WHAT IS UNITED NATION (UN)?

The United Nations (UN) is an intergovernmental organization to promote international

cooperation. Intergovernmental organization means an organization composed primarily of
sovereign states which in this case are called member states. The UN is a replacement for the
so-called ineffective League of Nation. The organization was established on 24 October 1945
after the World War II (WWII) in order to prevent another world war. At its founding, the
UN had only 51 member states that keeps growing larger and presently it has 193 member
states.

The UN has six principal organs namely; the General Assembly that is the main deliberative
assembly; the Security Council that acts as a decision maker in certain resolutions for peace
and security; International Court of Justice (ICJ) is a primary judicial organ; the Secretariat
acts in providing studies, information and facilities needed by the UN; the Economic and
Social Council (ECOSOC) is established to promote international economic and social
operation and development; and UN Trusteeship Council was established for administering
trust territories which was suspended in 1994 since all territories have now attained self-
government or independence, either as separate nations or by joining neighboring
independent countries.

THE POWERFUL UN SECURITY COUNCIL

The UN Security Council was created after the most destructive war in history to help the
world respond to global security threats with overwhelming force if needed. The UN Charter,
as amended in 1965 creates a fifteen-member council with the authority to impose binding
decisions on all UN member states. The UNSC’s power resides with the five permanent
members who were the WWII’s principal victors, all of whom are now nuclear-armed states
which are the United States of America (USA), United Kingdom (UK), Russia, France and
China. Nonetheless, the charter makes no mention of geographic representation as a
consideration for permanent membership, but provides ten additional seats elected for two-
year terms based on contributions to peace and security, with consideration to geographic
parity (in practice the elected seats have been divvied up among the regional blocs).1

1
Charter of United Nations, Chapter V, Article 23

1
The Security Council is the UN’s most powerful body, the only one with the authority to
issue legally binding resolutions that can be backed up by sanctions, blue-helmeted
peacekeepers or by force of arms. In term of voting procedure, each member has one vote.
Decisions on procedure matters are made by an affirmative vote of at least 9 of the 15
members. On the other hand, decisions on substantive matters require nine votes and the
absence of a negative vote (veto)2 by any of the five permanent members. All five permanent
members have exercised the right of veto at one time or another. If a permanent member does
not fully agree with a proposed resolution but does not wish to cast a veto, it may choose to
abstain, thus allowing resolution to be adopted if it obtains the required number of nine
favorable votes.3 The presidency of the Council is held by each of the members in turn for
one month, following alphabetical order.4

The composition of the Council, as well as its procedures, are the subject of a working group
of the General Assembly considering Security Council reform, especially the addition of
permanent seats or enlargement of non-permanent membership. At issue is the notion of the
equitable representation of member states in addressing matters of global consequence.
Currently, sixty-seven UN member states have never sat on the Council. 5 All members of
United Nations, however, agree to accept and carry out the decisions that member states are
then obligated to implement under the Charter.

Before it goes further, it is essential to know the functions and power of the UN Security
Council. The function and powers of the Security Council as listed under Chapter V of UN
Charter are as follows:

 to maintain international peace and security in accordance with the principles and
purposes of the United Nations;
 to formulate plans for establishing a system to regulate armaments;
 to call upon the parties to a dispute to settle it by peaceful means;
 to recommend methods of adjusting such disputes or the terms of settlement;
 to determine the existence of a threat to the peace or act of aggression and to
recommend what action should be taken;
2
A constitutional right to reject a decision or proposal made by a law-making body
3
Abstention is not regarded as a veto in most cases, though all five members must actively concur to amend the
UN Charter or to recommend the admission of a new UN member state
4
www.un.org/en/sc/presidency/
5
current finding as to 8th March 2017 at www.un.org/en/sc/members/notelected.asp

2
  to call on Members to apply economic sanctions and other measures not involving the
use of force to prevent or stop aggression;
 to take military action against an aggressor;
 to recommend the admission of new Members;
 to exercise the trusteeship functions of the United Nations in "strategic areas"; and
 to recommend to the General Assembly the appointment of the Secretary-
General and, together with the Assembly, to elect the Judges of the International
Court of Justice.

The Security Council is organized in such a way that it can function continuously. A
representative of each its members must be present at all times at UN Headquarters. The
Council may meet elsewhere: in 1972 it held a session in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia 6; in 1973
they met in Panama City, Panama7; and in 1990 they met in Geneva. When a complaint
concerning a threat to peace is brought before it, the Council’s first action is usually to
recommend that the parties try to reach agreement by peaceful means as stated in the Charter.
The Council may set forth principles for such agreement. In some cases, the Council itself
undertakes investigation and mediation. It may dispatch a mission, appoint special envoys or
request the Secretary-General to use his good offices to achieve a pacific settlement of the
dispute.

The ‘peace’ referred to in Article 39 may involve conflicts other than those between states. At
the time the Charter was established, it was envisaged that conflicts within the borders of a
state could also constitute a threat to or breach of the peace, and thus that the Council could
order the use of enforcement measures. The Council has broadened its definition of these
cases over time, so that gross violations of human rights may now be seen as a threat to the
peace, as was the case with the genocide in Rwanda.

In exercising its enforcement powers, the Security Council has imposed economic sanctions
against a number of States and other parties. The great majority of these sanctions regimes
have been imposed in the post-Cold War period. The Council imposed general trade
sanctions on Iraq in 1990, but since then the Council has preferred to imposed more
"targeted" sanctions such as arms embargoes, travel bans, restrictions on diplomatic relations,
and bans on key commodities like petroleum and diamonds.
6
International Legal Materials Vol.11, No.2 (March 1972) pp.436-442
7
Security Council official records, 28th year, 1696th meeting, 15 March 1973, Panama City

3
Under Article 42 of the Charter, the Security Council has the power to order the use of force
to maintain or restore peace and security. However, the collective use of force as a military
sanction does not operate in the way originally intended. It was envisaged that States would
conclude agreements with the United Nations, enabling the Council to require troop
contributions to create and carry out military enforcement operations. Due to the Cold War
this procedure was not implemented, and more recently there has not been the political will to
return to the original intentions of the Charter.

Nonetheless the Security Council has delegated its Chapter VII powers to member States who
volunteer their forces to carry out the enforcement action. These delegations of power include
a delegation of a power of command and control over such forces, usually to those
volunteering. Recently, the Council has delegated its enforcement powers to NATO in certain
Balkan conflicts, to a force assembled by the Economic Community of West African States
in Liberia and Sierra Leone, and to a multinational force led by Australia in East Timor.
These are sometimes referred to as "coalitions of the willing." The best-known case is the
coalition led by the United States that assembled under Resolution 678 in response to Iraq's
invasion of Kuwait in 19908.

It should also be known that the Council has delegated its Chapter VII powers to member
States for the attainment of various objectives including to counter a use of force, to carry out
a naval interdiction against a state, to achieve humanitarian objectives, to protect UN
declared 'safe areas,' and to ensure implementation of a peace agreement. Member states are
often less than satisfied with the results of these operations, which are frequently seen as
reflecting the interests of the powerful states taking part, and not sufficiently reflecting the
will of the Council or the international community as a whole.

When a dispute leads to hostilities, the Council’s primary concern is to bring them to an end
as soon as possible. It may issue ceasefire directives that can help prevent an escalation to the
conflict. The Council may also dispatch military observers or a peacekeeping force to help
reduce tensions, separate opposing forces and establish a calm in which settlements may be
sought. Beyond this, the Council may opt for enforcement measures, including economic
sanctions, arms embargoes, financial penalties and restrictions, and travel bans; severance of
diplomatic relations; blockade; or even collective military action. A chief concern is to focus
action on those responsible for the policies or practices condemned by the international
8
Adopted at the 2963rd meeting by 12 votes to 2 (Cuba and Yemen) with 1 abstention (China)

4
community, while minimizing the impact of the measures taken on other parts of the
population and economy.

CRITICISMS ON THE EXCESSIVE USE OF VETO POWER

While the structure and operational mechanisms of the UN Security Council have been
criticized for many years and until today after 72 years of the UN’s establishment, they have
recently come under heightened attack given the inability of the UNSC to intervene
effectively in the prolong conflict in Syria. Particular attention has been paid to the veto
mechanism, which can be enacted only by the UNSC's permanent member states. Three new
proposals to reform the UNSC veto mechanism are assessed and extensively detailed in a
report published recently by the independent non-profit Security Council Report. While the
probability of reforming the UNSC remains low, the newly energized debate, along with the
centrality of the UNSC in the international arena, warrants a fresh reflection on the veto
mechanism, and in particular, how it plays out with respect to Israel. Given the very slim
chance that the proposed changes will be adopted, Israel need not be particularly alarmed
about prospective reforms in the UNSC. Nevertheless, the criticism regarding the UNSC's
performance and the proposed reforms serve as an important reminder to Israeli decision
makers regarding yet another area where the strong US-Israel alliance is of supreme
importance to Israel9. This is further strengthened by the newly-elected the US President
Donald Trump which makes the tie between the two states is even more fortified.

The UN Security Council (UNSC) is commissioned to address issues that pose a threat to
international peace and security. The UN Charter stipulates that all members of the United
Nations are obligated to implement decisions of the UNSC, which in practice awards this
body with crucial power. Such power has been demonstrated in decisions relating to the use
of military force and the imposition of economic sanctions on states, and points to the
importance of the UNSC's composition, mechanisms, and decision making processes. 

While the UNSC's structure and operational mechanisms have been internationally criticized
for many years, they have recently come under heightened attack following its inability to
intervene effectively in the conflict in Syria. Particular attention has been given to the veto
mechanism, which can be enacted only by the UNSC's permanent member states. This
9
http://www.wrmea.org/2005-may-june/an-updated-list-of-vetoes-cast-by-the-united-states-to-shield-israel-
from-criticism-by-the-u.n.-security-council.html “The list shows how frequent the US used the veto to shield
Israel”

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mechanism was a condition put forth for the founding of the UN in the mid-1940s in order to
guarantee the participation of the most powerful states in the newly-established body, and as
such is protected in the UN Charter. The Council's veto is constituted by a negative vote of
one or more of the permanent members on a draft resolution supported by nine or more other
Council members. Since 1946, 233 draft resolutions or parts thereof have been vetoed.
Insofar as permanent members have used the veto to defend their perceived national interests
or to uphold a doctrine of their foreign policy, the UNSC's ability to act is often paralyzed.
The latest draft proposal which was voted negative by China and Russia dated 28 th February
2017 regarding the prohibition of bacteriological methods of warfare in the Syrian Arab
Republic’s conflict.10

The current wave of criticism is accompanied by three proposals to reform the UNSC's veto
mechanism, assessed and extensively detailed in a report published in late October 2015 by
the independent non-profit Security Council Report. While the probability of reforming the
UNSC remains low, the newly energized debate, along with the centrality of the UNSC in the
international arena, warrants a fresh reflection on the veto mechanism, and in particular, how
it plays out with respect to Israel and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

Among its findings, the report highlights the UNSC's inability to mount an effective response
to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict in general and to the recurring crises in Gaza in particular.
Just as Russia’s interests in Ukraine have hindered effective engagement on that issue, UNSC
action on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is considered constrained by the US, which
traditionally protects Israel's interests, thus making the adoption of decisions critical of Israeli
conduct hard to achieve.

In July (S/2006/508)11 and November (S/2006/878)12 2006, for example, the US cast vetoes
on draft resolutions calling on Israel to halt military operations in Gaza endangering civilians.
In February 2011 (S/2011/24)13 the US cast a veto on a resolution demanding that Israel cease

10
S/2017/172 Agenda Item : Middle East
11
This draft resolution called for the immediate and unconditional release of the abducted Israeli soldier and all
detained Palestinian officials and civilians. It also called upon Israel to halt its military operations and
disproportionate use of force and called upon the Palestinian Authority to take immediate action to bring an end
to violence, including the firing of rockets on Israeli territory. 12 July 2006
12
This draft resolution called upon Israel to cease its military activities in Gaza and upon the Palestinian
Authority to take steps to stop the firing of rockets into Israel and requested the Secretary-general to establish a
fact-finding mission in Beit Hanoun. 10 November 2006
13
This was the draft resolution on settlements vetoed by the US. The other 14 Council members voted in favour.
18 February 2011

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settlement activity in the occupied Palestinian territories. Without these vetoes, subsequent
steps could have included the creation of a sanctioning mechanism against Israel, overseen by
the UN, until Israel was seen to comply with the resolutions passed by the Council. In July
2014, during Operation Protective Edge, Jordan, a non-permanent member of the Council,
attempted to mobilize action through a draft resolution calling for a ceasefire; a withdrawal of
Israeli forces from the Gaza Strip; the lifting of Israeli restrictions on Gaza; and renewed
efforts to achieve peace based on the two-state solution. Though the draft was discussed
several times in consultations, no consensus was reached, which validates additional criticism
of the UNSC is subject regarding the disparities in power, knowledge, and experience
between permanent and elected members of the UNSC. Thus, with respect to Operation
Protective Edge, while the US did not cast the veto as in previous years, the report notes that
the US position constricted the UNSC’s flexibility. 

Between 1945 and (September) 2015, the United States has vetoed a total of 30 UNSC
resolutions related to Israel and the Palestinians. 14 This by far amounts to the largest number
of resolutions vetoed by a UNSC permanent member on one specific issue. Next in line is the
United States veto of UNSC resolutions on the situation between Israel and Lebanon (10
vetoes, a tie with 10 vetoes enacted by the US on the situation in South Africa). Examples of
the highest number of UNSC resolutions enacted by other permanent members on any one
issue are the UK, with nine vetoes on the situation in South Africa and the situation in
Rhodesia (each); and China, with four vetoes on the situation in Syria. 

One factor that is not reflected by statistics on the veto is the “pocket” veto, referring to cases
in which draft resolutions are not formally presented because of the looming threat of the
veto by one or more permanent members. Pocket vetoes thus block resolutions that
potentially could have made a difference, because of the initial assessment that the draft
would clash with the interests of one or more of the permanent members and thus have no
chance of adoption. Pocket vetoes are impossible to quantify, as records only exist if a draft
resolution is circulated as a UNSC document, and in most cases, this happens only if there is
reasonable expectation of adoption.

With the aim of rectifying the situation, 2017 has thus far produced three initiatives
pertaining to enactment of the veto mechanism open to the five permanent members.  One is

14
A study made by the Institute for National Security Studies led by Dr.Radoshitzky shows that the US has
been consistent with their veto to shield Israel

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the French initiative, which is still being finalized, currently calling for a political declaration
on suspension of veto powers in cases of mass atrocity and calling on permanent members to
explain their vote when casting a veto 15. Another is the Accountability, Coherence and
Transparency Group's (ACT)16 code of conduct committing UNSC members not to vote
against “credible” draft resolutions that seek to end or prevent genocide, crimes against
humanity, or war crimes.17 A third is the Elders’18 Proposal (an independent group of global
leaders currently chaired by former Secretary-General Kofi Annan) calling for the five
permanent members not to use, or threaten to use, their veto in situations of mass atrocities
without publicly clarifying an alternative course of action in order to protect the populations
in question.

Common to all three initiatives is that their support would not be legally binding. In other
words, signing them would not constitute an obligation under international law –which places
a big question mark on the likelihood of any of these mechanisms successfully addressing
broad concerns about the UNSC's performance in recent years. This, along with the very slim
chance that the proposed changes will be adopted, suggests that Israel should not be
particularly alarmed about prospective reforms in the UNSC. Nevertheless, given the
criticism regarding the UNSC's performance and the proposed reforms, the report should
serve as an important reminder to Israeli decision makers regarding yet another area where
the strong US-Israel alliance is of supreme importance to Israel.

THE LIMITS OF LEGALITY IN THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL

The previous arguments may have shown that the Council has broad powers to maintain
international peace and security, most notably under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, and its

15
Political statement on the suspension of the veto power in case of mass atrocities presented by France and
Mexico in the 70th General Assembly of the UN
16
ACT comprises of 27 countries from all continents
17
All UN Member States have a fundamental interest in the Security Council’s decision-making process and its
outcomes. After all, the Council “acts on their behalf” as stated in Article 24(1) of the UN Charter. In turn, the
members are obliged “to accept and carry out” decisions of the Council in accordance with Article 25. Given the
extensive authority of the Council and the impact of its decisions, it is legitimate for UN members to wish for a
well-functioning Security Council and to expect to be informed as well as, to the extent possible, involved in the
decision-making process of this important UN organ. A Security Council working in a more transparent,
accountable and inclusive way - both within its own structure and in relation to the wider membership - is more
legitimate, coherent and efficient. The ultimate objective is a Security Council carrying out more effectively its
primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security.
18
The Elders is an organisation founded by Nelson Mandela chaired by Kofi Annan and made up of prominent
elder statesmen and women from across the globe. The proposal for UN Reform is entitled ‘Strengthening the
United Nations’ and is part of a wider push to make the UN ‘fit for purpose’

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decisions are binding on UN members. At the same time, some of the Council’s actions have
been labelled as ultra vires and the lack of a binding, legal oversight mechanism to reign in
Council action has been decried. Accepting that there is a difficulty in imposing legally
binding checks and balances on the UNSC, it is also relevant to discuss the limitation of the
veto power even though most state members think to limit UNSC’s is like harnessing an
unruly horse. Despite the major thoughts, it must be made known to the public that great
power comes with great responsibility.

While the Charter itself gives the Security Council much deference and respect, the
International Court of Justice (ICJ) can also be seen as a check and balance on the Council's
power. Nevertheless, the Court has not exercised these powers and has not challenged the
Council's authority on any of its decisions. It is essential to discuss international cases which
were brought to ICJ.19

Tadic’s case

Recently, the International Court of Justice decided two cases, Prosecutor v. Tadic and the
Lockerbie’s case, which explored the Security Council's powers. Prosecutor v. Tadic raised
the issue of the ICJ's jurisdiction. Tadic, a Bosnian Serb war criminal, was tried for 31
breaches of the Geneva Conventions, violations of the laws and customs of war and crimes
against humanity related to the torture and murder of Muslims in a Serb run prison camp in
Bosnia. He challenged the ICJ's jurisdiction and argued it was not legitimately exercising
jurisdiction in his case. In addition, he argued that the UN did not have the power to create a
judicial branch. The court concluded that Court derives its jurisdiction through the body that
formed it. The ICJ is a body under the Security Council, therefore the Council can determine
ICJ’s jurisdiction. Sadly as it sounds, it shows that there are no separation of powers between
the Security Council and the ICJ but somehow, what is saving all the exaggerated powers to
be misused is the Charter.

Unlike any previous case, the Lockerbie affair has raised questions about the nature and
extent of the Security Council’s powers under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. Due to the
recent surrender of the suspects in the 1988 Lockerbie bombing, the ICJ may no longer be in
a position to pronounce itself on the validity of the resolutions adopted by the Council in this

19
Thomas M. Franck. The "Powers of Appreciation": Who is the Ultimate Guardian of UN Legality? 86 Am. J
Int'l L.519, 519-523 (1992).

9
matter. However, the question of whether the Security Council resolutions can be subjected
to judicial review by the Court remains of crucial importance for the constitutional system of
the UN system. Next, there will be three main issues to be discussed: the binding nature of
the Charter for the Council; the nature and extent of the Council’s power of determination
under Article 39 of the Charter; and the Council’s position with respect to the international
law.

Lockerbie case

In Lockerbie case, a bomb exploded on board Pan Am flight 103 from London to New York
over Lockerbie, Scotland.20 The explosion caused the plane to crash, killing all 259 people on
board and 11 on the ground. After lengthy investigations, the UK and the US concluded that
the bomb had been placed on the plane by two Libyan nationals alleged to have acted as
agents of the Libyan government. In a joint declaration of 27 November 1991, the British and
American government demanded that Libya surrender the two suspects for trial in the US or
the UK.21

Libya also claimed that its domestic law did not permit the extradition of national, but agreed
to institute proceedings against the suspects and requested assistance from the US and the UK
investigators. Libya also offered an opportunity for observers from the two countries to be
present at the proceedings. These requests were apparently ignored.

When Libya refused to surrender the suspects, the SC adopted Resolution 731 on 21 st January
1992. This resolution, which had the character of a non-binding recommendation, asked
Libya to comply with the request made by the British and American governments, including
the call for surrender of the two suspects. On 3rd March 1998, while the matter was still
pending before the SC, Libya, based on Article 14 of Montreal Convention, filed two
applications asking the ICJ to find that it had complied with all of its obligations under the
Montreal Convention, that the UK and the US were in violation of their obligations under that
Convention, and that they were obliged to desist from the use of any force or threats against
Libya.22
20
Bernard Gwertzman, Tension Over Libya: Trying to Topple Qaddafi, N.Y. Times, Apr. 18, 1986, at Al
(indicating that the Tripoli raid was part of an ongoing attempt to unseat Qaddafi).
21
Clyde Haberman, Israelis Remain Convinced Syrians Downed Flight 103, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 21, 1991, at
A14; Roy Rowan, Pan Am 103: Why Did They Die?, Time Apr. 27, 1992, at 24, 29.

22

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The court heard the matter on the 26th to the 28th March 1992. Three days later, on the 31st
March 1992, the SC, acting under Chapter VII of the Charter, adopted Resolution 748
wherein Libya was called upon to extradite the individuals concerned by 15 th April or suffer
sanctions. On 14th April, the ICJ denied interim measures. On 15 th April, sanctions were
imposed. Subsequently, the Libyan General People Congress has passed a tentative resolution
approving of the surrender of the suspects and the Libyan government has supplied the
British intelligence service with the of IRA terrorists trained in special camps in Libya.

In its brief judgment denying interim measures, the Court stated that the parties were obliged
to carry out the decisions of the Security Council in accordance with Article 25 of the
Charter, and that at the interim measures stage of the proceedings, Resolution 748 was prima
facie binding on the parties under this Resolution superseded any obligations under other
instruments, including the Montreal Convention. The indication of provisional measures
would also prima facie deprive the US and the UK of their rights under the Resolution. The
ICJ made it clear that it was not definitively deciding the legal effect of Resolution 748 or its
jurisdiction to entertain the merits of the case. The ICJ may therefore have ultimately
determine the legitimacy of the Resolution in terms of the Charter and could make an order
inconsistent with the Security Council’s resolution. The effect of the decision is that, in the
interim the respondent states may utilize the prima facie presumption of legitimacy in order
to pressure Libya into extraditing the alleged offenders.

Overall, the approach of the majority of the Court in the 1998 judgments can be described as
extremely cautions where it may be seen that the Court carefully limited itself to the
resolution of only those issues for which a decision could not possibly have been avoided at
the preliminary stage. As a consequence of this approach, many questions surrounding the
issue of judicial review of SC resolutions were dealt with only implication or were left
completely open.

RECOMMENDATION – THE REFORM MOVEMENT

Questions of Interpretation and Application of 1971 Montreal Convention Arising from the Aerial Incident at
Lockerbie (Libyan Arab Jamahriya v. United Kingdom), Request for the Indication of Provisional Measures,
Order of 14 April 1992, ICJ Reports (1992) 3; Questions of Interpretation and Application of 1971 Montreal
Convention Arising from the Aerial Incident at Lockerbie (Libyan Arab Jamahriya v. United Kingdom),
Request for the Indication of Provisional Measures, Order of 14 April 1992, ICJ Reports (1992) 114. The two
orders being virtually identical, in the following only the order concerning the US will be cited.

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Any change in the membership of the Security Council requires a two-thirds vote from the
General Assembly, which includes all the permanent members. The only change so far to the
Security Council was in 1965. At that time, non-permanent membership was enlarged from six
to its present ten.
It is generally agreed that something still needs to change. Even though everyone seems to
agree on the fundamental idea of reform, efforts have been stymied for over a decade. Most
reform proposals relate to the work, size, and composition of the Security Council. Concerning
size and composition, the General Assembly at the prompting of General Secretary Kofi Annan
adopted resolution 48/26 in 1993. This established the Open-ended Working Group to consider
all the issue of Security Council membership reform. For a decade now, diplomats and
committees have been working on Security Council reform. Most of the discussion has
revolved around technicalities such as how much should it be expanded, should they be
permanent members, and whether they should have vetoes or whether vetoes should be
abolished altogether.

In 1997, there was a strong push to get Germany and Japan permanent Security Council seats.
The initiative faced many hurdles that eventually derailed the effort. Many delegations
opposed any more permanent members since they would create more arbitrary distinctions
between member states. Other delegations felt it was unfair to only add Germany and Japan
since it would elevate yet another European state and make the council even more
unrepresentative of the world’s people. Italy intensely opposed the Germany-Japan initiative
and pushed for its own Italian Proposal. This proposal rejected further permanent members in
favour of a special class of intermediate states that would be elected periodically by the
General Assembly and would rotate in and out of Security Council seats. Here are the ideas
of reformation of the UN Security Council:

1. Expansion of Security Council

Many argue for expansion, if only to reflect the steady rise in membership in the
United Nations. The General Assembly has grown from 51 to 193. The number of
permanent members, however, has remained the same. Most reform proposals suggest
expanding the council from five to ten permanent members, and elected members
from ten to fourteen. Beyond that there is little agreement. What should the new

12
 geographic composition be? Which new members should be awarded permanent
seats? Should states be elected by regional groupings?

“If you add another five permanent members, all of them casting vetoes, forget about
anything being accomplished,” says James Paul, executive director of the Global
Policy Forum. “It’s not just casting a veto, but the threat of casting a veto that keeps
the whole issue off the agenda. A lot of council members wanted to act regarding
Chechnya, but the Russians wouldn’t even allow any discussion, much less action.”

2. Giving or taking away the Veto

How did the permanent five secure these privileges in the first place? After World War

II, the victors took another crack at forming an international body to bring stability to

the globe. Hoping to do better than the ill-fated League of Nations, the victors anointed

themselves responsible for providing the money and muscle to “maintain international

peace and security.” Others saw them as simply protecting their own interests, but

decided that this was a small price to pay if it meant peaceful coexistence. The Cold

War unfolded soon after and polarized the globe and effectively froze the Security

Council. After the fall of the Berlin Wall, this inactivity changed. There was an

outbreak of ethnic, tribal, and religious conflict across the globe which spurred Security

Council activism in both peacekeeping missions and punitive sanctions. At that point,

the rest of the world, confronted with an active and powerful Security Council began to

question the wisdom of the veto.

Use of the veto after the Cold War has dropped off dramatically but the statistics belie

the true power of the right to veto. The mere threat of the veto has prevented many

actions or talks to ever get under way. For example, the Security Council never acted in

Chechnya since it was assured that Russia would veto any measure. Following is a

13
 graph that shows how many times each of the Permanent Five countries have used this

power. Also included is a chart showing the subjects of recent veto issues.

Veto Use in the UN Security Council

Graph prepared by Benjamin Holt, September, 1999 Updated by Giji Gya

Subjects of UN Security Council Vetoes

Source: data from the UN and Sydney D. Bailey and Sam Daws “The procedure of the UN Security Council,” 3rd
Edition, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1998

Vote
Vetoing Member
Year Date of Vote (yes-veto- no or Subject
State
abstain)
2003 October 14 USA 10-1-4 on the security wall built by Israel in the West Bank.
on the Israeli decision to "remove" Palestinian
September 16 USA 11-1-3
Authority leader Asser Arafat.
on the Israeli killings of several UN employees and
2002 December 20 USA 12-1-2 the destruction of the World Food Program
(WFP) warehouse
on the renewal of the UN peacekeeping mission in Bosnia
June 30 USA 13-1-1 and the immunity of US peacekeepers from ICC
jurisdiction
on the withdrawal of Israeli forces from Palestinian-
2001 December 14 USA 12-1-2 controlled land and condemning acts of terror against
civilians

on establishing a UN observer force to protect Palestinian

March 27 USA 9-1-4 civilians
(report of Council meeting SC/7040)

14
2000 no vetoes
on the extension of UNPREDEP in the Republic of
1999 February 25 China 13-1-1
Macedonia
1998 no vetoes

Demanding Israel's immediate cessation of

1997 March 21 USA 13-1-1
construction at Jabal Abu Ghneim

Calling upon Israel to refrain from East Jerusalem

March 7 USA 14-1-0
settlement activities

Authorization for 155 observers for the purpose of

January 10 China 14-1-0
verification of the ceasefire in Guatemala

While in recent years the permanent members have shown restraint in using the veto,
this guarantees nothing of the future. Moreover, the simple threat to use the veto has
been shown to strongly effect the final outcome of Security Council debates. The
position of Belgium’s Minister for Foreign Affairs, Erik Derycke is that “the right to
veto is incompatible with the general interest.” Many countries feel the same.

3. More transparency

The Security Council is an exclusive club and acts the part. Oftentimes their
discussions are back-door closed talks. This problem is already being addressed by
measures that would enhance the communication between the Council and the General
Assembly. There is really no argument against maintaining, improving, and
formalizing these measures. Some of these measures include: regular meetings
between the Security Council and the General Assembly, briefings on the work of the
Security Council, more open meetings of the Council, and transparency of the work of
sanctions committees. These efforts will go a long way to bringing the Security
Council and the General Assembly closer together.

4. Dissolution of the council

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 One bold proposal would forget about expansion of the Security Council and just
eliminate all permanent membership and create a council of elected representatives
from different regional areas. Those advocating this approach point out that
permanent members are like presidents for life. The problem with this drastic
proposal is its unfeasibility. Any proposal that does pass would have to have the
support of the powerful veto-bearing countries. A more pragmatic suggestion would
be to add five permanent Security Council members but without veto powers. This
idea is based on basic 21st century political reality and not on any ideal concept of
equality or fairness. The result of adding more countries would increase global
representation and thereby bolster its credibility.

In my own opinion, I believe that moving forward the best reform would be to expand the

Security Council by five permanent members who do not get the veto power. I think that this is

pragmatically the best idea because it has a realistic chance to pass. Furthermore, it makes the

Security Council more representative of the world without making the Council too bulky. The

challenges facing today’s international community, such as tension in the Middle East, AIDS,

and the environment, can only be resolved through coordinated and multilateral efforts. The

reason being is the global nature of many of these problems. As the United Nations debates

possible reform let us not forget the importance of having a strong international organization.

As frustrating as it might be for the largest country or the smallest country to work within the

United Nations framework the alternatives are not worth considering.

CONCLUSION

Lockerbie was a first test case for the rule of law in the international legal order of the UN.
For the first time, the authority of the Security Council under Chapter VII of the Charter has
been challenged in ICJ. As a consequence of this challenge, the question of the nature and
extent of the Council’s powers under Chapter VII of the Charter has taken a new significance.
Unlike any previous case, the Lockerbie case serve as a paradigm for the conflict between
law and politics in international relations. They oppose fundamentally different conceptions

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of the security system of the UN. At issue is the question of whether the UN security system
of should be regarded primarily as a political merchandise or rather as an organization of law
governed by binding rules and procedures. The ICJ has approached this question with
considerable caution. Both in its orders of 1992 and its 1998 judgments, it has responded only
to those questions whose resolutions was strictly necessary at the corresponding stage of the
proceedings. However, between the lines of the 1998 judgments, a newly gained confidence
on the part of the Court may be discerned. By affirming its jurisdiction over the disputes, the
Court has resisted all attempts to remove Chapter VII of the Charter from the ambit of legal
interpretation. From this perspective, the Court’s judgments of the 1998, constitute a small
but nonetheless important step forward. It may be a very thin line of demarcation but to the
very least, it shows there is actually separation of powers between the Court and the Council.
In a nutshell, it cannot be wholly assumed that the UN Security Council is untouchable and it
is also not right to infer that the Council has limited powers.

In the end, it must be made well known to the world that the Security Council is more than a
political power tool; it is an organ with important responsibilities derived from the Charter.
The authority of the Council will not be diminished, but enhanced, if it accepts that its
decisions are not above the law. There is no contradiction between the rule of law and
international peace and security. By promoting the former, the ICJ will contribute to the
maintenance of the latter.

LIST OF REFERENCES

1. The UN Charter
2. The Provisional Rules of Procedures of the Security Council
3. The measures listed in the Annex of the draft resolution L.42 Rev.2 of May 2012
4. UN Documents – Security Council Report
5. UN (2014), Basic Facts about the United Nations 2014, UN

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6. Formerand, Jacques (2009). The A to Z of the United Nations. Scarecrow Press.
7. Sievers, Daws, (2014). The Procedure of the UN Security Council 4 th ed, Oxford
University Press.
8. Dan Sarooshi, (1999) The United Nations and the Development of Collective
Security. Oxford University Press
9. David M. Malone, (1998) Decision-Making in the UN Security Council. Oxford
University Press
10. H.R Michal, (10 November 2010). INSS Insight No.765. Criticism of the UN Security
Council Veto Mechanism: Ramifications for Israel
11. Vera Gowlland-Debbas. “The Security Council and the ICC”, in Laurence Boisson de
Chazournes, Marcelo Kohen and Jorges Vinuales (ed.), Diplomatic and Judicial
Means of Dispute Settlement (Martinus Nijhoff, 2012), pp.25-45.

12. Vera Gowlland-Debbas."The Relationship between the Security Council and the
International Criminal Court", in 3 Journal of Armed Conflict Law (1998) 97-119.

13. Vera Gowlland-Debbas "The Relationship between the International Court of Justice
and the Security Council in the Light of the Lockerbie Case", 88 AJIL (1994) 643-
677.

14. Convention on Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Civil Aviation,
Sept. 23, 1971, 24 U.S.T. 565, 974 U.N.T.S. 177 [hereinafter Convention on
Suppression].

15. Jeffrey Laurenti (2003) Reforming the UN Security Council: Will its Time Ever
Come? USA-UNA. March 17,2003.
16. Dr. Danesh D. Sarooshi. Security Council. University of London.
17. James Paul. (1997) As Reform Negotiations Reach Fever Pitch, Germany and Japan
Push for Permanent Seats.” New York, 7 March 1997.
18. Erik Derycke, (1997) Selected Quotations on the Subject of UN Reform.” 52 nd UN
General Assembly. Sept. 22, 1997.

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