Professional Documents
Culture Documents
2 Contents 2
3 3
4 4
5 5
6 6
7 List of Figures vii 7
8 List of Tables ix 8
9 Acknowledgements xi 9
10 Notes on Contributors xiii 10
11 Preface xvii 11
12 12
13 1 Introduction 1 13
14 Salvatore Palidda 14
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15 15
16 PART I THE CHANGE OF SECURITY GOVERNANCE SINCE 1990 16
17 17
18 2 The Rise of Postmodern Security Governance and the Proliferation 18
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19 of Ignored Insecurities and Their Victims, 17
19
20 Salvatore Palidda 20
21 21
22 3 Ignored Securities? On the Diversity of Securities and a Proposal 22
23 for Their Integration 65 23
24 Harald Arnold and Rita Haverkamp 24
25 25
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26 7KH*RYHUQDQFHRI&ULPHLQWKH5LVN6RFLHW\)URPµ'HVLJQLQJ 26
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27 27
28 Tim Lukas 28
29 29
30 5 Resilience Discourses and Ignored Insecurities: The Neoliberal 30
31 Myth of Self-contained Individualism 91 31
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14
15 11 Industrial Disasters: The Italian Case 179 15
16 Pietro Saitta 16
17 17
18 12 The Use of Natural Disasters to Turn the Rule of Law into Corrupt 18
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19 Governance, Favouring Private Companies 191 19
20 Antonello Petrillo 20
21 21
22 References 215 22
23 Index 259 23
24 24
25 25
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26 26
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27 27
28 28
29 29
30 30
31 31
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32 32
33 33
34 34
35 35
36 36
37 37
38 38
39 39
40 40
41 41
42 42
43 43
44 44
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15 witnessed a systematic erosion of its territory and a dramatic increase in pollution, 15
16 stemming from a substantially unregulated industrial presence. From North to 16
17 South, at different stages of post-Second World War development, both large 17
18 process industries (oil, petrochemical- and chemical-related) employing thousands 18
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19 19
20 have become increasingly central to the local economy. For example, Sardinia 20
21 (Sarroch, Porto Torres), Sicily (Milazzo, Gela, Augusta, Siracusa, Melilli, Priolo) 21
22 and Apulia (Manfredonia, Taranto) are home to some of the largest petrochemical 22
23 DQG VWHHO ZRUNV LQ (XURSH ,Q WKH &HQWUDO DQG 1RUWKHUQ UHJLRQV RI WKH FRXQWU\ 23
24 other similar industries are also present (Falconara, Livorno, Marghera); but these 24
25 areas have also been at the epicentre of another type of industrial development, and 25
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32 In addition, since the 1950s, the construction industry has become a leading 32
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34 VSHFXODWLRQSURFHVVHVDQGKDVFRQWULEXWHGWRZDUGVPDNLQJ,WDO\WKHWKLUG(XURSHDQ 34
35 FRXQWU\IRUKXPDQDFWLYLWLHVUHODWHGDJULFXOWXUDOGH¿FLW5RQGLQRQH 35
36 Yet, over the years, Italy has undergone a severe process of industrial 36
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38 38
39 39
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43 of such development models. Probably, the Italian encounter with neoliberalism and its 43
44 quintessential forms of production began in such milieus. See: Palidda (2013). 44
1 refuse dumping and so on) are no longer active, but their legacy is relevant in 1
2 terms of soil contamination. Since 1998, different decrees and acts issued by the 2
3 Ministry of the Environment and the national government3KDYHLGHQWL¿HGVLWHV 3
4 RIQDWLRQDOLQWHUHVW6,1LQQHHGRIUHPHGLDWLRQ±URXJKO\FRUUHVSRQGLQJWRDQ 4
5 area equal to 3 per cent of the national territory. In addition, about 13,000 sites 5
6 of regional interest should be added, which still need accurate monitoring with 6
7 regard to pollution levels. 7
8 Furthermore, the presence of military bases and shooting ranges in the South 8
9 RI ,WDO\ ± HVSHFLDOO\ LQ 6DUGLQLD 6DOWR GL 4XLUUD 3HUGDVGHIRJX &DSR 7HXODGD 9
10 &DSR)UDVFD66WHIDQR/D0DGGDOHQDDQGVRRQ±KDYHIUHTXHQWO\EHHQDWWKH 10
11 centre of controversies and alarms over the radioactive nature of their wastes 11
12 and emissions. 12
13 Finally, still in the South, but more especially in Campania, for decades now 13
large parts of the region have been grappling with an unprecedented waste crisis, 14
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14
15 which has also produced vast social turmoil as well as effects on public health 15
16 (Chapter 12 Petrillo in this volume). Not by chance, a huge area surrounding 16
17 Naples, including the villages of Acerra, Nola and Marigliano, has been renamed 17
18 WKH µWULDQJOH RI GHDWK¶ 6HQLRU DQG 0D]]D %XW LQ VSLWH RI LWV QRWRULHW\ 18
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19 19
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21 WKH ± 1DSOHV µWUDVK FULVLV¶ DQG WKH UHODWHG ULRWV PDGH FOHDU WR PDQ\ 21
22 mainstream international observers that Italy faces serious environmental, health 22
23 and social questions (Petrillo, 2009; De Biase, 2015). 23
24 Certainly, this is not an exhaustive list of the cases and problems that exist in 24
25 Italy, but it should be enough to suggest that the environmental issues at hand are 25
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27 27
28 28
29 Issues 29
30 30
31 Epidemiological Issues 31
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32 32
33 Epidemiological rates in industrial and formerly industrial areas are the most 33
34 obvious sign of the magnitude of the problems faced by regions exposed to toxic 34
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37 Italian Government in the past few years. Such a review shows that, during the 37
38 \HDUV±µIRUDWRWDORIGHDWKVERWKPHQDQGZRPHQDQH[FHVV 38
39 of 9,969 deaths is observed, with an average of about 1,200 extra deaths per year. 39
40 40
41 30LQLVWHULDO GHFUHH (QYLURQPHQW 6HSWHPEHU Q 1DWLRQDO 3URJUDP 41
42 for the environmental restoration of polluted sites); Law n. 388/2000; Ministerial decree 42
43 468/01; Law 179/02; Law 266/05; Legislative decree 152/06; Ministerial decree 11/4/08; 43
44 Ministerial decree 25/5/08; Order of the President of the Ministerial Council 3716/2008. 44
1 Most of these excesses are observed in IPS’s Italian polluted sites located in 1
2 Southern and Central Italy’ (Pirastu et al., 2011, 30). 2
3 By going into more detail, one sees, for example, that in Gela (Sicily) 3
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6 and in excess for all sexes and age groups. Such rates are compatible with other 6
7 data indicating that, historically, in Gela’s spring water, arsenic, mercury, benzene, 7
8 vinyl chloride, 1.2 dichloroethane were found in unprecedented quantities: for 8
9 example, arsenic: 250,000 mg/l (legal limit: 10 mg/L); mercury: 6,600 mg/l (l.l: 1 9
10 mg/L); benzene: 34,000 mg/L (l.l: 1 mg/L), and so forth (Mudu, 2009, 11). 10
11 7DUDQWR$SXOLDKRVWVDODUJHVWHHOZRUNVDQGKHUHPRUWDOLW\H[FHVVHVIRU 11
12 all types of cancer (between 10 and 30 per cent for different pathologies) and 12
13 respiratory disease (40 and 50 per cent for men and women, respectively) have 13
14 been found (Pirastu et al., 2011b, 136). Some of these rates can be correlated to 14
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15 other data, and show that the food chain is severely affected by emissions from 15
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18 26 per cent of samples collected presented an excess of dioxins (Iavarone et 18
19 al., 2009). 19
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20 Manfredonia (Apulia) is home, among other things, to a petrochemical 20
21 plant that exploded in 1976, releasing enormous quantities of arsenic into the 21
22 environment. The effects of that incident became visible only in the early years of 22
23 the new millennium, when a mortality study showed increasing rates of pulmonary 23
24 and cholestatic tumors (Portaluri, 2006, 218). 24
25 Between 1948 and 1997, Pieve Vergonte (Piedmont) was the site of a chemical 25
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28 Several years after production ended, epidemiological rates still show an excess in 28
29 PRUWDOLW\UDWHVIRUDOOW\SHVRIWXPRXU3LUDVWXHWDOHGV± 29
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31 LQ&DPSDQLDWKHUHDUHVHYHUDOODQG¿OOVLWHVUXEELVKLQFLQHUDWRUVDQGDERYHDOO 31
32 a number of illegal sites used for dumping waste and toxic substances from all 32
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34 circulatory and digestive apparatus diseases have been registered in the area 34
35 (Pirastu et al., eds. 2011, 86). 35
36 The sites mentioned above are, of course, only a small selection of cases 36
37 ¿YH RXW RI WKH SUHVHQWHG E\ WKH 6HQWLHUL 3URMHFW +RZHYHU WKH\ DUH DOO RI 37
38 particular interest because they are paradigmatic of the issues under discussion 38
39 here. In particular, these events suggest that Italy has had to face a vast number of 39
40 µGLVDVWHUV¶DWGLIIHUHQWPRPHQWVLQLWVSDVW±WKDWLVHYHQWVWKDWKDYHEHHQWKHFDXVH 40
41 of thousands of deaths, malformations and diseases, and that have affected the 41
42 environment, the food chain, and, ultimately, the safety of entire communities and 42
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1 spite of the fact that some of these accidents happened almost 40 years ago, and 1
2 certain discoveries concerning epidemiological rates were made decades ago. 2
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6 event and, thus, loses its urgency. The Italian experience seems to provide many of 6
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8 WKDWWKHGH¿QLWLRQRIXUJHQF\FDQEHFRQVLGHUHGPHUHO\DIRUPDOOHJDOSURFHVVWKDW 8
9 does not imply prompt institutional reactions or solutions.4 Certainly, in opposition 9
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12 Perhaps the realms of non-industrial disaster are a better demonstration of this, in 12
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countermeasures aimed at reducing the impact of such events, where responsibility 14
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15 is both natural and human. On the contrary, these have become occasions for setting 15
16 in motion, sometimes on a larger scale, the sort of classic speculative dynamics that 16
17 national capitalism is based on (Nimis, 2009; Saitta, 2013). 17
18 7KH MXGLFLDO KLVWRU\ RI GLVDVWHUV FDQ KHOS XV WR XQGHUVWDQG WKLV SRLQW ,Q WKH 18
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24 7DUDQWRIRULQVWDQFH)UHTXHQWO\WKLVSURFHVVLVIROORZHGE\DGHFLVLRQ±W\SLFDOO\ 24
25 that of shutting down a plant or an industrial complex. But, contrary to what one 25
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27 the top and the bottom of communities. The result is that legal decisions are, de 27
28 facto, bypassed by the virulence of political and social reactions (see infra). As 28
29 a consequence, the social and technical structure that caused the contamination 29
30 remains substantially intact, and operations start up again (Saitta, 2009). 30
31 Over the course of the following pages, each of these points will be discussed. 31
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32 For now, what is important is to highlight that the nature of epidemiological rates 32
33 is trivial, and that the salience of an environmental crisis does not derive from its 33
34 magnitude, but from indirect mediating social factors (Beamish, 2002, 11). 34
35 35
36 Social Issues 36
37 37
38 An analysis of the most typical patterns in matters concerning the environment 38
39 and human activities would show that, usually, critical considerations of current 39
40 development models become part of the public and political agenda when disasters 40
41 41
42 46LPLODUWHQGHQFLHVZHUHUHFRUGHGLQRWKHUFRXQWULHV:HDOH6]DV] 42
43 and Beamish (2002) observed that remedial policies and structures are discretional, and this 43
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1 KDYHDOUHDG\WDNHQSODFHDQGLQPDQ\FDVHVRQO\DWDYHU\ORFDOOHYHO0RUHRIWHQ 1
2 than not, with some noticeable exceptions, catastrophic events do not produce 2
3 changes in the general organization of the economic forms of a country, and 3
4 GHEDWHVGHYHORSPRVWO\DWWKHOHYHORIWKHDIIHFWHGFRPPXQLWLHV±DOWKRXJKVXFK 4
5 debates are usually not immune from contradictions, and requests for dramatic 5
6 changes in organization are opposed by many members of the same communities, 6
7 who favour current models rather than u-turns, whose effects are unpredictable in 7
8 terms of occupation, salary and future prospects. 8
9 This peculiar situation is due to the fact that, in most cases, and prior to 9
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12 permeate the life of places, even their aesthetics, and produce what one could 12
13 FDOO µGHSHQGHQFH¶ E\ YLUWXH RI LQGXVWULDO VDODULHV WKH ULVH RI OLQNHG LQGXVWULHV 13
14 the development of industry-related facilities (hotels, restaurants and other similar 14
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15 services), and the extension of urbanized areas, so that the life of places tends to 15
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17 then, become part of the inhabitants’ mental and economic horizons, and their 17
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19 presence. Frequently, because of their lights, the emanating fumes and tubes, 19
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21 the same way as the mountains or the sea. 21
22 Interestingly, when, for a number of different reasons, such dreams come 22
23 to an end, or change into a nightmare as the effects to health become apparent, 23
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29 conditions within the communities: in fact, according to the repeatedly mentioned 29
30 Sentieri study, 60 per cent of the population of the sites of national interest belongs 30
31 to the two more disadvantaged quintiles. 31
32 In the case of Italy, this type of scenario mostly corresponds to situations in 32
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33 places such as Gela and Taranto, where the activities of local process industries 33
34 belonging to giant groups, such as Eni and Italsider, are suspected of having 34
35 caused, over the course of 60 years, a wide array of health problems among 35
36 ZRUNHUVDQGFLWL]HQV&RPEDHWDO%XWLQUHDOLW\,WDO\SURYLGHVGR]HQV 36
37 of examples relating to different production and activities, including dangerous 37
38 manufacturing (asbestos), decommissioned technologies (nuclear plants), food 38
39 industry (agriculture) and speculations (waste disposal). 39
40 We might argue, then, that disasters are not only human or natural events, 40
41 nor should they be considered merely the consequences of the cynical conduct of 41
42 speculators. Rather, many of these catastrophic events should be deemed socially 42
43 constructed facts that involve entire communities, and whose origins lie in an 43
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15 is an almost metaphysical body which combines the interests of local society in 15
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18 the day after an industrial plant was seized on the orders of a local court. After an 18
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19 investigation, and following the provisions of a national mandate (D.L. 22/1997), 19
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21 ban on it. 21
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24 common in Europe due to its environmental impact. Environmental analyses have 24
25 shown an abundant concentration of elements related to the combustion of pet- 25
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36 Taranto magistrate ordered the seizure of a local steel mill, and the arrest of eight corporate 36
37 executives. Experts appointed by the court had ascertained the role of the company in the 37
38 contamination of the area, a pollution process, moreover, compatible with the extremely 38
concerning causes and rates of mortality recorded in the city. Before the company announced
39 39
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occupied parts of the city for days (streets, highways and other strategic infrastructures were
41 WDNHQ6RRQDIWHUWKHQDWLRQDOJRYHUQPHQWODXQFKHGDQLQYHVWPHQWSURJUDPPHDLPHGDW 41
42 assisting the company in the amelioration of the industrial plant. Interestingly, a consultative 42
43 referendum aimed at expelling the company was abandoned, and at the moment, parts of 43
44 the industrial plant are closed; however, from time to time, new alarms are raised. 44
1 order, erected barricades, closed all access to the city and engaged in clashes with 1
2 WKHSROLFH7KLVVKRXOGEHHQRXJKHYLGHQFHWRFRQFOXGHWKDWLQZKDWWRRN 2
3 place can be summed up in terms of resistance against misery, and the struggle 3
4 IRUHPSOR\PHQW±DQ\NLQGRIHPSOR\PHQW2UZHFDQFRQFOXGHWKDWWKHGD\ZDV 4
5 the culmination of a disciplinary process aimed at persuading the local masses 5
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7 However, it would be too hasty to describe the matter solely in these terms. 7
8 Indeed, we might also claim that the residents were misinformed, and generally 8
9 unable to understand the nuances of the topic, and the saliency of the violations 9
10 FRPPLWWHGE\WKHUH¿QHU\+RZHYHULWLVGLI¿FXOWWREHOLHYHWKDWPHPEHUVRIWKH 10
11 community were completely naïve and insensitive. The effects of industrialization, 11
12 LQ IDFW ZHUH FOHDU WR WKH PDMRULW\ RI WKH SRSXODWLRQ GXH WR WKH HSLGHPLRORJLFDO 12
13 rates and their familiarity with disease, malformations and suffering. It is more 13
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15 HFRORJLFDOFRQFHUQDQGOR\DOW\WRWKHHVWDEOLVKPHQW7KLVK\SRWKHVLVLVEDFNHGXS 15
16 inter alia, by the apparent tranquility of the same population after the seizure of 16
17 WDQNVWKHIROORZLQJ\HDU 17
18 According to a classic study by Hytten and Marchioni (1970) on the Gela case, the 18
19 way the oil company running the operations was perceived, was essentially due to the 19
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20 IDFWWKDWLWZDVDµVWDWHFRPSDQ\¶WKDWLVDFRPSDQ\KLVWRULFDOO\HQWUXVWHGWRRSSRVLQJ 20
21 the oligopoly of private companies in the sector; a company, moreover, that also 21
22 SXUVXHGFDSLWDOLVWREMHFWLYHVEXWZDVUHTXHVWHGWRGRVRLQRUGHUWRSURGXFHµVRFLDO 22
23 SUR¿W¶E\SURYLGLQJMREVDQGZHOIDUH,QRWKHUZRUGVWKHSHWURFKHPLFDOSODQWZDV 23
24 perceived as public property, a friendly presence and certainly not as an alien entity. 24
25 7R WKLV SV\FKRORJLFDO DQDO\VLV ZH VKRXOG DOVR DGG DQ HQGHPLF GH¿FLW LQ 25
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29 µSDVVDJHIURPIDWKHUWRVRQ¶DQGXVHGWREHDYHU\FRPPRQSUDFWLFHRUH[SHFWWR 29
30 pass on their positions to their children. In so doing, they experience the dominion 30
31 exercised by the company directly and in its most elementary forms. One could 31
32 FODLPWKDWSHRSOHFRQWUDFWGHEWVZLWKWKHLQGXVWU\IURPWKHLUYHU\¿UVWFRQWDFWZLWK 32
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33 it, so it should not be surprising that, according to many labour leaders, modern 33
34 trade unions ought not to be aggressive, but should always aim to negotiate and 34
35 bargain for solutions (Saitta, 2009). 35
36 However, by helping to organize a protest against the seizure of a company 36
37 LGHQWL¿HGDVWKHRQO\UHDOELJHPSOR\HULQWKHDUHDWKHWUDGHXQLRQVDOVRIHOWWKH\ 37
38 ZHUHIXO¿OOLQJWKHLUWDVNE\WU\LQJWRKHOSVDYHMREVVDODULHVDQGZHOIDUH$QGLI 38
39 this is so, how is it possible to escape the contradiction of devotion to a corporate 39
40 LGHRORJ\WKDWLVDOVRDGHIHQFHRIZHOIDUH"$QGKRZWRPDNHWKHYLHZRIWKHVH 40
41 trade unionists less corporate-centric? And above all, is it possible to avoid the 41
42 production of toxic substances and pollutants in milieus of that sort? 42
43 A paradoxical response to some of these questions was provided by one local 43
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1 in the listing of fuels. Using a simple sleight of hand, and in total opposition to 1
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3 community to transform a highly toxic substance into an almost innocuous one.6 3
4 Such a manoeuvre, conducted on the edge of legal formalism, did not protect 4
5 the corporation from harsh criticism, and this new measure was accompanied by a 5
6 communication plan aimed at showing the company’s renewed attention towards 6
7 the environment and health. The company announced that 200 million euros 7
8 ZHUHWREHVSHQWRQWKHHQYLURQPHQW±PRUHVSHFL¿FDOO\IRUWKHDGRSWLRQRIVR 8
9 FDOOHG612[WHFKQRORJ\ZKLFKKHOSVWRFOHDQUHVLGXDOIXPHVDµ%HVW$YDLODEOH 9
10 Technology’, as required by the EU). 10
11 In this way, the age of disagreement came to an end (or until very recently, 11
12 ZKHQDQHZRLOVSLOOSURYRNHGWKHUHDFWLRQRID\RXQJHUJHQHUDWLRQRIDFWLYLVWV 12
13 LQWHUHVWHG LQ WKH µFRPPRQV¶ %XW LW LV VWLOO WRR HDUO\ WR FRPPHQW RQ WKLV 7KH 13
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15 and announcing changes in policy based on large investments and social 15
16 UHVSRQVLELOLW\ KDYH DFWXDOO\ KHOSHG WR EXLOG µQHZ¶ OHJLWLPDF\ WKXV PDNLQJ LW 16
17 SRVVLEOH WR UHO\ RQFH DJDLQ RQ OHJDO IRUPDOLVP MRE EODFNPDLO DV\PPHWU\ DQG 17
18 IHDU2ULQRWKHUZRUGVWRDFNQRZOHGJHWKHOLPLWDWLRQVRIWKHDYDLODEOHRSWLRQV 18
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19 19
20 Forms of Opposition 20
21 21
22 It would be wrong to assume that these processes are without opposition. From this 22
23 point of view, it may be useful to consider the concept of popular epidemiology 23
24 %URZQDQG0LNNHOVHQZKLFKFDQEHEURDGO\WUDFNHGLQPDQ\FDVHVDQG 24
25 certainly, in Gela and Taranto. 25
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32 the fears and anxieties of vulnerable people. However, if, from an academic and 32
33 political perspective, these characteristics sound negative, we should bear in mind 33
34 that popular epidemiology is also a form of resistance that can help bring issues 34
35 WRWKHVXUIDFHDQG¿OOLQUHOHYDQWLQIRUPDWLRQJDSVRIWHQSURYLGLQJUHDOLQVLJKWV 35
36 Interviews conducted with former leaders of local environmental movements 36
37 in Gela are, in this sense, exemplary. An analysis of the individual and collective 37
38 processes that guided their political involvement shows how certain practices 38
39 DURVHIURPWKHVRPHWLPHVH[WUHPHQHHGWRPDNHVHQVHRIWKHLURZQSDLQDQG 39
40 IURPWKHGLI¿FXOW\RISODFLQJWKHORVVRIORYHGRQHVLQWKHQDWXUDORUGHURIWKLQJV 40
41 This suggests that there are strong elements of irrationality behind this sort of 41
42 42
43 67KH UHVXOW RI WKLV LQWHUYHQWLRQ ZDV WKH IROORZLQJ GHFUHH '/ Q RI 0DUFK 43
44 ±Urgent instructions concerning the use of pet-coke in combustion plants. 44
1 SUDFWLFH DQG \HW WKLV W\SH RI WKLQNLQJ DOVR KDV WKH H[WUDRUGLQDU\ FDSDFLW\ WR 1
2 perceive trends, since the sensitivity of these witnesses to an abnormal cancer rate 2
3 ZDVFRQ¿UPHGE\VXEVHTXHQWUHVHDUFKFDUULHGRXWDOVRRQWKHEDVLVRIWKHLUUHSRUWV 3
4 (Pasetto, Comba and Pirastu, 2008). This becomes apparent when one considers 4
5 the method used to highlight the number of deaths attributable to inaccuracies in 5
6 GHDWKFHUWL¿FDWHVZKLFKFRQVLVWHGRIDQDO\VLQJWKHQXPEHURIµH[HPSWLRQV¶±WKDW 6
7 is, the number of people who are exempted from paying for the drugs needed to 7
8 WUHDWFHUWDLQGLVHDVHV&HUWDLQO\LWUHÀHFWVHSLGHPLRORJLFDOLPDJLQDWLRQ 8
9 2XU DQDO\VLV ZRXOG QRW EH FRPSOHWH ZLWKRXW UHÀHFWLQJ RQ WKH ODFN RI WUXVW 9
10 displayed by many witnesses. In particular, we need to address the widespread 10
11 view that doctors were corrupted by the local oil company. Some witnesses had 11
12 misgivings about the fact that data referring to deaths from cancer and other 12
13 diseases attributable to environmental pollution had long been unavailable because 13
14 of deliberate omission. The view expressed by some was that for years doctors had 14
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15 LQWHQWLRQDOO\¿OHGIDOVHGHDWKFHUWL¿FDWHVWRKLGHWKHHIIHFWVRISROOXWLRQDQGWR 15
16 protect the petrochemical establishment. 16
17 The plausibility of this hypothesis will not be discussed here, but it is worthwhile 17
18 UHÀHFWLQJ RQ WKH LPSDFW SURGXFHG E\ WKH EDG PDQDJHPHQW RI LQIRUPDWLRQ RQ 18
19 VLPLODU WRSLFV DQG FHUWDLQ PLFURSUDFWLFHV LQ WKH KHDOWK ¿HOG ,Q OLQH ZLWK WKLV 19
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20 the construction of reality by social actors seems to consist of apparently tiny 20
21 pieces that have the power to create huge distance between the institutions and the 21
22 public, thus enhancing the culture of suspicion. Also, some medical practices that 22
23 KDYHEHHQLQXVHIRUGHFDGHVKDYHQRWRQO\FDXVHGDVXEVWDQWLDOORVVRIREMHFWLYH 23
24 information for studying pathological phenomena, but have also discredited health 24
25 institutions and increased distrust in them. These occurrences demonstrate the 25
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33 Discussion 33
34 34
35 7KHZRUGµGLVDVWHU¶VKRXOGQRWRQO\LQGLFDWHFDWDVWURSKLFHYHQWVWKDWWDNHSODFH 35
36 at a given time, resulting in a relevant number of victims within a few short 36
37 PRPHQWVDQGPDUNLQJWKHOLIHRIWKHDIIHFWHGFRPPXQLWLHV6PLWK5DWKHU 37
38 WKHUHDUHDQ\QXPEHURIGLVDVWHUVWDNLQJSODFHLQWKHLQGXVWULDODUHDVRIWKHZRUOG 38
39 HYHQWVWKDWDUHFRQVWDQWDQGLQYLVLEOHDQGZKLFKODVWRYHUPDQ\GHFDGHV±DQG 39
40 accompany the daily life of the people living in the areas that host industrial plants. 40
41 Moreover, one should be cautious when distinguishing between natural- and 41
42 KXPDQUHODWHG GLVDVWHUV ,Q IDFW WKH FRQVHTXHQFHV RI PDQ\ QDWXUDO HYHQWV ± 42
43 HDUWKTXDNHVODQGVOLGHVRUÀRRGVIRUH[DPSOH±VKRXOGEHUHDGLQFRQQHFWLRQWR 43
44 human activities. In many cases, the erosion of the territory, urban development in 44
1 hazardous areas, the low quality of materials deployed for erecting infrastructures, 1
2 and speculations of all sorts, are elements that help explain the dimension of 2
3 disasters in both material and human terms. In other words, at this point in human 3
4 technological and social development, any analysis of the notion of disaster should 4
5 DOVRLQYROYHWKHFRQQHFWLRQVDQGUHODWLRQVKLSVEHWZHHQµKXPDQ¶DQGµQDWXUDO¶± 5
6 namely, technology and economics, nature and human activities. 6
7 Such connections and relationships can be considered as parts of a discourse 7
8 WKDW WDNHV SODFH ZLWKLQ VSHFL¿F IUDPHV DQG VHWV RI QDUUDWLRQV EDVHG RQ WKH 8
9 FRQFHSWVRIGHYHORSPHQWWUXVWLQWHFKQRORJ\DQGULVNFRQWURO6XFKDIUDPHKDV 9
10 been constituted over the course of the past two or three centuries, but the process 10
11 KDVEHHQJRLQJWKURXJKµDFFHOHUDWLRQSKDVHV¶RYHUWKHSDVWRUVR\HDUV±LQVSLWH 11
12 of the opposition that has developed during the same period. 12
13 7KH UHODWLRQVKLS EHWZHHQ SURGXFWLRQ ZHDOWK ULVN DQG VDIHW\ KDV UDLVHG WKH 13
concern of both academicians and lay actors. Often, visions of these problems by 14
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15 µH[SHUWV¶DQGµQRQH[SHUWV¶KDYHEHHQYHU\GLIIHUHQW6RZE\6WDUUDQG 15
16 the former have not omitted to blame the latter for their irrationality (for example, 16
17 LQWKH¿HOGRIQXFOHDUHQHUJ\,QDVLPLODUYHLQRWKHUVKDYHDGYRFDWHGDPRUH 17
18 VXEMHFWLYHDSSURDFKWKDWPLJKWH[SODLQIHDUDQGGLVWUXVWHLWKHULQSV\FKRORJLFDO 18
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19 (Fishoff et al., 1978; Slovic, Fishoff and Lichtenstein, 1980) or in institutional and 19
20 FXOWXUDOWHUPV6M|EHUJ0RHQDQG5XQGPR 20
21 In spite of different aims, perspectives and ideologies, these visions all 21
22 VKDUH WKH LGHD WKDW ULVN IHDU VDIHW\ DQG WKH OLNH DUH VRFLDO FRQVWUXFWLRQV WKDW 22
23 is, events and concepts whose meaning does not exist per se RU REMHFWLYHO\ 23
24 However, constructivism is often professed for different reasons. In fact, some 24
25 proponents believe that reality exists, and that the main problem is the perception 25
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26 RILW±DSHUFHSWLRQWKDWQHHGVWREHXQGHUVWRRGLQRUGHUWREHFKDQJHG)RUWKHVH 26
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32 societies. Rationality, safety, security and insecurity, then, can be seen as different 32
33 ZD\V RI E\SDVVLQJ REMHFWLRQV DQG DURXVLQJ VXEVHTXHQW HPRWLRQV LQ WKH SXEOLF 33
34 After all, among many other things, government is precisely the art of managing 34
35 collective emotions. Clearly, in most cases, the elites and the people do not share 35
36 priorities. The art of management to which I referred earlier, then, consists of 36
37 bringing together very different needs, and helping the people to accept what the 37
38 HOLWHVGHHPWREHLPSRUWDQW7KLVLVXOWLPDWHO\WKHFRPSOH[µSURFHVVRISURFHVVHV¶ 38
39 WKDWEHJLQVZLWKµLVVXHLQVWDOODWLRQ¶DQGHQGVZLWKWKHµFRQYHUVLRQ¶RIWKHSXEOLF 39
40 (Cohen and Hamman, 2005, 142). 40
41 In a nutshell, such an operation requires that those in charge of setting the 41
42 SXEOLFDJHQGDVHOHFWFHUWDLQSUREOHPVDQGQHJOHFWRWKHUV)RON'HYLOVDQGVWUHHW 42
43 crime are good examples of this multipurpose selection process, aimed at imposing 43
44 LQFRQVLVWHQW SULRULWLHV WKDW KDYH QR UHODWLRQ WR µIDFWV¶ IRU H[DPSOH WKH VWDWLVWLF 44
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15 WRWKHOHVVRQVRIDXWKRUVOLNH5XVFKHDQG.LUFKKHLPHU:LOOLDPV 15
16 Foucault (1979) and Ignatieff (1978) for whom the history of the liberal states and 16
17 their pedagogy, discourse, and penal institutions is, after all, that of a long and 17
18 FRPSOH[GLVFLSOLQDU\SURFHVVDLPHGDWPDNLQJVXEMHFWVDFFHSWWKHXQQDWXUDOZRUOG 18
19 of production, with its fumes, smells and slums. In the light of these observations, 19
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20 OLNHDFORVLQJFLUFOHLWLVSRVVLEOHWRPDLQWDLQWKDWDOLQHFRQQHFWVWKLVKLVWRU\RI 20
21 the West (and its colonies) and the events narrated in the previous section; that is, 21
22 WKHµSHWFRNHULRW¶DQGDµMREDWDQ\FRVW¶ 22
23 7KHSODXVLELOLW\RIVXFKDK\SRWKHVLVVHHPVWREHFRQ¿UPHGE\WKHIDFWWKDWWKH 23
24 instalment of massive industrial plants, especially in the Mezzogiorno, or South of 24
25 ,WDO\KDVRIWHQEHHQWKHUHVXOWRIDµVRFLDOFRQWUDFW¶EHWZHHQWKHSRSXODWLRQVLQWKH 25
DUHDDQGWKHJLDQWFRPSDQLHVZLOOLQJWRHVWDEOLVKWKHUH:KHQEDFNLQWKHV
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26 26
27 WKHZHOONQRZQ¿JXUH(QULFR0DWWHLSUHVLGHQWRI(1,WKHQDWLRQDORLOFRPSDQ\ 27
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28 YLVLWHGWKHSRRUODQGVRIWKH6RXWKKHPHWFURZGVRISHDVDQWVORRNLQJIRUDEHWWHU 28
29 and more modern life. In his speeches, he promised them wealth, wellbeing and 29
30 modernity, and the peasants, especially in Sicily, became his allies in the war that 30
31 SODFHGKLPLQRSSRVLWLRQWRDQDWLRQDOJRYHUQPHQWWKDWGLGQRWVXSSRUWKLVSURMHFWV 31
32 At this point, Mattei’s dream was not only his; an entire population wanted the oil 32
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33 ZHOOV WKDW ZRXOG PDNH WKHLU GUHDP RI EHFRPLQJ WKH 7H[DV RI ,WDO\ FRPH WUXH 33
34 7KH,WDOLDQµGHYHORSPHQWWKHRUHWLFLDQV¶ZKRZHUHDFWLYHLQWKHVDPH\HDUVGLG 34
35 OLNHZLVHWKHLUDQDO\VLVLQIDFWIRFXVHGRQWKHQRWLRQRIHFRQRPLFGXDOLVPDQG 35
36 SRUWUD\HG 6RXWKHUQ VRFLHW\ LQ JHQHUDO DV EDFNZDUG7KH 6RXWK LQ RWKHU ZRUGV 36
37 IRXQGLWVHOIFRXFKHGLQDGLVFRXUVHWKDWSURSHOOHGLWWRZDUGVµPRGHUQLW\¶WKDWLV 37
38 to the material conditions and development models based on the sudden erosion of 38
39 the land, land speculations and a wave of investments that changed the features of 39
40 their society, but not the exploitative structure of its organization (Sapelli, 1989; 40
41 Saitta, 2009; Petrillo, Chapter 12 in this volume). 41
42 As should now be clear, this process, which started in the 1950s, is at the basis 42
43 of the epidemiological and environmental question that already had its current 43
44 features some 20 years ago (Di Luzio, 2003). Nevertheless, the problem of these 44
1 ailing areas, which are more often than not situated in Southern Italy, has never 1
2 EHHQRQHRIµXQKHDOWK\GHYHORSPHQW¶EXWUDWKHULWKDVDOZD\VEHHQDSUREOHPRI 2
3 PDODGMXVWPHQWSRRUVRFLDOFDSLWDODQG¿QDOO\WKHPD¿D 3
4 4
5 5
6 Conclusion 6
7 7
8 7KLV FKDSWHU KDV IRFXVHG RQ VRPH DVSHFWV RI ZKDW FDQ EH GH¿QHG DV WKH 8
9 environmental question in Italy. The idea behind it, is that this country is witnessing 9
10 DQ HPHUJHQF\ WKDW VWULYHV WR EH DFNQRZOHGJHG DV VXFK )URP WKH 1RUWK WR WKH 10
11 South, the results of epidemiological investigations are clear: environment-related 11
12 diseases are, in a large part of Italy, one of the most important causes of mortality. 12
13 Beyond that, the decommissioning of plants is not followed by remediation, and 13
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15 have been treated. Moreover, in addition to the health crisis, the closure or resizing 15
16 of many operations has determined a serious social crisis. The industrialization 16
17 model present in many parts of Italy has not been directed, and it has reproduced 17
18 and broadened biases that were already typical of the social organization of the 18
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19 country. Such capitalism without direction has produced some serious effects, the 19
20 magnitude of which is only now becoming apparent. 20
21 On a larger scale, however, pollution, land speculation and extreme urbanization 21
22 are, in fact, very common ills that affect the country in a fairly uniform way. 22
23 Over the course of the past 20 or so years, no serious policies have been 23
24 XQGHUWDNHQ RQ WKH FRQWUDU\ WKH FRQWHPSRUDU\ PDQDJHPHQW RI VRFLHW\ KDV 24
25 contributed to aggravating the situation through a set of measures aimed at 25
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