and implement the NPC’s Separation Program. Contending that the assailed NPB
Resolutions were void, petitioners filed, in their individual and representative capacities, the
present Petition for Injunction to restrain respondents from implementing NPB Resolution Nos.
2002-124 and 2002- 125.
DECISION:
RATIO DECIDENDI: The Court’s Decision, written by Justice Minita V. Chico-Nazario,[5]
held that the Resolutions were invalid, because they lacked the necessary number of votes for
their adoption. Under Section 48, the power to exercise judgment and discretion in running the
affairs of the NPC was vested by the legislature upon the persons composing the National Power
Board of Directors. When applied to public functionaries, discretion refers to a power or right
conferred upon them by law, consisting of acting officially in certain circumstances, according to
the dictates of their own judgment and conscience, and uncontrolled by the judgment or
conscience of others. Presumably, in naming the respective department heads as members of the
board of directors, the legislature chose these secretaries of the various executive departments on
the basis of their personal qualifications and acumen that had made them eligible to occupy their
present positions as department heads. Thus, the department secretaries cannot delegate their
duties as members of the NPB, much less their power to vote and approve board resolutions.
Their personal judgments are what they must exercise in the fulfillment of their responsibilities.
There was no question that the enactment of the assailed Resolutions involved the exercise of
discretion, not merely a ministerial act that could be validly performed by a delegate.
Respondents’ reliance on American Tobacco Company v. Director of Patents[6] was misplaced.
The Court explicitly stated in that case that, in exercising their own judgment and discretion,
administrative officers were not prevented from using the help of subordinates as a matter of
practical administrative procedure. Officers could seek such aid, as long as the legally authorized
official was the one who would make the final decision through the use of personal judgment. In
the present case, it is not difficult to comprehend that in approving NPB Resolutions 2002-124
and 2002-125, it is the representatives of the secretaries of the different executive departments
123 | P a g e
and not the secretaries themselves who exercised judgment in passing the assailed Resolution.
This action violates the duty imposed upon the specifically enumerated department heads to
employ their own sound discretion in exercising the corporate powers of the NPC.
124 | P a g e
(111) Garcia v. Executive Secretary, 211 SCRA 219
ISSUE: Whether or not the President may issue an EO that can increase tariff rates
FACTS: The President issued an EO 438 which imposed, across the board, including crude oil
and other oil products, additional duty ad valorem. The Tariff Commission held public hearings
on said EO and submitted a report to the President for consideration and appropriate action. The
President, on the other hand issued an EO which levied a special duty of P0.95 per liter of
imported crude oil and P1.00 per liter of imported oil products
DECISION: WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and
Mandamus is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit. Costs against petitioner.
RATIO DECIDENDI: Yes, the delegation is constitutional. The Court said that although the
enactment of appropriation, revenue and tariff bills is within the province of the Legislative, it
does not follow that EO in question, assuming they may be characterized as revenue measure are
prohibited to the President, that they must be enacted instead by Congress. Section 28 of Article
VI of the 1987 Constitution provides: “The Congress may, by law authorize the President to
fix… tariff rates and other duties or imposts…” Thus, there is explicit constitutional permission
for Congress to authorize the President "subject to such limitations and restrictions as [Congress]
may impose. This referred to the Tariff and Customs Code which authorized the President to
issue said EOs.
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(112) US v. Tang Ho, 43 Phil 1
ISSUE: Whether or not Article 2868 is a delegation of power and is thus unconstitutional
FACTS: The Philippine Legislature enacted Act 2868 with one of its salient provisions, Section
1, authorizing the governor-General “for any cause resulting in an extraordinary rise in the price
of palay, rice or corn, to issue and promulgate temporary rules and emergency measures for
carrying out the purposes of the Act”. Thus, on August 1, 1919, the Governor-General signed EO
53, fixing the price of rice. On August 6, 1919, Ang Tang Ho was caught selling a ganta of rice
at the price of eighty centavos, a price higher than that fixed by EO 53. Defendant was found
guilty and now assails the constitutionality of the Act 2868 for invalid delegation of legislative
powers.
DECISION: The judgment of the lower court is reversed, and the defendant discharged
RATIO DECIDENDI: Yes. Said Act constituted an invalid delegation of power since the said
Act authorized the Governor-General to promulgate laws and not merely rules and regulations to
effect the law. The said Act was not complete when it left the legislature as it failed to specify
what conditions the Governor-General shall issue the proclamation as the said Act states “for any
cause”. It also failed to define “extraordinary rise” that such proclamation by the Governor-
General aims to prevent. Lastly, the said Act authorized the promulgation of temporary rules and
emergency measures by the Governor-General,
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(113) CoTeSCUP v. Secretary of Education, G.R. 216930, October 2018
ISSUE: Whether the K to 12 Law constitutes an undue delegation of power

FACTS: On May 15, 2013, Congress passed the K to 12 law, which took effect on June 8,
2013. This essentially adds 2 more years to the then-current 10-year scheme of the Philippine
education system.
DECISION: Petitions were denied; RA No 10533 (K to 12 Law), among others, was declared
constitutional
RATIO DECIDENDI: There is no undue delegation of legislative power in the enactment of
the K to 12 law. To determine this, there are two tests: the completeness test and the sufficient
standard test. For completeness test, the law must be complete when it leaves the legislature such
that when it reaches the delegate, the only thing he will have to do is to enforce it. For sufficient
standard test, it mandates adequate guidelines or limitations in the law to determine the
boundaries of the delegate's authority; limits must be specified. The K to 12 law's lack of
provision on labor does not render the law incomplete. Clearly, under the two tests, the K to 12
law, is complete in all essential terms and conditions and contains sufficient parameters on the
power delegated to the DepEd, CHED and TESDA.
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(114) Pelaez v. Auditor General, 15 SCRA 569
ISSUE: Whehter or not Section 68 of Revised Administrative Code constitutes an undue

delegation of legislative power
FACTS: Pursuant to the Section 68 of the Revised Administrative Code, the President issued
EO Nos. 93 to 121, 124 and 126 to 129, creating 33 municipalities enumerated in the margin.
Petitioner Pelaez alleged that said Section 68 has been impliedly repealed by RA No. 2370, and
constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power. The third paragraph of Section 3 of RA No.
2370 stated: "Barrios shall not be created or their boundaries altered nor their nams changed
except under the provisions of this Act or by Act of Congress."
DECISION: EOs were declared null and void
RATIO DECIDENDI: Yes, there is undue delegation of power. Section 10 (1) of the
Constitution's Article VII states that: "The President shall have control of al the executive
departments, bureaus, or offices, exercise general supervision over all local governments as may
be provided by law, and take care that the laws are faithfully executed." The Constitution is clear
in saying that only general supervision can be exercised over the local governments. No more
authority that that of checking or supervision may be done. In this case, by creating the 33
municipalities, the law conferred upon the President more power over the local governments.
128 | P a g e
(115) People v. Judge Dacuycuy, 173 SCRA 90
ISSUE: Whether or not the case constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power, the
duration of the penalty of imprisonment being solely left to the discretion of the court as if the
latter were the legislative department of the Government
FACTS: Private respondents were charged with violating RA 4670 (Magna Carta for Public
School Teachers), for which they have been convicted of. The penal provision, Section 32 of said
Act, states that "x x x upon conviction, [they] may be punished by a fine of not less than one
hundred pesos, or by imprisonment, in the discretion of the court." Respondents posited that said
penalty merely indicated as imprisonment is too broad and should not be enforced.
DECISION: Decision and resolution of respondent judge are REVERSED and SET ASIDE
RATIO DECIDENDI: There is undue delegation of legislative powers. Section 32 of RA 4670
provides an indeterminable period of imprisonment, with no maximum or minimum period set
by legislative authority. The courts are thus given a wide latitude of discretion, without benefit of
sufficient standard. This cannot be allowed, as it vests in the courts a power and a duty
essentially legislative in nature and is thus violative of the rules on separation of powers as well
as non-delegability of legislative powers.
129 | P a g e
(116) Sema v. COMELEC, G.R. 177597, (2008)
ISSUE: Whether or not the Congress can delegate to the Regional Assembly the power to create
provinces
FACTS: On August 28, 2006, the ARMM Regional Assembly, exercising its power to create
provinces under Section 19 of RA 9054, enacted Muslim Mindanao Autonomy Act No. 201
creating the Province of Shariff Kabunsuan. On May 10, 2007, the COMELEC issued Resolution
7902 renaming the legislative district combining the said provice with Cotabato as "Shariff
Kabunsuan Province with Cotabato City." Sema, here petitioner, questioned the Resolution
combining the Shariff Kabunsuan and Cotabato CIty into a single legislative district.
DECISION: Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054 is UNCONSTITUTIONAL insofar as it grants
to the Regional Assembly of the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao the power to create
provinces and cities. Thus, SC declares VOID Muslim Mindanao Autonomy Act No. 201
creating the Province of Shariff Kabunsuan. COMELEC Resolution 7902 is VALID.
RATIO DECIDENDI: SC ruled that Section 19, RA 9054, insofar as it grants to the Regional
Assembly the power to create provinces and cities, is void. Only Congress can create provinces
and cities because the creation of provinces and cities necessarily includes the creation of
legislative districts, a power only Congress can exercise under Section 5, Article VI of the
Constitution.
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(117) Jose Jesus M. Disini, Jr., et al. v. The Secretary of Justice, et al., G.R. No. 203335,
Feb. 11, 2014
ISSUE: Whether or not Congress validly delegated its legislative power when it gave the
Cybercrime Investigation and Coordinating Center (CICC) the power to formulate a national
cybersecurity plan
FACTS: Petitioners, as taxpayers, filed a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition before the
Court. They seek to nullify the several sections of RA 10175, otherwise known as the
"Cybercrime Prevention Act of 2012". They claim that the means adopted by the cybercrime law
for regulating undesirable cyberspace activities violate constitutional rights. The government in
turn posits that the law merely seeks to put order into cyberspace activities, punish wrongdoings,
and prevent attacks in the system.
DECISION: The following were declared void for being unconstitutional: Section 4(c)(3), 12
and 19 of RA 10175.
RATIO DECIDENDI: Yes, the delegation is valid. The Court referred to the two tests for valid
delegation: the completeness test and sufficient standard test. The Cybercrime law was deemed
to be complete in itself when it directed CICC to formulate and implement a national
cybersecurity plan. Sufficient standards were also clear when the law provided for the definition
of cybersecurity. The definition served as the parameters within which CICC should work in
formulating the plan. The formulation of the cybersecurity plan is also consisted with the policy
of the law; the policy was clearly adopted in the interest of law and order, which has been
considered as sufficient standard.
131 | P a g e
(118) Powell v. McCormack 395 US 486
ISSUE: Does the House have a textual commitment in the constitution to determine the
qualifications of its members?
FACTS: During the 89th Congress, it was found that Plaintiff had engaged in deceptive and
possibly illegal actions surrounding his service as chairman of the Committee on Education and
Labor. After his reelection to the 90th Congress, he was asked to step aside while the other
representatives were sworn in. Also, he was later asked to inform the Governor of New York that
his seat was vacant. Plaintiff sued, alleging the House did not have the constitutional authority to
deny his seat when he met the qualifications expressly set forth for Representatives in Article I of
the United States Constitution (Constitution).
DECISION: Yes. Case reversed and remanded.
RATIO DECIDENDI: The Defendants-Respondents, members of Congress including the
Speaker of the House John W. McCormack (Defendants), argued that the House has broad
powers under Article I, Section: 5 of the Constitution to determine the qualifications of its
membership. Plaintiff argued and the Supreme Court of the United States (Supreme Court)
agreed, the ratification debates and historical context of the framers limit the qualifications to
those set forth in the Constitution. The Supreme Court also notes that to hold otherwise would
nullify the framers’ decision to require two-thirds vote for expulsion.
132 | P a g e
(119) Pobre v Defensor-Santiago 597 SCRA 1 (2009)
ISSUE: Whether or not there is a ground for Sen. Defensor-Santiago to be disbarred or

subjected to disciplinary action by the Court for her questioned speech.
FACTS: In one of her privilege speeches before the Senate, Sen. Miriam Defensor-Santiago as
a response to the decision of the Judicial and Bar Council (JBC) declaring that only sitting
members of the Supreme Court can be nominated for the impending vacancy of the CJ post.
Consequently, nominees who were not incumbent members of the Court, including Sen.
Defensor-Santiago, were automatically disqualified. Private complainant Antero J. Pobre filed
the instant petition before the Court, contending that the lady senator's utterances amounted to a
total disrespect towards then CJ Panganiban and a direct contempt of Court. Accordingly, he
wanted disbarment proceedings or other disciplinary actions to be taken against Sen. Defensor-
Santiago.
DECISION: No
RATIO DECIDENDI: The Court sided with Sen. Defensor-Santiago's defense that she should
be afforded parliamentary immunity from suit pursuant to Section 11, Art. VI of the 1987
Constitution, which section states in part that "no [Senator] x x x shall be questioned nor be held
liable in any other place for any speech or debate in the Congress or in any committee thereof."
Although there was no express admission on the part of the lady senator that she did indeed say
those words, there was no categorical denial either, which the Court ultimately regarded as an
implied admission. Despite the dismissal of the letter-complaint, the Court heavily chastised the
lady senator for indulging in "insulting rhetoric and offensive personalities." In fact, her excuse
that her questioned speech was a prelude to crafting remedial legislation on the JBC struck the
Court as being a mere afterthought in light of the controversy her utterances had managed to stir.
Still, the Court held that parliamentary immunity is essential because without it, the parliament
or its equivalent would "degenerate into a polite and ineffective forum." However, it should be
noted that "[l]egislators are immune from deterrents to the uninhibited discharge of of their
legislative duties, not for their private indulgence, but for the public good."
133 | P a g e
(120) Aquino III vs COMELEC 617 SCRA 623 (2010)
ISSUE: w/n a population of 250,000 is an indispensable constitutional requirement for the

creation of a new legislative district in a province? Held:
FACTS: The Province of Camarines Sur was estimated to have a population of 1,693,821,2
distributed among four (4) legislative districts. Following the enactment of Republic Act No.
9716, the first and second districts of Camarines Sur were reconfigured in order to create an
additional legislative district for the province. Hence, the first district municipalities of
Libmanan, Minalabac, Pamplona, Pasacao, and San Fernando were combined with the second
district municipalities of Milaor and Gainza to form a new second legislative district. Petitioners
contend that the reapportionment introduced by Republic Act No. 9716, runs afoul of the explicit
constitutional standard that requires a minimum population of two hundred fifty thousand
(250,000) for the creation of a legislative district. Petitioners rely on Section 5(3), Article VI of
the 1987 Constitution as basis for the cited 250,000 minimum population standard. The provision
reads: (3) Each legislative district shall comprise, as far as practicable, contiguous, compact, and
adjacent territory. Each city with a population of at least two hundred fifty thousand, or each
province, shall have at least one representative. The petitioners claim that the reconfiguration by
Republic Act No. 9716 of the first and second districts of Camarines Sur is unconstitutional,
because the proposed first district will end up with a population of less than 250,000 or only
176,383.
DECISION: Dismissed
RATIO DECIDENDI: There is no specific provision in the Constitution that fixes a 250,000
minimum population that must compose a legislative district. The use by the subject provision of
a comma to separate the phrase “each city with a population of at least two hundred fifty
thousand” from the phrase “or each province” point to no other conclusion than that the 250,000
minimum population is only required for a city, but not for a province. Requisites for Creation. –
(a) A province may be created if it has an average annual income, as certified by the Department
of Finance, of not less than Twenty million pesos (P20,000,000.00) based on 1991 constant
prices and either of the following requisites: (i) a contiguous territory of at least two thousand
(2,000) square kilometers, as certified by the Lands Management Bureau; or (ii) a population of
not less than two hundred fifty thousand (250,000) inhabitants as certified by the National
Statistics Office. Notably, the requirement of population is not an indispensable requirement, but
is merely an alternative addition to the indispensable income requirement. Advertisements
134 | P a g e
(121) Aldaba vs. COMELEC 611 SCRA 147 (2010)
ISSUE: RA 9591 is unconstitutional for failing to meet the minimum population threshold of
250,000 for a city to merit representation in Congress as provided under Section 5(3), Article VI
of the 1987 Constitution and Section 3 of the Ordinance appended to the 1
FACTS: This is an original action for Prohibition to declare unconstitutional Republic Act No.
9591 (RA 9591), creating a legislative district for the city of Malolos, Bulacan, for violating the
minimum population requirement for the creation of a legislative district in a city. On 1 May
2009, RA 9591 lapsed into law, amending Malolos City Charter,2 by creating a separate
legislative district for the city. The population of Malolos City was 223,069. The population of
Malolos City on 1 May 2009 is a contested fact but there is no dispute that House Bill No. 3693
relied on an undated certification issued by a Regional Director of the National Statistics Office
(NSO) that “the projected population of the Municipality of Malolos will be 254,030 by the year
2010 using the population growth rate of 3.78 between 1995 to 2000.”
DECISION: Granted
RATIO DECIDENDI: RA 9591 is unconstitutional for being violative of Section 5(3), Article
VI of the 1987 Constitution and Section 3 of the Ordinance appended to the 1987 Constitution.
The 1987 Constitution requires that for a city to have a legislative district, the city must have “a
population of at least two hundred fifty thousand.” House Bill No. 3693 cites the undated
Certification of Regional Director Alberto N. Miranda of Region III of the National Statistics
Office (NSO) as authority that the population of the City of Malolos “will be 254,030 by the year
2010.” The Certification states that the population of “Malolos, Bulacan as of May 1, 2000 is
175,291.” The Certification further states that it was “issued upon the request of Mayor Danilo
A. Domingo of the City of Malolos in connection with the proposed creation of Malolos City as
a lone congressional district of the Province of Bulacan.” First, certifications on demographic
projections can be issued only if such projections are declared official by the National Statistics
Coordination Board (NSCB). Second, certifications based on demographic projections can be
issued only by the NSO Administrator or his designated certifying officer. Third, intercensal
population projections must be as of the middle of every year. Moreover, the Certification states
that “the total population of Malolos, Bulacan as of May 1, 2000 is 175,291.” The Certification
also states that the population growth rate of Malolos is 3.78% per year between 1995 and 2000.
Based on a growth rate of 3.78% per year, the population of Malolos of 175,291 in 2000 will
grow to only 241,550 in 2010. Any population projection forming the basis for the creation of a
legislative district must be based on an official and credible source. That is why the OSG cited
Executive Order No. 135, otherwise the population projection would be unreliable or
speculative.
135 | P a g e
(122) Naval v Comelec, 729 SCRA 299 (2014)
ISSUE: Whether or not Naval can be elected as a member of Sanggunian constituting a new
three-period term on a different district.
FACTS: From 2004 to 2007 to 2010, Naval had been elected and had served as a member of the
Sanggunian, Second District, Province of Camarines Sur. Upon the creation of RA 9716, the
legislative districts of Camarines Sur has been reapportioned moving the distric of Naval to the
Secon District. In the 2010 & 2013 elections, Naval won again as member of the Sanggunian and
subsequently questioned by Julia as another member of the Sanggunian positing the three-
consecutive term which is viloaltive of the Constitution
DECISION: Dismissed
RATIO DECIDENDI: Naval violated Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code when he filed
his COC despite knowledge of his ineligibility
136 | P a g e
(123) Bagabuyo v Comelec, 573 SCRA 290 (2008)
ISSUE: Whether or not the law, of which pertains to the legislative apportionment of a city,
involve the division and conversion of a local government unit, necessitating a plebiscite
FACTS: On October 10, 2006, Cagayan de Oro’s then Congressman Constantino G. Jaraula
filed and sponsored House Bill No. 5859: An Act Providing for the Apportionment of the Lone
Legislative District of the City of Cagayan De Oro or RA No. 9371. It increased Cagayan de
Oro’s legislative district from one to two. For the election of May 2007, CDO’s voters would be
classified as belonging to either the first or the second district, depending on their place of
residence. On March 13, 2007, COMELEC promulgated a resolution implementing the said act.
Bagabuyo filed a petition at the Supreme Court asking for the nullification of RA 9371 and
Resolution No. 7837 on constitutional grounds. Petitioner argued that COMELEC cannot
implement a law without the commencement of a plebiscite which is indispensable for the
division and conversion of a local govt. unit.
DECISION: Dismissed
RATIO DECIDENDI: The Court upheld respondent’s arguments saying that such law only
increased the representation of CDO in the House of Representatives and Sangguniang
Panglungsod. Creation, division, merger, abolition, and alteration of boundaries under Art. X
Sec. 10 requires the commencement of a plebiscite , while legislative apportionment or
reapportionment under Art. VI, Sec.5 need not. There was also no change in CDO’s territory,
population, income and classfication
137 | P a g e
(124) Reyes v Comelec, 699 SCRA 522 (2013) and 708 SCRA 197 (2013
ISSUE: 1. Whether or not the COMELEC has the jurisdiction over the petitioner who is a duly
proclaimed winner and who has already taken her oath of office for the position of member of
the House of Representative. 2. Whether or not the COMELEC erred in its ruli
FACTS: Petitioner filed her Certificate of Candidacy (COC) for the position of Representative
of the lone district of Marinduque. Respondent, a registered voter and resident of the
Municipality of Torrijos, Marinduque, filed before the COMELEC a petition for the cancellation
of petitioner’s COC. On October 31, 2012, the respondent filed the amended petition on the
ground that the petitioner’s COC contained material misrepresentations. Respondent alleged that
the petitioner is an American citizen because of her failure to comply with the requirements of
Republic Act (RA) No. 9225.
DECISION: Dismissed
RATIO DECIDENDI: 1. Pursuant to Section 17, Article 6 of the 1987 Constitution, the House
of Representative Electoral Tribunal has the exclusive jurisdiction to be . the sole judge of all
contests relating to the election returns and qualification of the members of House of
Representative. 2. In this case, there is no showing that the petitioner reacquired her Filipino
citizenship pursuant to RA 9225 so as to conclude that the petitioner renounced her American
citizenship, it follows that she has not abandoned her domicile of choice in the USA. Petitioner
claim that she served as Provincial Administrator of the province of Marinduque from January
18, 2011 to July 13, 2011 is not sufficient to prove her one-year residency for she has never
recognized her domicile in Marinduque as she remains to be an American citizen. No amount of
her stay in the said locality can substitute the fact that she has not abandoned her domicile of
choice in the USA.
138 | P a g e
(125) Banat v Comelec, GR 179271 (2009)
ISSUE: (1) Is the 20% allocation for party-list representatives provided in Sec 5 (2), Art VI of
the Constitution mandatory or is it merely a ceiling? (2)Is the 2% threshold and “qualifier”
votes prescribed by the same Sec 11(b) of RA 7941 constitutional? (3
FACTS: Barangay Association for National Advancement and Transparency (BANAT) filed
before the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) a petition to proclaim the full number of party
list representatives provided by the Constitution. However, the recommendation of the head of
the legal group of COMELEC’s national board of canvassers to declare the petition moot and
academic was approved by the COMELEC en banc, and declared further in a resolution that the
winning party list will be resolved using the Veterans ruling. BANAT then filed a petition before
the SC assailing said resolution of the COMELEC.
DECISION: Dismissed
RATIO DECIDENDI: 1) Neither the Constitution nor RA 7941 mandates the filling up of the
entire 20% allocation of party-list representatives found in the Constitution. The Constitution, in
paragraph 1, Sec 5 of Art VI, left the determination of the number of the members of the House
of Representatives to Congress. The 20% allocation of party-list representatives is merely a
ceiling; party-list representatives cannot be more then 20% of the members of the House of
Representatives. (2) No. We rule that, in computing the allocation of additional seats, the
continued operation of the two percent threshold for the distribution of the additional seats as
found in the second clause of Sec 11(b) of RA 7941 is unconstitutional. This Court finds that the
two percent threshold makes it mathematically impossible to achieve the maximum number of
available party-list seats when the available party-list seat exceeds 50. The continued operation
of the two percent threshold in the distribution of the additional seats frustrates the attainment of
the permissive ceiling that 20% of the members of the House of Representatives shall consist of
party-list representatives.We therefore strike down the two percent threshold only in relation to
the distribution of the additional seats as found in the second clause of Sec 11 (b) of RA 7941.
The two percent threshold presents an unwarranted obstacle to the full implementation of Sec 5
(2), Art VI of the Constitution and prevents the attainment of “the -broadest possible
representation of party, sectoral or group interests in the House of Representatives.” (3) No.
Neither the Constitution nor RA 7941 prohibits major political parties from participating in the
party-list system. On the contrary, the framers of the Constitution clearly intended the major
political parties to participate in party-list elections through their sectoral wings. However, by
vote of 8-7, the Court decided to continue the ruling in Veterans disallowing major political
parties from participating in the party-list elections, directly or indirectly.
139 | P a g e
(126) Ang Ladlad v Comelec, GR 190582 (2010)
ISSUE: 1. Whether or not the denial of accreditation by COMELEC, violated the constitutional
guaranteesagainst the establishment of religion. insofar as it justified the exclusion by using
religious dogma. 2. Whether or not the Assailed Resolutions contravened
FACTS: The COMELEC (Second Division)dismissed the Petition for registration of the
petitioner on moral grounds that petitioner tolerates immorality which offends religious beliefs,
and advocates sexual immorality. Petitioner should likewise be denied accreditation not only for
advocating immoral doctrines but likewise for not being truthful when it said that it ³ or any of
itsnominees/party-list representatives have not violated or failed to comply with laws, rules, or
regulationsrelating to the elections. Furthermore, states COMELEC, Ang Ladlad will be
exposing our youth to anenvironment that does not conform to the teachings of our faith.
DECISION: Granted
RATIO DECIDENDI: omelec’s citation of the Bible and the Koran in denying petitioner’s
application was a violation of the non-establishment clause laid down in Article 3 section 5 of
the Constitution. The proscription by law relative to acts against morality must be for a secular
purpose (that is, the conduct prohibited or sought to be repressed is “detrimental or dangerous to
those conditions upon which depend the existence and progress of human society"), rather than
out of religious conformity. The Comelec failed to substantiate their allegation that allowing
registration to Ladlad would be detrimental to society. The LGBT community is not exempted
from the exercise of its constitutionally vested rights on the basis of their sexual orientation.
Laws of general application should apply with equal force to LGBTs, and they deserve to
participate in the party-list system on the same basis as other marginalized and under-represented
sectors. Discrimination based on sexual orientation is not tolerated ---not by our own laws nor by
any international laws to which we adhere.
140 | P a g e
(127) Walden Bello v Comelec GR 191998 (2010)
ISSUE: 1) whether mandamus lies to compel the COMELEC to disqualify AGPP's nominees
motu proprio or to cancel AGPP's registration; (2) whether the COMELEC can be enjoined
from giving due course to AGPP's participation in the May 10, 2010... elections, the canv
FACTS: GPP filed with the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) its Manifestation of Intent
to Participate in the May 10, 2010 elections. Subsequently, It filed its Certificate of Nomination
together with the Certificates of Acceptance of its nominees wherein the first nominee is Mike
Arroyo. Several petitions for disqualification of Arroyo emerged but have been dismissed both
by Comelec Second division and comelec en banc. In the interim, AGPP obtained in the May 10,
2010 elections the required percentage of votes sufficient to secure a single seat. This entitled
Arroyo, as AGPP’s first nominee, to sit in the House of Representatives. He was proclaimed as
AGPP’s duly -elected party-list representative in the House of Representatives. On the same day,
Arroyo took his oath of office, as AGPP’s Representative. And, his name was, thereafter, entered
in the Roll of Members of the House of Representatives. Thereafter two (2) separate petitions for
quo warranto were filed with the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET)
questioning Arroyo’s eligibility as AGPP’s representative in the House of Representatives. The
HRET took cognizance of the petitions by issuing a Summons directing Arroyo to file his
Answer to the two petitions
DECISION: Dismissed
RATIO DECIDENDI: For a writ of mandamus to issue (in G.R. No. 191998), the mandamus
petitioners must comply with Section 3 of Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, which provides: "In the
present case, the mandamus petitioners failed to comply with the condition that there be "no
other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law." Under Section 2, in
relation with Section 4, of COMELEC Resolution No. 8807 (quoted below), any... interested
party may file with the COMELEC a petition for disqualification against a party-list nominee
141 | P a g e
(128) Atong Paglaum v Comelec, GR 203766
ISSUE: Whether or not the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in disqualifying
the said party-lists.
FACTS: Atong Paglaum, Inc. and 51 other parties were disqualified by the Commission on
Elections in the May 2013 party-list elections for various reasons but primarily for not being
qualified as representatives for marginalized or underrepresented sectors. Atong Paglaum et al
then filed a petition for certiorari against COMELEC alleging grave abuse of discretion on the
part of COMELEC in disqualifying them.
DECISION: Remanded to COMELEC
RATIO DECIDENDI: No, the COMELEC did not commit grave abuse of discretion in
following prevailing decisions in disqualifying petitioners from participating in the coming
elections. However, since the Court adopts new parameters in the qualification of the party-list
system, thereby abandoning the rulings in the decisions applied by the COMELEC in
disqualifying petitioners, we remand to the COMELEC all the present petitions for the
COMELEC to determine who are qualified to register under the party-list system, and to
participate in the coming elections, under the new parameters prescribed in this Decision.
Moreover, Section 5(2), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution mandates that, during the first three
consecutive terms of Congress after the ratification of the 1987 Constitution, "one-half of the
seats allocated to party-list representatives shall be filled, as provided by law, by selection or
election from the labor, peasant, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, women, youth,
and such other sectors as may be provided by law, except the religious sector." This provision
clearly shows again that the party-list system is not exclusively for sectoral parties for two
obvious reasons. First, the other one-half of the seats allocated to party-list representatives
would naturally be open to non-sectoral party-list representatives, clearly negating the idea that
the party-list system is exclusively for sectoral parties representing the "marginalized and
underrepresented." Second, the reservation of one-half of the party-list seats to sectoral parties
applies only for the first "three consecutive terms after the ratification of this Constitution,"
clearly making the party-list system fully open after the end of the first three congressional
terms. This means that, after this period, there will be no seats reserved for any class or type of
party that qualifies under the three groups constituting the party-list system. Hence, the clear
intent, express wording, and party-list structure ordained in Section 5(1) and (2), Article VI of
the 1987 Constitution cannot be disputed: the party-list system is not for sectoral parties only, but
also for non-sectoral parties.
142 | P a g e
(129) Coalition of Asso. of Senior Citizens in the Phil. v Comelec, 201 SCRA 786 (2013)
ISSUE: Whether or not there was grave abuse of discretion on the part of COMELEC for
issuing Resolution without due process?
FACTS: On May 5, 2010, the nominees of SENIOR CITIZENS signed an agreement, entitled
Irrevocable Covenant, containing the list of nominees to share power in their sharing power
agreement. The COMELEC issued a Omnibus Resolution in SPP No. 12-157 (PLM) and SPP
No. 12-191 (PLM) stating that the list of nominees submitted to them shall be permanent. This is
in lieu of the empty seat in Congress after the 2010 elections following the resignation of Rep.
Kho. Two SENIOR CITIZENS were allocated seats in the House of Representatives, the first
being Rep. Arquiza, and Rep. Kho as the second. Rep. Arquiza, honoring Rep. Kho’s
resignation, stated that their fourth nominee shall take the latter’s seat considering that the third
nominee, Datol, has previously been expelled from the party. COMELEC claims that they shall
stay true to the list presented by SENIOR CITIZENS, regardless of Datol’s (being the third
nominee) expulsion. Also that the resignation of Rep. Kho shall not be recognized because it will
change the order of nominees.
DECISION: Yes
RATIO DECIDENDI: There is grave abuse on the part of COMELEC for violating due
process. Instead, the COMELEC issued the May 10, 2013 Omnibus Resolution in SPP No.
12157 (PLM) and SPP No. 12-191 (PLM) without conducting any further proceedings. The
Court ruled that the Omnibus Resolution dated May 10, 2013 of the Commission on Elections En
Banc in SPP No. 12-157 (PLM) and SPP No. 12-191 (PLM) is REVERSED and SET ASIDE
insofar as Coalition of Associations of Senior Citizens in the Philippines, Inc. is concerned, and
that the Commission on Elections En Banc is ORDERED to PROCLAIM the Coalition of
Associations of Senior Citizens in the Philippines, Inc. as one of the winning party-list
organizations during the May 13, 2013 elections with the number of seats it may be entitled to
based on the total number of votes it garnered during the said elections.
143 | P a g e
(130) Lico v Comelec, GR 205505, Sep 29, 2015
ISSUE: Commission on Elections' (COMELEC) jurisdiction over the expulsion of a sitting

party-list representative: from the House of Representatives, on the one... hand; and from his
party-list organization, on the other
FACTS: Petition for Certiorari under Rule 64[1] in relation to Rule 65,[2] seeking to annul the
Resolutions in E.M. No. 12-039 dated 18 July 2012 and 31 January 2013 of the COMELEC.
Ating Koop is a multi-sectoral party-list organization On 30 November 2009, Ating Koop filed
its Manifestation of Intent to Participate in the Party-List System of Representation for the 10
May 2010 Elections.[4] On 6 March 2010, it filed with the COMELEC the list of its nominees,
with petitioner Lico as first... nominee and Roberto Mascarina as second nominee. On 8
December 2010, COMELEC proclaimed Ating Koop as one of the winning party-list groups
Petitioner Lico subsequently took his oath of office on 9 December 2010 before the Secretary-
General of the House of Representatives,[7] and thereafter assumed office. Several months prior
to its proclamation as one of the winning party-list organizations, or on 9 June 2010, Ating Koop
issued Central Committee Resolution 2010-01, which incorporated a term-sharing agreement
signed by its nominees.[8] Under the agreement,... petitioner Lico was to serve as Party-list
Representative for the first year of the three-year term. On 5 December 2011, or almost one year
after petitioner Lico had assumed office, the Interim Central Committee expelled him from Ating
Koop for disloyalt The said Petition, which was subsequently raffled to the Second Division,
prayed that petitioner Lico... be ordered to vacate the office of Ating Koop in the House of
Representatives, and for the succession of the second nominee, Roberto Mascarina as Ating
Koop's representative in the House. Ating Koop had expelled Congressman Lico for acts
inimical to the party-list group, such as malversation, graft and corruption
DECISION: Granted
RATIO DECIDENDI: We find that while the COMELEC correctly dismissed the Petition to
expel petitioner Lico from the House of Representatives for being beyond its jurisdiction, it
nevertheless proceeded to rule upon the validity of his expulsion from Ating Koop - a matter
beyond its purview. The COMELEC notably characterized the Petition for expulsion of
petitioner Lico from the House of Representatives and for the succession of the second nominee
as party-list representative as a disqualification case. For this reason, the COMELEC dismissed
the petition for lack of... jurisdiction, insofar as it relates to the question of unseating petitioner
Lico from the House of Representatives. Section 17, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution[34]
endows the HRET with jurisdiction to resolve questions on the qualifications of members of
Congress. In the case of party-list representatives, the HRET acquires jurisdiction over a
disqualification case... upon proclamation of the winning party-list group, oath of the nominee,
and assumption of office as member of the House of Representatives.[35] In this case, the
COMELEC proclaimed Ating Koop as a winning party-list group; petitioner Lico took his oath;
and... he assumed office in the House of Representatives. Thus, it is the HRET, and not the
COMELEC, that has jurisdiction over the disqualification case The jurisdiction of the HRET is
exclusive. It is given full authority to hear and decide the cases on any matter touching on the
validity of the title of the proclaimed winner
144 | P a g e
(131) Abang Lingkod vs. Comelec 2013
ISSUE: Whether national, regional, and sectoral parties and organizations are required under
the law to show their genuineness and bona fide existence in determining if they are eligible for
registration with the Commission on Elections
FACTS: This is a petition for certiorari filed by Abang Lingkod challenging the May 2013
resolution issued by COMELEC cancelling the Abang Lingkod's party-list registration.
COMELEC says that it is not enough that the party-list organization claim representation of the
marginalized and underrepresented because representation is easy to claim. Records shows that
Abang Lingkod failed to stablish its track record which is important to prove that the party-list
continuously represents the marginalized. Abang Lingkod merely offered pictures of some
alleged activities they conducted after the 2010 elections. These pictures appears to be edited.
Under The Party-List System Act, a group’s registration may be cancelled for declaring unlawful
statements in its petition. Photoshopping images to establish a fact that did not occur is
tantamount to declaring unlawful statements. It is on this ground that the Commission cancels
ABANG LINGKOD’s registration.
DECISION:
RATIO DECIDENDI: A party, by law, is either "a political party or a sectoral party or a
coalition of parties."17 A political party is defined as: x x x an organized group of citizens
advocating an ideology or platform, principles and policies for the general conduct of
government and which, as the most immediate means of securing their adoption, regularly
nominates and supports certain of its leaders and members as candidates for public office. A
party is a national party "when its constituency is spread over the geographical territory of at
least a majority of the regions. It is a regional party when its constituency is spread over the
geographical territory of at least a majority of the cities and provinces comprising the region."
On the other hand, a sectoral party: x x x refers to an organized group of citizens belonging to
any of the sectors enumerated in Section 5 hereof whose principal advocacy pertains to the
special interest and concerns of their sector.
145 | P a g e
(132) Akbayan vs HRET
ISSUE: Whether or not respondent HRET has jurisdiction over the question of qualifications of
petitioners Abayon and Palparan.
FACTS: Jovito S. Palparan, Jr. is the first nominee of the Bantay party-list group that won a
seat in the 2007 elections for the members of the House of Representatives. Lesaca and the
others alleged that Palparan was ineligible to sit in the House of Representatives as party-list
nominee because he did not belong to the marginalized and underrepresented sectors that Bantay
represented, namely, the victims of communist rebels, Civilian Armed Forces Geographical
Units (CAFGUs), former rebels, and security guards. Petitioner Palparan countered that the
HRET had no jurisdiction over his person since it was actually the party-list Bantay, not he, that
was elected to and assumed membership in the House of Representatives. Palparan claimed that
he was just Bantay’s nominee. Consequently, any question involving his eligibility as first
nominee was an internal concern of Bantay. Such question must be brought, he said, before that
party-list group, not before the HRET.
DECISION:
RATIO DECIDENDI: although it is the party-list organization that is voted for in the elections,
it is not the organization that sits as and becomes a member of the House of Representatives.
Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution,5 identifies who the “members” of that House are: Sec.
5. (1). The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than two hundred and fifty
members, unless otherwise fixed by law, who shall be elected from legislative districts
apportioned among the provinces, cities, and the Metropolitan Manila area in accordance with
the number of their respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio,
and those who, as provided by law, shall be elected through a partylist system of registered
national, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations. (Underscoring supplied) Section 17,
Article VI of the Constitution9 provides that the HRET shall be the sole judge of all contests
relating to, among other things, the qualifications of the members of the House of
Representatives. Since, as pointed out above, party-list nominees are “elected members” of the
House of Representatives no less than the district representatives are, the HRET has jurisdiction
to hear and pass upon their qualifications. By analogy with the cases of district representatives,
once the party or organization of the party-list nominee has been proclaimed and the nominee
has taken his oath and assumed office as member of the House of Representatives, the
COMELEC’s jurisdiction over election contests relating to his qualifications ends and the
HRET’s own jurisdiction begins.
146 | P a g e
(133) Aquino vs. Comelec
ISSUE: Whether “residency” in the certificate of candidacy actually connotes “domicile” to

warrant the disqualification of Aquino from the position in the electoral district.
FACTS: Petitioner Agapito Aquino filed his certificate of candidacy for the position of
Representative for the Second District of Makati City. Private respondents Move Makati, a duly
registered political party, and MateoBedon, Chairman of LAKAS-NUCD-UMDP of Brgy.
Cembo, Makati City, filed a petition to disqualify petitioner on the ground that the latter lacked
the residence qualification as a candidate for congressman which, under Sec. 6, Art. VI of the
Constitution, should be for a period not less than 1 year immediately preceding the elections.
DECISION:
RATIO DECIDENDI: In order that petitioner could qualify as a candidate for Representative
of the Second District of Makati City, he must prove that he has established not just residence
but domicile of choice. Petitioner, in his certificate of candidacy for the 1992 elections, indicated
not only that he was a resident of San Jose, Concepcion, Tarlac in 1992 but that he was a resident
of the same for 52 years immediately preceding that elections. At that time, his certificate
indicated that he was also a registered voter of the same district. His birth certificate places
Concepcion, Tarlac as the birthplace of his parents. What stands consistently clear and
unassailable is that his domicile of origin of record up to the time of filing of his most recent
certificate of candidacy for the 1995 elections was Concepcion, Tarlac. The intention not to
establish a permanent home in Makati City is evident in his leasing a condominium unit instead
of buying one. While a lease contract may be indicative of petitioner’s intention to reside in
Makati City, it does not engender the kind of permanency required to prove abandonment of
one’s original domicile.
147 | P a g e
(134) Abayon vs HRET
ISSUE: Whether or not respondent HRET has jurisdiction over the question of qualifications of
FACTS: petitioner Daryl Grace J. Abayon is the first nominee of the Aangat Tayo party-list
organization that won a seat in the House of Representatives during the 2007 elections.
Respondents filed a petition for quo warranto with respondent HRET against petitioner Abayon.
They claimed that Aangat Tayo was not eligible for a party-list seat in the House of
Representatives, since it did not represent the marginalized and underrepresented sectors since
she did not belong to the marginalized and underrepresented sectors, she being the wife of an
incumbent congressional district representative. It was Aangat Tayo that was taking a seat in the
House of Representatives, and not Abayon who was just its nominee. All questions involving her
eligibility as first nominee, said Abayon, were internal concerns of Aangat Tayo.
DECISION:
RATIO DECIDENDI: although it is the party-list organization that is voted for in the elections,
it is not the organization that sits as and becomes a member of the House of Representatives.
Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution,5 identifies who the “members” of that House are: Sec.
5. (1). The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than two hundred and fifty
members, unless otherwise fixed by law, who shall be elected from legislative districts
apportioned among the provinces, cities, and the Metropolitan Manila area in accordance with
the number of their respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio,
and those who, as provided by law, shall be elected through a partylist system of registered
national, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations. (Underscoring supplied) Section 17,
Article VI of the Constitution9 provides that the HRET shall be the sole judge of all contests
relating to, among other things, the qualifications of the members of the House of
Representatives. Since, as pointed out above, party-list nominees are “elected members” of the
House of Representatives no less than the district representatives are, the HRET has jurisdiction
to hear and pass upon their qualifications. By analogy with the cases of district representatives,
once the party or organization of the party-list nominee has been proclaimed and the nominee
has taken his oath and assumed office as member of the House of Representatives, the
COMELEC’s jurisdiction over election contests relating to his qualifications ends and the
HRET’s own jurisdiction begins.10 The Court holds that respondent HRET did not gravely
abuse its discretion when it dismissed the petitions for quo warranto against Aangat Tayo party-
list and Bantay party-list but upheld its jurisdiction over the question of the qualifications of
148 | P a g e
(135) Santiago vs Guingona
ISSUE: Whether or not there was an actual violation of the Constitution in the selection of
respondent as Senate minority leader
FACTS: During the election of officers in the Senate, Sen. Marcelo Fernan and Sen. Tatad were
both nominated to the position of Senate President. By a vote of 20 to 2, Sen. Fernan was
declared the duly elected Senate President. Thereafter, Sen. Tatad manifested that, with the
agreement of Sen. Santiago, allegedly the only other member of the minority, he was assuming
position of minority leader. He explained that those who had voted for Sen. Fernan comprised
the “majority,” while only those who had voted for him, the losing nominee, belonged to the
“minority.” However, senators belonging to the Lakas-NUCD-UMDP Party – number 7 and,
thus, also a minority – had chosen Sen. Guingona as the minority leader. Thus, Petitioners filed
this case for quo warranto.
DECISION:
RATIO DECIDENDI: The term “majority” has been judicially defined a number of times.
When referring to a certain number out of a total or aggregate, it simply “means the number
greater than half or more than half of any total.” The plain and unambiguous words of the subject
constitutional clause simply mean that the Senate President must obtain the votes of more than
one half of all the senators. Not by any construal does it thereby delineate who comprise the
“majority,” much less the “minority,” in the said body. And there is no showing that the framers
of our Constitution had in mind other than the usual meanings of these terms.In effect, while the
Constitution mandates that the President of the Senate must be elected by a number constituting
more than one half of all the members thereof, it does not provide that the members who will not
vote for him shall ipso facto constitute the “minority,” who could thereby elect the minority
leader. Verily, no law or regulation states that the defeated candidate shall automatically become
the minority leader.
149 | P a g e
(136) Avelino vs Cuenco
ISSUE: Whether or not Resolutions 67 & 68 was validly approved.

FACTS: The petitioners, Senator Jose Avelino, in a quo warranto proceeding, asked the court to
declare him the rightful Senate President and oust the respondent, Mariano Cuenco. In a session
of the Senate, Tanada’s request to deliver a speech in order to formulate charges against then
Senate President Avelino was approved. With the leadership of the Senate President followed by
his supporters, they deliberately tried to delay and prevent Tanada from delivering his speech.
The SP with his supporters employed delaying tactics, the tried to adjourn the session then
walked out. Only 12 Senators were left in the hall. The members of the senate left continued the
session and Senator Cuenco was appointed as the Acting President of the Senate and was
recognized the next day by the President of the Philippines.
DECISION:
RATIO DECIDENDI: It was held that there is a quorum that 12 being the majority of 23. In
fine, all the four justice agree that the Court being confronted with the practical situation that of
the twenty three senators who may participate in the Senate deliberations in the days
immediately after this decision, twelve senators will support Senator Cuenco and, at most, eleven
will side with Senator Avelino, it would be most injudicious to declare the latter as the rightful
President of the Senate, that office being essentially one that depends exclusively upon the will
of the majority of the senators, the rule of the Senate about tenure of the President of that body
being amenable at any time by that majority. And at any session hereafter held with thirteen or
more senators, in order to avoid all controversy arising from the divergence of opinion here
about quorum and for the benefit of all concerned,the said twelve senators who approved the
resolutions herein involved could ratify all their acts and thereby place them beyond the shadow
of a doubt.
150 | P a g e
(137) Alejandrino vs Quezon
ISSUE: Whether or not the resolution disciplining Alejandrino is null and void?
FACTS: Senator Jose Alejandrino was declared guilty of disorderly conduct and flagrant
violation of the privileges of the Senate for having treacherously assaulted Senator Vicente de
Vera. He was deprived of his prerogatives, privileges and emoluments of being a senator. He
filed mandamus and injunction against respondent Senate President Manuel Quezon from
executing the said resolution and to declare the said resolution null and void.
DECISION:
RATIO DECIDENDI: Neither the Philippine Legislature nor a branch thereof can be directly
controlled in the exercise of their legislative powers by any judicial process. The court lacks
jurisdiction to consider the petition.No court has ever held and no court will ever hold that it
possesses the power to direct the Chief Executive or the Legislature to take any particular action.
Also, if the Court does not have any authority to control the Philippine Senate, it has likewise no
authority to control the actions of subordinate employees acting under the direction of the same.
151 | P a g e
(138) De Venecia vs Sandiganbayan
ISSUE: Whether the doctrine of separation of powers exclude the members of Congress from
the mandate of R.A. 3019.
FACTS: On 12 March 1993, an Information (docketed as Criminal Case 18857) was filed with
the Sandiganbayan (First Division) against then Congressman Ceferino S. Paredes, Jr., of
Agusan del Sur for violation of Section 3 (e) of Republic Act 3019 (The Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act, as amended). After the accused pleaded not guilty, the prosecution filed a “Motion
To Suspend The Accused Pendente Lite.” In its Resolution dated 6 June 1997, the
Sandiganbayan granted the motion and ordered the Speaker to suspend the accused. But the
Speaker did not comply. Thus, on 12 August 1997, the Sandiganbayan issued a Resolution
requiring him to appear before it, on 18 August 1997 at 8:00 a.m., to show cause why he should
not be held in contempt of court. Unrelenting, the Speaker filed, through counsel, a motion for
reconsideration, invoking the rule on separation of powers and claiming that he can only act as
may be dictated by the House as a body pursuant to House Resolution 116 adopted on 13 August
1997. On 29 August 1997, the Sandiganbayan rendered a Resolution declaring Speaker Jose C.
de Venecia, Jr. in contempt of court and ordering him to pay a fine of P10,000.00 within 10 days
from notice.Jose de Venecia, Jr., in his capacity as Speaker of the House of Representatives;
Roberto P. Nazareno, in his capacity as Secretary-General of the House of Representatives; Jose
Ma. Antonio B. Tuaño, Cashier, House of Representatives; Antonio M. Chan, Chief, Property
Division, House of Representatives, filed the petition for certiorari.
DECISION:
RATIO DECIDENDI: As held in Miriam Defensor Santiago v. Sandiganbayan, et al., the
doctrine of separation of powers does not exclude the members of Congress from the mandate of
RA 3019. The order of suspension prescribed by Republic Act 3019 is distinct from the power of
Congress to discipline its own ranks under the Constitution. The suspension contemplated in the
above constitutional provision is a punitive measure that is imposed upon a determination by the
Senate or the House of Representatives, as the case may be, upon an erring member.Its purpose
is to prevent the accused public officer from frustrating his prosecution by influencing witnesses
or tampering with documentary evidence and from committing further acts of malfeasance while
in office. It is thus an incident to the criminal proceedings before the court. On the other hand,
the suspension or expulsion contemplated in the Constitution is a House-imposed sanction
against its members. It is, therefore, a penalty for disorderly behavior to enforce discipline,
maintain order in its proceedings, or vindicate its honor and integrity.
152 | P a g e
(139) Pobre vs. Defensor Santiago
ISSUE: Whether or not there is a ground for Sen. Defensor-Santiago to be disbarred or

subjected to disciplinary action by the Court for her questioned speech
FACTS: In one of her privilege speeches before the Senate, Sen. Miriam Defensor-Santiago
delivered the following remarks: x x x I am not angry. I am irate. I am foaming in the mouth. I
am homicidal. I am suicidal. I am humiliated, debased, degraded. And I am not only that, I feel
like throwing up to be living my middle years in a country of this nature. I am nauseated. I spit
on the face of Chief Justice Artemio Panganiban and his cohorts in the Supreme Court, I am no
longer interested in the position [of Chief Justice] if I was to be surrounded by idiots. I would
rather be in a different environment than in a Supreme Court of idiots. x x x Her speech came as
a response to the decision of the Judicial and Bar Council (JBC) declaring that only sitting
members of the Supreme Court can be nominated for the impending vacancy of the CJ post.
Consequently, nominees who were not incumbent members of the Court, including Sen.
Defensor-Santiago, were automatically disqualified. Private complainant Antero J. Pobre filed
the instant petition before the Court, contending that the lady senator's utterances amounted to a
total disrespect towards then CJ Panganiban and a direct contempt of Court. Accordingly, he
wanted disbarment proceedings or other disciplinary actions to be taken against Sen. Defensor-
Santiago.
DECISION:
RATIO DECIDENDI: o, the Court sided with Sen. Defensor-Santiago's defense that she
should be afforded parliamentary immunity from suit pursuant to Section 11, Art. VI of the 1987
Constitution, which section states in part that "no [Senator] x x x shall be questioned nor be held
liable in any other place for any speech or debate in the Congress or in any committee thereof."
Although there was no express admission on the part of the lady senator that she did indeed say
those words, there was no categorical denial either, which the Court ultimately regarded as an
implied admission. Despite the dismissal of the letter-complaint, the Court heavily chastised the
lady senator for indulging in "insulting rhetoric and offensive personalities." In fact, her excuse
that her questioned speech was a prelude to crafting remedial legislation on the JBC struck the
Court as being a mere afterthought in light of the controversy her utterances had managed to stir.
Still, the Court held that parliamentary immunity is essential because without it, the parliament
or its equivalent would "degenerate into a polite and ineffective forum." However, it should be
noted that "[l]egislators are immune from deterrents to the uninhibited discharge of of their
legislative duties, not for their private indulgence, but for the public good."
153 | P a g e
(140) Philconsa vs. Mathay
ISSUE: Whether or not the salary increase was constitutional?

FACTS: RA 4134 provided for increase of salary of Senate President, Speaker of the House and
members of the Senate and House of Representatives. This took effect on 30 June 1966.
However record show that the increase was implemented on 1964.Philippine Constitution
Association assailed the validity of RA 4134, stating that this is in violation of Section 14 Article
6 of the Constitution, “No increase in said compensation shall take effect until after the
expiration of the full term of all the members of the Senate and House of Representatives
approving such increase. Thus the petition for writ of prohibition.
DECISION:
RATIO DECIDENDI: Republic Act No. 4134 is not operative until December 30, 1969, when
the full term of all members of the Senate and House that approved it on June 20, 1964 will have
expired. Consequently, appropriation for such increased compensation may not be disbursed
until December 30, 1969. In so far as Republic Act No. 4642 (1965-1966 Appropriation Act)
authorizes the disbursement of the increased compensation prior to the date aforesaid, it also
violates the Constitution and must be held null and void.
154 | P a g e
(141) Ligot vs. Mathay, 56 SCRA 823 (1974)
ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner is entitled to such retirement benefit

FACTS: Petitioner was re-elected to a third term (December 30, 1965 to December 30, 1969)
but was held not entitled to the salary increase of P32,000.00 during such third term by virtue of
this Court’s unanimous decision in Philconsa vs. Mathay. He lost his next bid and filed for
retirement claim. House of Representative issued a treasury warrant using the unapproved
amount. Congress Auditor did not sign the warrant. Petitioner’s request for reconsideration was
denied, hence the petition.
RATIO DECIDENDI: To grant retirement gratuity to members of Congress whose terms
expired on December 30, 1969 computed on the basis of an increased salary of P32,000.00 per
annum (which they were prohibited by the Constitution from receiving during their term of
office) would be to pay them prohibited emoluments which in effect increase the salary beyond
that which they were permitted by the Constitution to receive during their incumbency.
155 | P a g e
(142) People vs. Jalosjos, GR 132875-76, February 3, 2000
ISSUE: Does membership in Congress exempt an accused from statutes and rules which apply
to validly incarcerated persons in general?
FACTS: The accused-appellant, Romeo Jalosjos, is a full-fledged member of Congress who is
confined at the national penitentiary while his conviction for statutory rape and acts of
lasciviousness is pending appeal. The accused-appellant filed a motion asking that he be allowed
to fully discharge the duties of a Congressman, including attendance at legislative sessions and
committee meetings despite his having been convicted in the first instance of a non-bailable
offense on the basis of popular sovereignty and the need for his constituents to be represented.
DECISION: Denied.
RATIO DECIDENDI: The immunity from arrest or detention of Senators and members of the
House of Representatives arises from a provision of the Constitution. The privilege has always
been granted in a restrictive sense. The provision granting an exemption as a special privilege
cannot be extended beyond the ordinary meaning of its terms. It may not be extended by
intendment, implication or equitable considerations. The accused-appellant has not given any
reason why he should be exempted from the operation of Sec. 11, Art. VI of the Constitution.
The members of Congress cannot compel absent members to attend sessions if the reason for the
absence is a legitimate one. The confinement of a Congressman charged with a crime punishable
by imprisonment of more than six years is not merely authorized by law, it has constitutional
foundations. To allow accused-appellant to attend congressional sessions and committee
meetings for 5 days or more in a week will virtually make him a free man with all the privileges
appurtenant to his position. Such an aberrant situation not only elevates accused-appellant’s
status to that of a special class, it also would be a mockery of the purposes of the correction
system.
156 | P a g e
(143) Adaza vs Pacana, 135 SCRA 431 (1985)
ISSUE: Whether or not Adaza can serve as a member of the Batasan and as a governor of the
province simultaneously.
FACTS: Adaza is the governor of Misamis Oriental and Pacana is the vice-governor. Their
respective term of office expires on March 3, 1986. Both parties ran in the Batasang Pambansa
(BP) elections in 1984 and respondent lost to petitioner. On July 23, 1984, Pacana took his oath
of office as the governor. Adaza has brought this petition to exclude Pacana therefrom, claiming
to be the lawful occupant of the position.
RATIO DECIDENDI: Section 10, Article VIII of the Constitution is clear and unambiguous. A
member of the BP may not hold any other office in the government. A public office is a public
trust. A holder thereof is subject to regulations and conditions as the law may impose and he
cannot complain of any restrictions on his holding of more than one office. The contention that
Pacana, as a mere private citizen, runs afoul of BP Blg. 697 which provides that governors, or
members of Sanggunian or barangay officials, upon filing a certificate of candidacy be
considered on forced leave of absence from office. When respondent reassumed the position of
vice-governor after the BP elections, he was acting within the law. Thus, the instant petition is
denied.
157 | P a g e
(144) Puyat vs. De Guzman, 113 SCRA 31 (1982)
ISSUE: Whether or not Assemblyman Fernandez, as a stockholder of IPI, may intervene in the
SEC case without violating Sec. 11, Art. VIII (now Sec. 14, Art. VI) of the Constitution
FACTS: After an election for the Directors of the International Pipe Industries Corporation
(IPI) was held, one group, the respondent Acero group, instituted at the SEC quo warranto
proceedings, questioning the election. Justice Estanislao Fernandez, then a member of the
Interim Batasang Pambansa, entered his appearance as counsel for respondent Acero to which
the petitioner, Puyat group, objected on Constitutional ground that no Assemblyman could
“appear as counsel before any administrative body,” and SEC was an administrative body.
Assemblyman Fernandez did not continue his appearance for respondent Acero. Assemblyman
Fernandez had purchased 10 shares of IPI for P200.00 upon request of respondent Acero.
Following the notarization of Assemblyman Fernandez’ purchase, he filed a motion for
intervention in the SEC case as the owner of 10 IPI shares alleging legal interest in the matter in
litigation. The SEC granted leave to intervene on the basis of Fernandez’ ownership of the said
10 shares.
DECISION: The intervention of Assemblyman Fernandez in SEC No. 1747 falls within the
ambit of the prohibition contained in Section 11, Article VIII of the Constitution.
RATIO DECIDENDI: Ordinarily, by virtue of the motion for intervention, Assemblyman
Fernandez cannot be said to be appearing as counsel. Ostensibly, he is not appearing on behalf of
another, although he is joining the cause of the private respondents. His appearance could
theoretically be for the protection of his ownership of 10 shares of IPI in respect of the matter in
litigation. However, certain salient circumstances militate against the intervention of
Assemblyman Fernandez in the SEC case. He had acquired a mere P200.00 worth of stock in
IPI, representing 10 shares out of 262,843 outstanding shares. He acquired them “after the fact”
that is, after the contested election of directors, after the quo warranto suit had been filed before
the SEC and 1 day before the scheduled hearing of the case before the SEC. And what is more,
before he moved to intervene, he had signified his intention to appear as counsel for respondent
Acero, but which was objected to by petitioners. Realizing, perhaps, the validity of the objection,
he decided, instead, to intervene on the ground of legal interest in the matter under litigation. The
Court is constrained to find that there has been an indirect appearance as counsel before an
administrative body, it is a circumvention of the Constitutional prohibition contained in Sec. 11,
Art. VIII (now Sec. 14, Art. VI). The intervention was an afterthought to enable him to appear
actively in the proceedings in some other capacity.
158 | P a g e
(145) Liban vs. Gordon, 593 SCRA 68 (2009) and 639 SCRA 709 (2011)
ISSUE: Was it proper for the Court to have ruled on the constitutionality of the PNRC statute?
Whether respondent should be automatically removed as a Senator pursuant to Section 13,
Article VI of the Philippine Constitution
FACTS: Petitioners Liban, et al., who were officers of the Board of Directors of the Quezon
City Red Cross Chapter, filed with the Supreme Court what they styled as “Petition to Declare
Richard J. Gordon as Having Forfeited His Seat in the Senate” against respondent Gordon, who
was elected Chairman of the Philippine National Red Cross (PNRC) Board of Governors during
his incumbency as Senator. Gordon filed a motion for partial reconsideration on a Supreme
Court decision which ruled that being chairman of the Philippine National Red Cross (PNRC)
did not disqualify him from being a Senator, and that the charter creating PNRC is
unconstitutional as the PNRC is a private corporation and the Congress is precluded by the
Constitution to create such.The Court then ordered the PNRC to incorporate itself with the SEC
as a private corporation. Gordon takes exception to the second part of the ruling, which
addressed the constitutionality of the statute creating the PNRC as a private corporation. Gordon
avers that the issue of constitutionality was only touched upon in the issue of locus standi. It is a
rule that the constitutionality will not be touched upon if it is not the lis mota of the case.
DECISION: No, it was not correct for the Court to have decided on the constitutional issue
because it was not the very lis mota of the case. The PNRC is sui generis in nature; it is neither
strictly a GOCC nor a private corporation. The office of the PNRC Chairman is not a
government office or an office in a government-owned or controlled corporation for purposes of
the prohibition in Section 13, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution.
RATIO DECIDENDI: The Court will not touch the issue of unconstitutionality unless it is the
very lis mota. It is a well-established rule that a court should not pass upon a constitutional
question and decide a law to be unconstitutional or invalid, unless such question is raised by the
parties and that when it is raised, if the record also presents some other ground upon which the
court may [rest] its judgment, that course will be adopted and the constitutional question will be
left for consideration until such question will be unavoidable. PNRC is a Private Organization
Performing Public Functions the Philippine government does not own the PNRC. It does not
have government assets and does not receive any appropriation from the Philippine Congress. It
is financed primarily by contributions from private individuals and private entities obtained
through solicitation campaigns organized by its Board of Governors. The PNRC is not
government-owned but privately owned.
159 | P a g e
(146) Macalintal vs. COMELEC, GR 157013, July 10, 2003
ISSUE: Is RA 9189 [Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003], valid & constitutional?
FACTS: A petition for certiorari and prohibition filed by Romulo B. Macalintal, a member of
the Philippine Bar, seeking a declaration that certain provisions of Republic Act No. 9189 (The
Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003) suffer from constitutional infirmity. Claiming that he
has actual and material legal interest in the subject matter of this case in seeing to it that public
funds are properly and lawfully used and appropriated, petitioner filed the instant petition as a
taxpayer and as a lawyer. Petitioner posits that Section 5(d) is unconstitutional because it violates
Section 1, Article V of the 1987 Constitution which requires that the voter must be a resident in
the Philippines for at least one year and in the place where he proposes to vote for at least six
months immediately preceding an election. Petitioner cites the ruling of the Court in Caasi vs.
Court of Appeals to support his claim. In that case, the Court held that a green card holder
immigrant to the United States is deemed to have abandoned his domicile and residence in the
Philippines.
DECISION: Partly granted.
RATIO DECIDENDI: Contrary to petitioner’s claim that Section 5(d) circumvents the
Constitution, Congress enacted the law prescribing a system of overseas absentee voting in
compliance with the constitutional mandate. Such mandate expressly requires that Congress
provide a system of absentee voting that necessarily presupposes that the “qualified citizen of the
Philippines abroad” is not physically present in the country. The petition was partly granted,
Sections 17(a), 18(b), 19(c), 20(d) are declared void for being repugnant to Section 1, Article IX-
A of the Constitution mandating the independence of constitutional commision, such as
COMELEC. Pursuant to Section 30 of RA No. 9189, the rest of the provisions of said law
continues to be in full force and effect.
160 | P a g e
(147) Abakada Group Party list vs. Purisima, GR 166715, August 14, 2008
ISSUE: Whether the creation of the congressional oversight committee violates the doctrine of
separation of powers under the Constitution
FACTS: Petitioners, Abakada Guro Party list invoking their right as taxpayers, filed a petition
challenging the constitutionality of RA 9335 and sought to prevent herein respondents from
implementing and enforcing said law. RA 9335 or Attrition Act of 2005 was enacted to optimize
the revenue-generation capability and collection of the BIR and the BOC. The law intends to
encourage their officials and employees to exceed their revenue targets by providing a system of
rewards and sanctions through the creation of Rewards and Incentives Fund and Revenue
Performance Evaluation Board. Petitioners assail the creation of a congressional oversight
committee on the ground that it violates the doctrine of separation of powers, as it permits
legislative participation in the implementation and enforcement of the law, when legislative
function should have been deemed accomplished and completed upon the enactment of the law.
Respondents, through the OSG, counter this by asserting that the creation of the congressional
oversight committee under the law enhances rather than violates separation of powers, as it
ensures the fulfillment of the legislative policy.
DECISION: Partially granted.
RATIO DECIDENDI: Congressional oversight is not unconstitutional per se, meaning, it
neither necessarily constitutes an encroachment on the executive power to implement laws nor
undermines the constitutional separation of powers. Rather, it is integral to the checks and
balances inherent in a democratic system of government. It may in fact even enhance the
separation of powers as it prevents the over-accumulation of power in the executive branch.
However, to forestall the danger of congressional encroachment “beyond the legislative sphere,”
the Constitution imposes two basic and related constraints on Congress. It may not vest itself,
any of its committees or its members with either executive or judicial power. And, when it
exercises its legislative power, it must follow the “single, finely wrought and exhaustively
considered, procedures” specified under the Constitution, including the procedure for enactment
of laws and presentment. Thus, any post-enactment congressional measure such as this should be
limited to scrutiny and investigation
161 | P a g e
(148) Bengzon vs. Blue Ribbon Committee, 203 SCRA 767
ISSUE: Whether or not the inquiry that is sought by the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee should
be granted
FACTS: It was alleged that Benjamin Romualdez and his wife together with the Marcoses
unlawfully and unjustly enriched themselves at the expense of the Filipino people. That they
obtained with the help of the Bengzon Law Office and Ricardo Lopa. Senator Juan Ponce Enrile
subsequently delivered a privilege speech alleging that Lopa took over various government
owned corporations which is in violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. Contained
in the speech is a motion to investigate on the matter. The motion was referred to the Committee
on Accountability of Public Officers or the Blue Ribbon Committee. Enrile subsequently took
advantage of the Senate’s privilege hour upon which he insisted to have an inquiry regarding the
matter. The SBRC rejected Lopa’s and Bengzon’s plea. Hence this petition.
DECISION: Granted.
RATIO DECIDENDI: The speech of Enrile contained no suggestion of contemplated
legislation; he merely called upon the Senate to look in to a possible violation of Sec.5 of RA
No.3019, otherwise known as “The Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.” In other words, the
purpose of the inquiry to be conducted by the Blue Ribbon Committee was to find out whether or
not the relatives of Cory, particularly Lopa, had violated the law in connection with the alleged
sale of the 36 or39 corporations belonging to Kokoy to the Lopa Group. There appears to be,
therefore, no intended legislation involved. Hence, the contemplated inquiry by the SBRC is not
really “in aid of legislation” because it is not related to a purpose within the jurisdiction of
Congress.
162 | P a g e
(149) Arnault vs. Nazareno, GR L-3820, July 18, 1950
ISSUE: Whether or not the senate has the authority to commit petitioner for contempt for a term
beyond its period of legislative session
FACTS: A petition for habeas corpus was filed by Arnault to relieve him from his confinement
in the New Bilibid Prison to which he has been committed by virtue of a resolution adopted by
the Senate on May 15, 1950. The Senate investigated the purchase by the government of two
parcels of land, known as Buenavista and Tambobong estates. An intriguing question that the
Senate sought to resolve was the apparent irregularity of the government’s payment to one Ernest
Burt, a non-resident American citizen, of the total sum of Php1.5million for his alleged interest
in the two estates that only amounted to Php20,000.00, which he seemed to have forfeited any
way long before. The Senate sought to determine who were responsible for and who benefited
from the transaction at the expense of the government.
DECISION: Denied.
RATIO DECIDENDI: The Senate had the authority to commit petitioner for contempt for a
term beyond its period of legislative session. There is no sound reason to limit the power of the
legislative body to punish for contempt to the end of every session and not to the end of the last
session terminating the existence of that body. The very reason for the exercise of the power to
punish for contempt is to enable the legislative body to perform its constitutional function
without impediment or obstruction.
163 | P a g e
(150) PHILCOMSAT Holdings Corporation vs. Senate, GR 180308, June 19, 2012
ISSUE: Whether or not Senate committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction in approving Committee Resolution No. 312
FACTS: Petitioners Locsin and Andal are bot directors and corporate officers of PHC, as well
as nominees of the government to the board of directors of both POTC and PHILCOMSAT filed
a petition for Certiorari and Prohibition assails and seeks to enjoin the implementation of and
nullify Committee Report No. 312 submitted by respondents Senate Committees on Government
Corporations and Public Enterprises and on Public Services (respondents Senate Committees) on
June 7, 2007 for allegedly having been approved by respondent Senate of the Republic of the
Philippines (respondent Senate) with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or in excess of
jurisdiction.
RATIO DECIDENDI: Article VI, Section 21 of the Constitution provides that the Senate or
the House of Representatives or any of its respective committees may conduct inquiries in aid of
legislation in accordance with its duly published rules of procedure. The rights of persons
appearing in or affected by such inquiries shall be respected. Such conferral of the legislative
power of inquiry upon any committee of Congress, in this case the respondents Senate
Committees, must carry with it all powers necessary and proper for its effective discharge. The
respondents Senate Committees cannot be said to have acted with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or in excess of jurisdiction when it submitted Committee Resolution No. 312,
given its constitutional mandate to conduct legislative inquiries.
164 | P a g e
(151) Neri v Senate Committee on Accountability of Public Officers 549 SCRA 77 and 564
SCRA 152)
ISSUE: Whether or not the communications elicited by the 3 questions covered by executive
privilege
FACTS: The Senate issued various Senate Resolutions directing SBRC, among others, to
conduct an investigation regarding the NBN-ZTE deal. Neri, the head of NEDA, was then
invited to testify before the Senate Blue Ribbon. He disclosed that the COMELEC Chairman
Abalos offered him P200M in exchange for his approval of the NBN Project, that he informed
PGMA about the bribery and that she instructed him not to accept the bribe. However, when
probed further on what they discussed about the NBN Project, he refused to answer, invoking
“executive privilege”. In particular, he refused to answer the questions on (a) whether or not
President Arroyo followed up the NBN Project, (b) whether or not she directed him to prioritize
it, and (c) whether or not she directed him to approve. As a result, the Senate cited him for
contempt.
DECISION: Granted
RATIO DECIDENDI: The Supreme Court found the Senate to have gravely abused its
discretion in citing the petitioner for contempt for his refusal to answer questions propounded to
him in the course of legislative inquiry. The Court declared that “there being a legitimate claim
of executive privilege, the issuance of contempt order suffers from constitutional infirmity.”
Executive privilege: 2 kinds: presidential communications (between president and executive
official) and deliberative process (between executive officials only)
165 | P a g e
(152) Balag v. Senate GR 234608
ISSUE: Whether or not the Senate has power to impose the indefinite detention of a person
cited in contempt during its inquiries
FACTS: Balag, leader of Aegis Juris Fraternity filed a petition before the SC after senators
ordered him detained in Senate premises for being uncooperative in the probe into the death of
the UST Law Student Horacio "Atio" del Castillo III. During the Senate inquiry, Balag
repeatedly invoked his right against self-incrimination when asked if he headed the fraternity
DECISION: Denied for being moot and academic. However, the period of imprisonment under
the inherent power of contempt of the Senate during inquiries in aid of legislation should only
last until the termination of the legislative inquiry.
RATIO DECIDENDI: The Court declared the case as moot and academic but the petition
presents a critical and decisive issue that must be resolved and capable of repetition. This issue
must be threshed out as the Senate's exercise of its power of contempt without a definite period is
capable of repetition,” it said, adding that “the indefinite detention of persons cited in contempt
impairs their constitutional right to liberty. The Supreme Court has ruled that the Senate has no
power to impose the indefinite detention of a person cited in contempt during its inquiries.
166 | P a g e
(153) Senate v. Ermita GR 169777
ISSUE: Is Section 3 of E.O. 464, which requires all the public officials, enumerated in Section
2(b) to secure the consent of the President prior to appearing before either house of Congress,
valid and constitutional?
FACTS: In the exercise of its legislative power, the Senate of the Philippines, through its
various Senate Committees, conducts inquiries or investigations in aid of legislation. The
Committee of the Senate issued invitations to various officials of the Executive Department for
them to appear as resource speakers in a public hearing on the railway project, others on the
issues of massive election fraud in the Philippine elections, wire tapping, and the role of military
in the so-called “Gloriagate Scandal”. Said officials were not able to attend due to lack of
consent from the President as provided by E.O. 464, Section 3 which requires all the public
officials enumerated in Section 2(b) to secure the consent of the President prior to appearing
before either house of Congress
DECISION: Partly Granted
RATIO DECIDENDI: No. The enumeration in Section 2 (b) of E.O. 464 is broad and is
covered by the executive privilege. The doctrine of executive privilege is premised on the fact
that certain information must, as a matter of necessity, be kept confidential in pursuit of the
public interest. The privilege being, by definition, an exemption from the obligation to disclose
information, in this case to Congress, the necessity must be of such high degree as to outweigh
the public interest in enforcing that obligation in a particular case.
167 | P a g e
(154) Belgica v. Executive Secretary GR 208566
ISSUE: Whether or not the 2013 PDAF Article and all other Congressional Pork Barrel Laws
similar thereto are unconstitutional considering that they violate the principles of/constitutional
provisions on (a) separation of powers; (b) non-delegability of legislati
FACTS: Belgica, et al filed an Urgent Petition For Certiorari and Prohibition With Prayer For
The Immediate Issuance of Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction
seeking that the annual "Pork Barrel System," presently embodied in the provisions of the GAA
of 2013 which provided for the 2013 PDAF, and the Executive‘s lump-sum, discretionary funds,
such as the Malampaya Funds and the Presidential Social Fund, be declared unconstitutional and
null and void for being acts constituting grave abuse of discretion. Also, they pray that the Court
issue a TRO against respondents
RATIO DECIDENDI: Yes, the PDAF article is unconstitutional. The post-enactment measures
which govern the areas of project identification, fund release and fund realignment are not
related to functions of congressional oversight and, hence, allow legislators to intervene and/or
assume duties that properly belong to the sphere of budget execution. This violates the principle
of separation of powers. Congress‘role must be confined to mere oversight that must be confined
to: (1) scrutiny and (2) investigation and monitoring of the implementation of laws. Any action
or step beyond that will undermine the separation of powers guaranteed by the constitution.
Thus, the court declares the 2013 pdaf article as well as all other provisions of law which
similarly allow legislators to wield any form of post-enactment authority in the implementation
or enforcement of the budget, unrelated to congressional oversight, as violative of the separation
of powers principle and thus unconstitutional.
168 | P a g e
(155) Araullo v Abad GR 209287
ISSUE: Whether or not the DAP, and all other executive issuances allegedly implementing the
DAP, violated Sec 25(5) of Article VI of the 1987 Constitution
FACTS: Maria Carolina Araullo filed a petition before the Supreme Cort questioning the
validity of DAP (Disbursement Accelaration Program). That, it is unconstitutional because it
violates the constitutional rule which provides that "no money shall be paid out of the Treasury
except in pursuance of an appropriation made by law. DBM Secretary Abad argued that the DAP
is based on GAA (General Appropriations Act) (Savings and augmentation provisions)
RATIO DECIDENDI: Yes, it violated Sec 25 (5) of Article VI of the Costitution. The
augmentation is, according to the ponencia, and defined in Art. VI, Sec. 25 (5) of the 1987
Constitution, and authorized within each year’s General Appropriations Act (GAA), is the use of
clearly-identified savings in the expenditures of government departments and offices to augment
clearly-identified, actual deficiencies within those respective government departments and
offices. What augmentation is not, however, is to allocate what was not authorized as an
expenditure in the GAA. It is not a transfer of executive department savings to legislative lump
sum allocations (cross-border augmentation) – by virtue of the latter’s unconstitutionality, or at
the very least, because such itself violates Art. VI Sec. 25 (5)
169 | P a g e
(156) Lawyers against Monopoly and Poverty (LAMP) v. The Secretary of Budget and
Management GR 164987
ISSUE: Whether or not the implementation of PDAF by the Members of Congress is

unconstitutional and illegal
FACTS: LAMP filed an action for certiorari assailing the constitutionality and legality of the
implementation of the Priority Development Assistance Fund (PDAF) as provided for in
Republic Act (R.A.) 9206 or the General Appropriations Act for 2004 (GAA of 2004). LAMP,
this situation runs afoul against the principle of separation of powers because in receiving and,
thereafter, spending funds for their chosen projects, the Members of Congress in effect intrude
into an executive function.
DECISION: Dismissed
RATIO DECIDENDI: The petition is miserably wanting in this regard. No convincing proof
was presented showing that, indeed, there were direct releases of funds to the Members of
Congress, who actually spend them according to their sole discretion. Devoid of any pertinent
evidentiary support that illegal misuse of PDAF in the form of kickbacks has become a common
exercise of unscrupulous Members of Congress, the Court cannot indulge the petitioner’s request
for rejection of a law which is outwardly legal and capable of lawful enforcement.
170 | P a g e
(157) Arnault v. Balagtas 97 Phil 358
ISSUE: Whether or not Congress has authority to punish recalcitrant witness

FACTS: This was a petition for habeas corpus filed by Jean Arnault against the Director of
Prisons, Balagtas. Arnault was incarcerated pursuant to a resolution by the Senate finding
Arnault in contempt for refusing to disclose the name of a person with whom he transacted
business in relation to a government purchase of of the Buenavista and Tambobong estates. The
circumstances of Arnault's incarceration are described in the companion case Arnaultvs.
Nazareno (1950) which affirmed the Legislature's power to hold a person in contempt for
defying or refusing to comply with an order in a legislative inquiry. Arnault eventually divulged
that he had transacted with one Jess D. Santos in relation to the Buenavista and Tambobong deal.
Upon further inquiry, the Senate, obviously not satisfied with Arnault's explanations, adopted
Resolution No. 114.
DECISION: Denied
RATIO DECIDENDI: The question raised by the petitioner was the legality of his detention by
order of the Senate for his refusal to answer questions put to him by one of its investigating
committees. The Supreme Court refused to order his release and deferred to the discretionary
authority of the legislative body to punish contumacious witnesses for contempt. The exercise of
the legislature's authority to deal with the defiant and contumacious witness should be supreme
and is not subject to judicial interference, except when there is a manifest and absolute disregard
of discretion and a mere exertion of arbitrary power coming within the reach of constitutional
limitations.
171 | P a g e
(158) Imbong v. Ochoa 721 SCRA 146
ISSUE: Whether or not RH Law violated the one subject-one title rule under the Constitution
FACTS: Petitioners question the constitutionality of the RH Law, claiming that it violates
Section 26(1), Article VI of the Constitution, prescribing the one subject-one title rule.
According to them, being one for reproductive health with responsible parenthood, the assailed
legislation violates the constitutional standards of due process by concealing its true intent – to
act as a population control measure. On the other hand, respondents insist that the RH Law is not
a birth or population control measure, and that the concepts of “responsible parenthood” and
“reproductive health” are both interrelated as they are inseparable.
RATIO DECIDENDI: No. In this case, a textual analysis of the various provisions of the law
shows that both “reproductive health” and “responsible parenthood” are interrelated and germane
to the overriding objective to control the population growth. Considering the close intimacy
between “reproductive health” and “responsible parenthood” which bears to the attainment of the
goal of achieving “sustainable human development” as stated under its terms, the Court finds no
reason to believe that Congress intentionally sought to deceive the public as to the contents of the
assailed legislation.
172 | P a g e
(159) Tanada v. Tuvera 136 SCRA 27
ISSUE: Whether or not the statutes in question which contain special provisions as to the date
they are to take effect still need to be published in the Official Gazette
FACTS: Petitioners herein are seeking a writ of mandamus to compel public officials to publish
and/or cause the publication in the Official Gazette of various presidential decrees, letters of
instructions, general orders, proclamations, executive orders, letters of implementation, and
administrative orders. Respondents, on the other hand, claimed that this case has no legal
personality or standing. Further, they argued that the publication in the Official Gazette in
necessary for the effectivity of the law where the law themselves provides for their own
effectivity dates
DECISION: Granted
RATIO DECIDENDI: . Yes. Publication in the Official Gazette is necessary in those cases
where the legislation itself does not provide for its effectivity date, for then the date of
publication is material for determining the date of the effectivity which must be 15 days
following the completion of its publication, but not when the law itself provides for the date
when it goes to effect. Publication of laws is part of substantive due process
173 | P a g e
(160) Abbas v. SET
ISSUE: Whether or not it is constitutional to inhibit all involved senators, six of which are
sitting in the tribunal
FACTS: On 09 October 1987 petitioner filed before Senate Electoral Tribunal an election
contest against 22 candidates of the LABAN who were proclaimed senators-elect. With the
exemption of Senator Estrada, the senators filed for motion for disqualification or inhibition from
the hearing and resolution on the ground that all of them are interested parties to said case.
DECISION: Dismissed
RATIO DECIDENDI: The Supreme Court dismissed the petition for certiorari for lack of
merit and affirmed the decision of the Tribunal to not let Senator-Members to inhibit or
disqualify himself, rather, just let them refrain from participating in the resolution of a case
where he sincerely feels that his personal interests or biases would stand in the way of an
objective and impartial judgment.
174 | P a g e
(161) Bondoc vs Pineda
ISSUE: Whether or not the House of Representatives is empowered to interfere with election
protests in the HRET by reorganizing the representation of the majority party in the HRET?
FACTS: On May 11, 1987, the petitioner (NP) and Pineda (LDP) were rival candidates for
Congressman of the Fourth District of Pampanga. Pineda was proclaimed the winner having
garnered a total of 31,700 votes compared to Bondoc’s 28,400 votes. The petitioner filed a
protest with the HRET, composed of 9 members, 3 Justices of the Supreme Court, 6 members of
the House chosen on the basis of proportional representation from political parties. A decision
was reached declaring Bondoc as the winner by 23 votes, another recount was insisted by the
LDP members of the tribunal which increased Bondoc to 107 votes more than Pineda’s.
Congressman Camasura (LDP) along with the Justices, voted to proclaim Bondoc as the winner.
Thereafter, Congressman Camasura received a letter informing him that he was expelled from
the LDP for allegedly helping organize the Partido Pilipino of Eduardo Cojuangco and inviting
LDP members to join. The House voted for Cong. Cmasura’s removal from the HRET and that
his vote be withdrawn.
DECISION: Petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus is granted
RATIO DECIDENDI: No, pursuant to Sec. 17 of Art. VI, the HRET is sole judge of all
contests in relation to the election, returns and qualification of their members. It is created as
non-partisan court to provide an independent and impartial tribunal for determination of contests.
The House cannot just shuffle and manipulate the political component for their benefit and
interests. The alleged “party disloyalty” of Cong. Camasura, as a reason for his removal from the
party, when he voted in favor of Bondoc, undermines the independence of the HRET. Such
members of the HRET have security of tenure. They can only be replaced in cases of term
expiration, death, permanent disability, resignation from the party. Disloyalty is not a valid cause
of termination.
175 | P a g e
(162) Codilla vs De Venecia
ISSUE: Whether or not respondent’s proclamation was valid.

FACTS: Petitioner garnered the highest votes in the election for representative in the 4th district
of Leyte as against respondent Locsin. Petitioner won while a disqualification suit was pending.
Respondent moved for the suspension of petitioner’s proclamation. By virtue of the Comelec ex
parte order, petitioner’s proclamation was suspended. Comelec later on resolved that petitioner
was guilty of soliciting votes and consequently disqualified him. Respondent Locsin was
proclaimed winner. Upon motion by petitioner, the resolution was however reversed and a new
resolution declared respondent’s proclamation as null and void. Respondent made his defiance
and disobedience to subsequent resolution publicly known while petitioner asserted his right to
the office he won.
DECISION: Petition for mandamus is granted
RATIO DECIDENDI: The respondent’s proclamation was premature given that the case
against petitioner had not yet been disposed of with finality. In fact, it was subsequently found
that the disqualification of the petitioner was null and void for being violative of due process and
for want of substantial factual basis. Furthermore, respondent, as second placer, could not take
the seat in office since he did not represent the electorate’s choice. Since the validity of
respondent’s proclamation had been assailed by petitioner before the Comelec and that the
Comelec was yet to resolve it, it cannot be said that the order disqualifying petitioner had
become final. Thus Comelec continued to exercise jurisdiction over the case pending finality.
The House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal does not have jurisdiction to review resolutions
or decisions of the Comelec. A petition for quo warranto must also fail since respondent’s
eligibility was not the issue.
176 | P a g e
(163) Cunanan vs Tan
ISSUE: Whether or not the appointment of Jorge Tan Jr is valid.

FACTS: Petitioner sought to nullify the ad interim appointment of Jorge Tan Jr as acting
Deputy Administrator of the Reforestation Administration. Carlos Cunanan was formerly
appointed in the same position but was later on rejected by the Commision of Appointment
prompting the President to replace him with Jorge Tan Jr immediately without his consent. Filing
the quo warranto proceeding to the Supreme Court, Cunanan questions the validity of the
convened Commission of Appointments citing irregularities as to the numbers of members
comprising the same.
DECISION: Dismissed
RATIO DECIDENDI: With the reorganization of the Commission of Appointment, it was
ruled that such is a power vested in the Congress as they deem it proper taking into consideration
the proportionate numbers of the members of the Commission of Appointment members as to
their political affiliations. However, with their reorganization, this affected a third party's right
which they rejected as its result. To correct this, the Supreme Court declared the reinstatement of
the petitioner and ordered respondent to vacate and turn over the office in contention.
177 | P a g e
(164) Velasco vs Belmonte
ISSUE: Does HRET have the jurisdiction over BB?

FACTS: COMELEC has cancelled BB’s CoC, acting upon the petition of AA, for alleged
misrepresentations in BB’s CoC. While the motion for reconsideration field by BB was pending,
the election was held and BB was proclaimed as winner by the Provincial Board of Canvassers.
CC filed an Election Protest in the HRET. COMELEC issued a Certificate of Finality on its
cancellation of BB’s CoC. Despite it, Speaker DD administered the oath of office to BB. BB
challenged COMELEC’s action and the Supreme Court upheld that there was no grave abuse of
discretion by COMELEC. AA filed for an immediate execution of COMELEC’s previous
resolution and to declare CC as winner. COMELEC declared the proclamation of BB as null and
void. CC filed a petition for the Court to issue a writ of mandamus to compel Speaker DD to
proclaim him as winner, despite notice given to him by COMELEC.
DECISION: Granted
RATIO DECIDENDI: NO. The jurisdiction of the HRET begins only after the candidate is
considered a Member of the House of Representatives. BB is not a bona fide member of the
House of Representatives for lack of a valid proclamation.. When BB took her oath of office
before respondent Speaker DD in open session, BB had no valid COC NOR a valid
proclamation. In view of the foregoing, BB has absolutely no legal basis to serve as a Member of
the House of Representatives, and therefore, she has no legal personality to be recognized as a
party-respondent at a proceeding before the HRET.
178 | P a g e
(165) Ty-Delgado vs HRET
ISSUE: WON the HRET gravely abused its discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction when it failed to disqualify Pichay for his conviction for libel, a crime involving
moral turpitude
FACTS: Philip Arreza Pichay was convicted by final judgment for four counts of libel. On 9
October 2012, Pichay filed his certificate of candidacy for the position of Member of the House
of Representatives for the First Legislative District of Surigao del Sur. Petitioner filed a petition
for disqualification under Section 12 of the Omnibus Election Code against Pichay before the
Commission on Elections on the ground that Pichay was convicted of libel, a crime involving
moral turpitude. She argued that when Pichay paid the fine on 17 February 2011, the five-year
period barring him to be a candidate had yet to lapse. HRET held that Pichay did not participated
the writing of the libelous articles but his conviction was in line with his duty as the president of
the publishing company. Based on the circumstances, the HRET concluded that Pichay’s
conviction for libel did not involve moral turpitude.
DECISION: Granted
RATIO DECIDENDI: In the present case, Pichay admits his conviction for four counts of
libel. the HRET committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of or excess of
jurisdiction when it failed to disqualify Pichay for his conviction for libel, a crime involving
moral turpitude. Since Pichay’s ineligibility existed on the day he filed his certificate of
candidacy and he was never a valid candidate for the position of Member of the House of
Representatives, the votes cast for him were considered stray votes.
179 | P a g e
(166) Republic vs Sandiganbayan
ISSUE: Whether or not the Swiss funds can be forfeited in favour of the Republic, on the basis
of the Marcoses’s lawful income?
FACTS: Petitioner Republic, through the Presidential Commission on Good Government
(PCGG), represented by the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), filed a petition for forfeiture
before the Sandiganbayan. Petitioner sought the declaration of the aggregate amount of US$356
million (now estimated to be more than US$658 million inclusive of interest) deposited in
escrow in the PNB, as ill-gotten wealth. The funds were previously held by the following five
account groups, using various foreign foundations in certain Swiss banks. Moreover, the petition
sought the forfeiture of US$25 million and US$5 million in treasury notes which exceeded the
Marcos couple's salaries, other lawful income as well as income from legitimately acquired
property. The treasury notes are frozen at the Central Bank of the Philippines, now Bangko
Sentral ng Pilipinas, by virtue of the freeze order issued by the PCGG. Before the case was set
for pre-trial, a General Agreement and the Supplemental Agreements were executed by the
Marcos children and then PCGG Chairman Magtanggol Gunigundo for a global settlement of the
assets of the Marcos family to identify, collate, cause the inventory of and distribute all assets
presumed to be owned by the Marcos family under their conditions contained therein.
DECISION: Granted
RATIO DECIDENDI: Yes. Their only known lawful income of $304,372.43 can therefore
legally and fairly serve as basis for determining the existence of a prima facie case of forfeiture
of the Swiss funds. The sum of $304,372.43 should be held as the only known lawful income of
respondents since they did not file any Statement of Assets and Liabilities (SAL), as required by
law, from which their net worth could be determined. Besides, under the 1935 Constitution,
Ferdinand E. Marcos as President could not receive "any other emolument from the Government
or any of its subdivisions and instrumentalities." Likewise, under the 1973 Constitution,
Ferdinand E. Marcos as President could "not receive during his tenure any other emolument from
the Government or any other source." In fact, his management of businesses, like the
administration of foundations to accumulate funds, was expressly prohibited under the 1973
Constitution.
180 | P a g e
(167) Estrada vs Arroyo
ISSUE: Whether or not Estrada permanently unable to act as President.

FACTS: Petitioner sought to enjoin the respondent Ombudsman from conducting any further
proceedings in any criminal complaint that may be filed in his office, until after the term of
petitioner as President is over and only if legally warranted. Erap also filed a Quo Warranto case,
praying for judgment “confirming petitioner to be the lawful and incumbent President of the
Republic of the Philippines temporarily unable to discharge the duties of his office, and declaring
respondent to have taken her oath as and to be holding the Office of the President, only in an
acting capacity pursuant to the provisions of the Constitution.”
DECISION: Dismissed
RATIO DECIDENDI: Yes, Section 11 of Article VII provides that “Congress has the ultimate
authority under the Constitution to determine whether the President is incapable of performing
his functions.” Both houses of Congress have recognized respondent Arroyo as the President.
Implicitly clear in that recognition is the premise that the inability of petitioner Estrada is no
longer temporary. Congress has clearly rejected petitioner’s claim of inability. Even if petitioner
can prove that he did not resign, still, he cannot successfully claim that he is a President on leave
on the ground that he is merely unable to govern temporarily. That claim has been laid to rest by
Congress and the decision that respondent Arroyo is the de jure President made by a co-equal
branch of government cannot be reviewed by the Supreme Court.
181 | P a g e
(168) Macalintal vs PET
ISSUE: Whether or not the creation of the Presidential Electoral Tribunal is Constitutional.
FACTS: Petitioner Atty. Romulo B. Macalintal, through a Motion for Reconsideration
reiterates his arguments that Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution does not provide for the
creation of the Presidential Electoral Tribunal (PET) and that the PET violates Section 12,
Article VIII of the Constitution. In order to strengthen his position, petitioner cites the concurring
opinion of Justice Teresita J. Leonardo-de Castro in “Barok” C. Biraogo v. The Philippine Truth
Commission of 2010 that the Philippine Truth Commission (PTC) is a public office which
cannot be created by the president, the power to do so being lodged exclusively with Congress.
Thus, petitioner submits that if the President, as head of the Executive Department, cannot create
the PTC, the Supreme Court, likewise, cannot create the PET in the absence of an act of
legislature.
DECISION: Dismissed
RATIO DECIDENDI: The Court reiterates that the PET is authorized by the last paragraph of
Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution and as supported by the discussions of the Members of
the Constitutional Commission, which drafted the present Constitution. With the explicit
provision, the present Constitution has allocated to the Supreme Court, in conjunction with
latter's exercise of judicial power inherent in all courts, the task of deciding presidential and vice-
presidential election contests, with full authority in the exercise thereof. The power wielded by
PET is a derivative of the plenary judicial power allocated to courts of law, expressly provided in
the Constitution. On the whole, the Constitution draws a thin, but, nevertheless, distinct line
between the PET and the Supreme Court. We have previously declared that the PET is not
simply an agency to which Members of the Court were designated. Once again, the PET, as
intended by the framers of the Constitution, is to be an institution independent, but not separate,
from the judicial department, i.e., the Supreme Court.
182 | P a g e
(169) Pormento vs Estrada
ISSUE: Whether or not Joseph Estrada is disqualified to run for presidency in the May 2010
elections according to the phrase in the Constitution which states that "the President shall not be
eligible for any re-election"?
FACTS: Atty. Pormento filed a petition for disqualification against former President Joseph
Estrada for being a presidential candidate in the May 2010 elections. The petition was denied by
COMELEC second division and subsequently by COMELEC en banc. Pormento then filed the
present petition for certiorari before the Court. In the meantime, Estrada was able to participate
as a candidate for President in the May 10, 2010 elections where he garnered the second highest
number of votes.
DECISION: Dismissed
RATIO DECIDENDI: No. There is no actual controversy in the case at bar. The respondent
did not win the second time he ran. The issue on the proper interpretation of the phrase "any re-
election" will be premised on a person second election as President. Assuming an actual case or
controversy existed prior to the proclamation of a President who has been duly elected in the
May 10, 2010 elections; the same is no longer true today. Following the results of that election,
private respondent was not elected President for the second time. Thus, any discussion of his "re-
election" will simply be hypothetical and speculative. It will serve no useful or practical purpose.
183 | P a g e
(170) Laurel vs Garcia
ISSUE: Whether or not the Chief Executive, her officers and agents, have the authority and
jurisdiction, to sell the Roppongi property.
FACTS: The subject property in this case is one of the 4 properties in Japan acquired by the
Philippine government under the Reparations Agreement entered into with Japan, the Roppongi
property. The said property was acquired from the Japanese government through Reparations
Contract No. 300. It consists of the land and building for the Chancery of the Philippine
Embassy. As intended, it became the site of the Philippine Embassy until the latter was
transferred to Nampeidai when the Roppongi building needed major repairs. President Aquino
created a committee to study the disposition/utilization of Philippine government properties in
Tokyo and Kobe, Japan. The President issued EO 296 entitling non-Filipino citizens or entities to
avail of separations' capital goods and services in the event of sale, lease or disposition.
DECISION: Granted
RATIO DECIDENDI: It is not for the President to convey valuable real property of the
government on his or her own sole will. Any such conveyance must be authorized and approved
by a law enacted by the Congress. It requires executive and legislative concurrence. It is indeed
true that the Roppongi property is valuable not so much because of the inflated prices fetched by
real property in Tokyo but more so because of its symbolic value to all Filipinos, veterans and
civilians alike. Whether or not the Roppongi and related properties will eventually be sold is a
policy determination where both the President and Congress must concur. Considering the
properties' importance and value, the laws on conversion and disposition of property of public
dominion must be faithfully followed.
184 | P a g e
(171) Marcos v. Manglapus
ISSUE: Whether or not, in the exercise of executive power, the President may prohibit the
Marcoses from returning to the Philippines.
FACTS: Former President Ferdinand E. Marcos was deposed from the presidency via the non-
violent “people power” revolution and was forced into exile. Marcos, in his deathbed, has
signified his wish to return to the Philippines to die. But President Corazon Aquino, considering
the dire consequences to the nation of his return at a time when the stability of government is
threatened from various directions and the economy is just beginning to rise and move forward,
has stood firmly on the decision to bar the return of Marcos and his family. Marcos filed for a
petition of mandamus and prohibition to order the respondents to issue them their travel
documents and prevent the implementation of President Aquino’s decision to bar Marcos from
returning in the Philippines. Petitioner questions Aquino’s power to bar his return in the country.
According to the Marcoses, such act deprives them of their right to life, liberty, property without
due process and equal protection of the laws. They also said that it deprives them of their right to
travel which according to Section 6, Article 3 of the constitution, may only be impaired by a
court order.
DECISION: Dismissed
RATIO DECIDENDI: Separation of power dictates that each department has exclusive
powers. According to Section 1, Article VII of the 1987 Philippine Constitution, “the executive
power shall be vested in the President of the Philippines.” However, it does not define what is
meant by “executive power” although in the same article it touches on exercise of certain powers
by the President, i.e., the power of control over all executive departments, bureaus and offices,
the power to execute the laws, the appointing power to grant reprieves, commutations and
pardons… (art VII secfs. 14-23). Although the constitution outlines tasks of the president, this
list is not defined & exclusive. She has residual & discretionary powers not stated in the
Constitution which include the power to protect the general welfare of the people. She is obliged
to protect the people, promote their welfare & advance national interest. (Art. II, Sec. 4-5 of the
Constitution). Residual powers, according to Theodore Roosevelt, dictate that the President can
do anything which is not forbidden in the Constitution (Corwin, supra at 153), inevitable to vest
discretionary powers on the President (Hyman, American President) and that the president has to
maintain peace during times of emergency but also on the day-to-day operation of the State.
185 | P a g e
(172) Saguisag v. Ochoa
ISSUE: Whether the President may enter into an executive agreement on foreign military bases,
troops, or facilities.
FACTS: EDCA or Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement is an agreement between the
Philippines and America wherein it authorizes the U.S. military forces to have access to and
conduct activities within certain "Agreed Locations" in the country. After eight rounds of
negotiations for two years, the Secretary of National Defense and the U.S. Ambassador to the
Philippines signed the agreement on 28 April 2014. President Benigno S. Aquino III ratified
EDCA on 6 June 2014. It was not transmitted to the Senate on the executive's understanding that
to do so was no longer necessary. Senators file Senate Resolution No. (SR) 105.91. The
resolution expresses the "strong sense" of the Senators that for EDCA to become valid and
effective, it must first be transmitted to the Senate for deliberation and concurrence
DECISION: Dismissed
RATIO DECIDENDI: The manner of the President's execution of the law, even if not
expressly granted by the law, is justified by necessity and limited only by law, since the
President must "take necessary and proper steps to carry into execution the law”. It is the
President's prerogative to do whatever is legal and necessary for Philippine defense interests
(commander-in-chief powers). EDCA is considered an executive agreement, therefore may be
bound through the President without the need of senatorial votes for its execution. The right of
the Executive to enter into binding agreements without the necessity of subsequent
Congressional approval has been confirmed by long usage
186 | P a g e
(173) Funa v. Ermita
ISSUE: Whether or not the designation of respondent Bautista as OIC of MARINA, concurrent
with the position of DOTC Undersecretary for Maritime Transport to which she had been
appointed, violated the constitutional proscription against dual or multiple offices f
FACTS: On October 4, 2006, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo appointed respondent Maria
Elena H. Bautista (Bautista) as Undersecretary of the Department of Transportation and
Communications (DOTC). Bautista was designated as Undersecretary for Maritime Transport of
the department under Special Order No. 2006-171 dated October 23, 2006. On September 1,
2008, following the resignation of then MARINA Administrator Vicente T. Suazo, Jr., Bautista
was designated as Officer-in-Charge (OIC), Office of the Administrator, MARINA, in
concurrent capacity as DOTC Undersecretary. On October 21, 2008, Dennis A. B. Funa in his
capacity as taxpayer, concerned citizen and lawyer, filed the instant petition challenging the
constitutionality of Bautista's appointment/designation, which is proscribed by the prohibition on
the President, Vice-President, the Members of the Cabinet, and their deputies and assistants to
hold any other office or employment.
DECISION: Granted
RATIO DECIDENDI: Sec. 13. The President, Vice-President, the Members of the Cabinet,
and their deputies or assistants shall not, unless otherwise provided in this Constitution, hold any
other office or employment during their tenure. They shall not, during said tenure, directly or
indirectly practice any other profession, participate in any business, or be financially interested in
any contract with, or in any franchise, or special privilege granted by the Government or any
subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled
corporations or their subsidiaries. They shall strictly avoid conflict of interest in the conduct of
their office. On the other hand, Section 7, paragraph (2), Article IX-B reads: Sec. 7. Unless
otherwise allowed by law or the primary functions of his position, no appointive official shall
hold any other office or employment in the Government or any subdivision, agency or
instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporations or their
subsidiaries. Thus, the Court ruled these sweeping, all-embracing prohibitions imposed on the
President and his official family, which prohibitions are not similarly imposed on other public
officials or employees such as the Members of Congress, members of the civil service in general
and members of the armed forces, are proof of the intent of the 1987 Constitution to treat the
President and his official family as a class by itself and to impose upon said class stricter
prohibitions.
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(174) Funa v. Agra
ISSUE: Whether or not the designation of Agra as the Acting Secretary of Justice, concurrently
with his position of Acting Solicitor General, violate the constitutional prohibition against dual
or multiple offices for the Members of the Cabinet and their deputie
FACTS: Petitioner alleges that Hon. Alberto C. Agra was appointed by the president to be the
Acting Secretary of Justice and that Agra was also aubsequently appointed as Acting Solicitor
General in concurrent capacity. Respondent has a diferrent story, he alleged that he was assigned
to be the Acting Solicitor General first then was subsequently assigned to be the Acvting
Secretary of Justice. Agra also alleged that he relinquished his position as Acting Solicitor
General but kept performing his duties until his successor was appointed. Nothwithstanding the
conflict in the versions of the parties, the fact that Agra has admitted to holding the two offices
concurrently in acting capacities is settled, which is sufficient for puposes of resolving the
constitutional question that petitioner raises herein.
DECISION: Granted
RATIO DECIDENDI: According to the Public Interest Center, Inc. v. Elma, the only two
exceptions: (1) those provided for under the Constitution, such as Section 3, Article VII,
authorizing the Vice Presided to become a member of the Cabinet; and (2) posts occupied by
Executive officials specified in Section 13, Article VII without additional compensation in ex
officio capacities as provided by law and as ewquires by the primary functions of the officials’
offices. The primary functions of the Office of the Solicitor General are not related or necessary
to the primary functions of the Department of Justice. Considering that the nature and duties of
the two offices are such as to render it improper, from considerations of public policy, for one
person to retain both, an incompatibility between the offices exists, further warranting the
declaration of Agra’s designation as the Acting Secretary of Justice, concurrently with his
designation as the Acting Solicitor General, to be void for being in violation of the express
provisions of the Constitution.
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(175) De Castro v. JBC
ISSUE: Whether or not the incumbent President can appoint the next Chief Justice
FACTS: These cases trace their genesis to the controversy that has arisen from the forthcoming
compulsory retirement of Chief Justice Puno on May 17, 2010, or seven days after the
presidential election. Under Section 4(1), in relation to Section 9, Article VIII, that “vacancy
shall be filled within ninety days from the occurrence thereof” from a “list of at least three
nominees prepared by the Judicial and Bar Council for every vacancy.” Also considering that
Section 15, Article VII (Executive Department) of the Constitution prohibits the President or
Acting President from making appointments within two months immediately before the next
presidential elections and up to the end of his term, except temporary appointments to executive
positions when continued vacancies therein will prejudice public service or endanger public
safety. The JBC, in its en banc meeting of January 18, 2010, unanimously agreed to start the
process of filling up the position of Chief Justice. Conformably with its existing practice, the
JBC “automatically considered” for the position of Chief Justice the five most senior of the
Associate Justices of the Court, namely: Associate Justice Antonio T. Carpio; Associate Justice
Renato C. Corona; Associate Justice Conchita Carpio Morales; Associate Justice Presbitero J.
Velasco, Jr.; and Associate Justice Antonio Eduardo B. Nachura. However, the last two declined
their nomination through letters dated January 18, 2010 and January 25, 2010, respectively. The
OSG contends that the incumbent President may appoint the next Chief Justice, because the
prohibition under Section 15, Article VII of the Constitution does not apply to appointments in
the Supreme Court.
DECISION: Denied
RATIO DECIDENDI: Prohibition under section 15, Article VII does not apply to
appointments to fill a vacancy in the Supreme Court or to other appointments to the judiciary.
The records of the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission reveal that the framers
devoted time to meticulously drafting, styling, and arranging the Constitution. Such
meticulousness indicates that the organization and arrangement of the provisions of the
Constitution were not arbitrarily or whimsically done by the framers, but purposely made to
reflect their intention and manifest their vision of what the Constitution should contain. As can
be seen, Article VII is devoted to the Executive Department, and, among others, it lists the
powers vested by the Constitution in the President. The presidential power of appointment is
dealt with in Sections 14, 15 and 16 of the Article. Had the framers intended to extend the
prohibition contained in Section 15, Article VII to the appointment of Members of the Supreme
Court, they could have explicitly done so. They could not have ignored the meticulous ordering
of the provisions. They would have easily and surely written the prohibition made explicit in
Section 15, Article VII as being equally applicable to the appointment of Members of the
Supreme Court in Article VIII itself, most likely in Section 4 (1), Article VIII.
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(176) Velicaria-Garafil v. OP
ISSUE: Whether petitioners' appointments violate Section 15, Article VII of the 1987
Constitution
FACTS: The present consolidated cases involve four petitions: G.R. No. 203372 with Atty.
Cheloy E. Velicaria-Garafil, who was appointed State Solicitor II at the Office of the Solicitor
General, as petitioner; G.R. No. 206290 with Atty. Dindo G. Venturanza, who was appointed
Prosecutor IV of Quezon City, as petitioner; G.R. No. 209138 with Irma A. Villanueva , who
was appointed Administrator for Visayas of the Board of Administrators of the Cooperative
Development Authority, and Francisca B. Rosquita, who was appointed Commissioner of the
National Commission of Indigenous Peoples, as petitioners; and G.R. No. 212030 with Atty.
Eddie U. Tamondong, who was appointed member of the Board of Directors of the Subic Bay
Metropolitan Authority, as petitioner. Prior to the conduct of the May 2010 elections, then
President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo issued more than 800 appointments to various positions in
several government offices. The ban on midnight appointments in Section 15, Article VII of the
1987 Constitution reads: Two months immediately before the next presidential elections and up
to the end of his term, a President or Acting President shall not make appointments, except
temporary appointments to executive positions when continued vacancies therein will prejudice
public service or endanger public safety. Thus, for purposes of the 2010 elections, 10 March
2010 was the cutoff date for valid appointments and the next day, 11 March 2010, was the start
of the ban on midnight appointments. Section 15, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution recognizes
as an exception to the ban on midnight appointments only "temporary appointments to executive
positions when continued vacancies therein will prejudice public service or endanger public
safety." None of the petitioners claim that their appointments fall under this exception. On 30
June 2010, President Benigno S. Aquino III (President Aquino) took his oath of office as
President of the Republic of the Philippines. On 30 July 2010, President Aquino issued EO 2
recalling, withdrawing, and revoking appointments issued by President Macapagal-Arroyo which
violated the constitutional ban on midnight appointments.
DECISION: the petitions in G.R. Nos. 203372, 206290, and 212030 are DENIED, and the
petition in G.R. No. 209138 is DISMISSED. The appointments of petitioners Atty. Cheloy E.
Velicaria-Garafil (G.R. No. 203372), Atty. Dindo G. Venturanza (G.R. No. 206290), Irma A.
Villanueva, and Francisca B. Rosquita (G.R. No. 209138), and Atty. Eddie U. Tamondong (G.R.
No. 212030) are declared VOID.
RATIO DECIDENDI: The following elements should always concur in the making of a valid
(which should be understood as both complete and effective) appointment: (1) authority to
appoint and evidence of the exercise of the authority; The President's exercise of his power to
appoint officials is provided for in the Constitution and laws. Discretion is an integral part in the
exercise of the power of appointment. Considering that appointment calls for a selection, the
appointing power necessarily exercises a discretion. (2) transmittal of the appointment paper and
evidence of the transmittal; It is not enough that the President signs the appointment paper. There
should be evidence that the President intended the appointment paper to be issued. It could
happen that an appointment paper may be dated and signed by the President months before the
appointment ban, but never left his locked drawer for the entirety of his term. Release of the
appointment paper through the MRO is an unequivocal act that signifies the President's intent of
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its issuance. (3) a vacant position at the time of appointment; and (4) receipt of the appointment
paper and acceptance of the appointment by the appointee who possesses all the qualifications
and none of the disqualifications. Acceptance is indispensable to complete an appointment.
Assuming office and taking the oath amount to acceptance of the appointment. An oath of office
is a qualifying requirement for a public office, a prerequisite to the full investiture of the office.
Petitioners have failed to show compliance with all four elements of a valid appointment. They
cannot prove with certainty that their appointment papers were transmitted before the
appointment ban took effect. On the other hand, petitioners admit that they took their oaths of
office during the appointment ban.
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(177) Manalo v. Sistosa
ISSUE: Whether or not the appointments made by the President were valid even without the
confirmation of Commission on Appointments
FACTS: Petitioners question the constitutionality and legality of the permanent appointments
issued by former President Corazon C. Aquino to the respondent senior officers of the Philippine
National Police who were promoted to the ranks of Chief Superintendent and Director without
their appointments submitted to the Commission on Appointments for confirmation under
Section 16, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution and Republic Act 6975 otherwise known as the
Local Government Act of 1990. On December 13, 1990, Republic Act 6975 creating the
Department of Interior and Local Government was signed into law by former President Corazon
C. Aquino. In accordance therewith, on March 10, 1992, the President of the Philippines, through
then Executive Secretary Franklin M. Drilon, promoted the fifteen (15) respondent police
officers herein, by appointing them to positions in the Philippine National Police with the rank of
Chief Superintendent to Director. The appointments of respondent police officers were in a
permanent capacity. Without their names submitted to the Commission on Appointments for
confirmation, the said police officers took their oath of office and assumed their respective
positions. Thereafter, the Department of Budget and Management, under the then Secretary
Salvador M. Enriquez III, authorized disbursements for their salaries and other emoluments.
DECISION: Dismissed
RATIO DECIDENDI: Yes. Appointments are valid. PNP, herein respondents, do not fall
under the first category of presidential appointees requiring the confirmation by Commission on
Appointments. Section 116 Article VII provide for four groups of government to be appointed by
President: First, the heads of the executive departments, ambassadors, other public ministers and
consuls, officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain, and other officers
whose appointments are vested in him in this Constitution; Second, all other officers of the
Government whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by law; Third, those whom the
President may be authorized by law to appoint; Fourth, officers lower in rank whose
appointments the Congress may by law vest in the President alone. It is well-settled that only
presidential appointments belonging to the first group require the confirmation by the
Commission on Appointments. The appointments of respondent officers who are not within the
first category, need not be confirmed by the Commission on Appointments. Congress cannot by
law expand the power of confirmation of the Commission on Appointments and require
confirmation of appointments of other government officials not mentioned in the first sentence of
Section 16 of Article VII of the 1987 Constitution.
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(178) Hontiveros-Baraquel v. TollRegulatory Board
ISSUE: Whether the TRB has the power to grant authority to operate a toll facility
FACTS: The Toll Regulatory Board (TRB) was created on 31 March 1977 by Presidential
Decree No. (P.D.) 1112 in order to supervise and regulate, on behalf of the government, the
collection of toll fees and the operation of toll facilities by the private sector. On the same date,
P.D. 1113 was issued granting to the Construction and Development Corporation of the
Philippines (now Philippine National Construction Corporation or PNCC) the right, privilege,
and authority to construct, operate, and maintain toll facilities in the North and South Luzon Toll
Expressways for a period of 30 years starting 1 May 1977. TRB and PNCC later entered into a
Toll Operation Agreement, which prescribed the operating conditions of the right granted to
PNCC under P.D. 1113. On 27 November 1995, the Republic of the Philippines through the
TRB as Grantor, CMMTC as Investor, and PNCC as Operator executed a Supplemental Toll
Operation Agreement (STOA) covering Stage 1, Phases 1 and 2; and Stage 2, Phase 1 of the
South Metro Manila Skyway. Under the STOA, the design and construction of the project roads
became the primary and exclusive privilege and responsibility of CMMTC. The operation and
maintenance of the project roads became the primary and exclusive privilege and responsibility
of the PNCC Skyway Corporation (PSC), a wholly owned subsidiary of PNCC, which undertook
and performed the latter's obligations under the STOA. On 18 July 2007, the Republic of the
Philippines, through the TRB, CMMTC, and PNCC executed the assailed Amendment to the
Supplemental Toll Operation Agreement (ASTOA). Under the ASTOA, Skyway O & M
Corporation (SOMCO) replaced PSC in performing the operations and maintenance of Stage 1
of the South Metro Manila Skyway. Petitioners argue that the franchise for toll operations was
exclusively vested by P.D. 1113 in PNCC, which exercised the powers under its franchise
through PSC in accordance with the STOA.
DECISION: Dismissed
RATIO DECIDENDI: TRB has the power to grant authority to operate a toll facility. In
Francisco v. TRB, the court held: It is abundantly clear that Sections 3 (a) and (e) of P.D. 1112 in
relation to Section 4 of P.D. 1894 have invested the TRB with sufficient power to grant a
qualified person or entity with authority to construct, maintain, and operate a toll facility and to
issue the corresponding toll operating permit or TOC. First, there is nothing in P.D. 1113 or P.D.
1894 that states that the franchise granted to PNCC is to the exclusion of all others. Second, if we
were to go by the theory of petitioners, it is only the operation and maintenance of the toll
facilities that is vested with PNCC. This interpretation is contrary to the wording of P.D. 1113
and P.D. 1894 granting PNCC the right, privilege and authority to construct, operate and
maintain the North Luzon, South Luzon and Metro Manila Expressways and their toll facilities.
Third, aside from having been granted the power to grant administrative franchises for toll
facility projects, TRB is also empowered to modify, amend, and impose additional conditions on
the franchise of PNCC in an appropriate contract, particularly when public interest calls for it.
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(179) Resident Marine Mammals of the Protected Seascape TanonStrait, et al v. Secretary

Angelo Reyes, et al
ISSUE: Whether or not Service Contract No. 46 is violative of the 1987 Philippine Constitution
and statutes
FACTS: Petitioners, collectively referred to as the "Resident Marine Mammals" in the petition,
are the toothed whales, dolphins, porpoises, and other cetacean species, which inhabit the waters
in and around the Tañon Strait. They are joined by Gloria Estenzo Ramos and Rose-Liza Eisma-
Osorio as their legal guardians and as friends (to be collectively known as "the Stewards") who
allegedly empathize with, and seek the protection of, the aforementioned marine species. Also
impleaded as an unwilling co-petitioner is former President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, for her
express declaration and undertaking in the ASEAN Charter to protect the Tañon Strait, among
others. On June 13, 2002, the Government of the Philippines, acting through the DOE, entered
into a Geophysical Survey and Exploration Contract-102 (GSEC-102) with JAPEX. This
contract involved geological and geophysical studies of the Tañon Strait. The studies included
surface geology, sample analysis, and reprocessing of seismic and magnetic data. JAPEX,
assisted by DOE, also conducted geophysical and satellite surveys, as well as oil and gas
sampling in Tañon Strait. On December 21, 2004, DOE and JAPEX formally converted GSEC-
102 into SC-46 for the exploration, development, and production of petroleum resources in a
block covering approximately 2,850 square kilometers offshore the Tañon Strait. JAPEX
committed to drill one exploration well during the second sub-phase of the project. On March 6,
2007, the EMB of DENR Region VII granted an ECC to the DOE and JAPEX for the offshore
oil and gas exploration project in Tañon Strait.14 Months later, on November 16, 2007, JAPEX
began to drill an exploratory well, with a depth of 3,150 meters, near Pinamungajan town in the
western Cebu Province.15 This drilling lasted until February 8, 2008. The petitioners insist that
SC-46 is null and void for having violated Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution.
DECISION: Granted
RATIO DECIDENDI: This Court has previously settled the issue of whether service contracts
are still allowed under the 1987 Constitution. In La Bugal, the Court held that the deletion of the
words "service contracts" in the 1987 Constitution did not amount to a ban on them per se. In
fact, portions of the deliberations of the members of the Constitutional Commission (ConCom)
to show that in deliberating on paragraph 4, Section 2, Article XII, they were actually referring to
service contracts as understood in the 1973 Constitution, albeit with safety measures to eliminate
or minimize the abuses prevalent during the martial law regime. In summarizing the matters
discussed in the ConCom, the Court established that paragraph 4, with the safeguards in place, is
the exception to paragraph 1, Section 2 of Article XII. The following are the safeguards this
Court enumerated in La Bugal: Such service contracts may be entered into only with respect to
minerals, petroleum and other mineral oils. The grant thereof is subject to several safeguards,
among which are these requirements: (1) The service contract shall be crafted in accordance with
a general law that will set standard or uniform terms, conditions and requirements, presumably to
attain a certain uniformity in provisions and avoid the possible insertion of terms
disadvantageous to the country. (2) The President shall be the signatory for the government
because, supposedly before an agreement is presented to the President for signature, it will have
been vetted several times over at different levels to ensure that it conforms to law and can
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withstand public scrutiny. (3) Within thirty days of the executed agreement, the President shall
report it to Congress to give that branch of government an opportunity to look over the
agreement and interpose timely objections, if any.69cralawlawlibrary. Adhering to the
aforementioned guidelines, the Court finds that SC-46 is indeed null and void for noncompliance
with the requirements of the 1987 Constitution.
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(180) Kulayan v. Tan
ISSUE: Whether or not a governor can exercise the calling-out powers of President?
FACTS: Three members from the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) were
kidnapped in the vicinity of the Provincial Capitol in Patikul, Sulu. Andres Notter, Eugenio
Vagni, and Marie Jean Lacaba, were purportedly inspecting a water and sanitation project for the
Sulu Provincial Jail when inspecting a water and sanitation project for the Sulu Provincial Jail
when they were seized by three armed men who were later confirmed to be members of the Abu
Sayyaf Group (ASG). A Local Crisis Committee, later renamed Sulu Crisis Management
Committee (Committee) was then formed to investigate the kidnapping incident. The Committee
convened under the leadership of respondent Abdusakur Mahail Tan, the Provincial Governor of
Sulu. Governor Tan issued Proclamation No. 1, Series of 2009, declaring a state of emergency in
the province of Sulu. The Proclamation cited the kidnapping incident as a ground for the said
declaration, describing it as a terrorist act pursuant to the Human Security Act (R.A. 9372). It
also invoked Section 465 of the Local Government Code of 1991 (R.A. 7160), which bestows on
the Provincial Governor the power to carry out emergency measures during man-made and
natural disasters and calamities, and to call upon the appropriate national law enforcement
agencies to suppress disorder and lawless violence. In the Proclamation, Tan called upon the
PNP and the CEF to set up checkpoints and chokepoints, conduct general search and seizures
including arrests, and other actions necessary to ensure public safety. Petitioners, Jamar Kulayan,
et al. contend that Proclamation No. 1 and its Implementing Guidelines were issued ultra vires,
and thus null and void, for violating Sections 1 and 18, Article VII of the Constitution, which
grants the President sole authority to exercise emergency powers and calling-out powers as the
chief executive of the Republic and commander-in-chief of the armed forces.
DECISION: Granted
RATIO DECIDENDI: It has already been established that there is one repository of executive
powers, and that is the President of the Republic. This means that when Section 1, Article VII of
the Constitution speaks of executive power, it is granted to the President and no one else.
Corollarily, it is only the President, as Executive, who is authorized to exercise emergency
powers as provided under Section 23, Article VI, of the Constitution, as well as what became
known as the calling-out powers under Section 7, Article VII thereof. While the President is still
a civilian, Article II, Section 339 of the Constitution mandates that civilian authority is, at all
times, supreme over the military, making the civilian president the nation’s supreme military
leader. The net effect of Article II, Section 3, when read with Article VII, Section 18, is that a
civilian President is the ceremonial, legal and administrative head of the armed forces. The
Constitution does not require that the President must be possessed of military training and
talents, but as Commander-in-Chief, he has the power to direct military operations and to
determine military strategy. Normally, he would be expected to delegate the actual command of
the armed forces to military experts; but the ultimate power is his. Given the foregoing,
Governor Tan is not endowed with the power to call upon the armed forces at his own bidding.
In issuing the assailed proclamation, Governor Tan exceeded his authority when he declared a
state of emergency and called upon Armed Forces, the police, and his own Civilian Emergency
Force. The calling-out powers contemplated under the Constitution is exclusive to the President.
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An exercise by another official, even if he is the local chief executive, is ultra vires, and may not
be justified by the invocation of Section 465 of the Local Government Code.
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(181) Ampatuan vs Puno
ISSUE: Wheter or not President Arroyo invalidly exercised emergency powers when she called
out the AFP and PNP to prevent and suppress all incidents of lawless violence in Maguindano,
Sultan Kudarat, and Cotabato City.
FACTS: On 24 November 2009, the day after the Maguindanao Massacre, then Pres. Arroyo
issued Proclamation 1946, placing “the Provinces of Maguindanao and Sultan Kudarat and the
City of Cotabato under a state of emergency.” She directed the AFP and the PNP “to undertake
such measures as may be allowed by the Constitution and by law to prevent and suppress all
incidents of lawless violence” in the named places. Three days later, she also issued AO 273
“transferring” supervision of the ARMM from the Office of the President to the DILG. She
subsequently issued AO 273-A, which amended the former AO (the term “transfer” used in AO
273 was amended to “delegate”, referring to the supervision of the ARMM by the DILG).
DECISION: Dismissed
RATIO DECIDENDI: The deployment is not by itself an exercise of emergency powers as
understood under Section 23 (2), Article VI of the Constitution, which provides: SECTION 23.
x x x (2) In times of war or other national emergency, the Congress may, by law, authorize the
President, for a limited period and subject to such restrictions as it may prescribe, to exercise
powers necessary and proper to carry out a declared national policy. Unless sooner withdrawn by
resolution of the Congress, such powers shall cease upon the next adjournment thereof The
President did not proclaim a national emergency, only a state of emergency in the three places
mentioned. And she did not act pursuant to any law enacted by Congress that authorized her to
exercise extraordinary powers. The calling out of the armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless
violence in such places is a power that the Constitution directly vests in the President. She did
not need a congressional authority to exercise the same.
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(182) Fortun vs Arroyo
ISSUE: Whether or not the Presidential Proclamation of Martial Law and suspension of the
privelege of Habeas Corpus in 2009 in Central Mindanao which were withdrawn after just eight
days is constitutional
FACTS: On November 23, 2009 heavily armed men, believed led by the ruling Ampatuan
family, gunned down and buried under shoveled dirt 57 innocent civilians on a highway in
Maguindanao. In response to this carnage, on November 24 President Arroyo issued Presidential
Proclamation 1946, declaring a state of emergency in Maguindanao, Sultan Kudarat, and
Cotabato City to prevent and suppress similar lawless violence in Central Mindanao. Believing
that she needed greater authority to put order in Maguindanao and secure it from large groups of
persons that have taken up arms against the constituted authorities in the province, on December
4, 2009 President Arroyo issued Presidential Proclamation 1959 declaring... martial law and
suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in that province except for identified areas
of the Moro Islamic Liberation Front On December 9, 2009 Congress, in joint session, convened
pursuant to Section 18, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution to review the validity of the
President's action. But, two days later or on December 12 before Congress could act, the
President issued Presidential Proclamation 1963, lifting martial law and restoring the privilege
of the writ of habeas corpus in Maguindanao.
DECISION: Moot and Academic; Political Issue; Dismissed
RATIO DECIDENDI: It is evident that under the 1987 Constitution the President and the
Congress act in tandem in exercising the power to proclaim martial law or suspend the privilege
of the writ of habeas corpus. They exercise the power, not only sequentially, but in a sense
jointly... since, after the President has initiated the proclamation or the suspension, only the
Congress can maintain the same based on its own evaluation of the situation on the ground, a
power that the President does not have. Consequently, although the Constitution reserves to the
Supreme Court the power to review the sufficiency of the factual basis of the proclamation or
suspension in a proper suit, it is implicit that the Court must allow Congress to exercise its own
review powers, which is... automatic rather than initiated. Only when Congress defaults in its
express duty to defend the Constitution through such review should the Supreme Court step in as
its final rampart. The constitutional validity of the President's proclamation of martial law or...
suspension of the writ of habeas corpus is first a political question in the hands of Congress
before it becomes a justiciable one in the hands of the Court. Here, President Arroyo withdrew
Proclamation 1959 before the joint houses of Congress, which had in fact convened, could act on
the same. Consequently, the petitions in these cases have become moot and the Court has
nothing to review. The lifting of martial law and... restoration of the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus in Maguindanao was a supervening event that obliterated any justiciable
controversy
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(183) Lagman vs Medialdea
ISSUE: Whether or not there is a sufficient factual basis for the proclamation of martial law or
the suspension of the privelege of writ of habeas corpus
FACTS: On May 23, 2017, President Rodrigo Duterte issued Proclamation No. 216, declaring
Martial Law in the whole island of Mindanao and the suspension of the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus therein. On May 25, the president submitted a written report to Congress on the
factual basis of the Martial Law declaration (as required by the Constitution). The main basis of
the declaration was the attack of the Maute terrorist group in Marawi City. According to the
report, the Maute group is an affiliate of ISIS which is aiming to establish an Islamic caliphate in
Marawi City (and might spread its control in all the other parts of Mindanao). It also cited the
ongoing rebellion and lawless violence that has plagued Mindanao for decades.
DECISION: Yes
RATIO DECIDENDI: In reviewing the sufficiency of the factual basis of the proclamation or
suspension, the Court considers only the information and data available to the President prior to
or at the time of the declaration. The determination by the Court of the sufficiency of factual
basis must be limited only to the facts and information mentioned in the Report and
Proclamation. The Court held that the President, in issuing Proclamation No. 216, had
sufficient factual bases tending to show that actual rebellion exists. The President only has to
ascertain if there is probable cause for a declaration of Martial Law and the suspension of the
writ of habeas corpus. The petitioners’ counter-evidence were derived solely from unverified
news articles on the internet, with neither the authors nor the sources shown to have affirmed the
contents thereof. As the Court has consistently ruled, news articles are hearsay evidence, twice
removed, and are thus without any probative value, unless offered for a purpose other than
proving the truth of the matter asserted. The alleged false and/or inaccurate statements are just
pieces and parcels of the Report; along with these alleged false data is an arsenal of other
independent facts showing that more likely than not, actual rebellion exists.
200 | P a g e
(184) Monsantos vs Factoran Jr.
ISSUE: Whether or not public officer, who has been granted an absolute pardon by the Chief
Executive, entitled to reinstatement to her former position without need of a new appointment?
FACTS: The Sandiganbayan convicted petitioner Salvacion A. Monsanto (then assistant
treasurer of Calbayog City) of the crime of estafa through falsification of public documents. She
was sentenced to jail and to indemnify the government in the sum of P4,892.50.The SC affirmed
the decision. She then filed a motion for reconsideration but while said motion was pending, she
was extended by then President Marcos absolute pardon which she accepted (at that time, the
rule was that clemency could be given even before conviction). By reason of said pardon,
petitioner wrote the Calbayog City treasurer requesting that she be restored to her former post as
assistant city treasurer since the same was still vacant. Her letter was referred to the Minister of
Finance who ruled that she may be reinstated to her position without the necessity of a new
appointment not earlier than the date she was extended the absolute pardon. Petitioner wrote
the Ministry stressing that the full pardon bestowed on her has wiped out the crime which
implies that her service in the government has never been interrupted and therefore the date of
her reinstatement should correspond to the date of her preventive suspension; that she is entitled
to backpay for the entire period of her suspension; and that she should not be required to pay the
proportionate share of the amount of P4,892.50 The Ministry referred the issue to the Office of
the President. Deputy Executive Secretary Factoran denied Monsanto’s request averring that
Monsanto must first seek appointment and that the pardon does not reinstate her former position.
DECISION: No
RATIO DECIDENDI: The pardon granted to petitioner has resulted in removing her
disqualification from holding public employment but it cannot go beyond that. To regain her
former post as assistant city treasurer, she must re-apply and undergo the usual procedure
required for a new appointment.
201 | P a g e
(185) Rosa-Vidal vs Comelec
ISSUE: Whether or not former President Joseph Estrada run for public office despite having
been convicted of the crime of plunder which carried an accessory penalty of perpetual
disqualification to hold public office?
FACTS: On Sep 2007, Sandiganbayan convicted Estrada for the crime of plunder with the
penalty of reclusion perpetua and accessory penalties of civil interdiction during the period of
sentence and perpetual absolute disqualification. On Oct 2007, President Arroyo extended
executive clemency, by way of pardon to Estrada thereby restoring his civil and political right
upon which Estrada received and accepted. On Nov 2009, Estrada filed a certificate of
candidacy for the position of President and has earned 3 oppositions in the COMELEC. In 2012
Estrada filed a COC vying for the position of Manila City Mayor. Then, Risos-Vidal, petitioner,
filed a petition for disqualification against Estrada. Petitioner Risos-Vidal filed a Petition for
Disqualification against Estrada before the Comelec stating that Estrada is disqualified to run for
public office because of his conviction for plunder sentencing him to suffer the penalty of
reclusion perpetua with perpetual absolute disqualification. Petitioner relied on Section 40 of the
Local Government Code (LGC), in relation to Section 12 of the Omnibus Election Code (OEC).
The Comelec dismissed the petition for disqualification holding that President Estrada’s right to
seek public office has been effectively restored by the pardon vested upon him by former
President Gloria M. Arroyo. Estrada won the mayoralty race in May 13, 2013 elections.
Alfredo Lim, who garnered the second highest votes, intervened and sought to disqualify Estrada
for the same ground as the contention of Risos-Vidal and praying that he be proclaimed as
Mayor of Manila.
DECISION: Yes
RATIO DECIDENDI: Estrada was granted an absolute pardon that fully restored all his civil
and political rights, which naturally includes the right to seek public elective office, the focal
point of this controversy. The wording of the pardon extended to former President Estrada is
complete, unambiguous, and unqualified. It is likewise unfettered by Articles 36 and 41 of the
Revised Penal Code. The only reasonable, objective, and constitutional interpretation of the
language of the pardon is that the same in fact conforms to Articles 36 and 41 of the Revised
Penal Code. The pardon itself does not explicitly impose a condition or limitation, considering
the unqualified use of the term “civil and political rights”as being restored. Jurisprudence
educates that a preamble is not an essential part of an act as it is an introductory or preparatory
clause that explains the reasons for the enactment, usually introduced by the word “whereas.”
Whereas clauses do not form part of a statute because, strictly speaking, they are not part of the
operative language of the statute. In this case, the whereas clause at issue is not an integral part
of the decree of the pardon, and therefore, does not by itself alone operate to make the pardon
conditional or to make its effectivity contingent upon the fulfilment of the aforementioned
commitment nor to limit the scope of the pardon.
202 | P a g e
(186) Saguisag vs Ochoa Jr.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement (EDCA) between the
Republic of the Philippines and the United States of America (U.S.) constitutional
FACTS: petitioners respectfully pray that the Honorable Court RECONSIDER, REVERSE,
AND SET - ASIDE its Decision dated January 12, 2016, and issue a new Decision GRANTING
the instant consolidated petitions by declaring the Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement
(EDCA) entered into by the respondents for the Philippine government, with the United States of
America, UNCONSTITUTIONAL AND INVALID and to permanently enjoin its
implementation. petitioners claim this Court erred when it ruled that EDCA was not a treaty.[5]
In connection to this, petitioners move that EDCA must be in the form of a treaty in order to
comply with the constitutional restriction under Section 25, Article XVIII of the 1987
Constitution on foreign military bases, troops, and facilities.[6] Additionally, they reiterate their
arguments on the issues of telecommunications, taxation, and nuclear weapons.[7] Petitioners
assert that this Court contradicted itself when it interpreted the word "allowed in" to refer to the
initial entry of foreign bases, troops, and facilities, based on the fact that the plain meaning of the
provision in question referred to prohibiting the return of foreign bases, troops, and facilities
except under a treaty concurred in by the Senate Secondly, by interpreting "allowed in" as
referring to an initial entry, the Court has simply applied the plain meaning of the words in the
particular provision.[10] Necessarily, once entry has been established by a subsisting treaty,
latter instances of entry need not be embodied by a separate treaty. After all, the Constitution did
not state that foreign military bases, troops, and facilities shall not subsist or exist in the
Philippines.
DECISION: Yes
RATIO DECIDENDI: The EDCA did not go beyond the framework. The entry of US troops
has long been authorized under a valid and subsisting treaty, which is the Visiting Forces
Agreement (VFA).[14] Reading the VFA along with the longstanding Mutual Defense Treaty
(MDT)[15] led this Court to the conclusion that an executive agreement such as the EDCA was
well within the bounds of the obligations imposed by both treaties. Thus, we find no reason for
EDCA to be declared unconstitutional. It fully conforms to the Philippines' legal regime through
the MDT and VFA. It also fully conforms to the government's continued policy to enhance our
military capability in the face of various military and humanitarian issues that may arise. This
Motion for Reconsideration has not raised any additional legal arguments that warrant revisiting
the Decision. Principles: On verba legis interpretation... verba legis Petitioners' own
interpretation and application of the verba legis rule will in fact result in an absurdity, which
legal construction strictly abhors. The settled rule is that the plain, clear and unambiguous
language of the Constitution should be construed as such and should not be given a construction
that changes its meaning With due respect, the Honorable Chief Justice Maria Lourdes P. A.
Sereno's theory of "initial entry" mentioned above ventured into a construction of the provisions
of Section 25, Article XVIII of the Constitution which is patently contrary to the plain language
and meaning of the said constitutional provision.
203 | P a g e
(187) Bayan vs Exec Secretary
ISSUE: Whether or not the Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA) unconstitutional

FACTS: The Republic of the Philippines and the United States of America entered into an
agreement called the Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA). The agreement was treated as a treaty
by the Philippine government and was ratified by then-President Joseph Estrada with the
concurrence of 2/3 of the total membership of the Philippine Senate. The VFA defines the
treatment of U.S. troops and personnel visiting the Philippines. It provides for the guidelines to
govern such visits, and further defines the rights of the U.S. and the Philippine governments in
the matter of criminal jurisdiction, movement of vessel and aircraft, importation and exportation
of equipment, materials and supplies. Petitioners argued, inter alia, that the VFA violates §25,
Article XVIII of the 1987 Constitution, which provides that “foreign military bases, troops, or
facilities shall not be allowed in the Philippines except under a treaty duly concurred in by the
Senate . . . and recognized as a treaty by the other contracting State.”
DECISION: No
RATIO DECIDENDI: Section 25, Article XVIII disallows foreign military bases, troops, or
facilities in the country, unless the following conditions are sufficiently met, viz: (a) it must be
under a treaty; (b) the treaty must be duly concurred in by the Senate and, when so required by
congress, ratified by a majority of the votes cast by the people in a national referendum; and (c)
recognized as a treaty by the other contracting state. There is no dispute as to the presence of
the first two requisites in the case of the VFA. The concurrence handed by the Senate through
Resolution No. 18 is in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution . . . the provision in
[in §25, Article XVIII] requiring ratification by a majority of the votes cast in a national
referendum being unnecessary since Congress has not required it.
204 | P a g e
(188) Biraogo vs Philippine Truth Commission
ISSUE: Whether or not E.O. No. 1 violates the principle of separation of powers by usurping
the powers of Congress to create and to appropriate funds for public offices, agencies and
commissions;
FACTS: Pres. Aquino signed E. O. No. 1 establishing Philippine Truth Commission of 2010
(PTC) dated July 30, 2010. PTC is a mere ad hoc body formed under the Office of the
President with the primary task to investigate reports of graft and corruption committed by third-
level public officers and employees, their co-principals, accomplices and accessories during the
previous administration, and to submit its finding and recommendations to the President,
Congress and the Ombudsman. PTC has all the powers of an investigative body. But it is not a
quasi-judicial body as it cannot adjudicate, arbitrate, resolve, settle, or render awards in disputes
between contending parties. All it can do is gather, collect and assess evidence of graft and
corruption and make recommendations. It may have subpoena powers but it has no power to cite
people in contempt, much less order their arrest. Although it is a fact-finding body, it cannot
determine from such facts if probable cause exists as to warrant the filing of an information in
our courts of law. Petitioners asked the Court to declare it unconstitutional and to enjoin the
PTC from performing its functions.
DECISION: No
RATIO DECIDENDI: There will be no appropriation but only an allotment or allocations of
existing funds already appropriated. There is no usurpation on the part of the Executive of the
power of Congress to appropriate funds. There is no need to specify the amount to be earmarked
for the operation of the commission because, whatever funds the Congress has provided for the
Office of the President will be the very source of the funds for the commission. The amount that
would be allocated to the PTC shall be subject to existing auditing rules and regulations so there
is no impropriety in the funding.
205 | P a g e
(189) Chavez vs. JBC
ISSUE: Whether or not the conditions sine qua non for the exercise of the power of judicial
review have been met.
FACTS: In 1994, instead of having only 7 members, an eighth member was added to the JBC as
two representatives from Congress began sitting in the JBC – one from the House of
Representatives and one from the Senate, with each having one-half (1/2) of a vote. Then, the
JBC En Banc, in separate meetings held in 2000 and 2001, decided to allow the representatives
from the Senate and the House of Representatives one full vote each. Senator Francis Joseph G.
Escudero and Congressman Niel C. Tupas, Jr. (respondents) simultaneously sit in the JBC as
representatives of the legislature. It is this practice that petitioner has questioned in this petition.
Respondents argued that the crux of the controversy is the phrase “a representative of Congress.”
It is their theory that the two houses, the Senate and the House of Representatives, are permanent
and mandatory components of “Congress,” such that the absence of either divests the term of its
substantive meaning as expressed under the Constitution. Bicameralism, as the system of choice
by the Framers, requires that both houses exercise their respective powers in the performance of
its mandated duty which is to legislate. Thus, when Section 8(1), Article VIII of the Constitution
speaks of “a representative from Congress,” it should mean one representative each from both
Houses which comprise the entire Congress.
DECISION: Yes
RATIO DECIDENDI: The Courts’ power of judicial review is subject to several limitations,
namely: (a) there must be an actual case or controversy calling for the exercise of judicial power;
(b) the person challenging the act must have “standing” to challenge; he must have a personal
and substantial interest in the case, such that he has sustained or will sustain, direct injury as a
result of its enforcement; (c) the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest
possible opportunity; and (d) the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the case.
Generally, a party will be allowed to litigate only when these conditions sine qua non are present,
especially when the constitutionality of an act by a co-equal branch of government is put in
issue. The Court disagrees with the respondents’ contention that petitioner lost his standing to
sue because he is not an official nominee for the post of Chief Justice. While it is true that a
“personal stake” on the case is imperative to have locus standi, this is not to say that only official
nominees for the post of Chief Justice can come to the Court and question the JBC composition
for being unconstitutional. The JBC likewise screens and nominates other members of the
Judiciary. Albeit heavily publicized in this regard, the JBC’s duty is not at all limited to the
nominations for the highest magistrate in the land. A vast number of aspirants to judicial posts all
over the country may be affected by the Court’s ruling. More importantly, the legality of the very
process of nominations to the positions in the Judiciary is the nucleus of the controversy. The
claim that the composition of the JBC is illegal and unconstitutional is an object of concern, not
just for a nominee to a judicial post, but for all citizens who have the right to seek judicial
intervention for rectification of legal blunders.
206 | P a g e
(190) Jardeleza vs. Sereno
ISSUE: Whether or not the right to due process is available in the course of JBC proceedings in
cases where an objection or opposition to an application is raised.
FACTS: Associate Justice Roberto Abad was about to retire and the Judicial and Bar Council
(JBC) announce an opening for application and recommendation for the said vacancy. Francis H.
Jardeleza (Jardeleza), incumbent Solicitor General of the Republic was included in the list of
candidates. Hence, he was interviewed. However, he received calls from some Justices that the
Chief Justice herself – CJ Sereno, will be invoking unanimity rule against him. It is invoked
because Jardeleza’s integrity is in question. During the meeting, Justice Carpio disclosed a
confidential information which characterized Jardeleza’s integrity as dubious. Jardeleza
answered that he would defend himself provided that due process would be observed. His
request was denied and he was not included in the shortlist. Hence, Jardeleza filed for certiorari
and mandamus with prayer for TRO to compel the JBC to include him in the list on the grounds
that the JBC and CJ Sereno acted with grave abuse of discretion in excluding him, despite having
garnered a sufficient number of votes to qualify for the position.
DECISION: Yes
RATIO DECIDENDI: While it is true that the JBC proceedings are sui generis, it does not
automatically denigrate an applicant’s entitlement to due process. The Court does not brush aside
the unique and special nature of JBC proceedings. Notwithstanding being “a class of its own,”
the right to be heard and to explain one’s self is availing. In cases where an objection to an
applicant’s qualifications is raised, the observance of due process neither contradicts the
fulfillment of the JBC’s duty to recommend. This holding is not an encroachment on its
discretion in the nomination process. Actually, its adherence to the precepts of due process
supports and enriches the exercise of its discretion. When an applicant, who vehemently denies
the truth of the objections, is afforded the chance to protest, the JBC is presented with a clearer
understanding of the situation it faces, thereby guarding the body from making an unsound and
capricious assessment of information brought before it. The JBC is not expected to strictly apply
the rules of evidence in its assessment of an objection against an applicant. Just the same, to hear
the side of the person challenged complies with the dictates of fairness because the only test that
an exercise of discretion must surmount is that of soundness. Consequently, the Court is
compelled to rule that Jardeleza should have been included in the shortlist submitted to the
President for the vacated position of Associate Justice Abad. This consequence arose from the
violation by the JBC of its own rules of procedure and the basic tenets of due process. True,
Jardeleza has no vested right to a nomination, but this does not prescind from the fact that the
JBC failed to observe the minimum requirements of due process.
207 | P a g e
(191) Villanueva vs JBC
ISSUE: W/N the policy of JBC requiring five years of service as judges of first-level courts
before they can qualify as applicant to second-level courts is constitutional
FACTS: Petitioner applied for a position as a judge in a second level court but JBC did not
include his name in the list of applicants since he failed to qualify. This is because the JBC put
priority to incumbent judges who served their position for at least five years and petitioner
hereonly served as judged for more than a year. The petitioner assailed, inter alia, the authority
of the JBC to add another qualification (5-year-qualitification) because thesaid qualification was
already prescribed
DECISION: Yes
RATIO DECIDENDI: The said added 5-year-qualification being assailed by the petitioner is
constitutional since as stated in the Sect. 8 (5), Art.VIII, the JBC is mandated to recommend
appointees to the judiciary. Consequently, it was also stated in the said provision thatonly the
persons nominated by the JBC is transmitted to the president that will choose whom to nominate
as judge in the judiciary.
208 | P a g e
(192) RE: COAopinion on the computation of the appraised value of the properties
purchased by the retired Chief / associate justices of the supreme court A.M. NO. 11-7-10-
SC JULY 31, 2012
ISSUE: W/N COA’s interference, in this case, violates the judiciary’s autonomy.
FACTS: Office of the General Counsel of the Commission on Audit (COA) found that an
underpayment amounting to P221,021.50 resulted when five retired Supreme Court justices
purchased from the Supreme Court the personal properties assigned to them during their
incumbency in the Court. The COA attributed this underpayment to the use by the Property
Division of the Supreme Court of the wrong formula in computing the appraisal value of the
purchased vehicles. According to the COA, the Property Division erroneously appraised the
subject motor vehicles by applying Constitutional Fiscal Autonomy Group (CFAG) Joint
Resolution No. 35 and its guidelines, in compliance with the Resolution of the Court En Banc in
A.M. No. 03- 12-01, when it should have applied the formula found in COA Memorandum No.
98-569-A4. Atty. Candelaria, Deputy Clerk of Court and Chief Administrative Officer,
recommended that the Court advise the COA to respect the in-house computation based on the
CFAG formula, noting that this was the first time that the COA questioned the authority of the
Court in using CFAG Joint Resolution No. 35 and its guidelines in the appraisal and disposal of
government property since these were issued in 1997. As a matter of fact, in two previous
instances involving two retired Court of Appeals Associate Justices, the COA upheld the in-
house appraisal of government property using the formula found in the CFAG guidelines. More
importantly, the Constitution itself grants the Judiciary fiscal autonomy in the handling of its
budget and resources.
DECISION: Yes
RATIO DECIDENDI: The COA’s authority to conduct post-audit examinations on
constitutional bodies granted fiscal autonomy is provided under Section 2(1), Article IX-D of the
1987 Constitution. This authority, however, must be read not only in light of the Court’s fiscal
autonomy, but also in relation with the constitutional provisions on judicial independence and the
existing jurisprudence and Court rulings on these matters. Any kind of interference on how these
retirement privileges and benefits are exercised and availed of, not only violates the fiscal
autonomy and independence of the Judiciary, but also encroaches upon the constitutional duty
and privilege of the Chief Justice and the Supreme Court En Banc to manage the Judiciary’s own
affairs.
209 | P a g e
(193) RE: Request for guidance/clarification on Section 7, Rule III of RA NO 10154,

Requiring retiring government employees to secure a clearance of pendency/non-pendency
of case/s from the Civi Service Commission
ISSUE: W/N the said provision is applicable to members of the judiciary

FACTS: Section 7, Rule III of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of Republic Act
No. (RA) 101541 states that: Notice of Pendency of Case. The retiring employee shall seek
Clearance of Pendency/Non-Pendency of Administrative Case from his/her employer agency,
Civil Service Commission (CSC),Office of the Ombudsman, or in case of presidential
appointees, from the Office of the President.
DECISION: No
RATIO DECIDENDI: Section 6,2 Article VIII of the 1987 Philippine Constitution
(Constitution) exclusively vests in the Court administrative supervision over all courts and court
personnel.3 As such, it oversees the court personnel’s compliance with all laws and takes the
proper administrative action against them for any violation thereof. The requirement of seeking a
Clearance of Pendency/Non-Pendency of Administrative Case from the Civil Service
Commission embodied in Section 7, Rule III of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of
Republic Act No. 10154 is declared INAPPLICABLE to retiring employees of the Judiciary
210 | P a g e
(194) RE: Save the SC judicial independence and fiscal autonomy movement v abolition of
judiciary development fund(JDF) and reduction of fiscal autonomy UDK-15143, Jan. 21,
2015
ISSUE: W/N petitioner Rolly Mijares has sufficiently shown grounds for this court to grant the
petition and issue a writ of mandamus.
FACTS: Petitioner Rolly Mijares (Mijares) prays for the issuance of a writ of mandamus in
order to compel this court to exercise its judicial independence and fiscal autonomy against the
perceived hostility of Congress. In the letter-petition, Mijares alleges that he is "a Filipino
citizen, and a concerned taxpayer. He filed this petition as part of his "continuing crusade to
defend and uphold the Constitution" because he believes in the rule of law. He is concerned
about the threats against the judiciary after this court promulgated Priority Development
Assistance Fund. The complaint implied that certain acts of members of Congress and the
President after the promulgation of these cases show a threat to judicial independence. Petitioner
argues that Congress "gravely abused its discretion with a blatant usurpation of judicial
independence and fiscal autonomy of the Supreme Court. Petitioner points out that Congress is
exercising its power "in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion or personal
hostility by abolishing the ‘Judiciary Development Fund’ (JDF) of the Supreme Court. With
regard to his prayer for the issuance of the writ of mandamus, petitioner avers that Congress
should not act as "wreckers of the law" by threatening "to clip the powers of the High
Tribunal[.]" Congress committed a "blunder of monumental proportions" when it reduced the
judiciary’s 2015 budget. Petitioner prays that this court exercise its powers to
"REVOKE/ABROGATE and EXPUNGE whatever irreconcilable contravention of existing laws
affecting the judicial independence and fiscal autonomy as mandated under the Constitution to
better serve public interest and general welfare of the people."
DECISION: No
RATIO DECIDENDI: The power of judicial review, like all powers granted by the
Constitution, is subject to certain limitations. Petitioner must comply with all the requisites for
judicial review before this court may take cognizance of the case. The requisites are: (1) there
must be an actual case or controversy calling for the exercise of judicial power; (2) the person
challenging the act must have the standing to question the validity of the subject act or issuance;
otherwise stated, he must have a personal and substantial interest in the case such that he has
sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as a result of its enforcement; (3) the question of
constitutionality must be raised at the earliest opportunity; and (4) the issue of constitutionality
must be the very lis mota of the case. The court held that there is no actual case or controversy
and that the petitioner has no legal standing to question the validity of the proposed bill.
211 | P a g e
(195) RE: Petition for recognition of exemption of the GSIS from payment of legal fees 612
SCRA 193 (2010)
ISSUE: W/N the legislature can exempt the GSIS from legal fees imposed by the Court on
GOCCs and local government units
FACTS: The GSIS seeks exemption from the payment of legal fees imposed on GOCCs under
Sec 22, Rule 141 (Legal Fees) of the ROC. The GSIS anchors its petition on Sec 39 of its
charter, RA 8291 (The GSIS Act of 1997) Required to comment on the GSIS’ petition, the OSG
maintains that the petition should be denied. On this Court’s order, the Office of the Chief
Attorney (OCAT) submitted a report and recommendation on the petition of the GSIS and the
comment of the OSG thereon. According to the OCAT, the claim of the GSIS for exemption
from the payment of legal fees has no legal basis.
DECISION: No
RATIO DECIDENDI: The GSIS is a corporate entity whose personality is separate and
distinct from that of its individual members. The rights of its members are not its rights; its
rights, powers and functions pertain to it solely and are not shared by its members. More
importantly, the Congress could not have carved out an exemption for the GSIS from the
payment of legal fees without transgressing another equally important institutional safeguard of
the Court’s independence — fiscal autonomy. Legal fees therefore do not only constitute a vital
source of the Court’s financial resources but also comprise an essential element of the Court’s
fiscal independence. The 1987 Constitution also took away the power of Congress to repeal,
alter, or supplement rules concerning pleading, practice and procedure.
212 | P a g e
(196) Cayetano v Monsod
ISSUE: W/N the appointment of Chairman Monsod of Comelec violates Section 1 (1), Article
IX-C of the 1987 Constitution?
FACTS: Respondent Christian Monsod was nominated by President Corazon C. Aquino to the
position of Chairman of the COMELEC in a letter received by the Secretariat of the Commission
on Appointments on April 25, 1991. Petitioner opposed the nomination because allegedly
Monsod does not possess the required qualification of having been engaged in the practice of law
for at least ten years. On June 5, 1991, the Commission on Appointments confirmed the
nomination of Monsod as Chairman of the COMELEC. On June 18, 1991, he took his oath of
office. On the same day, he assumed office as Chairman of the COMELEC. Challenging the
validity of the confirmation by the Commission on Appointments of Monsod's nomination,
petitioner as a citizen and taxpayer, filed the instant petition for certiorari and Prohibition
praying that said confirmation and the consequent appointment of Monsod as Chairman of the
Commission on Elections be declared null and void.
DECISION: No
RATIO DECIDENDI: The judgment rendered by the Commission in the exercise of such an
acknowledged power is beyond judicial interference except only upon a clear showing of a grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. (Art. VIII, Sec. 1 Constitution).
In the leading case of Luego v. Civil Service Commission, the Court said that, Appointment is an
essentially discretionary power and must be performed by the officer in which it is vested
according to his best lights, the only condition being that the appointee should possess the
qualifications required by law. If he does, then the appointment cannot be faulted on the ground
that there are others better qualified who should have been preferred. This is a political question
involving considerations of wisdom which only the appointing authority can decide.
213 | P a g e
(197) Gaminde v COA
ISSUE: W/N the term of office of Atty. Thelma P. Gaminde, as Commissioner, Civil Service
Commission, to which she was appointed on June 11, 1993, expired on February 02, 1999, as
stated in the appointment paper, or on February 02, 2000, as claimed by her.
FACTS: The President appointed petitioner Gaminde, ad interim, Commissioner, Civil Service
Commission. The Commission on Appointments, Congress of the Philippines confirmed the
appointment. On February 24, 1998, petitioner sought clarification from the Office of the
President as to the expiry date of her term of office. In reply to her request, the Chief Presidential
Legal Counsel, in a letter dated April 07, 1998, opined that petitioner's term of office would
expire on February 02, 2000, not on, February 02, 1999. Relying on said advisory opinion,
petitioner remained in office after February 02, 1999. On February 04, 1999, Chairman Corazon
Alma G. de Leon; wrote the Commission on Audit requesting opinion on whether or not
Commissioner Thelma P. Gaminde and her co-terminus staff may be paid their salaries
notwithstanding the expiration of their appointments on February 02,1999. On February 18,
1999, the General Counsel, Commission on Audit, issued an opinion that "the term of
Commissioner Gaminde has expired on February 02, 1999 as stated in her appointment
conformably with the constitutional intent." Consequently, on March 24, 1999, CSC Resident
Auditor Flovitas U. Felipe issued notice of disallowance disallowing in audit the salaries and
emoluments pertaining to petitioner and her co-terminus staff, effective February 02, 1999.
Petitioner appealed the disallowance but the Commission on Audit affirmed the propriety of the
disallowance, holding that the issue of petitioner's term of office may be properly addressed by
mere reference to her appointment paper which set the expiration date on February 02, 1999, and
that the Commission was bereft of power to recognize an extension of her term, not even with
the implied acquiescence of the Office of the President. Petitioner moved for reconsideration;
however, on August 17, 1999, the Commission on Audit denied the motion in Decision No. 99-
129.
DECISION: Her appointment expired on February 02, 1999, but is entitled to received her
salary and other emoluments
RATIO DECIDENDI: The term of office of Ms. Thelma P. Gaminde as Commissioner, Civil
Service Commission, under an appointment extended to her expired on February 02, 1999.
However, she served as de facto officer in good faith until February 02, 2000, and thus entitled to
receive her salary and other emoluments for actual service rendered. The terms of the first
Chairmen and Commissioners of the Constitutional Commissions under the 1987 Constitution
must start on a common date, irrespective of the variations in the dates of appointments and
qualifications of the appointees, in order that the expiration of the first terms of seven, five and
three years should lead to the regular recurrence of the two-year interval between the expiration
of the terms. Applying the foregoing conditions to the case at bar, we rule that the appropriate
starting point of the terms of office of the first appointees to the Constitutional Commissions
under the 1987 Constitution must be on February 02, 1987, the date of the adoption of the 1987
Constitution. In the law of public officers, there is a settled distinction between "term" and
"tenure." "The term of an office must be distinguished from the tenure of the incumbent. The
term means the time during the officer may claim to hold office as of right, and fixes the interval
after which the several incumbents shall succeed one another. The tenure represents the term
214 | P a g e
during which the incumbent actually holds the office. The term of office is not affected by the
hold-over. The tenure may be shorter than the term for reasons within or beyond the power of the
incumbent." We thus see the regular interval of vacancy every two (2) years, namely, February
02, 1994, for the first Chairman, February 02, 1992, for the first five-year term Commissioner,
and February 02, 1990, for the first three-year term Commissioner. Their successors must also
maintain the two year interval, namely: February 02, 2001, for Chairman; February 02, 1999, for
Commissioner Thelma P. Gaminde, and February 02, 1997, for Commissioner Ramon P.
Ereñeta, Jr.||
215 | P a g e
(198) Brillantes v Yorac
ISSUE: W/N the President may designate the Acting Chairman of the COMELEC in the
absence of the regular Chairman.
FACTS: The President designated Associate Commissioner Yorac as Acting Chairman of the
Commission on Elections, in place of Chairman Hilario B. Davide, who had been named
chairman of the fact-finding commission to investigate the December 1989 coup d’ etat attempt.
Brillantes challenged the act of the President as contrary to the constitutional provision that
ensures the independence the Commission on Elections as an independent constitutional body
and the specific provision that “(I)n no case shall any Member (of the Commission on Elections)
be appointed or designated in a temporary or acting capacity.” Brillantes contends that the choice
of the Acting Chairman of the Commission on Elections is an internal matter that should be
resolved by the members themselves and that the intrusion of the President of the Philippines
violates their independence. The Solicitor General the designation made by the President of the
Philippines should therefore be sustained for reasons of “administrative expediency,” to prevent
disruption of the functions of the COMELEC.
DECISION: No
RATIO DECIDENDI: The Constitution expressly describes all the Constitutional
Commissions as “independent.” They are not under the control of the President of the
Philippines in the discharge of their respective functions. Each of these Commissions conducts
its own proceedings under the applicable laws and its own rules and in the exercise of its own
discretion. Its decisions, orders and rulings are subject only to review on certiorari by this Court
as provided by the Constitution. The choice of a temporary chairman in the absence of the
regular chairman comes under that discretion. That discretion cannot be exercised for it, even
with its consent, by the President of the Philippines. The lack of a statutory rule covering the
situation at bar is no justification for the President of the Philippines to fill the void by extending
the temporary designation in favor of the respondent. The situation could have been handled by
the members of the Commission on Elections themselves without the participation of the
President.
216 | P a g e
(199) CSC v DBM
ISSUE: W/N DBM’s policy of “No Report, No Release” is constitutional

FACTS: CSC filed a petition for mandamus seeking to compel the DBM to release the balance
of its budget for fiscal year 2002. At the same time, it seeks a determination by this Court of the
extent of the constitutional concept of fiscal autonomy. General Appropriation Act of 2002
(GAA) appropriated total funds to the CSC but they claimed that there is an unreleased balance.
To CSC, this balance was intentionally withheld by DBM on the basis of its no report, no release
policy. DBM proffers at any rate that the delay in releasing the balance of CSC budget was not
on account of any failure on CSC part to submit the required reports; rather, it was due to a
shortfall in revenues. Moreover, DBM contends that CSC did not exhaust administrative
remedies as it could have sought clarification from DBM Secretary regarding the extent of fiscal
autonomy before resorting to Court. Second, even assuming that administrative remedies were
exhausted, there are no exceptional and compelling reasons to justify the direct filing of the
petition with Supreme Court instead of the trial court, thus violating the hierarchy of courts.
DECISION: No
RATIO DECIDENDI: DBM’s policy of “No Report, No Release” may not be validly enforced
against offices possessing fiscal autonomy without violating Article IX (A), Section 5 of the
Constitution which states: The Commission shall enjoy fiscal autonomy. Their approved annual
appropriations shall be automatically and regularly released. It is under such situation that a
relaxation of the constitutional mandate to automatically and regularly release appropriations is
allowed. Their approved appropriations shall be automatically and regularly released.
217 | P a g e
(200) Funa v Duque
ISSUE: W/N the designation of Duque as member of the Board of Directors or Trustees of the
GSIS, PHILHEALTH, ECC and HDMF, in an ex officio capacity, impair the independence of
the CSC and violate the constitutional prohibition against the holding of dual or mul
FACTS: Then president GMA issued EO 864 which allows tge chairman of the CSC to be in
the board of trustees/directors of certain GOCCs. Funa asserts that EO 864 and Section 14,
Chapter 3, Title I-A, Book V of EO 292 violate the independence of the CSC, which was
constitutionally created to be protected from outside influences and political pressures due to the
significance of its government functions. He further asserts that such independence is violated by
the fact that the CSC is not a part of the Executive Branch of Government while the concerned
GOCCs are considered instrumentalities of the Executive Branch of the Government. In this
situation, the President may exercise his power of control over the CSC considering that the
GOCCs in which Duque sits as Board member are attached to the Executive Department. Funa
claims that EO 864 and Section 14, Chapter 3, Title I-A, Book V of EO 292 violate the
prohibition imposed upon members of constitutional commissions from holding any other office
or employment. A conflict of interest may arise in the event that a Board decision of the GSIS,
PHILHEALTH, ECC and HDMF concerning personnel-related matters is elevated to the CSC
considering that such GOCCs have original charters, and their employees are governed by CSC
laws, rules and regulations. Respondents submit that the prohibition against holding any other
office or employment under Section 2, Article IX-A of the 1987 Constitution does not cover
positions held without additional compensation in ex officio capacities.
DECISION: Yes. The Court upholds the constitutionality of Section 14, Chapter 3, Title I-A,
Book V of EO 292, but declares unconstitutional EO 864 and the designation of Duque in an ex
officio capacity as a member of the Board of Directors or Trustees of the GSIS, PHILHEALTH,
ECC and HDMF.
RATIO DECIDENDI: While all other appointive officials in the civil service are allowed to
hold other office or employment in the government during their tenure when such is allowed by
law or by the primary functions of their positions, members of the Cabinet, their deputies and
assistants may do so only when expressly authorized by the Constitution itself. In other words,
Section 7, Article IX-B is meant to lay down the general rule applicable to all elective and
appointive public officials and employees, while Section 13, Article VII is meant to be the
exception applicable only to the President, the Vice-President, Members of the Cabinet, their
deputies and assistants. .Under Section 17, Article VII of the Constitution, the President
exercises control over all government offices in the Executive Branch. An office that is legally
not under the control of the President is not part of the Executive Branch, hence when the CSC
Chairman sits as a member of the governing Boards of the GSIS, PHILHEALTH, ECC and
HDMF, he may exercise powers and functions which are not anymore derived from his position
as CSC Chairman
218 | P a g e
(201) Sarmiento v Comelec
ISSUE: Whether or not the Commission on Elections en banc may hear and decide pre-
proclamation cases classified as special cases.
FACTS: Petitioners impugned the challenged resolutions of the Commission on Elections in
pre-proclamation cases classified as special cases.
DECISION: No
RATIO DECIDENDI: Article IX-C, Section 3 of the Constitution expressly provides that
election cases include pre-proclamation controversies, and all such cases must first be heard and
decided by a division of the commission. The commission, sitting en banc, does not have the
authority to hear and decide the same at the first instance.
219 | P a g e
(202) Ambil v Comelec
ISSUE: Whether or not the Supreme Court has the power to review decisions of the
COMELEC.
FACTS: On 04 Jun 1998, respondent Jose Ramirez filed an election protest with the
COMELEC challenging the result of the 11 May 1998 elections where petitioner Ruperto Ambil,
Jr. was proclaimed the duly-elected governor of Eastern Samar. On 24 Feb 2000, Commissioner
Japal Guidani retired from the service prior to the finalization of his proposed resolution in the
Ramirez protest. In said resolution, Commissioner Julio Desamito had dissented while
Commissioner Luzviminda Tancangco did not indicate her vote.
DECISION: Yes
RATIO DECIDENDI: Article IX-A, Section 7 provides that any decision, order or ruling of
each commission may be brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari by the aggrieved party
within thirty days from receipt of a copy thereof. The Court interpreted the provision to mean
final orders, rulings and decisions of the COMELEC rendered in the exercise of its adjudicatory
or quasi-judicial powers. The decision must be a final decision or resolution of the COMELEC
en banc, not a division, certainly not an interlocutory order of a division.
220 | P a g e
(203) Brillantes v comelec
ISSUE: Whether or not COMELEC may conduct “unofficial” tabulation of presidential election
results based on a copy of the election returns.
FACTS: Congress enacted R.A. No. 8436 authorizing COMELEC to use an automated election
system for the process of voting, counting of votes and canvassing/consolidating the results of
national and local elections. COMELEC subsequently approved Resolution 6712 adopting the
policy that the precint election results of each city and municipality shall be immediately
transmitted electronically in advance to the COMELEC in Manila. Petitioners questioned the
constitutionality of the quickcount as being preemptive of the authority vested in Congress to
canvass the votes for the President and Vice-President under Article VII, Section 4 of the
Constitutuion.
DECISION: No
RATIO DECIDENDI: The assailed resolution usurps, under the guise of an “unofficial”
tabulation of election results based on a copy of the election results, the sole and exclusive
authority of Congress to canvass the votes for the election of President and Vice-President.
221 | P a g e
(204) Sandoval v comelec
ISSUE: whether the COMELEC's order to set aside petitioner's proclamation was valid.
FACTS: Petitioner and private respondent herein were candidates for the congressional seat for
the Malabon-Navotas legislative district during the elections held on May 11, 1998. After
canvassing the municipal certificates of canvass, the district board of canvassers proclaimed
petitioner the duly elected congressman. The petitioner took his oath of office on the same day.
Private respondent filed with the Comelec a petition, which sought the annulment of petitioner's
proclamation. He alleged that there was a verbal order from the Comelec Chairman to suspend
the canvass and proclamation of the winning candidate, but the district board of canvassers
proceeded with the canvass and proclamation despite the said verbal order. He also alleged that
there was non-inclusion of 19 election returns in the canvass, which would result in an
incomplete canvass of the election returns. The Comelec en banc issued an order setting aside the
proclamation of petitioner and ruled the proclamation as void. Hence, this petition for certiorari
seeking the annulment and reversal of the Comelec order.
DECISION: No
RATIO DECIDENDI: its order to set aside the proclamation of petitioner is invalid for having
been rendered without due process of law. Procedural due process demands prior notice and
hearing. The facts show that COMELEC set aside the proclamation of petitioner without the
benefit of prior notice and hearing and it rendered the questioned order based solely on private
respondent's allegations.
222 | P a g e
(205) Al haj v comelec
ISSUE: Whether or not the grounds assailed by the petitioners constitute grounds for
declaration of failure of election.
FACTS: Petitioner assail the resolution of the Commission on elections en banc dismissing
their petition to declare a failure of elections in the Municipality of Munai, Province of Lanao del
Norte. In their petition, petitioners Tawantawan M. caruntongan and Nasser Manalao, candidates
for Municipal Mayor and Vice Mayor, respectively, enumerated the following as grounds for
declaration of failure of election: 1.Massive vote buying; 2.Illegal assignment of Rakim Paute as
Election Officer of Munai; 3.Appointment of disqualified BEIs; 4.Shoot-out on the eve of the
election between unidentified armed men and members of the Philippine Army escorting election
forms and paraphernalia in barangay Cadulawan; 5.Transfer of polling places without notice;
6.Absence of voting booths in barangay Tambo and cadulawan; and 7.Non-signing of the
Voter’s Registration Form. The COMELEC dismissed the petition because the grounds relied
upon are not those which constitute grounds for declaration of failure of election.
DECISION: Dismissed
RATIO DECIDENDI: Under Article 1, Section 6 of the Omnibus Election Code explicitly
states the only three instances wherein a failure of election may be validly declared are when: 1)
the election in any polling places has not been held on the date fixed in account of force majeure,
violence, terrorism, fraud, or other analogous causes; 2) the election in any polling place had
been suspended before the hour fixed by law for the closing of the voting on account of force
majeure, violence, terrorism, fraud, or other analogous causes, or 3) after the voting and during
the preparation and transmission of the election returns or in the custody or canvass thereof, such
election results in a failure to elect on account of force majeure, violence, terrorism, fraud, or
other analogous cases. This enumeration is exclusive and restrictive. It limits the power of the
Commission to annul the results of an election only to those instances where the election is not
held, is suspended or results in a failure to elect. The latter phrase should be understood in its
literal sense, which is, nobody was elected. Moreover, the irregularities pointed out by the
petitioners such as vote-buying, fraud, and terrorism are grounds for an election contest and may
not, as a rule, be invoked to declare a failure of election and to disenfranchise the greater number
of electorate through the misdeeds, precisely, of only relative few.
223 | P a g e
(206) General v Roco
ISSUE: Whether or not a CES eligibility is sufficient to acquire security of tenure.

FACTS: Respondent Ramon S. Roco was appointed by then President Fidel V. Ramos on 26
Aug 1996 as Regional Director of the Land Transportation Office in Region V, a position
equivalent to CES rank Level V. He was re-appointed to the same position by then President
Joseph Estrada. From his appointment in 1996, respondent was not a CES eligible and was only
conferred CES eligibility by the Career Executive Board on 13 Aug 1999. On 07 Sep 1999,
petitioner Luis Mario General, who was not a CES eligible, was appointed by then President
Estrada as Regional Director of LTO-V. Pursuant thereto, DOTC Undersecretary Herminio B.
Coloma, Jr., as officer-in-charge of the department, issued a memorandum directing petitioner
General to assume the said office immediately and for respondent Roco to report to the Office of
the Secretary.
DECISION: No
RATIO DECIDENDI: Two requisites must concur in order for an employee in the career
executive service may attain security of tenure: CES eligibility and appointment ot the
appropriate CES rank.
224 | P a g e
(207) CSC v salas
ISSUE: Whether or not Salas is a confidential employee.

FACTS: On 07 Oct 1989, respondent Salas was appointed by the PAGCOR chairman as
internal security staff member and assigned to the casino at the Manila Pavilion Hotel. His
employment was terminated by the Board of Directors of PAGCOR on 03 Dec 1991, allegedly
for loss of confidence.
DECISION: No
RATIO DECIDENDI: t is the nature of the position which finally determines whether a
position is primarily confidential, policy-determining or highly technical. The occupant of a
particular position could be considered a confidential employee if the predominant reason why
he was chosen by the appointing authority was the latter’s belief that he can share a close
relationship with the occupant. Where the position occupied is remote from that of the
appointing authority, the element of trust between them is no longer predominant.
225 | P a g e
(208) Office of the ombudsman v CSC
ISSUE: Whether or not de Jesus’ appointment may be properly changed from temporary status
to permanent despite non-compliance with the eligibility requirement for the position of Graft
Investigation Officer III.
FACTS: On 31 Jul 2002, Melchor Arthur Carandang, Paul Elmer Clemente, and Jose Tereso de
Jesus, Jr. were appointed Graft Investigation Officers III of the Office of the Ombudsman. The
Civil Service Commission approved such appointments on the condition that appointees must
obtain CES or CSE eligibility to acquire security of tenure. Carandang and Clemente had been
conferred with CSE eligibility on 06 Jun 2003.
DECISION: Yes
RATIO DECIDENDI: Under P.D.No. 807, Section 9(h) which authorizes the CSC to approve
appointments to postitions in the civil service, except those specified therein, its authority is
limited only to whether or not the appointee possess the legal qualifications and the appropriate
eligibility, nothing else. Third level eligibility is not required for third level officials appointed
by the Ombudsman in light of the provisions of the Constitution vis a vis the Administrative
Code of 1987.
226 | P a g e
(209) Vistan v nicolas
ISSUE: Whether or not respondent judge engaged in electioneering while still an MTC judge.
FACTS: Complainant Leonila Vistan alleged that as early as 10 Feb 1987, prior to the start of
the campaign period, and while still an MTC judge, respondent Ruben Nicolas started circulating
handbills/letters addressed to electoral constitutents in the second district of Bulacan indicating
his intention to run for a congressional seat.
DECISION: Yes
RATIO DECIDENDI: For having held himself out as a congressional candidate while still a
member of the Bench, respondent took advantage of his position to boost his candidacy,
demeaned the statude of his office, and must be pronounced guilty of gross misconduct, a clear
violation of Rule 5.10, Canon 5, of the Code of Judicial Conduct.
227 | P a g e
(210) Domingo v zamora
ISSUE: whether EO 81 and the DECS Memoranda are valid.

FACTS: On March 5, 1999, former President Joseph E. Estrada issued Executive Order No.
813 (EO 81 for brevity) entitled Transferring the Sports Programs and Activities of the
Department of Education, Culture and Sports to the Philippine Sports Commission and Defining
the Role of DECS in School-Based Sports. Pursuant to EO 81, former DECS Secretary Andrew
B. Gonzales (Secretary Gonzales for brevity) issued Memorandum No. 01592 on January 10,
2000. Memorandum No. 01592 temporarily reassigned, in the exigency of the service, all
remaining BPESS Staff to other divisions or bureaus of the DECS effective March 15, 2000.On
January 21, 2000, Secretary Gonzales issued Memorandum No. 01594 reassigning the BPESS
staff named in the Memorandum to various offices within the DECS effective March 15, 2000.
Petitioners were among the BPESS personnel affected by Memorandum No. 01594. Dissatisfied
with their reassignment, petitioners filed the instant petition. petitioners argue that EO 81 is void
and unconstitutional for being an undue legislation by President Estrada. Petitioners maintain
that the Presidents issuance of EO 81 violated the principle of separation of powers. Petitioners
also challenge the DECS Memoranda for violating their right to security of tenure.Petitioners
seek to nullify EO 81 and the DECS Memoranda. During the pendency of the case, Republic Act
No. 9155 (RA 9155 for brevity), otherwise known as the Governance of Basic Education Act of
2001, was enacted on August 11, 2001. RA 9155 expressly abolished the BPESS and transferred
the functions, programs and activities of the DECS relating to sports competition to the PSC.
DECISION: Dismissed
RATIO DECIDENDI: We dismiss this petition for being moot and academic. As manifested
by both petitioners and respondents, the subsequent enactment of RA 9155 has rendered the
issues in the present case moot and academic. Since RA 9155 abolished the BPESS and
transferred the DECS functions relating to sports competition to the PSC, petitioners now admit
that it is no longer plausible to raise any ultra vires assumption by the PSC of the functions of the
BPESS. Moreover, since RA 9155 provides that BPESS personnel not transferred to the PSC
shall be retained by the DECS, petitioners now accept that the law explicitly protects and
preserves their right to security of tenure.
228 | P a g e
(211) OP v Buenaobra
ISSUE: Whether or not respondent being a presidential appointee and a holder of a non-career
service postion could be removed from service at the pleasure of the President.
FACTS: The Office of the Ombudsman’s Special Prosecution Officer filed an information
against Nita Buenaobra, chairman of the Komisyon sa Wikang Pilipino, with the Sandiganbayan
for violation of Section 4(e) of R.A. No. 3019 for allegedly causing undue injury to the
government through gross inexcusable negligence in connection with the unauthorized reprinting
of the Diksyunaryo ng Wikang Pilipino. The Sandiganbayan ordered a reinvestigation while the
Presidential Anti-Graft Commission (PAGC) conducted a parallel administrative investigation
against respondent charging her with the same acts and ommissions subject of the
Sandiganbayan case. On 11 Apr 2003, petitioner adopted PAGC’s recommendation and
dismissed respondent from office.
DECISION: No
RATIO DECIDENDI: Non-career service personnel enjoy security of tenure. They may not be
removed without just cause and observance of due process.
229 | P a g e
(212) Capablanca v. CSC
ISSUE: Whether or not the CSC can conduct an investigation regarding the irregularity of
Capablanca’s CSP-CAT.
FACTS: Eugenio Capablanca was appointed into the PNP with the position of PO1 with
temporary status. He passed both the PNP Entrance Examination conducted by the National
Police Commission (NAPOLCOM) and the Career Service Professional Examination-Computer
Assisted Test (CSP-CAT) given by the Civil Service Commission (CSC) he was subsequently
conferred permanent status. The CSC conducted an investigation because of irregularities
regarding Capablanca’s CSP-CAT. Capablanca averred that only the NAPOLCOM had sole
authority to conduct police entrance exams.
DECISION: Yes. The CSC can conduct an investigation.
RATIO DECIDENDI: The CSC, as the central personnel agency of the Government, is
mandated to establish a career service, to strengthen the merit and rewards system, and to adopt
measures to promote morale, efficiency and integrity in the civil service. Jurisprudence has held
that Appointees to Police Officer and Senior Police Officer positions in the Philippine National
Police must have passed any of the following examinations: a) PNP Entrance Examination; b)
Police Officer 3rd Class Examination; and c) CSC Police Officer Entrance Examination. The
CSC is mandated to conduct the qualifying entrance examination (CSC Police Officer Entrance
Examination) for Police Officer 1.
230 | P a g e
(213) DBP v. COA 231 SCRA 202
ISSUE: Whether or not COA is allowed to conduct post-audit.

FACTS: DBP conducted a public bidding for one unit of uninterruptible power supply (UPS).
Thereafter, DBP issued Purchase Order No. 0137 to Voltronics for P1,436,539.25 inclusive of
customs duties and taxes. COA sent a notice to the chairman of DBP notifying him of the
disallowance of the amount representing customs duties and taxes and at the same time holding
him, along with other petitioners, jointly and severally liable for the aforementioned sum. They
submit the contrary on the ground that the transaction in question had already been approved and
passed in audit in accordance with the pre-audit system then obtaining and the later circular
requiring post-audit should not be applied retroactively
DECISION: Yes. COA can conduct post-audit.
RATIO DECIDENDI: While it is true that the applicable procedure in force at the time of the
questioned transaction was COA Circular 86-257 requiring a pre-audit, there is nothing to
preclude COA from conducting a post-audit of the already pre-audited transaction. Article IX
(D) Section 2(1) of the Constitution expressly grants respondent Commission the power to
conduct a post-audit.
231 | P a g e
(214) Bustamante v. COA
ISSUE: Whether or not such denial to give due course to the appeal of Bustamante constitutes
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction.
FACTS: Benito Bustamante, Regional Legal Counsel for the National Power Corporation
(NPC). Pursuant to NPC policy, in addition to the use of a government vehicle, Bustamante
claimed his transportation allowance for the month of January 1989. On May 31, 1990, he
received an Auditor's Notice to Person Liable dated April 17, 1990 from Regional Auditor
Martha Roxana Caburian disallowing P1,250.00 representing aforesaid transportation allowance.
Bustamante moved for reconsideration but was denied due course.
DECISION: No. The denial to give due course does not constitute grave abuse of discretion.
RATIO DECIDENDI: COA Circular No. 75-6 prohibited the use of government vehicles by
officials provided with transportation allowance. This includes the NPC which Bustamante avers
is not mentioned in the said circular. Said circular was within the powers of the COA provided
by the Constitution.
232 | P a g e
(215) DBP v. COA GR 88435
ISSUE: Whether or not the Constitution vests in the COA the sole and exclusive power to
examine and audit government banks so as to prohibit concurrent audit by private external
auditors under any circumstance
FACTS: After learning that the DBP had signed a contract with a private auditing firm for
calendar year 1986, the new COA Chairman wrote the DBP Chairman that the COA resident
auditors were under instructions to disallow any payment to the private auditor whose services
were unconstitutional, illegal and unnecessary. On July 1, 1987, the DBP Chairman sent to the
COA Chairman a copy of the DBP's contract with Joaquin Cunanan& Co., signed four months
earlier on March 5, 1987. The DBP Chairman's covering handwritten note sought the COA’s
concurrence to the contract. During the pendency of the DBP Chairman's note-request for
concurrence, the DBP paid the billings of the private auditor in the total amount of P487,321.14
despite the objection of the COA. On October 30, 1987, the COA Chairman issued a
Memorandum disallowing the payments, and holding the following persons personally liable for
such payment.
DECISION: No. COA does not have the sole and exclusive power to examine and audit
government banks so as to prohibit concurrent audit by private external auditors under any
circumstance.
RATIO DECIDENDI: The clear and unmistakable conclusion from a reading of the entire
Section 2, Article IX-D is that the COA's power to examine and audit is non-exclusive. On the
other hand, the COA's authority to define the scope of its audit, promulgate auditing rules and
regulations, and disallow unnecessary expenditures is exclusive. As the constitutionally
mandated auditor of all government agencies, the COA's findings and conclusions necessarily
prevail over those of private auditors, at least insofar as government agencies and officials are
concerned. The mere fact that private auditors may audit government agencies does not divest
the COA of its power to examine and audit the same government agencies. The COA is neither
by-passed nor ignored since even with a private audit the COA will still conduct its usual
examination and audit, and its findings and conclusions will still bind government agencies and
their officials. A concurrent private audit poses no danger whatsoever of public funds or assets
escaping the usual scrutiny of a COA audit.
233 | P a g e
(216) Nuñez v. Sandiganbayan
ISSUE: Whether or not the creation of Sandiganbayan violates equal protection insofar as
appeals would be concerned.
FACTS: Rufino Nuñez assailed the validity of P.D. 1486 creating the Sandiganbayan as
amended by P.D. 1606. He was accused before the Sandiganbayan for estafa through
falsification of public documents committed in connivance with his other co-accused, all public
officials, in several cases.
DECISION: No. The creation of the Sandiganbayan does not violate equal protection insofar as
appeals would be concerned.
RATIO DECIDENDI: The Constitution specifically makes mention of the creation of a special
court, the Sandiganbayan, precisely in response to a problem, the urgency of which cannot be
denied, namely, dishonesty in the public service.
234 | P a g e
(217) Roxas v. Vasquez
ISSUE: Whether or not the Court may review or interfere with the prosecutorial prerogative of
the Ombudsman.
FACTS: Manuel C. Roxas was the Chairman, while Ahmed S. Nacpil was a Member, of the
Bids and Awards Committee of the PC-INP who invited bids for the supply of sixty-five units of
fire trucks. The COA subsequently discovered that while the disbursement voucher indicated the
bid price has discrepancy. DILG Secretary filed a complaint with the Ombudsman for violation
of Republic Act No. 3019 against Roxas and Nacpil.
DECISION: Yes. The Court may interfere with the prosecutorial prerogative of the
Ombudsman.
RATIO DECIDENDI: Ordinarily, the Court will not interfere with the discretion of the
Ombudsman to determine whether there exists reasonable ground to believe that a crime has
been committed and that the accused is probable guilty thereof and, thereafter, to file the
corresponding information with the appropriate courts. However, the Court found that the case at
bar falls under one of the recognized exceptions to this rule, more specifically, the constitutional
rights of the accused are impaired and the charges are manifestly false. In cases where the
Ombudsman and the Special Prosecutor were unable to agree on whether or not probable cause
exists, the Court may interfere with the findings and conclusions.
235 | P a g e
(218) People v. Velez
ISSUE: Whether or not the Sandiganbayan violated Section 27 of Republic Act 6770 when it
treated the "Joint Motion for Reconsideration/ Reinvestigation" of Velez as a motion for
reconsideration under Section 27 of Republic Act 6770 and when it granted the "Motio
FACTS: Ignacio Salmingo filed an affidavit-criminal complaint with the Office of the
Ombudsman against Edwin Velez, mayor of Silay City, et al. for violation of R.A. 3019. After
finding probable cause, Ombudsman recommended the filing of information against the
malefactors. Velez filed with the Sandiganbayan a joint motion for reconsideration which was
granted.
DECISION: No. The Sandiganbayan did not violate R.A. 6770 or AN ACT PROVIDING FOR
THE FUNCTIONAL AND STRUCTURAL ORGANIZATION OF THE OFFICE OF THE
OMBUDSMAN, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES.
RATIO DECIDENDI: Records show that when the Office of the Ombudsman approved the
resolution prepared by the Graft Investigator, the Information was filed prematurely against the
respondents. The Office of the Ombudsman must have realized this when Velez et al. filed with
the Sandiganbayan their Joint Motion for Reconsideration/Reinvestigation and thus agreed to
treat the Motion as a motion for reconsideration under Sec 27 of RA 6770. By its agreement, the
Office of the Ombudsman merely corrected itself when it denied the motion for
reconsideration/reinvestigation filed by Velez with the Office of the Ombudsman on the sole
ground that the Information had already been filed with the Sandiganbayan. The Office of the
Ombudsman is vested under the Constitution with investigatory and prosecutorial powers. Said
office, through the Special Prosecutor, has direct control over the prosecution of the case. The
Office of the Ombudsman merely exercised its investigatory and prosecutorial powers.
236 | P a g e
(219) Ledesma v. CA
ISSUE: Whether or not the Ombudsman has encroached into the power of the Bureau of
Immigration over immigration matters.
FACTS: An investigation was requested on alleged anomalies surrounding the extension of the
Temporary Resident Visas of two foreign nationals. Graft Investigator resolved the
administrative case suspending petitioner for a year. The criminal case was dismissed.
DECISION: No. The Ombudsman has not encroached into the power of the Bureau of
Immigration over immigration matters.
RATIO DECIDENDI: The creation of the Office of the Ombudsman is a unique feature of the
1987 Constitution. The Ombudsman and his deputies, as protectors of the people, are mandated
to act promptly on complaints filed in any form or manner against officers or employees of the
government, or any of its subdivisions, agency or instrumentality.
237 | P a g e
(220) Ombudsman v. Madriaga
ISSUE: Whether or not the Office of the Ombudsman has the authority to impose
administrative sanctions over public officials.
FACTS: The San Juan School Club filed a letter-complaint before the Office of the
Ombudsman charging Gertudes Madriaga with violation of Section 1 of Rule IV and Section 1
of Rule VI of the rules implementing R.A. 6713.
DECISION: Yes. The Office of the Ombudsman has the authority to impose administrative
sanctions over public officials.
RATIO DECIDENDI: Article XI, Section 13 of the Constitution grants petitioner
administrative disciplinary powers to investigate on its own, or on complaint by any person, any
act or omission of any public official, employee, office or agent, when such act or omission
appears to be illegal, unjust, improper, or inefficient, and direct the officer concerned to take
appropriate actions against a public official or employee at fault and recommend his removal,
suspension, demotion, fine, censure or prosecution and ensure compliance therewith.
238 | P a g e
(221) Ombudsman v. Madriaga
ISSUE: Whether or not the Office of the Ombudsman has the authority to impose
administrative sanctions over public officials
FACTS: The San Juan School Club filed a letter-complaint filed before the Office of the
Ombudsman charging Gertrudes Madriaga, school principal of San Juan Elementary School and
Ana Marie Bernardo, Canteen Manager of the same school, with violation of Section 1 of Rule
IV and Section 1 of Rule VI of the Rules Implementing Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6713 otherwise
known as the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees. They
were subsequently found guilty of the offense charged. Consequently, they were meted out the
penalty of six (6) months imprisonment. On appeal, the Court of Appeals declared that the six-
month suspension meted out by the Office of the Ombudsman to Madriaga and Bernardo
(Gertrudes) is merely recommendatory to the Department of Education, the Office of the
Ombudsman filed the present Petition for Review on Certiorari.
DECISION:
RATIO DECIDENDI: Article XI, Section 13 of the 1987 Constitution grants the Ombudsman
administrative disciplinary power to direct the officer concerned to take appropriate action
against a public official or employee at fault, and recommend his removal, suspension, demotion,
fine, censure, or prosecution, and ensure compliance therewith. Section 15(3) of R.A. No. 6770
echoes the constitutional grant to the Ombudsman of the power to ―recommend‖ the imposition
of penalty on erring public officials and employees and ensure compliance therewith. The Court
notes that the proviso above qualifies the "order" "to remove, suspend, demote, fine, censure, or
prosecute" an officer or employee — akin to the questioned issuances in the case at bar. That the
refusal, without just cause, of any officer to comply with such an order of the Ombudsman to
penalize an erring officer or employee is a ground for disciplinary action, is a strong indication
that the Ombudsman's "recommendation" is not merely advisory in nature but is actually
mandatory within the bounds of law. This should not be interpreted as usurpation by the
Ombudsman of the authority of the head of office or any officer concerned. It has long been
settled that the power of the Ombudsman to investigate and prosecute any illegal act or omission
of any public official is not an exclusive authority but a shared or concurrent authority in respect
of the offense charged. By stating therefore that the Ombudsman "recommends" the action to be
taken against an erring officer or employee, the provisions in the Constitution and in R.A. 6770
intended that the implementation of the order be coursed through the proper officer, which in this
case would be the head of the BID. The word "recommend" in Sec. 15(3) must thus be read in
conjunction with the phrases "ensure compliance therewith" or "enforce its disciplinary authority
as provided in Section 21" of R.A. No. 6770. In fine, the Ombudsman's authority to impose
administrative penalty and enforce compliance therewith is not merely recommendatory. It is
mandatory within the bounds of the law. The implementation of the order imposing the penalty
is, however, to be coursed through the proper officer.
239 | P a g e
(222) Caoibes v. Ombudsman
ISSUE: Whether or not the Office of the Ombudsman should defer action on the criminal
complaint pending resolution of the Supreme Court for appropriate action
FACTS: Judge Jose Caoibes, Jr. and Florentino Alumbres were embroiled in an altercation
resulting to the latter filing before the Office of the Ombudsman a criminal complaint for
physical injuries, malicious mischief and assault upon a person in authority against the former.
Alumbres also filed an administrative case against Caoibes with the Supreme Court.
DECISION:
RATIO DECIDENDI: Yes, Under Section C, Article VIII of the Constitution, it is the
Supreme Court which is vested with exclusive administrative supervision over all courts and its
personnel. The Ombudsman cannot determine for itself and by itself whether a crminal
complaint against a judge, or court employee, involves administrative matter.
240 | P a g e
(223) Zaldivar v. Sandiganbayan
ISSUE: Whether or not the Tanodbayan has the authority to conduct preliminary investigations
and to direct the filing of criminal cases with the Sandiganbayan
FACTS: Zaldivar sought to restrain Sandiganbayan and Tanodbayan Raul Gonzales from
proceeding with the prosecution and hearing of criminal cases were filed by said Tanodbayan
without legal and constitutional authority.
DECISION:
RATIO DECIDENDI: Under the Constitution, the Special Prosecutor is a mere subordinate of
the Tanodbayan and can investigate and prosecute cases only upon the latter's authority or
orders. The Special Prosecutor cannot initiate the prosecution cases but only conduct the same if
instructed to do so by the Ombudsman.
241 | P a g e
(224) Orap v. Sandiganbayan
ISSUE: Whether or not the Tanodbayan has the authority to conduct a preliminary investigation
of a complaint charging a municipal judge and his clerk of court with violation of Section 3(e) of
Rep. Act No. 3019 and, upon a finding of prima facie case, proceed to
FACTS: Three informations were filed before the Sandiganbayan by Tanodbayan Special
Prosecutor Rodolfo B. Aquino, charging petitioner Vicente S. Orap Presiding Judge of the
Municipal Court of Mangatarem, Pangasinan, with violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act. The information, duly approved by Hon. Juan A. Sison, then Chief Special
Prosecutor of the Tanodbayan, were docketed as Criminal Cases Nos. SB-020, 021 and 022.
Likewise charged under Criminal Case No. 020 was Melanio B. Fernandez, petitioner's Clerk of
Court. The fourth information, docketed as Criminal Case No. SB-189, was filed against
petitioner, also for violation of Section 3(e) of Rep. Act No. 3019. The gravamen of all these
charges was to the effect that the accused on different occasions unlawfully and feloniously
received and took various sums of money from several persons in connection with Criminal Case
No. 2032 of the Municipal Court of Mangatarem entitled, "People vs. Pepito F. Iglesias", for
reckless imprudence resulting in multiple homicide, serious physical injuries and damage to
property. Before his scheduled arraignment, petitioner filed a motion to quash the informations
on the ground that the officer who signed the same had no authority to do so and that, corollarily,
the Sandiganbayan did not acquire jurisdiction over the offenses charged. After due hearing, the
respondent court denied petitioner's motion to quash. Petitioner verbally moved for the
reconsideration of the order but the relief sought was denied. Hence, the instant recourse.
DECISION:
RATIO DECIDENDI: The respondent Sandiganbayan ruled that the Tanodbayan has such
authority. The Tanodbayan functions not only as an ombudsman, but as prosecutor as well. As
ombudsman, his investigatory powers are limited to complaints initiated against officers and
personnel of administrative agencies, as defined in Section 9(a) of the law. As prosecutor,
however, the authority of the Tanodbayan is primary and without exceptions. His powers are
defined in Sections 17 and 19 of P.D. 1607. Section 17 of the Decree, in unequivocal term,
confers upon the Tanodbayan, through the Chief Special Prosecutor and the Special Prosecutors,
the exclusive authority to "conduct preliminary investigation of all cases cognizable by the
Sandiganbayan, to file informations therefor, and to direct and control the prosecution of said
cases therein." If, as petitioner contends, judges, and other court personnel lie outside the
investigatory power of the Tanodbayan, then no judge or court employee could ever be brought
to justice for crimes and offenses cognizable by the Sandiganbayan, for lack of proper officer or
entity authorized to conduct the preliminary investigation on complaints of such nature against
them. This absurd situation the law could never have intended, considering that the Office of the
Tanodbayan was purposely created to "give effect to the constitutional right of the people to
petition the government for redress of grievances and to promote higher standards of integrity
and efficiency in the government service." The informations in question have complied with the
substantial and formal requirements of the law. They carry the certification of the investigating
prosecutor as to the existence of a prima facie case. They also bear the approval of the Chief
Special Prosecutor, as required by Section 11 of PD 1606. As petitioner is charged with
violations of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, which are within the jurisdiction of the
242 | P a g e
Sandiganbayan as defined under Section 4 of P.D. 1606, the said court validly acquired
jurisdiction over the informations in question.
243 | P a g e
(225) Canonizado vs Aguirre
ISSUE: Whether or Not petitioners were removed by virtue of abolition

FACTS: The commissioners of NAPOLCOM were appointed separately, in various years and
their terms had not expired at the time amendatory law RA 6975 was passed. RA 8551 declared
the terms of sitting commissioners upon its effectivity.
DECISION: No
RATIO DECIDENDI: Under RA 6975, the NAPOLCOM was described as a collegial body
within the DILG. Whereas, RA 8551 made it an agency attached to the department for policy
and program coordination. This does not result to a creation of a new office.
244 | P a g e
(226) Carino v CHR
ISSUE: Whether or not, CHR has the power to adjudicate alleged human rights violations
FACTS: On September 17, 1990, a Monday and a class day, some 800 public school teacher,
among them the 8 herein private respondents who were members of the Manila Public School
Teachers Association (MPSTA) and Alliance of Concerned Teachers (ACT) undertook “mass
concerted actions” to “dramatize and highlight” their plight resulting from the alleged failure of
the public authorities to act upon grievances that had time and again been brought to the latter’s
attention. The respondents were preventively suspended by the Secretary of Education. They
complained to CHR.
RATIO DECIDENDI: No, the Commission evidently intends to itself adjudicate, that is to say,
determine with the character of finality and definiteness, the same issues which have been passed
upon and decided by the Secretary of Education and subject to appeal to CSC, this Court having
in fact, as aforementioned, declared that the teachers affected may take appeals to the CSC on
said matter, if still timely. The threshold question is whether or not the CHR has the power under
the constitution to do so; whether or not, like a court of justice or even a quasi-judicial agency, it
has jurisdiction or adjudicatory powers over, or the power to try and decide, or dear and
determine, certain specific type of cases, like alleged human rights violations involving civil or
political rights. The Court declares that the CHR to have no such power, and it was not meant by
the fundamental law to be another court or quasi-judicial agency in this country, or duplicate
much less take over the functions of the latter. The most that may be conceded to the
Commission in the way of adjudicative power is that it may investigate, i.e. receive evidence and
make findings of fact as regards claimed human rights violations involving civil and political
rights. But fact-finding is not adjudication, and cannot be likened to judicial function of a court
of justice, or even a quasi judicial agency or official. The function of receiving evidence and
ascertaining therefrom the facts of a controversy is not a judicial function, properly speaking. To
be considered such, the faculty of receiving evidence and making factual conclusions in a
controversy must be accompanied by the authority of applying the law to those factual
conclusions to the end that the controversy be decided or determined authoritatively, finally and
definitely, subject to such appeals or modes of review as may be provided by law. This function,
to repeat, the Commission does not have. Hence it is that the CHR having merely the power to
“investigate,” cannot and not “try and resolve on the merits” (adjudicate) the matters involved in
Striking Teachers HRC Case No. 90-775, as it has announced it means to do; and cannot do so
even if there be a claim that in the administrative disciplinary proceedings against the teachers in
question, initiated and conducted by the DECS, their human rights, or civil or political rights had
been transgressed.
245 | P a g e
(227) PBM Employees v. PBM Co.
ISSUE: Whether or not the workers who joined the strike violated the CBA?
FACTS: Philippine Blooming Employees Organization (PBMEO) decided to stage a mass
demonstration in front of Malacañang to express their grievances against the alleged abuses of
the Pasig Police. After learning about the planned mass demonstration, Philippine Blooming
Mills Inc., called for a meeting with the leaders of the PBMEO. During the meeting, the planned
demonstration was confirmed by the union. But it was stressed out that the demonstration was
not a strike against the company but was in fact an exercise of the laborers' inalienable
constitutional right to freedom of expression, freedom of speech and freedom for petition for
redress of grievances. The company asked them to cancel the demonstration for it would
interrupt the normal course of their business which may result in the loss of revenue. This was
backed up with the threat of the possibility that the workers would lose their jobs if they pushed
through with the rally. A second meeting took place where the company reiterated their appeal
that while the workers may be allowed to participate, those from the 1st and regular shifts should
not absent themselves to participate, otherwise, they would be dismissed. Since it was too late to
cancel the plan, the rally took place and the officers of the PBMEO were eventually dismissed
for a violation of the ‘No Strike and No Lockout’ clause of their Collective Bargaining
Agreement. The lower court decided in favor of the company and the officers of the PBMEO
were found guilty of bargaining in bad faith. Their motion for reconsideration was subsequently
denied by the Court of Industrial Relations for being filed two days late.
DECISION:
RATIO DECIDENDI: No. While the Bill of Rights also protects property rights, the primacy
of human rights over property rights is recognized. Because these freedoms are "delicate and
vulnerable, as well as supremely precious in our society" and the "threat of sanctions may deter
their exercise almost as potently as the actual application of sanctions," they "need breathing
space to survive," permitting government regulation only "with narrow specificity." Property and
property rights can be lost thru prescription; but human rights are imprescriptible. In the
hierarchy of civil liberties, the rights to freedom of expression and of assembly occupy a
preferred position as they are essential to the preservation and vitality of our civil and political
institutions; and such priority "gives these liberties the sanctity and the sanction not permitting
dubious intrusions." The freedoms of speech and of the press as well as of peaceful assembly and
of petition for redress of grievances are absolute when directed against public officials or "when
exercised in relation to our right to choose the men and women by whom we shall be governed.”
246 | P a g e
(228) MMDA v. Viron Trans.
ISSUE: Whether or not E.O, 179 is constitutional.

FACTS: To solve the worsening traffic congestions problem in Metro Manila the President
issued Executive Order (E.O.) 179, ―Providing for the Establishment of Greater Manila Mass
Transportation System. As determined in E.O. 179, the primary cause of traffic congestion in
Metro Manila has been the numerous buses plying the streets that impede the flow of vehicles
and commuters and the inefficient connectivity of the different transport modes. To decongest
traffic, petitioner Metropolitan Manila Development Authority (MMDA) came up with a
recommendation, proposing the elimination of bus terminals located along major Metro Manila
thoroughfares, and the construction of mass transport terminal facilties to provide a more
convenient access to mass transport system to the commuting public. The project provided for
under this E.O. was called ―Greater Manila Transport System‖ (Project) wherein the MMDA
was designated as the implementing agency. Accordingly, the Metro Manila Council the
governing board of the MMDA issued a resolution, expressing full support of the project. The
respondents, which are engaged in the business of public transportation with a provincial bus
operation, Viron Transport Co., Inc. and Mencorp Transportation System, Inc., assailed the
constitutionality of E.O. 179 before the Regional Trial Court of Manila. They alleged that the
E.O., insofar as it permitted the closure of existing bus terminal, constituted a deprivation of
property without due process; that it contravened the Public Service Act which mandates public
utilities to provide and maintain their own terminals as a requisite for the privilege of operating
as common carriers; and that Republic Act 7924, which created MMDA, did not authorize the
latter to order the closure of bus terminals. The trial court declared the E.O. unconstitutional. The
MMDA argued before the Court that there was no justiciable controversy in the case for
declaratory relief filed by the respondents; that E.O. 179 was only an administrative directive to
government agencies to coordinate with the MMDA, and as such did not bind third persons; that
the President has the authority to implement the Project pursuant to E.O. 125; and that E.O. 179
was a valid exercise of police power.
DECISION:
RATIO DECIDENDI: By designating the MMDA as implementing agency of the “Greater
Manila Transport System,” the President clearly overstepped the limits of the authority conferred
by law, rendering E.O. 179 ultra vires. Executive Order 125, invoked by the MMDA, was issued
by former President Aquino in her exercise of legislative powers. This executive order
reorganized the Ministry (now Department) of Transportation and Communications (DOTC),
and defined its powers and functions. It mandated the DOTC to be the primary policy, planning,
programming, coordinating, implementing, regulating and administrative entity to promote,
develop and regulate networks of transportation and communications. The grant of authority to
the DOTC includes the power to establish and administer comprehensive and integrated
programs for transportation and communications. Accordingly, it is the DOTC Secretary who is
authorized to issue such orders, rules, regulations and other issuances as may be necessary to
ensure the effective implementation of the law. The President may also exercise the same power
and authority to order the implementation of the mass transport system project, which admittedly
is one for transportation. Such authority springs from the President‘s power of control over all
executive departments as well as for the faithful execution of the laws under the Constitution.
247 | P a g e
Thus, the President, although authorized to establish or cause the implementation of the Project,
must exercise the authority through the instrumentality of the DOTC, which, by law, is the
primary implementing and administrative entity in the promotion, development and regulation of
networks of transportation. It is the DOTC, and not the MMDA, which is authorized to establish
and implement a project such as the mass transport system. By designating the MMDA as
implementing agency of the Project, the President clearly overstepped the limits of the authority
conferred by law, rendering E.O. 179 ultra vires. In the absence of a specific grant of authority to
it under R.A. 7924, MMDA cannot issue order for the closure of existing bus terminals Republic
Act (R.A.) 7924 authorizes the MMDA to perform planning, monitoring and coordinative
functions, and in the process exercises regulatory and supervisory authority over the delivery of
metro-wide services, including transport and traffic management. While traffic decongestion has
been recognized as a valid ground in the exercise of police power, MMDA is not granted police
power, let alone legislative power. Unlike the legislative bodies of the local government units,
there is no provision in R.A. 7924 that empowers the MMDA or the Metro Manila Council to
enact ordinances, approveresolutions and appropriate funds for the general welfare of the
inhabitants of Metro Manila. In light of the administrative nature of its powers and functions, the
MMDA is devoid of authority to implement the Greater Manila Transport System as envisioned
by E.O. 179; hence, it could not have been validly designated by the President to undertake the
project. It follows that the MMDA cannot validly order the elimination of respondents‘
terminals. Even assuming arguendo that police power was delegated to the MMDA, its exercise
of such power does not satisfy the two sets of a valid police power measure: (1) the interest of
the public generally, as distinguished from that of a particular class, requires its exercise; and (2)
the means employed are reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose and not
unduly oppressive upon individuals. In various cases, the Court has recognized that traffic
congestion is a public, not merely a private concern. Indeed, the E.O. was issued due to the felt
need to address the worsening traffic congestion in Metro Manila which, the MMDA so
determined, is caused by the increasing volume of buses plying the major thoroughfares and the
inefficient connectivity of existing transport system. With the avowed objective of decongesting
traffic in Metro Manila the E.O. seeks to eliminate the bus terminals now located along major
Metro Manila thoroughfares and provide more convenient access to the mass transport system to
the commuting public through the provision of mass transport terminal facilities. Common
carriers with terminals along the major thoroughfares of Metro Manila would thus be compelled
to close down their existing bus terminals and use the MMDA-designated common parking
areas. The Court fails to see how the prohibition against respondents‘ terminals can be
considered a reasonable necessity to ease traffic congestion in the metropolis. On the contrary,
the elimination of respondents‘ bus terminals brings forth the distinct possibility and the equally
harrowing reality of traffic congestion in the common parking areas, a case of transference from
one site to another. Moreover, an order for the closure of bus terminals is not in line with the
provisions of the Public Service Act. The establishment, as well as the maintenance of vehicle
parking areas or passenger terminals, is generally considered a necessary service by provincial
bus operators, hence, the investments they have poured into the acquisition or lease of suitable
terminal sites.
248 | P a g e

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Constitutional Law 1

(41) EPG CONSTRUCTION VS VIGILAR ...............................................................50

(85) Valles v COMELEC GR 137000, Aug. 9, 2000 ..................................................95

(172) Saguisag v. Ochoa ............................................................................................186

(210) Domingo v zamora ...........................................................................................228

(2) Lambino vs. COMELEC GR 174153 (2006)

(3) Marbury vs. Madison, 5 US 137

(4) Angara vs. Electoral Commission, 63 Phil 139 (1936)

(7) Mariano vs. Comelec, GR 118577

(8) Montesclaros vs. Comelec, GR 152295 (2002)

(10) Ocampo vs Enriquez GR 225973, November 8, 2016

(11) Imbong v. Ochoa, GR 204819, April 8, 2014

(12) Estrada v. Sandiganbayan, GR 148560 (2001)

ISSUE: Whether or not RA 7080 is unconstitutional for being vague

(13) Imbong v. Ochoa, GR 204819, April 8, 2014

ISSUE: Whether or not aiding or abetting libel on the cyberspace is consitutional.

(15) Gonzales III v. Office of the President

ISSUE: Whether or not a Deputy Ombudsman may be subjected to the administrative

(16) Vinuya v. Romulo, GR 162230, April 28, 2010

(17) Gonzales v. Narvasa, GR 140835

(18) Lacson v. Perez, GR 147780

(19) Defunis v. Odegard

ISSUE: Whether or not the petition is moot and academic

(20) Interational Service for the Acquisition of Agri-biotech Applications, Inc. v.

ISSUE: Whether or not the case is moot and academic.

ISSUE: Whether or not the petition is moot and academic.

ISSUE: Whether or not the petition is moot and academic.

ISSUE: Whether or not Petitioners have legal standing.

ISSUE: Whether or not Senator Ople has standing to maintain suit.

(27) Information Technology Foundation vs. ComElec, GR 159139 [Per J. Panganban, En

ISSUE: Whether or not ITF has standing to file the case.

ISSUE: Whether or not Kilosbayan has standing to maintain instant suit.

ISSUE: Whether or not petitioners have legal standing.

(32) SAYSON VS SINGSON

(33) REPUBLIC VS PURISIMA

ISSUE: WON the respondent’s decision is valid

ISSUE: Was UP's funds validly garnished?

(35) RAYO VS CFI

ISSUE: Whether respondent National Power Corporation performs a governmental function

(36) FAROLAN VS CTA

(37) REPUBLIC VS SANDIGANBAYAN

ISSUE: WON the Republic can invoke state immunity.

(38) SANTIAGO VS REPUBLIC

(39) DOTC VS SPS. ABECINA

ISSUE: Whether or not DOTC may properly invoke state immunity

(40) AMIGABLE VS CUENCA

ISSUE: W/N the appellant may properly sue the government.

(41) EPG CONSTRUCTION VS VIGILAR

(42) TORIO v. FONTANILLA

ISSUE: Whether or not the Municipality of Malasiqui may be held liable.

(43) ARIGO v. SWIFT G.R. No. 206510

(44) Holy See vs. Rosario G.R. 101949 (1994)

(45) USA vs Ruiz G.R. No. L-35645

(46) MINUCHER VS. COURT OF APPEALS

(47) REPUBLIC OF INDONESIA VS VINZON

(48) DFA v. NLRC G.R. No. 113191

(49) ATCI v. Echin 632 SCRA 528 (2010)

(50) Animos vs. PVAO G.R. No. 79156

(51) USA v. Reyes, GR No. 79233 (1993)

ISSUE: Whether or not Bradford enjoys state immunity

(52) Shauf v. CA, 191 SCRA 713 (1990)

(53) Nessia v. Fermin, 220 SCRA 615 (1993)

(54) Caloocan City v. Allarde, GR No. 107721 (2003)