410 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Heirs of Pedro Pasag vs. Parocha

G.R. No. 155483. April 27, 2007. *

HEIRS OF PEDRO PASAG, represented by EUFREMIO PASAG; HEIRS OF MARIA PASAG,

represented by EPIFANIA LUMAGUI; HEIRS OF JUANITA PASAG, represented by
ASUNCION ORTIOLA; HEIRS OF ISIDRO PASAG, represented by VIRGINIA P.
MENDOZA; HEIRS OF BASILIO PASAG, represented by MILAGROSA P. NABOR; and
HEIRS OF FORTUNATA PASAG, represented by FLORENTINA S. MEMBRERE,
petitioners, vs. Sps. LORENZO and FLORENTINA PAROCHA, PRISCILLA P. ABELLERA,
and MARIA VILORIA PASAG, respondents.
Civil Procedure; Evidence; Formal Offer; Formal offer of evidence is necessary because judges
are mandated to rest their findings of facts and their judgment only and strictly upon the evidence offered
by the parties at the trial.—The Rules of Court provides that “the court shall consider no evidence which
has not been formally offered.” A formal offer is necessary because judges are mandated to rest their
findings of facts and their judgment only and strictly upon the evidence offered by the parties at the trial.
Its function is to enable the trial judge to know the purpose or purposes for which the proponent is
presenting the evidence. On the other hand, this allows opposing parties to examine the evidence and
object to its admissibility. Moreover, it facilitates review as the appellate court will not be required to
review documents not previously scrutinized by the trial court.
Same; Same; Same; The formal offer of one’s evidence is deemed waived after failing to submit it
within a considerable period of time.—Strict adherence to the said rule is not a trivial matter. The Court
in Constantino v. Court of Appeals, 264 SCRA 59 (1996), ruled that the formal offer of one’s evidence is
deemed waived after failing to submit it within a considerable period of time. It explained that the court
cannot admit an offer of evidence made after a lapse of three (3) months because to do so would
“condone an inexcusable laxity if not non-compliance with a court order which, in effect,
_______________

 SECOND DIVISION.
*

411
VOL. 522, APRIL 27, 2007 411
Heirs of Pedro Pasag vs. Parocha
would encourage needless delays and derail the speedy administration of justice.”
Same; Same; Same; The party who terminated the presentation of evidence must make an oral offer
of evidence on the very day the party presented the last witness.—The pre-trial guidelines and Sec. 35 of
Rule 132 jointly considered, it is made clear that the party who terminated the presentation of evidence
must make an oral offer of evidence on the very day the party presented the last witness. Otherwise, the
court may consider the party’s documentary or object evidence waived. While Sec. 35 of Rule 132 says
that the trial court may allow the offer to be done in writing, this can only be tolerated in extreme cases
where the object evidence or documents are large in number––say from 100 and above, and only where
there is unusual difficulty in preparing the offer.
Same; Same; Same; Documents which may have been identified and marked as exhibits during pre-
trial or trial but which were not formally offered in evidence cannot in any manner be treated as
evidence.—The trial court is bound to consider only the testimonial evidence presented and exclude the
documents not offered. Documents which may have been identified and marked as exhibits during pre-
trial or trial but which were not formally offered in evidence cannot in any manner be treated as evidence.
Neither can such unrecognized proof be assigned any evidentiary weight and value. It must be stressed
that there is a significant distinction between identification of documentary evidence and its formal offer.
The former is done in the course of the pre-trial, and trial is accompanied by the marking of the evidence
as an exhibit; while the latter is done only when the party rests its case. The mere fact that a particular
document is identified and marked as an exhibit does not mean that it has already been offered as part of
the evidence. It must be emphasized that any evidence which a party desires to submit for the
consideration of the court must formally be offered by the party; otherwise, it is excluded and rejected.
Same; Same; Demurrer to Evidence; A demurrer to evidence is an instrument for the expeditious
termination of an action thus, abbreviating judicial proceedings; In passing upon the sufficiency of the
evidence raised in a demurrer, the court is merely required to ascertain whether there is competent or
sufficient proof to sustain the
412
412 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Heirs of Pedro Pasag vs. Parocha
indictment or to support a verdict of guilt.—A demurrer to evidence is an instrument for the
expeditious termination of an action; thus, abbreviating judicial proceedings. It is defined as “an objection
or exception by one of the parties in an action at law, to the effect that the evidence which his adversary
produced is insufficient in point of law (whether true or not) to make out his case or sustain the issue.”
The demurrer challenges the sufficiency of the plaintiff’s evidence to sustain a verdict. In passing upon
the sufficiency of the evidence raised in a demurrer, the court is merely required to ascertain whether
there is competent or sufficient proof to sustain the indictment or to support a verdict of guilt.
PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
     Felipe V. Abenojar for petitioners.
     David Briones for respondents.

VELASCO, JR., J.:

The rule on formal offer of evidence is not a trivial matter. Failure to make a formal offer within
a considerable period of time shall be deemed a waiver to submit it. Consequently, as in this
case, any evidence that has not been offered shall be excluded and rejected.
The Case
The present Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 seeks the annulment of the February
15, 2002 Decision  of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 68544, and its September
1

6, 2002 Resolution  denying petitioners’ Motion for

2

_______________

1
 Rollo, pp. 23-31. The Decision was penned by Associate Justice Delilah Vidallon-Magtolis and concurred in by
Associate Justices Candido Rivera and Juan Enriquez, Jr.
2
 Id., at p. 33.
413
VOL. 522, APRIL 27, 2007 413
Heirs of Pedro Pasag vs. Parocha
Reconsideration. In effect, petitioners entreat this Court to nullify the February 24, 2000
Resolution of the Urdaneta City Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 45 in Civil Case No.
U5743, granting the demurrer to evidence filed by respondents and dismissing their Complaint,
which ruling was upheld by the CA.
The Facts
The instant case arose from a Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of Documents and Titles,
Recovery of Possession and Ownership, Reconveyance, Partition and Damages filed by
petitioners at the Urdaneta City RTC of Pangasinan against respondents. Petitioners alleged a
share over three (3) properties owned by respondents, which formed part of the estate of
petitioners’ deceased grandparents, Benito and Florentina Pasag. They averred that Benito and
Florentina Pasag died intestate, thus, leaving behind all their properties to their eight (8)
children––Pedro, Isidro, Basilio, Severino, Bonifacio, Maria, Juanita, and Fortunata. However,
Severino, the predecessor of respondents, claimed in an affidavit of selfadjudication that he is the
sole, legal, and compulsory heir of Benito and Florentina Pasag. Consequently, he was able to
appropriate to himself the properties covered by Original Certificates of Title (OCT) Nos. 2983
and 1887. Thereafter, Severino executed a deed of absolute sale over the said properties in favor
of his daughter, respondent Florentina Parocha. Moreover, petitioners alleged that Severino used
the same affidavit of self-adjudication to secure a free patent over an agricultural land that had
long been under the possession of Benito and Florentina Pasag.
In denying the material allegations in the Complaint, respondents averred in their Answer that
the properties left behind by the spouses Benito and Florentina Pasag had already been
partitioned among their eight (8) surviving children. They claimed that the parcels of land
covered by OCT Nos. 2983 and 1887 are Bonifacio’s share of which he later on
414
414 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Heirs of Pedro Pasag vs. Parocha
renounced in a Quitclaim Deed in favor of his brother, Severino. As regards the parcel of land
covered by OCT No. P20607, respondents asserted that the said land had been in Severino’s
possession and occupation since 1940, thus, giving him the right to apply for and be granted a
free patent over it. Having complied with the requirements of law, Severino’s title had now
become indefeasible.
The trial of the case commenced on March 19, 1996. On March 9, 1999, petitioners rested
their case and were granted ten (10) days within which to submit their formal offer of
documentary exhibits. However, petitioners failed to submit the said pleading within the required
period.
On April 19, 1999, petitioners asked the trial court to give them until May 11, 1999 to submit
their offer of evidence; and it subsequently granted their motion. However, on May 11, 1999,
they again failed to submit their offer of evidence and moved for another extension of five (5)
days.
Unfortunately, petitioners still failed to submit their formal offer of evidence within the
extended period. Consequently, in its June 17, 1999 Order,  the trial court deemed waived
3

petitioners’ right to make their formal offer of evidence.

On July 27, 1999, petitioners moved for the admission of their offer of evidence. On
September 1, 1999, however, the trial court issued an Order  denying petitioners’ formal offer of
4

evidence for their “consistent failure”  to submit it.

5

On October 28, 1999, respondents filed a Motion to Dismiss on Demurrer to Evidence.

On February 24, 2000, in its Resolution,  the trial court granted respondents’ demurrer to
6

evidence and ordered the

_______________

 Records, p. 167.
3

 Id., at pp. 188-190.

4

 Id., at p. 189.
5

 Id., at pp. 211-216.

6

415
VOL. 522, APRIL 27, 2007 415
Heirs of Pedro Pasag vs. Parocha
dismissal of the Complaint. Petitioners’ Motion for Reconsideration was denied for lack of merit.
Petitioners appealed the case to the CA.
The Ruling of the Court of Appeals
Affirming the ruling of the trial court, the CA held that petitioners failed to prove their claim by
a preponderance of evidence. It observed that “no concrete and substantial evidence was adduced
by [petitioners]”  to substantiate their allegation that Severino, the predecessor of respondents,
7

fraudulently executed an affidavit of self-adjudication in order to exclude petitioners from the

settlement of the estate of Benito and Florentina Pasag.
The Issues
Petitioners submit the following issues for our consideration:
I.

The Hon. Court of Appeals committed reversible error in affirming the Decision of the Court a quo
despite the gross negligence of their counsel thus depriving their rights to due process.

II.

The Court of Appeals committed reversible error in affirming the Decision of the trial court instead of
remanding the case for further proceedings to clearly establish their respective claims on the subject
properties. 8

Simply stated, the issues revolve on the propriety of the following: (1) waiver of petitioners’
offer of documentary evidence; and (2) dismissal of the Complaint on a demurrer to evidence.
_______________

 Supra note 1, at p. 30.
7

 Rollo, p. 18; original in boldface.

8

416
416 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Heirs of Pedro Pasag vs. Parocha
The Court’s Ruling
The petition has no merit.
Waiver of the Offer of Evidence
The Rules of Court provides that “the court shall consider no evidence which has not been
formally offered.”  A formal offer is necessary because judges are mandated to rest their findings
9

of facts and their judgment only and strictly upon the evidence offered by the parties at the
trial.  Its function is to enable the trial judge to know the purpose or purposes for which the
10

proponent is presenting the evidence.  On the other hand, this allows opposing parties to examine
11

the evidence and object to its admissibility. Moreover, it facilitates review as the appellate court
will not be required to review documents not previously scrutinized by the trial court. 12

Strict adherence to the said rule is not a trivial matter. The Court in Constantino v. Court of
Appeals  ruled that the formal offer of one’s evidence is deemed waived after failing to submit it
13

within a considerable period of time. It explained that the court cannot admit an offer of evidence
made after a lapse of three (3) months because to do so would “condone an inexcusable laxity if
not non-compliance with a court order which, in effect, would encourage needless delays and
derail the speedy administration of justice.” 14

_______________

 Rule 132, Sec. 34.

9
  Parel v. Prudencio, G.R. No. 146556, April 19, 2006, 487 SCRA 405; Katigbak v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No.
10

140183, July 10, 2003, 405 SCRA 558; Ong v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 117103, January 21, 1999, 301 SCRA 387.
 People v. Alicante, G.R. Nos. 127026-27, May 31, 2000, 332 SCRA 440.
11

 Ong v. Court of Appeals, supra.

12

 G.R. No. 116018, November 13, 1996, 264 SCRA 59.

13

 Id., at p. 65.
14

417
VOL. 522, APRIL 27, 2007 417
Heirs of Pedro Pasag vs. Parocha
Applying the aforementioned principle in this case, we find that the trial court had reasonable
ground to consider that petitioners had waived their right to make a formal offer of documentary
or object evidence. Despite several extensions of time to make their formal offer, petitioners
failed to comply with their commitment and allowed almost five months to lapse before finally
submitting it. Petitioners’ failure to comply with the rule on admissibility of evidence is
anathema to the efficient, effective, and expeditious dispensation of justice. Under the Rule on
guidelines to be observed by trial court judges and clerks of court in the conduct of pre-trial and
case of deposition and discovery measures,  it is provided that:
15

On the last hearing day allotted for each party, he is required to make his formal offer of evidence after
the presentation of his last witness and the opposing party is required to immediately interpose his
objection thereto. Thereafter the judge shall make the ruling on the offer of evidence in open court.
However, the judge has the discretion to allow the offer of evidence in writing in conformity with Section
35, Rule 132[.]
On the other hand, Section 35 of Rule 132 of the Rules of Court provides that “documentary and
object evidence shall be offered after the presentation of a party’s testimonial evidence.” It
requires that “such offer shall be done orally unless allowed by the Court to be done in writing.”
The pre-trial guidelines and Sec. 35 of Rule 132 jointly considered, it is made clear that the
party who terminated the presentation of evidence must make an oral offer of evidence on the
very day the party presented the last witness. Otherwise, the court may consider the party’s
documentary or object evidence waived. While Sec. 35 of Rule 132 says that the trial court may
allow the offer to be done in writing, this can only be tolerated in extreme cases where the object
evidence or documents are large in number––say from 100 and above,
_______________

 June 8, 2004 En Banc Resolution in A.M. No. 03-1-09-SC.

15

418
418 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Heirs of Pedro Pasag vs. Parocha
and only where there is unusual difficulty in preparing the offer.
The party asking for such concession should however file a motion, pay the filing fee, set the
date of the hearing not later than 10 days after the filing of the motion,  and serve it on the
16

address of the party at least three (3) days before the hearing.  In short, it is a litigated motion
17

and cannot be done ex parte. Counsels for parties should not however rely on the benevolence of
the trial court as they are expected to have thoroughly and exhaustively prepared for all possible
pieces of evidence to be presented and the purposes for which they will be utilized. As a matter
of fact, the draft of the offer of evidence can already be prepared after the pre-trial order is
issued, for, then, the counsel is already fully aware of the documentary or object evidence which
can be put to use during trial. Remember that under the pre-trial guidelines, the trial court is
ordered to integrate in the pre-trial order the following directive:
“No evidence shall be allowed to be presented and offered during the trial in support of a party’s
evidence-in-chief other than those that had been identified below and pre-marked during the pre-trial.
Any other evidence not indicated or listed below shall be considered waived by the parties. However, the
Court, in its discretion, may allow introduction of additional evidence in the following cases: (a) those to
be used on cross-examination or re-cross-examination for impeachment purposes; (b) those presented on
re-direct examination to explain or supplement the answers of a witness during the crossexamination; (c)
those to be utilized for rebuttal or sur-rebuttal purposes; and (d) those not available during the pre-trial
proceedings despite due diligence on the part of the party offering the same.” 18

_______________

 RULES OF COURT, Rule 15, Sec. 5.

16

 Id., at Sec. 4.
17

 Supra note 15.
18

419
VOL. 522, APRIL 27, 2007 419
Heirs of Pedro Pasag vs. Parocha
It is apparent from the foregoing provision that both parties should obtain, gather, collate, and list
all their respective pieces of evidence––whether testimonial, documentary, or object––even prior
to the preliminary conference before the clerk of court or at the latest before the scheduled pre-
trial conference. Otherwise, pieces of evidence not identified or marked during the pre-trial
proceedings are deemed waived and rendered inutile. The parties should strictly adhere to the
principle of “laying one’s cards on the table.” In the light of these issuances and in order to
obviate interminable delay in case processing, the parties and lawyers should closely conform to
the requirement that the offer of evidence must be done orally on the day scheduled for the
presentation of the last witness.
Thus, the trial court is bound to consider only the testimonial evidence presented and exclude
the documents not offered. Documents which may have been identified and marked as exhibits
during pre-trial or trial but which were not formally offered in evidence cannot in any manner be
treated as evidence. Neither can such unrecognized proof be assigned any evidentiary weight and
value. It must be stressed that there is a significant distinction between identification of
documentary evidence and its formal offer. The former is done in the course of the pre-trial, and
trial is accompanied by the marking of the evidence as an exhibit; while the latter is done only
when the party rests its case.  The mere fact that a particular document is identified and marked
19

as an exhibit does not mean that it has already been offered as part of the evidence.  It must be 20

emphasized that any evidence which a party desires to submit for the consid-
_______________

 People v. Franco, G.R. No. 118607, March 4, 1997, 269 SCRA 211.

19

 Republic v. Wee, G.R. No. 147212, March 24, 2006, 485 SCRA 308; Villaluz v. Ligon, G.R. No. 143721, August 31,
20

2005, 468 SCRA 486; Macasiray v. People, G.R. No. 94736, June 26, 1998, 291 SCRA 154.
420
420 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Heirs of Pedro Pasag vs. Parocha
eration of the court must formally be offered by the party; otherwise, it is excluded and rejected. 21

Dismissal of the Complaint on a Demurrer to Evidence

Having established that the documentary evidence of petitioners is inadmissible, this Court is
now tasked to determine the propriety of the dismissal of the Complaint on a demurrer to
evidence.
A demurrer to evidence is an instrument for the expeditious termination of an action;  thus, 22

abbreviating judicial proceedings.  It is defined as “an objection or exception by one of the
23

parties in an action at law, to the effect that the evidence which his adversary produced is
insufficient in point of law (whether true or not) to make out his case or sustain the issue.”  The 24

demurrer challenges the sufficiency of the plaintiff’s evidence to sustain a verdict.  In passing 25

upon the sufficiency of the evidence raised in a demurrer, the court is merely required to
ascertain whether there is competent or sufficient proof to sustain the indictment or to support a
verdict of guilt. 26

_______________

21
 Landingin v. Republic, G.R. No. 164948, June 27, 2006, 493 SCRA 415; Pigao v. Rabanillo, G.R. No. 150712, May
2, 2006, 488 SCRA 546; Katigbak v. Sandiganbayan, supra note 10.
22
 Sec. 1 of Rule 33 of the Rules of Court provides: [A]fter the plaintiff has completed the presentation of his evidence,
the defendant may move for dismissal on the ground that upon the facts and the law the plaintiff has shown no right to
relief. x x x
23
 Consolidated Bank and Trust Corporation (SOLIDBANK) v. Del Monte Motor Works, Inc., G.R. No. 143338, July
29, 2005, 465 SCRA 117.
24
 H. Black, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 433 (6th ed., 1990).
25
 Ong v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 140904, October 9, 2000, 342 SCRA 372; Gutib v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No.
131209, August 13, 1999, 312 SCRA 365.
26
 Id.
421
VOL. 522, APRIL 27, 2007 421
Heirs of Pedro Pasag vs. Parocha
In the present case, we have thoroughly reviewed the records and are convinced that petitioners
have failed to sufficiently prove their allegations. It is a basic rule in evidence that the burden of
proof lies on the party who makes the allegations.  However, petitioners did not substantiate their
27

allegations and merely argued that the Complaint should be “threshed out in a full blown trial in
order to establish their respective positions on issues [which are] a matter of judicial
appreciation.” 28

Regardless of the bare argument of petitioners, however, we find that the trial and appellate
courts were correct in dismissing the Complaint. The allegation that Severino fraudulently
excluded the other heirs of Benito and Florentina Pasag in the settlement of the latter’s estate was
not supported by concrete evidence. While petitioners maintain that the estate of Benito and
Florentina was never partitioned among their heirs, the testimony of their witness, Eufemio
Pasag, proves otherwise. Significantly, during crossexamination, Eufemio admitted that the
children of Benito and Florentina, including the father of petitioners, had received properties as
inheritance from the said spouses. He testified, thus:
Q Are you aware that there are eight (8) children of the
spouses Benito and Faustina Pasag?
A Yes, sir.
Q And one of whom is Bonifacio Pasag?
A Yes, sir.
_______________
  Acabal v. Acabal, G.R. No. 148376, March 31, 2005, 454 SCRA 555; Saguid v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 150611,
27

June 10, 2003, 403 SCRA 678; Pimentel v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 117422, May 12, 1999, 307 SCRA 38; Luxuria
Homes, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 125986, January 28, 1999, 302 SCRA 315.
 Rollo, p. 59; petitioners’ Memorandum.
28

422
42 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
2
Heirs of Pedro Pasag vs. Parocha
Q And one of whom is Severino Pasag?
A Yes, sir.
Q Are you likewise aware, Mr. Witness, that after the death
of the spouses Benito and Faustina Pasag, there was no
last will and testament?
A Yes, sir.
Q And of course, you are aware that there are properties left
by the said spouses, is that right?
A Yes, sir.
Q And in fact, your father Pedro Pasag has already a title in
his name of the properties left by the spouses to Pedro
Pasag, is that right?
A Yes, sir.
Q And in fact, it is where your house was situated or
erected among those properties that was given to your
father, is that right?
A Yes, sir.
Q And of course you are aware that likewise Severino
Pasag, after the death of the spouses Benito and Faustina
Pasag, acquired some properties as inheritance, is that
right?
A Yes, sir.
  xxxx
Q And you also agree with me that Isidro Pasag, Juanito
Bustillo, Fortunata Savellano, Basilio Pasag, and Maria
Lumague and the other brothers and sisters of your fat
her likewise received property of their own as a result of
the death of your grandfather, is that right?
A Yes, sir.29

_______________

 TSN, March 9, 1999, pp. 5-7.

29

423
VOL. 522, APRIL 27, 2007 423
Heirs of Pedro Pasag vs. Parocha
It must be stressed that fraud is not presumed; and it must be proved by clear and convincing
evidence,  and not by mere conjectures or speculations.  No such evidence was presented in this
30 31

case to sustain petitioners’ allegations.

WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition and AFFIRM the assailed February 15, 2002 Decision
and September 6, 2002 Resolution of the CA, with costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
     Quisumbing (Chairperson), Carpio, Carpio-Morales and Tinga, JJ., concur.
Petition denied, assailed decision and resolution affirmed.
Note.—Neither the rules of procedure nor jurisprudence would sanction the admission of
evidence that has not been formally offered during the trial. But this evidentiary rule is
applicable only to ordinary trials not to cases covered by the rule on summary procedure—cases
in which no full blown trial is held. (Heirs of Lourdes Saez Sabanpan vs. Comorposa, 408 SCRA
692 [2003])

——o0o——
_______________

30
 Morandarte v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 123586, August 12, 2004, 436 SCRA 213; Maestrado v. Roa, G.R. No.
133324, March 9, 2000, 327 SCRA 678; Mangahas v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 95815, March 10, 1999, 304 SCRA
375; Sanchez v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 108947, September 29, 1997, 279 SCRA 647.
31
 Sanchez v. Court of Appeals, supra.
424
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