IN RE: VICENTE Y. BAYANI [A.C. No. 5307. August 9, 2000] a.
a. A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in
DOCTRINE:
A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him as his negligence
in connection therewith shall render him liable. (Rule 18.03, Canon 18 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility)
FACTS:
Atty. Vicente Y. Bayani failed to submit proof of service of the appellants
brief on the Solicitor General in G.R. No. 115079 (People v. Albior) and the
consequent inability of the latter to file the appellee's brief. The Supreme Court
referred the matter to the IBP for investigation, report and recommendation.
Thereafter, IBP Commissioner Victoria Gonzalez-De Los Reyes sent a letter to Atty.
Bayani requiring the latter to submit his comment within 5 days from receipt
thereof but to no avail. Hence, the IBP Commissioner recommended that Atty.
Bayani be suspended from the practice of the law profession for a period of three
(3) months and until the time he complies with the Order of the Supreme Court. In
turn, the IBP – Board of Governors adopted and approved said report and
recommendation.
ISSUE: Is the report and recommendation meritorious?
RULING:
Yes. A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him as his
negligence in connection therewith shall render him liable. Atty. Bayani's failure to
submit proof of service of appellant's brief on the Solicitor General in G. R. No.
115079 and his failure to submit the required comment manifest willful
disobedience to the lawful orders of the Supreme Court, a clear violation of the
canons of professional ethics. A counsel must always remember that his actions or
omissions are binding on his clients. A lawyer owes his client the exercise of utmost
prudence and capability in that representation.
Further, lawyers are expected to be acquainted with the rudiments of law
and legal procedure, and anyone who deals with them has the right to expect not
just a good amount of professional learning and competence but also a whole-
hearted fealty to his client's cause.
TEODULFO B. BASAS, complainant, vs. ATTY. MIGUEL I. ICAWAT, respondent.
Doctrine:
connection therewith shall render him liable.
b. A lawyer shall account for all money or property collected or received for or from
the client
Facts: Atty. Miguel Icawat was the lawyer for Teodulfo Basas and some other
laborers in their complaint against their employer. The NLRC rendered an adverse
decision. Basas and his fellow workers, however, insisted that they appeal the
decision. Atty. Icawat, however, failed to file the required memorandum of appeal.
Basas filed an administrative complaint, also alleging that Atty. Icawat issued a
receipt for an amount less than that which they had paid him.
Issue: Whether or not Atty Icawat fall short of the diligence required by the legal
profession?
Held: Yes. Respondent’s failure to file the memorandum of appeal required by the
NLRC Rules of Procedure reveals his poor grasp of labor law.
Respondent manifestly fell short of the diligence required of his profession, in
violation of Canon 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which mandates
that a lawyer shall serve his client with competence and diligence. Rule 18.03
provides:
"A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in
connection therewith shall render him liable."
Further, his failure to issue the proper receipt for the money he received from his
clients, respondent also violated Rule 16.01 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility which states that a lawyer shall account for all money or property
collected or received for or from the client.
The Court fined Atty. Icawat in the amount of PhP 500, with a warning that a
repetition of the same offense or a similar misconduct will be dealt with more
severely.
TEODORO R. RIVERA v. ATTY. SERGIO ANGELES A.C. No. 2519, August 29, 2000
DOCTRINE: The Court is not oblivious of the right of a lawyer to be paid for the legal
services he has extended to his client but such right should not be exercised
whimsically by appropriating to himself the money intended for his clients. There
should never be an instance where the victor in litigation loses everything he won to
the fees of his own lawyer.
FACTS: Complainants filed against Atty. Sergio Angeles a case for disbarment on
the grounds of deceit and malpractice. Based on the affidavit-complaint, Atty.
Angeles is their counsel in two civil cases which obtained a final judgement by the
1
Supreme Court. Thereafter, an alias writ of execution was issued in said cases.
However, the sheriff’s return stated that no leviable property can be found in the
premises of the defendants. When they talked with the defendants, one of the
defendants revealed that they have already given the amount of P42,999 to Atty.
Angeles for partial settlement of the judgement. This was evidenced by a photocopy
of the partial settlement of judgement and receipt of payment. All these transpired
without the knowledge of the complainants. A demand letter was sent to Atty.
Angeles but to no avail.
Respondent, in his comment, denied the accusations. He said that he had
the right to retain the amount and to apply the same to professional fees due him
under the subsequent agreement first with complainant Teodoro Rivera and later
with Mrs. Dely Dimson Rivera as embodied in the Deed of Assignment or under the
previous agreement of P20% of P206,000.00. Complainants, in their reply, denied
the assignment of their rights to respondent.
The case was referred to the OSG for investigation, report, and
recommendation. The OSG submitted the case for resolution because the lawyer
failed to attend the scheduled hearings. The IBP issued an order requiring the
parties to manifest their intent to continue prosecuting the case. The investigating
commissioner submitted that Atty. Angeles violated the Code of Professional
Responsibility specifically Rule 1.01 of the, Canon 16, and Rule 16.01 thereof and
recommends his indefinite suspension from the practice of law.
The Board of Governors of the IBP issued a resolution adopting the report
and recommendation of the investigating commissioner. However, instead of the
indefinite suspension, the sanction was only for a one-year suspension from the
practice of law for deceiving his client.
ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Angeles should be sanction for practicing deceit in
dealing with his client.
RULING: Yes. Atty. Angeles should be sanction for practicing deceit in dealing with
his client.
The Court is not oblivious of the right of a lawyer to be paid for the legal
services he has extended to his client but such right should not be exercised
whimsically by appropriating to himself the money intended for his clients. There
should never be an instance where the victor in litigation loses everything he won to
the fees of his own lawyer.
Here, the Court finds merit in the recommendation of the IBP.
Respondent’s act of deceit and malpractice indubitably demonstrated his failure to
live up to his sworn duties as a lawyer. The Supreme Court repeatedly stressed the
importance of integrity and good moral character as part of a lawyer’s equipment in
the practice of his profession. For it cannot be denied that the respect of litigants for
the profession is inexorably diminished whenever a member of the Bar betrays their
trust and confidence.
[Atty. Angeles was suspended for one year.]
G.R. No. 100113 September 3, 1991
RENATO CAYETANO, petitioner, vs. CHRISTIAN MONSOD, HON. JOVITO R.
SALONGA, COMMISSION ON APPOINTMENT, and HON. GUILLERMO CARAGUE, in
his capacity as Secretary of Budget and Management, respondents.
DOCTRINE: The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases in court.
Practice of law means any activity, in or out of court, which requires the application
of law, legal procedure, knowledge, training and experience. "To engage in the
practice of law is to perform those acts which are characteristics of the profession.
Generally, to practice law is to give notice or render any kind of service, which
device or service requires the use in any degree of legal knowledge or skill." At this
point, it might be helpful to define private practice. The term, as commonly
understood, means "an individual or organization engaged in the business of
delivering legal services." (Ibid.). Lawyers who practice alone are often called "sole
practitioners." The practice of law is defined as the performance of any acts . . . in or
out of court, commonly understood to be the practice of law.
FACTS: Respondent Christian Monsod was nominated by President Corazon C.
Aquino to the position of Chairman of the COMELEC. Petitioner opposed the
nomination because allegedly Monsod does not possess the required qualification
of having been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years. On June 5, 1991,
the Commission on Appointments confirmed the nomination of Monsod as
Chairman of the COMELEC. On June 18, 1991, he took his oath of office. On the
same day, he assumed office as Chairman of the COMELEC. Challenging the validity
of the confirmation by the Commission on Appointments of Monsod's nomination,
petitioner as a citizen and taxpayer, filed the instant petition for certiorari and
Prohibition praying that said confirmation and the consequent appointment of
Monsod as Chairman of the Commission on Elections be declared null and void.
ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Monsod is qualified for the position of Chairman of the
COMELEC.
RULING: Yes. Atty. Christian Monsod is a member of the Philippine Bar, having
passed the bar examinations of 1960 with a grade of 86.55%. He has been a dues
paying member of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines since its inception in 1972-
73. He has also been paying his professional license fees as lawyer for more than ten
years. After graduating from the College of Law (U.P.) and having hurdled the
bar, Atty. Monsod worked in the law office of his father. During his stint in the World
Bank Group (1963-1970), Monsod worked as an operations officer for about two
years in Costa Rica and Panama, which involved getting acquainted with the laws of
2
member-countries negotiating loans and coordinating legal, economic, and project
work of the Bank. Upon returning to the Philippines in 1970, he worked with the
Meralco Group, served as chief executive officer of an investment bank and
subsequently of a business conglomerate, and since 1986, has rendered services to
various companies as a legal and economic consultant or chief executive officer. As
former Secretary-General (1986) and National Chairman (1987) of NAMFREL.
Monsod's work involved being knowledgeable in election law. He appeared for
NAMFREL in its accreditation hearings before the Comelec. In the field of advocacy,
Monsod, in his personal capacity and as former Co-Chairman of the Bishops
Businessmen's Conference for Human Development, has worked with the under
privileged sectors, such as the farmer and urban poor groups, in initiating, lobbying
for and engaging in affirmative action for the agrarian reform law and lately the
urban land reform bill. Monsod also made use of his legal knowledge as a member
of the Davide Commission, a quasi-judicial body, which conducted numerous
hearings (1990) and as a member of the Constitutional Commission (1986-1987),
and Chairman of its Committee on Accountability of Public Officers, for which he
was cited by the President of the Commission, Justice Cecilia Muñoz-Palma for
"innumerable amendments to reconcile government functions with individual
freedoms and public accountability and the party-list system for the House of
Representative.
Lawyers play an important role in any debt restructuring program. For aside from
performing the tasks of legislative drafting and legal advising, they score national
development policies as key factors in maintaining their countries' sovereignty.
Interpreted in the light of the various definitions of the term Practice of law".
particularly the modern concept of law practice, and taking into consideration the
liberal construction intended by the framers of the Constitution, Atty. Monsod's past
work experiences as a lawyer-economist, a lawyer-manager, a lawyer-entrepreneur
of industry, a lawyer-negotiator of contracts, and a lawyer-legislator of both the rich
and the poor — verily more than satisfy the constitutional requirement — that he
has been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years. The appointing
process in a regular appointment as in the case at bar, consists of four (4) stages: (1)
nomination; (2) confirmation by the Commission on Appointments; (3) issuance of a
commission (in the Philippines, upon submission by the Commission on
Appointments of its certificate of confirmation, the President issues the permanent
appointment; and (4) acceptance e.g., oath-taking, posting of bond, etc. . . . The
power of the Commission on Appointments to give its consent to the nomination of
Monsod as Chairman of the Commission on Elections is mandated by Section 1(2)
Sub-Article C, Article IX of the Constitution. We should not lose sight of the fact that
Mr. Monsod is a lawyer, a member of the Philippine Bar, who has been practising
law for over ten years. This is different from the acts of persons practising
law, without first becoming lawyers.
The Commission on the basis of evidence submitted doling the public hearings on
Monsod's confirmation, implicitly determined that he possessed the necessary
qualifications as required by law. The judgment rendered by the Commission in the
exercise of such an acknowledged power is beyond judicial interference except only
upon a clear showing of a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction. (Art. VIII, Sec. 1 Constitution). Thus, only where such grave abuse of
discretion is clearly shown shall the Court interfere with the Commission's
judgment. In the instant case, there is no occasion for the exercise of the Court's
corrective power, since no abuse, much less a grave abuse of discretion, that would
amount to lack or excess of jurisdiction and would warrant the issuance of the writs
prayed, for has been clearly shown.
AQUINO v. PASCUA
Petitioner: Fr. Ranhilio Aquino, Academic Head of the Philippine Judicial Academy
Respondent: Atty. Edwin Pascua, Notary Public in Cagayan. 
Facts: Father Aquino alleged that Atty. Pascua falsified two documents. According
to Fr. Aquino, Atty Pascua made it appear that he had notarized the Affidavit-
Complaint of Joseph B. Acorda and Remigio B. Domingo. But none of the documents
notarized appear in the Notarial Register of Atty. Pascua. 
Atty. Pascua: admitted having notarized the two documents but they were not
entered in his Notarial Register due to the oversight of his legal secretary, Lyn Elsie
C. Patli, whose affidavit was attached to his comment.
Petitioners: Atty. Pascuas omission was not due to inadvertence but a clear case of
falsification.
On November 16, 1999, we granted their motion. Thereafter, we referred the case
to the Office of the Bar Confidant for investigation, report and recommendation.
Office of the Bar Confidant:
Under the notarial law, the notary public shall enter in
such register, in chronological order, the nature of each
instrument executed, sworn to, or acknowledged before him, the
person executing, swearing to, or acknowledging the instrument,
xxx xxx Failure of the notary to make the proper entry or entries in
his notarial register touching his notarial acts in the manner
required by law is a ground for revocation of his commission (Sec.
249, Article VI).
3
 Atty. Pascua claims that the omission was not intentional a three-month suspension from the practice of law upon him is in order. Likewise,
but due to oversight of his staff. Whichever is the case, since his offense is a ground for revocation of notarial commission, the same
Atty. Pascua cannot escape liability. His failure to enter into should also be imposed upon him. 
his notarial  register the documents that he admittedly notarized
is a dereliction of duty on his part as a notary public and he is
bound by the acts of his staff. In the Matter of the IBP Membership Dues Delinquency of Atty. MARCIAL A.
EDILION
The act was not simple inadvertence as Atty. Pascua
claims it. The last entry in his notarial register is Document No. (IBP Administrative Case No. MDD-1)
1200 on December 28, 1998 on Page 240. On the other hand, the
EN BANC, A.M. No. 1928 August 3, 1978, CASTRO, C.J.
two affidavit-complaints allegedly notarized on December 10,
1998are Document Nos. 1213 and 1214, respectively, under Page
No. 243, Book III. Also, the only supporting evidence of the claim
Doctrine: The Supreme Court, in order to further the State's legitimate interest in
of inadvertence by Atty. Pascua is the affidavit of his own
elevating the quality of professional legal services, may require that the cost of
secretary which is hardly credible since the latter cannot be
improving the profession in this fashion be shared by the subjects and beneficiaries
considered a disinterested witness or party.
of the regulatory program — the lawyers. The practice of law is not a property right
As a lawyer commissioned to be a notary public, but a mere privilege,  and as such must bow to the inherent regulatory power of the
Atty. Pascua is mandated to subscribe to the sacred duties Court to exact compliance with the lawyer's public responsibilities.
appertaining to his office, such duties being dictated by public
policy and impressed with public interest.
Facts:
A member of the Bar may be disciplined or disbarred for
any misconduct in his professional or private capacity. The Court The respondent Marcial A. Edillon is a duly licensed practicing attorney in
has invariably imposed a penalty for notaries public who were the Philippines. In 1975, IBP Board of Governors unanimously adopted Resolution
found guilty of dishonesty or misconduct in the performance of No. 75-65 in Administrative Case No. MDD-1 (In the Matter of the Membership
their duties.  Dues Delinquency of Atty. Marcial A. Edillon) recommending to the Court the
removal of the name of the respondent from its Roll of Attorneys for "stubborn
refusal to pay his membership dues" to the IBP since the latter's constitution
ISSUE: WON Atty. Pascua is guilty of misconduct? notwithstanding due notice.
RULING:
The respondent's pleadings would show that the propriety and necessity of
the IBP are in essence conceded. The respondent, however, objects to particular
We resolve to adopt the findings of facts and conclusion of law by the Office of the
features of Rule of Court 139-A — in accordance with which the Bar of the
Bar Confidant. We find Atty. Pascua guilty of misconduct in the performance of his
Philippines was integrated — and to the provisions of par. 2, Section 24, Article III,
duties for failing to register in his   Notarial  Register the affidavit-complaints of
of the IBP By-Laws. Section 10 of the Court Rule reads: SEC. 10. Effect of non-
Joseph B. Acorda and Remigio B. Domingo.
payment of dues. — Subject to the provisions of Section 12 of this Rule, default in
Misconduct generally means wrongful, improper or unlawful conduct the payment of annual dues for six months shall warrant suspension of membership
motivated by a premeditated, obstinate or intentional purpose. The term, in the Integrated Bar, and default in such payment for one year shall be a ground
however, does not necessarily imply corruption or criminal intent. for the removal of the name of the delinquent member from the Roll of Attorneys.
The penalty to be imposed for such act of misconduct committed by a
lawyer is addressed to the sound discretion of the Court.   In the present case,
considering that this is Atty. Pascuas first offense, we believe that the imposition of
4
 The core of the respondent's arguments is that the above provisions
constitute an invasion of his constitutional rights in the sense that he is being
compelled, as a pre-condition to maintaining his status as a lawyer in good standing,
to be a member of the IBP and to pay the corresponding dues, and that as a
consequence of this compelled financial support of the said organization to which
he is admittedly personally antagonistic, he is being deprived of the rights to liberty
and property guaranteed to him by the Constitution. The respondent similarly
questions the jurisdiction of the Court to strike his name from the Roll of Attorneys,
contending that the said matter is not among the justiciable cases triable by the
Court but is rather of an "administrative nature pertaining to an administrative
body."
Issue: Whether or not Rule of Court 139-A and of the By-Laws of the IBP are
unconstitutional or illegal.
Ruling:
No. An "Integrated Bar" is a State-organized Bar, to which every lawyer
must belong, as distinguished from bar associations organized by individual lawyers
themselves, membership in which is voluntary. Organized by or under the direction
of the State, an integrated Bar is an official national body of which all lawyers are
required to be members. They are, therefore, subject to all the rules prescribed for
the governance of the Bar, including the requirement of payment of a reasonable
annual fee for the effective discharge of the purposes of the Bar, and adherence to
a code of professional ethics or professional responsibility breach of which
constitutes sufficient reason for investigation by the Bar and, upon proper cause
appearing, a recommendation for discipline or disbarment of the offending
member. 
The practice of law is not a vested right but a privilege, a privilege
moreover clothed with public interest because a lawyer owes substantial duties not
only to his client, but also to his brethren in the profession, to the courts, and to the
nation, and takes part in one of the most important functions of the State — the
administration of justice — as an officer of the court.  The practice of law being
clothed with public interest, the holder of this privilege must submit to a degree of
control for the common good, to the extent of the interest he has created.
The most compelling argument sustaining the constitutionality and validity
of Bar integration in the Philippines is the explicit unequivocal grant of precise
power to the Supreme Court by Section 5 (5) of Article X of the 1973 Constitution of
the Philippines and Section 1 of Republic Act No. 6397. Even without the enabling
Act and looking solely to the language of the provision of the Constitution granting
the Supreme Court the power "to promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice
and procedure in all courts, and the admission to the practice of law," it at once
becomes indubitable that this constitutional declaration vests the Supreme Court
with plenary power in all cases regarding the admission to and supervision of the
practice of law. When the respondent Edillon entered upon the legal profession, his
practice of law and his exercise of the said profession, which affect the society at
large, were (and are) subject to the power of the body politic to require him to
conform to such regulations as might be established by the proper authorities for
the common good, even to the extent of interfering with some of his liberties.
Respondent Marcial A. Edillon should is hereby disbarred, and his name is hereby
ordered stricken from the Roll of Attorneys of the Court.
------ ----------------------------------------------------------
--------
First objection posed by the respondent: Section 1 of the Court Rule is
unconstitutional for it impinges on his constitutional right of freedom to associate
(and not to associate).
Court: To compel a lawyer to be a member of the Integrated Bar is not violative of
his constitutional freedom to associate. Integration does not make a lawyer a
member of any group of which he is not already a member. He became a member
of the Bar when he passed the Bar examinations.  Bar integration does not compel
the lawyer to associate with anyone. The only compulsion to which he is subjected
is the payment of annual dues. The Supreme Court, in order to further the State's
legitimate interest in elevating the quality of professional legal services, may
require that the cost of improving the profession in this fashion be shared by the
subjects and beneficiaries of the regulatory program — the lawyers. Assuming that
the questioned provision does in a sense compel a lawyer to be a member of the
Integrated Bar, such compulsion is justified as an exercise of the police power of the
State. 
Second objection posed by the respondent: Court Rule requiring payment of a
membership fee is void.
Court: Nothing in the Constitution prohibits the Court, under its constitutional
power and duty to promulgate rules concerning the admission to the practice of law
5
and the integration of the Philippine Bar (Article X, Section 5 of the 1973
Constitution) — which power the respondent acknowledges — from requiring
members of a privileged class, such as lawyers are, to pay a reasonable fee toward
defraying the expenses of regulation of the profession to which they belong. It is
quite apparent that the fee is indeed imposed as a regulatory measure, designed to
raise funds for carrying out the objectives and purposes of integration.  conclude that we find no sufficient basis for modifying the conclusions and rulings
Third objection posed by the respondent: The enforcement of the penalty provisions
would amount to a deprivation of property without due process and hence infringes
on one of his constitutional rights.
Court: The practice of law is not a property right but a mere privilege, and as such
must bow to the inherent regulatory power of the Court to exact compliance with
the lawyer's public responsibilities.
Fourth objection posed by the respondent: The power and/or jurisdiction of the
Supreme Court to strike the name of a lawyer from its Roll of Attorneys.
Court: The Court's jurisdiction was greatly reinforced by our 1973 Constitution when
it explicitly granted to the Court the power to "Promulgate rules concerning
pleading, practice ... and the admission to the practice of law and the integration of
the Bar ... (Article X, Sec. 5(5) the power to pass upon the fitness of the respondent
to remain a member of the legal profession is indeed undoubtedly vested in the
Court.
G.R. No. 79690-707 February 1, 1989
ENRIQUE A. ZALDIVAR, petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN and HONORABLE RAUL M. GONZALEZ,
claiming to be and acting as Tanodbayan-Ombudsman under the 1987
Constitution, respondents.
G.R. No. 80578 February 1, 1989
ENRIQUE A. ZALDIVAR, petitioner,
vs.
HON. RAUL M. GONZALES, claiming to be and acting as Tanodbayan-Ombudsman
under the 1987 Constitution, respondent.
RESOLUTION
PER CURIAM:
We have examined carefully the lengthy and vigorously written Motion for
Reconsideration dated October 18, 1988 filed by counsel for respondent Raul M.
Gonzalez, relating to the per curiam Resolution of the Court dated October 7, 1988.
We have reviewed once more the Court's extended per curiam Resolution, in the
light of the argument adduced in the Motion for Reconsideration, but must
embodied in that Resolution. The Motion for Reconsideration sets forth copious
quotations and references to foreign texts which, however, whatever else they may
depict, do not reflect the law in this jurisdiction.
Nonetheless, it might be useful to develop further, in some measure, some of the
conclusions reached in the per curiam Resolution, addressing in the process some of
the "Ten (10) Legal Points for Reconsideration," made in the Motion for
Reconsideration.
1. In respondent's point A, it is claimed that it was error for this
Court "to charge respondent [with] indirect contempt and convict
him of direct contempt."
In the per curiam Resolution (page 50), the Court concluded that "respondent
Gonzalez is guilty both of contempt of court in facie curiae and of gross misconduct
as an officer of the court and member of the bar." The Court did not use the phrase
"in facie curiae" as a technical equivalent of "direct contempt," though we are
aware that courts in the United States have sometimes used that phrase in speaking
of "direct contempts' as "contempts in the face of the courts." Rather, the court
sought to convey that it regarded the contumacious acts or statements (which were
made both in a pleading filed before the Court and in statements given to the
media) and the misconduct of respondent Gonzalez as serious acts flaunted in the
face of the Court and constituting a frontal assault upon the integrity of the Court
and, through the Court, the entire judicial system. What the Court would stress is
that it required respondent, in its Resolution dated 2 May 1988, to explain "why he
should not be punished for contempt of court and/or subjected to administrative
sanctions" and in respect of which, respondent was heard and given the most
ample opportunity to present all defenses, arguments and evidence that he wanted
to present for the consideration of this Court. The Court did not summarily impose
punishment upon the respondent which it could have done under Section 1 of Rule
71 of the Revised Rules of Court had it chosen to consider respondent's acts as
constituting "direct contempt."
2. In his point C, respondent's counsel argues that it was "error for
this Court to charge respondent under Rule 139 (b) and not 139 of
the Revised Rules of Court."
In its per curiam Resolution, the Court referred to Rule 139 (b) of the Revised Rules
of Court pointing out that:
6
 [R]eference of complaints against attorneys either to the the (US) Constitution require that contempt subject to prison terms of more than
Integrated Bar of the Philippines or to the Solicitor General is not one year be based on grand jury indictments.
mandatory upon the Supreme Court such reference to the
In his concurring opinion in the same case, Mr. Justice Frankfurter
Integrated Bar of the Philippines or to the Solicitor General is
said:
certainly not an exclusive procedure under the terms of Rule 139
(b) of the Revised Rules of Court, especially where the charge Whatever the conflicting views of scholars in construing more or
consists of acts done before the Supreme Court. less dubious manuscripts of the Fourteenth Century, what is
indisputable is that from the foundation of the United States the
The above statement was made by the Court in response to respondent's motion
constitutionality of the power to punish for contempt without the
for referral of this case either to the Solicitor General or to the Integrated Bar of the
intervention of a jury has not been doubted. The First Judiciary Act
Philippines under Rule 139 (b). Otherwise, there would have been no need to refer
conferred such a power on the federal courts in the very act of
to Rule 139 (b). It is thus only necessary to point out that under the old rule, Rule
their establishment, 1 State 73, 83, and of the Judiciary
139, referral to the Solicitor General was similarly not an exclusive procedure and
Committee of eight that reported the bill to the Senate, five
was not the only course of action open to the Supreme Court. It is well to recall that
member including the chairman, Senator, later to be Chief Justice,
under Section 1 (entitled "Motion or complaint") of Rule 139, "Proceedings for the
Ellsworth, had been delegates to the Constitutional Convention
removal or suspension of attorneys may be taken by the Supreme Court, (1) on its
(Oliver Ellsworth, Chairman, William Paterson, Caleb Strong,
own motion, or (2) upon the complaint under oath of another in writing"
Ricard Basett, William Few. 1 Annals of Cong 17). In the First
(Parentheses supplied). The procedure described in Sections 2 et seq. of Rule 139 is
Congress itself no less than nineteen member including Madison
the procedure provided for suspension or disbarment proceedings initiated upon
who contemporaneously introduced the Bill of Rights, had been
sworn complaint of another person, rather than a procedure required for
delegates to the Convention. And when an abuse under this
proceedings initiated by the Supreme Court on its own motion. It is inconceivable
power manifested itself, and led Congress to define more
that the Supreme Court would initiate motu proprio proceedings for which it did not
explicitly the summary power vested in the courts, it did not
find probable cause to proceed against an attorney. Thus, there is no need to refer
remotely deny the existence of the power but merely defined the
a case to the Solicitor General, which referral is made "for investigation to
conditions for its exercise more clearly, in an Act "declaratory of
determine if there is sufficient ground to proceed with the prosecution of the
the law concerning contempts of court." Act of Mar. 2, 1831, 4
respondent" (Section 3, Rule 139), where the Court itself has initiated against the
Stat 487.
respondent. The Court may, of course, refer a case to the Solicitor General if it feels
that, in a particular case, further factual investigation is needed. In the present case, xxxxxxxxx
as pointed out in the per curiam Resolution of the Court (page 18), there was "no
Nor has the constitutionality of the power been doubted by this
need for further investigation of facts in the present case for it [was] not
Court throughout its existence . In at least two score cases in this
substantially disputed by respondent Gonzalez that he uttered or wrote certain
Court, not to mention the vast mass of decisions in the lower
statements attributed to him" and that "in any case, respondent has had the
federal courts, the power to punish summarily has been accepted
amplest opportunity to present his defense: his defense is not that he did not make
without question. ... 2
the statements ascribed to him but that those statements give rise to no liability on
his part, having been made in the exercise of his freedom of speech. The issues To say that a judge who punishes a contemnor judges his own cause, is simplistic at
which thus need to be resolved here are issues of law and of basic policy and the best. The judge who finds himself compelled to exercise the power to punish for
Court, not any other agency, is compelled to resolve such issues." contempt does so not really to avenge a wrong inflicted upon his own person;
rather he upholds and vindicates the authority, dignity and integrity of the judicial
In this connection, we note that the quotation in page 7 of the Motion for
institution and its claim to respectful behaviour on the part of all persons who
Reconsideration is from a dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Black in Green v. United
appears before it, and most especially from those who are officers of the court.
State. 1 It may be pointed out that the majority in Green v. United States, through
Mr. Justice Harlan, held, among other things, that: Federal courts do not lack power 3. In his point D, respondent counsel urges that it is error "for this
to impose sentences in excess of one year for criminal contempt; that criminal Court to apply the "visible tendency" rule rather than the "clear
contempts are not subject to jury trial as a matter of constitutional right; nor does and present danger" rule in disciplinary and contempt charges."
7
The Court did not purport to announce a new doctrine of "visible tendency," it was,
more modestly, simply paraphrasing Section 3 (d) of Rule 71 of the Revised Rules of
Court which penalizes a variety of contumacious conduct including: "any improper
conduct tending, directly or indirectly, to impede, obstruct or degrade the
administration of justice."
The "clear and present danger" doctrine invoked by respondent's counsel is not a
magic incantation which dissolves all problems and dispenses with analysis and
judgment in the testing of the legitimacy of claims to free speech, and which
compels a court to exonerate a defendant the moment the doctrine is invoked,
absent proof of impending apocalypse. The clear and present danger" doctrine has
been an accepted method for marking out the appropriate limits of freedom of
speech and of assembly in certain contexts. It is not, however, the only test which
has been recognized and applied by courts. In Logunzad v. Vda. de Gonzales, 3 this
Court, speaking through Mme. Justice Melencio-Herrera said:
...The right of freedom of expression indeed, occupies a preferred
position in the "hierarchy of civil liberties" (Philippine Blooming
Mills Employees Organization v. Philippine Blooming Mills Co.,
Inc., 51 SCRA 191 [1963]. It is not, however, without limitations. As
held in Gonzales v. Commission on Elections, 27 SCRA 835, 858
[1960]:
"From the language of the specific constitutional provision, it
would appear that the right is not susceptible of any limitation. No
law may be passed abridging the freedom of speech and of the
press. The realities of life in a complex society preclude however, a
literal interpretation. Freedom of expression is not an absolute. It
would be too much to insist that all times and under all
circumstances it should remain unfettered and unrestrained.
There are other societal values that press for recognition."
The prevailing doctrine is that the clear and present danger rule is
such a limitation. Another criterion for permissible limitation on
freedom of speech and of the press, which includes such vehicles
of the mass media as radio, television and the movies, is the
"balancing-of-interests test" (Chief Justice Enrique M. Fernando
on the Bill of Rights, 1970 ed., p. 79). The principle "requires a
court to take conscious and detailed consideration of the interplay
of interests observable in a given situation or type of situation
(Separate Opinion of the late Chief Justice Castro in Gonzales v.
Commission on Elections, supra, p. 899). (Emphasis Supplied) 4
Under either the "clear and present danger" test or the "balancing-of-interest test,"
we believe that the statements here made by respondent Gonzalez are of such a
nature and were made in such a manner and under such circumstances, as to
transcend the permissible limits of free speech. This conclusion was implicit in the
per curiam Resolution of October 7, 1988. It is important to point out that the
"substantive evil" which the Supreme Court has a right and a duty to prevent does
not, in the instant case, relate to threats of physical disorder or overt violence or
similar disruptions of public order. 5 What is here at stake is the authority of the
Supreme Court to confront and prevent a "substantive evil" consisting not only of
the obstruction of a free and fair hearing of a particular case but also the avoidance
of the broader evil of the degradation of the judicial system of a country and the
destruction of the standards of professional conduct required from members of the
bar and officers of the courts. The "substantive evil" here involved, in other words,
is not as palpable as a threat of public disorder or rioting but is certainly no less
deleterious and more far reaching in its implications for society.
4. In his point H, respondent's counsel argues that it is error "for
this Court to hold that intent is irrelevant in charges of
misconduct." What the Court actually said on this point was:
Respondent Gonzalez disclaims an intent to attack and denigrate
the Court. The subjectivities of the respondent are irrelevant so
far as characterization of his conduct or misconduct is concerned.
He will not, however, be allowed to disclaim the natural and plain
import of his words and acts. It is, upon the other hand, not
irrelevant to point out that the respondent offered no apology in
his two (2) explanations and exhibited no repentance (Resolution,
p. 7; footnotes omitted).
The actual subjectivities of the respondent are irrelevant because such subjectivities
(understood as pyschological phenomena) cannot be ascertained and reached by
the processes of this Court. Human intent can only be shown derivatively and
implied from an examination of acts and statements. Thus, what the Court was
saying was that respondent's disclaimer of an intent to attack and denigrate the
Court, cannot prevail over the plain import of what he did say and do. Respondent
cannot negate the clear import of his acts and statements by simply pleading a
secret intent or state of mind incompatible with those acts or statements. It is
scarcely open to dispute that, e.g., one accused of homicide cannot successfully
deny his criminal intent by simply asserting that while he may have inserted a knife
between the victim's ribs, he actually acted from high motives and kind feelings for
the latter.
5 In his point 1, respondent's counsel argues that it is error "for
this Court to punish respondent for contempt of court for out of
court publications."
8
Respondent's counsel asks this Court to follow what he presents as alleged modern
trends in the United Kingdom and in the United States concerning the law of
contempt. We are, however, unable to regard the texts that he cites as binding or
persuasive in our jurisdiction. The Court went to some length to document the state
of our case law on this matter in its per curiam Resolution. There is nothing in the
circumstances of this case that would suggest to this Court that that case law, which
has been followed for at least half a century or so, ought to be reversed.
6. In his point J, respondent's counsel pleads that the imposition
of indefinite suspension from the practice of law constitutes
"cruel, degrading or inhuman punishment". The Court finds it
difficult to consider this a substantial constitutional argument. The
indefiniteness of the respondent's suspension, far from being
"cruel" or "degrading" or "inhuman," has the effect of placing, as
it were, the key to the restoration of his rights and privileges as a
lawyer in his own hands. That sanction has the effect of giving
respondent the chance to purge himself in his own good time of
his contempt and misconduct by acknowledging such misconduct,
exhibiting appropriate repentance and demonstrating his
willingness and capacity to live up to the exacting standards of
conduct rightly demanded from every member of the bar and
officer of the courts.
ACCORDINGLY, the Court Resolved to DENY the Motion for Reconsideration for lack
of merit. The denial is FINAL.
OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR, Complainant,  26, 2008 Decision’s modification and reversal.
vs.
SARAH P. AMPONG, COURT INTERPRETER III, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF ALABEL,
SARAN GANI PROVINCE, BRANCH 38, Respondent.
Facts:
Sometime in August 1994, the CSC instituted an administrative case against
Ampong for Dishonesty, Grave Misconduct, and Conduct Prejudicial to the Best
Interest of the Service for having impersonated or taken the November 1991 Civil
Service Eligibility Examination for Teachers on behalf of one Evelyn B. Junio-Decir
(Decir). After Ampong herself admitted to having committed the charges against
her, the CSC rendered a resolution3 dismissing her from service, imposing all
accessory penalties attendant to such dismissal, and revoking her Professional
Board Examination for Teachers (PBET) rating. Ampong moved for reconsideration
on the ground that when the said administrative case was filed, she was already
appointed to the judiciary; as such, she posited that the CSC no longer had any
jurisdiction over her. Ampong’s motion was later denied, thus, prompting her to file
a petition for review before the Court of Appeals (CA). CA denied Ampong’s petition
and affirmed her dismissal
Notwithstanding said Decision, the Financial Management Office (FMO) of the OCA,
which did not receive any official directive regarding Ampong’s dismissal, continued
to release her salaries and allowances. However, in view of Judge Infante’s letter
notifying the OCA of such situation, the FMO issued a Memorandum dated
September 7, 2011 informing the OCA that starting June 2011, it had started to
withhold Ampong’s salaries and allowances.
Ampong prayed that the Court revisit its ruling in G.R. No. 167916 despite its finality
because it might lead to unwarranted complications in its enforcement.10
Moreover, Ampong reiterated her argument that the CSC did not have any
jurisdiction over the case against her.
Issue: Whether or not Ampong had been dismissed from her employment as Court
Interpreter III of the RTC.
Ruling:
Yes.
The Supreme Court has already held in its August 26, 2008 Decision that Ampong
was administratively liable for dishonesty in impersonating and taking the
November 1991 Civil Service Eligibility Examination for Teachers on behalf of one
Decir. Pursuant to the doctrine of immutability of judgment, which states that "a
decision that has acquired finality becomes immutable and unalterable, and may no
longer be modified in any respect, even if the modification is meant to correct
erroneous conclusions of fact and law," Ampong could no longer seek the August
This Court has defined dishonesty as the "(d)isposition to lie, cheat, deceive, or
defraud; untrustworthiness; lack of integrity; lack of honesty, probity or integrity in
principle; lack of fairness and straightforwardness; disposition to defraud, deceive
or betray." [Ampong’s] dishonest act as a civil servant renders her unfit to be a
judicial employee. Indeed, We take note that [Ampong] should not have been
appointed as a judicial employee had this Court been made aware of the cheating
that she committed in the civil service examinations. Be that as it may, [Ampong’s]
present status as a judicial employee is not a hindrance to her getting the penalty
she deserves. 
Under section 58(a) of the Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil
Service (URACCS), the penalty of dismissal carries with it the following
administrative disabilities: (a) cancellation of civil service eligibility; (b) forfeiture of
retirement benefits; and (c) perpetual disqualification from re-employment in any
government agency or instrumentality, including any government-owned and
9
controlled corporation or government financial institution. Ampong should be made Judgment of the CA’s Decision. Thereafter, complainant tried repeatedly to contact
to similarly suffer the same. respondent, but to no avail. When she finally got to talk to him, respondent assured
her that "it was alright" as they still had six months to appeal the case to the
It must be stressed that every employee of the Judiciary should be an example of
Supreme Court. After that final meeting, no updates on the labor case were ever
integrity, uprightness, and honesty. Like any public servant, she must exhibit the
communicated to complainant.
highest sense of honesty and integrity not only in the performance of her official
duties but also in her personal and private dealings with other people, to preserve On Special Proceeding
the court’s good name and standing. The image of a court of justice is mirrored in
The RTC of Roxas City dismissed it for lack of jurisdiction. A Motion for
the conduct, official and otherwise, of the personnel who work thereat, from the
Reconsideration was filed, but it was also denied. Once again, respondent did
judge to the lowest of its personnel. Court personnel have been enjoined to adhere
nothing to reverse the RTC Decision. Consequently, the Entry of Judgment was
to the exacting standards of morality and decency in their professional and private
received on 28 October 2008.
conduct in order to preserve the good name and integrity of the courts of justice.
Here, Ampong failed to meet these stringent standards set for a judicial employee The disbarment complaint
and does not, therefore, deserve to remain with the Judiciary. 21
The complainant charges respondent with gross negligence and deceit in violation
ADELIA V. QUIACHON vs. ATTY. JOSEPH ADORA. RAMOS (A.C. No. 9317, June 4, of Canon Rules 18.03 and 18.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
2014)
Respondent averred that complainant was informed of the status of the case. He
SERENO, CJ: claimed that he had told complainant that he "cannot cite any error of law or abuse
of discretion on the part of the Court of Appeals’ decision that necessitates a
RATIO: The withdrawal of a disbarment case against a lawyer does not terminate or
Petition for Review with the Supreme Court." Thus, he supposedly advised her to
abate the jurisdiction of the IBP and of this Court to continue an administrative
"respect the decision of the Court of Appeals."
proceeding against a lawyer-respondent as a member of the Philippine Bar.
In a Resolution, the Court referred the case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
FACTS:
(IBP) for investigation, report, and recommendation. During the pendency of the
A disbarment case filed by complainant against her lawyer (respondent), who proceedings, complainant filed a Motion to Withdraw Complaint.
represented the complainant who was then the plaintiff in a labor case filed before
IBP Commissioner Hector B. Almeyda (Almeyda) declared that respondent had been
the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) and in a special proceeding case
remiss in failing to update complainant in what had happened to the cases being
filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC).
handled by respondent in behalf of complainant. There was a failure to inform
ON NLRC case complainant (the client) of the status of the cases that thereafter prevented the
client from exercising her options. There was neglect in that regard. He, however,
The Labor Arbiter (LA) granted complainant a favorable decision. Upon appeal, it
recommended the dismissal of the case against him, stating that "with the decision
was reversed and set aside by the NLRC in its Decision, and denied the Motion for
to withdraw the complaint, there does not appear basis to go ahead with the
Reconsideration filed by respondent on complainant's behalf. A Petition for
proceedings since without the complaint, there will be no basis to make any finding
Certiorari was filed before the Court of Appeals (CA), but it affirmed the NLRC's
of liability."
reversal of the LA's Decision. The Notice of the CA Decision was received by the
lawyer on November 23, 2010. A Resolution was subsequently passed by the Board of Governors of the IBP
resolving to adopt and approve the Report and Recommendation of investigation
After the Petition was filed before the CA, Quiachon would always ask respondent
commissioner Almeyda. The case against respondent was dismissed with a warning
about the status of her case. The latter always told her that there was no decision
that a repetition of the same act shall be dealt with more severely.
yet.
ISSUE: Whether or not the case shall be dismissed due to the filing of motion to
Sometime in August 2011, while complainant was in respondent’s office waiting for
withdraw complaint
him to arrive, she noticed a mailman delivering an envelope with the title of her
labor case printed thereon. The complainant asked the secretary of respondent to HELD: No.
open the envelope and was surprised to discover that it contained the Entry of
10
The withdrawal of a disbarment case against a lawyer does not terminate or abate
the jurisdiction of the IBP and of this Court to continue an administrative proceeding
against a lawyer-respondent as a member of the Philippine Bar.
The complainant in a disbarment case is not a direct party to the case, but a witness
who brought the matter to the attention of the Court. There is neither a plaintiff nor
a prosecutor in disciplinary proceedings against lawyers. The real question for
determination in these proceedings is whether or not the attorney is still a fit person
to be allowed the privileges of a member of the bar. Public interest is the primary
objective.
In this case, the IBP found that respondent violated Canon Rules 18.03 and 18.04 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility.1âwp Thus, it should have imposed the
appropriate penalty despite the desistance of complainant or the withdrawal of the
charges.
The failure of respondent to file an appeal from the CA Decision without any
justifiable reason deserves sanction. Lawyers who disagree with the pursuit of an
appeal should properly withdraw their appearance and allow their client to retain
another counsel.
In the present case, respondent failed not only to keep the client informed of the
status of the case, but also to avail of the proper legal remedy that would promote
the client's cause. It is clear that respondent neglected the case entrusted to him.
All lawyers owe fidelity to their client's cause. Regardless of their personal views,
they must present every remedy or defense within the authority of the law in
support of that cause.
Whenever lawyers take on their clients' cause/s, they covenant that they will
exercise due diligence in protecting the client's rights; their failure to exercise that
degree of vigilance and attention expected of a good father of a family makes them
unworthy of the trust reposed in them by their client/s and make them answerable
to the client, the courts and society.
People vs Castaneda
Facts: Myrna Garcia and Custodio Vestidas, Jr. were charged before the CTA of
falsely declaring goods. Garcia and Vestidas, Jr. filed their Demurrer to Evidence
claiming that the prosecution failed to prove their guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
CTA dismissed the case against Garcia and Vestidas, Jr. The prosecution filed its
motion for reconsideration but was denied by the CTA in 15 May 2013 resolution.
On 24 July 2013, the Run After the Smugglers Group, Revenue Collection
Monitoring Group, as counsel for the BOC, received a copy of the July 15, 2013
Resolution of the CTA ordering the entry of judgment in the case. Hence, this
petition for certiorari, ascribing grave abuse of discretion on the part of the CTA
when in ruled that: 1) the pieces of documentary evidence submitted by the
prosecution were inadmissible in evidence; 2) the object evidence consisting of the
alleged misdeclared goods were not presented as evidence; and 3) the witnesses
failed to positively identifythe accused as responsible forthe misdeclaration of
goods.
Issue: WON CTA was correct in ordering the dismissal of the case against
respondents.
Decision: Yes. Court agrees with CTA.
At the outset, it should be noted that the petition was filed beyond the
reglementary period for the filing under Rule 65. Section 4, Rule 65 of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure is explicit in stating that certiorari should be instituted
within a period of 60 days from notice of the judgment, order or resolution sought
to be assailed. The 60-day period is inextendible to avoid any unreasonable delay
that would violate the constitutional rights of parties to a speedy disposition of their
case. While there are recognized exceptions to such strict observance, there should
be an effort on the part of the party invoking liberality to advance a reasonable or
meritorious explanation for his/her failure to comply with the rules.
On a final note, the Court deems it proper to remind the lawyers in the
Bureau of Customs that the canons embodied in the Code of
Professional Responsibility equally apply to lawyers in government
service in the discharge of their official tasks.   Thus, RATS lawyers
17
should exert every effort and consider it their duty to assist in the speedy
and efficient administration of justice. 18
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED and the assailed March 26,
2013 and May 15, 2013 Resolutions of the Court of Tax Appeals are
AFFIRMED.
The Office of the Ombudsman is hereby ordered to conduct an
investigation for possible criminal or administrative offenses committed
by the Run After the Smugglers (RA TS) Group, Revenue Collection
Monitoring Group (RCMG), Bureau of Customs, relative to the filing and
handling of the subject complaint for violations of the Tariff and Customs
Code of the Philippines.
11
CONCHITA A. BALTAZAR, ROLANDO SAN PEDRO, ALICIA EULALIO-RAMOS,
SOLEDAD A. FAJARDO AND ENCARNACION A. FERNANDEZ, Complainants,
vs.
ATTY. JUAN B. BAÑEZ, Respondent.
RESOLUTION
SERENO, CJ.:
Complainants are the owners of three parcels of land located in Dinalupihan,
Bataan.1 n 4 September 2002, they entered into an agreement, they stood to be
paid ₱35,000.000 for all the lots that would be sold in the subdivision.2 For that
purpose, they executed a Pecial Power of Attorney authorizing Fevidal to enter into
all agreements concerning the parcels of land and to sign those agreements on their
behalf.3
Fevidal did not update complainants about the status of the subdivision project and
failed to accout for the titles to the subdivided land.4 Complainants also found that
he had sold a number of parcels to third parties, but that he did not turn the
proceeds over to them. Neither were complainants invited to the ceremonial
opening of the subdivision project.5
Thus, on 23 August 2005, they revoked the Special Power of Attorney they had
previously executed in his favor.6
Complainants subsequently agreed to settle with Fevidal for the amount of
₱10,000,000, but the latter again failed to pay them.7
Complainants engaged the professional services of respondent for the purpose of
assisting them in the preparation of a settlement agreement.8
Instead of drafting a written settlement, respondent encouraged them to institute
actions against Fevidal in order to recover their properties. Complainants then
signed a contract of legal services,9 in which it was agreed that they would not pay
acceptance and appearance fees to respondent, but that the docket fees would
instead be shared by the parties. Under the contract, complainants would pay
respondent 50% of whatever would be recovered of the properties. In preparation
for the filing of an action against Fevidal, respondent prepared and notarized an
Affidavit of Adverse Claim, seeking to annotate the claim of complainants to at least
195 titles in the possession of Fevidal.10
A certain Luzviminda Andrade (Andrade) was tasked to submit the Affidavit of
Adverse Claim to the Register of Deeds of Bataan.11
The costs for the annotation of the adverse claim were paid by respondent.
Unknown to him, the adverse claim was held in abeyance, because Fevidal got wind
of it and convinced complainants to agree to another settlement.12
Meanwhile, on behalf of complainants, and after sending Fevidal a demand letter
dated 10 July 2006, respondent filed a complaint for annulment, cancellation and
revalidation of titles, and damages against Fevidal before the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Bataan on 13 October 2006.13
Complainants found it hard to wait for the outcome of the action. Thus, they
terminated the services of respondent on 8 June 2007, withdrew their complaint
against Fevidal on 9 June 2007, and finalized their amicable settlement with him on
5 July 2007.14
Respondent filed a Manifestation and Opposition15 dated 20 July 2007 before the
RTC, alleging that the termination of his services and withdrawal of the complaint
had been done with the intent of defrauding counsel. On the same date, he filed a
Motion for Recording of Attorney’s Charging Lien in the Records of the Above-
Captioned Cases.16
When the RTC granted the withdrawal of the complaint,17 he filed a Manifestation
and Motion for Reconsideration.18
After an exchange of pleadings between respondent and Fevidal, with the latter
denying the former’s allegation of collusion,19 complainants sought the
suspension/disbarment of respondent through a Complaint20 filed before the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) on 14 November 2007. Complainants alleged
that they were uneducated and underprivileged, and could not taste the fruits of
their properties because the disposition thereof was "now clothed with legal
problems" brought about by respondent.21
In their complaint, they alleged that respondent had violated Canons 1.01,22
1.03,23 1.04,24 12.02,25 15.05,26 18.04,27 and 20.0428 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. On 14 August 2008, the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline adopted
and approved the Report and Recommendation29 of the investigating
commissioner. It suspended respondent from the practice of law for a period of one
year for entering into a champertous agreement.30
On 26 June 2011, it denied his motion for reconsideration. On 26 November 2012,
this Court noted the Indorsement of the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline, as well
as respondent’s second motion for reconsideration. We find that respondent did
not violate any of the canons cited by complainants. In fact, we have reason to
believe that complainants only filed the instant complaint against him at the
prodding of Fevidal.
Respondent cannot be faulted for advising complainants to file an action against
Fevidal to recover their properties, instead of agreeing to a settlement of
₱10,000,000 – a measly amount compared to that in the original agreement, under
which Fevidal undertook to pay complainants the amount of ₱35,000,000. Lawyers
12
have a sworn duty and responsibility to protect the interest of any prospective the client’s rights in exchange for some bargain to have a part of the thing in
client and pursue the ends of justice.31 dispute.37
Any lawyer worth his salt would advise complainants against the abuses of Fevidal Such contracts are contrary to public policy38 and are thus void or inexistent.39
under the circumstances, and we cannot countenance an administrative complaint
They are also contrary to Canon 16.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility,
against a lawyer only because he performed a duty imposed on him by his oath. The
which states that lawyers shall not lend money to a client, except when in the
claim of complainants that they were not informed of the status of the case is more
interest of justice, they have to advance necessary expenses in a legal matter they
appropriately laid at their door rather than at that of respondent. He was never
are handling for the client. A reading of the contract for legal services40 shows that
informed that they had held in abeyance the filing of the adverse claim. Neither was
respondent agreed to pay for at least half of the expense for the docket fees. He
he informed of the brewing amicable settlement between complainants and
also paid for the whole amount needed for the recording of complainants’ adverse
Fevidal. We also find it very hard to believe that while complainants received
claim. While lawyers may advance the necessary expenses in a legal matter they are
various amounts as loans from respondent from August 2006 to June 2007,32 they
handling in order to safeguard their client’s rights, it is imperative that the advances
could not spare even a few minutes to ask about the status of the case. We shall
be subject to reimbrusement.41 The purpose is to avoid a situation in which a
discuss this more below. As regards the claim that respondent refused to "patch
lawyer acquires a personal stake in the clients cause. Regrettably, nowhere in the
up" with Fevidal despite the pleas of complainants, we note the latter’s Sinumpaang
contract for legal services is it stated that the expenses of litigation advanced by
Salaysay dated 24 September 2007, in which they admitted that they could not
respondents shall be subject to reimbursement by complainants.
convince Fevidal to meet with respondent to agree to a settlement.33
In addition, respondent gave various amounts as cash advances (bali), gasoline and
Finally, complainants apparently refer to the motion of respondent for the
transportation allowance to them for the duration of their attorney-client
recording of his attorney’s charging lien as the "legal problem" preventing them
relationship. In fact, he admits that the cash advances were in the nature of
from enjoying the fruits of their property. Section 26, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court
personal loans that he extended to complainants.42
allows an attorney to intervene in a case to protect his rights concerning the
payment of his compensation. According to the discretion of the court, the attorney Clearly, respondent lost sight of his responsibility as a lawyer in balancing the clients
shall have a lien upon all judgments for the payment of money rendered in a case in interests with the ethical standards of his profession. Considering the surrounding
which his services have been retained by the client. We recently upheld the right of circumstances in this case, an admonition shall suffice to remind him that however
counsel to intervene in proceedings for the recording of their charging lien. In dire the needs of the clients, a lawyer must always avoid any appearance of
Malvar v. KFPI,34 we granted counsel’s motion to intervene in the case after impropriety to preserve the integrity of the profession.
petitioner therein terminated his services without justifiable cause. Furthermore,
WHEREFORE, Attorney Juan B. Bañez, Jr. is hereby ADMONISHED for advancing the
after finding that petitioner and respondent had colluded in order to deprive
litigation expenses in a legal matter her handled for a client without providing for
counsel of his fees, we ordered the parties to jointly and severally pay counsel the
terms of reimbursement and lending money to his client, in violation of Canon
stipulated contingent fees. Thus, the determination of whether respondent is
16.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. He us sternly warned that a
entitled to the charging lien is based on the discretion of the court before which the
repetition of the same or similar act would be dealt with more severly.
lien is presented. The compensation of lawyers for professional services rendered is
subject to the supervision of the court, not only to guarantee that the fees they
charge remain reasonable and commensurate with the services they have actually
TAPAY AND RUSTIA V. BANCOLO
rendered, but to maintain the dignity and integrity of the legal profession as well.35
Facts:
In any case, an attorney is entitled to be paid reasonable compensation for his
services.36 Tapay and Rustia received an Order from the Office of the Ombudsman-Visayas
requiring them to file a counter-affidavit to a complaint for usurpation of authority,
That he had pursued its payment in the appropriate venue does not make him liable
falsification of public document, and graft and corrupt practices filed against them
for disciplinary action.1âwphi1 Notwithstanding the foregoing, respondent is not
by Nehimias Divinagracia, Jr. (Divinagracia), a co-employee in the Sugar Regulatory
without fault. Indeed, we find that the contract for legal services he has executed
Administration. The Complaint was allegedly signed on behalf of Divinagracia by
with complainants is in the nature of a champertous contract – an agreement
one Atty. Charlie L. Bancolo of the Jarder Bancolo Law Office. The Office of the
whereby an attorney undertakes to pay the expenses of the proceedings to enforce
13
Ombudsman dismissed the criminal case for falsification of public document for
insufficiency of evidence.
Tapay and Rustia filed with the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) a complaint to
disbar Atty. Bancolo and Atty. Jarder, Atty. Bancolo’s law partner. The complainants
alleged that they were subjected to a harassment Complaint filed before the Office
of the Ombudsman with the forged signature of Atty. Bancolo. They stated further
that the signature of Atty. Bancolo in the Complaint was not the only one that was
forged. Complainants attached a Report which examined three other letter-
complaints signed by Atty. Bancolo for other clients, allegedly close friends of Atty.
Jarder. Complainants maintained that not only were respondents engaging in
unprofessional and unethical practices, they were also involved in falsification of
documents used to harass and persecute innocent people.
Respondents admitted that the cases filed by Divinagracia against complainants
before the Office of the Ombudsman were accepted by the Jarder Bancolo Law
Office. Atty. Bancolo alleged that after being informed of the assignment of the
cases, he ordered his staff to prepare and draft all the necessary pleadings and
documents. However, due to some minor lapses, Atty. Bancolo permitted that the
pleadings and communications be signed in his name by the secretary of the law
office. The Board of Governors of the IBP issued a resolution suspending Atty.
Bancolo from the practice of law for 2 years.
Issue:
Whether Atty. Bancolo be administratively liable.
Ruling:
Yes. A lawyer shall not, directly or indirectly, assist in the unauthorized practice of
law. A lawyer shall not delegate to any unqualified person the performance of any
task which by law may only be performed by a member of the Bar in good standing.
The lawyer’s duty to prevent, or at the very least not to assist in, the unauthorized
practice of law is founded on public interest and policy. Public policy requires that
the practice of law be limited to those individuals found duly qualified in education
and character. The purpose is to protect the public, the court, the client, and the
bar from the incompetence or dishonesty of those unlicensed to practice law and
not subject to the disciplinary control of the Court.
In the Answer, Atty. Bancolo categorically stated that because of some minor
lapses, the communications and pleadings filed against Tapay and Rustia were
signed by his secretary, albeit with his tolerance. Undoubtedly, Atty. Bancolo
violated the Code of Professional Responsibility by allowing a non-lawyer to affix his
signature to a pleading. This violation Is an act of falsehood which IS a ground for
disciplinary action.
The complainants did not present any evidence that Atty. Jarder was directly
involved, had knowledge of, or even participated in the wrongful practice of Atty.
Bancolo in allowing or tolerating his secretary to sign pleadings for him. Thus, we
agree with the finding of the IBP Board that Atty. Jarder is not administratively
liable.
De Leon vs. Atty. CasteloAC No. 8620 (January 12, 2011)
FACTS:
On April 29, 2010, De Leon initiated an administrative case against Atty. Castelo for
alleged dishonesty and falsification committed in the pleadings he filed in behalf of
the defendants in a civil action in which De Leon intervened. He alleged that various
pleadings were filed for defendants Spouses Lim Hio and Dolores Chu despite said
spouses being already deceased at the time of filing. As such, complainant submits
that respondent violated his Lawyer’s Oath and The Code of Professional
Responsibility.
Castelo, in his comments, explained that the persons who had engaged him
as attorney to represent the Lim family were William and Leonardo Lim, the
children of Spouses Lim Hio and Dolores Chu; that they were already actively
managing the family business, and now co-owned the properties by virtue of the
deed of absolute sale their parents had executed in their favor; and that they had
honestly assumed that their parents had already caused the transfer of the TCTs to
their names. Likewise, a Motion for Substitution of Defendants was filed. Thus,
whether Spouses Lim Hio and Dolores Chu were still living or already deceased as of
the filing of the pleadings became immaterial. Also, he assured that he had no
intention to commit either a falsehood or a falsification, for he in fact submitted the
death certificates of the Spouses in order to apprise the trial court of that fact.
ISSUE:
W/N respondent violated the letter and spirit of the Lawyer’s Oath and the
Code of Professional Responsibility in making the averments in the pleadings of the
defendants
HELD:
No. A plain reading of the pleadings indicates that the respondent did not
misrepresent that Spouses Lim Hio and Dolores Chu were still living. On the
contrary, he directly stated in his answer and clarification that the Spouses were
already deceased. He was acting in the interest of the actual owners of the
14
properties when he filed the answer with counterclaim and cross-claim. As such, his
pleadings were privileged and would not occasion any action against him as an
attorney. Also, since the Spouses were no longer the actual owners of the affected
properties, the fact that they are already deceased is immaterial.
De Leon could not disclaim knowledge that the Spouses were no longer
living. As voluntary intervenor, he was charged with notice of all the other persons
interested in the litigation. He also had an actual awareness of such other persons,
as his own complaint in intervention. Thus, he could not validly insist that the
respondent committed any dishonesty or falsification in relation to him or to any
other party.
Court also emphasized that good faith must always motivate any complaint
against a Member of the Bar. A Bar that is insulated from intimidation and
harassment is encouraged to be courageous and fearless, which can then best
contribute to the efficient delivery and proper administration of justice.
Hence, the complaint for disbarment or suspension filed against Atty.
Eduardo G. Castelo is dismissed for utter lack of merit.
Gregorio Dimarucot y Garcia VS. People of the Philippines GR. 183975
FACTS: Petitioner is accused of Frustrated Murder. the RTC convicted petitioner.
Upon receiving the notice to file appellants brief, petitioner thru his counsel de
parte requested and was granted additional period of twenty (20) days within which to
file said brief.
On August 29, 2007, the CA issued a Resolution dismissing the appeal due to the fact
that the accused-appellant failed to file his appellants brief within the reglementary
period. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, his counsel admitting that he
was at fault in failing to file the appellants brief due to personal problems
emanating from his [counsels] wife’s recent surgical operation. He also cited his
advanced age (he will turn 76 on May 30, 2008) and medical condition
(hypertension with cardiovascular disease and pulmonary emphysema), attaching
copies of his birth certificate, medical certificate and certifications from the
barangay and church minister.
The CA denied the omnibus motion holding that petitioner is bound by the mistakes
and negligence of his counsel.
ISSUE: Whether or not Petitioner’s contention is tenable
RULING: NO.
In relation to Legal Ethics: Petitioner cannot simply harp on the mistakes and
negligence of his lawyer allegedly beset with personal problems and emotional
depression. The negligence and mistakes of counsel are binding on the client.
There are exceptions to this rule, such as:
(1) when the reckless or gross negligence of counsel deprives the client of due
process of law,
(2) when the application of the general rule results in the outright deprivation of
ones property or liberty through a technicality
(3) where the interests of justice so require
In this case, negligence of counsel is not a defense for the failure to file the
appellants brief within the reglementary period. For a claim of counsels gross
negligence to prosper, nothing short of clear abandonment of the clients cause must
be shown. The court found no reason to exempt petitioner from the general
rule. The admitted inability of his counsel to attend fully and ably to the prosecution
of his appeal and other sorts of excuses should have prompted petitioner to be
more vigilant in protecting his rights and replace said counsel with a more
competent lawyer. Instead, petitioner continued to allow his counsel to represent
him on appeal and even up to this Court, apparently in the hope of moving this
Court with a fervent plea for relaxation of the rules for reason of petitioners age and
medical condition. Verily, diligence is required not only from lawyers but also from
their clients.
GILBERT URMA, TEOFILO URMA, DANTE URMA, and JERRY URMA VS. HON.
ORLANDO BELTRAN, G R. No. 180836.
KEYWORD: MISTAKE / NEGLIGENCE OF COUNSEL
FACTS:
The petitioners and respondents are blood relatives being the nearest of
kin of the deceased spouses Laureano and Rosa Urma. They are the children of
Laureanos brother who predeceased him. The petitioners claim ownership of the
lot they are occupying by virtue of a deed of sale allegedly executed by Laureano on
April 10, 1985 in favor of petitioner Teofilo Urma, and in agreement with
respondent Marcela Urma-Caingat. On the other hand, six (6) of the respondents
15
claim ownership over portions of the subject property by virtue of a deed of as a new counsel could be employed to allege and show that the prior counsel had
donation executed in their favor by Rosa in February 1996. not been sufficiently diligent, experienced, or learned.
During the pre-trial, both parties agreed the only issue of fact to be
revolved was the genuineness of the deed of absolute sale dated April 10, 1985
allegedly executed by Laureano in favor of Teofilo Urma; that said document be
examined by the NBI; that both parties would accept the result of the dactyloscopic
examination to be conducted; and that said result would be the basis of the
judgment to be rendered. It was further stipulated that if the NBI report would
state that Laureano indeed executed the deed of sale, the judgment would be in
favor of the petitioners. Otherwise, the decision should favor the respondents.
Upon orders of the trial court, the NBI performed the examination and
found that the questioned fingerprint was not identical with the genuine specimen
thumbmark. Hence, the RTC ruled in favor of the respondents by declaring them
the absolute owners of portions of the disputed land and ordering the petitioners to
vacate said portions
In the belief that their counsel committed gross negligence in handling
their case, the defendants filed a Motion For New Trial. They argued that their
counsel should not have joined the motion for a judgment on the pleadings because
their answer contained specific denials and defenses which tendered an issue. They
likewise claimed that they were uneducated and not too familiar with the niceties
of the law and legal procedures. Hence, they should not be bound by the mistakes
and omissions of their counsel.

ISSUE: WON the counsel is guilty of mistake/negligence.

HELD: No. With regard to the petitioners argument that they should be excused
from the procedural blunder committed by their former counsel, the Court finds it
bereft of merit. The petitioners were not denied due process and their rights were
not violated when their counsel, Atty. Raul Morales, agreed that the only issue that
needed to be resolved was the authenticity of the deed of sale in favor of petitioner
Teofilo Urma.
There was nothing amiss in entering into such stipulations. The petitioners only
cried foul when the examination result turned out to be unfavorable to them.
Granting that their counsel made a mistake in entering into such stipulations, such
procedural error unfortunately bound them. The Court has consistently held that
the mistake or negligence of a counsel in the area of procedural technique binds the
client unless such mistake or negligence of counsel is so gross or palpable that
would require the courts to step in and accord relief to the client who suffered
thereby. Without this doctrinal rule, there would never be an end to a suit so long

16