SEC.

13- Right to Bail

When right may be invoked; by whom?

PEOPLE vs. Fitzgerald

Ruling:

The right to bail emenates from of the right to be presumed innocent. It is accorded to a
person in the custody of the law who may, by reason of the presumption of innocence
he enjoys,41 be allowed provisional liberty upon filing of a security to guarantee his
appearance before any court, as required under specified conditions.

Article III of the 1987 Constitution, Sections 4 and 5, Rule 114 of the 2000 Rules of
Criminal Procedure set forth substantive and procedural rules on the disposition of bail
applications. Sec. 4 provides that bail is a matter of right to an accused person in
custody for an offense not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment,
but a matter of discretion on the part of the court, concerning one facing an accusation
for an offense punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment when the
evidence of his guilt is strong. As for an accused already convicted and sentenced to
imprisonment term exceeding six years, bail may be denied or revoked based on
prosecution evidence as to the existence of any of the circumstances under Sec. 5,
paragraphs (a) to (e)

RODRIGUEZ V. PRESIDING JUDGE

Issue:

WON extradites are entitled to right to bail.

Ruling:

We emphasize that bail may be granted to a possible extraditee only upon a clear and
convincing showing (1) that he will not be a flight risk or a danger to the
community, and (2) that there exist special, humanitarian and compelling
circumstances.
BAIL WHEN DISCRETIONARY

TABORITE V. SOLLESTA

Ruling:

the discretion of the court in cases involving capital offenses may be exercised only
after there has been a hearing called to ascertain the weight of the evidence against the
accused." Peremptorily, the discretion lies not in determining whether or not there will
be a hearing, but in appreciating and evaluating the weight of the evidence of guilt
against the accused. It follows that any order issued in the absence of the requisite
evidence is not a product of sound judicial discretion but of whim and caprice and
outright arbitrariness.
As earlier pointed out, the prosecution must first be accorded an opportunity to present
evidence. It is on the basis of such evidence that judicial discretion is exercised in
determining whether the evidence of guilt of the accused is strong. In other words,
discretion must be exercised regularly, legally and within the confines of procedural due
process, that is, after evaluation of the evidence submitted by the prosecution. Any
order issued in the absence thereof is not a product of sound judicial discretion but of
whim and caprice and outright arbitrariness.

Note:WHEN BAIL IS NOT ALLOWED

THE RIGHT TO BAIL is not available to military

COMMENDADOR V. DE VILLA

Ruling:

We find that the right to bail invoked by the private respondents in G.R. Nos. 95020 has
traditionally not been recognized and is not available in the military, as an exception to
the general rule embodied in the Bill of Rights. This much was suggested in Arula,
where we observed that "the right to a speedy trial is given more emphasis in the
military where the right to bail does not exist.

The justification for this exception was well explained by the Solicitor General as
follows:
The unique structure of the military should be enough reason to exempt military men
from the constitutional coverage on the right to bail.
GUIDELINES FOR FIXING A BAIL

De La Camara V. Enage

Ruling:

The guidelines in the fixing of bail was there summarized, in the opinion of Justice
Sanchez, as follows:
(1) ability of the accused to give bail;
(2) nature of the offense;
(3) penalty for the offense charged;
(4) character and reputation of the accused;
(5) health of the accused;
(6) character and strength of the evidence;
(7) probability of the accused appearing in trial;
(8) forfeiture of other bonds;
(9) whether the accused was a fugitive from justice when arrested; and
(10) if the accused is under bond for appearance at trial in other cases."

Respondent Judge, however, did ignore this decisive consideration appearing at the
end of the above opinion: "Discretion, indeed, is with the court called upon to rule on the
question of bail. We must stress, however, that where conditions imposed upon a
defendant seeking bail would amount to a refusal thereof and render nugatory the
constitutional right to bail, we will not hesitate to exercise our supervisory powers to
provide the required remedy.

RIGHT TO BAIL AND RIGHT TO TRAVEL ABROAD

Manotok vs Ca

Ruling:

A court has the power to prohibit a person admitted to bail from leaving the Philippines.
This is a necessary consequence of the nature and function of a bail bond.

Rule 114, Section 1 of the Rules of Court defines bail as the security required and given
for the release of a person who is in the custody of the law, that he will appear before
any court in which his appearance may be required as stipulated in the bail bond or
recognizance.

Its object is to relieve the accused of imprisonment and the state of the burden of
keeping him, pending the trial, and at the same time, to put the accused as much under
the power of the court as if he were in custody of the proper officer, and to secure the
appearance of the accused so as to answer the call of the court and do what the law
may require of him

SANTIAGO V. VASQUEZ

Ruling:

the hold departure order is but an exercise of respondent court's inherent power to
preserve and to maintain the effectiveness of its jurisdiction over the case and the
person of the accused.

Manotoc, Jr. vs. Court of Appeals, et al.,32 to the effect that:

A court has the power to prohibit a person admitted to bail from leaving the Philippines.
This is a necessary consequence of the nature and function of a bail bond.
Rule 114, Section 1 of the Rules of Court defines bail as the security required and given
for the release of a person who is in custody of the law, that he will appear before any
court in which his appearance may be required as stipulated in the bail bond or
recognizance.

SEC.14 CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS OF THE ACCUSED

DUE PROCESS

ALONTE V. SAVILLANO

Ruling:

Jurisprudence acknowledges that due process in criminal proceedings, in particular,

require

(a) that the court or tribunal trying the case is properly clothed with judicial power to
hear and determine the matter before it;

(b) that jurisdiction is lawfully acquired by it over the person of the accused;

(c) that the accused is given an opportunity to be heard; and

(d) that judgment is rendered only upon lawful hearing.

NOTE:
There can be no short-cut to the legal process, and there can be no excuse for not
affording an accused his full day in court. Due process, rightly occupying the first and
foremost place of honor in our Bill of Rights, is an enshrined and invaluable right that
cannot be denied even to the most undeserving.
In this case the court violated the due process right of the accused since he was
convicted even the witness did not testify.

PEOPLE V. MACARANG

Ruling:

the failure of the trial court to inquire from accused-appellant himself whether he wanted
to present evidence; or submit his memorandum elucidating on the contradictions and
insufficiency of the prosecution evidence, if any; or in default thereof, file a demurrer to
evidence with prior leave of court, if he so believes that the prosecution evidence is so
weak that it need not even be rebutted. The inquiry is simply part and parcel of the
determination of the validity of the waiver, i.e., "not only must be voluntary, but must be
knowing, intelligent, and done with sufficient awareness of the relevant circumstances
and likely consequences," which ought to have been done by the trial court not only
because this was supposed to be an uncomplicated and routine task on its part, but
more importantly since accused-appellant himself did not personally, on a person-to-
person basis, manifest to the trial court the waiver of his own right.

PRESUMPTION OF INNOCENCE

HIZON V. CA

Ruling:

The validity of laws establishing presumptions in criminal cases is a settled matter. It is

generally conceded that the legislature has the power to provide that proof of certain
facts can constitute prima facie evidence of the guilt of the accused and then shift the
burden of proof to the accused provided there is a rational connection between the facts
proved and the ultimate fact presumed. To avoid any constitutional infirmity, the
inference of one from proof of the other must not be arbitrary and unreasonable. In fine,
the presumption must be based on facts and these facts must be part of the crime when
committed. 

We stress, however, that the statutory presumption is merely prima

facie. It can not, under the guise of regulating the presentation of evidence, operate to
preclude the accused from presenting his defense to rebut the main fact presumed. At
no instance can the accused be denied the right to rebut the presumption. 

MADARANG V. SANDIGANBAYAN

Rulig:

True, the law creates a presumption that the mere failure of an accountable officer to
produce public funds which have come into his hand on demand by an officer duly
authorized to examine his accounts is prima facie evidence of conversion. The
presumption is, of course, rebuttable. Accordingly, if petitioner is able to present
adequate evidence that can nullify any likelihood that he had put the funds or property
to personal use, then that presumption would be at an end and the prima facie case is
effectively negated.

Note:

The constitutional presumption of innocence requires of courts more than casual

consideration of every circumstance tending to show the guilt of an accused. Courts
have the imperative duty to put the prosecution's evidence under severe testing (People
vs. Diaz, 308 SCRA 744 [1999]). To be sure, a finding of prima facie evidence of
accountability does not shatter the presumptive innocence petitioner enjoys
because before prima facie evidence arises, certain facts still have to be proved.

MONTEVERDE V. PEOPLE

Ruling:

In all criminal cases, mere speculations cannot substitute for proof in establishing the
guilt of the accused. Indeed, suspicion no matter how strong must never sway
judgment. Where there is reasonable doubt, the accused must be acquitted even
though their innocence may not have been established. The Constitution presumes a
person innocent until proven guilty by proof beyond reasonable doubt. When guilt is not
proven with moral certainty, it has been our policy of long standing that the presumption
of innocence must be favored, and exoneration granted as a matter of right.

EUGENIO V. PEOPLE

Ruling:

the circumstances surrounding the alleged commission of crimes are capable of two
inferences, one favoring the innocence of the accused and the other her guilt, the
inference for her innocence must prevail, consistent with the Constitutional presumption
of her innocence.

LEJANO V. PEOPLE

Ruling:

A criminal case rises or falls on the strength of the prosecution’s case, not on the
weakness of the defense. Once the prosecution overcomes the presumption of
innocence by proving the elements of the crime and the identity of the accused as
perpetrator beyond reasonable doubt, the burden of evidence then shifts to the defense
which shall then test the strength of the prosecution’s case either by showing that no
crime was in fact committed or that the accused could not have committed or did not
commit the imputed crime, or at the very least, by casting doubt on the guilt of the
accused.

BOARD OF TRUSTEES V. ALBERT VELASCO

Ruling:

that an employee who has a pending administrative case filed against him is given the
benefit of the doubt and is considered innocent until the contrary is proven. 41
In this case, respondents were placed under preventive suspension for 90 days
beginning on 23 May 2002.1avvphi1 Their preventive suspension ended on 21 August
2002. Therefore, after serving the period of their preventive suspension and without the
administrative case being finally resolved, respondents should have been reinstated
and, after serving the same number of days of their suspension, entitled to the grant of
step increment.

CIRCUMSTANCIAL EVIDENCE

PEOPLE V. BATO

Ruling:

in the absence of direct proof, a conviction may be based on circumstantial

evidence, 25 but to warrant such conviction, the following requisites must concur:
(1) there is more than one circumstance;
(2) the facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and
(3) the combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond
reasonable doubt.26

Hence, it has been held that a judgment of conviction based on circumstantial evidence
can be upheld only if the circumstances proven constitute an unbroken chain leading to
one fair and reasonable conclusion, to the exclusion of any other, that the accused are
guilty

EQUIPOISE RULE

CORPUS V. PEOPLE

Ruling:

The equipoise rule invoked by the petitioner is applicable only where the evidence of the
parties is evenly balanced, in which case the constitutional presumption of innocence
should tilt the scales in favor of the accused. There is no such equipoise here. The
evidence of the prosecution is overwhelming and has not been overcome by the
petitioner with his nebulous claims of persecution and conspiracy.

Right to be heard by himself and counsel

PEOPLE V. BERMAS

Ruling:

In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed to be innocent until the
contrary is proved, and shall enjoy the right to be heard by himself and counsel, to be
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him, to have a speedy and
public trial, to meet the witnesses face to face, and to have compulsory process to
secure the attendance of witnesses in his behalf.

In criminal cases there can be no fair hearing unless the accused be given an
opportunity to be heard by counsel. The right to be heard would be of little avail if it does
not include the right to be heard by counsel. Even the most intelligent or educated man
may have no skill in the science of the law, particularly in the rules of procedure, and,
without counsel, he may be convicted not because he is guilty but because he does not
know how to establish his innocence.

The right to counsel must be more than lust the presence of a lawyer in the courtroom
or the mere propounding of standard questions and objections. The right to counsel
means that the accused is amply accorded legal assistance extended by a counsel who
commits himself to the cause for the defense and acts accordingly.

AMBION V. CHIONGSON

Ruling:

An examination of related provisions in the Constitution concerning the right to counsel,

will show that the preference in the choice of counsel pertains more aptly and
specifically to a person under investigation rather than one who is the accused in
criminal prosecution.

there is no denial of the right to counsel where a counsel de oficio was appointed during
the absence of the accuseds counsel de parte pursuant to the courts desire to finish the
case as early as practicable under the continuous trial system.
PEOPLE V. NADERA

Ruling:

The right to counsel must be more than just the presence of a lawyer in the courtroom
or the mere propounding of standard questions and objections. The right to counsel
means that the accused is amply accorded legal assistance extended by a counsel who
commits himself to the cause for the defense and acts accordingly.

PEOPLE V. BASCUGUIN

Ruling:

Courts must see to it that an accused must be afforded a qualified and competent
representation. Where it appears that a counsel de officio resorted to procedural
shortcuts that amounted to inadequate counseling, the Court will strike down the
proceedings had in order to promote a judicious dispensation of justice. Therefore,
given the attendant circumstances of this case, this Court cannot send accused-
appellant to the death chamber, for no matter how outrageous the crime charged might
be, or how depraved the offender would appear to be, the uncompromising rule of law
must still prevail. Verily, a judgment of conviction cannot stand upon an invalid
arraignment.

ESTRADA V. BADOY

Ruling:

Our minds cannot sit easy with regard to the charge of violation of the accuseds' right to
counsel. A PAO lawyer is considered as independent counsel within the contemplation
of the Constitution considering that he is not a special counsel, public or private
prosecutor, counsel of the police, or a municipal attorney whose interest is admittedly
adverse to that of the accused. In People vs. Bacor, 55 we ruled that the assistance of a
PAO lawyer satisfies the constitutional requirement of a competent and independent
counsel for the accused.

PEOPLE V. LARRANAGA

Ruling:

There is no denial of the right to counsel where a counsel de officio was appointed
during the absence of counsel de parte of the accused, pursuant to the court’s desire to
finish the case as early as practicable under continuous trial system.
CALIANGAN V. PEOPLE

Ruling:

petitioner never had the chance to present her defense because of the nonfeasance
(malfeasance, even) of her counsel. It also concluded that, effectively, she was without
counsel.6 Considering these findings, to deprive petitioner of her liberty without affording
her the right to be assisted by counsel is to deny her due process.

In criminal cases, the right of the accused to be assisted by counsel is

immutable.7 Otherwise, there will be a grave denial of due process. 8 The right to counsel
proceeds from the fundamental principle of due process which basically means that a
person must be heard before being condemned.

PEOPLE V. TULIN

Ruling:

On the first issue, the record reveals that a manifestation (Exhibit "20", Record) was
executed by accused-appellants Tulin, Loyola, Changco, and Infante, Jr. on February
11, 1991, stating that they were adopting the evidence adduced when they were
represented by a non-lawyer. Such waiver of the right to sufficient representation during
the trial as covered by the due process clause shall only be valid if made with the full
assistance of a bona fide lawyer. During the trial, accused-appellants, as represented
by Atty. Abdul Basar, made a categorical manifestation that said accused-appellants
were apprised of the nature and legal consequences of the subject manifestation, and
that they voluntarily and intelligently executed the same. They also affirmed the
truthfulness of its contents when asked in open court.

is also provided by law that "[r]ights may be waived, unless the waiver is contrary to law,
public order, public policy, morals, or good customs or prejudicial to a third person with
right recognized by law."

it is amply shown that the rights of accused-appellants were sufficiently and properly
protected by the appearance of Mr. Tomas Posadas. An examination of the record will
show that he knew the technical rules of procedure. Hence, we rule that there was a
valid waiver of the right to sufficient representation during the trial, considering that it
was unequivocally, knowingly, and intelligently made and with the full assistance of
a bona fide lawyer, Atty. Abdul Basar. Accordingly, denial of due process cannot be
successfully invoked where a valid waiver of rights has been made.
Right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him

PEOPLE V. MONTERON

Ruling:

Constitutional due process demands that the accused in a criminal case should be
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him. The rationale behind
this constitutional guarantee are: 

First, to furnish the accused with the description of the charge against him as will
enable him to make his defense; 

second, to avail himself of his conviction or acquittal, for protection against a further
prosecution for the same cause; and 

third, to inform the court of the facts alleged, so that it may decide whether they are
sufficient in law to support a conviction, if one should be had

PEOPLE V. CRISOLOGO

Ruling:

The absence of an interpreter in sign language who could have conveyed to the
accused, a deaf-mute, the full facts of the offense with which he was charged and who
could also have communicated the accused's own version of the circumstances which
led to his implication in the crime, deprived the accused of a full and fair trial and a
reasonable opportunity to defend himself. Not even the accused's final plea of not guilty
can excuse these inherently unjust circumstances.

The absence of a qualified interpreter in sign language and of any other means,
whether in writing or otherwise, to inform the accused of the charges against him denied
the accused his fundamental right to due process of law. 1 The accuracy and fairness of
the factual process by which the guilt or innocence of the accused was determined was
not safeguarded. The accused could not be said to have enjoyed the right to be heard
by himself and counsel, and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation
against him 2 in the proceedings where his life and liberty were at stake.

PEOPLE V. PARAZO

Ruling:

SAME RULING WITH PP V. CRISOLOGO

PEOPLE V. ALCALDE

Ruling:

Settled is the rule that when a judge is informed or discovers that an accused is
apparently in a present condition of insanity or imbecility, it is within his discretion to
investigate the matter. If it be found that by reason of such affliction the accused could
not, with the aid of counsel, make a proper defense, it is the duty of the court to
suspend the proceedings and commit the accused to a proper place of detention until
his faculties are recovered.28 Moreover, the aforementioned Section 12(a) of Rule 116
mandates the suspension of the arraignment and the mental examination of the
accused should it appear that he is of unsound mind.

PEOPLE V. PANGILINAN

Ruling:

When the hearings for his petition for bail were conducted, the trial court had already
acquired jurisdiction over his person. Settled is the rule that jurisdiction over the person
of the accused is acquired upon his arrest or voluntary appearance. 19 In the case at bar,
the trial court acquired jurisdiction over the person of the appellant when he was
arrested on 19 March 1997. His arrest, not his arraignment, conferred on the trial court
jurisdiction over his person.

Arraignment is the formal mode and manner of implementing the constitutional

right of an accused to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation
against him.20 The purpose of arraignment is, thus, to apprise the accused of the
possible loss of freedom, even of his life, depending on the nature of the crime
imputed to him, or at the very least to inform him of why the prosecuting arm of
the State is mobilized against him.

PEOPLE V. MUPAS

The prosecution has the burden to overcome such presumption of innocence by

presenting the quantum of evidence required. In addition, the prosecution must rest on
its own merits and must not rely on the weakness of the defense. In fact, if the
prosecution fails to meet the required quantum of evidence, the defense may logically
not even present evidence on its own behalf. In which case, the presumption of
innocence shall prevail and hence, the accused shall be acquitted. However, once the
presumption of innocence is overcome, the defense bears the burden of evidence to
show reasonable doubt as to the guilt of the accused. Reasonable doubt is that doubt
engendered by an investigation of the whole proof and an inability after such
investigation to let the mind rest each upon the certainty of guilt. Absolute certainty of
guilt is not demanded by the law to convict a criminal charge, but moral certainty is
required as to every proposition of proof requisite to constitute the offense. 25
The trial court solely hinged its judgment of conviction on the victim Rogelio’s lone and
uncorroborated testimony. While it is true that the testimony of one witness is sufficient
to sustain a conviction if such testimony establishes the guilt of the accused beyond
reasonable doubt, the Court rules that the testimony of one witness in this case is not
sufficient for this purpose.26 Apart from Rogelio’s testimony, the Court observes that the
prosecution’s version of events has no leg to stand on.

PEOPLE V. AURE

Ruling:

It is settled that the testimony of a married rape victim, such as AAA, is given full weight
and credence because no married woman with a husband and children would place
herself on public trial for rape where she would be subjected to suspicion, morbid
curiosity, malicious imputations, and close scrutiny of her personal life, not to speak of
the humiliation and scandal she and her family would suffer, if she was merely
concocting her charge and would not be able to prove it in court.

Jurisprudence instructs that when the credibility of a witness is of primordial

consideration, as in this case, the findings of the trial court, its calibration of the
testimonies of the witnesses and its assessment of the probative weight thereof, as well
as its conclusions anchored on said findings, are accorded respect if not conclusive
effect. This is because the trial court has had the unique opportunity to observe the
demeanor of the witnesses and was in the best position to discern whether they were
telling the truth. When the trial court’s findings have been affirmed by the appellate
court, as in the present case, said findings are generally binding upon this Court.

PEOPLE V. GUEVARRA

Ruling:

In resolving issues pertaining to the credibility of the witnesses, this Court is guided by
the following well-settled principles: (1) the reviewing court will not disturb the findings of
the lower court, unless there is a showing that it overlooked, misunderstood or
misapplied some fact or circumstance of weight and substance that may affect the
result of the case; (2) the findings of the trial court on the credibility of witnesses are
entitled to great respect and even finality, as it had the opportunity to examine their
demeanor when they testified on the witness stand; and (3) a witness who testifies in a
clear, positive and convincing manner is a credible witness. 
SPEEDY TRIAL

TAI LIM V. CA

Ruling:

that the right to a speedy disposition of a case, like the right to speedy trial, is deemed
violated only when the proceedings is attended by vexatious, capricious, and
oppressive delays; or when unjustified postponements of the trial are asked for and
secured, or when without cause or justifiable motive a long period of time is allowed to
elapse without the party having his case . . . A mere mathematical reckoning of the time
involved, therefore, would not be sufficient.

SUMBANG V. GEN. COURT MARTIAL

Ruling:

"It must be here emphasized that the right to a speedy disposition of a case, like the
right to speedy trial, is deemed violated only when the proceeding is attended by
vexatious, capricious and oppressive delays; or when unjustified postponements of the
trial are asked for and secured, or when without cause or justifiable motive a long period
of time is allowed to elapse without the party having his case tried. Equally applicable is
the balancing test used to determine whether a defendant has been denied his right to a
speedy trial, or a speedy disposition of a case for that matter, in which the conduct of
both the prosecution and the defendant are weighed, and such factors as length of
delay, reason for the delay, defendant's assertion or non-assertion of his right, and
prejudice to the defendant resulting from the delay, are considered."

DE ZUZURUARREGUI V. ROSETE

Ruling:

The right to speedy trial is a relative one, subject to reasonable delays and
postponements arising from illness, medical attention, and body operations, as in the
present case where it was duly proven that complainant had to undergo a carotid
operation. Speedy trial means one that can be had soon after indictment is filed as the
prosecution can, with reasonable diligence, prepare for trial. As has been stated,
accused persons sometimes forget that those who are aggrieved also have rights. 23 For
this reason, in determining the right of the accused to speedy trial, courts should do
more than a mathematical computation of the number of postponements of scheduled
hearings of the case. What offends the right to speedy trial are unjustified
postponements which prolong trial for an unreasonable length of time. 24 This is not the
case here
LUMANLAW V. PERALTA

Ruling:

The 30-day period for an arraignment provided in the Speedy Trial Act is not absolute.
Judicial proceedings do not exist in a vacuum, but have to contend with the realities of
everyday life. Rather than merely making mathematical calculations of periods that have
elapsed between stages, one should consider if the delays were vexatious, capricious,
oppressive, or unjustified.[5] This Court reviewed the reasons for the postponements in
the case and found that the violation of petitioner’s right to speedy trial was manifest,
given the length and the unreasonableness of a majority of the delays. It saw in the
fourteen postponements a lack of earnest effort on the part of respondent to conduct the
arraignment as soon as the court calendar allowed.[6] An arraignment takes, at most,
ten minutes of the court’s business and does not normally entail legal gymnastics. It
consists simply of reading to accused persons the charges leveled against them,
ensuring their understanding of those charges, and obtaining their plea to the charges.
A prudent and resolute judge can conduct an arraignment as soon as the accused is
presented before the court.

UY V. ADRIANO

Ruling:

R.A. No. 8493 (Speedy Trial Act of 1998) is a means of enforcing Section 14(2), Article
III of the Constitution. 79 The spirit of the law is that the accused must go on record in the
attitude of demanding a trial or resisting delay. If he does not do this, he must be held,
in law, to have waived the privilege.

PEOPLE V. MENDOZA

Ruling:

As can be gleaned from the records, accused-appellant never invoked in the RTC that
he has been deprived of his right to speedy trial and speedy disposition of case. As it is,
any allegation of violations of rights should first be ventilated with the RTC concomitant
with the prayer to dismiss the case with prejudice. It is a bit too late in the day for herein
accused-appellant to invoke now his right to speedy trial (People vs. Tee, 395 SCRA
443 [2003]). By raising this point belatedly with the [CA], accused-appellant has thus
waived his objection and accordingly forfeits his right to the aforesaid constitutional
guarantees.
TAN V. PEOPLE

Ruling:

Exhaustively explained in Corpuz v. Sandiganbayan, an accused’s right to speedy trial

is deemed violated only when the proceeding is attended by vexatious, capricious, and
oppressive delays. In determining whether petitioner was deprived of this right, the
factors to consider and balance are the following: (a) duration of the delay; (b) reason
therefor; (c) assertion of the right or failure to assert it; and (d) prejudice caused by such
delay

In the cases involving petitioner, the length of delay, complexity of the issues and his
failure to invoke said right to speedy trial at the appropriate time tolled the death knell on
his claim to the constitutional guarantee. More importantly, in failing to interpose a timely
objection to the prosecution’s manifestation during the preliminary hearings that the
cases be tried separately, one after the other, petitioner was deemed to have
acquiesced and waived his objection thereto.

IMPARTIAL TRIAL

RE: REQUEST FOR LIVE RADIO-TV COVERAGE OF THE TRIAL IN THE

SANDIGANBAYAN OF THE PLUNDER CASES AGAINST FORMER PRESIDENT
JOSEPH E. ESTRADA

Ruling:

, the Court believes that there should be an audio-visual recording of the proceedings.
The recordings will not be for live or real time broadcast but for documentary purposes.
Only later will they be available for public showing, after the Sandiganbayan shall have
promulgated its decision in every case to which the recording pertains.

GARCIA V. DOMINGO

Ruling:

There can be no violation to the right to public trial when the accused agreed to held the
trial in the chambers of the presiding judge.

public where the evidence may be characterized as "offensive to decency or public

morals." 21

What did occasion difficulty in this suit was that for the convenience of the
parties, and of the city court Judge, it was in the latter's air-conditioned chambers
that the trial was held. Did that suffice to investigate the proceedings as violative
of this right? The answer must be in the negative. There is no showing that the public
was thereby excluded. It is to be admitted that the size of the room allotted the Judge
would reduce the number of those who could be our present. Such a fact though is not
indicative of any transgression of this right. Courtrooms are not of uniform dimensions.
Some are smaller than others. Moreover, as admitted by Justice Black in his masterly In
re Oliver opinion, it suffices to satisfy the requirement of a trial being public if the
accused could "have his friends, relatives and counsel present, no matter with what
offense he may be charged."

RIGHT TO MEET THE WITNESSES FACE TO FACE

PEOPLE V. QUIDATO

Ruling:

In indicting accused-appellant, the prosecution relied heavily on the affidavits executed

by Reynaldo and Eddie. The two brothers were, however, not presented on the witness
stand to testify on their extra-judicial confessions. The failure to present the two gives
these affidavits the character of hearsay. It is hornbook doctrine that unless the affiants
themselves take the witness stand to affirm the averments in their affidavits, the
affidavits must be excluded from the judicial proceeding, being inadmissible hearsay. 

CARIAGO V. CA

Ruling:

Section 47 of Rule 130 reads:

SEC. 47. Testimony or deposition at a former proceeding. – The testimony or deposition
of a witness deceased or unable to testify, given in a former case or proceeding, judicial
or administrative, involving the same parties and subject matter, may be given in
evidence against the adverse party who had the opportunity to cross-examine him.
More specific however is the rule prescribed in Rule 115, Section 1(f) of the Rules of
Court in respect of the admissibility in evidence in a criminal case of the previous
testimony of unavailable witnesses which reads:

Section 1. Rights of accused at the trial. – In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall
be entitled:

f) To confront and cross-examine the witnesses against him at the trial. Either party may
utilize as part of its evidence the testimony of a witness who is deceased, out of or can
not with due diligence be found in the Philippines, unavailable or otherwise unable to
testify, given in another case or proceeding, judicial or administrative, involving the
same parties and subject matter, the adverse party having had the opportunity to cross-
examine him;

It must be emphasized that this rule is strictly complied with in criminal cases, hence,
"mere sending of subpoena and failure to appear is not sufficient to prove inability to
testify. The Court must exercise its coercive power to arrest." 10 In the instant case, no
efforts were exerted to have the witness arrested which is a remedy available to a party-
litigant in instances where witnesses who are duly subpoenaed fail to appear. On this
score alone, the sworn statement of Ricardo Cariaga should not have been admitted as
evidence for the prosecution, and we shall no longer delve into the other aspects of this
rule.

PEOPLE V. MONJE

Ruling:

the basis of cumulus circumstantial evidence - consisting mainly of the testimony of a

witness who failed and refused to return to court and submit to cross-examination four
(4) times - is judicial tyranny of the highest order, which this Court should never commit.

Admission of a testimony made by a witness who refuses to finish the cross

examination is a violation the accused right’s to meet the witness face to face.

RIGHT TO COMPULSARY PROCESS

Ruling:

the requisites for compelling the attendance of witnesses, may be applied to this
expanded concept. Thus, the movant must show:

(a) that the evidence is really material;

(b) that he is not guilty of neglect in previously obtaining the production of such
evidence;

(c) that the evidence will be available at the time desired; and (d) that no similar
evidence could be obtained.

TRIAL IN ABSENTIA

PEOPLE V. MACARAEG

Ruling:

that while the accused may waive his presence at the trial of the case, his presence
may be compelled when he is to be identified.

PARADA V. VENERACION

Ruling:
trial in absentia may proceed only if the accused failed to appear at the trial without
justification despite due notice. In this case, complainant was never notified of any
hearing from the time he changed his address up to the promulgation of the decision
despite the fact that he notified the court and his bonding company.

Section 14 (2), Article 3 of the Constitution provides, inter alia, that trial may proceed
notwithstanding the absence of the accused provided that he has been duly notified and
his failure to appear is unjustifiable. The requisites then of a valid trial in absentia are:
(1) the accused has already been arraigned; (2) he has been duly notified of the trial;
and (3) his failure to appear is unjustifiable.

SEC. 15

Writ of HABEAS CORPUS

Villavecencio V. Lukban

Ruling:

A prime specification of an application for a writ of habeas corpus is restraint of liberty.

The essential object and purpose of the writ of habeas corpus is to inquire into all
manner of involuntary restraint as distinguished from voluntary, and to relieve a person
therefrom if such restraint is illegal. Any restraint which will preclude freedom of action is
sufficient. The forcible taking of these women from Manila by officials of that city, who
handed them over to other parties, who deposited them in a distant region, deprived
these women of freedom of locomotion just as effectively as if they had been
imprisoned. Hence, Writ of Habeas Corpus can be invoked.

MONCUPA V. ENRILE

Ruling:

A release that renders a petition for a writ of habeas corpus moot and academic must
be one which is free from involuntary restraints. Where a person continues to be
unlawfully denied one or more of his constitutional freedoms, where there is present a
denial of due process, where the restraints are not merely involuntary but appear to be
unnecessary, and where a deprivation of freedom originally valid has, in the light of
subsequent developments, become arbitrary, the person concerned or those applying in
his behalf may still avail themselves of the privilege of the writ.

ILAGAN V. ENRILE

Ruling:
The function of the special proceeding of habeas corpus is to inquire into the legality of
one's detention. Now that the detained attorneys' incarceration is by virtue of a judicial
order in relation to criminal cases subsequently filed against them before the Regional
Trial Couravao City, the remedy of habeas corpus no longer lies.

ILUSORIO V. BILDNER

Ruling:

May a wife secure a writ of habeas corpus to compel her husband to live with her in
conjugal bliss? The answer is no. Marital rights including coverture and living in conjugal
dwelling may not be enforced by the extra-ordinary writ of habeas corpus.

FERIA V. CA

Ruling:

The mere loss or destruction of the records of a criminal case subsequent to conviction
of the accused will not render the judgment of conviction void, nor will it warrant the
release of the convict by virtue of a writ of habeas corpus. The proper remedy is the
reconstitution of judicial records which is as much a duty of the prosecution as of the
defense.

TIJING V. CA

Ruling:

The writ of habeas corpus extends to all cases of illegal confinement or detention by

which any person is deprived of his liberty, or by which the rightful custody of any
person is withheld from the person entitled thereto. 12 Thus, it is the proper legal remedy
to enable parents to regain the custody of a minor child even if the latter be in the
custody of a third person of his own free will. It may even be said that in custody cases
involving minors, the question of illegal and involuntary restraint of liberty is not the
underlying rationale for the availability of the writ as a remedy. Rather, it is prosecuted
for the purpose of determining the right of custody over a child. 13 It must be stressed too
that in habeas corpus proceedings, the question of identity is relevant and material,
subject to the usual presumptions including those as to identity of the person.

IN RE: GARCIA

Ruling:
It is a well-settled rule that the writ will not issue where the person in whose behalf the
writ is sought is out on bail.

CALVIN V. CA

Ruling:

Habeas corpus, is a high prerogative writ,12 which furnishes an extraordinary remedy

and may not thus be invoked under normal circumstances but, as the Court of Appeals
has so aptly explained, the illegal order and warrant of arrest issued by petitioner Judge
subsists and private respondent is offered no speedy, adequate remedy or appeal in the
ordinary course of law. The writ of habeas corpus, although not designed to interrupt the
orderly administration of justice, can be invoked, in fine, by the attendance of a special
circumstance that requires immediate action.

Note:

Writ of habeas corpus can be invoked against illegal order and warrant of arrest.

JACKSON V. MACALINO

Ruling:

Sec. 4. When writ not allowed or discharged authorized. – If it appears that the person
alleged to be restrained of his liberty is in the custody of an officer under process issued
by a court or judge or by virtue of a judgment or order of a court of record, and that the
court or judge had jurisdiction to issue the process, render the judgment; or make the
order, the writ shall not be allowed; or if the jurisdiction appears after the writ is allowed,
the person shall not be discharged by reason of any informality or defect in the process,
judgment, or order. Nor shall anything in this rule be held to authorize the discharge of a
person charged with or convicted of an offense in the Philippines, or of a person
suffering imprisonment under lawful judgment.

The term "court" includes quasi-judicial bodies like the Deportation Board of the Bureau
of Immigration.27

Even if the arrest of a person is illegal, supervening events may bar his release or
discharge from custody. What is to be inquired into is the legality of his detention as of,
at the earliest, the filing of the application for a writ of habeas corpus, for even if the
detention is at its inception illegal, it may, by reason of same supervening events such
as the instances mentioned in Section 4, Rule 102, be no longer illegal at the time of the
filing of the application. Any such supervening events are the issuance of a judicial
process preventing the discharge of the detained person.

IN RE: GONZALES
Ruling:

When the release of the persons in whose behalf the application for a Writ of Habeas
Corpus was filed is effected, the petition of the writ becomes moot and academic.

IN RE: MAJOR AQUINO

Ruling:

the writ of habeas corpus does not extend into questions of conditions of confinement;
but only to the fact and duration of confinement. The high prerogative writ of habeas
corpus was devised and exists as a speedy and effectual remedy to relieve persons
from unlawful restraint.66 Its object is to inquire into the legality of one’s detention, and if
found illegal, to order the release of the detainee. 67 It is not a means for the redress of
grievances or to seek injunctive relief or damages.

VELUZ V. VILLANUEVA

Ruling:

The writ of habeas corpus extends to all cases of illegal confinement or detention by

which any person is deprived of his liberty or by which the rightful custody of a person is
being withheld from the one entitled thereto. It is issued when one is either deprived of
liberty or is wrongfully being prevented from exercising legal custody over another
person. Thus, it contemplates two instances: (1) deprivation of a person’s liberty either
through illegal confinement or through detention and (2) withholding of the custody of
any person from someone entitled to such custody.
18
 It is only if the court is satisfied that a person is being unlawfully restrained of his
liberty will the petition for habeas corpus be granted.19 If the respondents are not
detaining or restraining the applicant or the person in whose behalf the petition is filed,
the petition should be dismissed.

FLETCHER V. Director of Bureau

Ruling:

The writ of habeas corpus should not be issued when the custody over a person is by
virtue of judicial process or a valid judgement.

WRIT OF AMPARO

Secretary of National Defense V. Manalo

Ruling:

Writ of Amparo is the most potent remedy available to any person whose right to life,
liberty, and security has been violated or threatened with violation by an unlawful act or
omission by public officials or employees and by private individuals and entities.

Razon Jr. V. Tagitis

Ruling:

we rule that the respondent’s petition for the Writ of Amparo is sufficient in form and
substance and that the Court of Appeals had every reason to proceed with its
consideration of the case. The present case is one of first impression in the use and
application of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo in an enforced disappearance situation.

The victims of enforced disappearances were called the "desaparecidos," which literally
means the "disappeared ones.” In general, there are three different kinds of
"disappearance" cases:

1) those of people arrested without witnesses or without positive identification of the

arresting agents and are never found again;

2) those of prisoners who are usually arrested without an appropriate warrant and held
in complete isolation for weeks or months while their families are unable to discover
their whereabouts and the military authorities deny having them in custody until they
eventually reappear in one detention center or another; and

3) those of victims of "salvaging" who have disappeared until their lifeless bodies are
later discovered.

NOTE:

WRIT OF AMPARO does not determine guilt nor pinpoint criminal culpability for the
disappearance; rather, it determines responsibility, or at least accountability, for the
enforced disappearance for purposes of imposing the appropriate remedies to address
the disappearance

CANLAS V. NAPICO

Ruling:
writ of amparo is a remedy available to any person whose right to life, liberty, and
security is violated or threatened with violation by an unlawful act or omission of a public
official or employee, or of a private individual or entity.

The threatened demolition is not included among the enumeration of rights protected by
the writ. Their claim to their dwelling does not constitute right to life, liberty, and security.

RUBRICO V. ARROYO

Ruling:

While there are several pending bills on command responsibility, 19 there is still no
Philippine law that provides for criminal liability under that doctrine. 20

It may plausibly be contended that command responsibility, as legal basis to hold

military/police commanders liable for extra-legal killings, enforced disappearances, or
threats, may be made applicable to this jurisdiction on the theory that the command
responsibility doctrine now constitutes a principle of international law or customary
international law in accordance with the incorporation clause of the Constitution. 21 Still, it
would be inappropriate to apply to these proceedings the doctrine of command
responsibility, as the CA seemed to have done, as a form of criminal complicity through
omission, for individual respondents’ criminal liability, if there be any, is beyond the
reach of amparo. In other words, the Court does not rule in such proceedings on any
issue of criminal culpability, even if incidentally a crime or an infraction of an
administrative rule may have been committed. As the Court stressed in Secretary of
National Defense v. Manalo (Manalo), 22 the writ of amparo was conceived to provide
expeditious and effective procedural relief against violations or threats of violation of the
basic rights to life, liberty, and security of persons; the corresponding amparo suit,
however, "is not an action to determine criminal guilt requiring proof beyond reasonable
doubt x x x or administrative liability requiring substantial evidence that will require full
and exhaustive proceedings."

RODRIGUIZ V. MACAPAGAL

Ruling:

If command responsibility were to be invoked and applied to these proceedings, it

should, at most, be only to determine the author who, at the first instance, is
accountable for, and has the duty to address, the disappearance and harassments
complained of, so as to enable the Court to devise remedial measures that may be
appropriate under the premises to protect rights covered by the writ of amparo. As
intimated earlier, however, the determination should not be pursued to fix criminal
liability on respondents preparatory to criminal prosecution, or as a prelude to
administrative disciplinary proceedings under existing administrative issuances, if there
be any.

Precisely in the case at bar, the doctrine of command responsibility may be used to
determine whether respondents are accountable for and have the duty to address the
abduction of Rodriguez in order to enable the courts to devise remedial measures to
protect his rights. Clearly, nothing precludes this Court from applying the doctrine of
command responsibility in amparo proceedings to ascertain responsibility and
accountability in extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances.

PADOR V. ARCAYAN

Ruling:

To     be     entitled     to      the     privilege     of      the     writ     of

Amparo,   petitioners      must      be     proven      by      substantial      evidence      that      
their      rights     to     life,    liberty      and      security      are      being      violated      or       
threatened       by      an      unlawful     act      or      omission.      It       was
undisputed      that       the      intrusion      occurred,      whether      the       entry      was
done      with      or      without     permission,       it      was     merely     a     violation     
of      Padors’     property     rights.     The     writ     of      Amparo   does      not
envisage     the      protection     of     concerns      that      are     purely     property      
or      commercial      in      nature.      

SEC.- 16 SPEEDY DISPOSITION OF CASES

Cervantes V. Sandiganbayan

Ruling:

. It is the duty of the prosecutor to speedily resolve the complaint, as mandated by the
Constitution, regardless of whether the petitioner did not object to the delay or that the
delay was with his acquiescence provided that it was not due to causes directly
attributable to him.

BINAY V. SANDIGANBAYAN

Ruling:

we find that the cases were sufficiently complex, thus justifying the length of time for
their resolution.

BERNAT V. SANDIGANBAYAN

Ruling:
There can be no violation to the right of speedy disposition of cases when the petitioner
failed seasonably to assert his rights.

NOTE:

TATAD V. SANDIGANBAYAN

Ruling:

Tatad v. Sandiganbayan,20 which petitioners invoked, there was a delay of almost three

(3) years in the conduct of the preliminary investigation by the Tanodbayan. In ruling
that such delay constituted a violation of the constitutional rights of the accused to due
process and to a speedy disposition of cases, this Court took into account the following
circumstances: (1) the complaint was resurrected only after Tatad had a falling out with
the former President Marcos, and hence, political motivations played a vital role in
activating and propelling the prosecutorial process; (2) the Tanodbayan blatantly
departed from the established procedure prescribed by law for the conduct of
preliminary investigation; and (3) the simple factual and legal issues involved did not
justify the delay.

DELA PENA V. SANDIGANBAYAN

Ruling:

They slept on their right – a situation amounting to laches. The matter could have taken
a different dimension if during all those four years, they showed signs of asserting their
right to a speedy disposition of their cases or at least made some overt acts, like filing a
motion for early resolution, to show that they were not waiving that right. Their silence
may, therefore be interpreted as a waiver of such right.

SEC.21- DOUBLE JEOPARDY

VINCOY V. CA

Ruling:

Dismissal of a case during preliminary investigation does not constitute double jeopardy
since a preliminary investigation is not a part of trial and is not the occasion for full and
exhaustive display of the parties evidence.

DIMAYACYAC V. CA

Ruling:
the reinstatement of criminal cases against the accused did not violate his right against
double jeopardy since the dismissal of the information by the trial court had been
effected at his own instance when the accused filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds
that the facts charged do not constitute an offense and that the RTC had no jurisdiction
over the case. In this case, considering that since the dismissal of the previous criminal
case against petitioner was by reason of his motion for the quashal of the information,
petitioner is thus deemed to have expressly given his consent to such dismissal.

NOTE:

There can be no DOUBLE JEOPARDY when the previous criminal case was dismissed
by reason of quashal of the information. Thus, the petitioner deemed to have expressly
given his consent to such dismissal.

PEOPLE V. ESPINOSA

Ruling:

A waiver of the constitutional right against double jeopardy must be clear, categorical,
knowing and intelligent. Corollary to this rule, the alleged conditions attached to an
arraignment must be unmistakable, express, informed and enlightened. Otherwise, the
plea should be deemed to be simple and unconditional.

FLORES V. JOVEN

Ruling:

There can be no double jeopardy when the accused was not arraigned in the previous
case.

BINAY V. SANDIGANBAYAN

Ruling:

The filing of the information in the Sandiganbayan did not put petitioners in double
jeopardy even though they had already pleaded "not guilty" to the information earlier
filed in the RTC. The first jeopardy never attached in the first place, the RTC not
being not being a court of competent jurisdiction. There can be no double
jeopardy where the accused entered a plea in a court that had no
jurisdiction. 62 The remedy of petitioners, therefore, was not to move for the quashal of
the information pending in the Sandiganbayan on the ground of double
jeopardy. 63 Their remedy was to move for the quashal of the information pending in
the RTC on the ground of lack of jurisdiction.

ZAPATOS V. PEOPLE
Ruling:

while petitioner had already pleaded not guilty before the RTC, jeopardy did not attach
as it did not acquire jurisdiction. There can be no double jeopardy where the accused
entered a plea in court that had no jurisdiction.

MERCIALES V. CA

Ruling:

The right of offended parties to appeal an order of the trial court which deprives them of
due process has always been recognized, the only limitation being that they cannot
appeal any adverse ruling if to do so would place the accused in double jeopardy.

PEOPLE V. MAGAT

Ruling:

In effect, the judgment rendered by the trial court which was based on a void plea
bargaining is also void ab initio and can not be considered to have attained finality for
the simple reason that a void judgment has no legality from its inception. 12 Thus, since
the judgment of conviction rendered against accused-appellant is void, double jeopardy
will not lie.

PEOPLE V. RONDERO

Ruling:

when an accused appeals from the sentence of the trial court, he waives the
constitutional safeguard against double jeopardy and throws the whole case open to the
review of the appellate court, which is then called to render judgment as the law and
justice dictate, whether favorable or unfavorable, and whether they are made the
subject of assigned errors or not. This precept should be borne in mind by every lawyer
of an accused who unwittingly takes the risk involved when he decides to appeal his
sentence.