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Open Resource-Based View (ORBV): A Theory of Resource Openness

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 Open Resource-Based View (ORBV)

Open Resource-Based View (ORBV):

A Theory of Resource Openness
Completed Research Paper

Detlef Schoder Daniel Schlagwein

University of Cologne University of Sydney
Cologne Institute for 4072 Abercrombie Building (H70)
Information Systems (CIIS) USYD NSW 2006,
Pohligstrasse 1, 50969 Cologne, Australia
Germany schlagwein@sydney.edu.au
schoder@wim.uni-koeln.de

Kai Fischbach
University of Bamberg
An der Weberei 5, 96047 Bamberg,
Germany
kai.fischbach@uni-bamberg.de

Abstract
Openness is often deeply embedded in information technology (IT); it can be both a driver
for and a result of new forms of dealing with information resources and can make major
differences for businesses. Resource-level theories explain competitive advantages and
differences in the performance of firms through their exclusive possession and use of
valuable, rare, inimitable, and non-substitutable (VRIN) resources. Increasingly, though,
we find an interesting “openness” phenomenon in business practice: firms such as IBM,
Google, Tesla, Facebook, and Apple have opened once proprietary VRIN information
resources (e.g., digital content, code, and APIs) to public use via the Internet. Such open
strategies challenge traditional resource-level theories that suggest protecting such
resources rather than giving them away for free. We provide a theoretical explanation
based on combining insights in the literatures on openness, value creation, and resource-
level theories. We develop (1) the concept of “resources openness” in its two dimensions,
access and control, and (2) a theoretical model to explain the impacts of these two
openness dimensions on firms’ value creation and value appropriation. The paper
increases our understanding of the nature and implications of openness.

Keywords: Openness, Open-Resource-based View (ORBV), information resources, value

creation, value appropriation, theory development

Introduction: The Openness Phenomenon

The concept of “openness” is central to work on open innovation (West and Bogers 2017), open-source
software development (Aksulu and Wade 2010), and other “open” domains (Schlagwein et al. 2017). The
most common understanding of openness refers to a paradigm of firms (or other organizations) innovating
systematically using firm-external ideas, also known as “open innovation” (Chesbrough 2003). The options
for such open approaches have emerged through the rapidly decreased costs of information and knowledge
exchange in the digital economy (Benkler 2006). Understanding the relationship between openness and IT
is decisive for gaining competitive advantage, business model innovation, and firm performance, and

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 Open Resource-Based View (ORBV)

therefore is or should be of specific concern to scholars of information systems (IS). Openness can be both
a driver of and a result of innovative forms of information resources management. IT is central to open
phenomena; for example, open source development and crowd-sourcing (sourcing ideas or work from
Internet crowds) are not merely ‘‘supported by’’ but are ‘‘shaped by’’ IT (Majchrzak and Malhotra, 2013).
Consequently, especially over the past decade, increasing interest in openness has become evident among
IS scholars. Evidence can be found in conference tracks (e.g., the track on “Openness and IT’’ at the
European Conference on Information Systems [ECIS], 2013–19, conferences (e.g., the International
Federation for Information Processing [IFIP] Working Group 2.13 Open Source Software conference
series); special issues of journals (e.g., Crowston and Wade, 2010; Whelan et al., 2014); and the formation
of the Association for Information Systems (AIS) Special Interest Group on Open Research and Practice
(SIGOPEN).
The new possibilities for managing innovation and approaching value creation present challenges to pre-
Internet firm-level theories (Bailey et al. 2019). Scholars of openness have thus called for further work on
the theoretical foundations of openness (Chesbrough and Appleyard 2007; Schlagwein et al. 2017; West et
al. 2006; Nielsen and Sahay 2019). Nielsen and Sahay (2019), for example, call for the critical study of the
phenomenon of openness and its impact on people, organizations, and societies. They state that openness
has positive and negative implications and, potentially, can give rise to many paradoxes. For example,
generating innovation may require openness for collaboration among actors, while the commercialization
(aka value appropriation) of an innovation may raise the contrasting need to enhance protection by limiting
openness. To build a more normative frame to analyze openness and its implications, Nielsen and Sahay
(2019) propose seeking a better understanding of the relationship between “access goods” and Global Public
Goods. In this paper, we relate these forms of information resources and their implications on value
creation and value appropriation.
This paper contributes an “Open Resource-based View” (ORBV) as a theoretical lens aimed at explaining
the openness phenomenon and related strategic moves by firms in opening up resource bases to third
parties—that is, “resource openness” by firms. Such a view of resource openness reconciles business reality
in the “openness” space and resource-based view (RBV) foundations (Alexy et al. 2018). Specifically, we
contribute a typology of openness (Figure 1) that is a novel theoretical conceptualization of openness.
Through our proposed theoretical model (Figure 2), we connect the impact of openness of information
resources tightly to value creation and value appropriation. The propositions in our theoretical model
provide a link between openness, value creation, and value appropriation that has been missing in the value
creation literature. From a pure RBV perspective, strategically opening valuable, rare, inimitable, and non-
substitutable (VRIN) resources cannot be explained properly; however, with our ORBV we can better
explain that for increased value creation and value appropriation in certain situation, it is rational to open
even VRIN resources. Information resources (e.g., digital content, code, and APIs) are a particular type of
resource. As such, they fall under the scope of resource-level theories of the firm. These theories base their
explanations of how a firm generates value and outperforms other firms on the firm’s possession and use
of resources, using these as their units of analysis. The traditional RBV considers that resources that are
particularly VRIN are central for value creation and competitive advantage (Barney 1986b; Barney 1991;
Wernerfelt 1984). The RBV argues that VRIN resources must be protected—that is, closed to externals—to
ensure competitive advantage (Barney 1991; Teece et al. 1997). In other words, a central claim of the RBV
is that protecting VRIN resources from use by external parties improves firm performance (Crook et al.
2008; Kettinger et al. 1994; Wernerfelt 1984). Similar claims are made in other resource-level theories.
However, the innovation behavior of several information firms (e.g., IBM, Google, Tesla, Facebook, and
Apple) challenges the theoretical rationale of “protecting” VRIN resources. These firms have embarked
successfully on what some have called “open strategies” (Chesbrough 2007). IBM in 2001, for example,
gave away millions of dollars’ worth of VRIN resources (i.e., previously proprietary source code and patents)
to the open source software community for free. IBM decided to release its proprietary source code under
a GNU open source license with the stated purpose to contribute to the development of Linux (IBM 2010;
IBM 2011). Code under a GNU license can be used and modified freely by anyone (Free Software Foundation
2007), including IBM’s competitors. By giving up control of a VRIN resource, it would seem that the firm
was waiving its “appropriability” (exclusive ability to appropriate value) of that particular resource (Kogut
2000; Kogut and Zander 1992; Teece 1986) and thus making value appropriation from the resource
impossible (Amit and Schoemaker 1993; Spender 1994; Teece et al. 1997). Nevertheless, IBM has benefited
substantially from its open strategy (Chesbrough 2007; Samuelson 2006). Google employed a similar open

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 Open Resource-Based View (ORBV)

strategy by making the Android operating system open source in 2007 (Google 2019). More recently, Tesla
“freed” certain portions of its patent family to interested parties, intentionally not asking for license fees. In
2007, Facebook opened another type of VRIN resource, its previously proprietary application programming
interfaces (APIs) and programming languages, to third-party developers (Facebook 2019).
Though their usefulness is apparent, these open strategies are not in line with conventional business
strategy (e.g., other firms that compete with Apple and Google, such as Nokia and Blackberry, did not open
their mobile operating system APIs in comparable situations).
For scholars, the success of such open strategies raises interesting theoretical questions. The strategic
openness moves described above seem to contradict a central tenet of the RBV, which discourages making
VRIN resources available to the general public. The RBV and other resource-level theories do not provide a
good explanation for the two forms of the openness phenomenon evident in the examples above: in one,
firms deliberately giving up control of their VRIN resources (IBM, Google); in the other, firms deliberately
opening up access to their VRIN resources (Facebook, Apple). Few if any works, however, have attempted
to link this type of openness to theories of the firm (Chesbrough and Appleyard 2007). While it has been
suggested that a theory of openness could be based on Grover and Kohli (2012) or reconsolidated with
resource-level theories (Alexy et al. 2018), a fully articulated “theory of resource openness” is lacking.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. In the next section, we develop the concept of “resource
openness” with its two dimensions, access and control. We then introduce a distinction between value
creation and value appropriation of firms and connect them to “resource openness.” We propose a
theoretical model regarding the impact of resource openness on value creation and value appropriation of
firms. Returning to the above examples, we show how these open strategies can now be better understood.
In the last sections, we discuss the implications for the state of knowledge and future research, before
offering our conclusion.

Resource Openness: Access to and Control of Resources

The literature is inconsistent with respect to what is referred to as “openness” (Dahlander and Gann 2010;
Schlagwein et al. 2017). In their review of the literature on open innovation, Dahlander and Gann (2010)
show that the underlying understanding of openness is typically derived from Chesbrough’s
conceptualization of “open innovation [as] a paradigm that assumes that firms can and should use external
ideas as well as internal ideas, and internal and external paths to market, as firms look to advance their
technology” (Chesbrough 2003, p. XXIV). This conceptualization of openness had significant impact and
was instrumental in creating the research stream on “open innovation.” As a foundation for a definition of
“openness” at the resource level, however, this conceptualization is somewhat vague. First, the definition
does not specify what is “open” (i.e., the entity to which openness is attributed) (Schlagwein et al. 2017).
Second, the definition does not specify how the entity is “open” (i.e., the criteria for deciding whether the
entity is open or the degree to which it is open). For our argument, we need to develop a more concrete
definition and conceptualization of openness that allows us to answer the “what” and “how” questions. In
regard to the “what” question (what is the open entity?), we use resources as the entity type for that to which
the attribute “open” refers (“openness” can also have very different referents, such as processes and
domains) (Schlagwein et al. 2017).

Information Resources
Resources can be categorized into static resources (the narrow sense) and dynamic capabilities (the wider
sense). Static resources include physical assets, knowledge assets such as patents, and so on; dynamic
capabilities include organizational capabilities such as changing the business model rapidly or learning
from the external environment (Teece 2007; Wade and Hulland 2004). Here, we use “resources” to refer to
static assets and “capabilities” to refer to dynamic capacities (Makadok 2001). We are interested in the
openness of resources, not the openness of capabilities.
Knowledge resources are one important type of resources. We need to examine this resource type more
closely, because it is this resource type to which the argument primarily applies. Explicit knowledge
resources are codified knowledge; we refer to them with the more common term “information resources”
(Levitan 1982; Nonaka and von Krogh 2009; Sabherwal and King 1991). Information resources have unique

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 Open Resource-Based View (ORBV)

attributes. In particular, they have close-to-zero copy costs (an information resource can be copied at
marginal costs) and non-rivalry in consumption (an information resource can be used by one party without
reducing its availability to another party) (Shapiro and Varian 1999). These characteristics also provide the
rationale for focusing on knowledge resources in this paper: openness (free, public access) is possible to
arrange for most knowledge and information resources (e.g., source code) because of non-rivalry in the use
of such resources. Openness is impossible to arrange for most physical resources (e.g., physical machines)
because of rivalry in the use of such resources. In contrast, tacit knowledge resources include know-how,
skills, and “sticky information” (von Hippel 1994) that are embedded in people or processes (Nonaka 1994;
Nonaka and von Krogh 2009). Information resources can be traded and are mobile, whereas tacit
knowledge is non-tradable and non-mobile (Jacobides et al. 2006, Polanyi 1966).
Control of and access to information resources can be reconfigured and are crucial dimensions for
conceptualizing resource openness (Boudreau 2010). Public goods, which typically share both attributes
non-rivalry and non-excludability (Samuelson 1954), are hardly changeable into other forms and conditions
(aka as private goods, club goods etc.). In contrast to the conceptualization by Ostrom and Ostrom (1977),
who considered the exclusion and subtractability of goods to be “external variables” (i.e., exogenous factors
not to be shaped for instance by firms), these characteristics in the case of information resources can often
be fabricated and are technologically contingent (see Vassilakopoulou et al. 2018 for an example of data
openness in communal settings). In particular, in a lot of instances in the realm of information resources,
the transformation of attributes of goods can be achieved more easily and dynamically through IT, with
different actors intentionally influencing the attributes of goods. For example, IT-enabled geo-blocking of
services, individual profile-based service provision in e-commerce, various forms of technical gatekeeping
in social media, and so on, may change the conditions of access to and control of these resources and, as
such, transform theses goods from public goods to club goods or even private goods (and vice versa).
Accordingly, companies are in a better-than-ever position to change the attributes and condition of
information resources through IT and “move” between the regimes, that is, the types of information
resources (see our propositions below and our IBM example in “Brief Illustration”). So, what are supposed
to be private goods may temporarily share conditions of club goods or even public goods, and thus share all
implications of its characteristics (see, e.g., the wealth of literature on public choice, which scrutinizes the
ramifications of public goods for public service provision).

Control of Information Resources

The knowledge resources (i.e., explicit information resources and tacit know-how) potentially relevant for
a firm’s value creation processes can be located in various “spheres.” Open innovation is based on the
recognition that many such resources are located outside of the focal firm (Chesbrough 2003; West and
Bogers 2013). The location of relevant knowledge resources can be thought of as a “knowledge landscape”
(see also Afuah and Tucci 2012).
We consider knowledge resources to be located in three basic spheres. The control dimension of resource
openness corresponds to which party has de jure (e.g., property rights) or de facto control over a knowledge
resource and can hence set the terms of access to that resource. This is the first dimension of our typology
of resource openness (see Figure 1). Control can be classified as three types.
There is internal control (column C1 in Figure 1): the focal firm owns and controls its information
resources and know-how or has similar proprietary authority over the resource, which (in line with the
resource-based view) can be used by the firm for value creation. Internal control does not necessarily imply
exclusive internal access and use. Access may be granted to third parties (including the public), but the
controlling firm reserves the right to withdraw or modify the access to the resource or modify the resource
itself. For example, firms such as Facebook or Apple provide access to their APIs for external developers
but are able to close access or modify the terms of access to the APIs (or modify the APIs) at will.
Group control (column C2 in Figure 1) of a resource is applied jointly by a group of firms (e.g., a group of
partners or a consortium). In the group control sphere, the focal firm may form relationships and
partnerships with other firms through contractual arrangements. The focal firm can define the modes of
access to the information resource (or the resource itself) only in agreement with other parties. Android’s
Open Handset Alliance (central to the Google example), an open source consortium, is an example of a
formal group control arrangement (Goldman and Gabriel 2005; Osterloh and Rota 2007). The focal firm
can potentially use information resources and know-how in the group control sphere for value creation or

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 Open Resource-Based View (ORBV)

create group-level resources (in line with the relational view). An advantage of joining groups and using
resources under group control for value creation is that such resources might otherwise be unavailable to
the focal firm. A disadvantage is that partners may block necessary changes to the resource or use the shared
resources in ways that are not beneficial to the focal firm. Nielsen and Aanestad (2006) describe an example
of successfully balancing control against autonomy; they conceptualize and coin the term “control
devolution” as a deliberate design theory for business sector information infrastructure.
Finally, there is external control (column C3 in Figure 1), in which potentially relevant information
resources and know-how are located externally at unaffiliated firms or with other individuals. External
actors (from the perspective of the focal firm) define the access terms of the resource and can modify the
resource. The focal firm has no control of the resource it needs for its own value creation. External resources
may be unavailable for the value creation of firms (unless they are public goods), but could be voluntarily
contributed to the value creation of the firm if technically possible. In other words, despite their usefulness
(the premise of “open” approaches and the open innovation literature), the firm cannot use these resources
for value creation because they may be inaccessible or unknown to it (Afuah and Tucci 2012). The contents
and apps developed by external parties for Facebook or Apple’s iOS are examples of external control; they
are based on external resources and know-how but contribute to the value and functionality of these
systems.

Access to Information Resources

The control dimension, as discussed above, is concerned with which party or parties have de jure control
over a resource and can specify the terms of access to that resource. The access dimension is concerned with
which party or parties have de facto access and can use a resource for value creation.
Access and control are related dimensions of openness, but they are not identical (Boudreau 2010). To
appreciate the difference, let us reconsider the introductory examples.
IBM waived its legal control rights regarding all source code it contributed towards Linux development by
making that resource open source. That is, IBM gave up internal control of access to the code resources.
Instead, the GNU licensing regime, a consortium, now controls the use of the code resources. The GNU
license irrevocably makes the source code and its derivatives available to and usable by anyone (Free
Software Foundation 2007; Goldman and Gabriel 2005). Third parties can use the open source code and,
for example, fork off a development stream for their own use without IBM’s agreement as the original
creator of the code. In short, IBM used openness in terms of access and control. The Google case is very
similar.
Facebook opened its APIs and other resources (development tools, programming languages) required to
create applications. However, the API resource remains under Facebook’s legal control. As the property
rights owner, Facebook can change the terms of access to the APIs at any time. The API resource moved
from exclusive access (by Facebook) to open access (by the public), as did IBM’s code resource. However,
unlike IBM’s code, Facebook’s APIs remain under internal control. In short, Facebook used openness in
terms of access but not in terms of control. The Apple case is very similar.
We define the access dimension of resource openness as concerned with which party actually uses a
resource for value creation. It is the second dimension of our typology of resource openness (see Figure 1
below). There are three types of access.
Exclusive access (row A1 in Figure 1) to an information resource means that only the focal firm can use
that resource. This can be achieved through technical mechanisms (e.g., closed information systems) or
legal protection (e.g., intellectual property rights) (Cornish and Llewellyn 2010; Maskus 2000; Pisano
2006). The unavailability of such resources to competitors may directly provide competitive advantage for
the firm (Barney 1991). Externals, however, are prevented from combining such resources with their
complementary knowledge resources (explicit information resources or tacit know-how) that could create
additional use value for consumers.
Partner access (row A2 in Figure 1) to an information resource means that access is available to those in
a group of formal partners. Firms build mutual relations and form common resource pools to support their
value-creating processes (Inkpen 2000; Khanna et al. 1998; Kogut and Zander 1992). The rents resulting
from such partner access to resources may need to be shared, but the share may be larger than what each

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 Open Resource-Based View (ORBV)

partner could achieve alone (Dyer and Singh 1998). Additional resource combinations are enabled through
partner access that may increase the use value of products for consumers (Almirall and Casadesus-Masanell
2010).
Open access (row A3 in Figure 1) to information resources indicates that resources are available to the
public at no or marginal costs and without extensive individual legal arrangements (Lessig 2002; Lessig
2004; Pénin 2007). Open access may help distribute a resource to a wide range of actors (Foray 2004;
Nooteboom 2000). Open access describes an indiscriminate public access regime in which no or only
marginal prior legal and financial arrangements are required to use an information resource. Open access
allows for a wide range of value creation options and knowledge combinations (Afuah and Tucci 2012;
Jeppesen and Lakhani 2010). The option of providing open access to information resources has become a
strategic option only with the low transaction costs for information exchange and the ubiquity of the
Internet (Benkler 2002; Benkler 2006).

On the Relationship of the Access and Control Dimensions

The two dimensions introduced, access and control, are not necessarily orthogonal. In other words, they
are not necessarily independent from each other—and need not be. Obviously, some “mechanics” are
apparent, while some are subtler. For example, it is usually necessary to have control over a resource in
order to grant access to third parties. Here, “access” becomes a precondition for various and defined forms
of “control” (Figure 1: Cases 1, 4, and 7). Other relations are less obvious. In another example, a company
may have access to (external) resources, but may not necessarily be in a position to exercise a significant
amount of control (Figure 1: Case 8 “public goods” or Case 9). Someone having access to a resource does
not necessarily mean he or she can exercise any control.

Typology of Resource Openness

Combining these two dimensions—access and control—allows us to develop a typology of resource
openness/closedness. Figure 1 shows the resulting typology of resource types formed by the combinations
of the two dimensions; Table 1 provides further descriptions and examples of the different resource types.

Figure 1: Typology of Resource Openness

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 Open Resource-Based View (ORBV)

Resource Description Example

Type (cell
in Figure 1)
Closed Resources are controlled and accessed internally by the focal firm. Apple’s touchscreen patent (US
resources of The RBV focuses on this type of resource and their key role in value patent Jobs et al. 7.479,949)
the firm (1) creation and competitive advantage.
Exclusively Resources are under group control but are used exclusively by a LEGO’s Mindstorms patents
used group single firm. Resources of this type are part of formal cooperation resulting from research
resources (2) between firms, with the exclusive use being either established de cooperation with MIT (patents
facto or formally arranged through legal agreements. can be used commercially only by
LEGO, not MIT).
Closed Resources are controlled and accessed exclusively by an external Microsoft’s Windows operating
resources of party (or parties). In an RBV analysis, the value creation of system source code, from the
externals (3) competitive advantage based on resources of type 1 (focal firm) perspective of IBM.
would be compared against value creation and competitive
advantage based on resources of type 3 (competitors).
Shared Resources are under the control of the firm but are made accessible JVC’s VHS video recording
resources of to partners as part of formal collaborative arrangements. standard (shared with partnering
the firm (4) firms such as Mitsubishi,
Panasonic, and Sharp).
Shared Resources accessed and controlled jointly by partners. In The Open Handset Alliance’s
group economics, such resources have often referred to as “club goods.” (OHA) Android operating system
resources (5) In the relation view, such resources are called “relational resources” source code (jointly developed by
(Dyer and Singh 1998). Such resources enable value co-creation and with additional use rights for
between firms. members of the OHA consortium).
Shared Resources are under the control of an external party (or parties), JVC’S VHS video standard, from
resources of but are made accessible to the focal firm as part of formal the perspective of its partner
externals (6) collaborative arrangements. Resources of type 6 are the reverse Mitsubishi.
case of resources of type 4.
Open The focal firm controls resources, but access for use is granted to Apple’s iPhone APIs; Google’s
resources of the public. Google Maps data.
the firm (7)
Open group Open group resources are not under the control of any particular Any code under GPL-based open
resources (8) firm, but instead are available to anyone for use under equal source license, including Apache,
restrictions. Control may rest with a commercial group/consortium Linux (including the code
or a non-commercial community/consortium. In the latter case, the contributed by IBM), and MySQL
resources could be considered “common resources” (Benkler 2006) source code.
or “public goods.”
Open An external party (or parties) control resources, but access for use Apple’s iPhone APIs and Google’s
resources of is granted to the public (including the focal firm). Resources of type Google Maps data, both from the
externals (9) 6 are the reverse case of resources of type 4. perspective of third-party
developers.

Table 1: Description of Resource Openness

To appreciate the role of resource openness, we must introduce—in addition to the concepts of resource-
based theory and our typology of resource openness—a distinction between value creation and value
appropriation.

Value Creation and Value Appropriation

An apparent key consequence of resource openness is that other external actors are participating in and
contributing to the creation and distribution of value within the larger innovation network around the focal
firm (i.e., the firm opening up its resources, such as IBM or Google, Facebook, Tesla, and Apple). To
understand the impact of resource openness, it is crucial to consider the difference between the processes
of value creation and value appropriation, which are often conflated in the literature (including resource-

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 Open Resource-Based View (ORBV)

level papers) (Bloodgood 2013; Lepak et al. 2007). Openness can be considered to have very different effects
on value creation and on value appropriation (Bloodgood 2013; Chesbrough 2007).
Value creation is the creation of (additional) value for customers/consumers with products/services
through the activities/processes of the focal firm or based on the firm’s resources (our definition, based on
Lepak et al. 2007). The value of a product (or service) for consumers (or customers) can be described as its
“social value” (Allen 1983) or “use value” (Bowman and Ambrosini 2000); the latter may include intangible
and non-monetary elements (Kohli and Grover 2008; Lepak et al. 2007; Sarkar et al. 2009). For example,
the opening of Apple’s resources (APIs and SDKs [software development kits]) to create apps for iOS,
leading to a much greater number of available apps, increases the use value of iPhones for consumers.
Value appropriation concerns the “producer surplus,” that is, the part of value creation captured by the
focal firm (our definition, based on Lepak et al. 2007; Mizik and Jacobson 2003; Peteraf and Barney 2003).
The prices a firm obtains for its products are the exchange value of those products (Bowman and Ambrosini
2000), which typically does not capture all the value created (Lepak et al. 2007). The use value of a product
is typically greater than the exchange value of that product (Allen 1983). Despite some economic theories
claiming claim use value and exchange value are identical, that is often not the case in practice (Lepak et al.
2007). For example, Apple might not be able to capture the full use value of a smartphone for consumers
(because perfect price discrimination is not possible, competitive pressures force prices down, etc.).
Having developed a classification of resource openness in terms of the dimensions “control” and “access”
and introduced a distinction between value creation and value appropriation, we can now theorize the
impact of resource openness on value creation and value appropriation of firms.

Impact of Resource Openness on Value Creation and

Value Appropriation
Let us first consider the impact of resource openness on value creation. After that, we turn to the impact of
resource openness on value appropriation and appropriability.

Resource Openness and Value Creation

Previous research on open innovation and open value creation (i.e., value creation involving open
resources) shows that openness typically makes a positive contribution to a firm’s value creation. Openness
may help the firm identify solutions that would typically be unavailable because the firm’s knowledge base
is too far removed from the relevant knowledge resources even to see the opportunity (Afuah and Tucci
2012; Jeppesen and Lakhani 2010). While monetary incentives are needed in some cases, in other cases
users of a firm’s products may be willing to contribute their knowledge resources for free simply because
they would like to use improved products (Harhoff et al. 2003; von Hippel and von Krogh 2006).
The potential of open value creation has been recognized and used by a range of organizations (Chesbrough
2003; Tapscott and Williams 2006). Its effectiveness is based on the substantially lower costs for
information exchange over digital systems such as the Internet. Generally, knowledge exchanges are
associated with related transaction costs (e.g., search costs) (Coase 1937; Williamson 1979; Williamson
1981). Compared to all earlier macroeconomic situations, open access to information resources is now
possible and effective because of the substantially lowered transaction costs for such resources (Benkler
2002; Benkler 2006). Internet-based open value creation offers an effective alternative mode for value
creation in addition to ideal-type hierarchies or markets (Boudreau 2010; Boudreau and Lakhani 2009).
In a resource-theoretical approach, value creation is conceptualized as the valuable combination of
complementary resources (Ansoff 1965; Barney 1986b; Spender 1994; Teece 1986). Both types of
knowledge resources (explicit information resources and tacit know-how) are necessary for these resource
combinations (Alavi and Leidner 2001; Nonaka and von Krogh 2009). Hence, a wider range of available
information resources and know-how is useful for allowing new resource combinations and, hence, to
enable value creation—the argument central to organizational knowledge creation theory (Alavi and
Leidner 2001; Nonaka 1994; Nonaka and Takeuchi 1995).
What information resources and know-how are available for resource combination and hence for a firm’s
value creation? We distinguish three value creation regimes.

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 Open Resource-Based View (ORBV)

Closed value creation considers the combination of the focal firm’s resources (information resources,
know-how, and other resources) exclusively accessed internally for value creation. Closed value creation is
explained by the RBV (Barney 1991; Wernerfelt 1984), according to which relatively better internally
controlled (VRIN) resources of the focal firm—compared to the resources available to external
competitors—lead to more greater-than-normal (more effective) value creation, and thus to a relative
competitive advantage, and then ultimately to better performance of the focal firm. The RBV considers
resources that are accessed exclusively for greater-than-normal value creation.
Relational value creation considers, in addition, the value creation resulting from combining partner
resources with internal resources. These resource combinations require relational, partnership-based
access to the information resources that are part of such combinations. Relational value creation is
explained by the relational view (Duschek 2004; Dyer and Singh 1998), according to which additional rents
are created by sharing resources among partners (i.e., providing access to such resources and, in some cases,
creating new, relational resources). The relational view considers resources that are accessed through
formally defined partnerships and resources accessed exclusively as both contributing to greater-than-
normal value creation.
Open value creation also considers the value creation resulting from combinations that involve open
external resources and internal resources. Here, openly accessed resources, like resources accessed through
partnerships and exclusively accessed resources, are considered to contribute to greater-than-normal value
creation. The value of open information resources lies in the fact that they allow resource combinations of
the closed resources of the firm with open resources of externals as well as resource combinations of open
resources of the firm with some of the closed resource of externals (resource type 3). Hence, all resource
types shown in Figure 1 are considered to be potentially available and critical for greater-than-normal value
creation.
The key to understanding the significance of open value creation is to consider the increased possibility of
finding combinations of information resources and complementary know-how effectively in an open access
regime. That is, open access allows for more (and potentially better) combinations of information resources
and know-how. New knowledge (including product or process innovations) can be created by combining
the firm’s information resources (explicit) or know-how (tacit) with that of externals. For example,
Facebook allows its APIs to be combined with external information resources (e.g., Google Maps data used
in many Facebook apps) and external know-how (e.g., the innovative idea of the Facebook FarmVille game).
This corresponds to the “outside-in process” of open innovation (Dahlander 2004). Facebook’s provision
of open access to API information resources has created greater-than-normal value creation for Facebook
(compared with MySpace and Facebook’s own prior strategy) (Lakhani et al. 2013). Apple essentially
presents the same case as Facebook.
IBM allows its once proprietary source code and the know-how of developers to be combined with the open
source code (e.g., code of the Linux operating system). This corresponds to the “inside-out process” of open
innovation (Dahlander 2004). IBM’s use of the Linux open source code resource has created greater-than-
normal value creation for IBM (compared with Microsoft and IBM’s own prior strategy) (Samuelson 2006).
Google essentially presents the same case as IBM.
Opening resources and using open resources will allow additional, valuable resource combinations to be
found. Using open value creation, firms such those as in our examples can combine their internally
controlled resources with externally controlled resources and hence increase their value creation
capabilities. Openness allows firms to use resources from the internal, group, and external control spheres
for their value-creation processes, potentially increasing the use value of their products for users.
The open value creation strategies of IBM, Google, Facebook, and Apple are difficult to explain with theories
such as the RBV. These considerations lead us within our ORBV framework to formulate a first proposition
regarding the relationship between the access dimension of resource openness and the potential for value
creation:
Proposition 1: Increasing access to a firm’s information resource has a positive impact on value
creation based on that resource (value created through resource combinations that include the
resource).

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 Open Resource-Based View (ORBV)

As our earlier examples show, opening access to an information resource does not necessarily require giving
up control. Facebook and Apple retained control of their APIs; IBM and Google (largely) gave up control of
their source code. Should a firm also give up control when providing open access to information resources?
For relational value creation, it has been established that the incentives of partners to collaborate and co-
create with the focal firm depends on the degree of control the firm has on the relational resources (Dyer
and Singh 1998). The same applies to open value creation. For example, open source developers prefer to
work on open software projects that operate under an open source licensing regime that is not under the
control of a single firm (Goldman and Gabriel 2005; Osterloh and Rota 2007; von Hippel and von Krogh
2006; von Krogh and von Hippel 2006). One can expect that these findings from open source research are
also valid for other forms of open value creation (Dahlander and Gann 2010; von Hippel and von Krogh
2006). The more control a firm has/maintains on a resource, the less likely others are to use that resource
for creating value (e.g., to avoid supporting a commercial business model or to enter into a power
relationship), even if the resource is accessible to them. For example, open source developers may be more
inclined to help develop Linux further than to help IBM develop one of its proprietary operating systems.
This consideration allows us to formulate a second proposition regarding the relationship between the
control dimension of resource openness and the potential for value creation:
Proposition 2: Increasing control of a firm’s information resource has a negative impact on the
value creation based on that resource.
Having developed propositions regarding the relationship between the access and control dimensions of
openness on firms’ value creation, we now discuss the relationship between these two dimensions and the
value appropriation of firms.

Resource Openness and Value Appropriation/Appropriability

Here, we discuss the relationship between resource openness and value appropriation and value
appropriability of firms. Research on openness has been criticized for emphasizing its positive effects on
value creation while neglecting the supposedly negative effects on value appropriation. One core argument
of such criticism (in line with the RBV) is that openness disregards appropriability of the value created with
open resources (Bloodgood 2013).
To understand the relationship better, we first need to consider the difference between value appropriation
and value appropriability. Value appropriation concerns the absolute amount appropriated from a product
(i.e., the price of the product), whereas value appropriability refers to the relative share of the value of a
product that the firm can capture (i.e., the relative share of value appropriated from the total value created)
(Teece 1986). Firms may indeed lose some value appropriability through openness, and yet the total effect
of increased value creation and decreased value appropriability for the firm may still be positive (i.e.,
increased absolute value appropriation).
Second, we need to consider resource dependencies. Resource relations are not all equal. In some cases, the
value (value creation potential) of resources remains independent from the availability of other resources;
in other cases, the value of a resource depends on the availability of a complementary resource. Resource-
based theory—especially the relational view—offers concepts with which to discuss resource dependencies.
Complementarity between resources means they augment the use of one another, but neither resource
will lose all its value without the other resource (Harrison et al. 2001). This is the reason resources are
combined (Teece 1986). For example, a Facebook iPhone app makes both the Facebook platform and the
iOS platform more valuable. This augmentation leads, for example, to the relational rents of the relational
view, as firms’ relationships bring their complementary resources together, generating more value than
having the resources in isolation (Dyer and Singh 1998).
Specificity of a complementary resource describes the feature of being unidirectionally specialized with
respect to (depending on) another resource (Lippman and Rumelt 2003b). A unidirectionally specialized
(dependent) resource will lose its value if access to the (independent) resource to which it is specific is
withdrawn (Lippman and Rumelt 2003b; Vicente-Lorente 2001). Further, cospecificity between
complementary resources describes the feature of being bidirectionally specialized (mutually dependent)
(Lippman and Rumelt 2003b; Teece 1986). That is, both resources may lose their value if the relationship

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 Open Resource-Based View (ORBV)

between the two resources ends. Resources that are (co-)specialized are complementary, but
complementary resources are not necessarily (co-)specialized.
These different relationship types lead to unequal power relationships between resources and hence the
owning (controlling) by firms of those resources. Open access to internal information of the firm allows
external firms to use those resources for value creation (as above). The degree to which this value creation
can be appropriated by the focal firm depends on whether the external resources that are combined (and
by implication the resulting external-internal resource combinations) are only complementary or are (co-)
specific to the resources the firm controls. The level of dependency will determine the negotiation power of
the focal firm, and hence the level of value appropriability. While the firm loses some value appropriability,
it will not be zero. For example, Facebook and Apple exercise control over their APIs and thus, for example,
could decide to remove unwanted apps (both Facebook and Apple do so as of this writing) or request a share
of revenue from apps (as Apple does). In contrast, IBM and Google gave up control of their code base and
cannot directly prevent unwanted use of it or charge for its use.
Further, opening access to resources does not change the control of those resources per se. Resource
dependencies between information resources are typically of a technical nature (e.g., an app requires an
API). Control (ownership) of these resources, however, is a legal construct (e.g., a licensing regime for
source code). It follows that while the firm cannot (or can only with substantial investment) change the
nature of its information resource in terms of the corresponding technical dependencies, it can change the
control of that information resource based purely on strategic legal decisions (e.g., putting the information
resource under a different legal construct such as a “Creative Commons” content license). Earlier, we
discussed giving up control of information resources because contributors prefer non-proprietary control
(inter alia, to avoid a negative power relationship) and its positive effect on value creation. The
counterargument to consider for a decision to give up control is that while technical dependencies remain
in place for that information resource, the firm can no longer leverage those dependencies to negotiate its
value appropriability position. That is, the firm can no longer threaten to withdraw the resource from open
access because it no longer controls that resource.
These considerations allow us to formulate third and fourth propositions:
Proposition 3: Increasing access to a firm’s information resource has a negative impact on the
firm’s value appropriability (of value created based on that resource).
Proposition 4: Increasing control of a firm’s information resource has a positive impact on the
firm’s value appropriability (of value created based on that resource).
Finally, the firm is typically not interested in the absolute return (unless it is a not-for-profit organization,
in which case value creation will be the key interest). That is, firms will be interested primarily in optimizing
their value appropriation. The relationship to the above constructs and value appropriation is
straightforward. Given the same value appropriability (“relative size of the slice of pie”), the firm’s value
appropriation will increase with the value creation based on its resources. Given the same value creation
(“absolute size of the pie”), the firm’s value appropriation will increase with value appropriability (i.e., the
firm’s power to command a share of the created value).
This consideration leads us to our final two propositions:
Proposition 5: Increased value creation has a positive impact on the firm’s value appropriation.
Proposition 6: Increased value appropriability has a positive impact on the firm’s value
appropriation.
Figure 2 summarizes our six theoretical propositions regarding the impacts of resource openness on value
creation and value appropriation. Providing access to a resource increases the number of possible resource
combinations and hence value creation with that resource, but the value created will need to be shared with
others. Controlling a resource limits the valuable combinations of that resource even when opened because
it discourages external contributors to possible resource combinations; control, however, ensures a strong
position in the negotiation of value share with external contributors. These propositions, together with the
openness typology developed above, provide a theoretical model of (information resource) openness.

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 Open Resource-Based View (ORBV)

Figure 2: Theoretical Model of the Effects of Resource Openness

Brief Illustration
The ORBV explains why the respective firms in the introductory examples made their strategic openness
moves. Here we illustrate one openness move, “Substituting Proprietary Resources” (IBM and Google);
other examples are discussed elsewhere (Schlagwein, Schoder, Fischbach 2010a,b).
One strategic use of open access to resources is that firms (such as IBM) can compensate for resource
deficits in comparison to (closed) competitors by supporting the development of equivalent resources
through openness. IBM instead chose to use open value creation to create a substitute resource, the Linux
operating system. Linux can be considered a substitute for competitor Microsoft’s Windows operating
system (using this substitute removes IBM’s dependency on Microsoft). Prior to its strategic openness
move, IBM had failed in a “closed” manner to develop an operating system comparable to Windows and
became dependent on a licensed Windows version (for full argument and case description, see West 2003;
West and Gallagher 2006).
IBM’s commitment to the open source software sector is motivated by the fact that its hardware products,
such as servers, require powerful operating systems (Berlind 2002; IBM 2010; IBM 2011). Hence, IBM
hardware depends on the availability of such operating systems (e.g., Windows or Linux). Choosing an open
source package over a commercial package makes IBM (and its customers) independent of competitor
Microsoft. The existing external code base and the high level of willingness of external developers to
participate in the development of a non-proprietary open source project makes Linux more competitive
with Microsoft’s Windows than any of IBM’s earlier proprietary operating systems developed internally
(such as AIX, OS/2, and OS/390).
As stated above, IBM was failing to keep pace with Microsoft using closed value creation before it decided
to contribute its resources to Linux open source development. Today, IBM does not even compile a Linux
“distribution” (i.e., an operating system package for end users). Instead, IBM relies on third-party firms
such as RedHat and Novell (or free community projects such as Debian and Ubuntu) to deliver Linux
distribution packages. IBM has not become dependent on these firms because their Linux packages are not
based on (dependent on) proprietary code but on an open resource, and there is a healthy market for such
Linux packages. In essence, through its open source software participation, IBM has nullified a competitive
disadvantage (power dependency on Microsoft). Note that in addition to the focal benefits of interest here,
IBM derives several indirect benefits from its engagement with Linux, such as being able to sell specialized
services and complementary software (IBM 2012).
IBM clearly expresses the expected benefits of using an open resource (instead of a third-party proprietary
information resource): “IBM announced support for the open source Linux operating system. Since that
time IBM has invested considerable financial, technical, and marketing resources to foster the growth,
development, and use of Linux technology … to innovate in ways IBM cannot do by itself.” (IBM 2010, p.
2). IBM demonstrates the use of resource openness for a substitution effect, devaluing competitors’
investments in their resource base or replacing an inadequate own proprietary resource.
Google’s strategy of making Android open source is of a similar strategic nature and based on a comparable
resource configuration. As an advertising business, Google could have become dependent on Apple had it

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 Open Resource-Based View (ORBV)

decided to base all its apps and mobile traffic on iOS. Instead, Google opted for creating and supporting
Android as a substitute for iOS as a smartphone platform (Schlagwein et al. 2010).

Discussion
We motivated this paper by pointing out that a theoretical understanding of openness is lacking (e.g.,
Chesbrough and Appleyard 2007; Dahlander and Gann 2010; Schlagwein et al. 2017). We answer these
calls by building theory based on the literatures on openness, value creation, and resource-level theories,
so as to explain better the openness phenomenon.
The typology of openness (Figure 1) is a contribution to the openness literature. It extends earlier
conceptualizations of openness along a single open-to-closed dimension (Dahlander and Gann 2010;
Schilling 2016; West 2003) to account for the different dimensions of openness in terms of control and
access (in relation to resources, one major referents of “openness” terminology, Schlagwein et al. 2017).
This constitutes a novel theoretical conceptualization of this form of openness, and it will be useful for
analyses beyond the impact of openness on value creation and value appropriation (such as a conceptual
tool for public policy discussion).
Introducing the two dimensions of openness of resources makes an important contribution to resource-
based theory. Openness/closedness is a fundamental attribute of a resource. Why is the notion of different
regimes’ openness in terms of access and control of resources not reflected in existing resource-level
theories? The main reason is, indeed, because of a technological change. Only with widespread use of
broadband Internet has open value creation become an option, at a time when much of the dominant
resource-level theories have already been framed (Bailey et al. 2019). The number of people using the
Internet and the frequency of that use have continued to increase over the past decade, and the ways in
which the Internet is being used have shifted significantly from consumption to collaboration and creation
(Benkler 2011). The Internet offers an infrastructure for “open” information resource exchange and know-
how combination at no or negligible cost (Benkler 2002). Only the Internet offers the IT-enabled option of
true openness of information resources.
The theoretical model (in Figure 2) regarding the impact of openness resource contributes to our
understanding of value creation and value appropriation. Openness of a firm’s resources (with respect to
access or control) has different effects on the firm’s abilities to create and appropriate value. Openness of
resources will, ceteris paribus, have positive impacts on possible value creation because open resources,
and hence the resource sets that include open resources, allow for additional value-creating combinations
of information resources and know-how. At the same time, openness of resources will, ceteris paribus,
diminish the ability of the focal firm to appropriate that additional value. The model builds on the value
creation literature (Bowman and Ambrosini 2000; Lepak et al. 2007), while adding value appropriability
(Teece 1986) based on resource dependencies as an additional consideration. That is, we have discussed
how value creation, conceptualized as resource combinations, relates to resource dependencies such as
complementarity and (co-)specificity (Lippman and Rumelt 2003a; Lippman and Rumelt 2003b), and how
relative value appropriability and absolute value appropriation in different situations may occur. The
propositions in the theoretical model developed provide a link between openness, value creation, and value
appropriation that has been missing in the value creation literature.
The model also adds to resource-based theory as an explanation for the type 3 value creation regime, “open
value creation.” Absent the technological option of open value creation, it has often been argued that VRIN
resources should be protected from externals (Barney 1991; Kettinger et al. 1994). However, the
considerations we present in our paper suggest instead that VRIN resources should not be kept protected
(internal control and exclusive access, resource type 1) under all conditions. Rather, changing the resource
openness (in either dimension, access or control) of a VRIN resource can be useful for the focal firm because
such openness may substantially increase the value creation based on that resource. While value
appropriability is indeed reduced through resource openness, absolute value appropriation might still
increase. The two open strategy types (discussed in the preceding section) show that strategically opening
VRIN resources does make strategic sense for increased value creation and for absolute value appropriation
in certain situations. The opened resource needs to remain related to other resources in the firm’s control.
The open resource then may allow for creating complementary assets and may remove dependencies to
resources under third-party control.

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 Open Resource-Based View (ORBV)

The paper provides a conceptual framework and mental model to understand and explain better the
increasing number of examples of openness in business practice. The typology and propositions provided
in this paper can be employed to dissect business models, conceptually and visually, that use (or could use)
openness of information resources. We motivate the paper with the examples of IBM, Google, Facebook,
Tesla, and Apple opening VRIN resources and the difficulties in understanding such strategic moves based
on the implicit or explicit admonition in existing resource-level theories to protect such resources. The
theoretical model provided here is useful for understanding such moves and goes beyond prior
explanations. Hence, it contributes to the literature by clarifying the relationship between resource
openness, value creation, and value appropriation.

Conclusion
This paper contributes a theoretical explanation of the openness phenomenon and the nature and impacts
of “resource openness” by building on the literatures on openness, value creation, and resource-level
theories. The model is able to explain and resolve the contradiction between the empirically evident
business practice of opening VRIN resources (such as in the cases of IBM, Google, Facebook, and Apple)
and the theoretically recommended suggestion of protecting VRIN resources. The model consists of
propositions regarding the impact of access to and control of information resources on value creation, value
appropriability, and value appropriation of firms. From a focal firm’s perspective, providing open access to
a resource will increase value creation from resource combinations that include that resource. Controlling
a resource will ensure value appropriability but may, by discouraging potential contributors, reduce value
creation from resource sets that include this resource. A resource should be opened in terms of access
and/or control if the expected additional value creation can be captured through complementary or (co-)
specific resources controlled by the focal firm. As a delimitation and due to the character of a theoretical
and explorative approach, we have not (yet) tested empirically the propositions in this paper. Further
empirical research is needed to reveal additional assumptions, contingencies, and outcomes.

Acknowledgements
We gratefully acknowledge the ongoing discussions and valuable support of Thomas Hummel provided for
earlier versions of this paper.

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