11

course of law”. These are1, the powers inherent in our higher judiciary.

Sometimes some men and women who sit on the bench are not conscious of

limits of such power, or do not have the sensitivity to exercise judicial restraint

when called for, only means:that those (few) men (and women) are not equal

to the supremely difficult itask of judging entrusted to them under the

Constitution: it only indicates that perhaps it is time we adopt a better method

of selection of judges for over higher judiciary.

As to who can approach courts for relief under Articles 32 and 226-

obviously, persons who are “prejudicially affected” by acts or omissions of

any governmental or other authority - sometimes even by “strangers”.

Constitutional historian H.M Seervai has given an example of public spirited

individuals being granted locus to move the courts with beneficial results to

public administration - in Piloo Mody v. State of Maharashtra (1975) the

petitioner, a public spirited citizen, impugned the action of the State

Government in granting leases of valuable plots of land at Backbay

Reclamation, Bombay, at a gross undervalue.

The result of the litigation was to help secure to the state exchequer a

crore of rupees more : a very substantial sum in those days. It was this and

later cases that gave impetus to the concept of PIT (Public Interest Litigation),
i

since then frequently used (but now-a-days frequently misused). It is the

misuse that require correction, not by abolishing PILs, but laying down norms
and framing strict guideline^ for insuring that such PILs are not improperly

motivated. ' ' '

PIL should be decided judiciously, we do not need judges who 'behave

like emperors. What we do'need is those “whom the lust of office does not

kill;/ whom the spoils of office cannot buy;/ who possess opinions and a