GMA NETWORK, INC., Petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.

G.R. No. 205357               September 2, 2014

TOPIC: Freedom of expression, of speech and of the press, airtime limits
FACTS:
            The five (5) petitions before the Court put in issue the alleged unconstitutionality of
Section 9 (a) of COMELEC Resolution No. 9615 limiting the broadcast and radio advertisements
of candidates and political parties for national election positions to an aggregate total of one
hundred twenty (120) minutes and one hundred eighty (180) minutes, respectively. They contend
that such restrictive regulation on allowable broadcast time violates freedom of the press, impairs
the people’s right to suffrage as well as their right to information relative to the exercise of their
right to choose who to elect during the forth coming elections
                Section 9 (a) provides for an “aggregate total” airtime instead of the previous “per
station” airtime for political campaigns or advertisements, and also required prior COMELEC
approval for candidates’ television and radio guestings and appearances.
ISSUE:
                Whether or not Section 9 (a) of COMELEC Resolution No. 9615 on airtime limits
violates freedom of expression, of speech and of the press.
HELD:
                YES. The Court held that the assailed rule on “aggregate-based” airtime limits is
unreasonable and arbitrary as it unduly restricts and constrains the ability
of candidates and political parties to reach out and communicate with the people. Here, the
adverted reason for imposing the “aggregate-based” airtime limits – leveling the playing field –
does not constitute a compelling state interest which would justify such a substantial restriction
on the freedom of candidates and political parties to communicate their ideas, philosophies,
platforms and programs of government. And, this is specially so in the absence of a clear-cut
basis for the imposition of such a prohibitive measure.
                It is also particularly unreasonable and whimsical to adopt the aggregate-based time
limits on broadcast time when we consider that the Philippines is not only composed of so many
islands. There are also a lot of languages and dialects spoken among the citizens across the
country. Accordingly, for a national candidate to really reach out to as many of the electorates as
possible, then it might also be necessary that he conveys his message through his advertisements
in languages and dialects that the people may more readily understand and relate to. To add all of
these airtimes in different dialects would greatly hamper the ability of such candidate to express
himself – a form of suppression of his political speech.
ATTY. ROMULO B. MACALINTAL v. COMELEC, GR No. 157013, 2003-07-10
Facts:
Macalintal, a member of the Philippine Bar, seek... declaration that certain provisions of
Republic Act No. 9189 (The Overseas Absentee Voting Act of
2003)... suffer from constitutional infirmity.
R.A. No. 9189, entitled, "An Act Providing for A System of Overseas Absentee Voting by
Qualified Citizens of the Philippines Abroad, Appropriating Funds Therefor, and for Other
Purposes," appropriates funds under Section 29 thereof which provides that a supplemental...
budget on the General Appropriations Act of the year of its enactment into law shall provide for
the necessary amount to carry out its provisions. Taxpayers, such as herein petitioner, have the
right to restrain officials from wasting public funds through the enforcement of an...
unconstitutional statute.
The challenged provision of law involves a public right that affects a great number of citizens.
The Court has adopted the policy of taking jurisdiction over cases whenever the petitioner has
seriously and convincingly presented an issue of transcendental significance to the Filipino
people.
he need to consider the constitutional issues raised before the Court is... buttressed by the fact
that it is now more than fifteen years since the ratification of the 1987 Constitution requiring
Congress to provide a system for absentee voting by qualified Filipinos... abroad.
Thus, strong reasons of public policy demand that the Court resolves the instant petition... and
determine whether Congress has acted within the limits of the Constitution or if it had gravely
abused the discretion entrusted to it.
Petitioner posits that Section 5(d) is unconstitutional because it violates Section 1, Article V of
the 1987 Constitution which requires that the voter must be a resident in the Philippines for at
least one year and in the place where he proposes to vote for at least six... months immediately
preceding an election.
He claims that the right of suffrage... should not be granted to anyone who, on the date of the
election, does not possess the qualifications provided for by Section 1, Article V of the
Constitution.
Issues:
Does Section 5(d) of Rep. Act No. 9189 allowing the registration of voters who are immigrants
or permanent residents in other countries... by their mere act of executing an affidavit expressing
their intention to return to the Philippines, violate the residency requirement in Section 1 of
Article V of the Constitution?
Ruling:
R.A. No. 9189 was enacted in obeisance to the mandate of the first paragraph of Section 2,
Article V of the Constitution that Congress shall provide a system for voting by qualified
Filipinos abroad.
It must be stressed that Section 2 does not provide for the parameters of... the exercise of
legislative authority in enacting said law. Hence, in the absence of restrictions, Congress is
presumed to have duly exercised its function as defined in Article VI (The Legislative
Department) of the Constitution.
Such statutes are regarded as conferring a privilege and not a right, or an absolute right. When
the legislature chooses to grant the right by statute, it must operate with equality among all the
class to which it is granted; but statutes of this nature may be limited in... their application to
particular types of elections. The statutes should be construed in the light of any constitutional
provisions affecting registration and elections, and with due regard to their texts prior to
amendment and to predecessor statutes and... the decisions thereunder; they should also be
construed in the light of the circumstances under which they were enacted; and so as to carry out
the objects thereof, if this can be done without doing violence to their provisions and mandates.
Further, in passing on... statutes regulating absentee voting, the court should look to the whole
and every part of the election laws, the intent of the entire plan, and reasons and spirit of their
adoption, and try to give effect to every portion thereof.
Ordinarily, an absentee is not a resident and vice versa; a person cannot be at the same time, both
a resident and an absentee.[30] However, under our election laws and the countless
pronouncements of the Court pertaining to elections, an absentee... remains attached to his
residence in the Philippines as residence is considered synonymous with domicile.
For political purposes the concepts of residence and domicile are dictated by the peculiar criteria
of political laws. As these concepts have evolved in our election law, what has clearly and
unequivocally emerged is the fact that residence for election purposes... is used synonymously
with domicile.
Thus, the Constitutional Commission recognized the fact that while millions of Filipinos reside
abroad principally for economic reasons and hence they contribute in no small measure to the
economic uplift of this country, their voices are marginal insofar as the choice of... this country's
leaders is concerned.
It is in pursuance of that intention that the Commission provided for Section 2 immediately after
the residency requirement of Section 1. By the doctrine of necessary implication in statutory
construction, which may be applied in construing constitutional... provisions,... the strategic
location of Section 2 indicates that the Constitutional Commission provided for an exception to
the actual residency requirement of Section 1 with respect to qualified Filipinos abroad. The
same Commission has in... effect declared that qualified Filipinos who are not in the Philippines
may be allowed to vote even though they do not satisfy the residency requirement in Section 1,
Article V of the Constitution.
Contrary to the claim of petitioner, the execution of the affidavit itself is not the enabling or
enfranchising act. The affidavit required in Section 5(d) is not only proof of the intention of the
immigrant or permanent resident to go back and resume residency in the Philippines, but more
significantly, it serves as an explicit expression that he had not in fact abandoned his domicile of
origin. Thus, it is not correct to say that the execution of the affidavit under Section 5(d) violates
the Constitution that proscribes "provisional... registration or a promise by a voter to perform a
condition to be qualified to vote in a political exercise."
To repeat, the affidavit is required of immigrants and permanent residents abroad because by
their status in their host countries, they are presumed to have relinquished their intent to return to
this country; thus, without the affidavit, the presumption of abandonment of Philippine domicile
shall remain.
It must be emphasized that Section 5(d) does not only require an affidavit or a promise to
"resume actual physical permanent residence in the Philippines not later than three years from
approval of his/her registration," the Filipinos abroad must also declare that they have... not
applied for citizenship in another country. Thus, they must return to the Philippines; otherwise,
their failure to return "shall be cause for the removal" of their names "from the National Registry
of Absentee Voters and his/her permanent disqualification to vote in... absentia."
Thus, Congress crafted a process of registration by which a Filipino voter permanently residing
abroad who is at least eighteen years old, not otherwise disqualified by law, who has not
relinquished Philippine citizenship and who has not actually abandoned his/her... intentions to
return to his/her domicile of origin, the Philippines, is allowed to register and vote in the
Philippine embassy, consulate or other foreign service establishments of the place which has
jurisdiction over the country where he/she has indicated his/her address for... purposes of the
elections, while providing for safeguards to a clean election.
H. HARRY L. ROQUE v. COMELEC, GR No. 188456, 2009-09-10
Facts:
Harry L. Roque... uing as taxpayers and concerned citizens, seek to nullify respondent Comelec's
award of the 2010 Elections Automation Project (automation project) to the joint venture of
Total Information Management Corporation (TIM) and Smartmatic International Corporation
(Smartmatic)... and to permanently prohibit the Comelec, TIM and Smartmatic from signing...
and/or implementing the corresponding contract-award.
Congress enacted Republic Act No. (RA) 8436 authorizing the adoption of an automated election
system (AES)... in the May 11, 1998 national and local elections and onwards
On January 23, 2007, the amendatory RA 9369... ssed authorizing anew the Comelec to use an
AES. In 2008 Comelec managed to automate the regional polls in the Autonomous Region of
Muslim Mindanao (ARMM),... hailed as successful automated ARMM 2008 elections paved the
way for Comelec,... to prepare for a nationwide computerized run for the 2010 national/local
polls Comelec and Smartmatic TIM Corporation, as provider, executed a contract... for the lease
of goods and services... petitioners interposed the instant recourse which, for all intents and
purposes, impugns the validity and seeks to nullify the Comelec-Smartmatic-TIM Corporation
automation contract adverted to... petitioners would have the Comelec-Smartmatic-TIM
Corporation automation contract nullified since, in violation of the Constitution, it constitutes a
wholesale abdication of the poll body's constitutional mandate for election law enforcement.
the mechanism of the PCOS machines would infringe the constitutional right of the people to the
secrecy of the ballot which, according to the petitioners, is provided in Sec. 2, Art. V of the
Constitution.
Issues:
(1) the Joint Venture Agreement (JVA) of Smartmatic and TIM; and (2) the PCOS machines to
be used... constitutionality and statutory flaw of the automation contract itself.
Ruling:
contention is not well taken.
The first function of the Comelec under the Constitution... and the Omnibus Election Code for
that matter--relates to the enforcement and administration of all laws and regulations relating to
the conduct of elections to public office to ensure a free,... orderly and honest electoral exercise.
By acceding to Art. 3.3 of the automation contract... upervision and control of the system to be
used for the... automated elections. To a more specific point, the loss of control, as may be
deduced from the ensuing exchanges, arose from the fact that Comelec would not be holding
possession of what in IT jargon are the public and private keys pair.
The Court is not convinced.
3.3
SMARTMATIC, as the joint venture partner with the greater track record in automated elections,
shall be in charge of the technical aspects of the counting and canvassing software and hardware
The proviso designating Smartmatic as the joint venture partner in charge of the technical aspect
of the counting and canvassing wares does not to us translate, without more, to ceding control of
the electoral process to Smartmatic.
Art. 6.7 of the automation contract
, providing:... the entire processes of voting, counting, transmission, consolidation and
canvassing of votes shall be conducted by COMELEC's personnel and officials,... With the view
we take of the automation contract, the role of Smartmatic TIM Corporation is basically to
supply the goods necessary for the automation project, such as but not limited to the PCOS
machines, PCs, electronic transmission devices and related equipment, both hardware... and
software, and the technical services pertaining to their operation.
As lessees of the goods and the back-up equipment, the corporation and its operators would
provide assistance with respect to the machines to be used by the Comelec which, at the end of
the day, will be... conducting the election thru its personnel and whoever it deputizes.
Parenthetically, the contention that the PCOS would infringe on the secrecy and sanctity of the
ballot because... the voter would be confronted with a "three feet" long ballot
Surely,... the Comelec can put up such infrastructure as to insure that the voter can write his
preference in relative privacy. And as demonstrated during the oral arguments, the voter himself
will personally feed the ballot into the machine. A voter, if so minded to preserve the secrecy...
of his ballot, will always devise a way to do so. By the same token, one with least regard for
secrecy will likewise have a way to make his vote known.
The Comelec is an independent constitutional body with a distinct and pivotal role in our scheme
of government. In the discharge of its awesome functions as overseer of fair elections,
administrator and lead implementor of laws relative to the conduct of elections, it should not... be
stymied with restrictions that would perhaps be justified in the case of an organization of lesser
responsibility.[103] It should be afforded ample elbow room and enough wherewithal in devising
means and initiatives that would enable it to accomplish the great objective for... which it was
created--to promote free, orderly, honest and peaceful elections. This is as it should be for, too
often, Comelec has to make decisions under difficult conditions to address unforeseen events to
preserve the integrity of the election and in the process the voice of... the people
This independent constitutional commission,... it is true, possesses extraordinary powers and
enjoys a considerable latitude in the discharge of its functions.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DENIED.
BARANGAY ASSOCIATION FOR NATIONAL ADVANCEMENT v. COMELEC, GR No.
177508, 2009-08-07
Facts:
Before the Court is a petition for prohibition[1] with a prayer for the issuance of a temporary
restraining order or a writ of preliminary injunction[2] filed by petitioner Barangay Association
for National Advancement and Transparency
(BANAT) Party List (petitioner) assailing the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 9369 (RA
9369)[3] and enjoining respondent Commission on Elections (COMELEC) from implementing
the statute.
Petitioner assails the following provisions of RA 9369:
Section 34 which provides:
SEC. 34. Sec. 26 of Republic Act No. 7166 is hereby amended to read as follows:
"SEC. 26. Official Watchers. - Every registered political party or coalition of political parties,
and every candidate shall each be entitled to one watcher in every polling place and canvassing
center: Provided That, candidates for the Sangguniang Panlalawigan,... Sangguniang Panlunsod,
or Sangguniang Bayan belonging to the same slate or ticket shall collectively be entitled to only
one watcher.
"The dominant majority party and dominant minority party, which the Commission shall
determine in accordance with law, shall each be entitled to one official watcher who shall be paid
a fixed per diem of four hundred pesos (400.00).
Additionally, the poll watchers of the dominant majority and minority parties in a precinct shall,
if available, affix their signatures and thumbmarks on the election returns for that precinct.[36]
The dominant majority and minority parties shall also be... given a copy of the certificates of
canvass[37] and election returns[38] through their respective poll watchers. Clearly, poll
watchers play an important role in the elections.
Moreover, while the contracting parties may establish such stipulations, clauses, terms, and
conditions as they may deem convenient, such stipulations should not be contrary to law, morals,
good customs, public order, or public policy
Issues:
hether Section 34 violates Section 10, Article III of the Constitution.[8]
Ruling:
The petition has no merit.
is settled that every statute is presumed to be constitutional.[9] The presumption is that the
legislature intended to enact a valid, sensible and just law. Those who petition the Court to
declare a law unconstitutional must show that there is a clear and... unequivocal breach of the
Constitution, not merely a doubtful, speculative or argumentative one; otherwise, the petition
must fail.[10]
In this case, petitioner failed to justify why RA 9369 and the assailed provisions should be
declared unconstitutional.
RA 9369 does not violate Section 26(1), Article VI of the Constitution
Petitioner alleges that the title of RA 9369 is misleading because it speaks of poll automation but
contains substantial provisions dealing with the manual canvassing of election returns. Petitioner
also alleges that Sections 34, 37, 38, and 43 are neither embraced in the title... nor germane to the
subject matter of RA 9369.
Both the COMELEC and the OSG maintain that the title of RA 9369 is broad enough to
encompass topics which deal not only with the automation process but with everything related to
its purpose encouraging a transparent, credible, fair, and accurate elections.
Section 34 does not violate Section 10, Article III of the Constitution... assails the
constitutionality of the provision which fixes the per diem of poll watchers of the dominant
majority and dominant minority parties at Pon election day. Petitioner argues that this violates
the freedom of the parties to contract and their right to fix the terms and... conditions of the
contract they see as fair, equitable and just. Petitioner adds that this is a purely private contract
using private funds which cannot be regulated by law.
The OSG argues that petitioner erroneously invoked the non-impairment clause because this only
applies to previously perfected contracts. In this case, there is no perfected contact and, therefore,
no obligation will be impaired.
Both the COMELEC and the OSG argue that the law is a proper exercise of police power and it
will prevail over a contract. According to the COMELEC, poll watching is not just an ordinary
contract but is an agreement with the solemn duty to ensure the sanctity of votes. The role... of
poll watchers is vested with public interest which can be regulated by Congress in the exercise of
its police power. The OSG further argues that the assurance that the poll watchers will receive
fair and equitable compensation promotes the general welfare. The OSG also states... that this
was a reasonable regulation considering that the dominant majority and minority parties will
secure a copy of the election returns and are given the right to assign poll watchers inside the
polling precincts.
There is no violation of the non-impairment clause. First, the non- impairment clause is limited
in application to laws that derogate from prior acts or contracts by enlarging, abridging or in any
manner changing the intention of the parties.[32] There is... impairment if a subsequent law
changes the terms of a contract between the parties, imposes new conditions, dispenses with
those agreed upon or withdraws remedies for the enforcement of the rights of the parties.[33]
As observed by the OSG, there is no existing contract yet and, therefore, no enforceable right or
demandable obligation will be impaired. RA 9369 was enacted more than three months prior to
the 14 May 2007 elections. Hence, when the dominant majority and minority parties hired... their
respective poll watchers for the 14 May 2007 elections, they were deemed to have incorporated
in their contracts all the provisions of RA 9369.
Second, it is settled that police power is superior to the non-impairment clause.[34] The
constitutional guaranty of non-impairment of contracts is limited by the exercise of the police
power of the State, in the interest of public health, safety, morals,... and general welfare of the
community.
Therefore, assuming there were existing contracts, Section 34 would still be constitutional
because the law was enacted in the exercise of the police power of the State to promote the
general welfare of the people. We agree with the COMELEC that the role of poll watchers is...
invested with public interest. In fact, even petitioner concedes that poll watchers not only guard
the votes of their respective candidates or political parties but also ensure that all the votes are
properly counted. Ultimately, poll watchers aid in fair and honest elections.
Poll watchers help ensure that the elections are transparent, credible, fair, and accurate. The
regulation of the per diem of the poll watchers of the dominant majority and minority parties
promotes the general welfare of the community and is a valid exercise of police... power.
MAYOR GAMAL S. HAYUDINI, Petitioner, v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS AND
MUSTAPHA J. OMAR,Respondents.

PERALTA, J.:

FACTS:

On October 5, 2012, Hayudini filed his Certificate of Candidacy (CoC) for the position of
Municipal Mayor of South Ubian, Tawi-Tawi in the May 13, 2013 National and Local Elections
held in the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao. Ten days after, Mustapha J. Omar (Omar)
filed a Petition to Deny Due Course or Cancel Hayudini's CoC. Omar basically asserted that
Hayudini should be disqualified for making false representation regarding his residence. He
claimed that Hayudini declared in his CoC that he is a resident of the Municipality of South
Ubian when, in fact, he resides in Zamboanga City.

Thereafter, Hayudini filed a Petition for Inclusion in the Permanent List of Voters in Barangay
Bintawlan, South Ubian before the Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC). Despite the
opposition of Ignacio Aguilar Baki, the MCTC granted Hayudini's petition on January 31, 2013.
On that same day, the COMELEC's First Division dismissed Omar's earlier petition to cancel
Hayudini's CoC for lack of substantial evidence that Hayudini committed false representation as
to his residency.

Oppositor Baki, subsequently, elevated the case to the Bongao Regional Trial Court (RTC),
Branch 5. The RTC, on March 8, 2013, reversed the MCTC ruling and ordered the deletion of
Hayudini's name in Barangay Bintawlan's permanent list of voters. In view of said decision,
Omar filed before the COMELEC a Petition to Cancel the Certificate of Candidacy of Gamal S.
Hayudini by Virtue of a Supervening Event on March 26, 2013.

Hayudini appealed the March 8, 2013 RTC decision to the Court of Appeals but was denied.

On May 13, 2013, Hayudini won the mayoralty race in South Ubian, Tawi-Tawi. He was
proclaimed and, consequently, took his oath of office.

On June 20, 2013, the COMELEC Second Division issued a Resolution granting Omars second
petition to cancel Hayudini's CoC.

Hayudini, thus, filed a Motion for Reconsideration with the COMELEC En Banc, arguing that its
Second Division committed grave error when it gave due course to a belatedly filed petition and
treated the March 8, 2013 RTC Decision as a supervening event. The COMELEC En Banc
denied Hayudinis Motion for Reconsideration for lack of merit. The COMELEC declared Omar
as the mayor.

Thus, Hayudini filed the instant petition for certiorari and prohibition.

Hayudini mainly advances the following arguments:

ISSUES: Whether the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in declaring Omar as the
duly-elected mayor

HELD: The Court finds the petition to be without merit.

REMEDIAL LAW: special civil action for certiorari under rule 65; grave abuse of discretion

A special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 is an independent action based on the specific
grounds and available only if there is no appeal or any other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy
in the ordinary course of law. It will only prosper if grave abuse of discretion is alleged and is
actually proved to exist.

Grave abuse of discretion has been defined as the arbitrary exercise of power due to passion,
prejudice or personal hostility; or the whimsical, arbitrary, or capricious exercise of power that
amounts to an evasion or refusal to perform a positive duty enjoined by law or to act at all in
contemplation of law. For an act to be condemned as having been done with grave abuse of
discretion, such an abuse must be patent and gross.

Here, Hayudini miserably failed to prove that the COMELEC rendered its assailed Resolutions
with grave abuse of discretion.

POLITICAL LAW: COMELEC rules of procedures; liberal construction

Hayudini contends that the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion when it admitted,
and later granted, Omars petition despite failure to comply with Sections 2 and 4 of Rule 23 of
the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, as amended by Resolution No. 9523. The subject sections
read:

Section 2. Period to File Petition. The Petition must be filed within five (5) days from the last
day for filing of certificate of candidacy; but not later than twenty five (25) days from the time of
filing of the certificate of candidacy subject of the Petition. In case of a substitute candidate, the
Petition must be filed within five (5) days from the time the substitute candidate filed his
certificate of candidacy.

xxxx

Notwithstanding the aforementioned procedural missteps, the Court sustains the COMELECs
liberal treatment of Omars petition.

As a general rule, statutes providing for election contests are to be liberally construed in order
that the will of the people in the choice of public officers may not be defeated by mere technical
objections. Moreover, it is neither fair nor just to keep in office, for an indefinite period, one
whose right to it is uncertain and under suspicion. It is imperative that his claim be immediately
cleared, not only for the benefit of the winner but for the sake of public interest, which can only
be achieved by brushing aside technicalities of procedure that protract and delay the trial of an
ordinary action. This principle was reiterated in the cases of Tolentino v. Commission on
Elections and De Castro v. Commission on Elections, where the Court held that in exercising its
powers and jurisdiction, as defined by its mandate to protect the integrity of elections, the
COMELEC must not be straitjacketed by procedural rules in resolving election disputes.

Settled is the rule that the COMELEC Rules of Procedure are subject to liberal construction. The
COMELEC has the power to liberally interpret or even suspend its rules of procedure in the
interest of justice, including obtaining a speedy disposition of all matters pending before it. This
liberality is for the purpose of promoting the effective and efficient implementation of its
objectives - ensuring the holding of free, orderly, honest, peaceful, and credible elections, as well
as achieving just, expeditious, and inexpensive determination and disposition of every action and
proceeding brought before the COMELEC. Unlike an ordinary civil action, an election contest is
imbued with public interest. It involves not only the adjudication of private and pecuniary
interests of rival candidates, but also the paramount need of dispelling the uncertainty which
beclouds the real choice of the electorate. And the tribunal has the corresponding duty to
ascertain, by all means within its command, whom the people truly chose as their rightful leader.

REMEDIAL LAW: supervening event

Given the finality of the RTC decision, the same should be considered a valid supervening event.
A supervening event refers to facts and events transpiring after the judgment or order had
become executory. These circumstances affect or change the substance of the judgment and
render its execution inequitable. Here, the RTCs March 8, 2013 decision, ordering the deletion of
Hayudinis name in the list of voters, which came after the dismissal of Omars first petition, is
indubitably a supervening event which would render the execution of the ruling in SPA No.
13106(DC)(F) iniquitous and unjust. As the COMELEC aptly ruled, the decision to exclude
Hayudini was still non-existent when the COMELEC first promulgated the Resolution in SPA
No. 13-106(DC)(F) on January 31, 2013, or when the issues involved therein were passed upon.
27 The First Division even expressed that although the Election Registration Board (ERB)
denied Hayudinis application for registration, it could not adopt the same because it was not yet
final as Hayudini was still to file a Petition for Inclusion before the MCTC. Thus, it is not far-
fetched to say that had this final RTC finding been existent before, the COMELEC First Division
could have taken judicial notice of it and issued a substantially different ruling in SPA No. 13-
106(DC)(F).

POLITICAL LAW: false representation in the certificate of candidacy

The same ruling adequately equipped Omar with the necessary ground to successfully have
Hayudinis CoC struck down. Under the rules, a statement in a certificate of candidacy claiming
that a candidate is eligible to run for public office when in truth he is not, is a false material
representation, a ground for a petition under Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code.

Sections 74 and 78 read:

Sec. 74. Contents of certificate of candidacy. The certificate of candidacy shall state that the
person filing it is announcing his candidacy for the office stated therein and that he is eligible for
said office; if for Member of the Batasang Pambansa, the province, including its component
cities, highly urbanized city or district or sector which he seeks to represent; the political party to
which he belongs; civil status; his date \of birth; residence; his post office address for all election
purposes; his profession or occupation; that he will support and defend the Constitution of the
Philippines and will maintain true faith and allegiance thereto; that he will obey the laws, legal
orders, and decrees promulgated by the duly constituted authorities; that he is not a permanent
resident or immigrant to a foreign country; that the obligation imposed by his oath is assumed
voluntarily, without mental reservation or purpose of evasion; and that the facts stated in the
certificate of candidacy are true to the best of his knowledge.

Sec. 78. Petition to deny due course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy. A verified petition
seeking to deny due course or to cancel a certificate of candidacy may be filed by the person
exclusively on the ground that any material representation contained therein as required under
Section 74 hereof is false. The petition may be filed at any time not later than twenty-five days
from the time of the filing of the certificate of candidacy and shall be decided, after due notice
and hearing, not later than fifteen days before the election.

The false representation mentioned in these provisions must pertain to a material fact, not to a
mere innocuous mistake. A candidate who falsifies a material fact cannot run; if he runs and is
elected, cannot serve; in both cases, he or she can be prosecuted for violation of the election
laws. These facts pertain to a candidate's qualification for elective office, such as his or her
citizenship and residence. Similarly, the candidate's status as a registered voter falls under this
classification as it is a legal requirement which must be reflected in the CoC. The reason for this
is obvious: the candidate, if he or she wins, will work for and represent the local government
under which he or she is running. Even the will of the people, as expressed through the ballot,
cannot cure the vice of ineligibility, especially if they mistakenly believed, as in the instant case,
that the candidate was qualified.

Aside from the requirement of materiality, a false representation under Section 78 must consist
of a "deliberate attempt to mislead, misinform, or hide a fact which would otherwise render a
candidate ineligible." Simply put, it must be made with a malicious intent to deceive the
electorate as to the potential candidate's qualifications for public office.

Section 74 requires the candidate to state under oath in his CoC "that he is eligible for said
office." A candidate is eligible if he has a right to run for the public office. If a candidate is not
actually eligible because he is not a registered voter in the municipality where he intends to be
elected, but still he states under oath in his certificate of candidacy that he is eligible to run for
public office, then the candidate clearly makes a false material representation, a ground to
support a petition under Section 78. It is interesting to note that Hayudini was, in fact, initially
excluded by the ERB as a voter. On November 30, 2012, the ERB issued a certificate confirm in
the disapproval of Hayudini's petition for registration. This is precisely the reason why he needed
to file a Petition for Inclusion in the Permanent List of Voters in Barangay Bintawlan before the
MCTC. Thus, when he stated in his CoC that he is eligible for said office," Hayudini made a
clear and material misrepresentation as to his eligibility, because he was not, in fact, registered as
a voter in Barangay Bintawlan.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED.

Philippine Press Institute vs COMELEC GR 119694 22 May 1995
Facts: COMELEC promulgated Resolution No 2772 directing newspapers to provide free print
space of not less than ½ page for use as “Comelec Space” from 06March1995 to 06May1995.
COMELEC Commisssioner sent letters to publishers informing them of the same. PPI seek to
declare the resolution unconstitutional and void on the ground of taking private property w/o just
compensation. TRO was enforced. SocGen argues that even if the questioned Resolution and its
implementing letter directives are viewed as mandatory, the same would nevertheless be valid as
an exercise of the police power of the State. COMELEC Chair stated that they will clarify the
resolution that the letter was intended to solicit and not to compel. Resolution No. 2772-A was
promulgated.
Issue: Whether or not Resolution 2772 is void on the ground of deprivation of use w/o
compensation of newspaper?
Decision: To compel print media companies to donate “Comelec-space” amounts to “taking” of
private personal property for public use. The extent of the taking or deprivation is not
insubstantial measured by the advertising rates ordinarily charged by newspaper publishers
whether in cities or in non-urban areas.
The taking of print space here sought to be effected may first be appraised under the rubric of
expropriation of private personal property for public use. The threshold requisites for a lawful
taking of private property for public use need to be examined here: one is the necessity for the
taking; another is the legal authority to effect the taking. The element of necessity for the taking
has not been shown by respondent Comelec. It has not been suggested that the members of PPI
are unwilling to sell print space at their normal rates to Comelec for election purposes. It has not
been suggested that Comelec has been granted the power of eminent domain either by the
Constitution or by the legislative authority. A reasonable relationship between that power and the
enforcement and administration of election laws by Comelec must be shown.
The taking of private property for public use is, of course, authorized by the Constitution, but not
without payment of “just compensation.”
ANG LADLAD VS. COMELEC
Facts:
Petitioner is a national organization which represents the lesbians, gays, bisexuals, and trans-
genders. It filed a petition for accreditation as a party-list organization to public respondent.
However, due to moral grounds, the latter denied the said petition. To buttress their denial,
COMELEC cited certain biblical and quranic passages in their decision. It also stated that since
their ways are immoral and contrary to public policy, they are considered nuissance. In fact, their
acts are even punishable under the Revised Penal Code in its Article 201.
A motion for reconsideration being denied, Petitioner filed this instant Petition on Certiorari
under Rule 65 of the ROC.
Ang Ladlad argued that the denial of accreditation, insofar as it justified the exclusion by using
religious dogma, violated the constitutional guarantees against the establishment of religion.
Petitioner also claimed that the Assailed Resolutions contravened its constitutional rights to
privacy, freedom of speech and assembly, and equal protection of laws, as well as constituted
violations of the Philippines’ international obligations against discrimination based on sexual
orientation.
In its Comment, the COMELEC reiterated that petitioner does not have a concrete and genuine
national political agenda to benefit the nation and that the petition was validly dismissed on
moral grounds. It also argued for the first time that the LGBT sector is not among the sectors
enumerated by the Constitution and RA 7941, and that petitioner made untruthful statements in
its petition when it alleged its national existence contrary to actual verification reports by
COMELEC’s field personnel.
Issue:
WON Respondent violated the Non-establishment clause of the Constitution;
WON Respondent erred in denying Petitioners application on moral and legal grounds.
Held:
Respondent mistakenly opines that our ruling in Ang Bagong Bayani stands for the proposition
that only those sectors specifically enumerated in the law or related to said sectors (labor,
peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, elderly, handicapped, women,
youth, veterans, overseas workers, and professionals) may be registered under the party-list
system. As we explicitly ruled in Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party v. Commission on
Elections, “the enumeration of marginalized and under-represented sectors is not exclusive”. The
crucial element is not whether a sector is specifically enumerated, but whether a particular
organization complies with the requirements of the Constitution and RA 7941.
Our Constitution provides in Article III, Section 5 that “[n]o law shall be made respecting an
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof.” At bottom, what our non-
establishment clause calls for is “government neutrality in religious matters.” Clearly,
“governmental reliance on religious justification is inconsistent with this policy of neutrality.”
We thus find that it was grave violation of the non-establishment clause for the COMELEC to
utilize the Bible and the Koran to justify the exclusion of Ang Ladlad. Be it noted that
government action must have a secular purpose.
Respondent has failed to explain what societal ills are sought to be prevented, or why special
protection is required for the youth. Neither has the COMELEC condescended to justify its
position that petitioner’s admission into the party-list system would be so harmful as to
irreparably damage the moral fabric of society.
We also find the COMELEC’s reference to purported violations of our penal and civil laws
flimsy, at best; disingenuous, at worst. Article 694 of the Civil Code defines a nuisance as “any
act, omission, establishment, condition of property, or anything else which shocks, defies, or
disregards decency or morality,” the remedies for which are a prosecution under the Revised
Penal Code or any local ordinance, a civil action, or abatement without judicial proceedings. A
violation of Article 201 of the Revised Penal Code, on the other hand, requires proof beyond
reasonable doubt to support a criminal conviction. It hardly needs to be emphasized that mere
allegation of violation of laws is not proof, and a mere blanket invocation of public morals
cannot replace the institution of civil or criminal proceedings and a judicial determination of
liability or culpability.
As such, we hold that moral disapproval, without more, is not a sufficient governmental interest
to justify exclusion of homosexuals from participation in the party-list system. The denial of Ang
Ladlad’s registration on purely moral grounds amounts more to a statement of dislike and
disapproval of homosexuals, rather than a tool to further any substantial public interest.
ATONG PAGLAUM, INC., represented by its President, Mr. Alan Igot, Petitioner, v.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.

CARPIO, J.:

FACTS:

52 party-list groups and organizations filed separate petitions totaling 54 with the Supreme Court
(SC) in an effort to reverse various resolutions by the Commission on Elections (Comelec)
disqualifying them from the May 2013 party-list race. The Comelec, in its assailed resolutions
issued in October, November and December of 2012, ruled, among others, that these party-list
groups and organizations failed to represent a marginalized and underrepresented sector, their
nominees do not come from a marginalized and underrepresented sector, and/or some of the
organizations or groups are not truly representative of the sector they intend to represent in
Congress.

Petitioners argued that the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction in disqualifying petitioners from participating in the 13 May 2013 party-list
elections, either by denial of their new petitions for registration under the party-list system, or by
cancellation of their existing registration and accreditation as party-list organizations; andsecond,
whether the criteria for participating in the party-list system laid down inAng Bagong Bayani and
Barangay Association for National Advancement and Transparency v. Commission on
Elections(BANAT) should be applied by the COMELEC in the coming 13 May 2013 party-list
elections.
ISSUE: Whether or not the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion

HELD: No. The COMELEC merely followed the guidelines set in the cases of Ang Bagong
Bayani and BANAT. However, the Supreme Court remanded the cases back to the COMELEC
as the Supreme Court now provides for new guidelines which abandoned some principles
established in the two aforestated cases.

Political Law- Party-list system

Commissioner Christian S. Monsod, the main sponsor of the party-list system, stressed that "the
party-list system is not synonymous with that of the sectoral representation." Indisputably, the
framers of the 1987 Constitution intended the party-list system to include not only sectoral
parties but also non-sectoral parties. The framers intended the sectoral parties to constitute a part,
but not the entirety, of the party-list system.As explained by Commissioner Wilfredo Villacorta,
political parties can participate in the party-list system "For as long as they field candidates who
come from the different marginalized sectors that we shall designate in this Constitution."

Republic Act No. 7941 or the Party-List System Act is the law that implements the party-list
system prescribed in the Constitution. Section 3(a) of R.A. No. 7941 defines a "party" as"either a
political party or a sectoral partyor a coalition of parties." Clearly, a political party is different
from a sectoral party. Section 3(c) of R.A. No. 7941 further provides that a"political partyrefers
to anorganized group of citizens advocating an ideology or platform, principles and policies for
the general conduct of government."On the other hand, Section 3(d) of R.A. No. 7941 provides
that a "sectoral partyrefers to an organized group of citizens belonging to any of the sectors
enumerated in Section 5 hereofwhose principal advocacy pertains to the special interest and
concerns of their sector."R.A. No. 7941 provides different definitions for a political and a
sectoral party. Obviously, they are separate and distinct from each other.
Under the party-list system, an ideology-based or cause-oriented political party is clearly
different from a sectoral party. A political party need not be organized as a sectoral party and
need not represent any particular sector. There is no requirement in R.A. No. 7941 that a national
or regional political party must represent a "marginalized and underrepresented" sector. It is
sufficient that the political party consists of citizens who advocate the same ideology or platform,
or the same governance principles and policies,regardless of their economic status as citizens.
Political Law- parameters in qualifying party- lists

The COMELEC excluded from participating in the 13 May 2013 party-list elections those that
did not satisfy these two criteria: (1) all national, regional, and sectoral groups or organizations
must represent the "marginalized and underrepresented" sectors, and (2) all nominees must
belong to the "marginalized and underrepresented" sector they represent. Petitioners may have
been disqualified by the COMELEC because as political or regional parties they are not
organized along sectoral lines and do not represent the "marginalized and underrepresented."

Also, petitioners' nominees who do not belong to the sectors they represent may have been
disqualified, although they may have a track record of advocacy for their sectors. Likewise,
nominees of non-sectoral parties may have been disqualified because they do not belong to any
sector. Moreover, a party may have been disqualified because one or more of its nominees failed
to qualify, even if the party has at least one remaining qualified nominee.

In determining who may participate in the coming 13 May 2013 and subsequent party-list
elections, the COMELEC shall adhere to the following parameters:

1. Three different groups may participate in the party-list system: (1) national parties or
organizations, (2) regional parties or organizations, and (3) sectoral parties or organizations.

2. National parties or organizations and regional parties or organizations do not need to organize
along sectoral lines and do not need to represent any "marginalized and underrepresented" sector.

3. Political parties can participate in party-list elections provided they register under the party-list
system and do not field candidates in legislative district elections. A political party, whether
major or not, that fields candidates in legislative district elections can participate in party-list
elections only through its sectoral wing that can separately register under the party-list system.
The sectoral wing is by itself an independent sectoral party, and is linked to a political party
through a coalition.

4. Sectoral parties or organizations may either be "marginalized and underrepresented" or lacking

in "well-defined political constituencies." It is enough that their principal advocacy pertains to
the special interest and concerns of their sector. The sectors that are "marginalized and
underrepresented" include labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural
communities, handicapped, veterans, and overseas workers. The sectors that lack "well-defined
political constituencies" include professionals, the elderly, women, and the youth.
5. A majority of the members of sectoral parties or organizations that represent the "marginalized
and underrepresented" must belong to the "marginalized and underrepresented" sector they
represent. Similarly, a majority of the members of sectoral parties or organizations that lack
"well-defined political constituencies" must belong to the sector they represent. The nominees of
sectoral parties or organizations that represent the "marginalized and underrepresented," or that
represent those who lack "well-defined political constituencies," either must belong to their
respective sectors, or must have a track record of advocacy for their respective sectors. The
nominees of national and regional parties or organizations must be bona-fide members of such
parties or organizations.

6. National, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations shall not be disqualified if some of
their nominees are disqualified, provided that they have at least one nominee who remains
qualified.

This Court is sworn to uphold the 1987 Constitution, apply its provisions faithfully, and desist
from engaging in socio-economic or political experimentations contrary to what the Constitution
has ordained. Judicial power does not include the power to re-write the Constitution. Thus, the
present petitions should be remanded to the COMELEC not because the COMELEC committed
grave abuse of discretion in disqualifying petitioners, but because petitioners may now possibly
qualify to participate in the coming 13 May 2013 party-list elections under the new parameters
prescribed by this Court.

Petitions Granted
JUAN G. FRIVALDO v. COMELEC, GR No. 120295, 1996-06-28
Facts:
Frivaldo filed his Certificate of Candidacy for the office of Governor of Sorsogon in the
995 elections.
Raul R. Lee, another candidate, filed a petition... with the Comelec
Comelec promulgated a Resolution... granting the petition
The Motion for Reconsideration filed by Frivaldo remained unacted upon until after... elections.
So, his candidacy continued and he was voted for during the elections held on said date.
Provincial Board of Canvassers completed the canvass of the election returns and a Certificate of
Votes... showing the following votes
Juan G. Frivaldo
73,440
RaulR.Lee
53,304
Lee filed... a (supplemental) petition... raying for his proclamation as the duly-elected Governor
of Sorsogon.
Accordingly... at 8:30 in the evening of June 30,1995,... Lee was proclaimed governor of
Sorsogon.
Frivaldo filed with the Comelec a new petition,... praying for the annulment of... proclamation of
Lee and for his own proclamation.
He alleged that on June 30, 1995, at 2:00 in the afternoon, he... took his oath of allegiance as a
citizen of the Philippines after "his petition for repatriation under P.D. 725 which he filed with
the Special Committee on Naturalization in September 1994 had been granted."
As such... there was no more legal impediment to the proclamation (of Frivaldo) as governor
Comelec First Division promulgated the herein assailed Resolution... holding that Lee, "not
having garnered the highest number of votes," was not legally entitled to be proclaimed as duly-
elected governor; and that Frivaldo,... "having garnered the highest number of votes, and...
having reacquired his Filipino citizenship by repatriation on June 30, 1995 under the provisions
of Presidential Decree No. 725
(is... qualified to hold the office of governor of Sorsogon"... e further contends that assuming the
assailed repatriation to be valid, nevertheless it could only be effective as at 2:00 p.m. of June 30,
1995 whereas the citizenship qualification prescribed by the Local Government Code "must exist
on the date of his election,... if not when the certificate of candidacy is filed,"
Issues:
Issues in G.R. No. 123755
The alleged repatriation of respondent was neither valid nor is the effect thereof retroactive as to
cure his ineligibility and qualify him to hold the Office of Governor
Consolidated Issues
Was the repatriation of Frivaldo valid and legal? If so, did it seasonably cure his lack of
citizenship as to qualify him to be proclaimed and to hold the Office of Governor? If not, may it
be given retroactive effect? If so, from when?
Was the repatriation of Frivaldo valid and legal? If so, did it seasonably cure his lack of
citizenship as to qualify him to be proclaimed and to hold the Office of Governor? If not, may it
be given retroactive effect? If so, from when?
Is Frivaldo's "judicially declared" disqualification for lack of Filipino citizenship a continuing
bar to his eligibility to run for, be elected to or hold the governorship of Sorsogon?
Ruling:
validity and effectivity of Frivaldo's repatriation is the lis mota, the threshold legal issue in this
case. All the other matters raised are secondary to this.
we also hold that the repatriation of Frivaldo RETRO ACTED to the date of the filing of his
application on August 17,1994.
ased on the foregoing, any question regarding Frivaldo's status as a registered voter would also
be deemed settled. Inasmuch as he is considered as having been repatriated--i.e., his Filipino
citizenship restored -- as of August 17, 1994, his previous registration as a voter is... likewise
deemed validated as of said date.
It is not disputed that on January 20, 1983 Frivaldo became an American. Would the retroactivity
of his repatriation not effectively give him dual citizenship, which under Sec. 40 of the Local
Government Code would disqualify him "from running for any elective local... position?"
We answer this question in the negative, as there is cogent reason to hold that Frivaldo was really
STATELESS at the time he took said oath of allegiance and even before that, when he ran for
governor in 1988. In his Comment, Frivaldo wrote... that he "had long renounced and had long
abandoned his American citizenship--long before May 8, 1995. At best, Frivaldo was stateless in
the interim -- when he abandoned and renounced his US citizenship but before he was repatriated
to his Filipino citizenship."
"Everytime the citizenship of a person is material or indispensable in a judicial or administrative
case, whatever the corresponding court or administrative authority decides therein as to such
citizenship is generally not considered res judicata, hence it has... to be threshed out again and
again, as the occasion demands."
EMILIO RAMON “E.R.” P. EJERCITO v. COMELEC, GR No. 212398, 2014-11-25
Facts:
Three days prior to the May 13, 2013 National and Local Elections, a petition for disqualification
was filed by San Luis before the Office of the COMELEC Clerk in Manila against Ejercito, who
was a fellow gubernatorial candidate and, at the time, the incumbent Governor of the
Province of Laguna.[3] Alleged in his Petition are as follows:
[Ejercito], during the campaign period for 2013 local election, distributed to the electorates of the
province of Laguna the so-called "Orange Card" with an intent to influence, induce or corrupt the
voters in voting for his favor. Copy thereof is hereto attached and marked... as Annex "C" and
made as an integral part hereof;
"Orange Card" could be used in any public hospital within the Province of Laguna for their
medical needs as declared by the statements of... witnesses which are hereto attached and marked
as Annex "D" as integral part hereof;
The so-called "Orange Card" is considered a material consideration in convincing the voters to
cast their votes for [Ejercito's] favor in clear violation of the provision of the Omnibus Election
Code which provides and I quote:
"Sec. 68. Disqualifications. Any candidate who, in an action or protest in which he is a party is
declared by final decision by a competent court guilty of, or found by the Commission of having
(a) given money or other material consideration to influence, induce... or corrupt the voters or
public officials performing electoral functions;
Based on the records of the Provincial COMELEC, the Province of Laguna has a total of
1,525,522 registered electorate. A certification issued by the Provincial Election Supervisor is
hereto attached and marked as Annex "E" as an integral part hereof;
. In this regard, par. (a), Section 5 of COMELEC Resolution No. 9615, otherwise known as the
Rules and Regulations Implementing FAIR ELECTION ACT provides and I quote:
"Authorized Expenses of Candidates and Parties. The aggregate amount that a candidate or party
may spent for election campaign shall be as follows:
For candidates Three pesos (P3.00) for every voter currently registered in the constituency where
the candidate filed his certificate of candidacy.
For other candidates without any political party and without any support from any political party
Five pesos (P5.00) for every voter currently registered in the constituency where the candidate
filed his certificate of candidacy.
For Political Parties and party-list groups Five pesos (P5.00) for every voter currently registered
in the constituency or constituencies where it has official candidates. (underscoring mine for
emphasis)
Accordingly, a candidate for the position of Provincial Governor of Laguna is only authorized to
incur an election expense amounting to FOUR MILLION FIVE HUNDRED SEVENTY-SIX
THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED SIXTY-SIX (P4,576,566.00) PESOS.
However, in total disregard and violation of the afore-quoted provision of law, [Ejercito]
exceeded his expenditures in relation to his campaign for the 2013 election. For television
campaign commercials alone, [Ejercito] already spent the sum of PhP23,730.784 based on our...
party's official monitoring on the following dates[:] April 28, May 4 & May 5, 2013.
exceeded in the total allowable expenditures for which he paid the sum of P16,611,549;
Subsequently, on May 16, 2013, San Luis filed a Very Urgent Ex-Parte Motion to Issue
Suspension of Possible Proclamation of Respondent and Supplemental to the Very Urgent Ex-
Parte Motion to Issue Suspension of Possible Proclamation of Respondent.[5]
However, these were not acted upon by the COMELEC. The next day, Ejercito and Ramil L.
Hernandez were proclaimed by the Provincial Board of Canvassers as the duly-elected Governor
and Vice-Governor, respectively, of Laguna.[6] Based on the
Provincial/District Certificate of Canvass, Ejercito obtained 549,310 votes compared with San
Luis' 471,209 votes.[7]
The COMELEC First Division issued a Summons with Notice of Conference on June 4, 2013.[8]
Ejercito then filed his Verified Answer on June 13, 2013 that prayed for the dismissal of the
petition due to procedural and substantive irregularities... and taking into account his
proclamation as Provincial Governor.[9] He countered that the petition was improperly filed
because, based on the averments and relief prayed for, it is in reality a complaint for election
offenses; thus, the case should have... been filed before the COMELEC Law Department, or the
election registrar, provincial election supervisor or regional election director, or the state,
provincial or city prosecutor in accordance with Laurel v. Presiding Judge, RTC, Manila, Br. 10.
[10]
Assuming that the petition could be given due course, Ejercito argued that San Luis failed to
show, conformably with Codilla, Sr. v. Hon. De Venecia,[11] that he (Ejercito) was previously
convicted or declared by final judgment of a competent court... for being guilty of, or found by
the COMELEC of having committed, the punishable acts under Section 68 of Batas Pambansa
(B.P.) Bilang 881, or the Omnibus Election Code of the Philippines, as amended (OEC).[12]... s
to the acts he allegedly committed, Ejercito claimed that the same are baseless, unfounded, and
totally speculative. He stated that the Health Access Program or the E.R. "Orange Card" was a
priority project of his administration as incumbent Governor of Laguna and was never... intended
to influence the electorate during the May 2013 elections. He added that the "Orange Card,"
which addressed the increasing need for and the high cost of quality health services, provides the
Laguneños not only access to medical services but also the privilege to avail... free livelihood
seminars to help them find alternative sources of income. With respect to the charge of having
exceeded the total allowable election expenditures, Ejercito submitted that the accusation
deserves no consideration for being speculative, self-serving, and... uncorroborated by any other
substantial evidence.
Citing Sinaca v. Mula,[13] Ejercito asserted that the petition questioning his qualification was
rendered moot and academic by his proclamation as the duly-elected Provincial Governor of
Laguna for the term 2013-2016. He perceived that his successful... electoral bid substantiates the
fact that he was an eligible candidate and that his victory is a testament that he is more than
qualified and competent to hold public office.
San Luis substantially reiterated the content of the Petition in his Memorandum.[16]
Additionally, he alleged that:
After the election, [San Luis] was able to secure documents from the Information and Education
Department of the Commission on Elections showing that [Ejercito] have incurred advertising
expenses with ABS-CBN in the amount of [P20,197,170.25] not to mention his... advertisement
with GMA 7. Copies of the summary report, media purchase order, advertising contract[,] and
official receipt are marked as EXHS. "B-1", "B-2", "B-3", and "B-4" (Annexes "A", "B", "C",
and "D", supplemental to the very urgent ex-parte... motion)[.][17]
It was stressed that the case is a "Special Action for Disqualification" seeking to disqualify
Ejercito as gubernatorial candidate for violation of Section 68 (a) (c) of the OEC. He prayed that
"[t]he Petition BE GRANTED [and] x x x [Ejercito] BE DISQUALIFIED, and PREVENTED
from... further holding office as Governor of Laguna."[18] In refutation of Ejercito's defenses,
San Luis argued that it is precisely because of the commission of the election offenses under
Section 68 of the OEC that he (Ejercito) should be disqualified. Also,... citing Section 6 of
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6646,[19] San Luis contended that Ejercito's proclamation and
assumption of office do not affect the COMELEC's jurisdiction to continue with the trial and
hearing of the action until it is finally... resolved.
On September 26, 2013, the COMELEC First Division promulgated a Resolution, the dispositive
portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Commission (First Division) RESOLVED, as it hereby
RESOLVES, to:
(1)
GRANT the Petition for Disqualification filed against respondent Emilio Ramon "E.R." P.
Ejercito;
(2)
DISQUALIFY respondent Ejercito from holding the Office of the Provincial Governor of
Laguna, pursuant to Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code;
(3)
ORDER respondent Ejercito to CEASE and DESIST from performing the functions of the Office
of the Provincial Governor of Laguna;
(4)
DECLARE a permanent VACANCY in the Office of the Provincial Governor of Laguna;
(5)
DIRECT the duly elected Vice Governor of Laguna to assume the Office of the Provincial
Governor by virtue of succession as provided in Section 44 of the Local Government Code; and
(6)
DIRECT the Campaign Finance Unit to coordinate with the Law Department of this Commission
for the conduct of a preliminary investigation into the alleged violations of campaign finance
laws, rules and regulations committed by respondent
Ejercito.
On procedural matters, the COMELEC First Division held that the title of San Luis' petition and
its reliance on Section 68 (a) (c) of the OEC as grounds for his causes of action clearly show that
the case was brought under Rule 25 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure,[22] as amended by
COMELEC Resolution No. 9523,[23] which allows petitions for disqualification to be filed "any
day after the last day for filing of certificates of candidacy, but not later than the date of
proclamation." No credence was given... to Ejercito's contention that the petition was mooted by
his proclamation as Governor of Laguna. The COMELEC First Division opined that the case of
Sinaca is inapplicable, because it was not about Sinaca's eligibility or whether he committed any
of the acts enumerated in
Section 68 of the OEC. Consistent with Maquiling v. Commission on Elections,[24] it was
declared that Ejercito's garnering of more votes than San Luis in the May 2013 elections is not
tantamount to condonation of any act or acts that he committed... which may be found to be a
ground for disqualification or election offense.
The COMELEC First Division settled the substantive issues put forth in the petition for
disqualification in this wise:
Anent [San Luis'] first cause of action, [San Luis] presented the Sworn Statement dated [May 7,
2013] of a certain Mrs. Daisy A. Cornelio, together with the "Orange Card" issued to Mrs.
Cornelio, marked respectively as Exhibits "A-4" and "A-3" as per [San
Luis']
The COMELEC En Banc agreed with the findings of its First Division that San Luis' petition is
an action to disqualify Ejercito, reasoning that:... x x x First, the title of the petition indicating
that it is a petition for disqualification clearly expresses the objective of the action. Second, it is
manifest from the language of the petition that the causes of action have relied primarily on
Section 68 (a) and
(c) of the OEC[,] which are grounds for disqualification x x x. Third, notwithstanding that the
relief portion of the petition sounded vague in its prayer for the disqualification of Ejercito, the
allegations and arguments set forth therein are obviously geared towards seeking... his
disqualification for having committed acts listed as grounds for disqualification in Section 68 of
OEC. Lastly, as correctly observed by the COMELEC First Division, San Luis' Memorandum
addresses and clarifies the intention of the petition when it prayed for Ejercito... to "be
disqualified and prevented from holding office as Governor of Laguna." While there is a prayer
seeking that Ejercito be held accountable for having committed election offenses, there can be no
doubt that the petition was primarily for his disqualification.
Ejercito was a bona fide candidate who was disqualified, not because of any ineligibility existing
at the time of the filing of the certificate of candidacy, but because he violated the rules of
candidacy. His disqualifying circumstance, that is, his having over-spent in his... campaign, did
not exist at the time of the filing of his certificate of candidacy. It did not affect the validity of
the votes cast in his favor. Notwithstanding his disqualification, he remains the candidate who
garnered the highest number of votes.
San Luis is in a different circumstance. The votes for the disqualified winning candidate
remained valid. Ergo, San Luis, being the second placer in the vote count, remains the second
placer. He cannot[,] thus[,] be named the winner.
On May 23, 2014, Ejercito filed before this Court a Petition for certiorari with application for the
issuance of a status quo ante order or temporary restraining order (TRO)/writ of preliminary
injunction (WPI).[35] Without... issuing a TRO/WPI, the Honorable Chief Justice, Maria
Lourdes P. A. Sereno, issued on May 28, 2014 an order to respondents to comment on the
petition within a non-extendible period of ten (10) days from notice.[36] Such order was
confirmed nunc pro... tunc by the Court En Banc on June 3, 2014.[37]
Section 268. Jurisdiction. The regional trial court shall have the exclusive original jurisdiction to
try and decide any criminal action or proceeding for violation of this Code, except those relating
to the offense of failure to register or failure to vote which shall be... under the jurisdictions of
metropolitan or municipal trial courts. From the decision of the courts, appeal will lie as in other
criminal cases."[55]
In the case at bar, the COMELEC First Division and COMELEC En Banc correctly ruled that
the petition filed by San Luis against Ejercito is not just for prosecution of election offense but
for disqualification as well. Indeed, the following are clear indications:
Section 5. Effect of Petition if Unresolved Before Completion of Canvass. If a Petition for
Disqualification is unresolved by final judgment on the day of elections, the petitioner may file a
motion with the Division or Commission En Banc where the case... is pending, to suspend the
proclamation of the candidate concerned, provided that the evidence for the grounds to disqualify
is strong. For this purpose, at least three (3) days prior to any election, the Clerk of the
Commission shall prepare a list of pending cases and furnish... all Commissioners copies of said
the list.
In the event that a candidate with an existing and pending Petition to disqualify is proclaimed
winner, the Commission shall continue to resolve the said Petition.
It is expected that COMELEC Resolution No. 9523 is silent on the conduct of preliminary
investigation because it merely amended, among others, Rule 25 of the COMELEC Rules of
Procedure, which deals with disqualification of candidates. In disqualification cases, the
COMELEC may... designate any of its officials, who are members of the Philippine Bar, to hear
the case and to receive evidence only in cases involving barangay officials.[59] As
aforementioned, the present rules of procedure in the investigation and prosecution of... election
offenses in the COMELEC, which requires preliminary investigation, is governed by
COMELEC Resolution No. 9386. Under said Resolution, all lawyers in the COMELEC who are
Election Officers in the National Capital Region ("NCR"), Provincial Election Supervisors,
Regional
Election Attorneys, Assistant Regional Election Directors, Regional Election Directors and
lawyers of the Law Department are authorized to conduct preliminary investigation of
complaints involving election offenses under the election laws which may be filed directly with
them,... or which may be indorsed to them by the COMELEC.[60]
Similarly, Ejercito's reliance on COMELEC Resolution No. 2050 is misplaced. COMELEC
Resolution No. 2050, which was adopted on November 3, 1988, reads:
WHEREAS, there remain pending before the Commission, a number of cases of disqualification
filed by virtue of the provisions of Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code in relation to
Section 6 of R.A. 6646, otherwise known as the Electoral Reforms Law of 1987;
WHEREAS, opinions of the members of the Commission on matters of procedure in dealing
with cases of this nature and the manner of disposing of the same have not been uniform;
WHEREAS, in order to avoid conflicts of opinion in the disposition [of] disqualification cases
contemplated under Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code in relation to Section 6 of Rep.
Act 6646, there is a strongly felt need to lay down a definite policy in the disposition of... this
specific class of disqualification cases;
NOW, THEREFORE, on motion duly seconded, the Commission en banc:
RESOLVED, as it hereby resolves, to formulate the following rules governing the disposition of
cases of disqualification filed by virtue of Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code in relation to
Section 6 of R.A. No. 6646, otherwise known as the Electoral Reforms Law of
1987:
Any complaint for the disqualification of a duly registered candidate based upon any of the
grounds specifically enumerated under Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code, filed directly
with the Commission before an election in which the respondent is a candidate, shall be...
inquired into by the Commission for the purpose of determining whether the acts complained of
have in fact been committed. Where the inquiry by the Commission results in a finding before
election, that the respondent candidate did in fact commit the acts complained, the
Commission shall order the disqualification of the respondent candidate from continuing as such
candidate.
In case such complaint was not resolved before the election, the Commission may motu proprio,
or [on] motion of any of the parties, refer the complaint to the [Law] Department of the
Commission as the instrument of the latter in the exercise of its exclusive power to... conduct a
preliminary investigation of all cases involving criminal infractions of the election laws. Such
recourse may be availed of irrespective of whether the respondent has been elected or has lost in
the election.
Any complaint for disqualification based on Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code in relation
to Section 6 of Rep. Act No. 6646 filed after the election against a candidate who has already
been proclaimed as winner shall be dismissed as a disqualification case. However, the...
complaint shall be referred for preliminary investigation to the Law Department of the
Commission.
In Bagatsing v. COMELEC,[62] the Court stated that the above-quoted resolution covers two (2)
different scenarios:
First, as contemplated in paragraph 1, a complaint for disqualification filed before the election
which must be inquired into by the COMELEC for the purpose of determining whether the acts
complained of have in fact been committed. Where the inquiry... results in a finding before the
election, the COMELEC shall order the candidate's disqualification. In case the complaint was
not resolved before the election, the COMELEC may motu propio or on motion of any of the
parties, refer the said complaint to the Law Department... of the COMELEC for preliminary
investigation.
Second, as laid down in paragraph 2, a complaint for disqualification filed after the election
against a candidate (a) who has not yet been proclaimed as winner, or (b) who has already been
proclaimed as winner. In both cases, the complaint shall be dismissed as a... disqualification case
but shall be referred to the Law Department of the COMELEC for preliminary investigation.
However, if before proclamation, the Law Department makes a prima facie finding of guilt and
the corresponding information has been filed with the appropriate... trial court, the complainant
may file a petition for suspension of the proclamation of the respondent with the court before
which the criminal case is pending and the said court may order the suspension of the
proclamation if the evidence of guilt is strong.[63]... political... party. Expenditures duly
authorized by the candidate or the treasurer of the party shall be considered as expenditures of
such candidate or political party.
Issues:
The focal query is: How shall We interpret "the expenses herein referred to shall include those
incurred or caused to be incurred by the candidate" and "except the candidate, the treasurer of a
political party or any person authorized by such candidate or treasurer" found in
Sections 100 and 103, respectively, of the OEC? Do these provisions exclude from the allowable
election expenditures the contributions of third parties made with the consent of the candidate?
The Court holds not.
Section 51. Limitations upon expenses of candidates. No candidate shall spend for his election
campaign an amount more than the salary or the equivalent of the total emoluments for one year
attached to the office for which he is a candidate: Provided, That the expenses herein... referred
to shall include those incurred by the candidate, his contributors and supporters, whether in cash
or in kind, including the use, rental or hire of land, water or air craft, equipment, facilities,
apparatus and paraphernalia used in the campaign: Provided, further,... That, where the land,
water or air craft, equipment, facilities, apparatus and paraphernalia used is owned by the
candidate, his contributor or supporter, the Commission is hereby empowered to assess the
amount commensurate with the expenses for the use thereof, based on the... prevailing rates in
the locality and shall be included in the total expenses incurred by the candidate.
In the case of candidates for the interim Batasang Pambansa, they shall not spend more than
sixty thousand pesos for their election campaign.
Section 52. Limitation upon expenses of political parties, groups or aggrupations. A political
party, group or aggrupation may not spend for the election of its candidates in the constituency
or constituencies where it has official candidates an aggregate amount more than the... equivalent
of fifty centavos for every voter currently registered therein: Provided, That expenses incurred by
such political party, group or aggrupation not duly registered with the Commission and/or not
presenting or supporting a complete list of candidates shall be considered... as expenses of its
candidates and subject to the limitation under Section 51 of this Code. Expenses incurred by
branches, chapters or committees of a political party, group or aggrupation shall be included in
the computation of the total expenditures of the political party,... group or aggrupation.
(Emphasis supplied)
Section 54. Persons authorized to incur election expenditures. No person, except the candidate or
any person authorized by him or the treasurer of a political party, group or aggrupation, shall
make any expenditure in support of, or in opposition to any candidate or political... party, group
or aggrupation. Expenditures duly authorized by the candidate of the treasurer of the party, group
or aggrupation shall be considered as expenditure of such candidate or political party, group or
aggrupation.
Ruling:
Prior to P.D. No. 1296, R.A. No. 6388 (otherwise known as the "Election Code of 1971") was
enacted.[124] Sections 41 and 42 of which are relevant, to quote:
Section 41. Limitation Upon Expenses of Candidates. No candidate shall spend for his election
campaign more than the total amount of salary for the full term attached to the office for which
he is a candidate.
Section 42. Limitation Upon Expenses of Political Parties and Other Non-political
Organizations. No political party as defined in this Code shall spend for the election of its
candidates an aggregate amount more than the equivalent of one peso for every voter currently...
registered throughout the country in case of a regular election, or in the constituency in which
the... election shall be held in case of a special election which is not held in conjunction with a
regular election. Any other organization not connected with any political party, campaigning for
or against a candidate, or for or against a political party shall not spend more than a... total
amount of five thousand pesos. (Emphasis supplied)
Much earlier, Section 12 (G) of R.A. No. 6132,[125] which implemented the resolution of both
Houses of Congress calling for a constitutional convention, explicitly stated:
Section 12. Regulations of Election Spending and Propaganda. The following provisions shall
govern election spending and propaganda in the election provided for in this Act:... x x x
(G) All candidates and all other persons making or receiving expenditures, contributions or
donations which in their totality exceed fifty pesos, in order to further or oppose the candidacy of
any candidate, shall file a statement of all such expenditures and contributions made... or
received on such dates and with such details as the Commission on Elections shall prescribe by
rules. The total expenditures made by a candidate, or by any other person with the knowledge
and consent of the candidate, shall not exceed thirty-two thousand pesos. (Emphasis... supplied)
In tracing the legislative history of Sections 100, 101, and 103 of the OEC, it can be said,
therefore, that the intent of our lawmakers has been consistent through the years: to regulate not
just the election expenses of the candidate but also of his or her... contributor/supporter/donor as
well as by including in the aggregate limit of the former's election expenses those incurred by the
latter. The phrase "those incurred or caused to be incurred by the candidate" is sufficiently
adequate to cover those expenses which are contributed... or donated in the candidate's behalf.
By virtue of the legal requirement that a contribution or donation should bear the written
conformity of the candidate, a contributor/supporter/donor certainly qualifies as "any person
authorized by such candidate or treasurer." Ubi lex non... distinguit, nec nos distinguere
debemus.[126] (Where the law does not distinguish, neither should We.) There should be no
distinction in the application of a law where none is indicated.
The inclusion of the amount contributed by a donor to the candidate's allowable limit of election
expenses does not trample upon the free exercise of the voters' rights of speech and of expression
under Section 4, Artticle III of the Constitution. As a content-neutral... regulation,[127] the law's
concern is not to curtail the message or content of the advertisement promoting a particular
candidate but to ensure equality between and among aspirants with "deep pockets" and those
with less financial resources. Any restriction... on speech or expression is only incidental and is
no more than necessary to achieve the substantial governmental interest of promoting equality of
opportunity in political advertising. It bears a clear and reasonable connection with the
constitutional objectives set out in
Section 26, Article II, Section 4, Article IX-C, and Section 1, Art. XIII of the Constitution.[128]
Indeed, to rule otherwise would practically result in an unlimited expenditure for political
advertising, which skews the political process and subverts the... essence of a truly democratic
form of government.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The May 21, 2014 Resolution of the COMELEC En
Banc in SPA No. 13-306 (DC), which upheld the September 26, 2013 Resolution of the
COMELEC First Division, granting the petition for disqualification filed by private respondent
Edgar "Egay"
S. San Luis against petitioner Emilio Ramon "E.R." P. Ejercito, is hereby AFFIRMED.
Principles:
When the intent of the law is not apparent as worded, or when the application of the law would
lead to absurdity, impossibility or injustice, extrinsic aids of statutory construction may be
resorted to such as the legislative history of the law for the purpose of solving doubt,... and that
courts may take judicial notice of the origin and history of the law, the deliberations during the
enactment, as well as prior laws on the same subject matter in order to ascertain the true intent or
spirit of the law.[122]
ROSALINDA A. PENERA v. COMELEC, GR No. 181613, 2009-09-11
Facts:
Penera and private respondent Edgar T. Andanar (Andanar) were mayoralty candidates in Sta.
Monica
Andanar filed... a Petition for Disqualification... against Penera... for unlawfully engaging in
election campaigning and partisan political activity prior to the commencement of the campaign
period.
Andanar claimed... that... before the start of the authorized campaign period
Penera and her partymates went around the different barangays in Sta. Monica, announcing their
candidacies and requesting the people to vote for them on the... day of the elections.
Penera admitted that a motorcade did take place, she explained that it was simply in accordance
with the usual... practice in nearby cities and provinces, where the filing of certificates of
candidacy (COCs) was preceded by a motorcade... the COMELEC... disqualified Penera from
continuing as a mayoralty candidate... for engaging in premature campaigning
Whether or not [Penera] has engaged in an election campaign or partisan political activity
outside the campaign period.
Issues:
Whether or not [Penera] has engaged in an election campaign or partisan political activity
outside the campaign period.
Ruling:
We find no merit in the instant Petition.
under Section 80 of the Omnibus Election Code
It shall be unlawful for any person, whether or not a voter or candidate, or for any party, or
association of persons, to engage in an election campaign or partisan... political activity except
during the campaign period
If the commission of the prohibited act of premature campaigning is duly proven, the
consequence of the violation is clearly spelled out in Section 68... which reads:
Any candidate who... violated any of Sections 80... shall be disqualified from continuing as a
candidate, or if he has been elected, from holding the office.
In the case at bar, it had been sufficiently established
, not just by Andanar's evidence, but also those of Penera herself, that Penera and her
partymates,... participated in a motorcade which passed through the different barangays... of Sta.
Monica, waived their hands to the public, and threw candies to the onlookers.
Additionally, the Joint Affidavit... gave an even more straightforward account of the events,
thus:... after actual registration with the COMELEC... the motorcade proceeded to three (3)
barangays out of the 11 barangays while supporters were throwing sweet candies to the crowd;...
there was merriment and marching music
For violating Section 80 of the Omnibus Election Code, proscribing election campaign or
partisan political activity outside the campaign period, Penera must be disqualified from holding
the office of Mayor of Sta. Monica.
ELEAZAR P. QUINTO v. COMELEC, GR No. 189698, 2009-12-01
Facts:

COMELEC issued Resolution No. 8678,4 the Guidelines on the Filing of Certificates of
Candidacy (CoC) and Nomination of Official Candidates of Registered Political Parties in
Connection with the May 10, 2010 National and Local Elections. Sections 4 and 5 of Resolution
No. 8678 provide:
SEC. 4. Effects of Filing Certificates of Candidacy.- a) Any person holding a public appointive
office or position including active members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, and other
officers and employees in government-owned or controlled corporations, shall be considered
ipso facto resigned from his office upon the filing of his certificate of candidacy.

... b) Any person holding an elective office or position shall not be considered resigned upon the
filing of his certificate of candidacy for the same or any other elective office or position.

Rule: In the instant case, is there a rational justification for excluding elected officials from the
operation of the deemed resigned provisions? I submit that there is. An election is the
embodiment of the popular will, perhaps the purest expression of the sovereign power of the
people. It involves the choice or selection of candidates to public office by popular vote.
Considering that elected officials are put in office by their constituents for a definite term, it may
justifiably be said that they were excluded from the ambit of the deemed resigned provisions in
utmost respect for the mandate of the sovereign will. In other words, complete deference is
accorded to the will of the electorate that they be served by such officials until the end of the
term for which they were elected. In contrast, there is no such expectation insofar as appointed
officials are concerned.

The dichotomized treatment of appointive and elective officials is therefore germane to the
purposes of the law. For the law was made not merely to preserve the integrity, efficiency, and
discipline of the public service; the Legislature, whose wisdom is outside the rubric of judicial
scrutiny, also thought it wise to balance this with the competing, yet equally compelling, interest
of deferring to the sovereign will.

Substantial distinctions clearly exist between elective officials and appointive officials. The
former occupy their office by virtue of the mandate of the electorate. They are elected to an
office for a definite term and may be removed therefrom only upon stringent conditions. On the
other hand, appointive officials hold their office by virtue of their designation thereto by an
appointing authority. Some appointive officials hold their office in a permanent capacity and are
entitled to security of tenure while others serve at the pleasure of the appointing authority.

Another substantial distinction between the two sets of officials is that under Section 55, Chapter
8, Title I, Subsection A. Civil Service Commission, Book V of the Administrative Code of 1987
(Executive Order No. 292), appointive officials, as officers and employees in the civil service,
are strictly prohibited from engaging in any partisan political activity or take (sic) part in any
election except to vote. Under the same provision, elective officials, or officers or employees
holding political offices, are obviously expressly allowed to take part in political and electoral
activities.```

This controversy actually stems from the law authorizing the COMELEC to use an automated
election system (AES)

(R.A.) No.

8436... any elective official... except for president and vice president... shall be deemed
resigned... only upon the start of the campaign period... candidate at the start of the campaign
period for which he filed his certificate of candidacy: Provided, That, unlawful acts or omissions
applicable to a candidate shall take effect only upon the start of the aforesaid campaign period...
any... person holding a public appointive office or position, including active members of the
armed forces, and officers and employees in government-owned or -controlled corporations,
shall be considered ipso facto resigned from his/her office and must vacate the same at the... start
of the day of the filing of his/her certificate of candidacy

```PETITION IS GRANTED```

Petitioners contend that the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion when it issued the assailed
Resolution. They aver that the advance filing of CoCs for the 2010 elections is intended merely
for the purpose of early printing of the official ballots in order to cope with time... limitations.
Such advance filing does not automatically make the person who filed the CoC a candidate at the
moment of filing.
Petitioners then assert that this being so, they should not be... deemed ipso facto resigned from
their government offices when they file their CoCs, because at such time they are not yet treated
by law as candidates

```WEAK```... tenuous

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is GRANTED

**Issues:**

they should not be... deemed ipso facto resigned from their government offices when they file
their CoCs, because at such time they are not yet treated by law as candidates

**Ruling:**

At first glance, the petition suffers from an incipient procedural defect.

The petitioners' contention, that the repeal of Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code
pertaining to elective officials gives undue benefit to such officials as against the appointive ones
and violates the equal protection clause of the constitution, is
EFREN RACEL ARATEA v. COMELEC, GR No. 195229, 2012-10-09
Facts:
Romeo D. Lonzanida (Lonzanida) and Estela D. Antipolo (Antipolo) were candidates for Mayor
of San Antonio, Zambales in the May 2010 National and Local Elections. Lonzanida Hied his
certificate of candidacy on 1 December 2009.
8 December 2009, Dra.
Sigrid S. Rodolfo (Rodolfo) filed a petition under Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code to
disqualify Lonzanida and to deny due course or to cancel Lonzanida's certificate of candidacy on
the ground that Lonzanida was elected, and had served, as mayor of San Antonio, Zambales... for
four (4) consecutive terms immediately prior to the term for the May 2010 elections. Rodolfo
asserted that Lonzanida made a false material representation in his certificate of candidacy when
Lonzanida certified under oath that he was eligible for the office he sought... election. Section 8,
Article X of the 1987 Constitution[5] and Section 43(b) of the Local Government Code[6] both
prohibit a local elective official from being elected and serving for more than three consecutive
terms for the same... position.
On 11 August 2010, the COMELEC En Bane Issued a Resolution[12] disqualifying Lonzanida
from running for Mayor in the May 2010 elections. The COMELEC En Banc's resolution was
based on two grounds: first, Lonzanida had been elected and had served as
Mayor for more than three consecutive terms without interruption; and second, Lonzanida had
been, convicted by final judgment often (10) counts of falsification under the Revised Penal
Code. Lonzanida was sentenced for each count of falsification to imprisonment of four
(4) years and one (1) day of prisi&oacuten correccional as minimum, to eight (8) years and one
(1) day of prisi&oacuten mayor as maximum. The judgment of conviction became final on 23
October 2009 in the Decision of this Court in Lonzanida v.
People,[13] before. Lonzanida filed his certificate of candidacy on 1 December Pertinent
portions of the 11 August 2010 Resolution read:
Issues:
Whether Lonzanida was disqualified under Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code, or made a
false material... representation under Section 78 of the same Code that resulted in his certificate
of candidacy being void ab initio, is determinative of whether Aratea or Antipolo is The rightful
occupant to the Office of the Mayor of San Antonio, Zambales.
Ruling:
On 25 August 2010, Antipolo filed a Motion for Leave to Intervene and to Admit Attached
Petition-in-Intervention.[15] She claimed her right to he proclaimed as Mayor of San Antonio,
Zambales because Lonzanida ceased to be a candidate when the COMELEC Second
Division, through its 18 February 2010 Resolution, ordered the cancellation of his certificate of
candidacy and the striking out of his name from the list of official candidates for the position of
Mayor of San Antonio, Zambales in the May 2010 elections.
We hold that Antipolo, the alleged "second placer," should be proclaimed Mayor because
Lonzanida's certificate of candidacy was void ab initio. In short, Lonzanida was never a
candidate at all. All votes for Lonzanida were stray votes. Thus, Antipolo, the only qualified...
candidate, actually garnered the highest number of votes for the position of Mayor.
A petition for disqualification tinder Section 68 clearly refers to "the commission of prohibited
acts and possession of a permanent resident status in a foreign country."[20] All the offenses
mentioned in Section 68 refer to election offenses under the
Omnibus Election Code, not to violations of other penal laws. There is absolutely nothing in the
language of Section 68 that would justify including violation of the three-term limit rule, or
conviction by final judgment of the crime of falsification under the Revised Penal
Code, as one of the grounds or offenses covered under Section 68.  In Codilla, Sr. v. de Venecia,
[2
Clearly, the violation by Lonzanida of the three-term limit rule, or his conviction by final
judgment of the crime of falsification under the Revised Penal Code, does not constitute a
ground for a petition under Section 68.
candidate tor mayor in the 20 5 0 local elections, was thus required to provide 12 items of
information in the certificate of candidacy:[22] name; nickname or stage name; gender; age;
place of birth; political party that nominated the candidate; civil... status; residence/address;
profession or occupation; post office address for election purposes; locality of which the
candidate is a registered voter; and period of residence in the Philippines before 10 May 2010. 
The candidate also certifies four statements: a statement... that the candidate is a natural born or
naturalized Filipino citizen; a statement that the candidate is not a permanent resident of, or
immigrant to, a foreign country; a statement that the candidate is eligible for the office he seeks
election; and a statement of the... candidate's allegiance to the Constitution of the Republic of the
Philippines.[23] The certificate of candidacy should also be under oath, and filed within the
period prescribed by law.
convict becomes ineligible to run for any elective public office perpetually. In the case of
Lonzanida, he became ineligible perpetually to hold,... or to run for, any elective public office
front the time the judgment of conviction against hint became final.  The judgment of conviction
was promulgated on 20 July 2009 and became final on 23 October 2009, before Lonzanida filed
his certificate of candidacy on 1 December
2009
Perpetual special disqualification is a ground for a petition under Section 78 of the Omnibus
Election Code because this accessory penalty is an ineligibility, which means that the convict is
not eligible to run for public office, contrary to the statement that
Section 74 requires him to state under oath in his certificate of candidacy. As this Court held in
Fermin v. Commission on Elections,[21] the false material representation may refer to
"qualifications or eligibility." One who suffers from... perpetual special disqualification is
ineligible to run for public office. If a person suffering from perpetual special disqualification
files a certificate of candidacy stating under oath that "he is eligible to run for (public) office," as
expressly required under Section
74, then he clearly makes a false material representation that is a ground for a p... requires the
candidate to certify that he is eligible for the public office he seeks election. Thus, Section 74
states that "the certificate of candidacy shall state that the person filing x x x is eligible for said
office." T
After being elected and serving for three... consecutive terms, an elective local official cannot
seek immediate reelection for the same office in the next regular election[32] because he is
ineligible.  One who has an ineligibility to run for elective public office is not "eligible for
[the] office."  As used in Section 74, the word "eligible"[33] mean
The distinction between a petition under Section 68 and a petition under Section 78 was
discussed in Loong v. Commission on Elections[40] with respect to the applicable prescriptive
period.  Respondent Nur Hussein Ututalum filed a petition under
Section 78 to disqualify petitioner Benjamin Loong for the office of Regional Vice-Governor of
the Autonomous Government of Muslim Mindanao for false representation as to his age.  The
petition was filed 16 days after the election, and clearly beyond the prescribed 25 day... period
from the last day of filing certificates of candidacy.   This Court ruled that Ututalum's petition
was one based on false representation under Section 78, and not for disqualification under
Section 68.  Hence, the 25-day p... and the appropriate... proceedings to raise the said
grounds."[44] A petition for disqualification can only be premised on a ground specified in
Section 12 or 68 of the Omnibus Election Code or Section 40 of the Local Government Code.
Thus, a petition questioning a candidate's... possession of the required one-year residency
requirement, as distinguished from permanent residency or immigrant status in a foreign country,
should be Hied under Section 78, and a petition under Section 68 is the wrong remedy.
Munder misrepresented that he was a registered voter of Bubong, Lanao del Sur, and that he was
eligible to register as a voter in 2003 even though he was not yet 18 years of age at the time of
the voter's registration. Moreover, Munder's... certificate of candidacy was not accomplished in
full as he failed to indicate his precinct and did not affix his thumb-mark. The COMELEC
Second Division dismissed Sarip's petition and declared that his grounds are not grounds Tor
disqualification under Section 68 but for denial... or cancellation of Munder's certificate of
candidacy under Section 78.  Sarip's petition was filed out of time as he had only 25 days after
the filing of Munder's certificate of candidacy, or until 21 December 2009, within which to file
his petition.
dissenting opinions place the violation of the three-term limit rule as a disqualification under
Section 68 as the violation allegedly is "a status, circumstance or condition which bars him from
running for public office despite the possessi
ALFAIS T. MUNDER v. COMELEC, GR No. 194076, 2011-10-19
Facts:
petitioner Munder ran as mayor of  Bubong, Lanao del Sur,  and filed his certificate of candidacy
(CoC) on 26 November 2009.  The last day for filing the certificate of... candidacy was on 30
November 2009.
Respondent Atty. Tago Sarip ("Sarip") likewise filed a certificate of candidacy and vied for the
same position
On 13 April 2010, Sarip filed a Petition for Disqualification[5] with the Comelec on the ground
that Munder was not a registered voter of Bubong, Lanao del Sur, and that the latter's application
for candidacy was not accomplished in full.
In the 10 May 2010 elections, Munder won overwhelmingly.
Munder... he argued that Sarip had availed himself of the wrong remedy and that the latter's
petition should be treated as a Petition to Deny Due Course to or to Cancel Certificate of
Candidacy... the Comelec Second Division sustained Munder's arguments and dismissed Sarip's
Petition.
the Comelec En Banc... reversed the ruling of the Second Division and disqualified Munder
Munder claims that Sarip should have instead filed a petition for quo... warranto after the
former's proclamation as the winning candidate.
Issues:
May a petition filed as a Petition for Disqualification properly invoke, as a ground, that the
candidate sought to be disqualified was not a registered voter and thus not be barred by the
earlier prescriptive period applicable to Petition to Deny Due Course to or... to Cancel Certificate
of Candidacy?... whether the petition was one for disqualification or for the cancellation of CoC.
Ruling:
The main ground of the said petition is that Munder committed dishonesty in declaring that he
was a registered voter of Barangay Rogero, Bubong, Lanao del Sur, when in fact he was not. 
This ... ground is appropriate for a Petition to Deny Due Course or to Cancel Certificate of
Candidacy.
the ground invoked by Sarip in his Petition for Disqualification against Munder - the latter's
alleged status as unregistered voter in the municipality - was inappropriate for the said petition.
The said ground should have been raised in a petition to... cancel Munder's CoC.  Since the two
remedies vary in nature, they also vary in their prescriptive period.  A petition to cancel a CoC
gives a registered candidate the chance to question the qualification of a rival candidate for a
shorter period: within 5 days from the... last day of their filing of CoCs, but not later than  25
days from the filing of the CoC sought to be cancelled.[23]  A petition for disqualification may
be filed any day after the last day of the filing of CoC but not later than the date of the...
proclamation.
The Comelec Second Division stated that the last day of filing of the CoCs was on 21 December
2009.  Thus, the period to file a Petition to Deny Due Course or to Cancel Certificate of
Candidacy had already prescribed when Sarip filed his petition against Munder.
Principles:
Under Sec. 4(A)(1) of Comelec Resolution 8696, a petition to deny due course or to cancel a
certificate of candidacy must be filed within five days from the last day of the filing of the
certificate of candidacy... but not later than twenty-five days from the filing thereof.
One of the important differences between the two petitions is their prescriptive periods.  For a
Petition to Deny
Due Course or to Cancel a Certificate of Candidacy, the period to file is within five days from
the last day of the filing of the certificate of candidacy, but not later than 25 days from the filing
thereof.  On the other hand, a petition to disqualify a candidate may be... filed at any day after the
last day of filing of the certificate of candidacy, but not later than the date of proclamation.
For a petition for disqualification, the law expressly enumerates the grounds in Section 68 of
Batas Pambansa Blg. 881 as amended, and which was replicated in Section 4(b) of Comelec
Resolution No. 8696.  The grounds stated by respondent in his Petition for Disqualification
that Munder was not qualified to run for not being a registered voter therein - was not included in
the enumeration of the grounds for disqualification.  The grounds in Section 68 may be
categorized into two.  First, those comprising "prohibited" acts of candidates;... and second, the
fact of their permanent residency in another country when that fact affects the residency
requirement of a candidate according to the law.
the two remedies that may be availed of by a candidate to prevent another from running in an
electoral race.
Dela Torre vs COMELEC [258 SCRA 485]
Posted by Pius Morados on November 6, 2011
(Municipal Corporation, Disqualification of Local Elective Officials, Moral Turpitude)
Facts: Section 40 (a) of Republic Act 7160 (Local Government Code of 1991) provides that a
prior conviction of a crime becomes a ground for disqualification from running for any elective
local position – i.e. “when the conviction is for an offense involving moral turpitude.”
Citing above as ground, the COMELEC in a resolution, declared petitioner disqualified from
running for the position of Mayor of Cavinti, Laguna. COMELEC held that petitioner was found
guilty by the MTC for violation of the Anti-Fencing Law, an offense whose nature involves
moral turpitude.
Petitioner claimed that Section 40 (a) of the Local Government Code does not apply to his case
inasmuch as the probation granted him by the MTC which suspended the execution of the
judgment of conviction and all other legal consequences flowing therefrom, rendered
inapplicable Section 40 (a) as well. However, he admits all the elements of the crime of fencing.
Issue: WON the petitioner applicant is disqualified for the coming elections due to a crime
involving moral turpitude.
Held: Yes. Moral turpitude is defined as an act of baseness, vileness, or depravity in the private
duties which a man owes his fellow men, or to society in general, contrary to the accepted and
customary rule of right and duty between man and woman or conduct contrary to justice,
honesty, modesty, or good morals.
From the definition of fencing in Sec. 2 of PD 1612, an element of the crime of fencing may be
gleaned that “the accused knows or should have known that the said article, item, object or
anything of value has been derived from the proceeds of the crime of robbery or theft.
Moral turpitude is deducible from this. Actual knowledge by the “fence” of the fact that property
received as stolen displays the same degree of malicious deprivation of one’s rightful property as
that which animated the robbery or theft which, by their very nature, are crimes of moral
turpitude. And although the participation of each felon in the unlawful taking differs in point in
time and in degree, both the “fence” and the actual perpetrator/s of the robbery or theft invaded
one’s peaceful dominion for gain – thus deliberately reneging the process “private duties” they
owe their “fellowmen” in a manner “contrary to accepted and customary rule of right and duty,
justice, honesty and good morals.”
Note: In determining whether a criminal act involves moral turpitude, the Court is guided by one
of the general principle that crimes mala in se involve moral turpitude while crimes mala
prohibita do not. However, SC admitted that it cannot always be ascertained whether moral
turpitude does or does not exist by merely classifying as crime as mala in se or as mala prohibita.
Whether or not a crime involves moral turpitude is ultimately a question of fact and frequently
depends on all the circumstance 

CAASI vs. CA
191 SCRA 229,1990
FACTS:
Private respondent MERLITO MIGUEL was elected as municipal mayor of Bolinao, Pangasinan
during the local elections of January 18, 1988. His disqualification, however, was sought by
herein petitioner, MATEO CAASI, on the ground that under SEC 68 of the OMNIBUS
ELECTION CODE, private respondent was not qualified because he is a green card holder,
hence, a permanent resident of the United States of America, not of Bolinao, Pangasinan.
ISSUES:
(1) Whether or not a green card is a proof that the holder is a permanent resident of US.
(2) Whether respondent Miguel has waived his status as a permanent resident of the USA prior to
the local elections on January 18, 1988.
HELD:
The Supreme Court ruled that Miguel’s immigration to the US in 1984 constituted an
abandonment of his domicile and residence in the Philippines. His intention to live there
permanently is evidenced by his possession of a GREEN CARD, which is a conclusive proof
that he is a permanent resident of the US despite his occasional visits to the Philippines. There is
no clear evidence that he made an irrevocable waiver of that status nor he surrendered his green
card to the appropriate US authorities before he ran for Mayor of Bolinao in the local election on
January 18, 1988. The court concluded that he was disqualified to run for said public office,
hence, his election thereto is null and void.
PANGKAT LAGUNA VS. COMELEC ET AL.
G.R. No. 148075. February 4, 2002

Facts: On January 30, 2001 then Vice Governor Teresita Lazaro succeeded to the office of the
Governor of Laguna when then Gov. Jose Lina was appointed Secretary of the DILG. Upon
assumption of office as Governor, Lazaro publicly declared her “intention to run for Governor”
in the coming May 2001 elections. Subsequently, she ordered the purchase of trophies,
basketballs, volleyballs, chessboard sets, t-shirts, medals and pins, and other sports materials
worth P4.5 millions. Gov. Lazaro bidded 79 public works projects on March 28, 2001. Pangkat
Laguna, a registered political party, filed a petition for disqualification of Gov. Lazaro for
premature campaigning.

Held: 1. The act of Gov. Lazaro in “ordering the purchase of various items and the consequent
distribution thereof of Laguna, in line with the local government unit’s sports and education
program” is not election campaigning or partisan political activity contemplated and explicitly
prescribed under the pertinent provisions of Sec 80 of the Omnibus Election Code.
2. Evidence is wanting to sufficiently establish the allegation that public funds were released,
disbursed, or expended during the 45-day prohibitive period provided under the law and
implementing rules. Absent such clear and convincing proof, the factual findings of the
COMELEC cannot be disturbed considering that the COMELEC is the constitutional body
tasked to decide, except those involving the right to vote, all questions affecting elections.